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LESSONS in CRISIS and RESOLUTION Irene Finel-Honigman Columbia University

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LESSONS in CRISIS and RESOLUTION Irene Finel-Honigman Columbia University International Trade and Finance Association 20th International Conference Working Papers Year 2010 Paper 2 BANKING IN EUROPE, BANKING ON EUROPE: LESSONS IN CRISIS AND RESOLUTION Irene Finel-Honigman Columbia University This working paper site is hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press (bepress) and may not be commercially reproduced without the publisher's permission. http://services.bepress.com/itfa/20th/art2 Copyright c 2010 by the author. BANKING IN EUROPE, BANKING ON EUROPE: LESSONS IN CRISIS AND RESOLUTION Abstract This paper examines the impact of the financial and currency crisis on EU and non EU banks in the context of the last two decades (1990-2010) conceptual strategies, public-private sector political and economic policies and the approach toward Anglo-American capitalism. EU banks have weathered the worst of 2008 relatively unscathed, but have been buffeted by the impact of the Greek debt crisis of 2010. It considers the lessons of history and presents a prognosis. This paper was presented at the twentieth international conference of the Inter- national Trade and Finance Association in Las Vegas, Nevada, May 24, 2010. International Trade and Finance Association: 20th International Conference Working Papers This paper examines the impact of the financial and currency crisis on EU and non EU banks in the context of the last two decades (1990-2010) conceptual strategies, public- private sector political and economic policies and the approach toward Anglo-American capitalism. EU banks have weathered the worst of 2008 relatively unscathed, but have been buffeted by the impact of the Greek debt crisis of 2010. What are the lessons of history and what is the prognosis? SHIFTING SANDS On May 9, 2010 before the Asian markets opened, the European Union announced a coordinated nearly $1 trillion Emergency Fund to bolster the euro and guarantee a safety net for all eurozone economies. Put together in coordination with the ECB and the IMF this announcement prior to the opening of the markets Monday morning , following a week of violence in Greece and extreme volatility ( 1000 point drop) on the NYSE , created a sense of relief and respite to global markets. The markets responded with enthusiasm, with a 400 point hike on the NYSE and banks across Europe including in the besieged PIIGS posted 12% jump in Spain,7% in Ireland and a 9% hike, even in Greece. Deutsche Bank shares rose 12% and Societe Generale heavily exposed to Greek debt up 21%. Market panic not only stopped, it appeared to be replaced by market euphoria as the EU clearly send a message that they would support the euro and all member countries. Short term this was a very welcome respite from the gloom and doom scenarios of the last three months, but in reality nothing fundamentally changed. Greece remains extremely fragile, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Ireland need to maintain strict austerity and monitoring in place, Germany still had to give final approval for a very unpopular bailout package and the UK ( although not in the eurozone) in the aftermath of a contentious election has to put in place draconian austerity measures. But the Emergency Fund did prove that once again , as in September 2008, European governments led by France, Germany and the UK saw the need to bailout their financial sectors and did so efficiently and in unison. The Crisis of 2008 which was primarily a financial crisis, focusing on the banking sectors, had morphed into a currency crisis in spring 2009 and again into a potential financial crisis which had to be averted. The three month old crisis has been allowed to fester due to political posturing, rivalries and fear of loss of prestige between France Germany , the IMF and the ECB. Despite the 160 billion euro package proposed by May 6 by the IMF and ECB, there was a risk of potential bank crises as the extent of French, German and Swiss bank exposure to Greece surfaced. Even RBS and HSBC had higher than foreseen exposure to Greek debt. The fear of Greece defaulting rocked highly volatile markets exacerbated by revelations of French banks higher than assumed exposure to Greek government bonds.: Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press International Trade and Finance Association: 20th International Conference Working Papers “Societe Generale yesterday revealed for the first time a €3bn( $3.9bn) exposure to Greek government bonds” (FT May 6, 2010) despite posting excellent first quarter net profit; “BNP post profit but reveals €8bn of assets exposed to Greece” ( FT, May 7, 2010) comprised of €5bn in sovereign bonds and €3bn of loans to Greek companies. As of early May, Credit Agricole held €850million and Natxix, €954 million of Greek bonds. The conflation of Greece’s debt crisis with Portugal, Italy, Ireland and Spain ( PIIGS) confused rather than clarified the situation. Both French Finance Minister, Christine Lagarde and Bundesbank President Alex Weber ( potential successor to Trichet at the ECB) tried to insert some reason and perspective into the media driven barrage of “eurozone collapse” scenarios. The fear of contagion was fueled by a spiraling loss of confidence in Greece’s ability to implement austerity measures required by the ECB IMF package and moreover by its inability to control domestic unrest which deteriorated in the week of May 2 from union led mass demonstrations to senseless violence and deaths of three bank workers in Athens. But the question remained: was the Euro rescue package in truth an EU bank bailout? FINANCIAL CRISIS RESPONSES In September 2008 the first reaction from EU banks was to accuse America of “ cowboy capitalism”, lack of morality, unethical behavior and collusion between big banks and government (the arguments resurfaced in the Goldman Sachs hearings, SEC complaint and revelations of the derivative transactions with Greece in 2001). However taking the high ground lost its impact within a week, once it was revealed that Spain, UK, Ireland, Germany and non EU (Norway, Switzerland, Iceland) countries had exposure to subprime mortgage loans or in the case of Ireland and Spain to an inflated real estate market. The German public and media were shocked to learn that the most traditionally conservative German Landesbanken after the loss of state subsidies under EU regulation in 1999 had sought high yield, high risk transactions and had begun to default by the summer of 2007. French banks, BNP despite losses due to Madoff feeder funds and Societe Generale despite substantial losses due to the Jerome Kerviel fraudulent trading scandal appeared basically unscathed. Within one week, the Belgium Dutch bank Fortis and French British Dexia collapsed. By 2009 BNP acquired Fortis adding Belgium and Luxembourg markets to its retail operation , which would prove profitable. The UK which had undergone its first shock in the failure and privatization of Northern Rock in the fall of 2007 saw the need to undertake partial privatization of Royal Bank of Scotland, Lloyds, and even Barclays. Whether directly affected or not, all EU governments required that major banks accept injections of capital and basically return to the fold of government ownership, influence and supervision under national central banks. http://services.bepress.com/itfa/20th/art2 International Trade and Finance Association: 20th International Conference Working Papers Overall European governments led by Merkel, Sarkozy and Gordon Brown acted quickly and extremely efficiently in coordination with the ECB and the Fed to insure all bank liabilities, increase deposit insurance, fend off public panic and bank runs and maintain stability. The meltdown in Iceland, the near default in Hungary and Latvia, the endemic weakness in all post 2004 member countries with the exception of Poland, made it clear that the ECB and the IMF had to assume far more aggressive roles, often on an ad hoc basis when any country within or outside of the eurozone was in danger of financial collapse or default. Post 2004 ( former CEE) members were the worst affected as the Crisis revealed inherent weakness in a majority foreign owned banking sector which had fueled lending sprees in euros and encouraged real estate speculation. RESULTS OF 2010 Yet within less than two years , banks appeared to have recovered and were in fact beginning to post substantial profits for last quarter of 2009. Until the severity of the Greek crisis revealed major fault lines across the eurozone, major European banks seemed to have even surpassed pre 2008 levels of profitability. Overall the banking sector has not undergone the major realignment imposed on US banks where the only investment banks left, Morgan Stanley and Goldman are still under bank holding status since September 2008, In Europe the landscape has undergone far less radical surgery. The top banks, Santander, BNP, Credit Agricole (CALYON),HSBC, Deutsche ,Commerz - Dresdner, Unicredito ,and even RSB and Barclays Capital have remained intact. Despite loss of prestige, unprecedented scrutiny due to tax collusion and exposure to Madoff, UBS has also gone through the crisis with minimal damage. Even in the UK, Royal Bank of Scotland, assumed near death in 2008 has not been broken up and Barclays, Lloyds were reverting to profitability. Ironically Barclays Capital which under the aegis of the British Financial Service Authority rejected coming in as savior for Lehman in September 2008 posted profits up nearly 47% for 2010, profiting from the sale of Lehman assets. 2009 reports show Deutsche profits up 24%. BNP (having incorporated the failing Fortis Bank) Commerz following the finalized Commerz-Dresdner merger in May 2009, HSBC and Santander all finished 2009 in the black. Even Irish banks under government control and severe austerity measures were regaining market credibility and a resurgence of foreign investment. Ireland had to undergo radical changes as the process of spinning off toxic loans had to evolve under the NAMA (National Asset Management Agency), the “bad bank” concept similar to the Securum in Sweden (1993) , CDR in France for Credit Lyonnais (1995).
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