www.policy-network.net e: [email protected] +44(0)2073402211 f: t: +44(0)2073402200 SW1P3QB Street11 Tufton Second floor Policy Network policy network paper The Broad Church coalition Long-term challengesfor theprogressive June 2017 CadywouldCharlie andPatrick Diamond

2 | The Broad Church |Long-term challengesfor theprogressive coalition |June2017 publications/6227/Dont-Forget-The-Middle Forgetlaunch: Don't The Middle,whichcanbefound here: http://www.policy-network.net/ ProgressiveThe Next Project for Accompanying the Britain. marking thisisanotherreport of the launch of the Policy workstream: Network published as part This is one of two reports and Alex Porter, have alsoprovided invaluable assistance. comments Josh Newlove and feedback drafts. on early Colleagues particularly at Policy Network, We would liketo thankProfessor Andrew Liddlefor Gamble, LazaandRoger Matthew their Acknowledgements the Department ofPoliticsthe Department at theUniversity ofOxford. University ofLondon, GwilymGibbonfellow at Nuffield College, Oxford, andavisitingin fellow in Public He is lecturer Patrick of Policy Policy Network. at Mary, Queen Diamond is co-chair from University College London. BA insocialandpoliticalsciences from inpublicpolicy theUniversity ofCambridge andanMSc economic policy, aswell asvarious analyses ofpublicopinionandvoting behaviour. Heholdsa Prior to joining, hewas aresearcher at onsocialand Demos, numerous authoring reports CadywouldCharlie isaresearcher leadingitswork atonthefuture Policy oftheleft. Network, About theAuthors Hobbit /Shutterstock.com Cover Photo Credit: www.policy-network.net

policy network paper paper 1. Introduction

The is in an uncertain, but vastly improved position since the June 2017 general election. Across Europe, mainstream social democratic parties have slumped to historic lows, losing voters to the centre right, populist right, populist left, as well as regional separatists. The British ,

no doubt helped by the first past the post system, has avoided such splits and – at least in England policy network – appears to have succeeded in uniting opposition to the Conservative party across the centre left.

The recent gains of populist parties in Europe, along with Trump’s rise in the US, have opened up new dividing lines in politics. Some believed that the traditional left-right divide that has characterised political contests for the last hundred years had broken down, and was being replaced by a new dividing line.1 In Britain, the Remain-Leave split at the EU referendum mirrored not only attitudes to related issues like immigration, international co-operation, national identity and globalisation, but also to a wider set of social issues: feminism, LGBT rights, multiculturalism, environmentalism, and a general sense of nostalgia about the past.

This divide in the electorate has been referred to as ‘open versus closed’, ‘globalists versus nativists’, ‘cosmopolitans versus communitarians’, the ‘anywheres versus the somewheres’, and more simply ‘liberal versus conservative’. After the 2016 referendum, many feared this divide would fragment the left’s electoral coalition. In fact, at the 2017 election Labour managed to unite a majority of Remainers behind them and gain new younger voters excited by Corbyn’s message, while the Conservatives failed to gain as many Leavers - particularly in traditionally Labour areas - as they had initially hoped.

Despite this, there are still serious challenges for the left in Britain. Labour did not win the 2017 election, and will have to gain three times as many seats at the next to form a working majority. While it would be foolish to make any electoral predictions so soon after June’s surprise result, it is important to point out that these divides have not gone away, and that there is every risk of them resurfacing as Labour goes into the next election when, as a serious contender for government, the party can expect vastly increased scrutiny of its detailed policy positions.

This short paper is being published in tandem with a second Policy Network paper – Don’t Forget the Middle – which analyses public attitudes and Labour’s position at the 2017 election, allowing for an evaluation of the more immediate challenges facing the party. This paper takes a longer- term view, looking at structural changes that have contributed to an uncertain future for the left. These include the erosion of class politics, changes in class identity, new divides in the UK electorate, and changing social and political attitudes. Taken together, the papers help to frame the thinking behind our new Policy Network work stream: the Next Progressive Project for Britain, chaired by Professor Andrew Gamble. The aim of the project is to be the focal point for working towards a popular and credible platform to enable Labour and the broader centre left to build on the 2017 result and deliver a new progressive majority for Britain.

1. D. Linker (2017), ‘The Stunning end of the left and right’, The Week. Available at: http:// theweek.com/articles/670870/ stunning-end-left-right; E. Simpson (2016), ‘The two- hundred year era of “left” and “right” is over’, Foreign Policy. Available at: http://foreignpolicy. com/2016/11/14/the-two- hundred-year-era-of-left-and- right-is-over/

3 | The Broad Church | Long-term challenges for the progressive coalition | June 2017 www.policy-network.net among Labour voters. Labour among acute is particularly boomers than baby leftwing traditionally less millennials to for be trend The generations of young people. than previous to redistribution, attitudes on example for leftwing, traditionally are less they parties, likely to more vote and left-of-centre for liberal socially are more today’sWhile people young 18-24 65 over and every aged for 2039, By year old. to one. three be will ratio the Today coalition. progressive people two are roughly there to aUS-style favourable less becoming is continue UK’s later the lives, in their toUnless vote today’s structure Labour age people young elections. at general UK in voting split dominant the behaviour increasingly at 2016 the key the was Education divide is age while EU UK the and referendum, US election groups. other from support without is coalition unlikely agoverning majority toprogressive deliver relative diversity, a US-style lackethnic of mean its However, particularly UK’s the demographics, those low on incomes. very and minorities ethnic university-educated, women, young, the among levels support of higher key respects: in certain coalition US the Democrats’ resembles increasingly base support Labour’s New divisions demographic as in many countries. other UK, in the base working-class ‘blue-collar’ traditional is adeclining There (55 cent) per of Britons with no longer any identifying class. 1980s, in thanwas the it than half more with identity people’s of component Class is important aless Class and class identity structure at 2017 the swings class-based were clear There election. general 45 of in group. that age age the than others voters under by Labour class among divides attitudinal are larger on: there asgoes time together to hold harder may and class become lines, along split is coalition particularly electoral Labour’s voters. than working-class in favour less redistribution but of pro-immigration and liberal socially more are professionals attitudes: political and social of However, predictor class remains animportant less class-based. is also and has weakened identification party Long-term class in recent decades. lines traditional along divided less steadily Voting has become in Britain Class politics Key2. findings 4 | The Broad Church |Long-term challengesfor theprogressive coalition |June2017 www.policy-network.net

policy network paper economic credibility of progressive policies. progressive of credibility economic in convincing votersthe of Labour for have temporarily, achallenge is still at there least but subsided to appears over decade, last the Labour for much trouble so has which caused debt, of politics The blip. this isbelieve atemporary to reason away is has good fallen there since immigration of EU the salience the referendum, While liberalism. towards but social values leftwing slide traditional from awaysteady a been has there differences, generational Alongside and issueChanging salience attitudes 5 | The Broad Church |Long-term challengesfor theprogressive coalition |June2017 www.policy-network.net

policy network paper is even less organised along traditional class lines, as many working-class voters to moved the as class many lines, working-class traditional along is even organised less resulting distribution The Democrats. Liberal the for any recovery significant without Conservatives to moving the voters overwhelmingly Ukip former with system, two-party to a largely back continued up to 2017This the effect a‘defragmentation’ experienced England where election, issues on that across cut classto campaigning lines. gain ground were able parties challenger where system two-party the of voting to contributed a‘fragmentation’ in class decline The grades. social higher the from coalition an electoral built asConservatives the just to from, build support of base voters gave astable it working-class among strength Labour’s period. postwar in the dominant sectors mining and manufacturing unionised) (largely in the than those toloyal Labour are less sectors, service-based private in the mostly incomes, modest voters on class has eroded, professions’”. ‘educated the and intellectual and strata’ middle ‘salaried the has among grown democracy social for “support argues, as Diamond hand, one the On class by occupational party, Labour the with Figure most 1: cent identifying per in 1984,than did they same. the felt manual fewer workers in 2012Labour with identified people self-employed and professionals managers, more that while reveals survey Social British Attitudes The basis. class has a shrinking identification party addition, In main parties. two the evenly voters between split working-class 2015the manual while classes, middle 12 just gapwas the non-manual the among election, points By vote the won by 36 manual of workers points. Labour while voters, middle-class ‘non-manual’ among points won by 40 Conservatives the 1964 the In election, general in importance. gained have factors as other changed has gradually in Britain politics class of in electoral century. role The 20th the of half second the of much for politics in British voting divide Class fundamental the was 3. Class voting 6 | The Broad Church |Long-term challengesfor theprogressive coalition |June2017 4 On the other, the On manual as working the 2

3 Endgame-for-the-Centre-Left network.net/publications/6153/ Available at: http://www.policy- Rowman &Littlefield, p.22. for thecentre London: left?, 4. P. Diamond(2016),Endgame final.pdf media/38723/bsa30_full_report_ http://www.bsa.natcen.ac.uk/ Attitudes 30’. available at: 3. NatCen (2013), Social ‘British Academy,British vol 5,pp. 91-124 Westminster’, ofthe Journal forprospects arealignment at system: the changing party 2. D. (2017), Sanders UK’s‘The www.policy-network.net

policy network paper working age population in routine and semi-routine occupations semi-routine and in routine population age working at 2017 the to Labour Conservative from cent by of per swing Figure 3: constituency election, 1945 since elections general UK Conservatives, the and vote share the Figure of Labour 2: for combined Labour. for opted young) professionals many while Ukip, (particularly via or Labour from directly Conservatives,either 7 | The Broad Church |Long-term challengesfor theprogressive coalition |June2017 5 table KS611UK from 2011Census, Nomisweb Occupational classdata derived britainelects.com/ge2017/; availableElects, at: http:// providedconstituency by Britain results ineach 5. Election www.policy-network.net

policy network paper the basic leftwing idea that government should redistribute from rich to rich poor. from redistribute that should government idea leftwing basic the on views and preferences, policy immigration examples: two are just Here that base. from further to even build needs it at when atime worrying be should recent voters are divided that its fact the 2015 its than just more but about is power; it to if regain to worry needs supporters Labour course, 2015 Of population. the of class rest than the lines along voter split were more coalition Labour 18-24 of small bloc 45 the of under, and aged those vote among who attitudes year –but the olds the –not people younger Among problem. reveals Study data adeeper Election British of Analysis The left’s long-term class problem voting in behaviour. shifts as aresult voting class-based of has occurred in class-based decline the words, other In position. electoral in better amuch be class would they voters, working of tide the to stem were able Labour authoritarian. and anti-immigrant leftwing, were more who occupations semi-routine and in routine than those libertarian more and pro-immigration more 2015 rightwing, were more managers and that professionals survey Attitudes Social British preferences alongside these other demographic categories. For example, NatCen found in their policy and values political basic of predictor class but remains animportant important now more are voting behaviour, below, factors as shown predicting of terms In other and age politics. British in line dividing animportant longer is it no mean not voting does in class-based decline The occupations professional and in managerial population age working at 2017 the to Labour Conservative of from by percentage swing Figure 4: constituency election, 8 | The Broad Church |Long-term challengesfor theprogressive coalition |June2017 7 Moreover, above if shows, graph as the 6 class_v5.pdf media/39094/bsa33_social- http://www.bsa.natcen.ac.uk/ Attitudes 33’. Available at: 7. NatCen (2016), Social ‘British 6. Ibid. www.policy-network.net

policy network paper voters. of coalition asimilar through cross-class to elections win that seeks Labour,for any and party other this continue will preferences; to create problems policy and values political basic shaping factor class continuewill, be an in important all likelihood, to effect, or a cohort effect this is a lifecycle ‘generation of X’. portion older the and Whether class boomers than baby lines along divided more were cohorts that younger see we can voters in isolation, Labour of views the we examine When (employees 45 under cent agree), and only) aged agree/strongly (per respondents offless are well who off to those better the from income redistribute Figure 6: should government only) (employees 45 under and aged respondents to UK, the immigration less Figure 5: cent preferring per 9 | The Broad Church |Long-term challengesfor theprogressive coalition |June2017 8 9 9. Ibid internet panelwave 7 Study, Election 8. British 2014-18 www.policy-network.net

policy network paper nationalism, immigration, globalisation, multiculturalism and other social issues onto that neatly social map multiculturalism other and globalisation, nationalism, immigration, issues: non-economic on primarily focused far has so divide’ ‘ the of narrative well-trodden The voter coalition. its of composition the of because more Labour affects it but as awhole, across country lines the these along adivision exposed referendum geography. EU and income The education, age, of lines the along divides overlapping related, are there and preferences, policy have and values new, They different groups. professional more as as well support, working-class its of rump asignificant has retained Labour recent elections In cent agree), agree/strongly (per 2015 only employees voters and Labour offless are well who off to those better the from income redistribute Figure should 8: government 2015Figure to UK, 7: the immigration less cent only preferring per employees voters and Labour 10 | The Broad Church |Long-term challengesfor theprogressive coalition |June2017 11 10 11. Ibid 10. Ibid www.policy-network.net

policy network paper as strong on economics as politics. identity is class the divide because term is issues, unlikely to long in the work economic ‘left’ traditional on Alternatively, class. focusing of middle professional new the 1980s, losing recent strategy the risks it since the lost has voters it gradually the to back win position globalisation-sceptic conservative, baseand support even generally working-class further. more the communitarian alienating andimmigration, it social globalisation liberalism, risks for support its emphasises party the if problem: strategic long-term Labour’s of crux the is This 10 (right) to 0(left) from ranging scale, Study composite left-right Election British the score on Figure mean 9: voter than tonon-Labour voters Labour who are not young professionals. scale, young professional voters Labour are, on average,closer significantly tothe average fact, In voters. Labour issues than working-class economic on ‘leftwing’ less this to of tend group be members and voters, Labour as predominantly emerged has professionals young educated recently, More better of generation anew working-class. 1960s in the voteroverwhelmingly was base its Labour when for much so that matter didn’t but voters than working-class redistribution on keen less have they For example, been rightwing. economically more classes have upper-middle and been that middle the case the been hasIt long to However, this economics. class divide: Brexit. on aspect compromise is another there as shown, issues a gapon like upwith come the and immigration bridge can how progressives on focused has therefore debate The to environmentalism. LGBT feminism, and rights such as attitudes split, the 11 | The Broad Church |Long-term challengesfor theprogressive coalition |June2017 when placed on a composite left-right left-right acomposite on placed when If Labour changes tack to adopt a more amore to adopt tack changes Labour If 12 , final.pdf media/38723/bsa30_full_report_ http://www.bsa.natcen.ac.uk/ AttitudesSocial 30’. available at: 12. NatCen (2013), ‘British www.policy-network.net

policy network paper no longer identifying withno longer any identifying class. 1980s, in thanwas the it (55 than half more with identity people’s of cent)component per Britons of 2015 By prompt. the without lessof an integral per Classcent. fallen to 25 is clearly that had figure in However, this shift: is asignificant 1983,working-class as underlying per identified cent 35 UK. in the that classmatters stillfeel clearly people asked, When than narrowed. wider grown had differences think that likely more have class to thinkwere differences class wider. grown Overall, respondents to identity a middle-class with likely than those were more also as working-class identifying Those classes. social the between difference wide fairly or avery either was there all respondents) felt 2015in the percent of (and 77 BSA as survey,working-class identified cent 82 who those of per force. winning anelection potentially voters of and pool large cent –avery per 60 since significantly the has changed not it remains – at around 1980s as working-class identifying population the of proportion class, the middle and working between to forced choose When would with they most? identify label class, which middle and working between other),to or forced choose if second, working and class (middle, any with particular identify participants do First, class on in recent decades. question have survey asked a two-stage Attitudes Social British Study and Election British the from Surveys favour. Labour’s not in and 30 over last significantly years, the have changed class Britain’s and structure actual class identity Second, class dominant of politics. since era the has voters it gained however.approach, middle-class could the it risk alienating First, with this are difficulties There existence. for reason –primary party’s Labour the –and left’s British the been class has traditionally working industrial the of interests the advancement all, the After up to back 1960s levels. support working-class its to bring could try cent, Labour per cent 99 the and 1per the or masses, elites versus the the on to focus has tended which left, the from recent rhetoric to opposed As class. of politics the on directly even to more might focus be left the of recovery the for latter, the Given strategy one preferences. policy and values political in determining relevant class remains has declined, class of voting of power as anindicator behaviour predictive the As and class structure Class4. identity 12 | The Broad Church |Long-term challengesfor theprogressive coalition |June2017 13 Moreover, 33 (60%) Attiudes Social (63%); British Study 1983 Election 13. British www.policy-network.net

policy network paper Survey Figure 11: force class, 1951-2016, by occupational labour male Census 2016 and Annual Population decades. postwar in the significantly changed has Britain of class that realoccupational structure Moreover, the case the doubt is it without background. occupational parents’ their is from drawn identity working-class people’s of much shows, BSA as the Instead, study people. to ‘working-class’ close other particularly many and infeel this not say do group they working-class, as now identify time, occupations 47At managerial same or the cent in professional those of per 1983 Britain, in Great Figure class of 10: identity 2015 and structure 13 | The Broad Church |Long-term challengesfor theprogressive coalition |June2017 15 14 Annual Population Survey Academy, Vol. 4,pp. 89-111;2016 process’, oftheBritish Journal changing structure, constant Britain: inmodern class mobility (2016), 15. Goldthorpe ‘Social Attitudes Social British 33 Study 1983; Election 14. British www.policy-network.net

policy network paper those at the bottom of the labour market –Diamond’s market ‘20’. labour the of at bottom the those and professionals affluent more among support to on its lower-middle, holding voters in the while pick up to these them thatenables strategy a find we inmust that argue paper, As jobs. Labour blue-collar skilled as well as traditional hospitality leisure and in sales, care, work They structure. is group ‘75’ in the class. This than middle rather as working in Diamond’s middle totend identify who at 2017 and incomes the middle and chunkelectorate the of make still upasizable who election, lower on those voters and ‘C2’ with aproblem had Labour Middle, the Forget in Don’t we chart As dependent on benefits. and markets labour the from excluded largely those of cent 20 composed per bottom marginalised a and future, the about apprehensive and insecure increasingly but in work employees, white-collar and blue- both classof new middle a represent majority vast in finance, top jobs the or while assets ‘5-75-20’the society. calls towards Diamond what has been in recent Europe decades across western trend dominant The to UK. unique the is hardly base working-class ‘blue-collar’ ‘traditional’ adeclining of trend The Survey Figure 12: force class, 1951-2016, by occupational labour female Census Annual Population and 14 | The Broad Church |Long-term challengesfor theprogressive coalition |June2017 16 17 Roughly 5 per cent at the top of society enjoy runaway success cent inherited with at top 5 society per of the Roughly centre left? 17. Diamond, 16. Ibid. www.policy-network.net Endgame forthe

policy network paper UK general election (fieldworkUK general election November-December 2016). how intend they and to EU vote UK the referendum, at a votedthey US in the election, presidential across accordingUK the US and education howto show here and similar groups age figures by The among older voters, education gap but not re-emerged amongage-group the young. June 2017At the education. by substantially differ not did brackets within- age within the election age: for voting intention proxy a effectively At 2015 the in fact, gapwas, education the election, to cent.to have university. or 1950 In per cent; been nowis it 48 3per rate just was participation the likely to more much go also but voters, than older likely to more votevoters Labour are considerably slightly to different. voting UK be behaviour, appears vote though, UK. Young in the referendum EU in the seen be also Similar can trends Clinton people. than older likely to more support were far people young groups, educated non-college and college both among and pensioners, educated Clinton than non-college likely to more support were far pensioners college-educated words, other another. one of In independently voting of behaviour indicators are strong education and age bothprogressive UK in the the US and coalitions: US, between difference crucial is another There ‘culture salient over women’s wars’ lacks UK as the rights. part fallen. has party with the identification long-term and at elections support has levels grown, Labour of community that BME UK as the to reach today’s US levels until is projected UK 2060s. not the the in Diversity diverse. ethnically less is lines;is thatBritain main difference the these along government aprogressive to deliver composition have not is does demographic that UK the here the problem main The backgrounds. minority ethnic from those and university-educated the among and men, than women among old, than young the the among levels support of has It higher respects. in keycoalition US the Democrats’ to resemble appear increasingly does base support Labour’s Britain. including countries, developed in other replicated –that could be House White in the Obama Barack put similar to that twice which coalition’ –broadly progressive that ‘postindustrial a new to has hope given rise the This important. more become have voting of behaviour, factors class as other apredictor occupational has diminished While 5. New divisions demographic 15 | The Broad Church |Long-term challengesfor theprogressive coalition |June2017 19 The gender divide is nowhere near US levels, most likely in US near most levels, is nowhere divide gender The 18 Moreover, there is some evidence 20

HEIPR_PUBLICATION_2014-15.pdf attachment_data/file/552886/ uploads/system/uploads/ https://www.gov.uk/government/ now-we-are-50/2005873.article; features/participation-rates- timeshighereducation.com/ Available at: https://www. rates: now we are 50’, THE. (2013), ‘Participation 20. Times Education Higher through-extend/ conservatives-really-breaking- co.uk/news/2015/06/12/are- Available at: https://yougov. voters?’, minority YouGov. throughbreaking withethnic the Conservatives really (2015), M. Sobolewska ‘Are 19. R.Ford, L.Janta-Lipinski, PST045216/00 census.gov/quickfacts/table/ Available at: https://www. Census Bureau, ‘Quick Facts’. United States Phil%20Rees.pdf; Population%20Projections%20 BSPS2015/BSPS%20Ethnic%20 Presentations/NewETHPOP/ at: https://www.ethpop.org/ Conference 2015.Available for Population Studies, Annual presentation at Society theBritish demographicfourth transition’, 2011-2061: newresults for the for theUKandlocal areas, ‘Ethnic population projections N. Lomax, P. (2015), Norman 18. P. Rees, P. Wohland, S.Clark, www.policy-network.net

policy network paper education Figure 14: over college 65 without aged whites and with in US campaigns, UK leads margin of and education Figure 13: 18-25 in US campaigns, UK leads margin of and university without and with whites year-old 16 | The Broad Church |Long-term challengesfor theprogressive coalition |June2017 22 21 22. Ibid. the Middle, Policy Network Cadywould (2017),Don’t Forget - fulldetailsinP. Diamond&C. (2017generalNetwork election Populus for pollconducted Policy anda and 2015general election), Study (EUreferendumElection Study (2016),theUKBritish operative Congressional Election Data takenfrom theUSCo- ofaquickillustration.purposes less easilypresentable for the be accounted for, butthisis confounding variables can a fullregression analysis other age andeducation effects.In and education, thusobscuring voters isnoteven across age ofethnicminority the distribution intheUScase, and particularly is astrong initsown factor right, asethnicity white participants, 21. The sampleislimited to www.policy-network.net

policy network paper and 24;and by to however, 2039. one three to be is ratio projected the 18 between aged person 65 over and every aged for people two today are around there Labour: for bad look trends demographic effect, alifecycle is it indeed than If class. rather generation on this based core as time anew bright vote emerges, looks latter, future the If Labour’s then lives? their throughout constant fairly remain and age at anearly millennials of are set attitudes political the where is a‘cohort effect’, it or older; as get they rightwing more become then and left the for vote people generation’s each where effect’, young a ‘lifecycle divide age Is the off? a one vote did decades? and Is it coming who in years the to people young the issue is: happen will what to longer-term the 8 June, run-up in the question big the was youth of turnout extent the While by 2017 age, Figure 15: support Labour and Conservative election general range: across age the another one of image amirror were almost support Labour and at 2017 the polls Conservative election. in pre-election general divide biggest single Age the was Age 6. 17 | The Broad Church |Long-term challengesfor theprogressive coalition |June2017 23 Forget theMiddle Diamond &C.Cadywould, Don’t Policy –fulldetailsinP. Network 23. Populus for pollconducted www.policy-network.net

policy network paper 18 Figure 16: UK population projections, age groups as a percentage of total adult population adult total of as groups apercentage age Figure 16: projections, population UK Labour, while those coming of age in the late in the Labour, coming age 1960s, of those while 1970s, early 1980s the 1990s of and (periods (the domination mid-1940sConservative mid-1970s) and of were consistently supportive more non- of periods under age of that came that cohorts found 2002 Tilley’s hand, study other the On Figure 17: 1974-2015 elections group, by general age UK lead Labour fortunes. electoral 18-24 the leaving then and entering overall changing cohorts parties’ the despite and bracket, different despite 1974. decades four of part consistent best the for fairly gapremained age The 18-24hand, since than Conservative consistently likely have to year more vote olds been Labour at work. effects cohort and age are both there suggests and is mixed, evidence The | The Broad Church |Long-term challengesfor theprogressive coalition |June2017 26 25 On the one one the On 24 onprojections#publications populati /populationandmigration/ peoplepopulationandcommunity how-britain-voted-october-1974/ ipsos.com/ipsos-mori/en-uk/ 1974. Available at: https://www. Britain Voted Since October MORI(2010),How 26. Ipsos 5516495C5A6C08BC656EEAB20 and-cohort-analysisdiv/3866469 value-change-an-age-period- socialization-and-trickle-down- children-blairs-babies-political- article/div-classtitlethatchers- journal-of-political-science/ org/core/journals/british- at: https://www.cambridge. Science, openaccess. Available ofPolitical Journal British Change,Value and Trickle-down Babies, Political Socialization Thatcher’s Children, Blair’s C. Hay, W. Jennings(2017) M. T. Grasso, S.Farrall, E. Gray, 40, pp242-756;etal1992;and attitudes’, Political Studies, Vol. links between ageandpolitical ‘Thatcher’s children: the exploring Johnston, C.J. Pattie (1992), 25. Also seeA.T. Russell, R.J. onsdigital.co.uk Available at: https://discovery. 2014-based Statistical Bulletin. National Population Projections: 24. Office for National Statistics, www.policy-network.net -

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This phenomenon exists This exists phenomenon report.pdf millennial-myths-realities-full- files/2017-05/ipsos-mori- www.ipsos.com/sites/default/ realities. Available at: https:// mythsThinks: Millennial and MORI Clemence (2017),Ipsos 28. B. Duffy, H.Shrimpton, M. 121-135 Statistical Society, Vol 165(1),pp. in theUK’, oftheRoyal Journal generations andpartisanship 27. J. Tilley (2002), ‘Political www.policy-network.net

policy network paper has shrunk sincehas shrunk 1980s. the However, people. gap age than older the redistribution government of supportive slightlystill more are people thatfinds and young spending, welfare mentioning than specifically rather redistribute, government should the whether about question adifferent Study (BES) asks Election British The effects. generational of importance the emphasises also preferences redistribution gap on age The to work. refuse if they benefits their lose should unemployed to the tend they believe example, for responsibility; than state rather individual of side the on to tend fall in particular women young years. political formative in their Thatcher’s premiership Margaret 1997 2010 and experienced who many on generation measures than the –were rightwing even more between adulthood entered who – those ‘Blair’sbabies’ effects, period and controlling lifecycle for high. is too benefit likely to are more think and unemployment state, successively welfare the of ‘proud’ less has become that generation each found also MORI Ipsos study Millennial Source: MORI Ipsos generation by taxes, to even higher leads it if poor the on spending Figure welfare 19: higher for support 20 | The Broad Church |Long-term challengesfor theprogressive coalition |June2017 29 31 30 Research has also found that has found also Research Grasso et al(2017) et Grasso that found 32 in-turn-out/ www.demos.co.uk/project/tune- Out, Demos. Available at: https:// Turn(2014), TuneIn, Reynolds 32. J. Birdwell, C.Cadywould, L. 31. Grasso etal(2017) welfare-state mori-generations.com/Pride-in- Available at: http://www.ipsos- the welfare state’, Generations. MORI(2013), 30. Ipsos ‘Pride in realities mythsThinks: Millennial and 29. B. Duffey etal,Ipsos MORI www.policy-network.net

policy network paper Figure cent agree) 21: agree/strongly (per redistribution government for support voters. Labour are not who respondents among seen be can (more trend opposite the traditional) while voters, Labour than older redistribution likely voters are to less support Study’s Labour young wording, British Election evenon the fact, In population. way of the different rest to the in avery divided class the voters as appear above, analysis with its party, Labour the for worryingly Perhaps most redistribution government for Figure 20: support 21 | The Broad Church |Long-term challengesfor theprogressive coalition |June2017 33 34 internet panelwave 10 Study, Election 34. British 2014-18 less well off.’ the better off to thosewhoare should redistribute income from or disagreed that ‘government they were askedifthey agreed people’,working whilein2016 redistributed towards ordinary ‘income andwealth shouldbe they agreed ordisagreed that respondents were askedwhether were slightly different.In 1983 in the1983and2016surveys 33. Note that thequestionasked www.policy-network.net

policy network paper per cent in the middle, and around classify around 25 per cent ‘confident as either 25 per around or multiculturals’ classify around cent and middle, in the per 50 categories, anti-immigration into most the cent population the of 25 per around put Lowles and markets. and technology liberties, civil of importance the stressed who postmodernists’ concerns; 4) and as well as life of ecological ‘hedonistic quality prioritised ‘post-materialists’ who 3) politics; in their consumerist and individualist were more who 2) movement; ‘modernists’ free of sceptical and anti-EU more also but union pro-trade and pro-welfare were more who ‘traditionalists’ 1) between distinguished example, for narrative. Callaghan, ‘open versus closed’ binary simple the beyond attitudes in social divides new these to categorise made haveAttempts been (31 far too gone had (21 cent) enough per far than not cent). per to minorities ethnic to opportunities give equal attempts felt they said Study survey, people more wave latest the In Election British the of has risen. immigration concern about in Britain, declined 2017The like 2016 the prejudice racial has As election, divided. anation revealed referendum, sex same the of adults two between relations towards sexual Figure 22: attitudes prejudices. racial declining and equality towards gender in attitudes seen be can values liberal similar towards trends but and greater relationships, tolerance towards same-sex in attitudes shift the has been recent decades of turnarounds stunning most the of One embraced. overwhelmingly have –issues that parties progressive equality gender and rights civil protection, environmental such as goals on that focus values ‘post-materialist’ of rise the saw also this period hand, other the On states. welfare of form in the self-help collective for translated into in turn - which ties support class community and –strong solidarity that engendered societies industrial of features traditional this has hand, eroded century. one 20th the the of On stages latter in the individualistic increasingly became have Anthony how societies and Giddens such chronicled as Ulrich Beck Sociologists over in figure as shown time across all generations such as redistribution values 19 above. leftwing slide traditional from awaysteady –a effects –have period with one combined previous than the leftwing less traditionally but liberal socially more being generation each – effects cohort These 7. and issue Changing salience attitudes social 22 | The Broad Church |Long-term challengesfor theprogressive coalition |June2017 36 35 37 Painter Manchester University Press of socialdemocracy, Manchester: 37. J. Callaghan (2009), The retreat internet panelwave 10 Study, Election 36. British 2014-18 various years Attitudes, Social 35. British www.policy-network.net

policy network paper concerns about their credibility? their about concerns continue they will competence, or to upagainst come economic with combined be can policies progressive voters austerity, yet believe the do Conservative failed of years After thisof trilemma. are right to conditions out the break immigration), whether is progressive. It unclear being and and conditionality welfare (including on competence, matching opinion public economic demonstrating of trilemma’ Peter Taylor-Goobythis of parliament. lifetime a ‘left the out has set has continued to since debt rise national all, 2010, the eliminated in be is unlikely to deficit the and After plans. spending progressive of credibility the concerns about long-term about minds sharpen or could redistribution, more and cuts benefit reversing pay freeze, sector to public the anend for way. either could turn in debate recent months –the standards could It provoke living on demand to hit in economy 2019 the Brexit-related continuation squeeze the of even aprolonged –or simply is a there If to Brexit. approach the of a‘softening’ of suggestions as do shift, apositive suggest is end coming toan May’smay Theresa team that from austerity sell.Signals to –difficult policies even –and investment spend and tax has made favour. decade last the of ‘debtleft’s The politics’ in the shifted or at any options –has opened given time policy acceptable politically of range – the window’ ‘Overton how the much and over whether Similarly, uncertainty remains considerable there engineer. to hard is this but againstbacklash globalisation work to for if the them the debate distribution of gains, shifts the make can Labour around. time next replicated be will this guarantee no is there but coalition. electoral anunstable together keep option to only the becomes it as even difficult, more issue the may on triangulation well become issue the immigration, of voters –on Labour especially –and public British the of divisions strong leave the Given voters. immigration-sceptic most the for issue, the especially ‘sort’ EU somehow will that the leaving to fails match expectations Brexit of reality as the blip this isbelieve atemporary to reason away is has good fallen there since immigration EU the concern about referendum, While to this paper. as anappendix literature is included ‘pioneers’. liberal ‘prospectors’; socially and uninterested politically or ‘settlers’; swing-voting conservative voters intothe socially camps: three are‘mainstream pro-immigration. who liberals’ 23 | The Broad Church |Long-term challengesfor theprogressive coalition |June2017 39 A full table summarising various schema from the the from schema summarising various table Afull Economics trumped culture at the 2017 election, 2017 the at culture election, trumped Economics 38 Cruddas, in his review of the 2015 the in of his review Cruddas, placed election, lose politics/2015/08/why-did-labour- www.newstatesman.com/ Statesman. Available at: http:// did Labourlose?’, New 39. J. Cruddas (2015), ‘Why of Identity, London: Searchlight Fear andHope: The NewPolitics 38. A.Painter &N.Lowles (2011), www.policy-network.net

policy network paper though, it is that we should stop being surprised by surprises. surprised being is it stop that we should though, elections future at together it keeping in ahead challenges shown, has this paper As in salience. decline others while acampaign, during emerge issues new can the as we at saw 2017 but the have divides emerged, New classaccording lines. to traditional election, in voting decline a alongside fallen, has identification party Long-term results. up unexpected to throwing itself by lends which instability, Ultimately, characterised is increasingly politics British this risk losing too. group democrats social the Netherlands, force as well, as in France liberal social the and cosmopolitan, is a separate there If right. populist the voters prefer ‘nativist’ the but integration, and immigration on position atough project they mainstream right; centrethe prefer voters conservative economically but discipline, fiscal of tone the adopt they parties; populist leftwing new or ‘real the left vote far and the voters prefer thing’ for leftwing but policies, leftwing afew adopt They to one. no upappealing end democrats social to everyone, socialists),to appeal Greek fate of is the that the by trying following ‘Pasokification’ across (which Europe have some termed parties centre-left collapse particular total of near the this with strategy, danger clear however, The appeal. a broad toretain or as win we have in seen in anattempt to issues opponents to appeal certain on ground some conceding in politics-speak is ‘triangulation’: to though, this, equivalent pejorative The politics. electoral in British succeeding of has any approach hope tent’ a‘big only might it seem divisions, political such of stark face the In Conclusion8. 24 | The Broad Church |Long-term challengesfor theprogressive coalition |June2017 the left’s electoral coalitionthe left’s electoral remains unstable, and particularly are there considerable . If 2017. If us has anything taught www.policy-network.net

policy network paper 9. Appendix: classifications of public attitudes public of 9. classifications Appendix: 25 Democratic socialists Community Progressives Swing Voters Britain New Free liberals Common sense Britain Our (2016)Opinium/SMF multiculturals Confident liberals Mainstream ambivalentsIdentity integrationist Culturally hostiles Latent enmity Active (2011) Lowles and Painter materialists post- Hedonistic Post-materialists Modernists Traditionalists Callaghan (2009) | The Broad Church |Long-term challengesfor theprogressive coalition |June2017 40 42 Pro-immigration, pro-single market, supports low tax economy, low tax supports market, pro-single Pro-immigration, anti-welfare business, Pro- conservatism. in interest social little market, inStrong the faith to immigration opposition and economy low tax support but opinions, political as having strong think themselves of Don’t in outlook isolationist broadly Anti-immigration, mass and immigration cosmopolitanism diversity, about positive professionals, cosmopolitan Centre-left benefit as net regard but immigration about sceptical Well educated, services public on impact immigration on ambivalent outlook, Less optimistic services public not integration, and identity around concerns immigration voters with prosperous more and older Mainly values and identity national to defend parties want globalisation, and immigration of fearful Less well-educated, politics formal from disengaged difference, ethnic and religious of intolerant to immigrants, hostility Open and markets pro-technology liberties, civil and freedom of importance stressing ‘pleasure-seekers’ Libertarian poor time and rich tax often concerns, as well as life of ecological quality Prioritise achievement and aspiration. Wary of government spending individual prioritise politics, in their consumerist and individualist More movement free of sceptical and anti-EU more but union pro-trade and pro-welfare More outlook internationalist pro-redistribution, state, pro-welfare Pro-immigration, anti-immigration business, of sceptical Pro-redistrubtion, spend and tax on balanced state, pro-welfare internationalist, Open, taxes low and support benefits on hard stance outlook, internationalist society, anequal supporting views, of Mixture internationalist 41 British-politics4_lr.pdf uploads/2016/09/Dead-Centre- opinium.co.uk/wp-content/ politics. Available at: http:// redefining the centre ofBritish Foundation Centre: (2016),Dead Market 42. Opinium/Social and Hope 41. A.Painter &N.Lowles, Fear 40. J. Callaghan, The retreat of www.policy-network.net

policy network paper 26 Pioneers Prospectors Settlers Cruddas (2015) | The Broad Church |Long-term challengesfor theprogressive coalition |June2017 43 self-determination and creativity, self-fulfilment openness, value altruistic, liberal, Socially to voting approach transactional Acquisitive low in interest politics, aspirational, and life way their of of continuity and identity cultural Value belonging, safety, security. national and family home, with concerned conservatives Social Lose?’ 43. J. Cruddas, didLabour ‘Why www.policy-network.net

policy network paper