Russian Decentralization and the Denial of History: an Analysis of the World Bank's Notion of Decentralization
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Anthropology of East Europe Review RUSSIAN DECENTRALIZATION AND THE DENIAL OF HISTORY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE WORLD BANK'S NOTION OF DECENTRALIZATION Jarrett Zigon, CUNY Graduate Center The World Bank often characterizes Russia's coherent governmental system of rules, we quickly decentralization process as putting the cart before the learn the World Bank's 'suggested' substance of horse. Among other things, analysts use this these rules. The remainder ofthe decentralization metaphor to represent the troubling fiscal policy of chapter is used to flesh out the three areas that should "subnational spending decisions ... being revenue constitute the substance of these coherent rules, viz., driven, rather than revenues being expenditure "the division ofnational political power between driven" (Bahl and Wallich 1996:327). I would like to national and subnational governments; the structure, use this same metaphor to represent the functions, and resources assigned to subnational decentralizing transition ofRussia, but in an entirely governments; and the electoral rules and other different manner. For it is true that Russia did put the political institutions that bind local politicians to their cart before the horse from the beginning of its post constituents" (ibid. 112). Soviet transition. But what I mean to indicate by In themselves, I find it difficult to argue using this overused metaphor is that Russia against any of these suggested areas of concern. In implemented a decentralization strategy long before fact, they seem to be the basic building blocks of any it had the institutional base to administer these well-functioning and legitimate democratic reforms successfully. To put it simply, Russia government. But if this is true, why is the Russian decentralized long before it should have. government currently not a well-functioning One need not be an astute observer of government? For in general, Russia has Russian history to come to this conclusion. Rather decentralized according to the three coherent rules the slightest appreciation ofRussia's Soviet history delineated by the World Bank. I will show that the would produce an understanding ofthe uniqueness of very implementation ofthe 'universal lessons' Russia's recent past and current transition. For as suggested by the World Bank was the cause ofthe many critics ofthe Russian decentralization process current instability of the Russian government. Thus, point out, the complexities of the Soviet legacy are by putting the decentralization cart before the horse too deep to expect a transition that resembles other of institution-building, Russia very early on took the transitions from authoritarian regimes (e.g., Lapidus path that inevitably led to economic and 1995:1-4; Shevtsova 1995:8; Aslund 1997:13). This governmental crisis. unique historical path of Russia is not considered by I am not suggesting, however, that the World Bank consultants, despite their rhetoric of World Bank or any other Western lending institution adapting decentralization programs to a "country's is causatively responsible for the egregious Russian prevailing conditions" (World Bank 2000: 111). transition. What I do hope to show, on the other In fact, a closer reading of the World hand, is that by decentralizing more or less according Development Report 199912000 shows that the to the universal prescriptions of the World Bank, and World Bank is more interested in implementing as early as it did, Russia took the path that led to 'universal' patterns of decentralization, rather than crisis. This path may have been unavoidable adapting decentralization programs to a "country's considering key elements of the decentralization prevailing conditions" (ibid. 111). For the ink must process were the result ofthe very break up ofthe have been barely dry on the words 'prevailing Soviet Union. However, the pressures applied by conditions' when analysts wrote: "the experience of Western lending institutions, such as the World Bank, the past 15 years has yielded some universal lessons, and Western governments cannot be easily which countries currently decentralizing can use to disregarded. For the continuous "analytical work and their advantage" (ibid. 111-2). The primary universal dialogue" on the topic ofdecentralization practiced lesson learned by the World Bank is that of "the need by the World Bank with Russian officials for a coherent set of rules to replace the hierarchical (www.worldbank.org:2000), must have made it system of governance characteristic of centralized abundantly clear to the Russians what was expected systems" (ibid. 112). But before the reader ofthe in order to receive badly needed loans. development report has time to suspect that these As just stated, a major portion of the early rules can be adapted to contextual conditions, for decentralization process was a result of the break up who could possibly argue against the need for a Vol. 19, No. 1. Spring 2001, Page: 85 Anthropology of East Europe Review of the Soviet Union itself. As Vasiliev argues, the Wallich 1996:324). Thus what Russia needed in the "disintegration of the vertical power structures of the early-1990s, as Shevtsova points out, was "not only former Soviet Union prompted various regions of to build a new economy and a new regime but to Russia to demand autonomy. Centralized authority reconstruct at the same time the state structures within Russia [had] been greatly undermined ... As a needed to carry out these tasks" (1995:8). Perhaps if result [of this power vacuum], local [or subnational] Western advisors, like those of the World Bank, had government[s] ... retained much more of [their] recognized the situation and the historical power than the central government" (1997:36). Just motivations driving it, for many ofthe republics and as the Soviet Union was a federation, so too Russia is regions were motivated by ill-feelings for their old a federated state. Thus the autonomous republics and relations with the Soviet center as much as with the regions of Russia are tied to the latter in the same Russian center, decentralization would not have been way Russia was tied to the Soviet Union. Because of so assiduously pushed. this relationship there was a great deal of fear in But this is not to be expected. For as former Moscow in the early days ofthe Soviet breakup that chief economist of the World Bank Joseph Stiglitz the various republics, regions and districts ofRussia himself points out, the Western macroeconomists would similarly claim sovereignty (Lapidus and who advised the Russians "typically had little Walker 1995:83). It did not help matters that Boris knowledge of the history or details of the Russian Yeltsin, the president ofthe newly sovereign Russian economy and didn't believe they needed any. The Federation, had supported the sovereignty of the great strength, and the ultimate weakness, of the various republics and regions ofthe Soviet Union. In playing the regional card against the centrist hand of economic doctrines upon which they relied is that the doctrines are - or are supposed to be - universal. Gorbachev, Yeltsin "threatened to undermine Institutions, history, or even the distribution of Russia's territorial integrity as much as the USSR's" (ibid. 85). income simply do not matter" (2000:6). Let us return to these 'universal lessons' in order to show how This is precisely what happened as center their hasty implementation have significantly periphery relations have been the primary contributed to the current instability of the Russian destabilizing problem of the 1990s. These relations Federation. were especially troubling from late-1991 through The first step of any decentralization 1993 when various republics and regions, such as process, according to the World Bank, is to establish Tatarstan and Chechnia, were doing everything from "the division of national political power between claiming economic autonomy to declaring national and subnational governments" (World Bank sovereignty. It was in this context that Moscow 2000:112). Ideally the rules governing this struggled at the same time to keep the federation relationship should be established at the national together and to satisfy Western calls for 'shock level. For this is the most effective means of therapy' decentralization and privatization (Aslund avoiding the central government becoming "a 1997:11-12; Cohen and Schwartz 1998). This was prisoner of subnational interests" (ibid. 114). But the moment Russia needed to build stable central this is precisely what was not able to happen in institutions not decentralize. Unfortunately, the Russia. How could it have? There was no stable World Bank and other Western lending institutions national government to establish a coherent system of "focused on [decentralization and] privatization with rules. For prior to the 'Second October Revolution' the intensity of a laser beam and ignored the wide of 1993, the federal government was characterized by ranging institutional development Russia sorely the power struggle between the executive and needed" (Blasi, Kroumova and Kruse 1997: 172). legislative branches. Because each quarreled with The mistake in the West was thinking that the other over who should control the government, in Russia retained the strong central government and effect, no one controlled the national government for institutions of the Soviet Union. This was not the two years. Thus, rather than the strong central case. The Soviet Union no longer existed. And bureaucracy imagined by some Western