Bosnia-Herzegovina Political Briefing: BIH`S Troyka Agreement - Ambitious Or Premature Plan to Exit from 10 Months-Long Government Crisis? Ivica Bakota

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Bosnia-Herzegovina Political Briefing: BIH`S Troyka Agreement - Ambitious Or Premature Plan to Exit from 10 Months-Long Government Crisis? Ivica Bakota ISSN: 2560-1601 Vol. 21, No. 1 (BH) Sept 2019 Bosnia-Herzegovina political briefing: BIH`s Troyka Agreement - ambitious or premature plan to exit from 10 months-long government crisis? Ivica Bakota 1052 Budapest Petőfi Sándor utca 11. +36 1 5858 690 Kiadó: Kína-KKE Intézet Nonprofit Kft. [email protected] Szerkesztésért felelős személy: Chen Xin Kiadásért felelős személy: Huang Ping china-cee.eu 2017/01 BIH`s Troyka Agreement - ambitious or premature plan to exit from 10 months-long government crisis? Introduction On August 5, the leaders of three dominant ethno-political parties (Troyka) in rather unexpected turn signed a coalition agreement that would put an end to 10 month-long crisis in forming the central government. Bakir Izetbegovic, leader of the Democratic Action Party (SDA), Milorad Dodik, Serb Member of Presidency and Chairman of the Union of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD), and Dragan Covic, leader of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ BIH) seemed to have finally reached an agreement on the formation of the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina, troubleshooting deadlock in the BIH Parliamentary Assembly and forming the Federal government. The Troyka Agreement was supported by the Head of Delegation of the European Union, Lars G. Wigemark and very ambitiously included a clause to form a government within a month time period from signing the agreement. As a main initiator, SNSD Chairman Milorad Dodik according to ethnic rotation key will nominate the Chairman of the Council of Ministers (COM Chairman) and also outline the distribution of the ministerial posts. Without big surprises, Zoran Tegeltija, SNSD member and RS government member, remains the sole candidate for COM Chairman, and 3 x 3 - 1 ministry allocation scheme (three ministries for each three party/ethnicities minus one ministry to “other” ethnicities) was also preliminary agreed. According to this plan, the SNSD will have a right to nominate ministers of Communications and Transport, Foreign Commerce and Economic Relations from its own list and propose the candidate for Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees from a list of “others” (Jews, Roma, etc.). The HDZ BIH will continue to hold the ministries of Finance& Treasury and Justice, and will “get” the Ministry of Civil Affairs and Communications. The SDA will have ministers in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Security and the Ministry of Defense. Main content of agreement More concretely, BIH Troyka signed a platform (Principles for Formation of Government at the State Level: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/izetbegovic-dodik-i-covic-dogovorili- formiranje-vlasti-u-bih/30093499.html) with 12 agreed points of cooperation. Among which, as it will be proven later on, at least half were given in spe. Some of the points are believed to be very loosely agreed upon, such as Point 1: the respect for GFA+11 (General Framework 1 Agreement, aka “Dayton” plus 11 Annexes which RS considers problematic), Point 2: BIH sovereignty and territorial integrity (considering recent statements and long-standing secessionist aspirations of Milorad Dodik). For some points exists general agreement, but no concrete plans for implementation, as Point 5 (equal ethnic representation within central and entity institutions), Point 7 (continuation of Reform Agenda), Point 8 (return or resettlement of war-displaced persons), Point 9 (Fight against corruption, criminal and terrorism) and Point 10 (foreign policy towards Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro) would likely to suggest given the previous track of cooperation in these fields. Finally, there were points no matter how loosely worded are no less contentious. Such are Point 3 (NATO integration processes) and Point 4 (reform of Electoral law). Only last point (Point 12) is more bounding with defining a month- long timeframe for action. Critique of the agreement Although the agreement specifically worded that the attitude towards NATO integration will be positive, but without any prejudice to future decisions regarding any move towards the NATO accession and SNSD Chairman Dodik personally confirmed this in his statement following the signature, neither Serb nor Muslim opposition parties were convinced in sincerity or feasibility of such agreement. Critics hold that the coalition agreement is practically unenforceable general middle ground that tries to navigate between the Serb anti-NATO stance, Croat equal ethnic representation demands and Bosniak unitarist aspirations. Bosniak (based) and civic opposition parties from the Federation of BIH, mainly SDP BIH, Our Party (NP) and People and Justice (NiP) focused their criticism primarily on the Bosniak SDA, accusing Bakir Izetbegovic of sacrificing civilian prospects of BIH and making a distance from NATO integration processes, “only for the sake of participating in the future government”. To the opposition from Republika Srpska, SNSD leader Dodik betrayed the pan- Serb consensus on military neutrality, accusing him of virtually agreeing to annulling the NSRS (People`s Assembly of the Republika Srpska) resolution on military neutrality from 2017. According to the first commentaries, both sides considered Croat HDZ BIH to be the winner of the coalition agreement, despite being perceived as a loser of the last elections. HDZ BIH Chairman Dragan Covic is believed to get the most from the agreement by Point 4, implementation of all relevant court decisions regarding the reform of Electoral law. Follow up (until Aug 27) Following the Troyka Agreement, however, nothing seemed to indicate announced breakthrough in government forming negotiations. During the summer recess, Croat MOP 2 Zeljko Komsic told the press that he expects the Serb MOP Dodik to endorse Annual National Plan (ANP) to be delivered to NATO as a part of obligations BIH assumed in re-activating MAP (Membership Activation Plan) status, and reminded Dodik, the decision for nomination of COM Chairman will solely depend on that. On the other hand, asked whether ANP endorsement is pegged with COM Chairman nomination, the Serb MOP Milorad Dodik replied that it is misinterpretation of the Point 3 of the Agreement which stated that negotiations do not imply any future decision regarding BIH`s NATO integrations. Pressured by the RS opposition, Dodik highlighted the positive attitude towards NATO set in the coalition agreement meant that NATO is left out the initial negotiation plan and should be discussed together with other issues after the COM is formed. Furthermore, the agreement states that a special commission for NATO integrations will come up with plans and proposals after obtaining consent by BIH Presidency and COM. Meanwhile, the Croat MOP Komsic and Bosniak MOP Dzaferovic responded by saying that endorsement of ANP was one of the key preconditions set in the agreement and that if the Serb MOP was not willing to reach a compromise, SNSD nominee Zoran Tegeltija will not be given mandate to form COM. Both Croat and Bosniak MOP said that it was unacceptable SNSD had been dismissive of the agreement`s main commitment (furthering NATO integrations) and the main reason for the BIH political deadlock thus far which is why they had decided to deliver it as ultimatum for the BIH Presidency session scheduled on August 27. This session was set with only one issue, to pass the nomination of Tegeltija for COM Chairman. However, after the both MOPs reiterated the stance only a day before, the Serb MOP Dodik rejected ultimatum tactics and called off the session. According to the first estimates by BIH media, the last chance to put the Troyka agreement into practice is thus missed as by September 5th the agreement will “automatically become one among many failed or stillborn political agreements in BIH”. What after - 3 scenarios As it is becoming obvious, the Troyka Agreement was the ad hoc and bona fide platform that did not take into account any serious concessions all three sides had to make in order to reach a breakthrough regarding the ongoing political crisis. Common sense suggests that Troyka, especially SNSD and SDA leaders draw up similar proposal, possibly to be tabled during this year where a more concrete solutions regarding the ANP endorsement by SNSD would follow nomination of the COM Chairman. However, it is less clear whether this new Chairman would be a Serb since, as the Croat MOP Komsic stated, Dodik intentionally “expended” his own 3 nomination. Preliminary commentaries suggest that even some Troyka 2.0 agreement would not be possible as long as ultimatums rule negotiations. Acting COM Chairman Denis Zvizdic (SDA) said the coalition was willing to discuss the issue with the SNSD despite its blackmailing tactics; however, they are not sure if the party is actually willing to discuss it or if it just wants to end this ill-fated agreement. The most of Sarajevo-based politicians agreed that the SNSD refusal to endorse ANP created a heavy burden on the coalition agreement which would probably have a crippling effect for the months to come. However, Dragan Covic of the HDZ BIH pointed out that consensus on the Euro-Atlantic integrations was written in the coalition agreement, but, according to him, the Bosniak party move was premature and the coalition cannot yield to any party's pressure but all sides should remain engaged in conversation. According to protracted plan for Troyka 2.0 agreement all three sides should expect difficult autumn in pushing ultimatums out of the negotiations and square something that is responsive to NATO integrations, but not implicative to BIH attitude on the same response. The opposition in RS is already called the biggest obstacle to pull such a maneuver as they are either keen to create a wider gap between needed concession and political mandate to do so or replace their own ethnic representatives on the negotiation table. SDS Chairman and acting BIH Foreign Commerce Minister Mirko Sarovic has rallied against Dodik should he try to betray his sacred commitment to the NSRS and squeezing him back into deadlock with Sarajevo.
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