liberal vision of nation-states cooper­ Liberal World ating to achieve security and prosperity remains as vital today as at any time in the modern age. In the long course of The Resilient Order history, liberal democracy has hit hard times before, only to rebound and gain Daniel Deudney and ground. It has done so thanks to the G. John Ikenberry appeal of its basic values and its unique capacities to effec­tively grapple with ecades after they were suppos­ the problems of modernity and edly banished from the West, the globalization. Ddark forces of world politics— The order will endure, too. Even illiberalism, autocracy, nationalism, though the United States’ relative power protectionism, spheres of influence, is waning, the international system that territorial revisionism—have reasserted the country has sustained for seven themselves. China and Russia have dashed decades is remarkably durable. As long all hopes that they would quickly transi­ as interdependence—economic, security- HIH ORLD ARE E LIING IN tion to democracy and support the liberal related, and environmental—continues to world order. To the contrary, they have grow, peoples and governments every­ strengthened their authoritarian systems where will be compelled to work together at home and flouted norms abroad. to solve problems or suffer grievous harm. Even more stunning, with the United By necessity, these efforts will build on Kingdom having voted for Brexit and and strengthen the institutions of the the United States having elected Donald liberal order. Trump as president, the leading patrons of the liberal world order have chosen to THE LIBERAL VISION undermine their own system. Across the Modern liberalism holds that world world, a new nationalist mindset has politics requires new levels of political emerged, one that views international integration in response to relentlessly institutions and globalization as threats rising interdependence. But political to national sovereignty and identity orders do not arise spontaneously, and rather than opportunities. liberals argue that a world with more The recent rise of illiberal forces and liberal democratic capitalist states will be leaders is certainly worrisome. Yet it is more peaceful, prosperous, and respect- too soon to write the obituary of liberal- ful of human rights. It is not inevitable ism as a theory of international relations, that history will end with the triumph liberal democracy as a system of govern- of liberalism, but it is inevitable that a ment, or the liberal order as the overarch- decent world order will be liberal. ing framework for global politics. The The recent rise of illiberal forces and the apparent recession of the liberal DANIEL DEUDNEY is Associate Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University. international order may seem to call this school of thought into question. But G. JOHN IKENBERRY is Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at despite some notable exceptions, states Princeton University. still mostly interact through well-worn

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All together now: at the G-20 summit in Hamburg, Germany, July 2017 institutions and in the spirit of self- governments, market-based economic interested, pragmatic accommodation. systems, and international institutions not Moreover, part of the reason liberalism out of idealism but because they believe may look unsuited to the times is that these arrangements are better suited to many of its critics assail a strawman realizing human interests in the modern version of the theory. Liberals are often world than any alternatives. Indeed, in portrayed as having overly optimistic— thinking about world order, the variable even utopian—assumptions about the path that matters most for liberal thinkers is of human history. In reality, they have a interdependence. For the first time in much more conditional and tempered history, global institutions are now neces­ optimism that recognizes tragic tradeoffs, sary to realize basic human interests; and they are keenly attentive to the intense forms of interdependence that possibilities for large-scale catastrophes. were once present only on a smaller scale Like realists, they recognize that it is are now present on a global scale. For often human nature to seek power, which example, whereas environmental prob­ is why they advocate constitutional and lems used to be contained largely within legal restraints. But unlike realists, who see countries or regions, the cumulative history as cyclical, liberals are heirs to the effect of human activities on the planet’s

POOL /REUTERS Enlightenment project of technological biospheric life-support system has now innovation, which opens new possibilities been so great as to require a new geologic both for human progress and for disaster. name for the current time period—the Liberalism is essentially pragmatic. Anthropocene. Unlike its backward- Modern liberals embrace democratic looking nationalist and realist rivals,

July/August 2018 17 Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry liberalism has a pragmatic adaptability democracies turned out to lack the and a penchant for institutional inno­ traditions and habits necessary to sustain vations that are vital for responding to democratic institutions. And large flows such emerging challenges as artificial of immigrants triggered a xenophobic intelligence, cyberwarfare, and genetic backlash. Together, these developments engineering. have called into question the legitimacy Overall, liberalism remains perennially of liberal democratic life and created and universally appealing because it rests openings for opportunistic demagogues. on a commitment to the dignity and Just as the causes of this malaise are freedom of individuals. It enshrines the clear, so is its solution: a return to the idea of tolerance, which will be needed in fundamentals of liberal democracy. Rather spades as the world becomes increasingly than deeply challenging the first principles interactive and diverse. Although the of liberal democracy, the current problems ideology emerged in the West, its values call for reforms to better realize them. have become universal, and its champions To reduce inequality, political leaders will have extended to encompass Mahatma need to return to the social democratic Gandhi, Mikhail Gorbachev, and Nelson policies embodied in the New Deal, pass Mandela. And even though imperialism, more progressive taxation, and invest in slavery, and racism have marred Western education and infrastructure. To foster a history, liberalism has always been at the sense of liberal democratic identity, they forefront of efforts—both peaceful and will need to emphasize education as a militant—to reform and end these catalyst for assimilation and promote practices. To the extent that the long arc nation­al and public service. In other of history does bend toward justice, it words, the remedy for the problems of does so thanks to the activism and moral liberal democracy is more liberal democ­ commitment of liberals and their allies. racy; liberalism contains the seeds of its own salvation. DEMOCRATIC DECLINE IN Indeed, liberal democracies have PERSPECTIVE repeatedly recovered from crises resulting In many respects, today’s liberal from their own excesses. In the 1930s, democratic malaise is a byproduct of the overproduction and the integration of liberal world order’s success. After the financial markets brought about an Cold War, that order became a global economic depression, which triggered system, expanding beyond its birthplace the rise of fascism. But it also triggered in the West. But as free markets spread, the New Deal and social democracy, problems began to crop up: economic leading to a more stable form of capitalism. inequality grew, old political bargains In the 1950s, the success of the Manhattan between capital and labor broke down, and Project, combined with the emerging social supports eroded. The benefits of U.S.-Soviet rivalry, created the novel globalization and economic expansion were threat of a worldwide nuclear holocaust. distributed disproportionately to elites. That threat gave rise to arms control pacts Oligarchic power bloomed. A modulated and agreements concerning the governance form of capitalism morphed into winner- of global spaces, deals forged by the United take-all casino capitalism. Many new States in collaboration with the Soviet

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Union. In the 1970s, rising middle-class replacing the liberal order with some­ consumption led to oil shortages, economic thing significantly different would be stagnation, and environmental decay. In extremely difficult. Despite the high response, the advanced industrial democ­ expectations they generate, revolutionary racies established oil coordination agree­ moments often fail to make enduring ments, invested in clean energy, and struck changes. It is unrealistic today to think that numerous international environmental a few years of nationalist demagoguery accords aimed at reducing pollutants. The will dramatically undo liberalism. problems that liberal democracies face Growing interdependence makes the today, while great, are certainly not more order especially difficult to overturn. challenging than those that they have faced Ever since its inception in the eighteenth and overcome in these historically recent century, liberalism has been deeply decades. Of course, there is no guarantee committed to the progressive improve­ that liberal democracies will successfully ment of the human condition through rise to the occasion, but to count them out scientific discovery and technological would fly in the face of repeated historical advancements. This Enlightenment experiences. project began to bear practical fruits on Today’s dire predictions ignore these a large scale in the nineteenth century, past successes. They suffer from a blinding transforming virtually every aspect of presentism. Taking what is new and human life. New techniques for produc- threatening as the master pattern is an tion, communication, transportation, and understandable reflex in the face of change, destruction poured forth. The liberal but it is almost never a very good guide to system has been at the forefront not just the future. Large-scale human arrange­ of stoking those fires of innovation but ments such as liberal democracy rarely also of addressing the negative conse­ change as rapidly or as radically as they quences. Adam Smith’s case for free seem to in the moment. If history is any trade, for example, was strengthened guide, today’s illiberal populists and when it became easier to establish supply authoritarians will evoke resistance and chains across global distances. And the countermovements. age-old case for peace was vastly strength­ ened when weapons evolved from being THE RESILIENT ORDER simple and limited in their destruction to After World War II, liberal democracies the city-busting missiles of the nuclear joined together to create an international era. Liberal democratic capitalist societies order that reflected their shared interests. have thrived and expanded because they And as is the case with liberal democracy have been particularly adept at stimulating itself, the order that emerged to accompany and exploiting innovation and at coping it cannot be easily undone. For one thing, with their spillover effects and negative it is deeply embedded. Hundreds of externalities. In short, liberal modernity mil­lions, if not billions, of people have excels at both harvesting the fruits of geared their activities and expectations to modern advance and guarding against the order’s institutions and incentives, its dangers. from farmers to microchip makers. How­ This dynamic of constant change and ever unappealing aspects of it may be, ever-increasing interdependence is only

20 foreign affairs Liberal World accelerating. Human progress has caused international institutions. Moscow’s grave harm to the planet and its atmo­ committed antiliberal stance did not stop sphere, yet climate change will also it from partnering with Washington to require unprecedented levels of inter­ create a raft of arms control agreements. national cooperation. With the rise of Nor did it stop it from cooperating with bioweapons and cyberwarfare, the capa­ Washington through the World Health bilities to wreak mass destruction are Organization to spearhead a global getting cheaper and ever more accessible, campaign to eradicate smallpox, which making the international regulation of succeeded in completely eliminating these technologies a vital national security the disease by 1979. imperative for all countries. At the same More recently, countries of all stripes time, global capitalism has drawn more have crafted global rules to guard against people and countries into cross-border environmental destruction. The signato- webs of exchange, thus making virtually ries to the Paris climate agreement, for everyone dependent on the competent example, include such autocracies as management of international finance China, Iran, and Russia. Westphalian and trade. In the age of global interde­ approaches have also thrived when it pendence, even a realist must be an comes to governing the commons, such internationalist. as the ocean, the atmosphere, outer space, The international order is also likely and Antarctica. To name just one exam­ to persist because its survival does not ple, the 1987 Montreal Protocol, which depend on all of its members being liberal has thwarted the destruction of the ozone democracies. The return of isolationism, layer, has been actively supported by the rise of illiberal regimes such as China democracies and dictatorships alike. Such and Russia, and the general recession of agreements are not challenges to the liberal democracy in many parts of the sovereignty of the states that create them world appear to bode ill for the liberal but collective measures to solve problems international order. But contrary to they cannot address on their own. the conventional wisdom, many of its Most institutions in the liberal order institutions are not uniquely liberal in do not demand that their backers be character. Rather, they are Westphalian, liberal democracies; they only require in that they are designed merely to solve that they be status quo powers and problems of sovereign states, whether capable of fulfilling their commitments. they be democratic or authoritarian. They do not challenge the Westphalian And many of the key participants in system; they codify it. The un, for these institutions are anything but liberal example, enshrines the principle of state or democratic. sovereignty and, through the permanent Consider the Soviet Union’s coopera­ members of the Security Council, the tive efforts during the Cold War. Back notion of great-power decision-making. then, the liberal world order was primarily All of this makes the order more durable. an arrangement among liberal democracies Because much of international coopera- in Europe, North America, and East Asia. tion has nothing at all to do with liberal- Even so, the Soviet Union often worked ism or democracy, when politicians who with the democracies to help build are hostile to all things liberal are in

July/August 2018 21 Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry power, they can still retain their interna- CORE MELTDOWN tional agendas and keep the order alive. In challenging the U.S. commitment to The persistence of Westphalian institu- nato and the trading rules of the North tions provides a lasting foundation on American Free Trade Agreement (nafta) which distinctively liberal and democratic and the World Trade Organization, Trump institutions can be erected in the future. has called into question the United States’ Another reason to believe that the traditional role as the leader of the liberal liberal order will endure involves the order. And with the vote to leave the eu, return of ideological rivalry. The last two the United Kingdom has launched itself and a half decades have been profoundly into the uncharted seas of a full withdrawal anomalous in that liberalism has had no from Europe’s most prized postwar credible competitor. During the rest of its institution. In an unprecedented move, the existence, it faced competition that made Anglo-American core of the liberal order it stronger. Throughout the nineteenth appears to have fully reversed course. century, liberal democracies sought to Despite what the backers of Trump outperform monarchical, hereditary, and and Brexit promise, actually effecting a aristocratic regimes. During the first half real withdrawal from these long-standing of the twentieth century, autocratic and commitments will be difficult to accom­­ fascist competitors created strong incen­ plish. That’s because the institutions of the tives for the liberal democracies to get liberal international order, although often their own houses in order and band treated as ephemeral and fragile, are together. And after World War II, they actually quite resilient. They did not built the liberal order in part to contain emerge by accident; they were the product the threat of the Soviet Union and of deeply held interests. Over the decades, international communism. the activities and interests of countless The Chinese Communist Party actors—corporations, civic groups, and appears increasingly likely to seek to government bureaucracies—have become offer an alternative to the components intricately entangled in these institutions. of the existing order that have to do Severing those institutional ties sounds with economic liberalism and human simple, but in practice, it is devilishly rights. If it ends up competing with the complicated. liberal democracies, they will again face The difficulties have already become pressure to champion their values. As abundantly clear with Brexit. It is not so during the Cold War, they will have easy, it turns out, to undo in one fell incentives to undertake domestic reforms swoop a set of institutional arrangements and strengthen their international that were developed over five decades and alliances. The collapse of the Soviet that touch on virtually every aspect of Union, although a great milestone in British life and government. Divorcing the annals of the advance of liberal the eu means scrapping solutions to real democracy, had the ironic effect of problems, problems that haven’t gone eliminating one of its main drivers of away. In Northern Ireland, for example, solidarity. The bad news of renewed negotiators in the 1990s found an elegant ideological rivalry could be good news solution to the long-running conflict there for the liberal international order. by allowing the region to remain part of

22 foreign affairs Liberal World the United Kingdom but insisting that their defense spending to bear more of there be no border controls between it the burden. Similarly, major pieces of the and the Republic of Ireland—a bargain nuclear arms control architecture from that leaving the eu’s single market and the end of the Cold War are unraveling customs union would undo. If officials and expiring. Unless American diplo­ do manage to fully implement Brexit, it matic leadership is forthcoming, the seems an inescapable conclusion that the world may find itself thrown back into a United Kingdom’s economic output and largely unregulated nuclear arms race. influence in the world will fall. The Trump administration’s Likewise, the initial efforts by the initiatives on trade and alliance politics Trump administration to unilaterally have generated a great deal of anxiety alter the terms of trade with China and and uncertainty, but their actual effect renegotiate nafta with Canada and is less threatening—more a revisiting of Mexico have revealed how intertwined bargains than a pulling down of the these countries’ economies are with the order itself. Setting aside Trump’s threats U.S. economy. New international link­ of complete withdrawal and his chaotic ages of production and trade have clearly and impulsive style, his renegotiations produced losers, but they have also of trade deals and security alliances can produced many winners who have a be seen as part an ongoing and necessary, vested interest in maintaining the status if sometimes ugly, equilibration of the quo. Farmers and manufacturers, for arrangements underlying the institutions instance, have reaped massive gains from of the liberal world order. nafta and have lobbied hard for Trump Moreover, despite Trump’s relentless to keep the agreement intact, making it demeaning of the international order, he politically difficult for him to pull off an has sometimes acted in ways that fulfill, outright withdrawal. rather than challenge, the traditional The incentives for Washington to stay American role in it. His most remarkable in international security institutions are use of force so far has been to bomb Syria even greater. Abandoning nato, as candi­ for its egregious violations of international date Trump suggested the United States norms against the use of chemical weapons should do, would massively disrupt a on civilians. His policy toward Russia, security order that has provided seven while convoluted and compromised, has decades of peace on a historically war- essentially been a continuation of that torn continent—and doing so at a time pursued by the George W. Bush and when Russia is resurgent would be all Obama administrations: sanctioning the more dangerous. The interests of the Russia for its revisionism in eastern United States are so obviously well Europe and cyberspace. Perhaps most served by the existing security order that important, Trump’s focus on China as a any American administration would be great-power rival will compel him or some compelled to sustain them. Indeed, in future administration to refurbish and lieu of withdrawing from nato, Trump, expand U.S. alliances rather than withdraw as president, has shifted his focus to the from them. On the issues that matter time-honored American tradition of most, Trump’s foreign policy, despite its trying to get the Europeans to increase “America first” rhetoric and chaotic

July/August 2018 23 Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry implementation, continues to move along uncertainties look insurmountable. In the tracks of the American-built order. the larger sweep of history, however, In other areas, of course, Trump really Brexit, Trump, and the new nationalism is undermining the liberal order. But as do not seem so unprecedented or perilous. the United States has stepped back, The liberal democracies have survived others have stepped forward to sustain and flourished in the face of far greater the project. In a speech before the U.S. challenges—the Great Depression, the Congress in April, French President Axis powers, and the international com­ Emmanuel Macron spoke for many U.S. munist movement. There is every reason allies when he called on the international to believe they can outlive this one. community to “step up our game and Above all, the case for optimism build the twenty-first-century world order, about liberalism rests on a simple truth: based on the perennial principles we the solutions to today’s problems are established together after World War II.” more liberal democracy and more liberal Many allies are already doing just that. order. Liberalism is unique among the Even though Trump withdrew the United major theories of international relations States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, in its protean vision of interdependence the trade deal lives on, with the 11 other and cooperation—features of the modern member states implementing their own world that will only become more impor­ version of the pact. Similarly, Trump’s tant as the century unfolds. Throughout withdrawal from the Paris agreement the course of history, evolution, crises, has not stopped dozens of other countries and tumultuous change have been the from working to implement its ambitious norm, and the reason liberalism has done goals. Nor is it preventing many U.S. so well is that its ways of life are so adept states, cities, companies, and individuals at riding the tumultuous storms of from undertaking their own efforts. historical change. Indeed, the cumulative The liberal order may be losing its chief effect of Trump’s nativistic rhetoric and patron, but it rests on much more than dangerous policies has been not to over­ leadership from the Oval Office. throw the system but to stimulate adjustments within it. THE LONG VIEW Fisher Ames, a representative from It is easy to view developments over the Massachusetts in the first U.S. Congress, last few years as a rebuke to the theory once compared autocracy to a merchant of liberalism and as a sign of the eclipse ship, “which sails well, but will some­ of liberal democracies and their interna­ times strike on a rock, and go to the tional order. But that would be a mistake. bottom.” A republic, he said, “is a raft, Although the recent challenges should which would never sink, but then your not be underestimated, it is important to feet are always in water.” The liberal recognize that they are closer to the rule order and its democracies will prevail than the exception. Against the baseline because the stately ships of illiberalism of the 1990s, when the end of the Cold readily run aground in turbulent times, War seemed to signal the permanent while the resilient raft of liberalism triumph of liberal democracy and the lumbers along.∂ “end of history,” the recent setbacks and

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