Arab Ethnicity and Diasporic : A Comparative Approach to Processes of Identity Formation and Religious Codification in the Muslim Communities in

Paulo G. Pinto

he Muslim communities in European and American countries have received increas- ing scholarly attention in recent years. Some groundbreaking studies have shown how Islam became part of the religious landscape of the “West” through the establish- ment of transnational connections and complex processes of cultural adaptation.1 Despite the many merits of these works, they tend to generalize cultural-­religious patterns to all the Muslim communities located within a particular nation-­state, which is taken as the main unit of analysis, referring to general entities such as “French Islam,” “American Islam,” or “British Islam.” Some scholars, while rejecting an essentialized portrait of , have pushed the limits of generalization to the whole European context, claiming that became a deterritorialized system of meaning that exists beyond cultural particularities.2 However, a closer look shows that the Muslim identities in Europe and the Americas are the result of complex relations between local sociological and cultural elements and the vari- ous constructs of the normative system of Islamic doctrines and practices that were globalized

of through the circulation of people (migration, travels, pilgrimages, etc.), texts, and images.

Studies Therefore, I argue in this article that one has to take the local community as the main unit of

and analysis, for it is there that the relation between local and supralocal — regional, national, or Africa global — influences acquires a particular configuration. National or regional patterns can only Asia, emerge from a careful comparison between the particularities and the common points among South East the discrete Muslim communities that exist in such political and geographical spaces. Comparative Middle To demonstrate these propositions, I analyze the constitution of Muslim identities the

2011 among -­speaking immigrants and their descendents in Brazil, showing how the rela- 2, No. -1264253 31, x tion between Arab ethnicity and Muslim identity is shaped by processes that connect local, Vol. Press national, and transnational realities. I rely on ethnographic data that I have gathered in my 3 10.1215/1089201University fieldwork research with the Muslim communities in Brazil since 2003. doi Duke by 2011 © Unless otherwise noted, all English translations are mine. Kepel, in the West: Islamic Movements in America and Eur- ope (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997). 1. Jocelyne Cesari, L’Islam à l’épreuve de l’Occident (Islam in West- ern Contexts) (Paris: La Découverte, 2004); Yvonne Haddad and 2. Olivier Roy, L’Islam mondialisé (Globalized Islam) (Paris: Seuil, Adair Lummis, Islamic Values in the United States: A Comparative 2004). Study (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987); Gilles Kepel, Les 3. I gathered the ethnographic data for this article during my banlieus de l’Islam: Naissance d’une religion en France (The Sub- fieldwork with Muslim communities in , , urbs of Islam: The Birth of a Religion in France) (Paris: Seuil, 1991); 312 and . I also have been doing research among the Mus-

Downloaded from https://read.dukeupress.edu/cssaame/article-pdf/31/2/312/243807/CSA312_06_Pinto_fpp.pdf by UFF user on 18 June 2019 Diasporic and Local: Muslims in Brazil 1920s, but they only gained force in relation to Brazil’s large Muslim community comprises the “Syrian-­Lebanese” or Palestinian associa- 313 about 1 million members and was formed since tions in the 1980s. These ethnic organizations the nineteenth century by diverse migration were largely dominated by Arab Christians, waves from the (, , and who also maintained churches and institutions ) and by the conversion of non-­Arab of their religious confession (Maronite, Greek .4 The Muslim community is mostly Orthodox, Melchite, etc.).5 urban, with large concentrations in Rio de Ja- After 1960 the fall in the number of Chris-

neiro, São Paulo, Curitiba, and Foz do Iguaçu. tian immigrants from the Middle East and the of Brazil Pinto Important sociological differences exist among assimilation of descendants of Arab immigrants in G. the communities in each of these sites. For ex- into mainstream Brazilian culture led to the de- Processes

ample, the Muslim community in Rio de Janeiro cline in the number of Arab ethnic associations Paulo has not received a significant influx of recent and their members. However, the growing num- to immigrants, a fact that makes the process of the bers of Muslim immigrants from the Middle Communities creation and reformulation of Muslim identi- East in the 1970s fostered the creation of Islamic Approach ties more dependent on local and national cul- institutions and the public affirmation of a spe- Muslim tural dynamics. In contrast, in the other three cific Muslim identity that is associated with, but the Muslim communities the production of Islamic not submerged in, the larger . in identities is strongly influenced by transnational Because most Muslim immigrants to Bra- Comparative

Islamic movements and by the constant contact zil came from the Arab Middle East — mainly A with Islam as practiced in the Middle East. Mus- Lebanon, Syria, and Palestine — they were iden- Islam:

lims in these three communities tend to work tified with the large Arab community already Codification

primarily in commercial activities. However, in- existing in Brazil.6 The Arab immigrants who creasing numbers are in qualified professions came to Brazil in the first half of the twentieth Diasporic Religious such as medicine, law, and engineering. century were mostly Christians, and they man- and and

The majority of Muslims in Brazil are aged to overcome or minimize the effects of the Arab immigrants and their descendants. Never- widespread racism and discrimination directed theless, there is a growing number of non-­Arab against them in the 1930s and 1940s, such as Ethnicity

Brazilians who have converted to Islam through their stigmatization as backward, fanatical, and Formation

personal relations, that is, through work, mar- greedy “Orientals” by a large part of the Brazil- Arab riage, or friendship with Muslims. The first ian intellectual elite.7 They surmounted these Islamic institutions appeared in Brazil in the difficulties through economic success and a Identity

lim communities in Foz do Iguaçu and Ciudad del man al-­Baghdadi al-­Dimachqi, Deleite do estrangeiro 6. There are no reliable estimates of the number of Este (Paraguay) since 2007. This research has been em tudo que é espantoso e maravilhoso / Masaliya in Brazil; of course, they would still vary accord- sponsored with grants from CNPq and FAPERJ. For al-­gharib bi-­kull amr ‘abib (Delight of the Foreigner ing to the definition of “Arab” used in them. The Arab previous results of this research see Paulo G. Pinto, in Everything That Is Amazing) (Algiers:, Bibliothè- institutions and some scholars advance numbers “Ritual, etnicidade e identidade religiosa nas comu- que Nationale d’Algérie; Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca that range between 3 million and 16 million Arabs nidades muçulmanas no Brasil” (“Ritual, Ethnicity América do Sul – Países Árabes, Biblioteca Nacional; and their descendants in a population of 170 million and Religious Identity in the Muslim Communities in Caracas: Fundación Biblioteca Ayacucho, 2007). How- Brazilians. The larger figures are less likely to corre- Brazil”), Revista USP—Universidade de São Paulo 67 ever, when the Arabic-­speaking Muslim immigrants spond to any demographic reality, but they reflect (2005): 228 – 50. started to create the first Islamic institutions in Bra- the greater recognition and visibility that the Arab zil in the early twentieth century, the Islamic identity immigrants and their descendants have achieved in 4. The census of 2000 gives the number of Muslims of the Malês was disappearing through conversion Brazilian society. See John Tofik Karam, Another Ara- in Brazil as 27,239. Muslim religious authorities speak to Catholicism or to African Brazilian religions, such besque: Syrian-­Lebanese Ethnicity in Neoliberal Brazil of 1 – 2 million Muslims. Based on my ethnographic as Candomblé and Umbanda. There was no continu- (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2007), 10 – 13. experience, the estimate of 1 million Muslims seems ity between the Malês and the Muslim communities more plausible. The Muslim African slaves who were 7. Jeffrey Lesser, A negociação da identidade nacio- created by Arab immigrants in the twentieth century. collectively known as the “Malês” in the eighteenth nal: Imigrantes, minorias e a luta pela etnicidade no See João José Reis, Rebelião escrava no Brasil: A histó- and the nineteenth centuries constituted the first or- Brasil (Negotiating National Identity: Immigrants, ria do levante dos Malês em 1835 (Slave Rebellion in ganized Muslim community in Brazil. They led a slave Minorities, and the Struggle for Ethnicity in Brazil) Brazil: The History of the Revolt of the Malês in 1835) uprising in 1835 in , known as the Revolt of the (São Paulo: Universidade Estadual Paulista, 2000), (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2003). Malês (Revolta dos Malês). There is a nineteenth- 87 – 135. ­century firsthand account of the Muslim communi- 5. Majid Radawi, Al-­hijra al-­’arabiyya ila al-­Brazil ties in Rio de Janeiro, Salvador, and Recife written by 1 8 7 0 – 1 9 8 6 (The Arab , 1870 – 1986) an Arabic-­speaking imam from the (Damascus: Dar Tlas, 1989). who stayed in Brazil from 1866 to 1869. See ‘Abdurah-

Downloaded from https://read.dukeupress.edu/cssaame/article-pdf/31/2/312/243807/CSA312_06_Pinto_fpp.pdf by UFF user on 18 June 2019 strong investment in the acquisition of cultural them as a security threat (in particular, the 314 capital, such as higher education for their sons Muslim community in Foz do Iguaçu).10 These and daughters, and thereby achieved impressive discourses clearly had negative effects on the upward social mobility.8 situation of Muslims in Brazil. Many informants The privileged social position reached told me that they were harassed in the streets by the Arab immigrants and their descendants and verbally abused, targeted as “terrorist” or, in Brazil allowed them to be incorporated as in the case of women, “bin Laden’s wife.” There “whites” in the racial classification that in- were also a few cases of physical aggression in forms the Brazilian national discourse. Brazil- Rio and São Paulo.

ian racial hierarchies rank “white” on the top However, the stigmatization of Arabs and of and “black” at the bottom of the social pyra- Muslims as “terrorists” was challenged by other

Comparative mid, with an enormous variety of intermediate discourses that define the Brazilian nation in Asia,

Studies “mixed” categories that people can mobilize opposition to what is perceived as the imperial- the and and manipulate to move upward in the racial istic policies of the United States and its allies. South Africa hierarchy according to the context and their so- Some nationalist groups, such as Movement for East cial and cultural capital. While this assimilation the Valorization of the Language, Resources, Middle is far from complete or unproblematic, since and , or MV-­Brasil, which gath- negative stereotypes that associate a backward ers sympathizers and members from both right-­ mentality, predatory greed and corruption, and and left-­wing parties, regularly denounce what fanatical religiosity with the image of the tur- they perceive as a constant American political cos (literally “Turks,” a term used to designate and cultural aggression against Brazil — for all immigrants from the Middle East and their example, the celebration of Halloween parties descendants) remain widespread among Brazil- among urban middle-­class youth and the cam- ians, it allowed a high degree of accommoda- paigns to preserve the Amazon forest fostered tion of the Arab immigrants in Brazilian soci- by nongovernmental organizations.11 This tense ety.9 The jus soli adopted by the Brazilian state relation with the United States in the Brazilian allowed the automatic acquisition of citizenship nationalist discourse caused a large segment of by all the second generation born in Brazil. Brazilian public opinion to see the 9/11 terrorist The media discourse on terrorism after attacks as a “retaliation” provoked by the very September 11 made more present some of the imperialist policies fostered by the Americans tensions underlying the ambiguous insertion in the Middle East.12 of Arabs in Brazilian society as whites who are, In this sense, Muslim identities in Brazil nonetheless, “marked” by cultural differences. inherited the ambiguous position of the Arab/ This tension became more acute in the case Syrian-­Lebanese ethnic identity, to which were of Muslims, who became the target of trans- added more dramatic symbolic and political national political discourses that tried to link meanings. With this broader context in mind, I them with international conflicts and define next analyze the construction of Muslim identi-

8. Oswaldo Truzzi, Patrícios: Sírios e Libaneses em São 10. See John Tofik Karam, “Crossing the Americas: The tember1 1 a “bin Laden Bar” and a “bin Laden’s Cave” Paulo (“Patrícios”: and Lebanese in São Paulo) U.S. War on Terror and Arab Cross-­Border Mobiliza- snooker bar opened in Niterói, the second largest (São Paulo: Hucitec, 1997). tions in a South American Frontier Region,” in this of Rio de Janeiro state, located on Guanabara Bay op- issue. posite the city of Rio de Janeiro. Also, the Brazilian 9. For the use of the term turco for Arab-­speaking im- surfing champion named “Jihad” competed with a migrants, see ibid., 67 – 79; for the use of this term for 11. See MV-­Brasil’s official Web site, mv-­brasil.org.br/ surfboard painted with bin Laden’s face. The surfer designating Armenian immigrants, see Roberto Grün, (accessed 15 October 2009). was prevented from competing in the United States Famílias e negócios: Armênios em São Paulo (Families 12. The cultural legitimacy of the representations with his board, although this kind of sanction never and Business: The Armenians in São Paulo) (São Paulo: of militant forms of Islam as a legitimate form of happened while he was competing in Brazil. Sumaré, 1992), 24 – 35. For the use of the same term to resistance against American imperialistic aggres- designate Middle Eastern immigrants in Mexico, see sions among some sectors of Brazilian society can be Theresa Alfaro-­Velcamp, So Far from Allah, So Close to seen in their playful inscription in cultural artifacts Mexico: Middle Eastern Immigrants in Modern Mexico and public spaces. Thus masks depicting Osama bin (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2007), 45 – 69. On Laden and Saddam Hussein were very popular attire the use of stereotypes among Brazilians, see Karam, in Rio’s street carnival from 2002 to 2007. After Sep- Another Arabesque, 26 – 27, 46 – 68.

Downloaded from https://read.dukeupress.edu/cssaame/article-pdf/31/2/312/243807/CSA312_06_Pinto_fpp.pdf by UFF user on 18 June 2019 ties and objectified codifications of the Islamic in addition to immigrants from that continent), tradition in Rio de Janeiro, Curitiba, São Paulo, and non-­Arab Brazilians who have converted to 315 and Foz do Iguaçu as a way to understand how Islam from other religious traditions. different relations between Arab ethnicity and Non-­Arab Brazilians are, in fact, the ma- Muslim identities emerge as the result of pro- jority in the community, while Arabs and their cesses that construct and objectify the Islamic descendants make up only 10 percent of the tradition.13 membership. The number of non-­Arab Brazil- ian converts increased dramatically since 2000,

Between Textual Universalism and from about 50 percent of the community to 85 of

15 Brazil Pinto Ethnic Distinction: The Muslim Community percent in 2007. In socioeconomic terms, the in G. of Rio de Janeiro great majority of the members are small mer- Processes

Rio de Janeiro is Brazil’s second largest city, chants in the region delimited by the commer- Paulo with about 9 million inhabitants in its metro- cial association of the SAARA (Sociedade de to politan area. The Muslim community’s religious Amigos da Rua da Alfândega e Adjacências — a Communities center is in the Islamic Mutual-­Aid Association traditional commercial area in downtown Rio, Approach (Sociedade Beneficente Muçulmana do Rio de near the location of the SBMRJ until 2007) Muslim Janeiro, SBMRJ). Until 2007 the SBMRJ had a or are employed in commerce, with a smaller the prayer hall (musallah) in a commercial building number of university students and professionals in in downtown Rio. Since that date, it moved to a (lawyers, veterinarians, etc.). Comparative

new mosque in the Tijuca neighborhood. This While Muslim Arabs are perceived to be A mosque is the only one currently operating in more endogamous than Christian Arabs in Islam:

Rio de Janeiro, for the mosque built in the Jaca- Brazil, marriage with non-­Arabs and even non- Codification

repaguá neighborhood in the 1980s is closed be- ­Muslims is quite common among Arab Muslim cause of disputes between the leadership of the men in Rio de Janeiro.16 The early Arab immi- Diasporic Religious community and the mosque’s builder. There is grants, both Muslim and Christian, were mostly and and

one musallah downtown and another one in Co- single men and usually married non-­Arab Bra- pacabana. There is also the Alawi Association in zilian women. Before the establishment of Mus- Tijuca, which serves as a space of sociability and lim associations in Brazil’s main in the Ethnicity 14

for the celebration of Alawi rituals. 1950s this usually meant the conversion of Mus- Formation

The Muslim community in Rio is rather lim men or their descendants to Catholicism.17 Arab small in comparison to those in São Paulo or Foz With the growing number of Brazil- do Iguaçu. According to SBMRJ estimates, there ian converts to Islam, the pattern of marriage Identity are five thousand Muslims in the whole state of among Muslims in Rio de Janeiro became more Rio de Janeiro. However, despite its small size, complex. Muslim men of Arab descent are more the Muslim community in Rio is of particular prone than the non-­Arab Brazilian male con- interest because it is one of only a few in Brazil verts to marry non-­Muslims. The converts tend whose members are not predominantly of Arab to look for brides inside the community. Even origin. It is instead a multicultural and multieth- the former imam, a Sudanese named Abdu, nic group that brings together Arabs and their and the current president of the Islamic associa- descendants, Africans (mainly foreign students, tion, an Egyptian named Muhammad, married

13. In this article I examine the concept of “objecti- 14. Alawis are an esoteric Shi‘i sect that exists in Syria, 15. Silvia Montenegro, “Dilemas identitários do Islã fication,” which Dale F. Eickelman and James Pisca- Lebanon, and the south of . In Rio they perform no Brasil” (“Identity Dilemmas of Islam in Brazil”) tori define as the codification of the Islamic tradition the daily prayers and celebrate some holy dates, such (PhD diss., Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, as an abstract, coherent, and integrated system that as Ashura and the Mawlid al-­Nabawi. They are con- 2000). can be transmitted and applied as a normative code sidered by many Sunnis, such as the Salafis, to be 16. Karam, Another Arabesque, 108 – 13. in the everyday life of Muslims. See Dale F. Eickelman heterodox Muslims. The Alawis in Rio de Janeiro nor- and James Piscatori, Muslim Politics (Princeton, NJ: mally do not attend the SBMRJ. Some of them point 17. The first Muslim association in Brazil was the Is- Princeton University Press, 1996), 48. As I show in the to the Salafi tendencies of this institution as a factor lamic Mutual-­Aid Association of São Paulo, created ethnographic examples analyzed herein, there are that discourages them from attending its activities. in 1929. This association also built the first mosque forms of the objectification of the Islamic tradition The Alawi Islamic Mutual-­Aid Association of Rio de in the country, the Mesquita Brasil (Brazil Mosque), that incorporate embodied and culturally marked un- Janeiro was created in 1931. between 1946 and 1960. Only in the late 1970s were derstandings and practices of Islam. other mosques starting to be built in Brazil.

Downloaded from https://read.dukeupress.edu/cssaame/article-pdf/31/2/312/243807/CSA312_06_Pinto_fpp.pdf by UFF user on 18 June 2019 non-­Muslim Brazilian women. Female converts ing the Friday sermon are immediately followed 316 usually express strong vocal criticism against by a Portuguese translation. the marriage of Muslim men with non-­Muslim Nevertheless, the symbolic value of the women.18 The Muslim marriage Web pages on Arabic language and Arab identity makes them the Internet are a resource that female converts markers of religious distinction within the com- have used, with some marriages being con- munity. During the informal gatherings that tracted with Muslims from Pakistan, South Af- follow religious rituals, it is common to see rica, and Egypt. The female converts who were Arabic speakers using that language in their already married to non-­Muslims before adher- interactions, marking an ethnic boundary that

ing to Islam have their marriages recognized by separates them from the rest of the community. of the community. The official line in Rio’s Muslim Those who have Arab origins but do not speak

Comparative community is that since there is no consensus the language are constantly the target of subtle Asia,

Studies among the religious scholars about this issue, it teasing and jokes that reinforce the value of the and is a matter of consciousness for the individuals Arabic as a cultural diacritic constitutive of the South Africa involved to decide. ethnic boundary between the Arab community East The multiethnic character of the Rio com- and other groups in the larger Brazilian soci- 19 Middle munity leads to a complex process of construc- ety. In fact, the great majority of the descen- tion of Muslim identities in interaction with dants of Arab immigrants do not speak Arabic, both Arab linguistic and cultural traditions and although in the past decade there has been a with the Brazilian social and cultural reality. renewed interest among Brazilians of Arab de- The Arabic language is valued as a key element scent, both Muslims and non-­Muslims, to learn of the religious universe of Islam, but not as one the language. A result has been the recent pro- that determines Muslim identity. For members liferation of Arabic courses in Rio de Janeiro.20 of the community who are not of Arab origin Beyond that, it is also significant that most (and even those who are but have not mastered of the positions of power and status within the the classical Arabic of religious texts), there is community are occupied by Arabic speakers, concern in teaching the language in order to clearly setting up an ethnic hierarchy.21 Abdu, give them direct access to the sacred text of a Sudanese, whom I mentioned above, was the the Koran. Nonetheless, the lingua franca for president and the imam (prayer leader) of the religious activities, such as sermons or courses, SBMRJ until 2007; he also defined himself as is Portuguese, with the exception of ritual for- Arab, notwithstanding the emphasis he placed mulas such as bismallah al-­rahman al-­rahim (in on his African origin after 2006 in order cre- the name of God the compassionate and the ate a greater connection with the African im- merciful) or salam aleikum wa rahmatu-­llah wa migrants and black Brazilian converts that com- b a r a k a t u - ­h u (may the peace, mercy, and grace of pose the community at the SBMRJ. Since 2007 God be with you) that are always pronounced in the SBMRJ presidency has been the charge of Arabic. The use of Portuguese in the official dis- an Egyptian, Muhammad, and the role of imam courses of the Muslim community shows the ef- has been performed by a Syrian Brazilian who forts of the SBMRJ’s leadership in constructing speaks Arabic and studied in Saudi Arabia. a religious and linguistic milieu that is, to some During the eight years in which Abdu was extent, integrated in the local cultural context. the religious leader of the Muslim community in Even the Koranic verses quoted in Arabic dur- Rio, he legitimated his position as imam through

18. Gisele F. Chagas, “Identidade, conhecimento e 20. Nowadays, in addition to the traditional Arabic poder na comunidade muçulmana do Rio de Janeiro” courses offered at the Federal University of Rio de (“Identity, Knowledge, and Power in the Muslim Janeiro (UFRJ) and the Mount Lebanon Club (Clube Community of Rio de Janeiro”) (master’s thesis, Uni- Monte Líbano), one can learn Arabic in the SBMRJ, versidade Federal Fluminense, 2006). the , at some language courses, and with private teachers. 19. For the role of cultural diacritics in the definition of ethnic boundaries, see Fredrik Barth, “Introduction,” 21. On the connections among religious knowledge, in Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organiza- Arabic language, and power in the SBMRJ, see Cha- tion of Culture Difference (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, gas, “Identidade, conhecimento e poder.” 1969; Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland, 1998).

Downloaded from https://read.dukeupress.edu/cssaame/article-pdf/31/2/312/243807/CSA312_06_Pinto_fpp.pdf by UFF user on 18 June 2019 his Arab origin, which, in principle, represented Carnival, activities such as “Islamic camping” a symbolic guarantee of his linguistic and cul- or “spiritual retreat” are usually offered and 317 tural mastery of Islam’s textual tradition. Abdu’s held on farms or at hotels in the countryside. religious leadership was accepted as legitimate On these occasions, those who want can retreat despite the fact that he did not have the neces- to an “Islamic” environment where leisure ac- sary religious education to be recognized as a tivities, including sports and hiking, are mixed sheikh or ‘alim (religious scholar), since he did with praying and the study of Islam.23 Other his studies in Libya at a more general level. It is traditions linked to urban middle-­class culture

also noteworthy that he has gradually empha- such as Mother’s Day or Children’s Day some- of Brazil Pinto sized the link between his Arab cultural identity times also are given an “Islamic” version in the in G. and the moral values he construes as essentially SBMRJ or are just the subject of commentaries Processes

Muslim, such as the public performance of re- in sermons about how a Muslim should behave Paulo ligious piety in the activities of everyday life. during their celebration. to Following his divorce from his first wife, a non- The missionary character of the commu- Communities ­Muslim Brazilian, he has rearticulated his life nity, however, makes it very conscious of its posi- Approach and self through his marriage with a Moroccan tion in Rio’s religious field, in which the Muslim Muslim woman who wears the veil (hijab). community tries to inscribe itself as part of the the Despite the relation between hierarchy local “religious diversity” by offering a discourse in and Arabic ethnicity in the religious division of of tolerance and coexistence. Since 2008 a del- Comparative

labor within the SBMRJ, the leadership’s public egation from the Muslim community partici- A discourse promotes the dissemination of Islam pates in the annual “March Against Religious Islam:

and the incorporation of converts into the com- Intolerance,” where it shares a space of identi- Codification

munity, as is demonstrated by the centrality of fication with other religious traditions such as educational activities, such as courses about African Brazilian cults (e.g., Candomblé and Diasporic Religious Islam or “Muslim culture.” These courses tend Umbanda), which the SBMRJ leadership would

24 and and

to focus on the challenges that Brazilian society consider condemnable polytheist religions. and culture pose for Muslims, particularly for Muslim identities in the SBMRJ are not converts or for recent immigrants. The classes only constituted in contrast to the beliefs and Ethnicity

touch on subjects like the use of the veil, the practices of non-­Muslims. They are also pro- Formation

prohibition against drinking alcohol or eating duced by the contrast among the different Is- Arab pork, and interactions with non-­Muslim friends lamic traditions represented among members and family members. These themes are mixed of the community, according to their diverse Identity with others of global scope, such as the image of origins. Since the dominant tradition in SBMRJ Islam and Muslims in the media, which is gen- is Salafiyah, a Sunni reformist movement that erally seen as holding hostile and misinformed emerged in the nineteenth century and preaches views on these topics; the conflicts in the Middle a return to the “original Islam” codified in the East; and the terrorist attacks of September 11.22 Koran and hadith (the collection of traditions, The SBMRJ also offers spaces and forms sayings, and actions of the Prophet), differences of sociability that are alternatives to Brazilian in the ritual practices and doctrine within the cultural traditions that are seen as “un-­Islamic” community tend to be perceived as bid‘ah (con- such as Carnival, which is particularly present demnable innovations), that is, as deviations in the everyday life of Muslims in Rio. During from “true” Islam that must be corrected.

22. Silvia Montenegro, “Discursos e contradiscursos: 24. This march was created in 2008 after episodes of O olhar da mídia sobre o islã no Brasil” (“Discourses violence between members of Evangelical churches and Counterdiscourses: The Media’s Regard on Islam and adepts of the African Brazilian cults. Almost all in Brazil”), Mana 8, no. 1 (2002), 63 – 91. religious groups, including the and the Jewish community, participate in this march, 23. This creation of alternative spaces of religious so- which takes place along Copacabana’s seaside ave- ciability is not exclusive to Muslims; devout Catholics nue. Many Evangelical churches refuse to participate, and Evangelical Christians also have their “spiritual for they consider themselves the real victims of the retreats” in order to avoid the festivities of Carnival. intolerance of other religious groups.

Downloaded from https://read.dukeupress.edu/cssaame/article-pdf/31/2/312/243807/CSA312_06_Pinto_fpp.pdf by UFF user on 18 June 2019 Members of the Muslim 318 community in Rio de Janeiro together with priests of the African-­Brazilian cults (Candomblé) and a Catholic priest in the March Against Religion

Intolerance. Despite the Arab attire, the Muslims

of in this picture are non- ­Arab Brazilian converts

Comparative Asia, to Islam. Picture by the

Studies author, 2008 the and South Africa East

Middle

Thus the SBMRJ’s religious leaders are the integration of converts, relegating cultural very critical of other Muslim traditions such as difference to the background and bringing ev- Sufism, the cult of the saints, and Shiism and eryone under the same religious discipline. seek to prevent members of the community from following these other paths. In that sense, Ethnicity Overcoming Sectarianism: one can say that the multiethnic character of The Muslim Community in Curitiba their community in Rio de Janeiro has gener- In the Muslim community in Curitiba, a pros- ated an awareness of doctrinal and ritual dif- perous city of 1.5 million inhabitants in the state ferences among various Islamic traditions, as of Paraná in southern Brazil, about five thou- evidenced by the need to codify Islam as an sand families (twenty thousand people) are af- abstract religious system that could be taught filiated with the mosque of Imam Ali Ibn Abi to new converts and should be mastered by all Talib.26 This mosque was constructed in 1977 Muslims. This necessity of creating a religious in an “international Islamic” style, with mina- common denominator among the members of rets, horseshoe arches, and a dome. The Mus- the SBMRJ led to a search for the “true” Islam lim society, which is at the same time a social within the framework of a Salafi preaching cen- club and a mutual-­aid institution, is composed tered on the textual tradition. almost exclusively of Syrian, Lebanese, Pales- The disciplinary practices developed by tinian, and Egyptian immigrants and their de- the SBMRJ’s religious authorities (sermons, scendants. From 2003 to 2005, its leader was the courses, normative texts, etc.) have produced a Shi‘i sheikh Muhammad Khalil, who received process that “objectifies” Islamic tradition, gen- his religious education in Qom, Iran, and in erating a “purified” religious system of cultural Lebanon. Before coming to Curitiba, he was and social practices that serves as a conscious the imam of the Muslim community in Santi- normative point of reference in the life of the ago, Chile, which was, according to him, “made faithful.25 That “objectified” Islam facilitates up almost completely of Lebanese and Palestin-

25. On these disciplinary practices, see Talal Asad, Ge- nealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Islam and Christianity (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 130 – 35.

26. The estimate of twenty thousand members was given to me by the vice president of the Islamic Mutual-­Aid Association of Curitiba during an inter- view in February 2008.

Downloaded from https://read.dukeupress.edu/cssaame/article-pdf/31/2/312/243807/CSA312_06_Pinto_fpp.pdf by UFF user on 18 June 2019 Friday sermon at the Imam Ali Ibn Abi Talib 319 Mosque in Curitiba. Picture by the author, 2011

of Brazil Pinto

in G.

Processes Paulo to Communities

Approach Muslim

the

in ians.” As the community is much larger and eth- flux coming from southern Lebanon, the num- Comparative

nically homogeneous than the one in Rio, the ber of Shi‘is in the community has grown. The A marriages tend to be among second- and third- mosque was built in 1977 as a Sunni mosque, Islam:

­generation Muslims of Arab descent. and it remained so until 1986, when the gov- Codification

In the Muslim community in Curitiba, my ernment of Iran, in its policy of disputing with conversations and interviews were almost always Saudi Arabia the finance and control of inter- Diasporic Religious conducted in Arabic or in a mixture of Arabic national Islam, offered significant donations to and

and Portuguese. This community has been the mosque. Thereafter, a Shi‘i sheikh has al- and

functioning since the 1950s, with the creation of ways led the mosque. The presence of Iran is the Islamic Mutual-­Aid Association. Sheikh Mu- immediately felt in the beautiful mihrab (the Ethnicity

hammad stressed in an interview that “the com- niche marking the direction of Mecca) of mo- Formation

munity in Curitiba was very smart to create first saic tiles in Persian style, with the inscription in Arab a club and then worry about building a mosque, Arabic and Portuguese: “Gift from the Islamic since the club allows for the integration of fami- Republic of Iran, 1996.” Identity lies, and particularly, keeps the youth together According to Sheikh Muhammad, the fer- and interested in Islam. If young Muslims do vor to promote a revolutionary and militant Shi- not do things together and feel that Islam is just ism supported by Iran alienated many Sunnis in about praying at the mosque or following the the community. The Iran-­Iraq war exacerbated rules of the religion, they will eventually lose in- tensions between the two groups to the point that terest in becoming good Muslims.” the community was on the verge of fragmenting Despite its hegemonic Arab presence, the or dissolving itself. In the words of the sheikh: community in Curitiba shows an important sec- “It was a difficult time. To give you an idea, the tarian division, for half of its members are Sun- Islamic school that was created at the same time nis and half Shi‘is. Since the 1970s, when the as the Muslim society had to close because it was civil war in Lebanon and the Israeli invasion impossible to reach consensus on the content of of South Lebanon intensified the immigration its religious curriculum.” 2 7 He added that the

27. The Islamic school reopened in 2007 with twenty elementary-­level students, half of them non- ­Muslims. The curriculum is similar to other Brazil- ian schools, with optional classes on Islam and Ara- bic language. According to the vice president of the Islamic Mutual-­Aid Association, many of the non- ­Muslim students take these classes.

Downloaded from https://read.dukeupress.edu/cssaame/article-pdf/31/2/312/243807/CSA312_06_Pinto_fpp.pdf by UFF user on 18 June 2019 situation only began to change with his prede- in Curitiba is based not on a conscious and 320 cessor, who toned down the politico-­religious integrated religious system that encompasses militancy of the official discourse that had pre- daily practices but on an interpretive consensus vailed in the mosque until he took charge of it. anchored in shared doctrinal understandings The predecessor of the current sheikh also with- and ritual practices. This strategy allowed for drew from the mosque all political or sectarian the incorporation of values and practices from symbols, such as portraits of Ayatollah Ruholla in the religious worldview of the Khomeini and images of the holy figures of community in Curitiba. There is, then, an “eth- Shiism. Thus a meta-­sectarian Muslim identity nification” of Islam as a “religion of Arabs in

began to be constructed through the emphasis Brazil,” as a convert identified the definition of of of doctrinal and ritual elements shared by Sun- Islam prevalent in the community, an inward-

Comparative nis and Shi‘is. ­looking religious universe, resistant to the in- Asia,

Studies At present, although ritual differences corporation of new members and bound to the the and among Sunnis and Shi‘is are evident in the col- Arab community. Indeed, the sheikh confirmed South Africa lective prayers, these differences are understood that the community does not have any mission- East and integrated as variations within a spectrum ary or da’wah (preaching and spreading Islam) Middle of legitimate practices. In the mosque, clay tab- strategy or any scheme aiming to integrate the lets (generally made of sacred soil from Karbala, few converts.29 These converts, generally univer- Iraq) are accessible in a box for those who wish sity students who came into contact with Islam their heads to touch a natural material during through their studies, confront a serious and prayer. Sunnis do not have this obligation. One powerful linguistic barrier in the community, of the consequences of such an effort at integra- since rituals, sermons, and a large part of the tion is the tendency to minimize the ritual and ordinary conversation among the members take doctrinal boundaries or abandon the mecha- place in Arabic, accompanied on occasion by nisms of exclusion used by sectarian groups to translation into Portuguese. mark their identity. As such, the rule of ritual The relation that the Curitiba community purity demanded by the Shi‘i tradition, accord- has with Brazilian society follows the dynamic ing to which a Shi‘i cannot pray behind a non- of an “ethnoreligious enclave,” similar to those, ­Shi‘i, is not followed in the mosque in Curitiba. for example, in the Jewish and Armenian com- Shi‘is and Sunnis freely mix among the rows munities in Brazil. But this relation does not during prayer. By the same token, the adhan thwart a deep integration into the local social (the call to prayer) does not include the piece and cultural universe in other realms of life used only by Shi‘is, which elevates ‘Ali (cousin (work, friendships, etc.). The Arab Muslims in and successor of Muhammad) to the level of the Curitiba participate actively in the Arab ethnic Prophet. associations, such as the Arab Brazilian Mutual- At the doctrinal level, overcoming sectar- ­Aid Association (Sociedade Beneficente Árabe ian differences entails a certain degree of ob- Brasileira) or the Syrian-­Lebanese Club (Clube jectification of Islam. The religious common Sírio-­Libanês), as well as in the economic, politi- denominators are deliberately found in the cal, and cultural spheres of local society. The ob- Koran, which is consensually accepted as the jectification of Islam in the Muslim community ultimate written source of religious truth by of Curitiba is done through the systematization both the Sunnis and the Shi‘is.28 However, in of shared cultural understandings of the reli- contrast to the practices of the community in gious doctrines and practices and allows its mem- Rio de Janeiro, the process of “objectification” bers to understate their sectarian differences.

28. Thomas Hylland Eriksen, Common Denominators: 29. Since 2005 some members of the community, in- Ethnicity, Nation-­Building, and Compromise in Mauri- cluding the vice president of the Islamic Mutual-­Aid tius (London: Berg, 1998). Association, have been trying to develop the work of spreading Islam among the larger society by provid- ing information and opening the mosque for public visitation on Sunday mornings. Also, in 2007, classes started to be held in the mosque on Saturdays in order to teach converts and non-­Muslims about Islam.

Downloaded from https://read.dukeupress.edu/cssaame/article-pdf/31/2/312/243807/CSA312_06_Pinto_fpp.pdf by UFF user on 18 June 2019 Diverse Identities and Institutional Pluralism: tics of a religion and a political ideology based The Muslim Community in São Paulo in a Third World perspective, which can also be 321 São Paulo, which is the largest Brazilian city, found among the followers of liberation theol- with 12 million inhabitants in its metropolitan ogy in Latin American Catholicism. The Ira- area, offers a pluralistic context for the rela- nian revolution and Hezbollah’s resistance to tion between Muslim identity and Arab ethnic- the Israeli occupation of Lebanon are some of ity, for the city has several Islamic institutions the things these converts cited to explain their and mosques. Owing to the community’s de- option for Shiism, which they consider “purer”

mographics, ethnic and religious diversity, and and more “revolutionary” than . of Brazil Pinto multiplicity of institutions, various levels and Other converts told me that they were in- in G. forms of belonging can be found.30 However, troduced to Islam by friends or by colleagues Processes

the Muslim communities in São Paulo are com- at work who are Shi‘is. According to them, Paulo posed mostly of Lebanese, Palestinian, or Syr- after some visits to the mosque and conversa- to ian immigrants. tions with Muslims, they were impressed by the Communities This ethnic dominance is more apparent solidarity and mutual respect that members Approach in the Shi‘i community. The Muhammad Raçu- showed to one another. They then converted. Muslim lullah mosque, also known as the Brás Mosque, Four members of the religious course held at the is the religious center of São Paulo’s Shi‘i com- the mosque said that they became interested in munity.31 Although the mosque has just three in Islam through news reports or through Mus- Comparative

thousand members, only a fraction of the city’s lim friends or acquaintances. After visiting A Shi‘i community (which numbers twenty thou- the mosque and learning about the doctrinal Islam:

sand), it is considered the center of Shi‘i identity principles, they converted because they were Codification

within the Muslim community. The Shi‘i com- convinced by what they defined as the religious munity is almost exclusively composed of Leba- truth of Islam. Diasporic Religious nese immigrants and their descendents and has Until 2007 the mosque was led by Sheikh and and

a clear Lebanese/Arab identity. Said Hassan Ibrahim, who was born in An Na- Members tend to marry within the com- batiyah at Tahta, South Lebanon, but was raised munity, owing to its large size, or grooms and in Beirut and educated in Qom, Iran. The Ethnicity

brides come from Lebanon for this purpose. mosque is located in the center of the textile Formation

Because the transnational links with the Mid- commercial sector of the Brás neighborhood, Arab dle East are very strong in this community, with which is dominated by Muslim merchants and many members coming and going from Brazil to Korean entrepreneurs. The labor force in the Identity Lebanon, or spending different phases of their wholesale stores, which are owned mostly by lives in one of the two countries, marriages with Muslims, is from the northeast of Brazil (nordes- Lebanese Muslims are frequent. tinos), while illegal Bolivian immigrants staff the There is a small group of converts (about clothing factories owned by Koreans. forty) in the Shi‘i mosque. Some of the converts The ethnic and religious diversity among told me that they were attracted to Shi‘i Islam business owners and workers in textile produc- because of its role in the struggle against North tion and commerce is reproduced in the mul- American imperialism and in defense of the tiple religious institutions and spaces that shape people’s right to self-­determination, as well as the urban landscape of Brás. Thus the neigh- by the message of solidarity, equality, and social borhood has a concentration of three Muslim justice. For them, Islam has all the characteris- institutions: the Shi‘i mosque, the Salah al-­Din

30. In the absence of precise, or even reliable, num- bers, it is reasonable to extrapolate from the commu- nities I studied that in the greater São Paulo region there are about 250,000 Muslims, which is about 25 percent of the Muslim population in Brazil.

31. This awkward transliteration in Portuguese of Muhammad Rasul Allah (Muhammad, the Prophet of God) is written on the mosque’s main entrance.

Downloaded from https://read.dukeupress.edu/cssaame/article-pdf/31/2/312/243807/CSA312_06_Pinto_fpp.pdf by UFF user on 18 June 2019 Mosque, and the Islamic Youth League (Liga da Arabic language is the linguistic context 322 Juventude Islamica), the last two of which are of most social interactions that take place within Sunni. Beyond that, there is the Bolivian Cul- the mosque. The religious rituals are also per- tural Center and many bars and forrós (public formed exclusively in Arabic, with no translation dance halls) that bring together migrants from of the sermon into Portuguese. Also the rituals the northeast of Brazil. are performed according to Lebanese cultural The architecture of the Brás Mosque shows traditions, with strong chest beating during the a process of the “Persianization” of the religious Ashura celebration. Therefore, within the con- imagination of Shi‘i communities around the text of the Muslim communities in São Paulo,

world through aesthetic and visual elements that the Shi‘i mosque appears as a space for the of link transnational Shiism with the religious and construction, assertion, and maintenance of an

Comparative cultural history of Iran. This process is actively identity that blends diasporic religious elements Asia,

Studies encouraged by the Islamic Republic of Iran, (the umma of global Islam) and ethnic/national the and which finances the construction or reconstruc- dimensions (the ) with the South Africa tion of mosques and sacred places.32 While the sectarian affirmation of transnational Shiism. East small Iranian community in São Paulo has the Like the Muslim community in Curitiba, the Middle Brás Mosque as the institutional and spatial ref- members of the Mesquita do Brás objectify erence point of their religious identity as Shi‘i Islam as a set of culturally shared understand- Muslims, the Iranians almost never attend ritual ings and embodied dispositions, rather than a activities, such as daily or community prayers, system of abstract doctrinal principles that can meetings, or get-­togethers, which take place be transmitted through discursive disciplinary regularly at the mosque. The Iranian presence mechanisms. becomes visible only during the most impor- tant celebrations of the Shi‘i calendar, such as Ethnicity Reinforcing Sectarianism: Ashura, which commemorates the martyrdom The Muslim Community in Foz do Iguaçu of Husayn, Muhammad’s grandson, at the battle The Muslim community in Foz do Iguaçu, in of Karbala. the state of Paraná, is almost totally composed The Iranians’ distancing is surprising at of Lebanese and Palestinian immigrants and first sight, given that Sheikh Said had his reli- their descendents. The Lebanese constitute gious training in Iran. However, some Iranians a large majority within the community. While with whom I talked told me that the connection there are no reliable statistics for the number of of the sheikh with Iran is not an attractive fea- Muslims in Foz do Iguaçu, the religious leaders ture. Many of them left Iran disappointed with of the community advance numbers that range the political and economic direction of the Is- from eighteen thousand to twenty-­two thousand lamic Republic, and they do not have any inter- Muslims in the area of the “Triple Border” (trí- est in what they define as “official Islam,” the plice fronteira/triple frontera). This area is at the religious interpretation favored by the Iranian confluence of the national borders of Brazil, state, which is the main reference for Sheikh Argentina, and Paraguay and has three cities, Said.33 The Iranians also resent the pervasive one in each country, that have among them presence of the cultural diacritics of Arab eth- different levels of integration. The economy of nicity in the religious context of the mosque. this region is oriented toward transborder com-

32. That investment by the Iranian government is evi- 33. On the social and political disappointment and dent in Syria, where the sacred places linked to Shi‘i indifference and the religious individualization that sacred history were reconstructed to exhibit a clear characterize contemporary Iranian society, see Fariba Shi‘i religious character. Many places like the tomb of Adelkhah, Being Modern in Iran (New York: Columbia Sayyidah Zaynab in Damascus, which used to have a University Press, 2000); and Olivier Roy and Farhad strong Sufi presence, were recreated within an aes- Khosrokhavar, Iran: Comment sortir d’une revolution thetic framework derived from Persian architecture. religieuse (Iran: How to Move away from a Religious See Paulo G. Pinto, “Pilgrimage, Commodities, and Revolution) (Paris: Seuil, 1999). Religious Objectification: The Making of Transna- tional Shiism between Iran and Syria,” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 27 (2007): 109 – 25.

Downloaded from https://read.dukeupress.edu/cssaame/article-pdf/31/2/312/243807/CSA312_06_Pinto_fpp.pdf by UFF user on 18 June 2019 Mesquita do Brás, the only Shi’i mosque in São Paulo. 323 Picture by the author, 2007

of Brazil Pinto

in G.

Processes Paulo to Communities

Approach Muslim

the

in merce and tourism, for it harbors the Iguaçu nity in the Triple Border gained great visibility Comparative

waterfalls, which are on the border between after September 11 after it was targeted by the A Brazil and Argentina and are a major tourist at- discourses on international terrorism fostered Islam:

traction of both countries. by the Argentinean and American governments, Codification

While Paraguay has no major tourist at- which tried to link it with the bombing attacks traction in this area, its city, Ciudad del Este, against the Israeli Embassy and the Jewish Diasporic Religious with 170,000 inhabitants, developed as a major Mutual-­Aid Association of Argentina (AMIA) and and

commercial hub that feeds the Brazilian market in Buenos Aires in 1992 and 1994, as well as with with both certified and falsified imported elec- militant groups in the Middle East.34 tronics and luxury goods from Asia, Europe, There are Islamic institutions in both Foz Ethnicity

and the United States. The commerce in Ciu- do Iguaçu and Ciudad del Este. In Foz do Ig- Formation

dad del Este is controlled mainly by Arab and uaçu there is the Mesquita Omar Ibn al-­Khattab, Arab Chinese immigrants and their descendants. which belongs to the Sunni community, and a Many Brazilians also work in Ciudad del Este. Husayniyah in the Sociedade Islamica de Foz do Identity Therefore, the economy of Foz do Iguaçu, which Iguaçu, which belongs to the Shi‘i community. on the Brazilian side is the largest city of the In Ciudad del Este, the Shi‘i community has region, with three hundred thousand inhabit- the Mesquita del Profeta Mohammed, and the ants, is fully integrated with Ciudad del Este, Sunni community has a prayer hall in a com- with a constant flux of people and goods flow- mercial building. While there is a great circula- ing between the two cities. The Arab Muslim tion of people between the institutions within community is spread between both cities, with each sectarian group, with the mosque and those who are better-­off economically tending prayer hall in Paraguay functioning more dur- to live in Brazil and those recently arrived living ing the working hours and the mosque and the in Paraguay. Puerto Iguazú on the Argentin- Husayniyah functioning for celebrations and ean side, with thirty-­two thousand inhabitants, collective prayers at night or during the week- is the smallest and the least integrated in the ends, there is almost no circulation of Sunnis to transborder economy of the three cities, with no Shi‘i religious institutions and vice versa. Arab/­Muslim community. The Muslim commu- The existence of separate institutions re-

34. Silvia Montenegro and Verónica Gimenez Bé- liveau, La Triple Frontera: Globalización y construc- ción social del espacio (The Triple Border: Globaliza- tion and the Social Construction of Space) (Madrid: Miño y Dávila, 2006).

Downloaded from https://read.dukeupress.edu/cssaame/article-pdf/31/2/312/243807/CSA312_06_Pinto_fpp.pdf by UFF user on 18 June 2019 Omar Ibn al-Khattab 324 Mosque in Foz do Iguaçu. Picture by the author, 2008

of

Comparative Asia,

Studies the and South Africa East

Middle

veals the importance of sectarian boundaries culation of people, goods, and ideas from Brazil for the Muslims in Foz do Iguaçu. While both to Lebanon and back. In many marriages the communities present a discourse of Islamic grooms and brides have come from Lebanon, to universalism, stressing the unity of Islam and where some of the wealthier families send their the irrelevance of sectarian divisions, there is sons and daughters to learn Arabic and the cul- a great awareness of the existence of two Mus- tural traditions of their region of origin. These lim communities with discrete understandings transnational ties are important symbolically and practices of the religion. Despite their dif- and economically, as many families have prop- ferences and rivalries, the Sunni and the Shi‘i erties and business in both Lebanon and Brazil. communities agree in their distinction between While there are some cases of marriage with Muslim and Arab identity. The leaders of both non-­Muslim Brazilian and Paraguayan women, communities see their role as the maintenance I did not come across any case of a mixed Sunni- of the Arab Muslim identity of their community ­Shi‘i couple, showing again the strength of the and its transmission to the new generations. sectarian divide. When I asked Sheikh Ahmad of the Sunni However, the very construction of Islam as mosque in Foz do Iguaçu if his community had a cultural heritage that, in principle, is shared any plan of spreading Islam in the Brazilian so- by all Middle Eastern immigrants and should ciety, he said: “No, we have no plans for da’wah be transmitted to their descendants enhanced among the non-­Muslims. Actually our main the awareness about the sectarian differences concern is to create conditions for the Muslims between Sunni and Shi‘i Muslims. To be able to to remain Muslims, and for the new generations transmit a general “Muslim identity” that is de- to not go away from Islam. If we manage to do fined as a specific cultural content, the commu- that, we can say that we were very successful.” nity had to reach a consensus about the doctrinal Indeed, neither the Sunni nor the Shi‘i commu- and ritual elements that constitute it. Therefore, nity has any plan for attracting new converts to the various doctrinal and ritual references that Islam, thus showing a complete identification of mark the boundary between Sunni and Shi‘i Islam and Arab ethnicity in their definition of constructions of the Islamic tradition were seen the Muslim identity. as deviations from the cultural consensus that The transnational connections with the should prevail in the community and, in the Middle East are very active, with an intense cir- end, led to its division along sectarian lines.

Downloaded from https://read.dukeupress.edu/cssaame/article-pdf/31/2/312/243807/CSA312_06_Pinto_fpp.pdf by UFF user on 18 June 2019 Sheikh Muhammad Khalil, who became is to teach Arabic to descendants of Muslim im- the leader of the Shi‘i community in Foz do migrants, allowing them to keep their linguistic 325 Iguaçu in 2005 after leading the mosque in and cultural ties with the Middle East. Curitiba, sees in the division the effect of the However, despite the obvious purpose of introduction into the Sunni community of maintaining the transnational character of the Wahhabi-­influenced understandings of Islam, Muslim community, the schools also serve as an which forced the Shi‘is to create their own re- instrument of cultural localization in Brazilian ligious institutions. According to him, the reli- (and Paraguayan) society. Both schools teach

gious consensus that existed in the community, the regular national curriculum common to of Brazil Pinto owing to their shared cultural understandings all Brazilian schools, public or private, together in G. of Islam as it was practiced in the Middle East, with a large number of hours for Arabic (and Processes

was broken by the introduction of what he English) as a foreign language. Therefore, while Paulo saw as an intolerant religious ideology by non- the Arab school enables new generations of Mus- to ­Lebanese sheikhs. lims to maintain transnational cultural connec- Communities In contrast, Sheikh Ahmad, who was born tions, it also gives them a clear insertion in the Approach in Brazil and completed his religious studies Brazilian educational and social context. Muslim in Saudi Arabia, blamed the Shi‘is for the di- This complex interaction between trans- the vision of the Muslim community, saying: “We national and local elements in the constitution in were all together in this mosque until the Shi‘is of Arab Muslim identities is even clearer in the Comparative

built their Husayniyah. Then it was impossible Lebanese Brazilian Scout Group (Grupo de Es- A to keep the community together, because they coteiros Líbano-­Brasileiro), which was created Islam:

would perform rituals [of the Ashura] there in 2005 by the Shi‘i community and functions Codification

that are not acceptable for us. They preferred to in a building next door to the Husayniyah. The maintain these rituals than to continue with us. Scout group accepts both boys and girls as mem- Diasporic Religious It is better this way, they have their religion and bers; they are taught by male and female tutors and and

we have ours.” respectively. The organization’s president, a There were nonreligious institutions, such member of the Shi‘i community, stressed that as the Clube da Unidade Árabe (Nadi al-­Ittihad the Lebanese Brazilian Scout Group is very Ethnicity

al-­Arabi/Arab Unity Club), which managed to much part of the scene of youth associations Formation

gather the Sunnis and Shi‘is on an ethnic basis in Foz do Iguaçu, in that it has strong connec- Arab as Arabs. However, the club was closed a few tions with the city’s other two scouts groups and years ago because of financial problems. The participates in the activities of the União dos Identity end of the club also entices mutual accusations Escoteiros do Brasil (Brazilian Union of Scout from the Sunni and the Shi‘i communities, with Groups). In this sense, the scout group is for the the Sunnis saying that the Shi‘is were respon- Muslim community an instrument of insertion sible for the club’s bankruptcy and the Shi‘is ac- in the local social context as well as in the Bra- cusing the Sunnis of closing the only institution zilian nation-­state. where members from both communities could However, this affirmation of belonging interact as Arabs. to the local society is articulated with the af- The strong identification of Islam with the firmation of cultural diacritics that delimit the cultural diacritics of Middle Eastern societies boundaries of the Arab Muslim community as can be seen in the investment that these com- a particular group within the Brazilian nation- munities have in their transmission to the new ­state. The president of the Lebanese Brazilian generations. Thus the Sunni community has the scout group expressed this double process when Escola Árabe Brasileira (Arab Brazilian School), he explained the purposes that informed the which functions in a building near the mosque, group’s creation: and the Shi‘i community has the Escola Li- The idea to create the scout group was to pro- banesa Brasileira (Lebanese Brazilian School). vide to our youth a space for healthy entertain- There is also a Shi‘i Lebanese school in Para- ment, where they could meet and know one an- guay. The main purpose of these private schools other, as well as other kids who are not from the

Downloaded from https://read.dukeupress.edu/cssaame/article-pdf/31/2/312/243807/CSA312_06_Pinto_fpp.pdf by UFF user on 18 June 2019 Poster depicting Akil 326 Merhei at the Lebanese- Brazilian Scout Group. Picture by the author, 2007

of

Comparative Asia,

Studies the and South Africa East

Middle

community. It is very important to teach them tences that allow its members to negotiate their [the young ones] social responsibilities and re- insertion in the local society, in the Brazilian spect for nature and the environment. In this nation-­state, and in the transnational social net- sense the Scout group can be seen as part of the works and symbolic systems that connect them education of our sons and daughters as Muslims to Middle Eastern societies. and as citizens. Of course the idea to create a The fostering of these multiple layers of group for the Lebanese and the rest of the Arab community comes from the necessity to allow local, national, and transnational social imagi- the young generations to live a normal life while naries by the Lebanese Brazilian Scout Group teaching them to respect the customs that de- was exemplified by Akil Merhei, its honorary fine us as Muslims and Arabs. We have boys and patron. Merhei was the group’s president until girls in all the activities, but we make sure that he was killed, together with his wife and two everything is within the boundaries of Islamic kids, in the indiscriminate bombing of South morality, in particular our camping [activities]. Lebanon by the Israeli army in the 2006 war. But, of course, it just reinforces the healthy and The figure of Merhei condenses several layers respectful atmosphere that is the essence of of meaning in the symbolic rendering of his life scouting. and death. As this statement indicates, Arab and Muslim In relation to this analysis, Merhei repre- identities are treated as having equivalent or, sented, at the same time, a local public figure, at least, overlapping cultural meanings, as both known and loved by many, who fostered the in- are referred to as a set of “customs” and moral sertion of the Arab Muslim community in the values related to Middle Eastern societies. The society of Foz do Iguaçu; he was a transnational group’s activities use both Portuguese and Arab Brazilian who lived and worked in Brazil Arabic as their linguistic contexts. This iden- and maintained his cultural and personal ties tification between ethnic and religious identi- with Lebanon, where he took his family for va- ties was stressed by the group’s president, who cations and visited relatives; he is a “martyr” pointed out that while most members are Shi‘is, (s h a h i d ) who became a victim of the regional the group also includes descendants of Sunni, and global conflicts that involved the Middle , and Christian Arab immigrants, who see East. In this sense, the figure of Merhei works in it a space where Arab identities can be rein- as a dominant symbol in the context of the forced among the new generations born in Bra- Lebanese Brazilian Scout Group, allowing the zil. Therefore, one can say that the scout group condensation and articulation of the gamut of fosters identities and creates cultural compe- identities (Brazilian, Lebanese, Arab, Muslim,

Downloaded from https://read.dukeupress.edu/cssaame/article-pdf/31/2/312/243807/CSA312_06_Pinto_fpp.pdf by UFF user on 18 June 2019 etc.) that organizes the various spheres of be- As this statement demonstrates, the Arab Mus- longing through which members of the group lims in Foz do Iguaçu have a sharp conscious- 327 circulate.35 ness of belonging to the local religious field and Similarly, while the religious imagination of having to play by its rules, while their reli- of the Muslim community is oriented toward the gious identity connects them with transnational Middle East, there is a sharp consciousness of religious and ethnic contexts in the constitution its belonging to the local religious field, which of the Arab Muslim communities in the Triple means the possible exposure of its members to Border region. The religious identities that are

the religious proselytism and transit of identities constructed and mobilized in these communi- of Brazil Pinto that characterizes a dominant model of religios- ties articulate local, national, and transnational in G. ity in Brazil. Thus the creation in Foz do Iguaçu spheres of belonging. Islam is objectified by Processes

of the Brazilian Christian Church for the Arabs members of both the Sunni and the Shi‘i com- Paulo (Igreja Cristã Brasileira para os ­Árabes) and munities as the religious context of a cultural to the Arab Evangelical Church (Igreja Evangélica heritage that connects them to the Middle East Communities Árabe/Kinissa Injiliyya ‘Arabiyya), both aimed and gives them a framework for belonging and Approach at converting Muslims to evangelical Christian- positioning themselves in Brazilian society. Muslim ity, was perceived by some Muslims as a threat the to the community and accepted by others as Conclusion in part of the local reality.36 The sheikhs of both The analysis shows how the relation between Comparative

the Sunni and the Shi‘i communities said that Arab ethnicity and Muslim identities in Bra- A the evangelicals were free to preach to Muslims, zil is informed by the local social and cultural Islam:

but they dismissed the group’s vision as a threat. context of each Muslim community, as well as Codification

“A true Muslim would not renounce his or her by the multiple connections that they establish faith,” said Sheikh Ahmad. with globalized and transnational Islamic and Diasporic Religious Sheikh Muhammad, the leader of the ethnic discourses and practices. Since the 1980s and and

Shi‘i community, elaborated on this point, there has been a shift from a codification of explaining: Arab identities in Brazil in ethnic or national terms (Lebanese, Syrian, Syrian-­Lebanese) to Well, we cannot do anything about that. Here is Ethnicity

another one that expresses Arab ethnicity in Formation not Lebanon, where missionary work is forbid- Arab den. Here it is part of our reality. I saw the ban- religious terms, conflating “Arabness” with ners in Arabic [that members of the Arab Evan- Muslim identities. The former resulted from Identity gelical Church carry on the streets of Foz do the effort of mainly Christian Middle Eastern Iguaçu] saying “Smile, Jesus loves you” [Ibitsam immigrants from Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine Yasu’ yuhibbak]. Well, all I can say is that when I to affirm their cultural difference in Brazilian see the banner I smile and agree that the sen- society in the first half of the twentieth century, tence is true; Jesus loves us as Muslims because while the latter was elaborated by Muslim im- we accept him as a prophet. The evangelicals migrants from the same regions who came to managed to put a teacher of sports in the [Sunni] Brazil in the last decades of that century. Arab school, and people in the [Sunni] mosque were very upset and ended up firing him. I would This process led to the ethnic codifica- let him stay, because I believe that the teachings tion of Islam as a religion particular to Arab im- of Islam are stronger than their [the evangeli- migrants and their descendants in Brazil. The cals’] arguments, and I bet that after some time cultural diacritics associated with Arab identity, he [the teacher] would become a Muslim. such as having Arabic as a domestic linguistic

35. Victor Turner defines the properties of the domi- 36. The Brazilian Christian Church for the Arabs is a cultural: El evangelio transcultural para Árabes en la nant symbols as condensation, the unification of dis- branch of the God’s Assembly and was active in Foz Triple Frontera” (“Missionary Projects and Repre- parate meanings in a single symbolic formation, and do Iguaçu from 2001 to 2006. The church closed after sentations of Cultural Diversity: The Transcultural the polarization of meaning. See Victor Turner, The failing to convert any Muslim Arab. The Arab Evangel- Evangelism for Arabs in the Triple Border Area”), in Forest of Symbols: Aspects of Ndembu Ritual (Ithaca, ical Church, which is a branch of the Baptist Church, Verónica Gimenez Béliveau and Silvia Montenegro, NY: Cornell University Press, 1967). continues its missionary work to this day and has suc- La Triple Frontera: Dinámicas culturales y procesos ceeded in converting a few Shi‘is and Druze to evan- transnacionales (The Triple Border: Cultural Dynamics gelical Christianity. See Silvia Montenegro, “Proyec- and Transnational Processes) (Buenos Aires: Espacio tos misionales y representaciones sobre la diversidad Editorial, 2010).

Downloaded from https://read.dukeupress.edu/cssaame/article-pdf/31/2/312/243807/CSA312_06_Pinto_fpp.pdf by UFF user on 18 June 2019 context or being able to provide a genealogical objectification that happened in the Muslim 328 connection to the Middle East, were resignified communities in Curitiba and São Paulo was as markers of religious distinction and, some- done through the systematization of shared times, conditions for fully belonging to many understandings and practices of the religious Muslim communities in Brazil. While all Mus- tradition, creating cultural “common denomi- lim communities in Brazil share discourses that nators” that in the case of Curitiba allowed the define Islam as a universal religion open to all, sectarian differences to be understated and in they usually codify Islamic values and doctrines the case of São Paulo conveyed the national/ as patterns of behavior or cultural competen- sectarian identification between the local com-

cies that are particular to Arab immigrants and munity and an imagined community of the Shi‘i of their descendants. Lebanese diaspora.

Comparative However, the way Arab cultural diacrit- In contrast, the multiethnic Muslim com- Asia,

Studies ics are mobilized and used in the processes of munity of Rio de Janeiro produced a completely the and reimagining and re-creating Islam as a moral different relation between Islam and Arab iden- South Africa community is not the same in the various Mus- tity. Because this community depends on the East lim communities in Brazil. It varies according conversion of non-­Muslims to guarantee its re- Middle to the ethnic composition, the dominant form production and expansion over time, it shifted of religious imagination, and the transnational during the 1990s from an ethnically marked connections that exist in each particular Mus- codification of Islam toward an objectified set lim community. In this sense, in Brazil there of doctrinal and ritual principles legitimized are multiple constructions of Islam, as well as by their explicit connection to what is defined of Arab ethnicity, and to understand how they as the “canonical” textual tradition of Islam, affect the social trajectories of their adherents, namely, the Koran and the hadith. This discur- one must focus on the processes that produce sive codification of Islam was informed by the their similarities and differences rather than normative models of the Salafiyah, which served treat them as mere variations of an abstract both as a source of legitimacy and as a cultural “Brazilian Islam.” idiom that connected the Muslim community The degree of identification between in Rio to transnational religious spaces, such as Arab ethnicity and Muslim identities is greater Saudi Arabia and Egypt. in those communities where there is a demo- In the mosque in Rio, there is a strong graphic predominance of Syrian, Lebanese, discursive affirmation of Islam as a universalis- and Palestinian immigrants and their descen- tic religious system in which ethnic differences dants, such as São Paulo, Curitiba, and Foz do have no importance at all. This was a recurrent Iguaçu. The religious codifications that emerge theme in most Friday sermons that I attended from these communities bear very much the during my fieldwork. Nevertheless, the religious marks of the cultural context to which the eth- prestige connected to certain cultural compe- nic imagination of the group is connected. A tences that also have an ethnic meaning, such as clear example is the fact that not only non-­Arab the mastering of the Arabic language, allowed Brazilian converts but also Iranian immigrants an almost complete monopoly of the positions and their descendants feel excluded from the of power and prestige — for example, the presi- religious and social life of communities such as dency of the Islamic Mutual-­Aid Association the Mesquita do Brás in São Paulo. and the roles of the imam and of the teacher in In this sense, the ethnographic analysis the courses offered in the mosque — by the Arab of the process of religious objectification in immigrants or Brazilians of Arab descent. these Muslim communities in Brazil leads one It is interesting to note that the multivo- to question Olivier Roy’s assertion that Islam cality of the diacritics associated with Arab eth- in diasporic contexts would be codified as an nicity, such as the Arabic language and certain abstract system free of references to particular Middle Eastern traditions, allowed them to be cultural contexts.37 The process of religious positively valued by the non-­Arab Brazilian

37. Roy, L’Islam mondialisé.

Downloaded from https://read.dukeupress.edu/cssaame/article-pdf/31/2/312/243807/CSA312_06_Pinto_fpp.pdf by UFF user on 18 June 2019 converts as cultural competences important to ences. However, in the community of the Mes- be known and mastered by all Muslims. There- quita do Brás, where most members are recent 329 fore, the main demand of the converts is not immigrants from Lebanon, the references to the the substitution of Portuguese for Arabic in the religious particularity of the Shi‘is in the Leba- religious rituals and sermons but the offering nese national context, as well as to certain con- of Arabic courses in the mosques. Similarly, structions of transnational Shiism, are central to many converts in Rio and São Paulo express its relation with national and religious diasporic their wish to live sometime in the Middle East spaces centered in Lebanon and Iran.

in order to learn both Arabic and what they see While sectarianism is downplayed in the of Brazil Pinto as the “Arab culture.” The Brazilian converts do Muslim community in Curitiba, it is the main in G. not reject the cultural diacritics of “Arabness”; organizing principle of competing Muslim Processes

rather, they object to their use in establishing institutions and their correlate communities Paulo ethnic hierarchies in the Muslim communities. in Foz do Iguaçu. This variation is due to the to However, Arabic speakers still occupy the discrete relations between the constructions Communities positions of power and prestige in the musal- of Islam and Arab ethnicity prevalent in each Approach lahs that were created since 2006 in São Paulo community. In Curitiba, to be culturally Arab Muslim and Rio de Janeiro by groups of Brazilian con- is seen as a precondition for full acceptance as the verts unhappy with their lack of integration a Muslim, despite the fact that these categories in in the communities centered in the mosques. are not seen as identical. There is awareness of Comparative

Despite their critique of what they perceive as the existence of non-­Muslim Arabs, who actu- A ethnic hierarchies centered on Arab identity ally constitute the larger and more powerful Islam:

in the mosques, these converts still attribute a part of the community in the ethnic clubs and Codification

greater understanding of the Islamic tradition associations. In this context, the Islamic beliefs to those who can read and speak Arabic. This is and practices that are shared by those who are Diasporic Religious not the case in the musallahs created by African ethnically identified as “Arabs” are performed and and

Muslims in São Paulo, where the religious and and lived as part of a cultural heritage that con- community leaders are all English speakers and nects the Muslims in Curitiba to the “authentic” there are almost no references to Arab cultural forms of Islam that exist in the Middle East. Ethnicity

markers. The persistence of the perception of The configuration of an ethnically marked Formation

Arab ethnic diacritics as a form of religious form of Islam in Foz do Iguaçu differs completely Arab capital among the Brazilian converts shows how from that existing in Curitiba. There Islam is strongly Islam is related to Arab ethnicity in the constructed as the cultural content that should Identity Brazilian cultural imaginary. define Arab identity, for the nonreligious ethnic Among the communities ethnically spaces and institutions such as the Arab Union marked as predominantly Arab, there are also Club are no longer functioning. Therefore one important variations in the processes of reli- could say that religious constructions of Arab gious objectification of each community accord- ethnicity are more prevalent in the Muslim com- ing to the intensity of the transnational connec- munity in Foz do Iguaçu, whereas Arab ethnic tions with the Middle East and the availability constructions of Islam are dominant in Curitiba. of other spheres of codification of Arab ethnic- The very process of religious codification of the ity. In the Muslim community in Curitiba, com- cultural content of “Arab identity” explains posed mostly of second-­ or third-­generation Bra- why the sectarian differences between Sunnis zilians of Arab descent, Arab ethnicity — which and Shi‘is became so prevalent in the former, is constructed by both Muslim and non-­Muslim whereas the codification of Islam as culturally Arabs in specifically ethnic spaces, such as the shared understandings and practices allowed Syrian-­Lebanese Club or the Arab Mutual-­Aid them to be relatively understated in the latter. Association — is the “common denominator” This ethnographic comparison among that certifies the local codification of Muslim these four Muslim communities in Brazil allows identity beyond the eventual sectarian differ- us to understand how various constructions

Downloaded from https://read.dukeupress.edu/cssaame/article-pdf/31/2/312/243807/CSA312_06_Pinto_fpp.pdf by UFF user on 18 June 2019 of Arab ethnicity and Muslim identities coex- 330 ist, are articulated, and compete in discrete social and cultural contexts. The comparative approach highlights the similarities and differ- ences among these communities, also revealing their internal divisions and diversity (Arabs and non-­Arabs, Muslims by birth and converts, im- migrants and Brazilian-­born Muslims of Arab descent, Sunnis and Shi‘is, etc.). Therefore,

instead of treating “Arab ethnicity” and “Mus- of lim identity” as categories that cover a homoge-

Comparative neous cultural space — as is usually implicit in Asia,

Studies the analyses of “American,” “European,” and the and “Brazilian” Islam — we can start seeing them as South Africa spheres of meaning and practice where local, East national, and transnational/diasporic cultural Middle elements and processes are mobilized and en- gaged by agents who constitute their identities and trajectories in the various social arenas in which they participate in their everyday life.

Downloaded from https://read.dukeupress.edu/cssaame/article-pdf/31/2/312/243807/CSA312_06_Pinto_fpp.pdf by UFF user on 18 June 2019