Before the FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION Washington, DC 20554

In the Matter of ) ) Promoting the Availability of ) MB Docket No. 16-41 Diverse and Independent ) Sources of Video Programming ) ) )

REPLY COMMENTS OF beIN SPORTS LLC

David R. Goodfriend Antonio Briceño 1300 19th Street, N.W. Deputy Managing Director 5th Floor beIN Sports LLC Washington, D.C. 20036 7291 NW 74th Street (202) 557-3512 Miami, FL 33166

April 19, 2016

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY…………………………………..2

II. THE COMMISSION SHOULD DEFINE “INDEPENDENT PROGRAMMER” AS LACKING ANY ATTRIBUTABLE OWNERSHIP INTEREST HELD BY, OR COMMON OWNERSHIP WITH, A MULTICHANNEL VIDEO PROGRAMMING DISTRIBUTOR OR BROADCAST LICENSEE…3

III. DIVERSITY OF OWNERSHIP THROUGH INDEPENDENT NETWORKS ENHANCES COMPETITION AND CHOICE IN CRITICAL SPORTS AND MULTICULTURAL FORMATS………………………………………4

IV. MOST-FAVORED-NATION (“MFN”) CLAUSES CURTAIL INDEPENDENT PROGRAMMERS’ ABILITY TO EXPAND DISTRIBUTION AND INCREASE REVENUES……………………………………………….6

V. ALTERNATIVE DISTRIBUTION METHOD (“ADM”) CONTRACT PROVISIONS PREVENT INDEPENDENT PROGRAMMERS FROM REACHING NEW AUDIENCES AND DEVELOPING NEW REVENUE STREAMS………………………………………………………………10

VI. INDEPENDENT PROGRAMMERS SUFFER DISPROPORTIONATE OBSTACLES TO SECURING DISTRIBUTION, COMPENSATION, AND PROMOTION………………………………………………………….11

VII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS……………………..17

Before the FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION Washington, DC 20554

In the Matter of ) ) Promoting the Availability of ) MB Docket No. 16-41 Diverse and Independent ) Sources of Video Programming ) ) )

REPLY COMMENTS OF beIN SPORTS LLC

I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY.

beIN SPORTS (“beIN”) respectfully disagrees with the assertions made by some

commenters in this proceeding that restrictive contractual provisions endured by independent

programmers are good for competition and consumers. They are not. In fact, the challenges

faced by independent programmers – those unaffiliated with any MVPD1 or broadcaster --

reduce innovation and choice, often to the detriment of consumers, particularly Latino and other

minority niche audiences. Sports programming, critical to the video marketplace, provides a

compelling example of why consumers benefit from a vibrant, competitive video marketplace

and why Commission action is necessary to maintain competition.

beIN sympathizes with the arguments made by MVPDs that broadcast conglomerates,

through their bundling practices, tend to crowd out truly independent programming. The

Commission should tackle this problem but not to the exclusion of addressing the unique

challenges faced by beIN and other independent programmers.

beIN is an independent programmer not owned or controlled by pay-TV providers or broadcasters. In August of 2012, beIN launched two channels, “beIN SPORTS” and “beIN

SPORTS en Español,” plus a live streaming service now branded ,“beIN SPORTS CONNECT.” beIN offers viewers popular sports content and entertainment across both channels and on beIN

SPORTS CONNECT. A cornerstone of beIN is its unrivaled live soccer coverage, which includes live matches from La Liga, Serie A, Ligue 1 and CONMEBOL/ CONCACAF/CAF

World Cup Qualifiers, as well as news and in-depth analysis of all the top soccer leagues from around the world. In addition to soccer, beIN serves as a haven to fans of motorsports, tennis, rugby, volleyball, Olympic, and boxing, among others. Both channels are currently available to over eighty percent of pay-TV consumers, carried on tiers delivered to just over thirty percent of pay-TV consumers.

beIN believes that the NOI defines an “independent programmer” too narrowly as “one that is not vertically integrated with a MVPD.”1 As representatives of the broadcast industry point out, most broadcasters would fall into this category.2 It simply cannot be the Commission’s intent to express concern for the negotiating leverage of major broadcaster-affiliated programming juggernauts, such as ESPN, a Disney subsidiary sharing common ownership with the ABC television network and the ABC owned-and-operated local broadcast stations. Such a definition would not preserve or increase source diversity among smaller, niche programming

1 Notice at n.4. 2 NAB Comments at 2. 3 services. Several cable and satellite TV providers correctly point to the bundling practices of the largest broadcast conglomerates,3 which beIN agrees share significant blame for the crowding out of independent programmers.

To reflect market reality, the Commission should define “independent” such that programmers with an attributable ownership interest held either by MVPDs or broadcasters are not considered to be independent sources of content. There is precedent for the Commission defining non-independent programmers based on elements other than vertical integration with a

MVPD.4 beIN suggests that the Commission take similar action in this and other dockets by broadening the applicable definition in order to better differentiate between programmers that have, and those that lack, maximum leverage with distributors. Doing so will allow the

Commission to target any pro-competitive action at the truly independent programmers facing the greatest challenges in reaching and serving consumers.

III. DIVERSITY OF OWNERSHIP THROUGH INDEPENDENT NETWORKS ENHANCES COMPETITION AND CHOICE IN CRITICAL SPORTS AND MULTICULTURAL FORMATS .

As some commenters point out, the goal of a diverse video marketplace is well established in the Communications Act and through decades of Commission policy, yet is

3 See, e.g., ACA at 20; Aspire at 3; AT&T at 11-12; HITN at 5; Verizon at 1. 4 See Applications of Comcast Corporation, General Electric Company and NBC Universal, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, Federal Communications Commission, MB Doc. No. 10-56, (rel. Jan. 20, 2011) (“Comcast/NBCU”) at ¶ 122, n. 292 (requiring Comcast to “neighborhood” independent news channels with all other news channels, and defining “independent” to mean, among other things, “unaffiliated with one of the top 15 programming networks, as measured by annual revenues”).

4 threatened by the status quo in today’s Pay-TV market.5 This is particularly acute in the critical formats sports and multicultural programming.

The Commission has recognized that sports programming is among the highest-rated in the video market and a critical element of the video marketplace,6 leading the Commission to take action in multiple proceedings to ensure that vertically integrated Regional Sports Networks were widely available to competing providers.7 This, in turn, means that competition and diversity among sports programmers enhances competition among distribution platforms, all to the benefit of consumers. Similarly, the Commission has found that the public interest is served when a variety of multicultural, minority-niche oriented programming is available to the public and has promoted diversity of ownership.8

According to Nielsen data (available upon request), beIN serves both sports and multicultural audiences. Soccer continues to grow in popularity across all demographics in the

U.S. To Latino and multicultural audiences in the U.S., it was and remains a major attraction. beIN’s experience reflects these trends. Despite its relatively young age and the obstacles faced by independent programmers, beIN has solid and growing ratings among demographic groups

5 See, e.g., Free Press Comments at 3 (“Independent and diverse programmers face higher barriers to distribution than incumbent and vertically integrated programmers do, often as a result of structural racial and gender inequities built into our media landscape by public policies.”). 6 See Sports Blackout Rules, Report and Order, Federal Communications Commission, MB Doc. No. 12-3 (Rel. Sept. 30, 2014) at ¶ 25 (“[W]e note that NFL games are consistently the highest rated programs on broadcast television.”). 7 See, e.g., Comcast/NBCU at n.107 (citing DIRECTV’s problems carrying the Comcast-owned sports network “Versus”); News Corporation and Liberty Media Corporation, Memorandum Opinion and Order, Federal Communications Commission, MB Doc. No. 07-18 (Rel. Feb. 26, 2008) at ¶ 68; News Corporation and Liberty Media Corporation, Memorandum Opinion and Order, Federal Communications Commission, MB Doc. No. 07-18 (Rel. Feb. 26, 2008) at ¶ 79. 8 See Promoting Diversification of Ownership in the Broadcasting Services, Report and Order, Federal Communications Commission, MB Doc. No. 07-294 (Rel. Jan. 8, 2016) at ¶ 1 (“[T]he Commission has a long history of promulgating rules and regulations designed to foster diversity in terms of minority and female ownership in particular”). 5 nationwide, while significantly over-indexing among Latino audiences. In 2015, American soccer fans saw over 9,000 total hours (about 378 days) of live national soccer programming from more than 20 networks, of which 36% was viewed in English and 64% was viewed in

Spanish. beIN provided more live soccer than any other network: 32%, or 2,880 total live hours.

The competitive ability of beIN to secure and expand distribution therefore impacts consumers of sports generally, and Latino/multicultural audiences in particular.

IV. MOST-FAVORED-NATION (“MFN”) CLAUSES CURTAIL INDEPENDENT PROGRAMMERS’ ABILITY TO EXPAND DISTRIBUTION AND INCREASE REVENUES.

Some commenters assert in this proceeding that MFN clauses serve pro-consumer, pro- competitive purposes.9 beIN disagrees. MFN clauses, stated simply, give a Pay-TV distributor the right to receive the best rates, terms, and conditions negotiated between a given programmer and any other video platform, often without the requirement to provide value in exchange.

MFNs also may severely restrict the conditions that can serve as the basis for the best rates and terms. MFNs therefore impose costs on programmers without providing incremental benefits, limiting the programmers’ ability to expand distribution and revenue opportunities, while curtailing innovative business arrangements. They operate to the sole benefit of the distributor, which automatically receives a discount in license fees or improvement in non-economic benefits any time the programmer enters an agreement with another distributor on better terms.

Moreover, and perhaps most telling, it appears that larger, well-established programmers affiliated with MVPDs or broadcasters do not endure MFNs as burdensome as those imposed on small, independent programmers.

9 Comcast at 26; AT&T at 4, 12-13. 6

MFN clauses present independent programmers with a Hobbesian choice of either a) expanding much-needed distribution on other carriers and suffering a reduction in license fees as a result, b) foregoing distribution opportunities in order to maintain license fee revenues with its existing distributors, or c) risking their distribution entirely as a result of potential breach of contract. The independent programmer suffers under any of these scenarios, either through lower revenues that result in fewer investments in original content and marketing, or forgone distribution opportunities that result in the same negative effects.

The MFN arises in the affiliation agreement through which a programmer grants a copyright license to the MVPD in consideration of some benefit, typically a license fee. The

MVPD, in the course of negotiating the affiliation agreement, typically demands an MFN as a condition to any distribution on its platform. MFNs generally take two forms, unconditional and conditional:

Unconditional MFN: Regardless of what other value the independent network received in exchange for a lower rate, such as better penetration, channel placement, promotion, resolution (HD or SD), or any other parameter, the MVPD holding the MFN is entitled to the lowest rate paid by the programmer. This means that the MVPD receives something of value (a lower rate) without having to provide anything of value, such as wider distribution to its subscribers.

Conditional MFN: The distributor is entitled to the lowest prevailing rate only under certain conditions, such as placing the network on the most widely available programming tier.

Even if the independent network succeeds in negotiating a conditional MFN, however, the

MVPD typically will carve out certain items of value that do not apply, effectively creating a back door to an unconditional MFN. 7

Impact of MFN Clauses

The MFN clauses described above limit beIN’s ability to launch new services, secure the widest possible distribution on MVPD platforms, along with the revenues from typical per- subscriber fees, and secure distribution on new, innovative online platforms. For example, a typical carve-out from the so-called conditional MFN is the exclusion of other MVPDs’ agreements to carry new networks created by the independent programmer. In other words, if the independent network enters a distribution agreement with distributor (x) that includes such a provision, then agrees with distributor (y) to lower the license fee in exchange for carrying a new network, distributor (x) would be entitled to the lower rate, but not be required to carry the additional network. This limits the independent network’s ability to achieve economies of scale by launching new networks.

MFN provisions have precluded independent programmers from reaching new audiences through innovative, Over-the-Top (“OTT”) services. beIN has been approached by emerging,

OTT video distributors with offers of carriage at a lower fee than that paid by the major MVPDs, and distribution on smaller, “skinny bundles” of channel packages. This would require beIN, however, to offer that same, lower per-subscriber fee to its existing Pay-TV distributors, thereby reducing a key source of revenue. No rational programmer would accept such a trade-off, regardless of the importance of the emerging market for OTT video services. This ultimately tends to force the independent programmer to stay in its lane of traditional pay-TV, foregoing opportunities to promote its content to new audiences and grow new revenue streams.

Similarly, MFNs have thwarted beIN’s ability to expand distribution on other traditional

MVPD platforms. Some Pay-TV companies have offered to carry beIN very broadly, but on a reduced license-fee basis. As in the example of the OTT provider, the independent network 8 often cannot accept such an offer because doing so would force a rate reduction across all platforms operating under an MFN.

Some commenters argue that MFNs actually increase the likelihood that independent networks will be carried10 or benefit independent programmers through longer-term contracts,11 among other things. Not so. The reduced license fee revenue resulting from a typical MFN is a total loss to the independent programmer. Advertising revenue, for example, simply cannot make up the difference.

Advertising is driven by two factors: homes passed and viewership. Even if the number of homes passed increases, without a corresponding increase in license fees, the programmer cannot invest as much in original content. This means that viewership (ratings) generated by high-quality and costly original programming remain harder to achieve for the independent programmer. Moreover, while a mature programmer should have a roughly 1:1 ratio of license fees to advertising revenues, in the early stages of a new network, the ratio is closer to 3:1, compounding the problem of reduced license fee revenues under MFNs faced by independent programmers.

Thus, the independent programmer is caught in a vicious cycle. On the one hand, it must accept increased distribution but at ever lower license fees. On the other hand, its ability to grow an audience and serve its community is hampered by obstacles to further investment in high- quality, original programming. The result for the programmer is an inherent competitive disadvantage and restricted ability to serve consumers. For American video consumers, including in the key formats of sports and multicultural programming, particularly minority

10 Comcast at 27. 11 AT&T at 12-13. 9 niche audiences seeking outlets that serve their particular needs, the result is less choice among competing programming sources—sometimes no options at all.

V. ALTERNATIVE DISTRIBUTION METHOD (“ADM”) CONTRACT PROVISIONS PREVENT INDEPENDENT PROGRAMMERS FROM REACHING NEW AUDIENCES AND DEVELOPING NEW REVENUE STREAMS.

The video marketplace is undergoing significant change, with consumers increasingly viewing content where, when, and how they choose, on myriad platforms and devices. Against this backdrop, Pay-TV distributors logically want to protect their “investment in programming”12 such that their subscribers who pay a monthly fee to receive a benefit for that payment. If the identical video content for which the subscriber pays a cable, telco, or satellite provider were available without charge on the Internet, the MVPD would lose subscribers. Some restrictions on programmers’ distribution of content on alternative platforms therefore makes sense. Many

“authentication” practices, for example, allow only the Pay-TV provider’s subscribers to view a network’s linear programming stream online, ensuring that the Pay-TV provider remains in control of online distribution and that online offerings do not cannibalize the paying subscriber base.

However, the ADM restrictions that many MVPDs have imposed on beIN often go beyond what seems necessary to preserve the value proposition of the Pay-TV service, and impose much tighter limits than those faced by non-independent programmers. Far from being what Comcast and AT&T call just another form of “windowing”13 (e.g., movies released first in theaters and then distributed on cable TV), these ADM clauses hinder beIN’s and other

12 AT&T at 13. 13 Comcast at 30. 10 independent programmers’ competitiveness in a rapidly changing, vibrant marketplace. By contrast, the non-independent major programmers apparently are free to innovate. Ultimately, the consumer suffers because independent programmers’ content is significantly less available than it could be, thereby restricting video choice and competition.

ADM restrictions faced by beIN have included restrictions on the number of hours or types of content beIN may offer online. Some distributors prevent or make difficult beIN’s ability to offer games online that do not appear on the linear network. In a stark example of how such restrictions can disproportionately impact minority niche audiences, some distributors have required that content “highly rated” among “Hispanics” not be distributed online. This demonstrates how an ADM restriction imposed by a Pay-TV provider for its own economic benefit restricts the ability of consumers, in this case Latinos, from enjoying the benefits of competing video sources on alternative distribution platforms.

VI. INDEPENDENT PROGRAMMERS SUFFER DISPROPORTIONATE OBSTACLES TO SECURING DISTRIBUTION, COMPENSATION, AND PROMOTION.

The Commission asks whether the types of restrictions described above are more common to independent programmers.14 They are. Based on publicly available information, along with years of executives’ experience in the television industry, beIN believes that many of the obstacles faced by independent programmers are not encountered by other content creators, especially those owned or controlled by broadcast conglomerates.

MFN Restrictions

14 Notice at ¶ 11. 11

Any cable/satellite network co-owned by a MVPD or broadcast licensee enjoys far greater negotiating leverage than do independent networks. In the context of launching new networks, ESPN (owned by broadcaster Disney) and FX (owned by broadcaster 21st Century

Fox), appear to have less restrictive MFN clauses than does beIN. Unlike beIN, which often faces MFN restrictions on its ability to launch new programming services, the large, non- independent networks and their parent companies launch multiple new networks and receive distribution as a matter of course--ESPN, ESPN2, ESPNews, ESPNU, ESPN Deportes, Fox

Sports 1, Fox Sports 2, and the list goes on. It appears that independent sports networks like beIN do not face a level playing field when it comes to conditional MFNs.

These networks also seem to have more permissive rate provisions in their MFN clauses.

For example, if an independent network buys promotional advertising on a large cable system, that expenditure is counted in the “net effective rate” paid in programming fees (i.e., [fee paid by cable operator] – [advertising payment by programmer] = net rate). Other distributors will exercise their MFN to demand the same net effective rate from the programmer. By contrast, the network owned by a large broadcast media conglomerate probably will have a carve-out from its

MFN provision under which advertising payments are excluded from any calculation of the net effective rate. The result is that the independent programmer gets paid less for the same type of content.

ADM Restrictions

Non-independent programmers do not have the same restrictive ADM provisions as does beIN. Premiere broadcast networks have begun offering their content in ways that would violate the typical ADM clause encountered by beIN. The clearest example of this dichotomy between non-independent programmers and beIN is the CBS All Access service. CBS All Access allows 12 subscribers to stream the local live CBS TV feed in many media markets without a pay TV subscription.15 By contrast, under its current ADM restrictions, beIN cannot stream its entire programming feed online using a stand-alone online subscription offering.

Perhaps the most glaring difference between what CBS All Access offers and what beIN may provide online is the distribution of highly rated, original content. A major selling point of

All Access is the exclusive availability of a new Star Trek series, sure to be a hit when it “airs” in

2017. While the first episode will air on CBS broadcast TV, the rest of the episodes will only be available only on All Access.16 An independent programmer typically would not be able to offer its highly rated programming online, as illustrated by the example of the ADM clause prohibiting beIN from putting content online that is particularly popular among “Hispanics.”17 Moreover,

CBS’ decision to restrict guaranteed ratings-earner Star Trek to streaming has the opposite effect of the ADM constraints typically imposed on independent programmers, compelling viewers to watch content online rather than on a Pay-TV service. Thus, in contrast to the digital Wild West enjoyed by CBS and other non-independent programmers, the ADM clause tends to keep beIN’s programming within the confines of Pay-TV, hindering beIN’s ability to compete in the emerging market of OTT programming.

A similar example from the sports programming context is ESPN’s streaming service,

WatchESPN. Users can view live streams of ESPN and all of its sister channels, as well as

15 CBS All Access FAQ:“I’m an All Access subscriber AND verified through my TV provider. What’s the difference?”, CBS, (available at https://cbsi.secure.force.com/CBSi/ViewArticle_allaccess?popup=true&aId=kA0E0000000blu5 &categories=CBS_Entertainment%3AAll_Access&template=template_cbsvod&referer=cbs.com /vod&data=&cfs=SFS_AA). There are some exceptions, such as NFL games aired on the local station. 16 See New Star Trek Television Series Coming In 2017 To CBS All Access, CBS, (available at http://www.cbs.com/shows/star-trek-series/). 17 See supra at 11. 13 replays of certain broadcasts. All of this content is available to users that log in via their MVPD.

Although beIN also can offer authenticated content online, it faces many more restrictions than

ESPN apparently does.

WatchESPN’s live TV feature falls within the scope of live online streaming often found in the ADM clauses encountered by beIN. Any sports programmer that wants to use streaming relies on the live stream because unlike episodic TV shows, viewer interest in sports games after they air is limited. ESPN can do it; beIN cannot.

The quantity restrictions in typical ADM clauses likely would be violated by

WatchESPN. Almost all of ESPN’s content is offered for streaming. This includes ten channels constantly playing popular sports content, including NFL, MLB and NBA games. ESPN may offer this expansive amount of sports content online. beIN cannot.

Watch ESPN’s coverage of high profile sporting events, like NFL Monday Night

Football and highly-rated shows like SportsCenter, along with exclusive online content in popular international sports like cricket,18 would violate an independent programmer’s typical

ADM quality provision as well. Such provisions usually prohibit showing highly rated programming online, as illustrated by beIN’s inability under some contracts to put content online that is particularly popular among “Hispanics.” Something like Monday Night Football, a highly rated national television event, would certainly be barred from streaming by an ADM quality provision.

The other broadcast networks offer similar services, accessible with a verification from a pay TV provider (“authenticated”). NBC’s website offers a live stream of its current broadcast, if

18 See ESPN cricket subscription service (available at http://www.espncricinfo.com/). 14 the consumer logs in with their Pay-TV provider.19 They also offer on-demand access to primetime and late night programming. Recent episodes of current shows are available for free, while older episodes require a login with a pay-TV provider. Select classic shows are offered as well without a login.20 By contrast, beIN has been forced to accept contractual restrictions that would prevent this type of offering.

All of these broadcaster-affiliated networks are carried by all of the major MVPDs. And all of their online services would violate the typical ADM restrictions encountered by beIN.

These non-independent networks benefit from the bargaining leverage enjoyed by broadcaster- affiliated programming services, leverage an independent programmer never can attain. Thus, the competitive disadvantages of independent programmers are manifested in fewer choices and less innovation online. The American consumer suffers from the resulting lack of robust competition.

Advertising and Distribution

In general, a programmer must pass a certain threshold number of homes to achieve

Nielsen ratings and the advertising revenues that come with them. Advertisers want to reach consumers, which in the case of Pay-TV is a function of how many homes have access to a network, and how many of those homes actually watch that network. National advertisers that make large, nationwide advertising buys, such as General Motors, Bank of America, or

McDonald’s, are key to the cable/satellite network. Almost all local advertising dollars are spent on local broadcast or local cable ad avails, so the pay-TV network is aiming to secure a piece of the national advertising pie. Generally speaking, national advertisers must see 30-40 million,

19 See NBC Live, NBC (available at http://www.nbc.com/live). 20 See generally NBC Video, NBC (available at http://www.nbc.com/video). 15

sometimes 60 million homes passed by a network before even considering an advertising

purchase on that network. Given these thresholds, the consolidation among MVPDs means that

any one of the top distributors are in a gatekeeping position, deciding whether a new,

independent programming service lives or dies.

Compounding the problems described above, even if a MVPD carries an independent

programmer, the distribution tends to be on a less “penetrated” programming tier than that of

non-independent programmers. This is because broadcast conglomerates require carriage of all

of their channels in lower tiers, crowding out the independent networks. In other words, the

independent network passes fewer homes, receiving less revenue from per-subscriber fees. beIN

often is not carried on the most highly penetrated programming tier. In the case of a large

distributor that also owns sports programming, such as Comcast or AT&T, beIN typically finds

itself disadvantaged in tier placement, promotion, electronic guide placement, and otherwise vis-

a-vis the non-independent sports programming channels.

In the case of independent sports programmers like beIN, the distribution challenges can

harm a network’s ability to acquire the all-important sports rights. Independent sports

programmers face a competitive disadvantage when bargaining for sports rights because, even if

they offer identical dollar-amount bids, an MVPD- or broadcaster-owned network can offer

superior distribution. The independent programmer will lose to the non-independent

programmer offering the same cash bid. All of these current marketplace realities show how the

imbalance in negotiating leverage between major MVPDs and independent programmers

undermines the competitiveness of such programmers and therefore the diversity and

competition among myriad voices within the video marketplace.

VII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS. 16

beIN and other independent programmers provide a critical source of competition and diversity in a video market where MVPDs consolidate and technological innovations proliferate. beIN and other independent programmers often endure disproportionately onerous contractual terms that tend to hinder the programmer’s ability to serve audiences, especially in the critical areas of sports and multicultural programming. Broadcast conglomerates exacerbate the problems faced by beIN and other independent networks through their bundling practices. beIN agrees with commenters that assert the Commission’s legal authority to act21 and believes that the Commission should address the market imbalances and competitive harms to consumers imposed by MFN and ADM clauses that disproportionately impact truly independent programmers. In particular, beIN recommends that the Commission issue a ban on so-called non-conditional MFNs and conditional MFNs that have the same effect, along with all forms of

ADM restrictions. beIN respectfully submits these Reply Comments in the hope that the

Commission will use the facts presented herein to enhance competition and diversity in the video market.

Respectfully submitted,

By:__/s/______

David R. Goodfriend

Dated: April 19, 2016

21 See INSP at 26; ITTA at 8, 9; RFD-TV at 31, 32; Alliance for Community Media et al. 17