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Preventing Biological Threats: What You Can Do

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Preventing Biological Threats: What You Can Do Preventing Biological Threats: What You Can Do Editors Simon Whitby Tatyana Novossiolova Gerald Walther Malcolm Dando A Guide to Biological Security Issues and How to Address Them Credits First published December 2015 by: Bradford Disarmament Research Centre, University of Bradford, Richmond Road, Bradford, BD7 1DP, West Yorkshire, UK. This book is available to download and use free of charge. Enquiries concerning the book should be sent to Simon Whitby at [email protected]. ISBN Number: This book was funded through the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD) Canada and the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence (MOD). The content and views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of DFATD, the Government of Canada, MOD or the Government of the United Kingdom. DFATD, the Government of Canada, MOD and the Government of the United Kingdom accept no responsibility or liability for any errors or omissions or the manner in which the information contained herein is constructed or applied. Contents List of Tables List of Figures List of Boxes List of Acronyms Acknowledgements Notes on Contributors Preface Paul van den IJssel, Ambassador of the Netherlands to Jordan Forward HRH Princess Sumaya bint El Hassan, President of the Royal Scientific Society of Jordan Chapters 1. Introduction and overview (Simon Whitby and Tatyana Novossiolova) Section 1. Threats and Responses 2. Biosecurity challenges in the 21st Century: the case of gain-of-function experiments (Koos van der Bruggen) 3. Advances in science and technology and the evolution of bioweapons capability (Kathryn Nixdorff) 4. Biological weapons as weapons of terror: perspectives on the threat (Catherine Jefferson) 5. Natural outbreaks and biosecurity: the 2014 Ebola outbreak (Maureen Ellis) 6. The BTWC: structure and development (Jez Littlewood) 7. The idea of a web of prevention (Graham Pearson) Section 2.Scientists, Organisations and Biosecurity 8. Dual use and the progress of life sciences: a case for promoting biosecurity and responsible conduct of research (Gerald Walther) 9. The role of industry in promoting biosecurity: a case study of the convergence of chemistry and biology (Ralf Trapp) 10. The role of scientific organisations in promoting biosecurity: a case study on IAP (Jo Husbands and Katherine Bowman) 11. Review of science and technology: a case study on the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Implementation Support Unit (Piers Millett) Section 3.Biosecurityand Law Enforcement 12. The Federal Bureau of Investigation Biosecurity Program: a case study of law enforcement and outreach (William So) 13. Multisectoral coordination for biosecurity preparedness: a case study on INTERPOL (Guy Collyer) Section 4. States and Biosecurity 14. The Danish biosecurity system (Robert Petersen) 15. Fostering biosecurity in Jordan (Jwan Ibbini) 16. National implementation of biosecurity in South Africa (Louise Bezuidenhout) 17. National implementation of biosecurity in Canada (Kirsten Almquist, Julia Fernandez, Stacey Mantha, and Morgan Kafenzakis) 18. The future governance of biotechnology (Catherine Rhodes) Section 5. Biosecurity and Active Learning 19. Immersing students in responsible science through active learning pedagogies: lessons from educational institutes in the MENA region (Lida Anestidou and Jay Labov) 20. Interactive biosecurity: Team-Based Learning in action (Tatyana Novossiolova) Section 6. Conclusion 21. Conclusion: building a web of prevention (Tatyana Novossiolova and Simon Whitby) Glossary List of Tables 1.1: Definitions of ‘Biosecurity’ 1.2: International consensus on the value of biosecurity education 3.1: Comparison of potential toxin and chemical weapons 3.2: Examples of the application of modern biotechnologies to the creation of novel biological agents carried out in the former Soviet Union at two major Biopreparat Institutes, Obolensk and Vector 6.1: Key provisions of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention 6.2: Examples of Additional Agreements under the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention 6.3: Confidence-Building Measures adopted by States Parties 6.4: Examples of events, incidents and developments and their impact on the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention 10.1: Selected contributions made by individuals, universities, international scientific organisations and industry to recent meetings of the Biological Weapons Convention 11.1: Topics covered by States Parties’ submissions on relevant developments in science and technology to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention 2011 Review Conference 11.2: Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Implementation Support Unit background information documents on science and technology 12.1: FBI WMD Coordinators Program Facts 12.2: Informed Policy Decision-Making 12.3: How Scientists View Law Enforcement 12.4: Core Tenets of FBI Biosecurity Program 12.5: Starting Biosecurity Engagements 12.6: Pre-employment Suitability and Reliability Programs 12.7: DIYbio/amateur biology defined 12.8: Security Projects from iGEM 13.1: INTERPOL Operation So3MMET, Regional Workshop Middle East 13.2: INTERPOL Operation So3MMET, Regional Workshop South Asia 15.1: List of Activities Carried out by the Royal Scientific Society 19.1: Some of the alleged irresponsible conduct of science and classification of scientific misconduct in the study connecting Thimersol in vaccines to increased incidence of autism 19.2: A sample of possible exam questions for this module 19.3: Alleged irresponsible conduct of science and classification of scientific misconduct in the study connecting Thimersol in vaccines to increased incidence of autism 20.1: Structure of the biosecurity Team-Based Learning seminar 20.2: Individual Readiness Assurance Test (iRAT) and Team Readiness Assurance Test (tRAT) sample questions 20.3: Questions included in the post-seminar questionnaire 20.4: Answers to post-seminar questions List of Figures 3.1: The development of the biological agent threat spectrum over time 4.1: The Anthrax Letters 4.2: The International Genetically Engineered Machine competition has come to epitomise the supposed trend towards de-skilling 7.1: The CBW (Chemical Biological Weapons) Spectrum 7.2: The Web of Prevention 7.3: The Prohibition Regime 7.4: Preparedness 10.1: Individual scientists and scientific organisations participate in meetings of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, held at the United Nations in Geneva, Switzerland 10.2: Engagement of international scientific networks in biosecurity: a timeline of selected activities 10.3: Scientific, technical and policy experts interested in biosecurity issues engage in discussions on recent developments and their potential implications for the Biological and Toxin and Chemical Weapons Conventions 11.1: State Parties submitting information to reviews of science and technology at successive Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Review Conferences 12.1: FBI WMD Directorate Seal 12.2: Striking a balance between science and security 12.3: Synthetic DNA Screening Guidance 12.4: IBC Function 12.5: NSABB Definition of DURC 12.6: 2014 iGEM 12.7: DIY bio 12.8: FBI outreach at the 2014 iGEM Giant Gymboree 13.1: INTERPOL guide to Bioterrorism prevention 13.2: S3oMMET Gap Analysis 14.1: The Danish biosecurity model 15.1: Site map of Jordan 15.2: Stakeholders’ involvement during crisis management in Jordan 15.3: Opening ceremony for the mobile biological lab on 13 November 2014 15.4: Educational posters prepared by students 15.5: The life sciences enterprise ‘Soup’ 18.1: From international governance to individual action 20.1: The responses to “Which of these statements best defines the dual-use dilemma”, Active Learning versus Lectures 20.2: The responses to “Which of these statements best defines the dual-use dilemma”, TBL versus non-TBL 20.3: The benefits of Team-Based Learning as a Train-the-Trainer methodology List of Boxes 1.1: The role of scientists in society 1.2: A need for biosecurity education 1.3: United States Government Policy for Institutional Oversight of Life Sciences Dual Use Research of Concern 2.1: Experiments of concern 2.2: Timeline of the gain-of-function debate 2.3: Young scientists who did the job 2.4: Biosecurity expert and commentator: David A. Relman 3.1: Matthew Meselson 3.2: US programme 3.3: Some agents of particular biological weapons relevance 3.4: Motivation of scientists working in the former Soviet Union on biological weapons for offensive purposes 4.1: Bruce Ivins and the Insider Threat 5.1: Local university students become active in the Ebola outbreak response 5.2: Diseases of concern and their natural occurrence (World Health Organization) 5.3: Practical biosecurity measures to be taken during a natural disease outbreak 5.4: Government engages local students in Mali to control Ebola 5.5: Professional certification in managing biological risks 7.1: Article I of the BTWC 7.2: Article I Final Declaration of the Seventh Review Conference in 2011 7.3: Article IV of the BTWC 7.4: Article IV Final Declaration of the Seventh Review Conference in 2011 7.5: Article III of the BTWC 8.1: Asilomar Conference in 1975 8.2: The Lemon-Relman Report increased the scope of the dual-use problem by arguing that all life science research is prone to misuse 8.3: A glass sculpture on H5N1 by the artist Luke Jerram 8.4: Next Generation Genomics: World Map of High-Throughput Sequencing 9.1: How convergence may affect existing arms control and security regimes 9.2: The Chemical Weapons Convention and the
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