Blockchain: The Birth of Decentralized Governance Benito Arruñada* and Luis Garicano** April 10, 2018*** Abstract By allowing networks to split, decentralized blockchain platforms protect members against hold up, but hinder coordination, given that adaptation decisions are ultimately decentralized. The current solutions to improve coordination, based on “premining” cryptocoins, taxing members and incentivizing developers, are insufficient. For blockchain to fulfill its promise and outcompete centralized firms, it needs to develop new forms of “soft” decentralized governance (anarchic, aristocratic, democratic, and autocratic) that allow networks to avoid bad equilibria. Keywords: blockchain, platforms, networks, hold‐up, coordination, relational capital, incomplete contracts, decentralized governance. JEL codes: D23, L12, L22, L86. * Pompeu Fabra University and Barcelona GSE. E‐mail:
[email protected]. ** IE Business School, London School of Economics and CEPR. E‐mail:
[email protected]. *** We thank Eric Brousseau, Miguel Espinosa, and Spyros Terovitis for valuable comments; Jin Lee, Luis Rayo and participants at the Workshop on Economic Governance of Data‐ driven Markets held at TILEC (Tilburg University), the Blockchain, Law & Policy Workshop held at the University of Amsterdam, and seminars at CUNEF (Madrid), the JRC of the European Commission (Seville) and the Department of Economics (University of Vigo) for useful discussions; and the research assistantship of Juan Barenys. This work received support from the Spanish Government through grant ECO2017‐85763‐R and the Severo Ochoa Program for Centers of Excellence in R&D (SEV‐2015‐0563). 1. Introduction The contractual technology on which the market economy is based has evolved over a period of two thousand years. Blockchain promises to overhaul it, by allowing for the creation of open, distributed, secure, encrypted and programmable digital ledgers and enabling secure and fully decentralized “P2P” trade.