EASTEconomics, Politics and PublicASIA Policy in East Asia andFORUM the Pacific Vol.10 No.1 January–March 2018 $9.50 Quarterly

Why ASEAN matters

Gary Clyde Hufbauer Success ensures long-term importance to the US Jayant Menon Trade: regional means, global objectives Tan See Seng A defence of ADMM Plus Amy E. Searight How ASEAN matters in the age of Trump ... and more ASIAN REVIEW — Gareth Evans: Australia and geopolitical transition Stephen Costello: Only Seoul can lead Korean integration EASTASIAFORUM CONTENTS 3 CHONG ja ian Quarterly Still in the driver’s seat or asleep at the ISSN 1837-5081 (print) wheel? ISSN 1837-509X (online) 6 gary clyde hufbauer From the Editors’ Desk Success ensures long-term importance to the US In recent times we’ve seen the United States retreat from leading 7 jayant menon the global order and apparently reversing its pivot to Asia; the rise Regional means and global objectives of China with its aggressive stance on the South China Sea and its 9 anthony milner infrastructure development ‘carrot’, the Belt and Road Initiative; a Culture and values central to creating deeper putative ‘Quad’ configuration of Indo-Pacific power around the US, partnership India, Japan and Australia; and a hot spot in North Korea. Given all 11 amy E. searight this and continued US–China rivalry for regional leadership, what How ASEAN matters in the age of Trump role can ASEAN play? How viable is ASEAN centrality, given the 13 gareth evans diversity of its members and its new challenges? ASIAN REVIEW: Australia in an age of In this EAFQ we examine these questions first from the outside, geopolitical transition comparing the substance of US repositioning with its rhetoric 15 philips j. vermonte (Hufbauer and Searight) and how Australia, like the rest of the region, ASIAN REVIEW: Managing the must prepare itself to live in Asia without the United States. This superpower transition will require being less reliant on the United States and engaging with 17 stephen costello China while strengthening relations with regional partners, such as ASIAN REVIEW: Only Seoul can lead ASEAN, and possibly the Indo-Pacific group (Evans, Milner). North Korean integration Korea plays into these uncertainties (Costello). 20 muhammad sinatra What are the pillars of ASEAN cooperation, and the ASEAN plus ASIAN REVIEW: A long election season cooperation mechanisms, incorporating dialogue partners but with looms for Indonesia ASEAN ‘centrality’? The value of ASEAN economic integration to 22 kuik cheng-chwee the multilateral trade liberalisation agenda, the challenges ahead for Power transitions threaten ASEAN’s hedging deeper integration beyond the border (Menon) and the importance of role the momentum for both in negotiating the Regional Comprehensive 24 john blaxland and Economic Partnership (RCEP) (Hufbauer) are one element. Others, greg raymond such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and ASEAN Defence Ministers Prosperity and protection: ASEAN through Thai eyes Meeting Plus, ensure continuation of ASEAN’s balancing role. But they will both need to be strengthened and extended to deal with 26 TAN SEE SENG issues like the South China Sea (Kuik, Tan), counter-terrorism and A defence of ADMM Plus combating intolerance (Jayakumar). To not be eclipsed, ASEAN needs 28 shashi jayakumar to reposition significantly (Chong, Vermonte). Rethinking ASEAN’s approach to We examine key member-state commitment to ASEAN—with counter-terrorism Vietnam’s view of ASEAN as a buffer in great power dynamics 30 huong le thu (Huong) and Thailand seeing ASEAN’s value for regional prosperity Vietnam’s experience, a reference point for and security (Blaxland and Raymond)—and offer a caution on Australia expectations of Indonesian leadership, given its political election cycle (Sinatra). COVER: Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte, left, chats with Indonesian President Joko Widodo at the presidential John Blaxland and Mari Pangestu palace in Jakarta in September 2016. Both nations are key members of ASEAN. Picture: Darren Whiteside, Reuters. Panel picture Page 4: Chiradech Chotchuang, Shutterstock.

2 EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY JANUARY — MARCH 2018 relevance at risk picture: jorge silva / reuters

Taking it easy in a parking site at a rice mill in Chainat province, Thailand. Still in the driver’s seat or asleep at the wheel?

CHONG Ja Ian ASEAN is unlikely, Southeast Asian common concerns and advance shared states interested in maintaining an interests. SEAN’s role as a platform for active role in shaping regional affairs ASEAN enabled what were A projecting Southeast Asia’s may have to start looking beyond relatively new, developing and in international influence is a challenge. ASEAN to do so—even at the expense some cases small states collectively Much of this has to do with growing of ASEAN centrality. to play a sort of quasi-middle power divergence in members’ economic and Among ASEAN’s greatest successes role with which more powerful political interests, compounded by has been to reduce the possibility of actors have to contend. This was the consequences of an increasingly war among its members. The mutual apparent in ASEAN’s successful ascendant China and sharpening accommodation among members ten-year international isolation of US–China rivalry. Differing interests contributed to another of the group’s Soviet-backed Vietnam and the impede the group’s effectiveness in a major accomplishments: as a platform Hanoi-sponsored Cambodian regime, changing world. Given that reform of for member states to project their conducted in conjunction with the

EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY JANUARY — MARCH 2018 3 United States and China. saw ASEAN expand to cover most of EASTASIAFORUM ASEAN may no longer inhabit such Southeast Asia with the incorporation Quarterly a sweet spot. of Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia and Established at the height of the Vietnam—the grouping’s former Cold War, ASEAN was entrenched adversary. EDITORIAL STAFF around an understanding among The question for ASEAN now Issue Editors conservative, anti-communist elites is whether its formula for success John Blaxland is Professor of with at least some authoritarian remains relevant. Finding common International Security and Intelligence sympathies. These elites accepted ground on pressing issues has Studies and Director of the ANU autonomy, mutual non-intervention, become a growing challenge, the Southeast Asia Institute. consensus on issues that required usual platitudes about solidarity and Mari Pangestu is Professor at the collective action and mutual restraint centrality notwithstanding. Recent University of Indonesia and former Indonesian Minister of Trade and from the use of force as the basis for efforts to manage disputes have had Tourism and Creative Industry. coordination, if not cooperation. Such limited success, as demonstrated Series Editors commitments reduced tensions among by the decades-long processes Peter Drysdale, Head, East Asia Forum member governments and enabled surrounding the Declaration of and East Asian Bureau of Economic them to focus on consolidating Conduct of Parties and the Code of Research, Crawford School of Public domestic political authority, economic Conduct over the South China Sea. Policy, ANU. development and, where convenient, Even the handling of trade Shiro Armstrong, Co-director, diplomatic cooperation. liberalisation, human trafficking, Australia-Japan Research Centre, and ASEAN successfully carved out trans-boundary haze, over-fishing Editor of East Asia Forum, Crawford an area of steady economic growth and large-scale human rights abuses School of Public Policy, ANU. and calm at a time when wars were within ASEAN have seen slow actual Editorial Staff Coordination: Brandon Smith. raging in Indochina and China was in progress. That these issues intersect Editing: Rosa Bishop, Nicol Brodie, the throes of the Cultural Revolution. with the dynamics associated with the Alison Darby, Oliver Friedmann, Sam As a result external actors, including rise of China and US–China rivalry Hardwick, Hannah Harmelin, Sarah the major powers, accepted ASEAN further complicates matters, given the O’Dowd, Nishanth Pathy, Michael prerogatives in Southeast Asia. potential for division stemming from Wijnen, Catherine Yen, Ebony Young, ANU. Riding on ASEAN’s Cold War Chinese and US pressure. successes, members consolidated the ASEAN’s increased diversity makes Editorial Advisers: Peter Fuller, Max Suich. group’s position as East Asia’s premier the group more susceptible to stasis. regional organisation—due partially to Production: Peter Fuller, Words & Pics. the absence of similar arrangements Email [email protected], [email protected]. in Northeast Asia. Other actors, including major powers like the EASTASIAFORUM Quarterly The views expressed are those of the individual United States, China and Japan, were authors and do not represent the views of the therefore willing to accept ASEAN In our next issue . . . Crawford School, ANU, EABER, EAF, or the ‘centrality’ and its position ‘in the institutions to which the authors are attached. driver’s seat’ when it came to intra- regional cooperation. These considerations characterised several ASEAN-focused cooperation initiatives in East Asia between the 1990s and 2000s. They included the ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN+3, Published by ANU Press the East Asian Summit and the Trade wars The Australian National University multilateral Chiang Mai Initiative for Canberra ACT 2601, Australia Email: [email protected] currency swaps after the 1997–98 and Asia Web: http://press.anu.edu.au Asian Financial Crisis. The 1990s also

4 EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY JANUARY — MARCH 2018 Expansion in the late 1990s added States is crucial for any arrangement, members who are still shifting away Despite a good run for given Beijing and Washington’s from socialist economic planning and inconstancies and sharpening rivalry. isolation. The founding members have half a century, ASEAN The United States and China will greater economic sophistication as nonetheless remain key external well as stronger ties to international now faces the risk of partners for any productive alternative capital and trade networks. Political approaches. change in the 1980s and 1990s redundancy because Working arrangements that do not removed Cold War-era authoritarian feature China or the United States systems in Indonesia, the Philippines of its inability and are not novel in East Asia. Experience and Thailand, though not in all cases from the Five Power Defence permanently. Leadership transitions perhaps unwillingness to Arrangements, the Comprehensive now absorb political energies in and Progressive Agreement for Trans- Brunei, Malaysia and Singapore. address the group’s own Pacific Partnership, the Trans-Pacific These cleavages distract from Strategic Economic Partnership, and shared concerns and exacerbate limitations even ASEAN when successful, may be difficulties in forging consensus on instructive. important issues. Resistance to reform Despite a good run for half a among Southeast Asian political elites century, ASEAN now faces the risk associated with ASEAN encumber of redundancy because of its inability how the grouping works. and perhaps unwillingness to address ASEAN and its members appear the group’s own limitations. Pressing to have limited willingness and ability issues like US–China rivalry, economic to make substantive adjustments to effective, ‘high quality’ institutions cooperation, environmental problems meet the new challenges. There is have to voluntarily accept added and common security concerns will significant opposition even to plucking multilateral commitments that cover not wait for ASEAN and its members low-hanging fruit, such as helping a range of issues. Whether through to get their house in order. ASEAN and its secretariat perform formal organisations or ad hoc Unless ASEAN can prove itself more effectively the tasks for which it agreements, improving coordination more adept at handling such is already responsible. Proposals for and lowering transaction costs over contemporary challenges, Southeast budget and personnel increases, along any issue area will entail compromises Asian states seeking to play an with organisational adjustments, run on autonomy and limits to parochial active regional role may have to into ready resistance, even though interests, given monitoring and supplement some of ASEAN’s they do not delegate more away from enforcement needs. Such demands current responsibilities. Looking at member governments. are unlikely to win consensus within the full range of options for dealing Talk of a multi-speed ASEAN does ASEAN. with shared concerns before they not seem to have spurred the group Middle- and high-income Southeast become overwhelming is a reasonable to change. Perhaps expectations for Asian states like Indonesia, Malaysia approach. reform are misplaced, given that and Singapore that benefit most from Some dimunition of ASEAN’s they may stand outside the original these approaches may have to look prominence may be worthwhile for its objectives for the group. If even for partners in developed economies members if other regional platforms modest shifts seem too ambitious, nearby that share similar perspectives. can help them pursue their interests ASEAN’s contemporary and future Candidates include Australia, Japan, more effectively. EAFQ roles are questionable. South Korea and, in some areas, Southeast Asian states wishing to Taiwan. Chong Ja Ian is Associate Professor of advance a stable and predictable rules- New regional initiatives need to be Political Science at National University based order may have to seek like- credible and independent. Avoiding of Singapore. minded extra-regional partners, given the suspicion of simply being a ASEAN’s limitations. States seeking front for either China or the United

EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY JANUARY — MARCH 2018 5 beyond the rhetoric Success ensures long-term importance to the US

Gary Clyde Hufbauer considerable force. The United States a paradigm for troubled regions badly needs regional powers that elsewhere. The United States has T THE APEC Summit in can counterbalance China’s growing grown weary of its erstwhile role A November 2017, US President geopolitical footprint. The three most as ‘policeman of the world’ but Donald Trump declared ‘We are not important powers in this respect are fortunately the need for this service is going to let the United States be taken India, Japan and ASEAN. greatly diminished when neighbouring advantage of anymore … I am always ASEAN has also fostered the countries get along. An immensely going to put America first’. explosive growth of supply chains, successful regional grouping, Considering Trump’s ‘America both among its members and with patterned after ASEAN, is the Pacific First’ philosophy and his disdain for outside powers, notably the United Alliance that joins Chile, Peru, past trade agreements—sentiments States, Japan, South Korea and Europe. Colombia and Mexico. that were proclaimed at the Da Nang No one in 1967 thought much about Groupings in Africa are less APEC summit and on numerous other supply chains. Trade was dominated successful. The Arab Maghreb Union occasions—it’s reasonable to conclude by natural resources on the one is perhaps the least successful, joining that ASEAN plays no role in Trump’s hand (such as oil, copper and other only on paper the north African states world view. But Trump is president commodities) and finished products from Morocco to Libya. ASEAN can for a defined term. His views on US made by vertically integrated firms on pride itself on providing a model relations with the rest of the world the other (including clothing, furniture for the successful regional groups neither represent mainstream opinion and steel). elsewhere and an aspiration for the nor define the importance of ASEAN The supply chain revolution has less successful groups. to the United States. enabled the magic of comparative ASEAN Summit meetings, at which ASEAN, in fact, is vitally important advantage to operate on a far grander leaders dialogue with external powers to the United States for several scale since each component—of a good such as China, Europe, Japan, India, reasons. or a service—can now be produced Australia and the United States, make Perhaps most importantly, ASEAN or assembled in the best location. it much easier for US political leaders has successfully pursued good The revolution has greatly benefitted to hold productive meetings with politics alongside good economics. the United States with less expensive their regional counterparts. The time At its inception in 1967, ASEAN was footwear, TVs, computers, smart of senior ministers is their scarcest intended to put an end to guerrilla phones and many other products. resource. The ability of US secretaries conflicts between Indonesia, Malaysia ASEAN’s success has served as of commerce, state, treasury and other and the Philippines. Owing in large departments to meet with all the measure to ASEAN, those conflicts leaders of Southeast Asia in a single have long since been relegated to the ASEAN has dramatically week is highly valued. history books. Future ASEAN integration could Today ASEAN serves both as an improved the livelihoods provide a strong lure for future US economic partner with China and presidents to reconsider membership as a bulwark against incremental of hundreds of millions in the renewed Comprehensive and Chinese expansion. None of the Progressive Agreement for Trans- ASEAN countries individually carries of people Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). Three much heft in geopolitical contests ASEAN members—Singapore, but collectively they represent a Malaysia and Vietnam—are already

6 EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY JANUARY — MARCH 2018 intra-asEan trade members of the CPTPP. Conceivably, over the next five years, the CPTPP Regional means will expand to include Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines and perhaps one or two other ASEAN members. and global Future US presidents will have to reconsider the political and economic losses resulting from the objectives US self-inflicted exclusion from such a powerful bloc. The case for US membership will be strengthened Jayant Menon offer preferential tariff rates to if the Regional Comprehensive non-members on a ‘most favoured Economic Partnership is concluded SSESSMENTS of ASEAN as a nation’ (MFN) basis. More than 90 between China, India, all of ASEAN A regional integration endeavour per cent of ASEAN countries’ tariff Japan, Korea, Australia and New often fail to separate the organisation’s lines have a preference margin of Zealand. underlying objectives from those zero, where preferential tariffs are no By enlarging trade between its that appear on the surface. Analysts lower than the MFN rate. More than members, ASEAN has significantly assume, perhaps understandably, 70 per cent of intra-ASEAN trade raised the standards of living across that the primary purpose of regional is also conducted at MFN rates of Southeast Asia. The United States cooperation agreements is to increase zero. ASEAN rarely uses preferences prospers when the rest of the world regional integration. If this were because there are hardly any prospers. The global expansion of the case, traditional measures of preferences to use. trade and investment over the past integration—such as shares of intra- Multilateralisation has minimised 70 years has made an enormous regional trade and investment—would trade diversion effects and in part contribution to the levels of wellbeing be the right metrics for assessing accounts for the stubbornly low intra- worldwide, especially in Asia. success. ASEAN trade shares. These low shares Indeed, according to the pioneering On these metrics ASEAN would be are a sign of success, not failure. analysis by Angus Maddison of judged a failure. Intra-regional trade Most intra-ASEAN trade is supply economic growth over the very long in ASEAN has remained low and chain-related trade in parts and term, the post-Second World War stagnant at 25 per cent for almost two components. These parts mostly travel period has been the best in human decades. Barely one-fifth of foreign duty free because of product-specific history. As part of this advance, direct investment (FDI) flowing into arrangements such as the WTO’s ASEAN has dramatically improved the ASEAN countries originates from Information Technology Agreement, livelihoods of hundreds of millions of within the region. or general ones such as duty drawback people. But should ASEAN be judged schemes or Special Economic ASEAN leaders and observers this way? What if there are broader Zone privileges. The decision to should look beyond the shadow of objectives being pursued? What if multilateralise the AFTA tariff neglect emanating from the current regionalism is only a means towards reductions supported value chain- administration in Washington. Over greater ends? driven trade because final markets for the longer term, there can be no doubt ASEAN is indeed pursuing broader the finished goods lie predominantly as to the importance of ASEAN not objectives. The implementation of in industrial country markets outside only for US geopolitical goals in Asia the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) the region. but also for US prosperity through provides a clear example. ASEAN’s Though multilateralisation has economic interdependence. EAFQ original members used this agreement subdued intra-regional trade, it has as a stepping stone to broader promoted rapid growth in overall Gary Clyde Hufbauer is a Reginald liberalisation and, in turn, to promote trade. ASEAN is the fourth largest Jones Senior Fellow at the Peterson globalisation. exporting region in the world, trailing Institute for International Economics, The evidence lies in the deliberate only the European Union, North Washington DC. decision by original members to America and China. Although ASEAN

EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY JANUARY — MARCH 2018 7 picture: jorge silva / reuters accounts for just 3.3 per cent of the world’s GDP, it produces more than 7 per cent of exports. Trade volume and the terms of trade matter most for welfare, not with whom trade is conducted. If intra-ASEAN trade is to increase in the future, it should be driven by factors other than preferences. Reducing non-tariff barriers (NTBs) in a non-discriminatory manner has potential to increase trade in services. For all services and increasingly goods as well, NTBs are the primary problem. For goods, achievements in tariff liberalisation have been offset by the rise in non-tariff impediments to trade, which increased from 1,634 to 5,975 between 2000 and 2015. This poses a new challenge for ASEAN. NTBs are not only likely to be more restrictive than lower tariffs, providing more protection to domestic producers, but they are opaque and more difficult to dismantle. In addition, NTBs are a moving target because they can take An assembly worker in the vehicle production line of the Honda plant in Prachinburi, Thailand. The rapid on new forms as soon as they are growth of trade has made ASEAN the fourth-largest exporting region in the world. targeted or dismantled. While NTBs may be more difficult individual member countries. objectives, even if they lie below the to identify, track and dismantle, this FDI inflows have flourished, even surface. In the economic sphere, does not discount the effectiveness of if intra-ASEAN flows remain little widely used indicators (such as shares the multilaterisation strategies. Unlike changed. As with trade, it is not of intra-regional trade and investment) tariffs, it is either difficult or costly to where FDI comes from that matters not only fail to capture the real story, exchange concessions in NTBs in a but its volume and form. The massive but point in the wrong direction. preferential manner, given the public economic transformations that the Trade and investment, irrespective goods nature of a lot of the reforms world has witnessed in ASEAN’s of their origin or destination, is what required and the consequent ease of original member countries—and matters. They, not intra-regional free riding. Whether it is tariffs or continues to observe in the newer shares, are the metrics whereby NTBs, the multilateralisation approach members—would not have been ASEAN’s integration must properly be remains ASEAN’s best way forward. possible if ASEAN had chosen the judged. EAFQ In the original design of the ASEAN preferential route. Investment Area the bloc flirted with ASEAN’s success lies in its almost Jayant Menon is Lead Economist the idea of providing preferential unique use of regionalism as a means in the Economic Research and treatment to investors from member towards a greater end—maximising Regional Cooperation Department countries, but it quickly abandoned the the welfare of its citizenry through at the Asian Development Bank, and idea and reaffirmed its commitment to the pursuit of global integration. Adjunct Fellow at the Arndt-Corden a non-discriminatory and open foreign The metrics that analysts use to Department of Economics at the investment regime, mirroring those in assess regionalism must reflect these Australian National University.

8 EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY JANUARY — MARCH 2018 australia’s challenge Culture and values central to creating deeper partnership picture: erik de castro / reuters Anthony Milner

SEAN is back on Australia’s A agenda, having been neglected in recent times. The media release for the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper states that Australia’s first foreign policy priority is to ‘increase [its] efforts to ensure [Australia] remain[s] a leading partner for Southeast Asia’. This priority will be highlighted at Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull’s Special Summit with ASEAN leaders this year. At a time of deep uncertainty, engaging with ASEAN is a prudent policy direction. But Australia faces at least four challenges. First, the Australian government will struggle to maintain its priority on ASEAN. For some years Australian commentary has been preoccupied with the US–China issue, which Australia Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull arrives for the ASEAN summit in Clark, Pampanga, the will likely continue to monopolise Philippines, in November 2017. Deeper relations with ASEAN would make Australia ‘a less lonely country’. foreign policy debate. The Australian government needs to explain that than it once was. Compared with and navigate differences between ASEAN is the central element in its the 1970s—when Australia became ASEAN and Australian policy overall Asia strategy, without implying ASEAN's first dialogue partner—its objectives. For instance, there has that US–China issues are any less economy is now far smaller than the long been anxiety in ASEAN about important. Deepening relations with ASEAN economy and its military being forced to take sides in struggles ASEAN will make Australia a less advantage is also lessened. Australia between major powers. In the Cold lonely country and strengthen its has to compete for influence in War, a number of ASEAN countries influence in both Washington and Southeast Asia in new ways. Not resisted joining the US-led Southeast Beijing. only are Japan and China massive Asian Treaty Organisation and Southeast Asia is the region of economic partners for the region but supported maintaining ‘equidistance’ Asia closest to Australia and where South Korea—a minor economy in the between rival blocs. It is not surprising Australia has its longest diplomatic 1970s—is now more important than to encounter ASEAN concern about track record. The world inevitably Australia. The diminished position of meetings between senior officials from judges Australia by the effectiveness of the United States, Australia’s much- Australia, Japan, India and the United its engagement with ASEAN. proclaimed ally, is a further element in States to discuss closer ‘quadrilateral’ Second, Australia is in some ways this changed balance. cooperation. Such initiatives inevitably a less attractive partner for ASEAN Third, Australia needs to recognise sharpen the sense of a pro-democracy

EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY JANUARY — MARCH 2018 9 gang-up on China. There is sensitivity about In all these policy areas Australia The phrase ‘deputy sheriff’ is often terminology, partly because it can will require a comprehensive and used to sum up Australia’s difference reveal serious policy orientation. It often subtle understanding of ASEAN from much ASEAN opinion in its is regrettable that official Australian perspectives. This raises the question strategic approach to the major statements tend to refer to 'Southeast of whether the government, media and powers. Time and time again this Asia', not 'ASEAN'. Australia needs university system still possess the level sticky descriptor crops up in Track to emphasise that it is not hesitating of Southeast Asia expertise achieved in 2 meetings such as the ASEAN– on the project of building a strong the 1970s. Australia–New Zealand Dialogue. ASEAN community. Turnbull’s Special The fourth challenge that Australia Canberra needs to make it clear Summit with ASEAN provides the faces with ASEAN concerns political that its foreign policy has long been ideal opportunity to symbolise and culture. When Australian governments tailored to Australian rather than US affirm Australia’s unequivocal respect speak about ‘work[ing] more closely interests—especially when the 2017 for this endeavour. with the region’s major democracies’, White Paper actually highlights the A further divergence in policy of they run up against the ideological need ‘to broaden and deepen our growing significance concerns China. tolerance that is a hallmark of ASEAN alliance cooperation’. ASEAN commentators seem less thinking. This tolerance underpinned, For many years, Australia has suspicious than Australians of China’s for instance, ASEAN’s rapid pursuit of focused on building ‘Pacific’ or ‘Asia policies, including the Belt and Road relations with Communist Indochina Pacific’ institutions with a strong US Initiative. Informed by centuries after the United States’ withdrawal in presence. In contrast, ASEAN tends of experience in handling China, the 1970s. to favour an ‘East Asia’ concept and to ASEAN favours a policy of signalling Australians do not reflect enough concentrate on building the ASEAN support for China-led projects and on how their liberal heritage may community itself. Former Australian only arguing hard about the details. sharpen the sense of Australia being prime minister Paul Keating famously ASEAN analysts do not advocate a an outsider in many Southeast Asian clashed with then Malaysian prime subservient approach. They seek smart eyes. Hostility to liberalism has been minister Mahathir Mohamad in accommodation, not confrontation, expressed not only in Islamic circles advocating the Asia Pacific Economic with China. in Southeast Asia. Political change in Cooperation forum. ASEAN firmly Thailand and the Philippines suggests rejected the proposal for an Asia Australians do not a reduced commitment to liberal Pacific Community put forward by values, and distinguished Singapore former Australian prime minister reflect enough on how sociologist Chua Beng Huat has drawn Kevin Rudd in 2008. attention to the determined rejection Today Australia’s advocacy of their liberal heritage of Western-style liberalism in Lee the ‘Indo-Pacific’ concept is causing Kuan Yew’s state. confusion. The White Paper’s may sharpen the sense A decade or so ago, Australian insistence that the Indo-Pacific is commentators thought they had heard the region of ‘primary importance of Australia being the end of the ‘Asian values’ debate. to Australia’ may seem a non- As Australia works at being ASEAN’s controversial innovation in Australia’s an outsider in many ‘leading partner’, government officials foreign policy rhetoric, but in and public intellectuals may well have Southeast Asia and China the stress Southeast Asian eyes to engage in more serious dialogue on the two oceans is seen to diminish about values and ideology. EAFQ the term ‘Asia’ and imply an anti-China mindset. Australia has reiterated its Anthony Milner is Professorial Fellow commitment to the East Asia Summit. at Asialink, University of Melbourne, It may be important now to insist that and Visiting Professor at the Asia highlighting the 'Indo-Pacific’ does not Europe Institute, University of Malaya. mean that Australia plans to bypass He is Emeritus Professor at The ASEAN-based institutions. Australian National University.

10 EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY JANUARY — MARCH 2018 continuing relevance picture: jonathan ernst / reuters National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster, left, and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson look on as President Trump talks to media at the East Asia Summit in Manila in November 2017.

How ASEAN matters in the age of Trump

Amy E. Searight preoccupation with the Middle East. most notable. The rebalance focused Perhaps the signature feature of on forging closer economic ties N HIS first year in office, President Obama’s pivot, or rebalance, was an through the Trans-Pacific Partnership I Donald Trump broke sharply attempt to transform what had long (TPP), embracing ASEAN-centred with many long-standing traditions been an episodic and ad hoc focus on multilateral frameworks and building in US foreign policy. Surprisingly, the Southeast Asia into sustained, high- stronger security ties with allies and attention the administration is paying level engagement. In the space of a emerging partners. These integrated to Southeast Asia has been one area of few months early in his presidency, lines of effort forged a compelling relative continuity. the Obama administration signed strategic narrative that the United Before the Obama administration, ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and States was committed to enduring US governments failed in key Cooperation, joined the East Asia leadership in the region. moments to consistently focus on Summit and appointed the first In its first year the Trump the region. Former president Bill resident ambassador to ASEAN. administration sought to maintain Clinton’s clinical and detached Obama sustained his focus on the pivot’s momentum—at least on response to the Asian financial crisis Southeast Asia throughout his two the security side—while avoiding the in 1997–98 undermined the United terms, culminating with the historic ‘rebalance’ label. President Trump States’ standing among Southeast Sunnylands summit with ASEAN welcomed the leaders of Vietnam, Asian countries that had been hit leaders in 2016. Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore hard by the crisis. Former secretary While the Obama administration’s in Washington between May and of state Condoleezza Rice’s decision pivot placed a heavy focus on October 2017. In November, the to skip two ASEAN Regional Forum revitalising alliances in Northeast President embarked on a 12-day trip meetings in three years underscored Asia, its focus on Southeast Asia and to Asia with stops in Vietnam and the George W Bush administration’s multilateralism in Asia were perhaps the Philippines to attend the APEC

EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY JANUARY — MARCH 2018 11 summit, a US–ASEAN summit and The administration needs to more greater engagement with ASEAN. the East Asia Summit, as well as hold clearly articulate how a network of Because no single bilateral relationship bilateral meetings. regional security partnerships will can get us where we want to go’. But the missing ingredient has been bolster a rules-based Indo-Pacific ASEAN’s recent difficulties in the lack of an economic engagement order that can continue to deliver maintaining unity on key issues has strategy. President Trump’s decision peace and prosperity. The slow staffing somewhat undercut its ability to to withdraw from the TPP signalled of Asia policy positions at the State drive the regional agenda and steer that he would embark on a very and Defense Departments (including outcomes, but it continues to provide different trade policy that would be the failure to appoint an ASEAN critical ballast that helps maintain more transactional, defensive and ambassador), has compounded the stability in an increasingly contested bilaterally focused. This has created difficulty of formulating, articulating strategic environment. ASEAN has uncertainty and scepticism in a region and implementing Trump’s regional developed and promoted norms that that views economic engagement as policies. have shaped regional expectations of the foundation of security. Trump’s embrace of ASEAN is behaviour and have become embedded The President’s speech at the perhaps surprising, given his evident in an open and inclusive regional APEC summit rolled out a new disdain for multilateralism and the architecture. framework for his administration’s growing dysfunction of ASEAN On the economic side, ASEAN has Asia policy under the banner of a itself. As ASEAN finds itself in an encouraged governments to maintain ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’. This new increasingly contested environment, relative openness to investment and framing is clearly an attempt to lay the it grows more divided on key commerce. In the security realm, foundations for a compelling strategic issues. China has sought to divide ASEAN has promoted norms of narrative to rebrand the rebalance, as and conquer ASEAN by putting non-coercion, mutual respect and well as signal an alternative to China’s tremendous pressure on smaller emphasis on dialogue. These regional emerging regional narrative based on countries like Cambodia and Laos frameworks have been critical to Xi Jinping’s ‘China Dream’ and Belt to refrain from forging ASEAN promoting a rules-based order that and Road Initiative. consensus on the South China Sea. imposes some degree of normative But the ’free and open Indo- pressure on countries seeking to Pacific’ vision remains well short of a ET ASEAN remains highly subvert collective norms, such as strategy. It is exceedingly vague and Y relevant for advancing US China’s attempts to unilaterally change specific policies have been slow to strategic and diplomatic goals in the status quo in the South China Sea. materialise. Despite the heavy focus the region. In part this is due to Creating a compelling strategic on the maritime domain, Trump’s geography—ASEAN is centrally narrative that builds confidence in speech made no mention of the South located at the crossroads of the Indo- US leadership will remain an uphill China Sea. The adjectives ‘free and Pacific. ASEAN-led frameworks, such challenge without a credible approach open’ imply economic openness, yet as the ASEAN Regional Forum and on trade and economic engagement. Trump has bluntly rejected any trade East Asian Summit, provide a venue But at least the Trump administration arrangements without reciprocity and for the United States to work with has demonstrated that it has the elimination of trade deficits at like-minded partners to help define learned the diplomatic advantages their core. Trump’s offer to negotiate issues and shape regional goals and of ‘showing up’ in the region and bilateral trade agreements has been expectations. embracing ASEAN-led summitry. met with a cool response by potential The ability to meet with the ten In one of the weaker moments in its partners, many of whom are focused member countries and the ‘plus’ history, ASEAN has demonstrated its instead on launching a ‘TPP-11’ countries at one set of meetings, continued relevance. EAFQ without the United States. both multilaterally and in bilateral Without a viable and compelling discussions on the margins, creates Amy E. Searight is Senior Advisor and economic component to its Asia diplomatic economies of scale. As Director of the Southeast Asia Program strategy, the Trump administration Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis put it, at the Center for Strategic and is left with focusing on Obama-era ‘a stable region requires us all to work International Studies in Washington, security policies, which need to evolve. together, and that is why we support DC.

12 EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY JANUARY — MARCH 2018 asian review: SHIFTING BALANCE

picture: CPL Steve Duncan / DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE, AUSTRALIA

Australia in an age of geopolitical transition

Gareth Evans Royal Air Force Wing Commander Colin Would, left, with key staff during Exercise Bersama Shield 17 at Butterworth, Malaysia. The annual exercise is held under the Five Power Defence Arrangements. ASEAN S THE global centre of economic could be ‘a more effective regional security player’ by working with countries like Australia.. A gravity shifts from the Euro- Atlantic to Asia, five accompanying ascent has been the speed and unnoticed by Beijing. geopolitical shifts demand particular extent of the decline in US influence. The most dramatic geopolitical attention: China’s rise, the United President Trump has shown no development in the region has been States’ comparative decline, India’s interest in the multilateral pursuit of the emergence of North Korea as emergence as a major player, North global public goods, the low point of a nuclear-armed state. Important Korea’s acquisition of nuclear weapons which was his decision to walk away US voices are urging a pre-emptive and ASEAN’s substantial loss of from the Paris Climate Accord, and military strike, with potentially coherence. much less commitment to the region horrendous escalation consequences, China wants strategic space in East than his predecessors. and there is not yet sufficient Asia and is no longer prepared to play Meanwhile, India has been consensus elsewhere that conflict second fiddle to the United States, matching its growing economic can be averted (as I certainly believe either there or as a global rule-maker. strength with increasing military possible) by a strategy of containment, It is parlaying its economic strength capability and diplomatic effectiveness. deterrence and negotiation. into geopolitical influence through the While it is likely to be cautious about A less dramatic but still troubling Belt and Road Initiative, modernising any quadrilateral grouping with the development is the deteriorating and expanding its military capability United States, Japan and Australia coherence of ASEAN. Recent human and pursuing expansionist territorial which could be seen as too overtly rights and democracy failings among claims in the South China Sea. a China-containment enterprise, its many of ASEAN’s members have Even more startling than China’s increasing capability is not going diminished both its internal harmony

EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY JANUARY — MARCH 2018 13 asian review: SHIFTING BALANCE and external credibility. And with from potentially hostile intrusion. So far as China is concerned, at least two ASEAN members now It must also mean being more of a Australia should not become Beijing’s acting as wholly-owned subsidiaries diplomatic free agent, unconstrained patsy any more than Washington’s. of Beijing, it has proved impossible by the constant urge to look over our But as the White Paper seems to to reach a consensus on any kind of shoulder to Washington. acknowldedge, we should build substantive, collective pushback on the The White Paper is strong and connections at multiple levels, South China Sea issue. sensible on the need to strengthen rather than view China as a one- I have argued for some time that an Australia’s partnerships with regional dimensional economic partner, crucial appropriate Australian policy response neighbours like India, Indonesia, Japan for Australian prosperity but to be to the unfolding regional challenges and South Korea. But in this context treated warily and confrontationally might be characterised as ‘less United it overdoes the focus on ‘democracies’, on security issues. There is particular States; more self-reliance; more Asia’. and gives less attention than it should opportunity to work with Beijing While the Australian government’s to building a closer relationship with on those many global and regional 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper, ASEAN. public goods issues which the White understandably, does not articulate Working more closely with Paper elsewhere properly emphasises its preferred response in nearly such countries like Australia, ASEAN could (unusually for a Coalition government) stark terms, it gets intriguingly close to be a more effective regional security as important areas for Australian embracing those prescriptions. player than it now is. It should not international activity. The White Paper argues for underestimate its collective military For all the current tensions and continued US ‘engagement’ in the capability—in particular that of uncertainties in the region, there is still region, but not ‘leadership’, and that Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia and good reason to be optimistic about the is the right call. Australia benefits Singapore. If regular, combined future. There is every reason to believe, too much from the our alliance to freedom of navigation operations were not just hope, that China will not seek justify walking away from it. But that mounted in contested waters in the to usurp America in the global order does not mean reflexively following South China Sea, China would need to but take its place alongside it, and Washington down every by-way. think long and hard about any show of that it could live quite comfortably Periodically saying ‘no’ is good foreign retaliatory violence. in a global and regional environment policy for a country that values its If ASEAN is to act as a collective characterised by cooperative security, independence and international counterweight to China, it will likely in which states primarily find their respect. have to modify its consensus-based security with others rather than We should be under no illusion that decision-making style — perhaps to against them. the United States will offer military the extent of becoming a two-or-more Getting there without tears will support in any circumstance where speed organisation as the European require a little more leadership than it does not see its own immediate Union now is. It is hard to believe that is currently on offer from the relevant interests under threat. While in the next few years business as usual powers. But the popular market for that was the case under previous will be an option for anyone. leaders who can deliver security administrations, it has been thrown without bellicosity remains strong into much starker relief by Trump’s For all the current across the whole region. There is not ‘America First’ approach. Australia, nearly as much taste anywhere for like the rest of the region, must tensions and uncertainties going to war this century as there was prepare itself to live in Asia without in the last. EAFQ the United States. in the region, there is Part of that preparation must Gareth Evans is Chancellor of the be more self-reliance, as Prime still good reason to be Australian National University and a Minister Turnbull acknowledges former Australian foreign minister. in his introduction to the White optimistic This article is an abridged version of Paper. Militarily, that must mean his Keynote Address at the Asia Society spending more on protecting our Asia 21 Young Leaders Summit in shores and maritime environment Melbourne, November 2017.

14 EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY JANUARY — MARCH 2018 asian review: Strategic tightrope

picture: damir sagolj / reuters

Managing the superpower transition

Philips J. Vermonte terms of size and geography but more their own economic difficulties. This is importantly in terms of momentum. why a grand proposal such as the Belt HERE is no doubt that the world This rise occurs at a time when other and Road Initiative is so attractive to T has entered a period of great regions—Europe and North America many leaders in the region, even if it uncertainty. At the same time as the in particular—are struggling to re-find has some potential flaws. inevitable rise of China we are seeing their way. China’s economic efforts have the relative decline of US power. Many The economic power of China is not stopped countries in the region states are nervously seeking a new more influential in the Asia Pacific from closely observing its moves strategic balance. than elsewhere. It is not hard to see in the South China Sea. They The United States remains the why: most countries in the region question China’s ‘charm offensive’ most powerful country in the world are developing and are in dire need of investments and development in military terms, and it will likely be of investment and development assistance since it contrasts so starkly some decades before China is able to assistance. Neither Washington nor with aggressive Chinese behaviour in catch up. But there is no slow catch- other economic powers can hope the contested sea. These mixed signals up in economic power: China is on to match Beijing’s ability to provide have caused a trust deficit between the fast lane to become the world’s economic assistance, especially at a China and ASEAN nations. Instead of most dominant economy not only in time when they are struggling with the Belt and Road Initiative giving rise

EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY JANUARY — MARCH 2018 15 asian review: Strategic tightrope to ‘mutual win-win cooperation’, it has superpower is probably legitimate, most relevance for Southeast Asian left ASEAN nations wondering what but it will regardless not resonate well countries) maritime security. China’s strategic intentions really are. with some countries in the region. The Regional institutions will need to On the other side of the Pacific, main interest of most Southeast Asian come forward to tackle issues now the United States has taken a countries is national development. off the US agenda. Unfortunately for different turn under the leadership of To choose outright between the two ASEAN, these are issues on which President Donald Trump. The Trump superpowers is not an option for most member countries cannot currently administration killed the Trans-Pacific ASEAN countries. These countries achieve solid agreement. Partnership, withdrew from the have mostly managed to navigate For example, the 2012 ASEAN Paris Agreement on climate change between the two superpowers in Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in and instigated the renegotiation recent years, but the NSS is forcing Cambodia failed for the first time to of the North American Free Trade the countries to navigate within very produce a joint declaration, thanks to Agreement. It seems eager to press narrow bands. vehement opposition by members who the reset button on many multilateral The NSS is very much ‘America were considered close to China over arrangements, at one stage even going First’: President Trump has made the inclusion of South China Sea issue so far as to question the future of it clear that some issues will top into the draft text of the declaration. NATO. All of this points to a rewriting his priority list while others will It was only through careful ‘shuttle’ of US strategic engagement. be relegated to the back seat. diplomacy that the then Indonesian While it may be legitimate for His priorities in Asia are the de- foreign minister Marty Natalegawa Washington to re-orient its foreign nuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula eventually managed to obtain policy, it has forced US allies and and the reduction of the US trade agreement from fellow member states friends to prepare for a scenario in deficit with many Asian countries. on the Six-Point Principles on the which the United States is no longer Issue areas that are deprioritised South China Sea. More generally, the ultimate provider of security include action on climate change, the ASEAN has been mostly toothless and stability. One might argue that protection of human rights and (of on the violation of human rights; the facts and realities are what should Rohingya issue is a case in point. guide policymaking, not perception picture: sarah fretwell / un photo Peace and stability in Southeast Asia and impression, but in a period of are anchored in a stable relationship uncertainty, perceptions—not facts— between China and the United States. are what matter. With President Trump pressing the The perceived US withdrawal reset button on many issues and with from global affairs provides space for China’s strategic intentions unclear, China to assert its influence. As the Southeast Asia could be facing two resident power in Asia, China has the belligerent superpowers. ASEAN advantage in pursuing its interests continues to be subject to asymmetric as well as in expanding its influence: power relations with both. In the Southeast Asian countries are ‘in its past, these asymmetric relations backyard’. China has been the largest have been mitigated by an ASEAN trading partner for most of Southeast that sits confidently in the driver’s Asia for several years. seat. If ASEAN countries cannot get President Trump’s National Security their act together, they will face two Strategy (NSS) spells out that the superpowers champing at the bit United States sees China as seeking ‘to without having a response or solution displace the United States in the Indo- to any of the pressing strategic issues Pacific region, expand the reaches of that face the region today. EAFQ its state-driven economic model and Former Indonesian foreign minister Marty re-order the region in its favour’. Such Natalagawa, whose ‘careful shuttle diplomacy’ Dr Philips J. Vermonte is Executive a view on a would-be superpower secured the Six-Point Principles on the South Director of the Centre for Strategic and from the lens of an incumbent China Sea. International Studies, Jakarta.

16 EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY JANUARY — MARCH 2018 asian review: THAWING THE PENINSULA

picture: jonathan ernst / reuters

South Korean President Moon Jae-in at a news conference in Seoul in November 2017. He is pursuing a pragmatic policy towards the North. Only Seoul can lead Korean integration

Stephen Costello legitimate security interests and conditional, were the result of years of directly addressed that state’s efforts by various leaders. They were VENTS have moved rapidly economic and political needs. based on practical steps and were E on the Korean Peninsula since What South Korea, the United grounded in the mutual interests of all the start of 2018. The speed partly States, the United Nations (UN) and parties. That is why they worked. reflects the failure of the previous other parties received from engaging The United States’ explicit rejection two governments in Seoul and past with North Korea was precious: caps of those deals is captured in the view three governments in Washington to on its nuclear and missile programs that ‘we don’t negotiate with evil, we seriously address North Korea. and the possibility of further North– defeat it’. It is impossible to calculate It has been 16 years since South South economic integration. There what those unilateral US decisions cost Korea and the United States were was never any question that such a generation in Northeast Asia. Many cooperating on a realistic plan, integration would favour South Korea North and South Koreans remember and ten years since South Korea or that it would have to eventually this history. was committed to one. Those adhere to international norms. North Korea’s offer to attend the plans acknowledged North Korea’s These achievements, though 2018 Winter Olympics in South

EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY JANUARY — MARCH 2018 17 asian review: THAWING THE PENINSULA

Korea has provided a small opening Ever since former South Korean the challenges posed by North Korea. for a return to realism. This opening president Kim Dae-Jung and then US Moon is the first leader in many was not initiated by South Korea, president Bill Clinton exited power, years to break this cycle, at least in his although the pragmatic Moon Jae- leadership on the issues surrounding willingness to discuss negotiations and in administration had expressed the Korean Peninsula has been very concrete steps toward South–North its general support for a return to much up for grabs. This may partly engagement. But Moon’s policies have engagement. Nor was it provided by explain why many prominent policy also been extremely contradictory. the United States, which has seemed proposals have been unrealistic, at He is open to inter-Korean talks, doubly committed to the optics of odds with recent diplomatic history, or economic cooperation and broad North Korea’s capitulation since based on ideological convictions. The assistance, yet he supports extreme Donald Trump became president. most notable include the attraction sanctions. These include global Embarrassingly, the opening was of rapid reunification, arguments for diplomatic and economic isolation, an provided by North Korea’s Kim Jong- arming South Korea and Japan with oil cut-off and bans on fish products, Un. This is a revealing comment on the nuclear weapons, planning for North luxury goods and travel. He has not political environments in Washington Korean collapse, the need for missile produced a workable road map. The and Seoul, and on the limited political defence and arguments to justify US Olympic engagement means he must and strategic capabilities of current military strikes. now come up with one or concede leaders in the White House and Blue The concurrent acceptance by so leadership of Korean Peninsula’s future House. Neither was able to break a many parties, including the UN, of US to the two parties—North Korea and dangerous stalemate. Instead, they and South Korean refusals to engage the United States—that are the least relied on North Korea, the weakest in credible negotiations, also reflects capable of leading. party, to do it for them. this leadership vacuum. The result The problem with extreme Kim’s manoeuvre was both in 2017 was a free-for-all as various sanctions and coercion is not that they shrewd and surprising. The North nations jockeyed for advantage in the are unfair or unjustified. It is that they Korean leader could use the optics of absence of any realistic framework for will not work. The premise that North Olympic brotherhood to strengthen understanding, much less addressing, Korea walked away from a working his position at home, complicate US deal is false. The United States did so, threats of military attack or chip away . . . the current impasse despite North Korea’s efforts (as well at sanctions. This is to be expected. as those of South Korea, China, Russia Still, a weak and isolated North Korea will not be addressed and others) to continue the deal. could never drive a wedge between Therefore, the current impasse will the United States and South Korea. by pressure on North not be addressed by pressure on North Even the real disagreements between Korea but by a return by the United the two governments won’t split the Korea but by a return States to positions and actions that alliance. address the root causes of Pyongyang’s During the Olympic truce, by the United States to nuclear weapons program. proponents of pressure, isolation and North Korea has legitimate security capitulation in the White House were positions and actions that concerns and the United States is only up against proponents of dialogue, adding to them. Moon would need diplomacy and deal-making in the address the root causes to propose and clearly embrace a Blue House. The winner of this concrete plan to relieve North Korea’s struggle will determine the next steps. of Pyongyang’s nuclear fears over sanctions, isolation and But there is a chance that South Korea security. Such assurances would be in will manoeuvre the United States to weapons program return for moves to cap and roll back a supporting role and begin to lead nuclear weapons and plans to integrate negotiations back toward working North Korea into international agreements. This is by no means norms. US officials say that they assured, but there is no one else are supporting Moon’s engagement capable of moving things forward. efforts. They are not, even though

18 EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY JANUARY — MARCH 2018 asian review: THAWING THE PENINSULA

PICTURE: Jakob Polacsek / WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM North–South engagement would Moon ‘requested’ a pause in US–South benefit the United States in several Korea military exercises, Trump gave concrete ways. in. Trump also quickly began to take The outlines of the next deal will be credit for the new diplomatic direction similar to the 1994 Agreed Framework even as his government struggled to and the North–South agreements explain its sudden about-face. which began in 2000. But this time an The Moon administration should existing nuclear weapons industry will digest what these developments mean. have to be captured and then rolled Seoul could finally begin to do the back. The UN will have to suspend heavy lifting in spelling out a realistic some of the sanctions it imposed after roadmap with confidence-building North Korea’s first nuclear test in 2006. measures and modest agreements. To do that, mere promises from the They could consult and notify United States and North Korea will Washington, but not ask for or expect be insufficient. Any new framework explicit US support. for economic engagement and The South Korean Foreign Minister, security rearrangements would have Kang Kyung-wha, stated clearly at to be backed by a new international Kang Kyung-wha: military options ‘not possible’ in the World Economic Forum annual coalition actively supported by the resolving the Korean situation. meeting in January 2018 that military UN. The only party that could lead that options were not possible. As long coalition is Seoul. requirements. The best way for as Seoul and Pyongyang are talking, Suspending sanctions as part Moon to view US postures today may military actions are even less likely of a larger initial deal with North be as a cry for help masquerading than they previously were. It is Korea seems like a daunting and as toughness. Within the alliance possible that the thaw will continue uphill battle. But it may be easier network, his determination to relieve beyond the Olympic period. Moon than it appears. One of the reasons the United States of some of its and Kim are already planning various for this is the United States’ reduced security burden would be hard to visits between the North and South by capacity for leadership. President resist. artists and assorted delegations. Trump appears uncommitted to any For its part, Beijing could have But lasting rapprochement will particular tactic since his ideology presented Washington with a choice depend on whom President Moon is so flexible (he simply needs to be at many times during the past 16 years listens to and how he prioritises able to say he is winning). Meanwhile between either returning to sincere North and South Korean interests. his Republican partners deeply resist talks or forfeiting Chinese pressure Nearing the end of February the South anything that North Korea would on North Korea. Instead Chinese Korean president seems to be tying embrace. Today that group is trying leaders chose to play along with US North Korea–US talks tightly to any to destroy the working deal to cap demands, knowing full well they new North Korea–South Korea talks. Iran’s nuclear weapons program, would not work. Chinese President That is unlikely to work, and could and for the same illogical reasons. In Xi Jinping has less leverage with Kim fatally slow down the momentum the larger institutional picture, the than his predecessors and so must now for progress. Looking ahead, initial Trump administration has accelerated work with Moon to protect Chinese agreements will signal how long the a decades-long hollowing-out of US interests. The eagerness of Xi and thaw will last, leaving Seoul to face its diplomatic capabilities. Russian President Vladimir Putin to inevitable choices. EAFQ Expectations of Washington support inter-Korean engagement over the next few years need to be was always likely. Beijing and Moscow Stephen Costello is an independent lowered. The Trump administration also supported the last policies of analyst and consultant and the has demonstrated that it has even less engagement. producer of AsiaEast. He was formerly capacity than its two predecessors If Seoul pivots to a leading role director of the Korea Program at the to understand the Korean theatre’s then Washington will pivot to a Atlantic Council and director of the broader economic and security supporting role. As soon as President Kim Dae Jung Peace Foundation.

EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY JANUARY — MARCH 2018 19 asian review: politics hotting up

picture: Beawiharta / reuters A long election season looms for Indonesia

Muhammad Sinatra the rhetoric, voters’ future livelihood keep domestic and overseas observers will be decided by the outcomes. Some engaged for the remainder of 2018. HE next year and a half is set of these elections will determine the Beyond this, the 2019 general T to be an eventful period for development of remote regional areas elections are dominating political Indonesian politics. In June 2018, 171 such as Maluku, North Maluku and discussion in Indonesia. While regional areas will simultaneously Papua, where the population is still President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) take to the polls to elect new mayors, deprived of modern luxuries in the needs to maintain political, economic regents and governors. These Western provinces. and social stability during the 2018 provincial elections will be followed by Some regional votes will also see elections, he must also act fast and the 2019 presidential elections. political contests far removed from firmly if he is to secure his reelection. The provincial elections will the national scene. In the West Java Current polls conducted by SMRC, be held in 39 cities, 115 regencies gubernatorial election, for example, Indikator and Indo Barometer show and 17 provinces, some of which political celebrities will vie against Jokowi is a clear favourite in the race. (namely West, East and Central former elites from the security forces. Jokowi’s electability score is hovering Java) are among the most populous In Central Java, the Indonesian between 45–65 per cent and a recent in the country. General Elections Democratic Party of Struggle has survey by SMRC also found that 74 Commission data indicates that up to turned heads by nominating the per cent of respondents were either 160 million votes could be made. incumbent governor, Ganjar Pranowo, ‘satisfied’ or ‘very satisfied’ with his These elections are considered whose name has been mentioned presidential performance so far. an early battleground ahead of the in a major e-ID corruption scandal. But Jokowi’s next term is far from presidential contest in 2019. The The Golkar party has also attracted guaranteed. To firm up his chances performance of each political party or attention by backing Nurdin Halid, a of reelection he must focus on coalition regionally could either make prominent member of the party elite, consolidating power within his inner or break their standing in the national to run as governor of South Sulawesi, circle and delivering on his previous elections. All-out battles between big despite the baggage of a corruption campaign promises of economic and small parties are therefore likely conviction. development. as they try to either retain control or The potential outcomes and Others have their eyes set on the job challenge the status quo. peculiarities of these contests mark the too. Jokowi’s rival Prabowo Subianto The 2018 regional elections are not regional elections as a giant political has not ruled out the possibility of just about national politics. Beneath event in its own right and one that will running again and is consistently

20 EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY JANUARY — MARCH 2018 asian review: politics hotting up placed second to Jokowi in polls. A the aegis of TNI. amplifying these sentiments. CSIS Indonesia survey also found Beyond the campaigning and polls, As the 2018 regional elections Prabowo to be more popular than identity politics stands out as one of loom, there may be more clashes of Jokowi among millennial netizens. the most influential factors shaping ideas between champions of identity Prabowo’s continued popularity is the 2018 and 2019 election outcomes. politics (such as the hard-line Islamic remarkable. Despite not systematically Ethno-religious language has become a Defenders Front) and the voice of campaigning since his defeat in the staple in opposition campaigns against moderation, led by Nahdlatul Ulama 2014 election, his voter base has not Jokowi and his camp in the past five and Muhammadiyyah. dispersed. Prabowo could further years and this card will likely be played The intense domestic focus of boost his popularity by hitting the by anti-Jokowi forces should he decide Indonesia’s upcoming elections may campaign trail during the 2018 to run for a second term. have important implications for regional elections, a strategy he used Identity politics was especially Indonesia’s regional and international during Jakarta’s 2017 gubernatorial salient in the Jakarta gubernatorial engagement. Campaigning race. election. This was one of the most demands may result in political Running for president is not bitter elections in post-1998 history elites channelling their attention Prabowo’s only option. He could go and saw Anies Baswedan defeat then and resources inwards, resulting down former president Megawati’s incumbent governor Basuki Tjahaja in Indonesia’s decreased presence path by nominating a proxy to run as Purnama (better known as ‘Ahok’). internationally. In particular, an his party’s candidate. Otherwise, he Ahok’s fall from grace—despite his Indonesian drawback could become a would need a popular companion on status as a pro-development and anti- serious snag to regional efforts to push his ticket to amplify his chances of corruption candidate—shows what the ASEAN at 50 agenda. election. Both of these roles would suit a powerful political weapon identity Anies Baswedan, the new Governor of politics has become, especially if used NDONESIA’S neighbours will Jakarta. No one else has the popularity against minorities. I need to remain vigilant to possible needed to run with Prabowo. It looks as if the use of identity spillovers from Indonesia’s domestic politics is not going anywhere for now. political narrative. Ethno-religious OKOWI, on the other hand, has Some rally-goers who participated language, for example, could be J a plethora of potential running in a series of religiously-tinged picked-up by opportunistic individuals mates to choose from. These include demonstrations in Jakarta have in Malaysia as a political strategy. Agus Harimurti Yudhoyono (son of established a network called Alumni Additionally, traditional punching bags former president Susilo Bambang 212. The network is keeping ethno- such as Malaysia and Australia should Yudhoyono), the controversial yet religious language in the public space brace against potential inflammatory popular Indonesian Armed Forces and its leadership board has already rhetoric directed at them by (TNI) former chief General Gatot proposed several of its members to candidates hoping to secure votes. Nurmantyo, the Minister of Finance, run as candidates under the Gerindra– Indonesia’s political atmosphere Sri Mulyani Indrawati, and even Prosperous Justice Party–National is set to remain highly combustible jailed former Jakarta governor Basuki Mandate Party coalition, although until the presidential election is Tjahaja Purnama. this fell on deaf ears. Such hurdles will settled in 2019. Those inside and Some, including Agus Yudhoyono likely strengthen the group‘s resolve outside Indonesia will need to exercise and the chief of the pro-Jokowi more than anything else. restraint so as to not turn a small spark Kang Islamic National Awakening Perpetuating identity politics will into a giant blaze. EAFQ Party, Muhaimin Iskandar, have deepen the social chasm between already started their campaigns with the majority and minority groups Muhammad Sinatra is an Analyst tours of the country and appearances in Indonesia. Recent anti-Chinese in the Foreign Policy and Security next to Jokowi at high-profile events. remarks on social media are one Studies department at the Institute of Observers have also interpreted manifestation of this destabilising Strategic and International Studies Gatot’s political speeches and activities tolerance. Dubious discourses like (ISIS), Malaysia. His research currently as indication of his political ambition, pribumi (native Indonesian) and focuses on terrorism in Southeast Asia despite his supposed neutrality under ‘communist resurgence’ are also and Indonesian politics.

EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY JANUARY — MARCH 2018 21 keeping the balance Power transitions threaten ASEAN’s hedging role picture: samrang pring / reuters KUIK Cheng-Chwee

INCE its inception in 1967, S ASEAN has served as a platform for multiple gradually expanding functions for its member states and the wider Asia Pacific community. One relatively understudied function of ASEAN is its role as a platform for ‘hedging’ in the post-Cold War era. In Southeast Asia, ASEAN and the ASEAN Plus multilateral mechanisms have provided an additional avenue for small- and medium-sized states to hedge against the risks associated with the rise of China. The states’ converging efforts (not necessarily collective nor coordinated actions) occur alongside traditional unilateral Welders at work on a bridge in Phnom Penh, one of many projects in Cambodia supported by the Chinese and bilateral channels for hedging and government. In Southeast Asia, infrastructure development is far more than an economic issue. allow them to simultaneously pursue actions that engage and constrain This allows smaller states to avoid South China Sea. China at the regional level. becoming subservient or over- The United States’ growing Engagement is the active use of dependent on their giant neighbours unpredictability under the Trump multilateral and bilateral processes (the risks of engagement without administration further weakens the to forge increasingly close, constrainment). They can also avoid capacity of ASEAN Plus platforms and comprehensive and productive ties antagonising any power or forgoing processes to pursue constrainment. with China. Constrainment involves any economic gains (the risks of Regional scepticism intensified after the contradictory action of keeping constrainment without engagement), President Trump’s tour of Asia in distance from and even constraining while mitigating the risks of November 2017, especially after the rising power, by using the very entrapment and abandonment in the his last-minute decision to skip same ASEAN-based platforms as the face of uncertainty. the East Asia Summit. The Trump diplomatic, economic and strategic This space may be shrinking. The administration’s lack of attention mechanisms for other regional powers power dynamics surrounding the towards ASEAN-based regional and players to provide checks and South China Sea are challenging multilateralism (alongside the balances on Beijing. Engagement and Southeast Asian cohesion and ASEAN other liabilities of Trump’s ‘America constrainment are two sides of the centrality. Beijing’s increasingly First’ agenda), is undoing some hedging coin. assertive actions at sea are not of the diplomatic and strategic ASEAN-centred platforms create significantly constrained by any accomplishments of the Obama and cultivate the offsetting space for actors such as the United States or administration’s ‘rebalancing to Asia’ weaker states to keep their options arrangements such as the Declaration policy. open to deal with the rise of China. of the Conduct of Parties in the This is all taking place at a time

22 EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY JANUARY — MARCH 2018 when China’s connectivity-based a stable distribution of power, a approach and more by all-out Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and sustainable peace and a durable confrontation. This would likely divide various Beijing-initiated multilateral prosperity in Asia. the region and undermine ASEAN’s mechanisms (such as the Asian One danger of the ongoing power role as a platform for hedging. Infrastructure Investment Bank) shift is that more and more Southeast These possibilities are likely to are gradually gaining momentum Asian states may move closer to result in regional polarisation and in Eurasia and beyond. China’s Beijing to benefit from China’s international instability. Any shift expanded presence globally and Japan’s numerous economic carrots and its in regional alignments would spark corresponding infrastructure-centred growing geopolitical clout. If the trend reactions among the big powers, each foreign policy are turning connectivity continues, this may further threaten vying to win back or further expand cooperation into the new chessboard Southeast Asian unity and ASEAN its own sphere of influence and of Asian geopolitical competition. centrality. Over time, if more ASEAN deny or limit its rival’s geopolitical As geoeconomics increasingly states repeatedly show a greater gains. Conflict might erupt at some converges with geopolitics in Asia, commitment to their big-power point, which would entrap states and the United States and other Western patron’s preferences than the interests undermine regional security. nations have thus far remained of other members of the group, Southeast Asian states’ current bystanders not effective players. This ASEAN risks becoming divided, hedging posture is far from the is a cause for concern. In Southeast weakened and marginalised. optimal choice for anyone. But it Asia, infrastructure development is The growing gravitational pull of is the second-best option that is in far more than an economic issue—it China’s power is not the only concern the interest of everyone, including is a matter of political significance. for Southeast Asian cohesion and China and other powers. The current Infrastructure is regarded by the centrality. Other powers, importantly ambiguity of neutral omni-alignment ruling elites of ASEAN states as the the United States and its allies, is far better than clear cut rivalry, key to governance performance and may forge a coalition of likeminded outright confrontation or all out tug- economic growth, upon which they nations in the Indo-Pacific if their of-war. rely to enhance or preserve their current efforts at constraint turn into Any power may make some political authority. containment. This would happen if immediate gains by inducing other China’s trillion-dollar BRI agenda such a coalition’s military actions states to side with it. But these short- is thus a growing inducement to targeted China explicitly and directly. term gains would be at the longer-term many Southeast Asian political The China policies of these states expense of provoking other power(s) elites, as shown by the increasing would be characterised less by the to push back. This could create a number, scope and scale of the current cooperation-amid-competition vicious cycle of actions and reactions negotiated and ongoing infrastructure that distracts states from domestic partnerships involving China in The current ambiguity of governance, deepens alignment the region. A growing inducement dilemmas, creates camps, exacerbates may not necessarily translate into neutral omni-alignment existing disputes and leads to conflicts growing influence, but a simultaneous that no state wants. increase in China’s inducements and a is far better than clear ASEAN’s role as a hedging perceived decrease in US commitment platform—despite all its limitations to the region may accelerate power cut rivalry, outright and shortcomings—is good for all shifts and regional transformation. Southeast Asian states and also good ASEAN remains a useful platform confrontation or all-out for all other powers and players. for Southeast Asian hedging precisely EAFQ because of these challenges. ASEAN- tug-of-war based forums are the only institutional Kuik Cheng-Chwee is an associate pillars of Asian architecture that are professor and co-convener of the not centred on or dominated by major East Asian International Relations powers. Preserving this institutional (EAIR) Caucus, National University of buffer role is crucial to preserving Malaysia (UKM).

EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY JANUARY — MARCH 2018 23 a proto-great power? Prosperity and protection: ASEAN through Thai eyes

John Blaxland and infrastructure, Thailand benefits from in political or foreign policy terms. A Greg Raymond closer integration with its Southeast senior Thai prime ministerial adviser Asian neighbours. That benefit is argued that ‘if ASEAN was a nation SEAN member states have shared across the region as the reach it would be very mixed. Brunei is a A different perspectives on the of transport and infrastructure monarchy, others are communist. significance of the grouping. As one projects increases. Some are democracies, some are not. of the founder member states, the Not surprisingly, Thai respondents Some are Buddhist, while others are second largest economy and a leading saw the advent of the ASEAN largely Muslim or Christian’. Similarly, state within ASEAN, Thailand’s Economic Community in 2015 as a a serving Thai military officer declared view is important. A survey of 1,800 positive development. Intra-ASEAN that making progress on security, former and current Thai officials trade is now bigger than trade humanitarian assistance or even joint conducted from 2014–17 on Thailand’s with any single external partner. In task forces would take time because of relationship with great powers Thailand’s case, exports to ASEAN the differences in politics, economies demonstrates that despite Bangkok’s are bigger than exports to China, the and levels of prosperity. reputation for hard realism in its United States, Japan or the European foreign policy, ASEAN surprisingly Union. As ASEAN’s share of world ALANCING the great powers seems to matter a great deal to gross domestic product continues to B is a key issue for Thailand. A Thailand in terms of regional security increase, this market of more than former foreign minister explained and prosperity. 637 million will offer opportunity to that ‘the creation of the ASEAN Respondents considered ASEAN to reduce reliance on external powers. architecture’ was a way ‘to manage be very important in terms of regional Security is multifaceted, which our relations with the external powers’. prosperity, with 72.3 per cent rating it explains why the rating given in the ASEAN now organises a wide range eight or higher (very important) out Thai survey was slightly lower than of meetings to help member states’ of ten on the Likert scale. In terms of that for regional prosperity. While relations with external powers. One ASEAN’s importance to security and the creation of ASEAN was never officer declared: ‘In ASEAN I speak stability, the rating was not as high but ostensibly about any form of mutual with many people. They don’t want the still significant, with 67.36 per cent security pact, its formation always had superpowers to come in and dominate. rating it eight or higher. a security dimension that was internal That is the concept. There are various In terms of prosperity, ASEAN is to ASEAN rather than external. After mechanisms to balance the powers’. becoming more important in part the US withdrawal from Vietnam Notwithstanding this ideal of great because of the advantages associated and the consolidation of communist power balancing, the reality is more with geography and infrastructure. regimes in mainland Southeast complicated. As another senior officer Indonesian President Joko Widodo Asia, Thailand decided to prioritise said: ‘The concept of ASEAN today had justifiably described Indonesia relations with its neighbours. For Thai is okay, but the reality is that it is as the region’s maritime fulcrum. But policymakers, ASEAN has remained very complicated inside, for example arguably his claim applies equally—if integral to Thailand’s security and is in relation to the Spratly Islands: it’s not more strongly—to the place of perceived as almost an article of faith. quite difficult [to achieve consensus] ASEAN and its member states sitting Yet this faith is not blind and Thai amongst ASEAN members’. astride the Indian and PacificO ceans. respondents frequently pointed out This task is complicated further Positioned centrally among ASEAN’s shortcomings. First, there by China’s growing influence across the mainland Southeast Asian is no expectation that ASEAN will the region, notably in Cambodia states and with relatively advanced present a unified front to the world and Laos. Like these two countries,

24 EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY JANUARY — MARCH 2018 picture: Sgt. Pablo N. Piedra/ / Us ARMY PHOTO

Thai officers on parade. ASEAN ‘has remained integral to Thailand’s security and is perceived as almost an article of faith’.

Thailand is on a path of integration of the ASEAN Defence Ministers Plus Thanks to the perpetuation of the with the Southeast Asian mainland, (ADMM Plus) forum, the significant notion of ASEAN centrality and including with southern China. The work undertaken by expert working despite its remarkable diversity, greater interconnectedness with China groups feeds into the ADMM Plus ASEAN gives comfort to its members impinges on member states’ perceived summits and provides much of the that their otherwise relatively freedom of political and economic detail for the practical application insignificant international roles action. and development of ideas to enhance amount to more than the sum of their History plays a role too. As noted collaboration. Collaboration in this parts. That sense of centrality, fragile by one senior intelligence official, the realm covers the five domains of cyber though it is, has been perpetuated unity of ASEAN is ‘a little bit weak and security, humanitarian assistance through the various forums that have shaken’ because of the past: ‘Thailand, and disaster relief, maritime security, ASEAN at their core. Thais argue for instance, used to invade Laos and peace-keeping operations, and military that it remains in the interests of the Cambodia, and Myanmar invaded medicine and humanitarian mine member states for this centrality to Thailand. That makes achieving action. continue. But in an era of growing consensus within ASEAN all the more great power contestation that may be difficult’. As suggested by the same ROGRESS has been slow and increasingly difficult. EAFQ intelligence official, ASEAN members P steady but over time these groups will need to learn how to forgive have generated significant outcomes, John Blaxland is Professor of and overcome past grievances if the including seminars, workshops, International Security and Intelligence organisation is to become ‘stronger exercises and conferences. Combined, Studies and Director of the Southeast and more united’. they provide an extraordinary range Asia Institute, The Australian National Despite enduring reasons for of opportunities for enhanced University. distrust and enmity, countries involved cooperation, increased mutual Greg Raymond is a Research Fellow in various ASEAN-related forums understanding and familiarity with in the Strategic and Defence Studies remain eager to participate—in other member states. Centre at The Australian National part to keep a check on each other’s In essence, the Thai establishment University, and co-editor of the journal intentions and initiatives. In the case sees ASEAN as a proto-great power. Security Challenges.

EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY JANUARY — MARCH 2018 25 security exception picture: Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Joshua Fulton / US NAVY

A sailor aboard USS Stethem secures a Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force aircraft during multinational helicopter deck landing practice during the at-sea phase of the ASEAN Defense Minister’s Meeting (ADMM) Plus Maritime Security and Counterterrorism Field Training Exercise 2016. A defence of ADMM Plus

TAN See Seng efforts have progressed further and For example, a combined maritime deeper than anything the region has security and counterterrorism EGIONAL security cooperation previously experienced. While ADMM exercise that took place in Brunei and R in the Asia Pacific has historically Plus was initiated as a triennial event, Singapore in May 2016 involved a total been a frustrated enterprise. The after meetings in 2010 and 2013 it was of 3,500 personnel, 18 naval vessels, surprise exception has been ‘upgraded’ to a biennial gathering. 25 aircraft and 40 special forces teams. cooperation in regional defence. The Some member countries reportedly All ADMM Plus member countries formation in 2010 of the ASEAN favour making ADMM Plus an annual participated in shore-based activities Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus affair. in Brunei, exercises that simulated (ADMM Plus) marked a departure ADMM Plus has conducted a terrorist attacks at sea between from the way that ASEAN and total of 12 exercises in the seven Brunei and Singapore, and land-based its dialogue partners previously designated areas of cooperation: exercises in north-western Singapore. approached security cooperation. counterterrorism, cyber security, Annual leaders’ retreats aimed ADMM Plus comprises the ten humanitarian assistance and disaster at facilitating in-depth discussions ASEAN member countries and relief, humanitarian mine action, among ministers have been conducted Australia, China, India, Japan, New maritime security, military medicine, on a fairly regular basis. While ADMM Zealand, Russia, South Korea and and peacekeeping. Some field exercises Plus understandably garners all the the United States. ADMM Plus have been huge and complex affairs. media attention, the ‘real work’ is

26 EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY JANUARY — MARCH 2018 left to the ASEAN Defence Senior inclusion of the South China Sea in the to a number of acute problems Officials’ Meeting Plus (ADSOM proposed ADMM Plus declaration in plaguing the region. Treating ADMM Plus) and affiliated working groups. 2015. Plus as a ‘peace process’ or dispute ADSOM Plus contributes to setting ADMM Plus does not imply settlement instrument patently and implementing the agendas, action the existence of an ASEAN model saddles it with unwarranted and plans and joint declarations of defence of defence regionalism. One only impractical expectations. ADMM Plus ministers and receives reports on need look at the fate of the ARF. is essentially an ad hoc response aimed various cooperative initiatives put After starting brightly and evoking at improving the ability of ASEAN forth by ADMM Plus members. excitement about an ‘Asia Pacific way’ countries to handle non-traditional ADMM Plus stands out as an of security cooperation, it fizzled in the security challenges. Any expectation exception to the rule in a region where heat of opposition among its members that it can and should have a key form has triumphed over substance in to its prospective involvement in role in conflict management in the regional security cooperation. ADMM preventive diplomacy. South China Sea needs to be critically Plus reflects what ASEAN and its The ARF’s subsequent turn to assessed against its limitations. dialogue partners can achieve so long non-traditional security in the late Yet it could prove equally premature as the will is there. But as much as the 2000s made good sense in light to outright dismiss the ability of achievements of ADMM Plus suggest of its difficulties. Still, it reflected ADMM Plus to, under the right that ASEAN and its partners could the indigent state of an institution conditions, use its extant success and finally be getting security right, their faced with the ignominy of calls for goodwill to improve regional security. ability to translate these successes into replacement (such as those made Despite its constraints, the ADMM lasting consequences for the region in 2008 by former Australian prime Plus should refrain from totally remains to be seen. The prospect of minister Kevin Rudd and in 2009 by recusing itself from the South China participant fatigue and diminishing former Japanese prime minister Yukio Sea conflicts as the ARF appears to returns from commitments to Hatoyama). have done. defence cooperation are all too real, Nearly two decades ago, the ADMM Plus countries could particularly if tensions over the South late Michael Leifer warned against consider leveraging their mutual China Sea continue to escalate. unrealistic expectations of ASEAN- goodwill to conduct joint maritime ADMM Plus could face a fate based regionalisms as peacemaking naval exercises in the South China similar to that of the ASEAN Regional mechanisms, given their evident Sea. This is an achievable goal given Forum (ARF) if regional and great inability to respond meaningfully that the majority of ADMM Plus powers refuse to exercise mutual members are signatories to the Code restraint in strategic competition. For Treating ADMM Plus as a of Unplanned Encounters at Sea example, due to intractable differences established at the Western Pacific among its member states, the ADMM ‘peace process’ or dispute Naval Symposium in 2014. ADMM Plus was forced to scrap a planned Plus still has the potential to stand joint statement on the South China settlement instrument out from the disappointments of past Sea at its 2015 meeting in Kuala ASEAN initiatives and contribute Lumpur. patently saddles it substantively to regional defence. At the time the media widely but EAFQ wrongly reported that the failure was with unwarranted and reminiscent of the disunity among Tan See Seng is Professor of ASEAN states in Phnom Penh in impractical expectations International Relations at the S. July 2012 that resulted in ASEAN’s Rajaratnam School of International failure to issue a mandatory joint Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological communiqué. In contrast, all 10 University, and is concurrently Deputy ASEAN members (including the four Director and Head of Research of the South China Sea claimant countries, Institute of Defence and Strategic Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines Studies at RSIS. and Vietnam) jointly rejected the

EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY JANUARY — MARCH 2018 27 more than consensus Rethinking ASEAN’s approach to counter-terrorism

Shashi Jayakumar of concrete agreement. But observers accordingly. This was the first time critical of ASEAN’s progress in anywhere in Southeast Asia that pro- SEAN turned 50 on 8 August counter-terrorism suggest that ASEAN IS elements had attempted to come A 2017 in the shadow of the is hindered by its consensus-seeking out of insurgency and take a city. Marawi insurgency in the Philippines. mode of working that privileges The multiple transnational elements The prolonged siege brought home respect for member states’ national were particularly noteworthy. Foreign the fact that terrorism is the most sovereignty above all else. ASEAN fighters from Indonesia and Malaysia intractable of ASEAN’s myriad is allegedly incapable of substantial (and allegedly from further afield) security issues. Terrorism is a matter decision-making on counter-terrorism were involved. Some militants appear that requires more than the group’s and is insignificant in the international to have entered Marawi through the traditional consensus—ASEAN needs counter-terrorism architecture. porous tri-border area stretching unanimous assent and concrete goals This critique is hardly surprising. across the Sulu–Sulawesi seas to deal with the problem. Consider the sheer diversity in how between Indonesia, Malaysia and the ASEAN has addressed terrorism member states approach threat Philippines. reasonably well on paper. Early perception. Some members, such as milestones include the November Indonesia and the Philippines, have ARAWI cannot simply be 2001 ASEAN Declaration on Joint been victims of attacks. Others, such M considered a local issue. Action to Counter Terrorism. as Singapore, have had near misses During the siege, some member Member states agreed to review or face a jihadist threat but are so far states offered humanitarian and other and strengthen national counter- comparatively unscathed. Malaysia has assistance, including drones and urban terrorism mechanisms and to deepen witnessed just one confirmed attack warfare training. The agreement counter-terrorism cooperation linked to the so-called Islamic State between Indonesia, Malaysia and the between law enforcement agencies. (IS). Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia Philippines in June 2017 to launch But knowledgeable observers had arguably do not see the jihadist terror maritime patrols with the aim of lingering suspicions that ASEAN was threat as a pressing concern and do interdicting trans-border terrorism subsuming terrorism under other not see multilateral counter-terrorism activities in the tri-border area is a concerns, especially transnational cooperation as a top-level priority. notable achievement, but more will be crime. Not that counter-terrorism needed as the hydra-like terror threat The key impetus for change was cooperation has been absent. Much evolves. the Bali bombings in October 2002, of the sharp end of counter-terrorism In the short term, the boundaries carried out by Al Qaeda affiliate work is done on a bilateral basis. between transnational crime and Jemaah Islamiyah. The cornerstone ASEAN member states tend to prefer terrorism will likely blur further, counter-terrorism agreements that these arrangements, which have particularly when it comes to followed were the legally binding 2007 historically proved to be an effective financing and the use of human ASEAN Convention on Counter- way to manage sensitive security smuggling networks. In 2017, for Terrorism (ACCT) and the 2009 issues. Counter-terrorism needs example, Malaysian police arrested a ASEAN Comprehensive Plan of a level of intelligence and security cell of IS sympathisers for smuggling Action on Counter Terrorism (revised cooperation to operate out of the weapons into Malaysia from southern in 2017). public spotlight. This is inevitable and Thailand. Given the overlaps between These agreements and declarations not confined to ASEAN. transnational crime and terrorism, sent signals to the international Marawi was a genuine game- ASEAN should leverage Interpol’s community that ASEAN was capable changer and ASEAN needs to adapt presence in the region. Interpol

28 EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY JANUARY — MARCH 2018 picture: romeo ranoco / reuters

A government soldier stands guard in front of damaged buildings in Marawi city in October 2017. The confllict there ‘cannot simply be considered a local issue’. concluded a three-year program in approach. On paper, at least, the on combatting terrorism. These 2017 to enhance the counter-terrorism landmark ACCT provides for ASEAN mechanisms should ideally involve capacities of ASEAN member states. to enhance intra-faith and inter-faith non-governmental organisations and Such initiatives must be expanded. dialogue. academic experts. ASEAN’s next step should be ASEAN’s long-term ambition It might, for example, be useful to to engage deeply with the issue should be to address the root causes establish a forum jointly under the of counter-narratives and the of extremist thought and activity. SOMTC Working Group and the transmission of extremist ideas online. Peacebuilding, education and social Special ASEAN Ministerial Meeting It is increasingly clear that after its integration all come into play. The on the Rise of Radicalisation and strategic retreat in Southeast Asia, most forward-looking sections of Violent Extremism. Such a forum IS still has an afterlife, particularly the ACCT are those concerned with could see government experts, on social media—an issue that will promoting the UN’s 2030 Sustainable academics and civil society frankly have cross-border implications. The Development Goals, tackling poverty sharing ideas in an unforced setting. opening in July 2016 of the ASEAN and addressing issues of development. A forum like this is a radical idea. Regional Digital Counter-Messaging But ASEAN will only take the next Communications Centre in Kuala SEAN’s mechanisms will need to step forward in combatting terrorism Lumpur is a welcome start. A evolve too. Combatting terrorism when pressing needs, existing efforts An important adjunct to these has in the past fallen under the and out-of-the-box thinking can be efforts would be combatting remit of the ASEAN Senior Officials brought together in this way. EAFQ intolerance in the real and online Meeting on Transnational Crime worlds. The rise of narrow, dogmatic (SOMTC) and specifically its Working Shashi Jayakumar is Senior Fellow interpretations of religion in some Group on Counter-Terrorism. New at the S. Rajaratnam School of parts of Southeast Asia underscores platforms may be needed for ASEAN International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang the pressing need for such an states to share experiences and views Technological University.

EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY JANUARY — MARCH 2018 29 challenge of heterogeneity Vietnam’s experience, a reference point for Australia

entailed an adjustment in the original it is in Vietnam’s interest to guard Huong Le Thu members’ strategic thinking and its continuing relevance. As an additional considerations of ASEAN’s increasingly important regional actor HE accession of Vietnam, a economic goals. Post-war Vietnam with an outward-looking strategy, T formerly antagonistic communist was significantly less developed Hanoi’s diplomatic footprint will be neighbour, to ASEAN was the result than the ‘ASEAN 6’. It was grouped critical in determining the future of several major geostrategic power into the ‘second tier ASEAN’ group development of ASEAN. shifts that continue to impact on the alongside newcomers Cambodia, Laos Vietnam’s accession has been grouping’s development today. and Myanmar, for which separate a mutually beneficial process: Conflict in Vietnam in the 1960s arrangements were made in regards to ASEAN was the bridge to Vietnam’s and ’70s provided the context for the economic integration. liberalisation and connection with the genesis of ASEAN. Despite the hard Vietnam’s successful transformation world when the United States was still feelings original member states held from an external threat into a fellow isolating it from global opportunities. towards each other during the period member state can be seen as the best Likewise, the inclusion of Indochinese of decolonisation and Cold War example of a member state adopting states reinvented ASEAN into a tension, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, ASEAN principles. Vietnam is now regional grouping that included Singapore and the Philippines one of the most active members of maritime and mainland Southeast agreed to work together to shield the organisation. Under the pressure Asia. themselves from the domino effect generated by rivalry between the US of communist expansion. ASEAN’s and China, Hanoi has been consistent OR half a century the region has diplomatic response to Vietnam’s 1978 in insisting that ASEAN play a role in F shaped ASEAN as an institution intervention in Cambodia remains the dispute management. while ASEAN has framed the conduct organisation’s biggest success. Vietnam has also vocally supported of regional politics. After decades The threat of communism brought multilateral ASEAN initiatives, such of expansion, however, ASEAN is together a group of dissimilar interests as the ASEAN Regional Forum, to struggling to adjust to new shifts in and provided a reason for ASEAN to uphold the rules-based order and power, particularly the rise of China. unite. When it subsided in the 1990s, stability of the region. The continuity The organisation also suffers from a Vietnam’s regional integration became of Vietnam’s domestic leadership, need to reform itself internally. a necessity and the former adversary alongside Singapore, means that its Increasing influence byC hina acceded to ASEAN in 1995. This ruling elites still maintain the original on individual member states has marked one of the most meaningful vision held by the founders of ASEAN. led to the abuse of ASEAN norms, transitions in the region’s history— Unlike Southeast Asian democracies including the principle of consensus. Southeast Asia had embraced its such as Indonesia, the Philippines and Growing frustration about this political and ideological diversity and Thailand (which have experienced ineffective practice has led to internal overcome Cold War bipolarity. power transitions that somewhat discussion about the possibility of ASEAN was a critical platform undermined their commitment to a new ‘ASEAN-X’ approach, where for Vietnam to break out from its ASEAN), Vietnam’s outlook on the issues are resolved among those that diplomatic isolation, re-engage with strategic importance of the group has are willing or are directly concerned its neighbourhood and indirectly remained consistent. with the problem at hand. While this move towards normalising its With its hard-earned membership, idea is still in the making, it signals relationship with the United States. ASEAN will remain one of the key that the innate diversity and different Vietnam’s accession to ASEAN pillars of Hanoi’s foreign policy and priorities within ASEAN make it

30 EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY JANUARY — MARCH 2018 picture: kham / reuters

Honour guards march past the ASEAN and Vietnamese flags before Vietnam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Hanoi. Vietnam is a vigorous member of the bloc. increasingly hard to reach ‘consensus’. a vision of leadership it has to offer to current political contexts have shifted The pending membership application ASEAN and what sort of leadership it their immediate focus away from of Timor Leste, if successful, will only is willing to follow ASEAN (such as the United States, lead ASEAN towards even deeper China, Russia, India, Japan and the heterogeneity. HE strategic considerations for EU), Australia is in the position to Timor Leste’s pending membership T Australia to join ASEAN differ demonstrate support for this regional may only further strain ASEAN unity. from those that were imperative for institution. But it does offer a useful case-study for Vietnam or the Indochinese members A change in the strategic landscape those who also contemplate joining. in the post-Cold War context. Joining in the late 20th century pulled This takes the edge off one of the ASEAN is optional for Canberra, and Vietnam into ASEAN and transformed oldest arguments against Australia’s the rationale for Australia to consider Vietnamese domestic politics. This joining ASEAN: that it differs joining the club is to better position success story should give Australia a too much from the group. While itself in a region with a stronger reference point that ASEAN is able Australia’s difference is indisputable, China. But whether belonging to the to adjust geopolitical needs. ASEAN that is not the main show-stopper. ASEAN group can shield Australia membership does not necessarily give The main barrier, other than from a more omnipresent China is more leverage. It is a question of what ASEAN 10’s disinclination to be an open question. Even so, this is an Canberra wants from ASEAN and agreeable to further expansion opportunity for Australia to lever whether it has really made most of the that would completely redefine the existing ASEAN platforms such as existing frameworks of dialogue and institution, to Australian membership the East Asia Summit and ASEAN strategic partnership. EAFQ is not related to how unified ASEAN Regional Forum to assert its status is but rather the lack of ASEAN as the oldest and closest ASEAN Huong Le Thu is a senior analyst at leadership. Before the membership dialogue partner. Unlike other key Australia Strategic Policy Institute. debate, Canberra should ask if it has major dialogue partners whose

EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY JANUARY — MARCH 2018 31 EXPANDING YOUR POLICY UNIVERSE

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