DOCSLIB.ORG

Enhancing the Security of Centralised and Distributed Payments

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text

Load more

Enhancing the Security of Centralised and Distributed Payments Submitted by Danushka Jayasinghe for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of the Royal Holloway, University of London 2017 Declaration I, Danushka Jayasinghe, hereby declare that this thesis and the work presented in it is entirely my own. Where I have consulted the work of others, this is always clearly stated. Signed . (Danushka Jayasinghe) Date: 1 Publications The research carried out has led to the publication and presentation of a number of academic papers in international conferences. 1. D. Jayasinghe, K. Markantonakis and K. Mayes, \Optimistic Fair-Exchange with Anonymity for Bitcoin Users," In The 11th International Conference on e-Business Engineering (ICEBE), Guangzhou, China, pp.44-51, IEEE, 2014. 2. D. Jayasinghe, R. N. Akram, K. Markantonakis, K. Rantos and K. Mayes, \En- hancing EMV Online PIN Verification,” In The 14th International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications (Trustcom/ BigDataSE/ISPA), pp.808-817, Helsinki, Finland, IEEE, 2015. 3. D. Jayasinghe, K. Markantonakis, I. Gurulian, R. N. Akram and K. Mayes, \Ex- tending EMV Tokenised Payments to Offline-Environments," In The 15th Inter- national Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Commu- nications (Trustcom/BigDataSE/ISPA), pp.443-450, Tianjin, China, IEEE, 2016. 4. D. Jayasinghe, K. Markantonakis, R. N. Akram and K. Mayes, \Enhancing EMV Tokenisation with Dynamic Transaction Tokens," In 12th International Work- shop: Radio Frequency Identification and IoT Security (RFIDSec), pp.107-122, Hong Kong, Springer, 2016. 5. D. Jayasinghe, S. Cobourne, K. Markantonakis, R. N. Akram and K. Mayes, \Philanthropy On The Blockchain," In The 11th WISTP International Confer- ence on Information Security Theory and Practice (WISTP), Heraklion, Greece, Springer, 2017. 2 Abstract In the last few decades, the way humans engage in payment transactions and the tools they use to transact with each other have evolved dramatically. Advancement in cryptography, information security, computer networking, distributed computing, etc. provides the required tools for modern day payment solution providers to design payment technologies that can be used to carry out convenient payment transactions. Yet, the financial loss associated with financial fraud, payment related attacks and data breaches that directly affect the financial institutions, merchants and consumers is significant. Because of this, an important development in the payment evolution is the consideration towards security of payment transactions. The main focus of this thesis is to enhance the security of both EMV (Europay MasterCard Visa) based centralised payments and Bitcoin/blockchain based distributed payments while showing more emphasis on new and emerging payment technologies such as: mobile payments, tokenisation and distributed ledger technology. EMV is a standard that provides interoperability to Chip & PIN, Contactless and Tokenised payment transactions in a global scale. The thesis, investigates the current EMV payment architectures to identify potential weaknesses that pose a threat to the security of payment transactions. In our research, we were able to identify five main issues related to EMV Online PIN Verification in two deployment methods and three main issues related to EMV Tokenisation that raise security concerns. We discuss potential attack scenarios, and propose solutions that address the identified issues and enhance the security of payment transactions. The proposed solutions are subject to mechanical formal analysis and practical implementation was carried out to obtain performance measurements. The thesis, also investigates payments in distributed payment systems such as Bit- coin and blockchains. We identify issues such as fair-exchange related to distributed payments and propose solutions to improve security and anonymity. Furthermore, we explore how blockchain technology can be leveraged to enhance the security in other payment transactions such as: donation payments, humanitarian aid and SMS-based mobile payments. Finally, the thesis provides conclusion of this research and suggesting future research directions. 3 Acknowledgement The completion of this thesis would not have been possible without the support of a number of wonderful people. First and foremost, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisor Prof. Konstantinos Markantonakis for his supervision and guidance throughout my PhD. I am grateful for his approachability, invaluable reviews and feedback. I would also like to thank my advisor, Prof. Keith Mayes for his support during the PhD. I would like to thank Dr. Raja Naeem Akram for his insightful reviews and com- ments on the thesis. I am also grateful to Sheila Cobourne for her reviews and support throughout my PhD. Special thanks to all my colleagues at the Smart Card & IoT Security Centre: Benoit Ducray, Iakovos Gurulian, Assad Umar, Lazaros Kyrillidis, Sara Abu-Ghazalah, Hafizah Mansor, Mehari Msgna, Rashedul Hassan, Robert Lee and Carlton Shepherd for the many interesting discussions. A very special thank goes to my beloved wife Madushani for her amazing support, love and care during my PhD. Your encouragement was a key ingredient for completing this milestone. I would also like to thank my parents and my two sisters for their love, support and encouragement during this time. Even though there isn't enough space here to mention all your names, I would also like to thank my friends, relatives, in-laws and others who have provided me help and support in any shape or form during this remarkable journey. Finally, I would also like to thank the UK Cards Association (subset of UK Finance since July 2017) and the ISG - Smart Card & IoT Security Centre for financially spon- soring my PhD. The invaluable discussions, recommendations and feedback provided by David Baker and Bill Reding from the UK Cards Association throughout this work are much appreciated. 4 Contents 1 Introduction 15 1.1 Motivation and Challenges.......................... 16 1.2 Aim and Objectives............................. 17 1.3 Contributions................................. 17 1.4 Thesis Outline................................ 20 I Background 23 2 Payment Systems and Formal Analysis Tools 24 2.1 EMV based Centralised Payments..................... 25 2.1.1 EMV................................. 25 2.1.2 EMV Online PIN Verification.................... 26 2.1.3 Financial Fraud........................... 28 2.1.4 EMV Tokenisation.......................... 29 2.1.5 Current Operating Environment of EMV Tokenisation...... 30 2.2 Bitcoin/Blockchain based Distributed Payments.............. 31 2.2.1 Blockchain Technology........................ 33 2.2.2 Bitcoin................................ 35 2.2.3 Existing SMS Payment Systems and Bitcoin........... 37 2.3 Anonymous and Fair-exchange Payment Schemes............. 37 2.3.1 Anonymous Payment Schemes................... 38 2.3.2 Fair-exchange Schemes........................ 38 2.4 Formal Analysis Tools............................ 40 2.4.1 CasperFDR.............................. 41 2.4.2 Scyther................................ 42 2.5 Summary................................... 43 5 II Improvements for EMV based Centralised Payments 45 3 Improving Online PIN Verification Security 46 3.1 Introduction.................................. 47 3.1.1 Two OPV Deployment Methods.................. 48 3.1.2 Problem Statement.......................... 50 3.1.3 Contributions............................. 51 3.2 Potential Concerns.............................. 52 3.2.1 Operating Environment and Assumptions............. 52 3.2.2 Attacker's Capability......................... 53 3.2.3 Two Potential Risk Scenarios.................... 54 3.3 Proposed Solutions.............................. 56 3.3.1 Card based Solutions......................... 60 3.3.2 Terminal based Solutions...................... 62 3.3.3 Binding of OPV and Transaction Authorisation.......... 64 3.3.4 Our Experience Related to EMV Specifications.......... 64 3.4 Analysis.................................... 65 3.4.1 Security Analysis........................... 65 3.4.2 Practical Implementation...................... 68 3.4.3 Mechanical Formal Analysis..................... 69 3.5 Summary................................... 69 4 Improving OPV Security in Unified Authorisation Method 71 4.1 Introduction.................................. 72 4.2 Potential Concerns.............................. 72 4.2.1 Two Potential Risk Scenarios.................... 73 4.3 Proposed Solutions.............................. 75 4.3.1 Card Based Solutions........................ 76 4.3.2 Terminal based Solution....................... 80 4.3.3 Binding of OPV and Transaction Authorisation.......... 82 4.4 Analysis.................................... 83 4.4.1 Security Analysis........................... 83 4.4.2 Practical Implementation...................... 85 4.4.3 Mechanical Formal Analysis..................... 86 4.5 Summary................................... 86 6 5 Tokenisation based Protocol for Offline Payment Transactions 88 5.1 Introduction.................................. 89 5.1.1 Problem Statement.......................... 89 5.1.2 Contributions............................. 90 5.2 Offline Operating Environment and Adversary's Capability....... 91 5.3 Proposed Solution.............................. 92 5.3.1 Protocol Assumptions........................ 93 5.3.2 Setup Phase.............................. 93 5.3.3 Payment Phase...........................
Recommended publications
  • White Paper of Bitcoin Ultimatum Introduction

    White Paper of Bitcoin Ultimatum Introduction

    White Paper of Bitcoin Ultimatum Introduction 1. Problematic of the Blockchain 4. Bitcoin Ultimatum Architecture industry 4.1. Network working principle 1.1. Transactions Anonymity 4.1.1. Main Transaction Types 1.2. Insufficient Development of Key Aspects of the 4.1.1.1. Public transactions Technology 4.1.1.2. Private transactions 1.3. Centralization 4.1.2. Masternode Network 1.4. Mining pools and commission manipulation 4.2. How to become a validator or masternode in 1.5. Decrease in Transaction Speeds BTCU 4.3. Network Scaling Principle 2. BTCU main solutions and concepts 4.4. Masternodes and Validators Ranking System 4.5. Smart Contracts 2.1. Consensus algorithm basis 4.6. Anonymization principle 2.2. Leasing and Staking 4.7. Staking and Leasing 2.3. Projects tokenization and DeFi 4.7.1. Staking 2.4. Transactions Privacy 4.7.2. Leasing 2.5. Atomic Swaps 4.7.2 Multileasing 4.8. BTCU Technical Specifications 3. Executive Summary 4.8.1. Project Stack 4.8.2. Private key generation algorithm 5. Bitcoin Ultimatum Economy 5.1. Initial Supply and Airdrop 5.2. Leasing Economy 5.3. Masternodes and Validators Commission 5.4. Transactions Fee 6. Project Roadmap 7. Legal Introduction The cryptocurrency market is inextricably tied to the blockchain – its fundamental and underlying technology. The modern market is brimming with an abundance of blockchain protocols, algorithms, and concepts, all of which have fostered the development of a wide variety of services and applications. The modern blockchain market offers users an alternative to both established financial systems and ecosystems/infrastructures of applications and services.
  • Aggregate Cash System: a Cryptographic Investigation Of

    Aggregate Cash System: a Cryptographic Investigation Of

    Aggregate Cash Systems: A Cryptographic Investigation of Mimblewimble Georg Fuchsbauer1,2, Michele Orrù2,1, and Yannick Seurin3 1 Inria 2 École normale supérieure, CNRS, PSL University, Paris, France 3 ANSSI, Paris, France {georg.fuchsbauer, michele.orru}@ens.fr [email protected] Abstract. Mimblewimble is an electronic cash system proposed by an anonymous author in 2016. It combines several privacy-enhancing techniques initially envisioned for Bitcoin, such as Confidential Transactions (Maxwell, 2015), non-interactive merging of transactions (Saxena, Misra, Dhar, 2014), and cut-through of transaction inputs and outputs (Maxwell, 2013). As a remarkable consequence, coins can be deleted once they have been spent while maintaining public verifiability of the ledger, which is not possible in Bitcoin. This results in tremendous space savings for the ledger and efficiency gains for new users, who must verify their view of the system. In this paper, we provide a provable-security analysis for Mimblewimble. We give a precise syntax and formal security definitions for an abstraction of Mimblewimble that we call an aggregate cash system. We then formally prove the security of Mimblewimble in this definitional framework. Our results imply in particular that two natural instantiations (with Pedersen commitments and Schnorr or BLS signatures) are provably secure against inflation and coin theft under standard assumptions. Keywords: Mimblewimble, Bitcoin, commitments, aggregate signatures. 1 Introduction Bitcoin and the UTXO model. Proposed in 2008 and launched early 2009, Bitcoin [Nak08] is a decentralized payment system in which transactions are registered in a distributed and publicly verifiable ledger called a blockchain. Bitcoin departs from traditional account-based payment systems where transactions specify an amount moving from one account to another.
  • Review Articles

    Review Articles

    review articles DOI:10.1145/3372115 system is designed to achieve common Software weaknesses in cryptocurrencies security goals: transaction integrity and availability in a highly distributed sys- create unique challenges in responsible tem whose participants are incentiv- revelations. ized to cooperate.38 Users interact with the cryptocurrency system via software BY RAINER BÖHME, LISA ECKEY, TYLER MOORE, “wallets” that manage the cryptograph- NEHA NARULA, TIM RUFFING, AND AVIV ZOHAR ic keys associated with the coins of the user. These wallets can reside on a local client machine or be managed by an online service provider. In these appli- cations, authenticating users and Responsible maintaining confidentiality of crypto- graphic key material are the central se- curity goals. Exchanges facilitate trade Vulnerability between cryptocurrencies and between cryptocurrencies and traditional forms of money. Wallets broadcast cryptocur- Disclosure in rency transactions to a network of nodes, which then relay transactions to miners, who in turn validate and group Cryptocurrencies them together into blocks that are ap- pended to the blockchain. Not all cryptocurrency applications revolve around payments. Some crypto- currencies, most notably Ethereum, support “smart contracts” in which general-purpose code can be executed with integrity assurances and recorded DESPITE THE FOCUS on operating in adversarial on the distributed ledger. An explosion of token systems has appeared, in environments, cryptocurrencies have suffered a litany which particular functionality is ex- of security and privacy problems. Sometimes, these pressed and run on top of a cryptocur- rency.12 Here, the promise is that busi- issues are resolved without much fanfare following ness logic can be specified in the smart a disclosure by the individual who found the hole.
  • Segwit2x &#8211

    Segwit2x –

    SegWit2x – A New Statement The Overwhelming power of SegWit2x In order to safeguard the community from an undesired chain split, the upgrade should be overwhelming, but it’s not enough. It should also ‘appear’ as overwhelming. People, businesses and services needs to be certain about what is going to happen and the risks if they won’t follow. My impression is that still too many speaking english people in the western world think the upgrade will be abandoned before or immediately after block 494784 is mined, thus they are going to simply ignore it. That could lead to unprepared patch up and confusion, while naïve users risk to harm themselves. For this reason and for the sake of the Bitcoin community as a whole, we need to show again, clearly and publicly the extent of the support to SegWit2x. We also need to commit ourselves in a widespread communication campaign. I know this is not a strict technical matter, but it could help a lot avoiding technical issues in the future. What we have to do First, we need a new statement from the original NYA signers and all the business, firms and individuals who joined the cause later. That statement should be slightly different from the original NYA though, and I am explaining why. We all know that what Bitcoin is will be ultimately determined by market forces, comprehensive of all the stakeholders involved: businesses, miners, users, developers, traders, investors, holders etc. Each category has its own weight in the process, and everybody has incentives in following the market.
  • Electronic Cash, Decentralized Exchange, and the Constitution

    Electronic Cash, Decentralized Exchange, and the Constitution

    Electronic Cash, Decentralized Exchange, and the Constitution Peter Van Valkenburgh March 2019 coincenter.org Peter Van Valkenburgh, Electronic Cash, Decentralized Exchange, and the Constitution, ​ ​ Coin Center Report, Mar. 2019, available at https://coincenter.org/entry/e-cash-dex-constitution Abstract Regulators, law enforcement, and the general public have come to expect that cryptocurrency transactions will leave a public record on a blockchain, and that most cryptocurrency exchanges will take place using centralized businesses that are regulated and surveilled through the Bank Secrecy Act. The emergence of electronic cash and decentralized exchange software challenges these expectations. Transactions need not leave any public record and exchanges can be accomplished peer to peer without using a regulated third party in between. Faced with diminished visibility into cryptocurrency transactions, policymakers may propose new approaches to financial surveillance. Regulating cryptocurrency software developers and individual users of that software under the Bank Secrecy Act would be unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment because it would be a warrantless search and seizure of information private to cryptocurrency users. Furthermore, any law or regulation attempting to ban, require licensing for, or compel the altered publication (e.g. backdoors) of cryptocurrency software ​ ​ would be unconstitutional under First Amendment protections for speech. Author Peter Van Valkenburgh Coin Center [email protected] About Coin Center Coin Center is a non-profit research and advocacy center focused on the public policy issues facing open blockchain technologies such as Bitcoin. Our mission is to build a better understanding of these technologies and to promote a regulatory climate that preserves the freedom to innovate using blockchain technologies.
  • One-Out-Of-Many Proofs: Or How to Leak a Secret and Spend a Coin

    One-Out-Of-Many Proofs: Or How to Leak a Secret and Spend a Coin

    One-out-of-Many Proofs: Or How to Leak a Secret and Spend a Coin Jens Groth1? and Markulf Kohlweiss2 1 University College London 2 Microsoft Research Abstract. We construct a 3-move public coin special honest verifier zero-knowledge proof, a so-called Sigma-protocol, for a list of commit- ments having at least one commitment that opens to 0. It is not required for the prover to know openings of the other commitments. The proof system is efficient, in particular in terms of communication requiring only the transmission of a logarithmic number of commitments. We use our proof system to instantiate both ring signatures and zerocoin, a novel mechanism for bitcoin privacy. We use our Sigma-protocol as a (linkable) ad-hoc group identification scheme where the users have public keys that are commitments and demonstrate knowledge of an opening for one of the commitments to unlinkably identify themselves (once) as belonging to the group. Applying the Fiat-Shamir transform on the group identification scheme gives rise to ring signatures, applying it to the linkable group identification scheme gives rise to zerocoin. Our ring signatures are very small compared to other ring signature schemes and we only assume the users' secret keys to be the discrete logarithms of single group elements so the setup is quite realistic. Sim- ilarly, compared with the original zerocoin protocol we only rely on a weak cryptographic assumption and do not require a trusted setup. A third application of our Sigma protocol is an efficient proof of mem- bership of a secret committed value belonging to a public list of values.
  • Interpretations of Existing Regulation Concerning Icos in Selected European and Asian Countries

    Interpretations of Existing Regulation Concerning Icos in Selected European and Asian Countries

    Interpretations of existing regulation concerning ICOs in selected European and Asian Countries June 2018 osborneclarke.com Private & Confidential Introduction Virtual Currencies have recently been extremely fashionable. Other examples are “Bitwala”, that offers a platform for financial Starting with the “mother” of all virtual currencies, the Bitcoin, which is transactions and a token which, according to its description, is designed currently – accompanied by the media – reaching astronomic prices as an equity investment (in a “digital company”), and “Savedroid”, (the “price” for a Bitcoin is currently1 just under EUR 10,000 and rose which offers a virtual wallet for buying and selling crypto currencies. briefly up to EUR 13,000 at the end of 2017), many other virtual currencies The alleged advantage of an ICO for digital start-ups / founders is that have emerged over the last few years. Trading in virtual currencies (also many members of the crypto industry believe that ICOs and tokens are known as digital currencies or crypto currencies) is booming. A more not subject to regulatory and capital market regulations and are therefore recent development in the crypto industry is the so-called Initial Coin not regulated. Compared to a conventional IPO this could save Offering (“ICO”). Based on a company’s initial public offering (“IPO”) an substantial costs for capital market law support, in particular the ICO represents a new form of corporate financing for digital companies. preparation of a prospectus and avoid any subsequent obligations. The success story around the ICO of the internet browser “brave” in May However, this assessment may often not be correct from a regulatory point 2017 illustrates why an ICO can be attractive for start-ups / founders: of view.
  • BITBOND RESEARCH REPORT Digital Assets2021 Institutional Adoptionof Bitbond July 2021 Research Report

    BITBOND RESEARCH REPORT Digital Assets2021 Institutional Adoptionof Bitbond July 2021 Research Report

    Institutional Adoption of Digital Assets 2021 Bitbond Research Report July 2021 RESEARCH REPORT RESEARCH BITBOND 1 Foreword Capital markets and financial services are currently going through an unprecedented level of change. While fintech companies have been reshaping consumer finance for several years, more recently, this force for change has also arrived in the institutional finance world. Foreword Corporate and investment banks, asset managers, institutional We hope you enjoy reading it and that you will be as excited investors, family offices, and other market participants are as we are when discovering that the institutional adoption becoming increasingly driven by technology. Either to gain a of digital assets is not a future promise but a reality that is competitive advantage, fight decreasing margins, or adapt to already here today. regulatory changes. We thank the entire Bitbond team for putting the hard work As part of this development, financial institutions are increas- into this research piece that it takes to create a full picture of ingly turning to digital assets to take advantage of the vast the status quo. Special thanks go to Bitbond crew members opportunities behind distributed ledger technology (DLT), Felix Stremmer and Henri Falque-Pierrotin, as well as senior blockchain, and decentralized finance (DeFi). At the time of banking analyst Sam Theodore for writing the introduction. publication, the total market capitalization of digital assets is We would equally like to thank all contributors at the around USD 1.4 trillion—a fivefold increase over one year. numerous financial institutions who were so open to sharing their insights with us. Without your input, this report would not While the absolute value may seem insignificant compared have been possible.
  • The Anatomy of a Money-Like Informational Commodity: a Study of Bitcoin by Tim Swanson

    The Anatomy of a Money-Like Informational Commodity: a Study of Bitcoin by Tim Swanson

    The Anatomy of a Money-like Informational Commodity: A Study of Bitcoin By Tim Swanson 1 © Copyright 2014 by Tim Swanson Cover art credit: Matt Thomas and Invisible Order This manuscript is released under the Creative Commons - Attribution 4.0 International license: to copy, transmit, share, adapt, remix, make commercial use of and freely distribute this work. 2 Table of Contents Preface .......................................................................................................................................................... 4 Acknowledgements ...................................................................................................................................... 5 Introduction .................................................................................................................................................. 6 Chapter 1: Bitcoin in theory and practice .................................................................................................... 9 Chapter 2: Public goods.............................................................................................................................. 24 Chapter 3: The Red Queen of Mining ........................................................................................................ 40 Chapter 4: A Bitcoin Gap ............................................................................................................................ 78 Chapter 5: Bitcoins made in China ............................................................................................................
  • Pitch Deck Bitcoin Meister

    Pitch Deck Bitcoin Meister

    Pitch Deck Bitcoin Meister Be your own bank today The Problem • Most Europeans don’t have high quality exchanges to buy Digital Currencies • The majority of Cryptocurrency markets are centralized • The largest cryptocurrency websites are owned by one company The Solution • The Bitcoin Meister exchange will operate under EU regulations Digital currency “banking” • The platform will work with cryptocurrency projects to promote Real World usage • We are partnered with projects and real world benefits, bringing us communities in the thousands Why? • A lot of exchanges have problems with hackers and funds are stolen, we provide a save, easy and secure access to cryptocurrencies • The market for cryptocurrencies is growing. They will be used on a every day basis like fiat money. • People need a personal service which will be covered by our Agents The Product Invest in us What does it do? Our website is a one stop Investing in Bitcoin Meister, will shop for people to satisfy help us build the digital their digital currency needs currency exchange Uniqueness Services Situated in Europe, we are Users can setup Savings building our platform as a DEX Account, use the DEX along with community, not a company Marketplace exchange & trading options MVPs (MVPs already working) OTC The Vision • People become their „own“ bank • You can buy everything with cryptocurrencies • No need for central banks „printing“ new money • Privacy and freedom • People use our services in their everyday life Market Size • Number of Cryptocurrencies: 7675 • Number of Cryptocurrencies:
  • List of Bitcoin Companies

    List of Bitcoin Companies

    List of bitcoin companies This is a list of Wikipedia articles about for-profit companies with notable commercial activities related to bitcoin. Common services are cryptocurrency wallet providers, bitcoin exchanges, payment service providers[a] and venture capital. Other services include mining pools, cloud mining, peer-to-peer lending, exchange-traded funds, over-the-counter trading, gambling, micropayments, affiliates and prediction markets. Headquarters Company Founded Service Notes Refs Country City bitcoin exchange, wallet Binance 2017 Japan Tokyo [1] provider bitcoin exchange, wallet Bitcoin.com [data unknown/missing] Japan Tokyo provider bitcoin exchange, digital Hong currency exchange, Bitfinex 2012 Kong electronic trading platform United San multisignature security BitGo 2013 States Francisco platform for bitcoin ASIC-based bitcoin BitMain 2013 China Beijing miners cryptocurrency BitMEX 2014 derivatives trading Seychelles platform United payment service BitPay 2011 Atlanta States provider Bitstamp 2011 bitcoin exchange Luxembourg bitcoin debit card, Bitwala 2015 Berlin international transfers, [2] Germany bitcoin wallet Blockchain.com 2011 wallet provider Luxembourg United San Blockstream 2014 software States Francisco shut down by the United BTC-e 2011 Russia bitcoin exchange States government in July 2017 Canaan ASIC-based bitcoin 2013 China Beijing Creative miners United Circle 2013 Boston wallet provider States United San wallet provider, bitcoin Coinbase 2012 States Francisco exchange bitcoin/ether exchange, wallet provider,
  • 2020-2025 Global Crypto Wallet Market Report - Production and Consumption Professional Analysis (Impact of COVID-19)

    2020-2025 Global Crypto Wallet Market Report - Production and Consumption Professional Analysis (Impact of COVID-19)

    CIN: U74994PN2018PTC176685 GST Number: 27AAACQ5401A1Z3 About the report: https://www.qurateresearch.com/reports/ICT/QBI-MR-ICT-1013189 2020-2025 Global Crypto Wallet Market Report - Production and Consumption Professional Analysis (Impact of COVID-19) Report Code: QBI-MR-ICT-1013189 Published Date : 2021-05-10 Report Price Single User : $ 3360.0 Multi User : $ nan Enterprise User : $ 6720.0 A crypto wallet is a tool that you can use to interact with a blockchain network. This report elaborates the market size, market characteristics, and market growth of the Crypto Wallet industry, and breaks down according to the type, application, and consumption area of Crypto Wallet. The report also conducted a PESTEL analysis of the industry to study the main influencing factors and entry barriers of the industry. In Chapter 3.4 of the report, the impact of the COVID-19 outbreak on the industry was fully assessed. Fully risk assessment and industry recommendations were made for Crypto Wallet in a special period. This chapter also compares the markets of Pre COVID-19 and Post COVID-19. In addition, chapters 8-12 consider the impact of COVID-19 on the regional economy. Key players in the global Crypto Wallet market covered in Chapter 13: ANX BitPesa Bitfinex Bittrex Binance Bitwala Bitcoin.com BitMex Bitcoin Suisse AG BitPay BitMain BitGo Bitstamp In Chapter 6, on the basis of types, the Crypto Wallet market from 2015 to 2025 is primarily split into: Software Hardware Paper Wallets In Chapter 7, on the basis of applications, the Crypto Wallet market