Dam-Break Problems, Solutions and Case Studies
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Field Trip Report Vajont Valley & Latemar (Italy)
04-06/07/2019 Field trip report Vajont valley & Latemar (Italy) Participants: Baville Paul Bonneau François Caumon Guillaume Clausolles Nicolas Frantz Yves Gouache Corentin Raguenel Margaux Schuh-Senlis Melchior IAMG Student Chapter Nancy RING TEAM - GEORESSOURCES Summary Introduction ............................................................................................................................................. 1 Chronostratigraphy of the field trip ........................................................................................................ 2 1. Vajont Formations (1 Figure 2, 65 – 160 Ma) .............................................................................. 2 2. Calcare del Vajont Formation (2 Figure 2, 160 – 170 Ma)........................................................... 3 3. Ignee Formation (3 Figure 2, 170 – 183 Ma) ............................................................................... 4 4. Soverzene Formation (4 Figure 2, 183 – 200 Ma) ....................................................................... 4 5. Dolomia Principale Formation (5 Figure 2, 200 – 230 Ma) ......................................................... 4 6. Rodella Formation (6 Figure 2, 230 – 247 Ma) ............................................................................ 5 7. Latemar Formation (7 Figure 2, 247 – 250 Ma) .......................................................................... 6 8. Bellerophon Formation (8 Figure 2, 250 – 258 Ma) ................................................................... -
Geological Considerations in Dams Failure Teodora Barbuntoiu A
Geotechnical Hazards | Geological Considerations in Dams Failure Teodora Barbuntoiu A Thesis in the Field of GeoEngineering For the Degree of Bachelor of Applied Earth Science Supervisors: Dr.Ir. W. Broere Dr.Ir. D.J.M. Ngan-Tillard Delft University of Technology July 2019 Teodora Barbuntoiu | Geological considerations in dams failure | AESB3400 Bachelor Thesis Abstract Dams and reservoirs pose safety concerns to society worldwide. In case of a disaster, the water impounded in the reservoir escapes and destroys everything in its path. Reasons for failure range from geology, hydrology and seismicity, to design problems, lack of maintenance and poor field investigation. Prior cases show that various dams gave away mainly due to geological causes, so there is a particular interest to see how the local terrain features could influence the longevity of the structure. Three historical case studies are discussed in order to emphasize the impact of geology regarding dam failure. The Saint Francis Dam is a prime example of poor site investigation, where the lack of knowledge on the foundation rock led to the rupture of the gravity dam. The Malpasset Dam gave away predominantly due to underestimated effects of the uplift, nevertheless, the geologists were unaware of an active fault system and the mechanical properties of the rock mass. The Baldwin Hills Reservoir comes with a more thorough site investigation, yet still, due to earth movements, the water from the reservoir infiltrated through the embankment. Therefore, geological features at the site need to be included in the design options of the dam in order to ensure a safe, feasible and economical project. -
Be Aware of Potential Risk of Dam Failure in Your Community
Be Aware of Potential Risk of Dam Failure in Your Community Approximately 15,000 dams in the United States are classified as high-hazard potential (HHP), meaning that their failure could result in loss of life. Dams can fail for a number of reasons, including overtopping caused by floods, acts of sabotage, or structural failure of materials used in dam construction. The worst dam failure in the United States occurred in 1889 in Johnstown, Pennsylvania. Over 2,200 died, with many more left homeless. Dams present risks but they also provide many benefits, including irrigation, flood control, and recreation. Dams have been identified as a key resource of our national infrastructure that is vulnerable to terrorist attack. States have the primary responsibility for protecting their populations from dam failure. Of the approximately 94,400 dams in the United States, State governments regulate about 70 percent. About 27,000 dams throughout our Nation could incur damage or fail, resulting in significant property damage, lifeline disruption (utilities), business disruption, displacement of families from their homes, and environmental damage. The most important steps you can take to protect yourself from dam failure are to know your risk. Contact government offices to learn if an Emergency Action Plan (EAP) is in place and to evacuate when directed by emergency response officials. An EAP is a formal document that identifies potential emergency conditions at a dam and specifies preplanned actions to be followed by the dam owner to reduce property damage and loss of life. The plan may save lives and property damage through timely evacuations of those who live, work, or enjoy recreation near a high-hazard potential dam. -
Table of Contents
Fairfield County, South Carolina, Emergency Operations Plan TABLE OF CONTENTS HEADING PAGE Introduction/Letter of Promulgation vii Legal Basis--Fairfield County Ordinance viii I. AUTHORITIES AND REFERENCES 1 A. Purpose 1 B. Authority 1 C. References 1 D. Maps 2 II. SITUATION AND ASSUMPTIONS 2 A. Situation 2 B. Assumptions 4 III. MISSION 5 IV. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 5 A. General 5 B. Municipalities 5 C. Fairfield County Government 5 D. State Government 6 E. Federal Government 6 F. Other Supporting Organizations 6 G. Actions by Phases of Emergency Management 6 H. Level of Readiness 8 I. Requesting Aid 8 J. Incident Command System 9 K. Damage Assessment 9 V. ORGANIZATION AND ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITIES 9 A. County Government 9 B. Municipalities 12 C. Incident Command 13 D. Responsibilities 13 E. Coordinating Instructions 14 TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONTINUED) PAGE HEADING VI. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS 14 A. Reporting Requirements 14 B. Computer Capability 14 C. Logistics 15 D. Mutual Aid Agreements 15 E. Support 15 F. Augmenting Response Staff 15 G. Documentation 15 H. Resources 15 VII. DIRECTION AND CONTROL 16 A. Emergency Operating Center (EOC) 16 B. Line of Succession 16 VIII. PLAN DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE 17 A. Implementation 17 B. Development 17 C. Maintenance 17 IX. DISTRIBUTION 17 ATTACHMENTS 18 1. Organization Chart 19 2. Tasks and Responsibilities 20 3. Alert List 21 4. Supporting Plans and Their Sources 22 TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONTINUED) HEADING PAGE ANNEXES A. Emergency Operations Center Appendix 1--Organization Chart 9 Appendix 2--Alert List 10 Appendix 3--Call Down System for EOC Activation 12 Appendix 4--Layout of EOC 13 B. -
Live, Virtual and Constructive Identity of the Italian Army Stability Policing
6 1 0 LiveInside the issue 2 r e Live, Virtual and Constructive Identity of the b m Italian Army e c e D Stability Policing: towards new Operational - 4 Capabilities 2 e u s s Technological Innovation and National Security I #Wearejointandcombined 瘀攀爀礀眀栀攀爀攀 愀瀀椀搀氀礀 EDITOR’S NOTE by Col. ITA (A) Gianluigi ARCA CONTENTS NRDC-ITA Commander 攀爀 Lt. Gen. Roberto PERRETTI EDITORIAL BOARD FROM THE STAFF Editor in Chief: Col. ITA (A) Gianluigi ARCA • The eNRF Support Concept Seminar at NRDC-ITA 4 Editors : Lt. Col. ITA (A) Vincenzo SCHETTINI, Maj. GBR (A) Christopher • Stability Policing: towards new Operational Capabilities 6 DAVIES • Public Affairs to become independent branch within HQ! 8 Assistant Editor and Graphic Designer: • NRDC-ITA CIS drives NATO technological innovation! 12 Cpl. ITA (A) Chiara MONTI ...................... • Live, Virtual and Constructive Identity of the Italian Army 14 Assistant in Imagery and Post Production: • Technological Innovation and National Security 20 WO1 ITA (A) Francesco CIVITELLI Photographers: Cpl. ITA (A) Raffaele SAN- SEVERINO, Cpl. ITA (A) Mattia RUSSO Web: WO ITA (A) Italo BOATO SPORT BOARD The everywhere rapidly is the autorized offi- ear reader, cial pubblication of NATO Rapid Deploy- able Corps, Italy. All editorial content of the • Exercise Eagle Triglav 28 this issue marks an im- “ER” issue, in fact, is honoured to everywhere rapidly is prepared , edited and • NRDC-ITA Mountain Military Training on Dolomites 30 Dportant and challenging host an article by Maj. Gen. Mau- approved by the NRDC -ITA Commander, period for NRDC-ITA. The Hea- rizio Boni, who as Ce.Si.Va. -
Book Review of “The Story of Vaiont Told by the Geologist Who Discovered the Landslide”
Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci., 11, 485–486, 2011 www.nat-hazards-earth-syst-sci.net/11/485/2011/ Natural Hazards doi:10.5194/nhess-11-485-2011 and Earth © Author(s) 2011. CC Attribution 3.0 License. System Sciences Book Review of “The Story of Vaiont Told by the Geologist Who Discovered the Landslide” F. Guzzetti1 and G. Lollino2 1Istituto di Ricerca per la Protezione Idrogeologica, Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, via Madonna Alta 126, 06128 Perugia, Italy 2Istituto di Ricerca per la Protezione Idrogeologica, Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, Strada delle Cacce 73, 10135 Torino, Italy THE STORY OF VAIONT TOLD BY THE GEOL- jont landslide in August 1959, four years before the catas- OGIST WHO DISCOVERED THE LANDSLIDE, BY: trophic failure. Semenza performed a systematic, large-scale E. SEMENDA, K-FLASH PUBLISHER, FERRARA, 205 geological and geomorphological investigation of the area, PAGES, PRICE: 28.00 C, ISBN 978-88-89288-02-3 and specifically of the site affected by the landslide before the On 9 October 1963, at 10:39 p.m. local time, between 240 slope failed catastrophically. During his fieldwork, Semenza and 300 million cubic meters of sedimentary rocks detached was able to identify and document a number of geological from Mount Toc, in Veneto, northern Italy, and slid into the and morphological features that he correctly interpreted as Vajont Lake. The falling rock mass acted like a huge piston, evidence of the presence of a very large, ancient landslide pushing the water of the lake against Casso and Erto, two deposit. The geomorphological information and geological small villages on the slope in front of the slope that failed, data collected by Semenza remain a brilliant example of a and then over an artificial dam 210 m high. -
Expecting Disaster: the 1963 Landslide of the Vajont Dam
Expecting Disaster: The 1963 Landslide of the Vajont Dam Wilko Graf von Hardenberg On October 9, 1963, at 10:39 pm 260 million cubic meters of rock broke off from the top of Monte Toc, on the border between Veneto and Friuli Venezia Giulia. It fell into the reservoir of the Vajont Dam, producing an enormous wave of at least 50 million cubic meters of water. The dam, completed in 1959 and one of the biggest in the world at the time, did not suffer any serious damage. However, flooding destroyed several villages in the valley and killed almost 2,000 people. A third of the population of Longarone, the largest village downstream of the dam, perished. The town of Longarone, Italy, before the landslide, 1963. The town of Longarone after the dam was overtopped by a giant wave. Unknown photographer, 1963. Courtesy of Vajont Survivor’s Committee. Unknown photographer, 1963. Click here to view image source. Courtesy of the Vajont Survivor’s Committee. Click here to view image source. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Public Domain Mark 1.0 License . This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Public Domain Mark 1.0 License . Though the dam incorporated the latest technical expertise, it had been built without due consideration of geological reports, possible tectonic problems, local knowledge of the territory and Monte Toc’s connate instability. Source URL: http://www.environmentandsociety.org/node/3401 Print date: 04 March 2020 11:07:46 Hardenberg, Wilko Graf von. "Expecting Disaster: The 1963 Landslide of the Vajont Dam." Arcadia ( 2011), no. -
Attachment B Flooding and Dam Failure
page 6-B-1 Attachment B Flooding and Dam Failure The Hazard Nature of the Flooding occurs when normally dry land is inundated with water (or Hazard flowing mud). Flooding may result from: bodies of water overflowing their banks, including artificial ones like dams and levees; structural failure of dams and levees; rapid accumulation of runoff or surface water; hurricane- caused storm surges or earthquake-caused tsunamis; or erosion of a shoreline. (Coastal flooding and erosion are not treated in this attachment.) Typically, the two parameters of most concern for flood planning are suddenness of onset--in the case of flash floods and dam failures--and flood elevation in relation to topography and structures. Other factors contributing to damage are the velocity or "energy" of moving water, the debris carried by the water, and extended duration of flood conditions. Flooding can happen at any time of the year, but predominates in the late Winter and early Spring due to melting snow, breakaway ice jams, and rainy weather patterns. Risk Area All States and territories are at risk from flooding. Apart from a rainy climate, local risk factors, usually present in combination, include: Rivers, These are bodies of water often subject to overflowing. The size of the Streams, and stream can be misleading; small streams that receive substantial rain or Drainageways snowmelt, locally or upstream, can overflow their banks. High-velocity, low elevation flooding can be dangerous and damaging. Six inches of moving water can knock a person off his or her feet; 12 inches of water flowing at 10 miles per hour carries the force of a 100 mile-per-hour wind, although the force would be distributed differently on obstacles. -
Sonoma County Multi-Jurisdictional Hazard Mitigation Plan Meeting Summary
Sonoma County Multi-Jurisdictional Hazard Mitigation Plan Meeting Summary Date/Time of Meeting: Thursday, September 24, 2020 Location: Digital Subject: Steering Committee Meeting No. 2 Project Name: Sonoma County Multi‐Jurisdictional Hazard Mitigation Plan Update In Attendance Attendees: 25 (21 SoCo, 4 TT) Planning Team: Lisa Hulette, Bart Spencer, Rob Flaner, Carol Baumann, Des Alexander Not Present: N/A Summary Prepared by: Des Alexander Quorum – Yes or No Yes Item Action Welcome and Introductions Lisa Hulette welcomed members of the steering committee to Previous steering committee the 2nd meeting for Sonoma County’s MJHMP update meeting notes were approved Des Alexander did a roll call, where 21 committee members were in attendance, with 4 members of Tetra Tech also on the call. No members of the public were on the call. Planning Process Motion to approve meeting summary for Steering Committee meeting 1 was made by Shari Meads, seconded by Kim Jordan, and approved All planning partners who wish to participate in process have been contacted Lisa and Bart discussed the draft mission/vision statement document that was sent to committee members. The document featured several sample mission and vision statements, as well as several goals and objectives Although several members did not have a comment, most of the comments that were made were focused on using fewer and more general words; making sure equity was factored into mitigation process, actions, and outcome; placing more emphasis on disaster mitigation with green infrastructure; separate natural and man‐made hazards in the goals section Meeting Summary Item Action Hazards of Concern The homework from the last meeting was briefly discussed. -
Dam Failure Refers to a Collapse, Overtopping, Breaching Or Any Related Condition That Causes Downstream Flooding
HAZARD: DAM FAILURE DAM FAILURE PROFILE: Dam failure refers to a collapse, overtopping, breaching or any related condition that causes downstream flooding. Approximately one-third of all dam failures are caused by overtopping due to inadequate spillway capacity, one-third are caused by seepage through or under the structure, and the remainder from improper design or construction or because of earthquake or landside events which trigger the failure of the dam. Examples of dam failure in the United States include the Johnstown Flood in 1889 resulting in 2209 deaths, the Saugus, California dam collapse in the Los Angeles Aqueduct system in 1928 resulting in 450 deaths, and the Teton Dam breach on the Snake River in Idaho during a flash flood in 1976 resulting in 11 deaths. During Hurricane Agnes in 1972, concern about the Conowingo Dam on the Susquehanna River led to the opening of all flood gates to release pressure when the water level was three feet higher than the dam’s rated capacity. COUNTY PERSPECTIVE AND HISTORY: According to the Maryland Department of the Environment, Garrett County has 28 dams, of which 11 are rated as high hazard dams as shown on Figure 33. The Maryland Hazard Analysis rates Garrett County’s composite risk for dam failure at 4 on a scale of one to five. The county’s planning committee agrees with this risk. The largest dams in the county include the Savage River Dam, the Bloomington Dam on the Potomac River, and the Deep Creek Lake Dam as shown on the map on Figure 34. -
Dam Awareness May 2018
Dam Awareness May 2018 Introduction There is a general lack of knowledge, understanding, and awareness of dams and their risks, leaving those most affected by dams unprepared to deal with the impacts of their failures. This fact sheet provides a general overview of dams for consideration and use by the intended audience, based on their situation. Responsibility and Liability for Dam Safety Dams are owned and operated by individuals, private and public organizations, and various levels of government (federal, state, local, tribal). The responsibility for operating and maintaining a safe dam rests with the owner. Common law holds that the storage of water is a hazardous activity. Maintaining a safe dam is a key element in preventing failure and limiting the liability that an owner could face. The extent of an owner’s liability varies from state to state and depends on statutes and case law precedents. Federally owned and regulated dams are subject to federal regulations and guidelines and applicable federal and state laws. Owners can be fiscally and criminally liable for any failure of a dam and all damages resulting from its failure. Any uncontrolled release of the reservoir, whether the result of an intentional release or dam failure, can have devastating effects on persons, property, and the environment (FEMA, 2016a). Any malfunction or abnormality outside the design assumptions and parameters that adversely affect a dam’s primary function of impounding water is considered a dam failure. Lesser degrees of failure can progressively lead to or heighten the risk of a catastrophic failure, which may result in an uncontrolled release of the reservoir and can have a severe effect on persons and properties downstream (FEMA, 2016b). -
Masculinity and Political Authority 241 7.1 Introduction 241
Durham E-Theses The political uses of identity an enthnography of the northern league Fernandes, Vasco Sérgio Costa How to cite: Fernandes, Vasco Sérgio Costa (2009) The political uses of identity an enthnography of the northern league, Durham theses, Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/2080/ Use policy The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-prot purposes provided that: • a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source • a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses • the full-text is not changed in any way The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders. Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details. Academic Support Oce, Durham University, University Oce, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP e-mail: [email protected] Tel: +44 0191 334 6107 http://etheses.dur.ac.uk University of Durham The Political Uses of Identity: An Ethnography of the Northern The copyright of this thesis rests with the author or the university to which it was League submitted. No quotation from it, or information derived from it may be published without the prior written consent of the author or university, and any information derived from it should be acknowledged. By Vasco Sergio Costa Fernandes Department of Anthropology April 2009 Thesis submitted in accordance with the requirement for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Supervisors: Dr Paul Sant Cassia Dr Peter Collins 2 1 MAY 2009 Abstract This is a thesis about the Northern League {Lega Nord), a regionalist and nationalist party that rose to prominence during the last three decades in the north of Italy Throughout this period the Northern League developed from a peripheral and protest movement, into an important government force.