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Fobaproa: El Costo Del Rescate Bancario Vol II.Indb Grupo Parlamentario del PRD en la LX Legislatura de la Cámara de Diputados del Congreso de la Unión Av. Congreso de la Unión, núm. 66 Col. El Parque 15960 México, D.F. Fobaproa: el costo del rescate bancario, volumen II Juan Moreno Pérez México, julio de 2009 Cuidado de la edición y corrección Renata Soto-Elízaga Diseño María de Lourdes Álvarez López Formación de texto Nicolás Severino Rámila Formación de cuadros María de Lourdes Álvarez López Asistencia editorial Susana Gutiérrez Soto Susana Nolasco Arano El texto de este libro está disponible en formato PDF y puede obtenerse en: <http://prd.diputados.gob.mx/publicaciones/p_03.htm>. Se autoriza plenamente (y se agradece) su reproducción, siempre y cuando se cite la fuente. GRUPO PARLAMENTARIO DEL PRD CÁMARA DE DIPUTADOS / CONGRESO DE LA UNIÓN LX LEGISLATURA Mesa Directiva Javier González Garza Coordinador Francisco Javier Calzada Vázquez VicecoordinadorVicecoordinador Ruth Zavaleta Salgado Vicepresidenta de la Mesa Directiva de la Cámara de Diputados Mario Vallejo Estévez PresidentePresidente de Debates del Pleno Sonia Nohelia Ibarra Fránquez Administración Interna Juan N. Guerra Ochoa Proceso Legislativo Roberto Mendoza Flores Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales Holly Matus Toledo Equidad Social Juan Manuel San Martín Hernández DesarrolloDesarrollo MetropolitanoMetropolitano Salvador Ruiz Sánchez Reforma del Estado Jesús Humberto Zazueta Aguilar Política Internacional Daniel Dehesa Mora Política Social Miguel Ángel Solares Chávez Cultura, Educación, Ciencia y TecnologíaTecnología Alliet Mariana Bautista Bravo Derechos Humanos y Justicia Social Javier Hernández Manzanares Representante ante el IFE César Flores Maldonado Jurisdiccional Interna Camerino Eleazar Márquez Madrid Comunicación Social Aleida Alavez Ruiz Jurídica Alejandro Sánchez Camacho Desarrollo Económico Rafael Franco Melgarejo Comunicaciones, Transportes y Turismo Adriana Díaz Contreras Desarrollo Rural Hugo Eduardo Martínez Padilla Vigilancia de la Auditoría Superior de la Federación y Contraloría Social Valentina Valia Batres Guadarrama Finanzas Públicas Claudia Lilia Cruz Santiago Política Interior Andrés Lozano Lozano Seguridad y Procuración de Justicia Irene Aragón Castillo Vigilancia de la Administración Interna ÍNDICE Capítulo 1 El Informe de Michael Mackey El informe Mackey: la auditoría que no fue 13 Informe Mackey: el necesario debate 17 El Fobaproa y el PAN 21 Las operaciones reportables del Fobaproa 25 Las operaciones del Fobaproa 55 El Fobaproa y las mentiras de Vicente Fox 59 Las listas del Fobaproa 63 Las listas de Mackey y la impunidad 67 Capítulo 2 El rescate de Banca Serfín El rescate de Serfín y el riesgo moral 75 7 FOBAPROA: EL COSTO DEL RESCATE BANCARIO El gran desfalco de Serfín 79 El rescate de Banca Serfín: un gran desfalco a la nación 83 Rescate bancario y gasto público 107 El rescate de Serfín (I) 111 El rescate de Serfín (II) 115 Serfín: la quiebra oculta 119 Capítulo 3 Las consecuencias del rescate bancario El disimulado desastre fiscal 125 Asignación de los ingresos petroleros excedentes para el rescate bancario, y simulación de superávit fiscal 129 Frustrado engaño a los legisladores 135 La deuda pública escondida 139 El Fobaproa y el PRD 143 El petróleo y el Fobaproa 145 La renuncia de Vicente Corta 149 Las secuelas del rescate bancario y la necesaria reforma fiscal 153 8 ÍNDICE Capítulo 4 La última batalla para reducir el costo del Fobaproa El Fobaproa: origen, evolución y situación actual 189 Nota 1: Los créditos reportados por el auditor Mackey durante su revisión de los pagarés de capitalización y compra de cartera del Fobaproa 221 Nota 2: Los créditos observados durante las revisiones efectuadas por la Auditoría Superior de la Federación a los pagarés de capitalización y compra de cartera del Fobaproa (pagaré por pagaré) 227 Nota 3: Los créditos observados durante las revisiones efectuadas por la Auditoría Superior de la Federación a los pagarés de capitalización y compra de cartera del Fobaproa (cuadros resumen) 241 Nota 4: La solventación de las observaciones de la Auditoría Superior de la Federación a los pagarés de capitalización y compra de cartera del Fobaproa 249 Nota 5: La estimación de la reserva del IPAB para asumir las pérdidas esperadas por los pagarés de capitalización y compra de cartera del Fobaproa 261 Nota 6: La estimación de la conversión de los pagarés de capitalización y compra de cartera del Fobaproa en nuevos títulos de deuda del IPAB 267 Nota 7: Estimación del costo actual del rescate bancario 273 9 FOBAPROA: EL COSTO DEL RESCATE BANCARIO El rescate bancario: la otra guerra sucia 279 El rescate bancario en México y los problemas para la administración de los pasivos resultantes 303 Consideraciones del Grupo Parlamentario del Partido de la Revolución Democrática respecto al Informe de la Comisión de Investigación sobre el Instituto para la Protección al Ahorro Bancario 323 10 CAPÍTULO 1 EL INFORME DE MICHAEL MACKEY EL INFORME MACKEY: LA AUDITORÍA QUE NO FUE 21 DE JULIO DE 1999 l informe sobre las operaciones del Fobaproa, entregado recientemen- te por el consultor canadiense Michael Mackey, no es una auditoría. EEn realidad se trata de una investigación encargada por la Cámara de Diputados, con el fin de tener elementos para efectuar de manera más eficaz sus labores de legislación. El objeto de la investigación fue cumplido razo- nablemente bien, aunque su alcance se vio limitado por la información parcial que le fue proporcionada por las autoridades. El reporte de Mackey constituye una grave denuncia respecto a la ma- nera equivocada, onerosa e irresponsable con que ha sido conducido el rescate del sistema bancario, y confirma, de manera sorprendente, el análi- sis dado a conocer el 15 de julio de 1998 por el Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRDPRD), mediante el documento “Fobaproa: el gran atentado contra la economía nacional. Alternativas para impedirlo”. Las conclusiones básicas de Mackey son prácticamente las mismas a las que llegó el PRD: la crisis de la banca fue resultado de una política equivo- cada del gobierno de Salinas; la forma en que el gobierno de Zedillo enfren- tó la crisis ha sido y sigue siendo una de las más costosas para el pueblo mexicano; el rescate de la banca se dio de una manera oculta y discrecional; las operaciones realizadas mediante el Fobaproa no sólo no resolvieron los grandes problemas de la banca, sino que incrementaron su fragilidad; la persistencia de las mismas políticas sólo conducirá a más rescates y a ma- yores costos para la población. El actual alud de declaraciones, comentarios y desplegados, provenien- te de todo tipo de voceros, abiertos y embozados, del gobierno, pretende 13 FOBAPROA: EL COSTO DEL RESCATE BANCARIO encubrir el fraude del siglo contra el pueblo mexicano, tratando de hacer creer que el informe de Mackey es una auditoría en la que no se encontró prácticamente nada. Mintiendo descaradamente, y aprovechando el escaso conocimiento de la mayoría de la población respecto a los complicados temas financieros, tratan de ocultar lo que resulta inocultable: que se ha hipotecado el futuro de varias generaciones de mexicanos. Este informe no es una auditoría, como en el mismo se señala con toda claridad (p. 5), sino un estudio encargado por la Cámara de Diputados para conocer una opinión autorizada respecto a la actuación de las autoridades durante el famoso rescate bancario. Lamentablemente, dicho informe está basado exclusivamente en la incompleta información que le proporcionaron las autoridades. Los resultados del informe de Mackey son una opinión, seria y profesional, respecto a lo sucedido, y no tienen ninguna implicación penal, como podrían tenerla los resultados de una auténtica auditoría. El objetivo del estudio encargado a Mackey a principios de septiembre de 1998, era dar elementos a los diputados para entender mejor el pro ble- ma del Fobaproa, y que pudieran legislar con mayor cuidado y conocimiento. Ese objetivo dejó de tener sentido a partir de la aprobación de la ley del Instituto para la Protección al Ahorro Bancario (IPABIPAB), el 12 de diciembre, por la mayoría de los diputados del PRI y del PAN. Con la expedición de esa ley, prácticamente se legalizó este gran fraude contra el pueblo mexicano. Como Mackey lo señala (p. 16), entre septiembre y diciembre las auto- ridades bloquearon totalmente su trabajo, impidiéndole avanzar. Pero, a partir de la aprobación de la ley del IPAB, empezaron a cooperar más, aunque ocultando información clave en todo momento. Mackey siguió realizando el trabajo para el que había sido contratado, sabiéndose que lo que encontra- ra no tendría ningún efecto, ya que la legalización del fraude había sido consumada. Sin embargo, los voceros del gobierno decidieron que el informe de Mackey podría tener otra utilidad: aparentar que se trataba de una auditoría, cuyos resultados podrían ayudar a justificar lo realizado a espaldas del pueblo. Como la investigación de Mackey sólo iba a conducir a un análisis general, limitado por la información cuidadosamente escogida que las au- toridades decidieron entregarle, sus resultados no implicarían ninguna acusación concreta, con posibles implicaciones legales. 14 EL INFORME MACKEY: LA AUDITORÍA QUE NO FUE Mackey se sujetó a lo que la Cámara de Diputados le había enco men- dado, y concluyó su estudio de una manera muy profesional, analizando cuidadosamente toda la información a que tuvo acceso, presentando las con clusiones a que había llegado. Esas conclusiones, y el análisis que con- dujo a ellas, son lo verdaderamente importante del trabajo de Mackey, no el pretendido descubrimiento de los responsables del enorme descalabro, ampliamente conocido y ocultado por las autoridades. El informe de Mackey merece ser estudiado con todo cuidado. El análi- sis presentado se debe profundizar, dando a conocer toda la evidencia que vaya estando disponible. La completa identificación y castigo de los res- ponsables no puede esperarse de autoridades cómplices del atentado. La justicia, que tarde o temprano llegará, debe empezar con el conocimiento del crimen, con evitar que a la actual impunidad se agregue la ignorancia respecto a lo sucedido.
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