INTERNAL 2020 JULY–DECEMBER SECURITY

SEMIANNUAL JOURNAL

Published by the Police Academy in Szczytno The journal Internal Security is indexed in the following databases: • ERIH PLUS, • EBSCO Criminal Justice Abstracts, • ProQuest International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS), • The Central European Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities (CEJSH), • The ResearchBib Journal Database, • INDEX Copernicus Journals Master List, • INDEX Copernicus World of Journals, • Google Scholar, • NUKAT, • WorldCat, • Zeitschriftendatenbank (ZDB), • Polish Ministry of Science and Higher Education list of scientific journals (20 points)

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Publisher: Police Academy in Szczytno 12-100 Szczytno, ul. Marszałka Józefa Piłsudskiego 111, INTERNAL SECURITY JULY–DECEMBER 2020 Michelle Ann McManus Ann Michelle Markovic Vesna Arkadiusz Letkiewicz Kočan Štefan Kazantzidou-Firtinidou Danai Jałoszyński Kuba Hryshchuk Viktor Greičius Saulius Geleri Aytekin Andrii Fomenko W.Chris Eskridge Chlebowicz Piotr Chaczko Zenon Cielecki Tadeusz Simion Carp BoltivetsSergij Keiichi Yamanaka Keiichi Bernard Wiśniewski Tchaikovsky S. Anatoly Miguel Abel Souto SarneckiJerzy Sergei Veklenko Urban Andrzej Gerald G. Sander Joseph F. Ryan Andrzej Misiuk Mika Janusz Mladen Bajagic Iwona Klonowska Editorial Board: http://internalsecurity.wspol.eu (chairman) Police Academy in Szczytno, Poland Police Academy inSzczytno, (chairman) Lewis University, United States ofAmerica Poland WSB Academy Górnicza, in Dąbrowa Police Academy inBratislava, Slovakia StudiesCenter (KEMEA), forSecurity Greece Poland Police Academy inSzczytno, Lviv Ukraine State ofInternal Affairs, University Lithuania inVilnius, Mykolas University Romeris Turkish National Police Academy, Turkey ofTechnologyUniversity inSydney, Australia University, Poland Opole University of Central of Lancashire, United Kingdom University Ukraine State Internal of Affairs, Dnipropetrovsk University of America ofNebraska-Lincoln,University United States Poland University of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn, ofMoldova ofRepublic of Internal Affairs Academy ‘Stefan oftheMinistr cel Mare’ Kiev, Ukraina ofFamily,Ministry Youth ofUkraine, andSport State Institute forFamily andYouth Development, in Belgrade, Serbia Academy ofCriminalistic andPolice Studies Kansai-University, School ofLaw,Kansai-University, School Japan Poland WSB Academy Górnicza, in Dąbrowa Interior oftheRussian Federation the of theMinistry of University Sankt-Petersburg ofEducation andScienceof theMinistry in Ukraine National Research Institute forUkrainian Studies ofSantiago deCompostela, Spain University Stockholm University, Sweden tion andFinance Ludwigsburg, Germany Sciences-Public ofApplied University Administra- Police Academy in Szczytno, Poland Police Academy inSzczytno, of America York, inNew Pace United States University ofWarsaw,University Poland Tomas Bata Republic inZlin, University Czech y Editorial Team:

Editor-in-Chief Paweł Lubiewski e-mail: [email protected] Deputy Editor-in-Chief Beata Bekulard e-mail: [email protected] Secretary Małgorzata Jasińska e-mail: [email protected] Assistant Editor Urszula Grzegorczyk e-mail: [email protected] Statistical Editor Monika Hejduk e-mail: [email protected] English Language Editor Skrivanek Sp. z o.o. e-mail: [email protected] Production Editor Grzegorz Sieńczewski e-mail: [email protected] Deputy Production Editor Adam Rogala e-mail: [email protected]

Subject Editors: Security Theory and Security Research Cyber Security Hubert Królikowski, Jagiellonian University Grzegorz Krasnodębski, Polish Naval in Cracow, Poland Academy in Gdynia, Poland e-mail: [email protected] e-mail: [email protected] History of Internal Security Maritime and Internal Waters Security Ewelina Sokołowska, Police Academy Tomasz Szubrycht, Polish Naval Academy in Szczytno, Poland in Gdynia, Poland e-mail: [email protected] e-mail: [email protected] Security Law New Technologies Leszek Wieczorek, Ministry of Justice Institute Tadeusz Szczurek, Military University of Forensic Research in Cracow, Poland of Technology in Warsaw, Poland e-mail: [email protected] e-mail: [email protected] Security Management International Cooperation Paweł Kępka, Main School of Fire Service Sławomir Górski, Ministry of Internal in Warsaw, Poland Affairs and Administration, Poland e-mail: [email protected] e-mail: [email protected] Criminology and Criminalistics Internal Security — Case Studies Agnieszka Choromańska, Police Academy Agata Tyburska, Police Academy in Szczytno, Poland in Szczytno, Poland e-mail: [email protected] e-mail: [email protected] Anti-Terrorism Miscellanea Waldemar Zubrzycki, Police Academy Jarosław Struniawski, Police Academy in Szczytno, Poland in Szczytno, Poland e-mail: [email protected] e-mail: [email protected]

Translators: Agnieszka Andrzejczyk, Mariola Bil, Olimpia Bogdalska, Małgorzata Jasińska, Anna Jurczenko, Anna Kierpiec-Leśniak, Anna Kodzis, Aleksandra Lewicka, Tomasz Mazur, Jacek Modrzejewski, Mirona Urbanik-Gołota, Ewelina Sokołowska INTERNAL 2020 JULY–DECEMBER SECURITY

CONTENTS

 SECURITY THEORY AND SECURITY RESEARCH Agnieszka Wioletta Filipek Security Culture as a Challenge for Uniformed Services and Other Citizens 7 Priit Suve Advancing the Concept of Problem in Problem-oriented Policing ...... 21

 SECURITY MANAGEMENT Jarosław Struniawski The Safety Concept for Football Matches ...... 41 Tomasz Zwęgliński, Chris Arculeo Risk Management as a Tool of the Civil Emergency Lanning in the United Kingdom — Comparison With the Polish Approach ...... 55 Klaudia Marczyová Role of the Police in the Slovak Republic and the Operational Duty ...... 83 Jadwiga Stawnicka, Iwona Klonowska Assessment of the National Map of Security Threats as an Important Element in the Process of the Polish Police Managing Public Security in Social Partnership in View of Surveys ...... 101

 LAW Aleksy Goettel Instruments for the Protection of Victims of Natural Disasters in Polish Tax Law ...... 119 Iveta Nováková Role of EU and National Legislation in Shaping Communication in Police Detention Centres ...... 133 Andrzej Józef Kozłowski, Iwona Z. Czaplicka-Kozłowska Security of Public Financial Resources and the Public Procurement Procedure — Analysis of Transparency and Characteristics of Procedures Based on Research ...... 147 Dominik Hryszkiewicz Training System of Polish Police Officers — in the Past and Today ...... 163  CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINALISTICS Wojciech Filipkowski Potential Use of Structured Analytical Techniques in Building Investigative Versions ...... 175 Adrian Szumski Prospects of International Harmonisation in the Sphere of Forensic Document Examination in Penal Proceedings ...... 185  ANTI-TERRORISM Tomasz Aleksandrowicz Beijing Convention and Beijing Protocol. Changes in the International and Legal Model for Combatting Aviation Terrorism ...... 195  CYBERSECURITY Milan Marcinek Cybercrime in Automotive Security in the 21th Century ...... 209  NEW TECHNOLOGIES Jarosław Radosław Truchan Selected Security Information Systems ...... 219 Maciej Antoni Zaorski Use of Selected Geospatial Tools for the Purposes of Reconnaissance ...... 235  CASE STUDY Wiesław Pływaczewski Achievements of the American Judiciary and Law Enforcement Agencies in Combatting Gangsterism (With Particular Emphasis on Motorcycle Gangs) ...... 247 Gergely Mogyoródi Selection of Police in Europe: Comparing the Hungarian and Polish Systems ...... 265 Ürmösné Gabriella Simon Portrayal and Attributes of Serial Killers and Some of the Most Notorious Ones ...... 279  HISTORY Piotr Gołdyn Women Police in Interwar Poland in the Light of Reports From Inspections Carried Out by Stanisława Paleolog ...... 293  MISCELLANEA Beata Bekulard Etiquette, Diplomatic Protocol and Savoir-Vivre as the Code of Conduct for Police Officers ...... 305 Ákos Erdős, Adrienn Magasvári, Andrea Szabó Professional Career Choice and Career Start in Regards to the Expectations of Hungarian Law Enforcement Higher Education and of the Law Enforcement Organs...... 321 Róbert Major, Gábor Mészáros Thoughts on Road Traffic Control ...... 333 SECURITY THEORY AND SECURITY RESEARCH

Security Culture as a Challenge for Uniformed Services and Other Citizens

Agnieszka Wioletta Filipek ORCID: 0000-0002-8876-2629 Siedlce University of Natural Sciences and Humanities, Poland

Abstract. In the modern world, conditions in various spheres of human security are changing at a very fast pace. How non- traditional events are interpreted and the kind of approach to all kinds of transformations may be conducive to a higher frequency of beneficial effects of these changes. The appropriate nature and level of security culture can contribute to perpetuating beneficial trends in solving specific problems, to dealing more effectively with difficult situations, treated as challenges, which can often result in opportunities, and not only as threats. The responsibility of officers of various services, not only for themselves, but also for their subordinates, as well as for decisive decisions resulting from legal conditions, has an even greater impact on the need for strong consolidation of individual judgements, verdicts or decisions. Relying on a personal security culture in various types of situations can more often have a positive impact on the functioning of the entity and their environment, provided that this security culture is of an acceptable character and high level. The author points out that a favourable culture of security for uniformed personnel and citizens will be conducive to a higher level of security. DOI: 10.5604/01.3001.0014.6655 http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0014.6655

Keywords: security culture, challenges, opportunities, threats, security, uniformed services, citizens

Introduction

‘Fortune is fickle’ a well-known Polish saying (literally in Polish: ‘the wheel of fortune turns round’). The thought contained in this maxim comes down to stat- ing that human life is interspersed with different periods. Everyone encounters phases of positive changes, sometimes sudden, sometimes slow, characterised by development in different spheres of life, which is most often associated with satisfaction, contentment, joy, happiness — almost a full feeling of security. Here one can imagine that the given security entity — the particular person or social group, society or nation — is a point, an element of a wheel in its ascending part or highest point. However, such an arrangement is not unchangeable. Just as every point of a spinning wheel is at the highest point only for a certain period of time, so in the life of a human being, a good streak lasts only for a certain time; for some entities longer for others shorter. For some people, it happens more often, for oth- ers it is less frequent. On the other hand, having a negative experience, which encourages a feeling of insecurity, is usually combined, in different time horizons for different persons, with the experience of less pleasant feelings, impressions characterised by a sense of anxiety, regression, dissatisfaction, depression, stagnation. It seems interesting

Internal Security, July–December 7 Agnieszka Wioletta Filipek Andrea Szabó that different people have different frequencies of positive and negative experiences. The causes of any sensations often result from the circumstances of the person’s environment or from themselves. However, the way in which one responds to these conditions depends solely on the will, knowledge, abilities and skills of the indi- vidual. The scope of possibilities of referring to the situations found or provoked by a person is probably to a large extent determined by the specific security culture characterising particular individuals or social groups. It seems that an appropriate character and high level of security culture may contribute to the fact that the fre- quency and duration of prosperity will appear more often and remain in the longer term. A low level of security culture, manifested, for example, by an ill-considered prioritisation of security-critical values, a lack of trust and fear of all risks, may in turn encourage the perception of difficult situations only as threats and not as chal- lenges. This way of thinking, in turn, usually leads to an atmosphere of confrontation rather than cooperation, which in turn results in a hostile attitude on the part of the person concerned, which can be a serious barrier to any change and, consequently, to development. The unawareness of the existence of more secure ways of influ- encing us will most likely not justify our mistaken actions. Usually, the actors are held accountable for various shortcomings by their immediate surroundings, but also by various social circles, from family to superiors, communities and nations. History also does not forget, especially the wrong decisions and actions. It is important that in the consciousness of a person who rationally, wisely takes care of their own security and that of their environment, characterised by a proper security culture, there is a conviction that the way they think, act and cooperate should be a manifestation of taking care not only of what is hap- pening here and now, but also what consequences it will have in the future, that it is worthwhile to proceed in such a way, that our functioning benefits not only the individual dimension, but also that it serves others, that it also benefits not only one dimension of security, but that we take into account the widest possible range of security. An equally important manifestation of the security culture that has a positive impact is the willingness, readiness and ability to take action through the right measures not only in situations of fear or defense against threats, but also in the sphere of social prevention. A properly configured security culture of specific entities can contribute to a more complete security achievement. A special role in this respect, sometimes even the ‘to be or not to be’ of specific entities, is played by the security culture of the personnel of all uniformed services. These include the military, police, border guard, fire department and various types of special ser- vices. What a security culture is and what elements of it help to see challenges, take advantage of opportunities and eliminate threats are explained in the following parts of the article.

Basic principles of the security culture

Security culture is a phenomenon that characterises every person and it has existed for as long as man has lived on Earth. Everyone, in their own characteristic way, tries to provide security for themselves and their environment. The person- nel of uniformed services are also responsible for security in their areas of activity.

8 Internal Security, July–December Security Culture as a Challenge for Uniformed Services and Other Citizens

Such a kind of specific, systematically repeated tendencies concerning the ways of taking care of security constitute the specific security culture of a given entity. It is worth mentioning, however, that it was only in the 20th century that Nick F. Pidgeon1, initiated the combination of the concepts of culture and security, describing their mutual coupling, according to the interpretation of the term ‘security’ at the time. According to this researcher, security culture is a system of meanings through which a certain group of people interpret the threats in the world, express the attitude of a given community to risks, threats and security, and indicate what values are considered important in this respect. The above approach to the ‘security culture’ focusses on a narrow, negative understanding of security, i.e. mainly on threats. This understanding of the concept of ‘security’ was still dominant in the period mentioned above. However, over time, the litera- ture stated that the necessary condition for the existence of positively understood security is, apart from the guarantee of inviolable survival (which mainly involves the prevention or elimination of threats — author’s note), the possibility of free development of a given entity2. Jerzy Stańczyk states that ‘security in its general sense has two essential components: the guarantee of the inviolable survival of a given entity and the freedom of their development’3. Such an understanding of the notion of ‘security’, which is now fully approved, is the basis for a pioneer- ing interpretation of the issue of security culture by M. Cieślarczyk, which includes the statement that ‘security culture is — in a nutshell — the way of thinking about and feeling security, as well as the ways of achieving security which are characteristic for a given entity’4. In addition to this simplified explanation of the discussed issue, M. Cieślarczyk also developed a broader definition of security culture. ‘Security culture is a model of basic assumptions, values, norms, rules, symbols and beliefs characteristic for a given entity, influencing their perception of challenges, opportunities and/or threats in their closer and further environ- ment, as well as the way they feel and think about security (Sphere A/ Figure 1) as well as the associated behaviour and actions (cooperation) in different ways by this entity, ‘learned’ and articulated, in the processes of education in the broad sense, including natural processes of internal integration and external adapta- tion and in other organisational processes (Sphere B/), as well as in the process of strengthening broadly (not only militarily) understood defense (Sphere C/), serving the harmonious development of this entity and their security in the broadest sense of the word, for the benefit of themselves but also of their sur- roundings’5.

1 Pidgeon N.F, Safety Culture and Risk Management in Organizations. Journal of Cross- Cultural Psychology, 1991, Vol. 22, pp. 129–140. 2 Stańczyk J, Współczesne pojmowanie bezpieczeństwa. Warsaw, 1996, pp. 17–19. 3 Stańczyk J, Bezpieczeństwo i pokój — wzajemne relacje, [in:] Rosa R (Ed.), Edukacja do bezpieczeństwa i pokoju w jednoczącej się Europie. Teoria i jej zastosowanie. Siedlce- Chlewiska, 1999, p. 65. 4 Cieślarczyk M, Teoretyczne i metodologiczne podstawy badania problemów bezpieczeństwa i obronności państwa. Siedlce, 2009, p. 157. 5 Ibid., p. 157.

Internal Security, July–December 9 Agnieszka Wioletta Filipek Andrea Szabó

Figure 1. Entity and their elements of security culture in relation to the environment.

ENVIRONMENT ENVIRONMENT avio — beh urs — rs ac ou tio an n e s m — e d c , o s A. MENTAL CULTURE SPHERE o e p d e u (conscious, spiritual, …) r t a i t t SUBJECTIVE i t o

a n B. ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE SPHERE (law, procedures, structure, …)

SUBJECTIVE-OBJECTIVE

n a

t o

i

t

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i

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a C. MATERIAL CULTURE SPHERE

u r

d e

e

p (engineering, technologies,

s

o

,

o

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c infrastructure, …)

e

m

e

s

OBJECTIVE a

n

n

o

o

i

t

u

c

r

a

s

s b r e u h o i a v ENVIRONMENT ENVIRONMENT

Source: M. Cieślarczyk, Teoretyczne…, op. cit., p. 159.

As shown in Fig. 1, the culture of security develops on the basis of three basic planes of human or any other entity’s functioning. It is primarily a consequence of the values, norms, rules, symbols and beliefs accepted by an entity, which affect the way the entity perceives themselves and what happens in their environment. Therefore, security cul- ture has an impact on the ability to see challenges, opportunities and/or threats in the immediate and remote environment. Its basic elements are concentrated mainly in the sphere of the entity’s mental, conscious and spiritual culture, and form the so-called sub- jective layer of security (A), i.e. the interior of an entity. Its structure is preserved mainly thanks to strength of will and knowledge, and also on the basis of the experiences of others that have been observed or transmitted. Piotr Gasparski describes this issue, explaining that: “Individual beliefs are the transformation and the internalisation of col- lective beliefs. The perception of threats is created culturally, for example, in the sense that we create views under the influence of opinions prevailing in our environment. The concept of risk or threat is not objective. It is socially constructed and the ways to pre- vent it are politically negotiable. The problem of practical acceptance of risk is entangled in group conflict, where loyalty to the community means more than objective scientific data6”. Well established internal reflections are usually the main directive for analysing the conditions, considering and, consequently, taking specific action on emerging difficult situations that may be considered as challenges or threats. Contrary to some interpretations, it is not irrelevant whether a particular event is described as a challenge or a threat. These are not the same concepts. The consequences of these two types of approaches are completely divergent, which is discussed in the next part of the article. By analysing the next element of security culture shown in Figure 1 (Sphere B), it can be concluded that any entity of security, externalises/should externalise their own thoughts and beliefs in accordance with the current law. This is the scope of the

6 Gasparski P, Psychologiczne wyznaczniki gotowości do zapobiegania zagrożeniom. Warsaw, 2003, pp. 55–56.

10 Internal Security, July–December Security Culture as a Challenge for Uniformed Services and Other Citizens organisational culture of the same entity, also called the subjective-objective sphere. On the other hand, the expression of internal needs of entities and at the same time the consequence of their characteristic reference to the law (an element of legal culture) is an effect in the form of constructing manifestations of material culture in the environ- ment of the entity, consisting of developed engineering, technologies and infrastructure. The mutual influence and connection between the three spheres of security cul- ture are illustrated by double-ended arrows in Fig. 1. Each of the separated spheres plays a very important role in the issue of making specific decisions and actions in rela- tion to the existing situations which are important from the entity’s point of view. Each of them affects the perception of these situations as challenges or threats. The hierarchy of roles and prestige of increasingly frequent and complex events concerning various areas of security is usually the result of a well-established order of values and assigning them a real meaning for us and our environment. According to researchers, references to values, i.e. cultural identifications, are the most important component of identity7. The Pope, St. John Paul II explains that values, as well as the terri- tory of a state, are the inherited state of possessions and constitute the culture of a given nation8. The order of thought, which is a consequence of the system of values that characterises a given entity, usually manifests itself in its specific attitudes and actions. In the ideal security culture model (Fig. 2.), values are its core and the main guideline for the norms, attitudes, behaviours, actions and interactions of the entity. They usu- ally occupy the first and central place in the process of making a variety of decisions, including those that determine the classification of events as threats or challenges.

Figure 2. Entity and their elements of security culture in an ideal model

SECURITY CULTURE — THE IDEAL MODEL ACTIONS AND ENVIRONMENT COOPERATION ENVIRONMENT BEHAVIOUR

ATTITUDES OTHER ECOLOGICAL AREAS NORMS AND HEALTH OF SECURITY SECURITY

hardly turbulent predictable MILITARY ECONOMIC SECURITY VALUES SECURITY IDENTITY

POLITICAL PUBLIC SECURITY SECURITY

ENVIRONMENT ENVIRONMENT

Source: Cieślarczyk M, Teoretyczne i metodologiczne…, op. cit., p. 160.

7 Zamojska E, Kulturowa tożsamość młodzieży. Studium empiryczne z badań nad młodzieżą ze szkół średnich. Poznań-Toruń, 1998, p. 6. 8 Jan Paweł II, Pamięć i tożsamość. Rozmowy na przełomie tysiącleci. Cracow, 2005, p. 66.

Internal Security, July–December 11 Agnieszka Wioletta Filipek Andrea Szabó

The ideal model of security culture with regard to natural persons and to legal entities9, in the next layer, contains a reference to the issue of norms. It is exactly the norms that should be followed by the entity in order to ensure their security in various subject areas and in their operating environments. The terms ‘norms’ and ‘values’ are often interpreted in scientific literature. The sociologist Piotr Sztompka explains that: ‘Such rules, which are the subject of ways or methods of action, means used to achieve the goal, can be called cultural norms. They state what people should do. However, the rules that are the subject of the objectives of action are called cultural values. They indicate what goals are worthy, appropri- ate, right. To put it a little differently: values indicate what people should strive for, and norms indicate how they should strive for it’10. Values and standards that are not mutually exclusive and taken into account together are the guiding principles. However, in order for this to actually be implemented, it must still be internalised in the form of attitudes. According to Stanisław Mika, ‘attitude can be defined as a relatively permanent structure of cognitive, emotional and behavioural pro- cesses relating to an object, or as a disposition to the appearance of such processes in which the attitude to that object is expressed’11. Stefan Nowak also believes that ‘a person’s attitude towards a certain object is a set of relatively permanent instructions for evaluating that object and reacting emotionally to it, as well as pos- sibly accompanying emotional-judgemental instructions and relatively permanent beliefs about the nature and properties of that object and relatively permanent instructions to behave towards it’12. Principles together with attitudes, i.e. knowledge and way of thinking about safety and emotional ‘qualifications’, have a great influ- ence on the entity’s relations with their environment, on their general reasoning, behaviour, actions and cooperation. This is particularly important in difficult, crisis situations, which are more often seen as threats by entities with an unfavourable security culture and rather as challenges by entities with a positive security culture.

Challenges: opportunities and threats

The category ‘challenges’ is quite often cited in the context of security sciences. Marek Ilnicki and Zdzisław Nowakowski claim that: ‘The XXI century is a time of great challenges not only for Poland, but also for its closer and farther neigh- bours’13. ‘From the point of view of the entity’s security, the ability to think and act on the basis of the category of challenges is an advantageous procedure. This way of handling situations that are not always easy, may consequently contribute to more frequent positive results than in the case where we treat any adversity only as a threat. Focussing on the negative, adverse aspects of various situations may cause the focus to be limited to their essence and consequently lead to distractions

9 Cieślarczyk M, Teoretyczne i metodologiczne…, op. cit., p. 42. 10 Sztompka P, Socjologia. Analiza społeczeństwa. Cracow, 2002, pp. 258–259. 11 Mika S, Psychologia społeczna dla nauczycieli. Warsaw, 1998, p. 106. 12 Nowak S, Pojęcie postawy w teoriach i stosowanych badaniach społecznych, [in:] Nowak S (Ed.), Teorie postaw. Warsaw, 1973, p. 23. 13 Ilnicki M, Nowakowski Z, Wstęp do: Współczesne wyzwania polityki bezpieczeństwa — wybrane zagadnienia. Warsaw, 2014, p. 5.

12 Internal Security, July–December Security Culture as a Challenge for Uniformed Services and Other Citizens for other eventualities. This way of thinking is not a positively evaluated element of the entity’s security culture’14. In the literature, you can find different interpretations of the terms: ‘challenges’, ‘opportunities’, and ‘threats’. A widely accepted proposal of explanation is given by Jan Wojnarowski, who believes that ‘Challenges by their nature are neither good nor bad. When used well, they are an opportunity for further development, and when used badly or not taken up, they can cause threats and lead to a crisis in the development or operation of a human being or system’15. Eugeniusz Nowak and Maciej Nowak share a similar opinion on the subject of challenges. They state that ‘A challenges is a process that has occurred or may occur in the future. It is characterised by a lack of clarity as to the evaluation of the phenomenon, event and the effects that it may cause. […] a challenge is a primary and superior con- cept and refers to any current or predicted events or phenomena. The challenge for national security is everything that can happen and that the state must take into account in the process of its existence and development’16. Consequently, a challenge can have different effects, including positive ones, on the entity. This interpretation of the term ‘challenge’ is supported by Michał Brzeziński’s critical view of equating the meaning of the terms ‘challenge’ and ‘threat’. The researcher explains: ‘Furthermore, it is noted that some of the negatively assessed phenomena are not of the nature of threats but challenges, expressing events or processes occurring or likely to occur in the future, characterised by a lack of clarity as to their content, including their probable consequences’17. Marian Cieślarczyk comprehen- sively explains the relationships between the terms ‘challenges’, ‘opportunities’ and ‘threats’, and he believes that: “When analysing the types of relationships18 between an entity and the environment in terms of their effects, three main types can be identified. These are: a) relationships that are still undefined in some dimension of time and space, so they are called challenges (+ -), b) positive relationships, referred to as opportunities (+), c) negative relationships, i.e. threats (-)”19. On the basis of the above explanation, but also of the previously quoted descrip- tions, it should be stated that these interpretations are in line with the thinking that ‘challenge’ is the broadest concept, covering both opportunities and threats. The way of thinking and the specific reactions of the security entity depend largely on whether the challenge will be transformed into an opportunity or identified as a threat over time. The effects of challenges are therefore ‘in the hands’ of spe- cific actors. Challenges in many areas will, to a large extent, be a consequence of the

14 Filipek A, Psychospołeczne i prakseologiczne aspekty jakości funkcjonowania systemu zarządzania kryzysowego. Siedlce, 2016, p. 82. 15 Wojnarowski J, System obronności państwa. Materiały do studiowania. Warsaw, 2005, p. 11. 16 Nowak E, Nowak M, Zarys teorii bezpieczeństwa narodowego. Warsaw, 2011, p. 39. 17 Brzeziński M, Kategoria bezpieczeństwa, [in:] Sulowski S, Brzeziński M, Bezpieczeństwo wewnętrzne państwa. Wybrane zagadnienia. Warsaw, 2009, p. 26. 18 By: Cieślarczyk M: ‘relacje to rodzaj związków i oddziaływań między różnymi elementami rzeczywistości’, [in:] Cieślarczyk M, Teoretyczne i metodologiczne…, op. cit. p. 80. 19 Cieślarczyk M, Teoretyczne i metodologiczne…, op. cit. p. 85.

Internal Security, July–December 13 Agnieszka Wioletta Filipek Andrea Szabó functioning of uniformed services, where the ability of their cooperation with citi- zens will also play an important role. ‘It should be remembered that by the nature of challenges, one can see that a challenge interpreted correctly and at the right time can be an opportunity for a given entity, i.e. an opportunity to achieve some positively understood effect. On the other hand, challenges interpreted incorrectly or undertaken at the wrong time may become a threat to a given entity, i.e. may have a harmful impact on its structures’20. It is worth mentioning that if the subject tries to see at least minimal chances for some positive results in difficult situations, and he/she does not see only their negative consequences, then there is a much higher probability that he/she will be able to cope more efficiently, effectively and successfully with the adversities of fate. This understanding of the concept of ‘challenge’ and the resulting conduct will be characteristic of entities with a higher security culture. Focussing only on the negative aspects of various cir- cumstances will in turn be the property attributed to entities with a lower security culture. It should also be remembered that ‘the absence of any perception of threats by an entity at all, will not indicate a high level of their security culture and will not have a positive impact on the security of the entity. It is necessary to be able to assess the situation wisely and act according to its conditions. In order to possess this ability to the right extent, it is good to know the causes of the circumstances, understand them and cause concrete actions within a certain period of time’21. There are many overlapping interpretations of the term ‘threat’ in the literature. It is most often associated with an adverse impact on the entity or its environment. Piotr Gasparski, for example, believes that ‘a threat is a situation that can, with some probability, bring an individual a loss’22. According to the researchers who developed the publication Sources of Threats and their Characteristics, “the notion of threat includes the range of events, either deliberately (consciously) triggered or random, which have a negative impact on: • functioning of political, economic and social structures of the state, • living conditions of the population, • human health and life, • state of the environment”23. According to Eugeniusz Nowak and Maciej Nowak, ‘Threats in general are under- stood primarily as insecurity and are perceived as negative phenomena causing the likelihood of a crisis situation and danger to the environment, leading in con- sequence to a crisis (understood as the climax of a crisis situation)’24. Włodzimierz Fehler also explains that: ‘In an intuitive perception, a threat is the opposite of secu- rity, meaning a situation in which the values relevant to an entity become difficult

20 Filipek A, Poziom i charakter kultury bezpieczeństwa młodzieży akademickiej, Mono- grafie 100. Siedlce, 2008, p. 163. 21 Filipek A, Psychospołeczne i prakseologiczne aspekty jakości funkcjonowania systemu zarządzania kryzysowego. Siedlce, 2016, p. 86. 22 Gasparski P, Psychologiczne wyznaczniki gotowości do zapobiegania zagrożeniom. Warsaw, 2003, p. 23. 23 Dawidowicz A, Janusz M, Sawczak S, Słupecki M, Źródła zagrożeń i ich charakterystyka. Wrocław, 2005, p. 6. 24 Nowak E, Nowak M, Zarys teorii bezpieczeństwa narodowego. Warsaw, 2011, p. 39.

14 Internal Security, July–December Security Culture as a Challenge for Uniformed Services and Other Citizens to access, erode or even annihilate’25. Janusz Sztumski distinguishes between current threats, i.e. existing in a given place and time, and potential threats, i.e. possible due to the probability of their occurrence in the near or far future26. The wide range and variability of threats does not make it easier to deal with them both by various services and, above all, by other citizens27. In the literature on the subject, their different categorisation is distinguished. An interesting division of threats was made by Jan Borkowski, who believes that in general we can distinguish two broad metacategories: natural (environmental) threats and civilization threats28. In Ryszard Zięba’s opinion, however, too often we treat difficult and new situations as threats, which is not conducive to achieving security. The researcher explains that ‘The model of analysing security in the context of a threat requires certain modifica- tions. It is not infrequent that threats are perceived as too-broad a set of negatively assessed phenomena. However, in fact, some of these phenomena are not so much threats as challenges, i.e., inalienable needs that require the formulation of answers and appropriate actions. Since such situations appear to be difficult in social perception, it happens that they are wrongly perceived as dangers’29. The above explanation brings us closer to discovering the importance of the security culture of entities influencing the way of thinking and taking action in difficult and new situations. It is probably of particular importance when transforming challenges into opportunities. Recognition and seizing opportunities is a significant asset of every entity. It shows its high security culture, which is manifested by the cour- age to take healthy risks in the context of emerging challenges. An opportunity is usually a consequence of a challenge. Michał Brzeziński describes opportunities as possibilities to multiply profits in any sphere of life. He also explains that oppor- tunities are usually important aspects of success, he describes them as a possibility to achieve success30. However, in order to achieve success, it is necessary to treat new, difficult and uncertain situations as challenges and not to try to find only threats in them. Thinking only negatively about complicated, incomprehensible situations may lead to escaping from them or to complete indifference. In turn, legitimate trust, wise risk and taking action in accordance with the accepted hierarchy of values can significantly contribute to transforming challenges into 25 Fehler W, Zagrożenie — kluczowa kategoria teorii bezpieczeństwa, [in:] Współczesne postrzeganie bezpieczeństwa. Materiały z konferencji zorganizowanej przez Wyższą Szkołę Administracji w Bielsku-Białej, 23 listopada 2006. Bielsko-Biała, 2007, p. 34. 26 Sztumski J, Brak bezpieczeństwa jako problem społeczny, [in:] Fehler W, Bezpieczeństwo publiczne w przestrzeni miejskiej. Warsaw, 2010, p. 309. 27 This opinion was formulated on the basis of the results of empirical research carried out as part of the project implemented in the field of state security and defence, entitled Na- tional Security System of the Republic of Poland, financed by the National Centre for Research and Development on the basis of an agreement No. DOBR/0076/IDI/2012/03 of 18.12.2012 Scientific Leader Kitler W), research sub-task 1.5. Security culture of entities as an element integrating the national security system and regulating its functioning and development, sub-task leader: A. Filipek, work code: SBN RP 1.5. 28 Borkowski J, Rozważania o zagrożeniach. Warsaw, 2014, pp. 20–23. 29 Zięba R, Kategoria bezpieczeństwa w nauce o stosunkach międzynarodowych, [in:] Bobrow D.B, Haliżak E, Zięba R, Bezpieczeństwo narodowe i międzynarodowe u schyłku XX wieku. Warsaw, 1997, p. 5. 30 Brzeziński M, Kategoria bezpieczeństwa.., op. cit., p. 26.

Internal Security, July–December 15 Agnieszka Wioletta Filipek Andrea Szabó opportunities. The importance of these, but also other elements of the security cul- ture for the functioning of the entity and the ability to use challenges is discussed in the next part of the article.

The role of security culture in taking challenges

The security culture of uniformed services and citizens, as a phenomenon affecting security, also has a special role to play in terms of identifying, interpret- ing and addressing various complex situations. The internal belief of each security entity that we are acting in accordance with an accepted hierarchy of values, guid- ing the case in the right direction, pursuing it in the service of truth and important interests, will promote its beneficial outcome as a challenge. This means that in the long run, in addition to the possibility of failure, there will also be a possibility of profit, or even success, while at the same time shaping our willpower. If a difficult, surprising event requires an entity to take a stand, then this entity with an appropri- ate security culture, based on its own convictions and the inner strength resulting from the individual character of the security culture, should really get involved, not let themselves be intimidated or terrorised, and even stand up for the right values and treat the situation as a challenge rather than write it off instantly. Then the entity should also not escape into indifference or helplessness which are signs of surrender and breakdown. Only making a decision not so much about a fight but about a game for an important matter, about its implementation in practice, may result in positive effects. The lack of a decision about struggling with prob- lems and surrender will not allow for success. Without an inner willingness to act in difficult situations, without the conviction that in the name of values, it is worth acting in this way and not otherwise, we will not taste the satisfaction resulting from introducing a risk factor into our lives. It will also be more difficult to achieve success, because we usually talk about success when there are specific obstacles to overcome. Such a situation will also not be conducive to the development of an entity, because without solving problems, gaining new knowledge and skills, we do not develop. On the other hand, stagnation, a lack of freshness and innovative- ness is often treated almost as a retreat. Such a way of functioning is characteristic of entities with an unfavourable security culture, i.e. not very active, closed, afraid of risk, reluctant to cooperate and characterised by a lack of trust. The abovemen- tioned features ascribed to a particular entity will probably be an asset contributing to treating surprising, difficult and new situations unequivocally as threats. Their manifestation may therefore be a lack of strength and reluctance to face the problem. Such an entity usually avoids difficulties and sees the only solution as ‘surrendering’, i.e., not interfering in specific matters or reducing to a complete escape from the problem. A lack of energy and willingness to exert power to do something about the situation can make the entity believe that they are incapable, which in turn will encourage them to continue to close-up, ignore opportunities and search for threats and enemies instead of building beneficial relationships. In turn, the recognition that, as a security entity, we have the opportunity to actively participate, through reasonable risk, vigilant trust and wise openness, in undertaking difficult tasks, will be conducive to treating them as challenges

16 Internal Security, July–December Security Culture as a Challenge for Uniformed Services and Other Citizens and not just threats. Developing such an attitude and ability to take decisive action is a difficult, long-term process, but at the same time, it provides a passport to a safer life. At the same time, solidarity with the values recognised in a given com- munity, respect for the law is usually associated with satisfaction, contentment, joy, happiness — close to an almost full sense of security. An important condition for this to happen is the need to develop a culture of security that promotes the fullest possible security already among children, in the family home, then at the stage of pre-school education, and further strengthened systematically during school teaching31 and at subsequent stages of education.

Conclusions

The ability to deal satisfactorily with various, often surprising situations in the modern world is not an ordinary, everyday element of every person’s life. Being able to find oneself in unexpected realities, being oneself and at the same time maintaining one’s well-being, resulting not only from subjective assessment, is a serious challenge for both uniformed personnel and other citizens. The respon- sibility of officers of various types of services not only for themselves, but also for their subordinates, as well as for decisive decisions resulting from legal conditions, has an even greater impact on the need to strongly consolidate individual judge- ments, verdicts or decisions. Relying on a personal security culture in various types of situations can more often have a positive impact on the functioning of the entity and its environment, provided that this security culture is of an acceptable character and high level. The ability to preserve one’s identity in such situations can only be conducive to the beneficial functioning of the entity and its environ- ments. M. Cieślarczyk’s research ‘shows that some groups of entities, characterised by a higher level of civilization development and a more functional culture of secu- rity, use the terms challenge and opportunity more often than the concept of threat. On the other hand, other groups of entities — which in thinking about security and related activities focus mainly on threats — are characterised by a dif- ferent culture of security, but also a lower level of development in various spheres of personal and social life’32.

References

1. Borkowski J, Rozważania o zagrożeniach. Warsaw, 2014. 2. Brzeziński M, Kategoria bezpieczeństwa, [in:] Sulowski S, Brzeziński M (Eds), Bezpieczeństwo wewnętrzne państwa. Wybrane zagadnienia. Warsaw, 2009. 3. Cieślarczyk M, Teoretyczne i metodologiczne podstawy badania problemów bezpieczeństwa i obronności państwa. Siedlce, 2009.

31 Cieślarczyk M, Filipek A, Rola rodziny, przedszkola i szkoły w kształtowaniu kultury bezpieczeństwa dzieci i młodzieży, [in:] Rosa R, Zacharuk T (Eds), Wiara, Nadzieja i Miłość. Tom II. Siedlce — Drohiczyn, 2013, pp. 275–288. 32 Cieślarczyk M, Teoretyczne i metodologiczne…, op. cit., pp. 86–87.

Internal Security, July–December 17 Agnieszka Wioletta Filipek Andrea Szabó

4. Cieślarczyk M, Filipek A, Rola rodziny, przedszkola i szkoły w kształtowaniu kul- tury bezpieczeństwa dzieci i młodzieży, [in:] Rosa R, Zacharuk Wiara T (Eds), Nadzieja i Miłość. Tom II. Siedlce-Drohiczyn, 2013. 5. Dawidowicz A, Janusz M, Sawczak S, Słupecki M, Źródła zagrożeń i ich charak- terystyka. Wrocław, 2005. 6. Fehler W, Zagrożenie — kluczowa kategoria teorii bezpieczeństwa, [in:] Współczesne postrzeganie bezpieczeństwa. Materiały z konferencji zorgani- zowanej przez Wyższą Szkołę Administracji w Bielsku–Białej 23 listopada 2006. Bielsko-Biała, 2007. 7. Filipek A, Poziom i charakter kultury bezpieczeństwa młodzieży akademickiej, Monografi e 100. Siedlce, 2008. 8. Filipek A, Psychospołeczne i prakseologiczne aspekty jakości funkcjonowania systemu zarządzania kryzysowego. Siedlce, 2016. 9. Gasparski P, Psychologiczne wyznaczniki gotowości do zapobiegania zagrożeniom. Warsaw, 2003. 10. Ilnicki M, Nowakowski Z, Wstęp do: Współczesne wyzwania polityki bezpieczeństwa — wybrane zagadnienia. Warsaw, 2014. 11. Jan Paweł II, Pamięć i tożsamość. Rozmowy na przełomie tysiącleci. Cracow, 2005. 12. Mika S, Psychologia społeczna dla nauczycieli. Warsaw, 1998. 13. Nowak S, Pojęcie postawy w teoriach i stosowanych badaniach społecznych, [in:] Nowak S (Ed.), Teorie postaw. Warsaw, 1973. 14. Nowak E, Nowak M, Zarys teorii bezpieczeństwa narodowego. Warsaw, 2011. 15. Pidgeon N.F, Safety Culture and Risk Management in Organizations. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 1991, Vol. 22. 16. Preserach sub-task No. 1.5., Security culture of entities as an element integrating the national security system and regulating its functioning and development, head of the sub-task: Filipek A, PhD, Work Code: SBN RP 1.5., [in:] National Secu- rity System of the Republic of Poland, a project in the fi eld of national defence and security fi nanced by the National Centre for Research and Development System — conract No. DOBR/0076/R/ID1/2012/03 of 18.12.2012, registered project number: O ROB/0076/03/001, head of the project: professor Waldemar Kitler. 17. Stańczyk J, Bezpieczeństwo i pokój — wzajemne relacje, [in:] Rosa R (Ed), Edu- kacja do bezpieczeństwa i pokoju w jednoczącej się Europie. Teoria i jej zastoso- wanie. Siedlce-Chlewiska, 1999. 18. Stańczyk J, Współczesne pojmowanie bezpieczeństwa. Warsaw, 1996. 19. Sztompka P, Socjologia. Analiza społeczeństwa. Cracow, 2002. 20. Sztumski J, Brak bezpieczeństwa jako problem społeczny, [in:] Fehler W (Ed.), Bezpieczeństwo publiczne w przestrzeni miejskiej. Warsaw, 2010. 21. Wojnarowski J, System obronności państwa. Materiały do studiowania. Warsaw, 2005. 22. Zamojska E, Kulturowa tożsamość młodzieży. Studium empiryczne z badań nad młodzieżą ze szkół średnich. Poznań–Toruń, 1998. 23. Zięba R, Kategoria bezpieczeństwa w nauce o stosunkach międzynarodowych, [in:] Bobrow D.B, Haliżak E, Zięba R (Eds), Bezpieczeństwo narodowe i międzynarodowe u schyłku XX wieku. Warsaw, 1997.

18 Internal Security, July–December Security Culture as a Challenge for Uniformed Services and Other Citizens

About the Author

Agnieszka Wioletta Filipek, Assoc. Prof., university professor, employee of the Siedlce University of Natural Sciences and Humanities at the Faculty of Social Sciences at the Institute of Security Sciences, director of the Prof. K. Bogdański Transdisciplinary Centre for Security Research. She received her post-doctoral degree in the fi eld of social sciences in the discipline of security science in 2017. Her scientifi c and research interests focus on the issues of security culture. E-mail: agnieszka.fi [email protected]

Streszczenie. We współczesnym świecie w bardzo szybkim tempie zmieniają się warunki w różnych sferach bezpieczeństwa człowieka. Sposób interpretacji nietradycyjnych zdarzeń i rodzaj podejścia do wszelkiego rodzaju przekształceń może sprzyjać pojawianiu się z większą częstotliwością korzystnych efektów tych zmian. Odpowiedni charakter i poziom kultury bezpieczeństwa może przyczyniać się do utrwalania korzystnych tendencji w kwestii rozwiązywania konkretnych problemów, do sprawniejszego radzenia sobie z niełatwymi sytuacjami traktowanymi jako wyzwania, z których niejednokrotnie mogą wynikać szanse, a nie tylko zagrożenia. Odpowiedzialność funkcjonariuszy różnego rodzaju służb nie tylko za siebie, także za osoby podległe, ale również za wynikające z uwarunkowań prawnych podejmowane zdecydowane decyzje z jeszcze większym natężeniem oddziałuje na potrzebę silnego ugruntowania poszczególnych orzeczeń, werdyktów, czy rozstrzygnięć. Opieranie się w różnego rodzaju sytuacjach na osobistej kulturze bezpieczeństwa może częściej pozytywnie oddziaływać na funkcjonowanie danego podmiotu i jego środowisk, pod warunkiem, że wspomniana kultura bezpieczeństwa będzie cechowała się akceptowanym charakterem i wysokim poziomem. Autorka zwraca uwagę, że korzystna kultura bezpieczeństwa pracowników służb mundurowych oraz obywateli będzie sprzyjała kształtowaniu wyższego poziomu bezpieczeństwa.

Zusammenfassung. In der modernen Welt ändern sich die Sicherheitsbedingungen des menschlichen Lebens rapide. Die Art und Weise der Interpretation von nicht traditionellen Ereignissen sowie die Art der Herangehensweise an alle Arten von Transformationen können das Auftreten vorteilhafter Auswirkungen dieser Änderungen mit größerer Häufigkeit begünstigen. Die angemessene Art und das angemessene Niveau der Sicherheitskultur können dazu beitragen, günstige Tendenzen bei der Lösung von spezifischen Problemen zu festigen und schwierige Situationen, die als Herausforderungen behandelt werden, die häufig zu Chancen und nicht nur als Bedrohungen führen können, effizienter zu bewältigen. Die Verantwortung der Beamten verschiedener Dienstarten nicht nur für sich selbst, sondern auch für die ihnen unterstellten Personen sowie ihre Verantwortung für Entscheidungen, die in Übereinstimmung mit dem Gesetz getroffen werden, hat einen noch größeren Einfluss auf die Notwendigkeit, Urteile, Beschlüsse oder Entscheidungen fest zu verankern. Der Rückgriff auf eine persönliche Sicherheitskultur in verschiedenen Arten von Situationen kann sich häufiger positiv auf das Funktionieren des Unternehmens und seiner Umgebung auswirken, vorausgesetzt, diese Sicherheitskultur ist von akzeptablem Charakter und hohem Niveau. Die Verfasserin weist darauf hin, dass eine günstige Sicherheitskultur von uniformiertem Personal als Bürgern zu einem höheren Sicherheitsniveau führen wird.

Резюме. В современном мире в разных сферах безопасности человека условия меняются очень быстро. Способ интерпретации нетрадиционных событий и подход к различным видам преобразований могут способствовать более частому возникновению положительных результатов, вызванных изменениями. Соответствующий характер и уро- вень культуры безопасности может способствовать закреплению положительных тенденций в области решения отдельных проблем, более эффективному преодолению сложных ситуаций, рассматриваемых в качестве вызовов, что часто может привести к появлению возможностей, а не только к опасности. Ответственность сотрудников разных служб не только за их самих, но и за подчиненных, а также — за принятие ответственных законных решений еще сильнее влияет на потребность в сильной консолидации отдельных решений, заключений или постановлений. Опора на культуру личной безопасности в различных ситуациях может чаще оказывать положительное влияние на деятельность данного учреждения и его среду при условии, что культура безопасности носит вполне социально одобряемый характер и находится на высоком уровне. Автор указывает, что положительная культура безопасности сотрудников силовых структур и граждан будет способствовать более высокому уровню безопасности.

Internal Security, July–December 19

Advancing the Concept of Problem in Problem-oriented Policing

Priit Suve ORCID: 0000-0003-4408-3568 Estonian Academy of Security Sciences, Estonia

Abstract. Recent developments in understanding the concept of problem in problem-oriented policing denote valuable perspectives but mainly from a substantialist perspective. In this article, the relational perspective in thinking of safety problems was introduced, and some key advancements presented. Exploiting causal and constitutive reasoning and the idea of the complexity of problems, the self-actional, inter-actional, and trans-actional perspectives were used for determining the differences between the substantialist and relationalist perspectives. The concept of problem was analysed from two perspectives. First, in light of initial and recent elaborations of the term. Second, through the actual use of the term. The substantialist ethos dominated through the data analysed and it has both advantages and disadvantages. However, relational thinking calls for a deeper understanding of safety problems. Resigning from the substantialist ethos and asking whether there are pre-given A-s and B-s, and turning towards the idea that there is no A-s without B-s, creates an environment for a more open-minded understanding of problems in policing. DOI: 10.5604/01.3001.0014.6656 http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0014.6656

Keywords: policing, concept of problem, relationalism, substantialism

Introduction

The field of safety echoes: nobody can guarantee success. The question is, instead, how to fail wisely? Failure and success can be weighed in light of some problem, but the concept of problem should be acknowledged in the first place. In this article, I expand a discussion renewed by Borrion, et al.1 and initiated by Goldstein2 about the concept of problem in problem-oriented policing (POP). However, using ideas of relational thinking, a slightly different setting for thinking of problems will be elaborated. Safety-related problems penetrate the whole social world, grasping many sci- entific disciplines. The police and policing are hardly separable from these. Even more, through crimes and the feeling of safety, they are often wedded into people’s everyday lives. Problem, as a concept, has been one of the characteristics of the police for a long time3, still has an impact and high value in the field of criminol- ogy4, and present new input for the advancement of safety5. The viewpoint, how the concept of problems in relation to safety is or should be defined, conceptualised

1 Borrion H, Ekblom P, Alrajeh D, Borrion AL, Keane A, Koch D, et al., The Problem with Crime Prob- lem-Solving: Towards a Second Generation Pop? The British Journal of Criminology, 2019, Vol. 60. 2 Goldstein H, Improving policing: A problem-oriented approach. Crime & Delinquency, 1979, Vol. 25, Issue 2, pp. 236–258. 3 Ibid., p. 242. 4 See, e.g., The Stockholm Prize in Criminology 2019. Internet. Available from: Electronic source: https://www.su.se/english/about/prizes-awards/the-stockholm-prize-in-criminology/ winner-of-the-stockholm-prize-in-criminology-2018-1.355362, accessed: 17.12.2019. 5 Borrion H, et al., op. cit.

Internal Security, July–December 21 Priit Suve and addressed in policing, is well elaborated6, tested7, and advanced8. However, the decentredness and low problem tractability (wickedness) of many problems put pressure on the ways problems are understood. Working under the public eye directs agents responsible for safety to propose answers instead of outlining questions. Terrorism can be seen as one sign of our times presenting a blunt example of the latter: ‘Before the US-led invasion in March 2003, Iraq had never experienced a sui- cide terrorist attack in its history’.9 For policing and the concept of problem, it would be challenging that the ‘presumed connection between suicide terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism is largely misleading and, what is worse, it may be encouraging domestic and foreign policies likely to exacerbate this terrorist threat’.10 The example above distills general dilemma in thinking of problems — whether and/or when is it sufficient to think of problems as static things or rather as dynamic relations? Does terrorism belong to the terrorist or their victims? Despite the threat that the topic of this article — thinking about problems — ‘would probably not receive much support in policing circles today’11, I take the risk and argue that relational thinking has much to offer for both — to the practitioners related to policing and researchers for more in-depth discussions and elaborations for the sake of safety. ‘[A]cknowl- edging the political dimension of the problem-oriented approach’12 I introduce discussions from (relational) sociology in showing how relationalism and sub- stantialism, as different perspectives, open new sources in thinking of problems. For example, one can imagine whether there is a difference in implementing a community policing strategy (in different countries or the same place in differ- ent times or by different people) as a pre-given substance or co-created process? Although I use examples of particular and well-known problems of safety from the point of view of police strategies (as they were expressed), the aim of the article is broader — to advance interdisciplinary research and discussions about problem from the point of view of and for the sake of safety at the micro and macro levels, and from the analytical (how things are) and normative (how things should be) per- spectives. The range of connections between problem and safety is broad and needs to be clarified from the point of view of this article. In addition to the previously men- tioned usage of the concept of problem, I emphasise two additional and also close but different safety-related dimensions. The first is related to police organisations, which should be designed in a way that allows administrative strategies (e.g. per- sonnel and/or financial strategies) to be combined with functional strategies (e.g. problem-oriented policing, COMPSTAT, community policing) in different functions

6 See, e.g. Goldstein H, op. cit., Goldstein H, On further developing problem-oriented poli- cing: The most critical need, the major impediments, and a proposal. Crime prevention studies, 2003, Vol. 15, pp. 13–48. 7 Braga A.A, Weisburd D.L, Waring E.J, Mazerolle L.G, Spelman W, Gajewski F, Problem- oriented policing in violent crime places: A randomised controlled experiment. Criminology, 1999, Vol. 37, Issue 3, pp. 541–580. 8 Borrion H, et al., op. cit. 9 Pape RA. Dying to win: The strategic logic of suicide terrorism. Random House Incorpo- rated, 2006, p. 33. 10 Ibid., p. 26. 11 Borrion H, et al., op. cit., p. 4. 12 Ibid., p. 16.

22 Internal Security, July–December Advancing the Concept of Problem in Problem-oriented Policing

(e.g. criminal police, community officers, traffic police) and levels (e.g. senior staff, rank-and-file officers). The second dimension is related to the social world that poses increasing demands for advanced knowledge in understanding problems. Here, I mean trends having a close impact on safety. These ‘trends’ are actually crises that are a single crisis with different phases, which are not resolved but ‘managed and contained’. This series of crises started in 2008 with the financial crisis; manifest- ing itself in the migration crisis of 2010–2012; illuminated in the struggle of emerging economies and rising powers (e.g. China and Brazil) 2013–2016, and in 2016, we entered a fourth phase of the crisis, a political crisis, which has the potential to reignite all of the previous three crises and generate a truly transformative crisis.13 Previous and future crises or phases of the crisis have different epicenters and hardly predictable directions. I argue that in the context of ‘failure to develop adequate responses to complex problems’,14 it is still possible ‘translate’ problems into a more adequate form and through the relational view, at least try to fail wisely. The article starts with a clarification of relationalism compared to substantialism with the clarification of self-action, inter-action, and trans-action. The latter is neces- sary for understanding safety problems from analytical and normative positions. Without grasping how things are (the problem!), the implementation of some tool (e.g. strategy) may cause unpredictable results. In the second part, I use the knowledge from problem-oriented policing and examples of police practices to demonstrate the benefits of relational think- ing. In using knowledge of problem-oriented policing, I will limit the discussions to Goldstein’s classical texts15 and recently published ideas of second-generation POP16. Also, I use well-known examples of stop-and-search practices17 and the often cited examination of problem-oriented policing18. However, I will not dive into discussions but will use these data with the purpose of illumination.

Theoretical issues

About relationalism

Although relational thinking has spread over many disciplines in the social sci- ences19, I will focus only on the nuances that have profound meaning for the topic. Substantialism and relationalism, together with self-action, inter-action, and trans-

13 Gamble A, Conclusion: The Crisis Gets Political, [in:] The Coming Crisis. Springer, 2018, pp. 117–118. 14 Hay C, Hunt T, Introduction: The Coming Crisis, the Gathering Storm, [in:] The Coming Crisis. Springer, 2018, p. 8. 15 Goldstein H, 1979, 2003, op. cit. 16 Borrion H, et al., op. cit. 17 Drury J, Ball R, Neville F, Reicher S, Stott C, Re-reading the 2011 riots: ESRC beyond contagion in- terim report. 2019; Tiratelli M, Quinton P, Bradford B, Does stop and search deter crime? Evidence from ten years of London-wide data. The British Journal of Criminology, 2018, Vol. 58, Issue 5, pp. 1212–1231. 18 Braga A.A, op. cit. 19 See e.g. Dépelteau F, The Palgrave handbook of relational sociology. Springer, 2018.

Internal Security, July–December 23 Priit Suve action are the concepts helping elaborate and advance knowledge in thinking about the concept of problem from a safety-related perspective. The field of safety and police research related to the concept of problem, faces the same dilemma, as famously stated by Mustafa Emirbayer: ‘whether to conceive of the social world as consisting primarily in substances or processes, in static ‘things’ or in dynamic, unfolding relations.”20 It seems trivial to state that social things are interrelated. In the field of safety, it is often expected that there is a causal connec- tion between an action and a social event. Sentences like ‘Problem-oriented policing is currently promoted by practitioners and academics as a more effective response to urban crime problems than conventional policing methods’21 articulate a com- mon way of thinking, expressing this notion of causality. However, as was clear from the example of terrorism mentioned above, this imaginary causality is not always direct or linear (I do not argue that this was a claim of Braga et al.22). In looking for a tool (e.g., police strategy) to solve something unsolvable (e.g., terrorism) unpleasant consequences may emerge. In light of this article, it is appropriate to clarify the general meaning of relation- alism with explanations from fields having direct links to safety issues: organisations and power. In a broader sense, relational thinking means thinking of the social world through social relations. In organisational theories, it was described as ‘[s] hifting the focus of inquiry from entities (e.g., leadership, the organisation) to organ- ising activity’. 23 For our purposes, to understand and develop relational thinking in the field of safety, the relational perspective on power is feasible: ‘It presumes the primacy of relations over entities. The identities of the As, Bs, and other ele- ments of power relations are viewed not as being ‘given’ prior to those relations, but as being constituted within them.’24 How this seemingly simple division from entities to relations produces something that is constituted within relations, will be explained below in more detail. To be clear: the premise of safety issues as given is another trap in policing since it binds the way of thinking and axiomatic ‘knowledge’. I will start this discussion with clarifying the idea of causality and con- stitutiveness, which offer knowledge prerequisites for further discussions, and could also be a useful starting point for thinking of a particular safety issue in everyday life.

Causal and constitutive reasoning Social facts, like problems of safety, are made of thoughts, concepts, beliefs, and other immaterial ‘things.‘ However, there are many things in common in the material and immaterial world, and one of them is the method of explanation from the point of causation. Marriage and a plate can both be broken, but it should be distinguished: how it happened (the process) and what made it possible (the

20 Emirbayer M, Manifesto for a relational sociology. American Journal of Sociology, 1997, Vol. 103, Issue 2, p. 281. 21 Braga A.A, op. cit., p. 542. 22 Ibid. 23 Eacott S, Starting points for a relational approach to organisational theory: An overview. Research in Educational Administration and Leadership, 2019, Vol. 4, Issue 1, p. 17. 24 Selg P, ‘The fable of the Bs’: between substantialism and deep relational thinking about power. Journal of Political Power, 2016, Vol. 9, Issue 2, p. 184.

24 Internal Security, July–December Advancing the Concept of Problem in Problem-oriented Policing constitutive elements of a plate and marriage)? For that reason, in starting to think about some problem, it is necessary to distinguish at least two kinds of explanations: causal and constitutive. This division is especially crucial since it brings in discus- sions about capacities, which poses an issue about the capacities of some particular tool (e.g., police strategy) and all of the participants (e.g., individuals, groups, organisations). However, also, it forces us to acknowledge a context, since ‘[t]he causal capacity tells what the system would do in specified situations (e.g. in certain enabling and triggering conditions).’25 For example, in choosing a police strategy to address some safety issue, it is necessary to think about the possible capacities of the strategy. The starting point is acknowledging the type of the strategy — is it analytical (i.e., constructed for some purposes like community policing (see COMP- STAT26) or empirical (i.e., the description of particular empirical data27? Explaining (1) why some strategy does not work is different from explaining (2) what the constitu- tive elements of this strategy are. The first question is about the process (normative) and tells how the social world works. The second is analytical and tells how the social world is composed, what the constitutive elements are. The same questions are also appropriate to ask regarding problems. It is crucial to distinguish the identifica- tion of (1) what a problem is (analytical-ontological position) from a question of (2) how it has happened (the process). I will elaborate these distinctions in more detail below, but ignoring the contextual information paves the way for failure. As Cum- mins explains: ‘Capacities are best understood as a kind of complex dispositional property.’28 This explanation was used in order to emphasise the complex nature of capacities — there is no definite list of capacities. Even more, in social life, there are countless ways to be related, but for failing wisely, it would be useful think about some possible combinations creating fertile ground for capacities that may arise. Analytical and processual capacities have different positions in the context (envi- ronment). It is crucial to understand that causal capacities take the environment for granted29. For that reason, the contextual information (environment) should be acknowledged and specified. There is nothing pre-given, but it depends on the position of the researcher. After the conceptualisation of a context, appropriate causal explanations will be available. However, relations between the constitutive elements make different capacities feasible. In thinking of problems in relation to possible solutions, it is also necessary to keep in mind the asymmetric nature of relations: ‘the system’s causal capacities do not constitute its parts and their organisation.’30 Also, compared to the process of the problem, the constitution of capacity does not take time — it happens instantly. For example, if there is a plan to use some police strategy, then it is necessary to train police officers. Both

25 Ylikoski P, Causal and constitutive explanation compared. Erkenntnis, 2013, Vol. 78, Issue 2, p. 278. 26 Weisburd D, Mastrofski SD, McNally AM, Greenspan R, Willis JJ, Reforming to preserve: Compstat and strategic problem solving in American policing. Criminology & Public Policy, 2003, Vol. 2, Issue 3, pp. 421–456. 27 See e.g., Wilson JQ, Varieties of police behavior. Harvard University Press, 1978. 28 Cummins R, ‘How does it work?’ versus ‘What are the laws?’: Two conceptions of psycho- logical explanation, [in:] Explanation and cognition. 2000, p. 122. 29 Ylikoski P, op. cit. 30 Ibid., p. 6.

Internal Security, July–December 25 Priit Suve training and implementation of strategy take time, but after training, the capacity for implementation is available instantly. As such, it is like a magic that can be used in policing. The question is, how to prepare a context in which particular capacities (e.g., kindness, safety) will appear, and how to discover these properties and condi- tions that made existing capacities (e.g., riots, drug problem, street crimes) available. Understanding and acknowledging contextual factors is a necessary precondition for failing wisely. As we will see from the examples below, failing in preparations may be preparation to fail. The actual situation is sometimes more complicated than is often described in positivist models for situations with definable problems and solutions. However, some problems are hard to define and not solvable, but still need immediate action — wicked problems.

About the nature of problems The central ethos of the problem-solving approach is to define a problem, i.e., a problem is the central element. Also, searching for the best practices is a well- known and rooted culture in the field of safety. These are the causes to bring in another dimension of problems — the nature of a problem. Seemingly the same problem may have a different nature, which has a crucial impact on the ways it should be treated. Comparative research related to gun violence in the US, Canada, and Australia31 offer an excellent example of the different nature of the problem and comes down to a search or creation of best practices. The research reveals that ‘some wicked social problems are not inherently wicked, but are instead influenced by the national political landscape.’32 This means, among other things, that the nature of the problem is contextual, and there is nothing pre-given — an idea that will be given a proper meaning in the discussions below. So, according to this research, gun violence should be given different kinds of attention in the compared countries. This knowledge is especially important because, at first glance, gun violence is gun violence and should be treated similarly, i.e., looking for best practices is the right way to go. However, this kind of oversimplification may appear as a source of a new problem instead of a solution. Although wickedness is a topic covered broadly in many disciplines, in this article, I cover only the main ideas related to the article’s purpose. In their seminal article, Rittel and Webber33 operate in the field of planning and claim that planners face problems which they entitle ‘wicked’. They offer ten characteristics of these kinds of problems. Although the authors often use safety-related issues as an example of a wicked problem, it does not mean that all safety-related issues are wicked. Instead of referring to these ideas, I draw an example which covers most of the characteristics of wickedness emphasised by Rittel and Webber. For example, in the case of problems with general public order: — It is complicated to define the problem. How to cover something, which is related to so many disciplines starting from policing and criminology, but 31 Newman J, Head B, The national context of wicked problems: Comparing policies on gun violence in the US, Canada, and Australia. Journal of comparative policy analysis: research and practice, 2017, Vol. 19, Issue 1, pp. 40–53. 32 Ibid., p. 50. 33 Rittel and Webber, op. cit.

26 Internal Security, July–December Advancing the Concept of Problem in Problem-oriented Policing

also linked to social-psychology, housing, education, medicine, economy, redundancy, and many others; — There is no one-single stopping rule. There is no single success-formula appliable to solve the problem of public order; — Solutions are not true-or-false but good-or-bad. A solution that led to a good result previously (e.g., some police strategy combined with some particular youth policy), may not offer the same result next time; — There is no ultimate test of a solution. Since many fields and agents are involved, the effect of the previous action is severe if any to measure; — Every attempt counts significantly. Mistakes will be visible and unforgivable. In hiring and engaging more police officers on public order, the impact on safety, society, and organisation may be drastic, starting with lowering trust in the police or causing a misbalance between the police organisation’s other functions; — There is a countless set of possible solutions. Here, there is an emphasis on the word set. In wicked issues, such as public order, the combination of various tools (including agents) is a key for success; — Every problem is unique can be considered to be a symptom of another problem. In thinking of problems of public order, it is useful to label a prob- lem as an answer and start to look for a question. Similarly to the example of terrorism presented above; — The existence of a problem can be explained in different ways. Reasoning has a crucial factor in the solution. Pieces of evidence should be presented. The question — how do you know that the problem is present? — is essen- tial and unavoidable. Discovered evidence refer to an ontological point (what is the problem), but not necessarily to the solution. During this more than forty year period from the initial article of wicked prob- lems, the idea of wickedness has spread and developed. Also, in the field of safety, the span of the topic is broad, from grasping the problem of alcohol use34 to police strategies such as problem-oriented policing35. Since the purpose of this article is to advance knowledge of thinking about the concept of problem in develop- ing the groundwork for better tackling of safety issues, we emphasise here the importance of framing a problem, which bridges the argumentation below. As was highlighted, all safety issues are not wicked, but the nature of these should also be clarified. From the point of view of decreasing complexity, problems can be understood as tame (both the problem and solution are clear), complex (the problem is clear, a solution is not), and wicked (neither the problem nor solution is clear).36 However, the described typology does not cover many aspects of social

34 Fleming J, Rules of engagement: Policing anti-social behaviour and alcohol-related vio- lence in and around licensed premises. Sydney: NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, 2008. 35 Sidebottom A, Tilley N, Eck JE, Towards checklists to reduce common sources of prob- lem-solving failure. Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice, 2012, Vol. 6, Issue 2, pp. 194–209. 36 See, e.g., Conklin J, Wicked problems & social complexity. CogNexus Institute San Francisco, CA, 2006; Alford J, Head B.W, Wicked and less wicked problems: A typology and a contingency framework. Policy and Society, 2017; Head B.W, Forty years of wicked problems literature: Forging closer links to policy studies. Policy and Society, 2019, Vol. 38, Issue 2, pp. 180–197.

Internal Security, July–December 27 Priit Suve life, which leads to the next crucial issue in the concept of problem, but also sheds light on many aspects of social life. Selg (forthcoming) emphasises situations where a solution is clear, but the problem is not. These kinds of problems — entitled ideo- logical problems — can often be encountered in everyday political life, and in this article, we look at the example below from the field of safety. Two aspects of the described typology should be specified. First, the question of the clarity of a problem seems to be simple, but also disastrous and often an object of manipulation, as brilliantly presented by Charles Tilly using the example of ter- rorism37. Similarly to Tilly’s38 argumentation that there is no owner of a definition of terror, terrorism, or terrorist, one should acknowledge that nobody owns the def- inition of a particular problem. The latter is especially crucial in the field of safety, which has countless regulations trying to capture all of the misbehavior. Second, related to a problem, a solution may be even more complicated, since all of the agents may imagine the outcome as well as the process of solving or mitigating a particular problem differently. Although there may be several sets of contextual factors, it is difficult to argue against the fact that in public service, there are often situations where some social event (e.g., increasing street crime; a terrorist act) cause public debate forcing officials to solve a problem. Problems of public order are well-known (e.g., misdemeanors, riots, violent crimes), in which hiring more police officers or applying military policing strategies appear to be quick and easy solutions. However, as was described above, more police and aggressive police tactics can be a source of new problems (such as distrust in the police). Also, there are plenty of examples in criminology, where it is possible to recognise the displace- ment of problems instead of resolving them. Riots or street crimes are obviously a signal, but the problem maybe something else. The signal-noise dilemma is clearly and famously presented by Nate Silver: ‘The noise is what distracts us from the truth.’39 I am not offering a theory of truth, but a possibility to orient oneself in the noise. Now, after clarifying the ideas of relationalism, causal and constitutive reason- ing, and the nature of problems, it is easier to understand the key aspects of our argumentation, and move closer to understandings of the concept of problem as an interconnected phenomenon.

Substantialism and relationalism: self-action, inter-action, and trans-action Since the primary purpose of this article is to craft a groundwork for thinking of problems in a way which allows the substantialist view to be made distinct from the relational, I use the terminology of self-actionalism, inter-actionalism, and trans- actionalism.40 According to François Dépelteau,41 there are two modes of perception

37 Tilly C, Terror as strategy and relational process. International Journal of Comparative Sociology, 2005, Vol. 46, Issue 1–2, pp. 11–32. 38 Tilly C, Terror, terrorism, terrorists. Sociological theory, 2004, Vol. 22, issue 1, pp. 5–13. 39 Silver N, The signal and the noise: why so many predictions fail–but some don’t. Pen- guin, 2012, p. 21. 40 Dewey J, Bentley AF, Knowing and the known. Beacon press Bosto, 1960; Emirbayer M, op. cit., Dépelteau F, op. cit., Selg P, op. cit. 41 Dépelteau F, op. cit.

28 Internal Security, July–December Advancing the Concept of Problem in Problem-oriented Policing of the social world. First, the co-deterministic theories explain evolution as ‘the effect of inter-actions between social structures and agency’.42 From that point, there are pre-existing structures and agencies. For example, in safety, it is possible to recognise good and bad actions; adults and juveniles; owners and the poor, and so on. In this regard, social structures must be external to action since they exist before action. Another view was first introduced in ‘Manifesto for a Relational Sociology’43, and means by words of Dépelteau, that ‘the main challenge posed by relational theories is to explain social phenomena without any total or partial causal relation from social structures to action.’44 The transaction is not like a line within a mathematical formula composed by single components (e.g., criminal + action + policeman) or just the addition of some actions of pre-given entities. These different lines and participants ‘in their developing interrelationship, constitute a singleness, such as we recognise when we speak of an argument, a debate, a dis- cussion or a fight.’45 If social things are not pre-given entities, but relations (nodes and ties) then who are criminals, what is a crime, and how should we think about problems? From the perspective of the concept of problem, the question is: should we study (1) self-action (where things are viewed as acting under their own powers); (2) inter- action (where thing is balanced against thing in causal interconnection);46 or (3) trans-action (the action A is the action A only because it is interconnected with the action B, and vice versa)?47 An answer to this question is not simple, since ‘[o] ur spontaneous view of the world is substantialist, not relational: in our language, we express the world as being composed of substances, rather than emerging, unfolding and processual relations.’48 Norbert Elias provides a brilliant example of this idea: ‘We say, ‘The wind is blowing’, as if the wind were actually a thing at rest which, at a given point in time, begins to move and blow. We speak as if the wind were separate from its blowing, as if a wind could exist which did not blow.”49 Fol- lowing the idea, in safety, there should be substances like assets or criminals that have properties like a price or dangerousness, which are connected in activities like stealing or blackmailing. From another perspective, Selg50 clarifies the relational view of everyday life using the term ‘distance’. To put it into the context of safety, we can imagine a distance between the policeman and criminal, while the ‘distance’ is a relation between the two, not a property or action. The distance does not belong to police- man or criminal. However, for a distance in our example, it is necessary to have both policeman and criminal. The instantness in relational thinking should also

42 Ibid., p. 52. 43 Emirbayer M, op. cit. 44 Dépelteau F, op. cit., p. 59. 45 Blumer H, Symbolic interactionism: Perspective and method. University of California Press, 1986, p. 110. 46 Dewey J, Bentley A.F, op. cit., p. 132. 47 Dépelteau F, op. cit., p. 60. 48 Selg P, Power and relational sociology, [in:] The Palgrave Handbook of Relational Sociol- ogy. Springer, 2018, p. 539. 49 Elias N, What is sociology? Columbia University Press, 1978, p. 112. 50 Selg P, op. cit., 2018, p. 540.

Internal Security, July–December 29 Priit Suve be emphasised since the idea helps in further discussions: a ‘distance’ appears instantly in thinking about policeman and criminal. It does not appear later. The problem is, there are countless another instant ‘things’ similar to distance (for exam- ple respect or fear), which we only recognise if needed, in particular circumstances. All of these invisible things are in place regardless of their recognition. Yet, this example does not offer suitable knowledge about how it would help us to understand benefits from substantialist view to relational view of safety prob- lems. So, it is possible to analyse individual action as a self-action by an observer, ‘but, in reality, it is reasonable to assume that so-called self-actions are always part of transactions where the actions of A and B are interdependent.’51 There is nothing wrong with conceptualising problems of safety from the point of view of stable relations, but trying to discover and study interdependencies of social action is more inclusive and offers deeper knowledge. In general, it is possible to analyse a criminal and an asset; a community and disorder; a police strategy and the feeling of safety, but these are always interrelated through ‘things’, as described above. A criminal is a criminal only in relation to a particular asset; disorder is disorder only in relation to a particular community; the police’s behavior has meaning with a particular feeling of safety, and so forth. Of course, there are conditions in which there is a higher capacity for something, but there still, nothing is pre-given.

Problem in policing: concept and examples

There are many ways to elucidate the theoretical ideas presented above. How- ever, it is true that, in the field of policing, the discussions of the concept of problem as relational is just the beginning. Therefore, I start from the outset. In this section I first look at the concept of problem as it was presented by Goldstein52 and elabo- rated by Borrion, et al.53, and then move towards the use of the concept in the classical experiment carried out by Braga, et al.,54 and in contemporary well-known stop-and-search cases.55 In such a way, it is possible to grasp both theoretical discus- sions as well as the concept in use. However, I do not criticise current standpoints, but try to develop the idea and support Goldstein’s ethos56 (‘At one time this emphasis was appropriate’) with minor accent: ideas developed in earlier times are often not useless, but need to be developed along with contemporary knowledge. The sections below are dedicated to illuminating the current positions of prob- lem in the examples taken into analysis, and to asking further questions in line with the theoretical perspectives to discover possible additional or hidden shades. In more detail, I focus on causal and constitutive reasoning; the nature of problem; and substantialist-relational perspectives. The following questions will be asked: — About the causality and constitutiveness: is the emphasis on the process (how is something happening) or on the constitutive elements (what makes

51 Dépelteau F, op. cit., p. 55. 52 Goldstein H, op. cit. 1979, 2003. 53 Borrion H, et al., op. cit. 54 Braga A.A, et al., op. cit. 55 Tiratelli M, et al., op. cit., Drury J, et al., op. cit. 56 Goldstein H, op. cit. ,1979, p. 239.

30 Internal Security, July–December Advancing the Concept of Problem in Problem-oriented Policing

it possible)? The notion of capacities is vital since they ground a context for an open-minded approach to a problem. Also, the knowledge of the principle of instantness may lead to a deeper understandings of causes of a problem by looking for a set that instantly made possible what hap- pened. Thereupon it is easier to discover (1) crucial participants, and (2) necessary causations. Recognising a moment of enactment (recognition) of a problem, the activating process (including causes, reasons, agents) itself may become clearer. — About the nature of problems: are these problems presented as simple (both the problem and the solution are clear), tame (the problem clear, a solution is not), wicked (neither the problem nor solution is clear), or ideological (a solution is clear, the problem is not)? Dealing with the recognition of the nature of a problem also clarifies the field of participants, capacities, and possible solutions, which all offer valuable input for organisational design as well as strategic choices in everyday policing. — About substantialism and relationalism: is the concept of problem or a par- ticular problem under discussion handled from a substantialist or relationalist perspective? The ontological-analytical position limits both the understand- ing of a problem and possible solutions. Since the prevention of further misbehavior can be recognised as one general ethos of the problem-oriented approach, thinking in terms of relations or substances has a crucial impact. In the analyses below, self-action and inter-action are treated as substantial, and trans-action as relational. In this study, it is not necessary to discern all three forms of action, and I make the difference based on the claim that ‘[s] ocial actors and actions are what they are, at some specific time and space, only through empirical chains of trans-actions.’57

Concept of problem in problem-oriented policing The purpose of Goldstein’s seminal paper58 is to summarise the nature of the ‘means over ends’ syndrome in policing and to explore ways of focussing greater attention on the results of policing — on the effect that police efforts have on the problem that the police are expected to handle. By ‘problems’, he means ‘the incredibly broad range of troublesome situations that prompt citizens to turn to the police, such as street robberies, residential burglaries, battered wives, van- dalism, speeding cars, runaway children, accidents, acts of terrorism, even fear’, and emphasises the perspective of the job of police to deal ‘with a wide range of behavioral and social problems that arise in a community — that the end prod- uct of policing consists of dealing with these problems.’59 In his further, developing paper, the purpose was ‘to join with others in exploring the future development of problem-oriented policing.’60 He emphasises the early idea of problem-oriented policing, which from the perspective of the police’s management, assumed ‘the

57 Dépelteau F, op. cit., p. 61. 58 Goldstein H, op. cit., 1979, p. 238. 59 Ibid., p. 242. 60 Goldstein H, op. cit., 2003, p. 14.

Internal Security, July–December 31 Priit Suve primary responsibility for identifying problems, analysing them’61, and also ‘[t]he fundamental premise underlying the concept of problem-oriented policing is that police practices, in responding to common problems that arise in the community.’62 Both ideas cited are remarkable not only from the point of POP but also from the point of current research. The third paper was analysed for the purpose of elab- orating Goldstein’s above-cited ideas to ‘revisit the problem-oriented policing (POP) literature and argue that the current conception of crime problem, akin to an obstacle, has overshadowed the goals that are threatened by crime.’63 Although all they found was the need to revise the concept of problem, the new ideas still hold A-s and B-s as pre-given structures and agents, but there is little discussion about the process of problem-creation. Table 1 generalises the overall concepts of problems discussed in the cited papers from the perspective of this article.

Table 1. Mode of defi ning a problem by Goldstein 1997, 2003 and Borrion et al., 2019.

On further developing problem-oriented The Problem with Improving policing: policing: The most Crime Problem-Solving: A problem-oriented critical need, the major Towards a Second approach64 impediments, Generation Pop?66 and a proposal65 Definition ‘By problems, I mean ‘each discrete piece ‘the problems tackled or description the incredibly broad of police business that by practitioners should not of problem range of troublesome the public expects be defined in terms of crime situations that prompt the police to handle or crime reduction alone. citizens to turn (referred to as Indeed, the adequacy to the police, such a ‘problem’)’68 of interventions as street robberies, ‘It was contemplated greatly depends upon residential burglaries, that the problems the ways analysts frame battered wives, would be sizeable the problems to solve in the vandalism, speeding — a collection first place.’70 cars, runaway of many similar ‘the problem is one of how children, accidents, incidents — usually to intervene to reduce acts of terrorism, even occurring throughout crime to acceptable levels, fear.’67 the jurisdiction served whilst also satisficing or within a reasonably the wider set of goals of all defined area. Examples stakeholders’71 would be the problem ‘In practice, this requires of the drinking- revising the concept driver, the robbery of problem and aligning of convenience stores, problem-solving models or theft from retail with the multicriteria establishments.’69 frameworks found in other disciplines, including design, engineering and risk management.’72

61 Ibid., p. 15. 62 Ibid., p. 19. 63 Borrion H, et al., op. cit., p. 1.

32 Internal Security, July–December Advancing the Concept of Problem in Problem-oriented Policing

Emphasis Emphasis Emphasis on elements Emphasis on elements with on process (how on elements. and particular area. the notion of multiplicity is something Especially from of disciplines having input happening) the point of crime, on policing. Deals mostly or on constitutive which appears with what-questions, elements as a core of a problem. and not how-questions. (what makes it possible)? Attention The nature The nature of problems Some indications of the on the nature of problems is not is not analytically nature of problems (e.g., of a problem analytically discerned. discerned. wickedness) are present. as tame, complex, or wicked. Substantialism Substantialism Substantialism Substantialism or relationalism? is the prevalent ethos. is the prevalent ethos. is the prevalent ethos.

Source: The author, based on Goldstein H, 1979 and 2003; Borrion H, et al., 2019.

Whatever the precise problem is, the causal and constitutive reasoning is a useful tool guiding to capacities. It is especially useful to remember that causal capaci- ties take the environment for granted, although it is questionable whether there is any pre-given environment. Merely acknowledging the fact that every criminal is responsible for his/her actions, but not solely responsible for his/her self, is a strik- ing reminder of the latter. Advancement and the notion towards interdisciplinarity is a valuable component added to thinking of problems by Borrion, et al.73 However, thinking more analytically about the nature of problems in terms of complexity (including ideological terms) creates an environment that reduces the possibility of failure. The latter is an idea from Bob Jessop, who emphasised the idea in governance where there is no guar- antee of success. It is only possible to choose ‘preferred forms of failure’74, and safety is one of the fields holding no warrants. Moreover, the way that one thinks of prob- lems implies possibilities for solutions and various means to the latter. It is not easy to separate a signal from the noise, and all of the tools available could be captured. However, the most important addition to the thinking of problems stems from the substantialist ethos of current usage of the concept. Although the argumentation is broadened from the crime-related problems to many different fields, the roots are

64 Goldstein H, op. cit., 1979. 65 Goldstein H, op. cit. 2003. 66 Borrion H, et al., op. cit. 67 Goldstein H, op. cit., 1979, p. 242. 68 Goldstein H, op. cit., 2003, p. 14. 69 Ibid., p. 15. 70 Borrion H, et al., op. cit., p. 5. 71 Ibid., p. 13. 72 Ibid. p. 16. 73 Ibid. 74 Jessop B, Governance and meta-governance: on reflexivity, requisite variety and requi- site irony. Governance as social and political communication, 2003, p. 118.

Internal Security, July–December 33 Priit Suve still dialectical in terms of problems and tools. Contrary to substantialism, the rela- tional thinking directs towards a shift of thinking focussed more on ethos instead of means. Social actors are not isolated but interdependent, and these dependencies should be discovered and studied in order to move closer to a problem. Environ- mental criminologists may argue that there can be a particular environment that creates a criminal or calls for a crime (self-actional perspective). However, the idea itself is relational: there are no A-s (criminals) without B (an environment) in this formula. Another widespread understanding is that there is a rule and a person who violates the latter, and both are constant (inter-actional perspective). However, it would be useful to think that there are no pre-given criminals, rules, or actions. The example of decriminalisation or criminalisation may be one of these exam- ples most familiar to the audience. The understanding of some particular action (whether the action is a crime or not) can change simultaneously with a shift in the calendar (in case of criminalisation or decriminalisation) or taking a step (in case of crossing a state’s border). Also, the decriminalisation may be an effect of police or citizens behaviour — for some reasons, actors stopped acting in particular way. It does not necessarily have to be handled as a formal juridical act. Probably all con- temporary societies can present some ‘dead’ legal rule. The example of the police’s power to use violence might be telling. The same action — using violence — can be legal if it is carried out by the police within the limits of the law, but it also can be illegal if it is carried out by the persons who cannot be fit into this particular law.

Concept of problem in action There is no need for a meta-analysis of case studies in problem-oriented policing to express some hidden values of a variety of the concept of problem. Here, I use data from the experiment of the efficacy of problem-oriented policing conducted by Anthony Braga and colleagues75, which still ‘remains a model evaluation study today.’76 In addition to this study focussed on a problem-oriented approach, I take a look at two reports involved in contemporary policing practices. Tiratelli M, et al.77 explored the relationship between stop-and-search and crime levels for a ten-year period, and Drury et al.78 ‘construct[ed] histories of some of the most significant riots in August 2011’. These data, mediated by experts, are appropriate to acquire knowledge about how the concept of problem was handled. However, I do recognise the fact that these data do not represent all of the understandings and angles in use. This is not the case. And although the chosen examples concerned Anglo-American police culture, they are also accessible, as well as well-known for a broader audience. Besides, luckily, all of the limitations mentioned above will not influence the subject matter of this article. As is presented in Table 2 below, the overall concept of the problems are treated from a substantialist viewpoint. Regardless of the fact of many examples of an interactional viewpoint, the problems are still treated in a substantial way presenting A-s and B-s. 75 Braga A.A, et al., op. cit. 76 Bachman R.D, Schutt R.K, Fundamentals of research in criminology and criminal justice. Seventh Edition. Sage Publications, 2020, p. 668. 77 Tiratelli M, et al., op. cit . 78 Drury J, et al., op. cit., p. 69.

34 Internal Security, July–December Advancing the Concept of Problem in Problem-oriented Policing

Table 2. Ethos of a problem in three studies

Problem‐oriented Does more stop and search policing in violent mean less crime? Analysis Re-reading the 2011 crime places: A ran- of Metropolitan Police English riots. ESRC ‘Beyond domised controlled Service panel data, Contagion’ interim report81 experiment79 2004–1480 Definition ‘Problem-oriented ‘This study aimed to add ‘To explain waves of riots, or description policing challenges to the limited evidence in place of the concept of problem officers to identify on the impact of stop of ‘contagion’ — the notion and to analyze the causes and search on crime. […] that people simply copied of problems behind As the type of analysis that others in a mindless a string of criminal was carried out could only and automatic way — incidents or substantive show correlation and not we propose a new model community concern’; causation, any evidence of a of riot spread as identity-based ‘very little is known about lagged negative association collective empowerment.’85 the value of problem- would point to a possible ‘[…] riots influenced each oriented interventions deterrent effect.’84 other: the occurrence of a riot in controlling violence’82 in one location subsequently ‘This research attempts made rioting more likely to generate more in certain other locations. […] knowledge on the that this influence process usefulness of problem- is actually one of the main oriented interventions predictors of rioting, and that to control violent the more intense the rioting places.’83 the greater the influence.’86 Emphasis on process Little or no attention Emphasis on process. Some limited attention (how is something to constitutiveness. to constitutiveness, processes happening) are mostly in focus. or in constitutive elements (what makes it possible)? Attention Little or no attention Little or no attention There are some indicative signs to the nature of a to the nature to the nature of problems to the complexity of problems. problem as tame, of problems from from the current complex, or wicked. the current perspective. perspective. Substantialism Substantialism Although emphasising Although emphasising or relationalism? is the prevalent ethos. the relational idea, the relational idea, it remains it remains on frames on frames of interactionalism of interactionalism (with A-s (with A-s and B-s), and for and B-s), and for that reason that reason is labelled is labelled as substantial. as substantial. Source: the author, based on Braga AA, et al., 1999; Quinton P, et al., 2017; Drury J, et al., 2019

79 Braga A.A, et al., op. cit. 80 Quinton P, Tiratelli M, Bradford B, Does More Stop and Search Mean Less Crime Analysis of Metropolitan Police Service Panel Data, 2004–14. College of Policing; 2017. 81 Drury J, et al., op. cit. 82 Braga A.A, et al., op. cit., p. 542. 83 Ibid., p. 543. 84 Quinton P, et.al., op. cit., p. 3. 85 Drury J, et al., op. cit., p. 4. 86 Ibid., p. 15.

Internal Security, July–December 35 Priit Suve

In addition to previous confirmations, I also acknowledge the limits coming from the methods of analysis. However, in summing up the three questions under discussion, in the research analysed, causality dominated over constitutiveness, the complexity of problems was used in a mediated way, and substantialism was the ruling ethos. At that point, it is appropriate to emphasise that all of the stressed fac- tors — constitutive reasoning, nature of problems, relationalism — are often touched on in the literature related to problems in policing. Yet, the touch is often so gen- eral, cursory and undeveloped that the benefits of these concepts remain hidden.

Discussion and conclusions

The purpose of the article is to advance the knowledge of thinking about the con- cept of problem in developing the groundwork for better tackling of safety issues. After the brief sketching out of ideas offering additional perspectives to the tra- ditional practice, I looked at the concept of problem from two perspectives: how it was elaborated in theoretical positions and used in three well-known studies. Regarding causal and constitutive reasoning, in all the papers, the central ethos was on processes and little or no attention was paid to constitutiveness. The process- orientedness is not a problem in itself, but may still ground nebulousness leading towards decisions having limited one-sided pieces of evidence and argumenta- tion about a problem as well as possibilities for tackling it. Grounding constitutive elements lead to more emotion-free knowledge, including particular contextual information. There is no pre-given context, which is an axiomatic precondition in the normative approach, and can appear as one of the reasons for failure. Both elements, as well as causality, are related to the nature of problems in terms of complexity. Although without labelling the nature of a problem, the analysis of problem-oriented policing and stop-and-search practices presented some undesirable consequences that may accompany a vague understanding or definition of complexity. Starting to solve the unsolvable problem, increases the probability of failure. Even more, as the example of stop-and-search presented, it can appear as a separate problem. Substantialism was probably the most evident feature characterising the per- ception of the concept of problem. However, the relational ethos could be the novel approach in thinking of safety problems and policing. As the dramatic conclusion (‘stop-and-search is clearly a problem not a solution’).87 Drury, et al.88 manifested that riots should be seen as a relation, not some pre-given event that should be solved by A-s and B-s. ‘Failure is a routine feature of everyday life,’89 and for that reason should be taken seriously. To fail wisely, the overall focus and wisdom on thinking about problems as complex issues could be increased in the field of policing. In this article, only some ideas were presented. The ideas of relationalism need more advanced research and clarification in terms of trans-actionalism which is not a common 87 Drury J, et al., op. cit., p. 19. 88 Ibid., p. 19. 89 Jessop B, From governance to governance failure and from multi-level governance to multi-scalar meta-governance, [in:] The disoriented state: Shifts in governmentality, ter- ritoriality and governance. Springer, 2009. p. 92.

36 Internal Security, July–December Advancing the Concept of Problem in Problem-oriented Policing vocabulary term and way of thinking in criminology and policing, although it does have great potential in the realm of safety. To summarise, the example of theft could be appropriate: a thief is responsible for the action, but the theft does not belong to a thief or a victim (or an asset) and should be seen as a relation in between. Acknowledging this, we are back at the very beginning and should deal with the concept of problem from many different perspectives within the enormous social roulette.

References

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38 Internal Security, July–December Advancing the Concept of Problem in Problem-oriented Policing

About the Author

Priit Suve, Assoc. Prof. of public management of School of Governance, Law and Society, Tallinn University and professor of police theory Institute of Inernal Security of Estonian Academy of Security Sciences in Estonia. Email: [email protected]

Streszczenie. Ostatnie zmiany w rozumieniu pojęcia problemu w policji, która jest instytucją zorientowaną na rozwiązywanie problemów wskazują na wartościowe aspekty, głównie zaś z perspektywy merytorycznej. W niniejszym artykule przedstawiono perspektywę relacyjną w myśleniu o problemach związanych z bezpieczeństwem oraz przedstawiono kilka kluczowych rozwiązań. Opierając się na rozumowaniu przyczynowym i konstytutywnym oraz pojęciu złożoności problemów, do określenia różnic między perspektywą substantialistyczną i relacjonalistyczną wykorzystano perspektywę samodzielności, interakcji i transakcji. Koncepcja problemu została przeanalizowana z dwóch perspektyw. Po pierwsze, w świetle początkowych i ostatnich opracowań tego terminu. Po drugie, przez faktyczne używanie pojęcia. W analizowanych danych dominował etos substantialistyczny, domyślnie mający zalety i wady. Jednak myślenie relacyjne wymaga głębszego zrozumienia problemów związanych z bezpieczeństwem. Rezygnacja z etosu substantialistycznego i pytanie, czy istnieją z góry określone A i B, oraz zwrócenie się w stronę idei, że nie ma A bez B, stwarza warunki do bardziej otwartego zrozumienia zagadnienia problemu w policji.

Zusammenfassung. Die jüngsten Änderungen im Verständnis des Problembegriffs bei der Polizei, einer Institution, die in sich zur Problemlösung berufen wurde, weisen auf wertvolle Aspekte hin, vor allem aber aus einer inhaltlichen Perspektive. Dieser Artikel bietet eine relationale Perspektive zum Nachdenken über Sicherheitsprobleme und zeigt einige wichtige Fortschritte auf. Unter Verwendung der kausalen und konstitutiven Argumentation und des Konzepts der Komplexität von Problemen, um die Unterschiede zwischen der substantiellen und der relationalistischen Perspektive zu definieren, wurde die Perspektive der Unabhängigkeit, Interaktion und Transaktion verwendet. Das Konzept des Problems wurde aus zwei Perspektiven analysiert: Zum einen im Lichte der jüngsten Studien des Begriffs und zum anderen durch die tatsächliche Verwendung des Begriffs. In den analysierten Daten dominierte das materielle Ethos, und es ist standardmäßig entweder gut oder schlecht. Relationales Denken erfordert jedoch ein tieferes Verständnis von Sicherheitsproblemen. Die Aufgabe des substantiellen Ethos und die Frage, ob es vorbestimmtes A und B gibt, und die Hinwendung zu der Idee, dass es kein A ohne B gibt, schaffen ein Umfeld für ein offeneres Verständnis des Problems in der Polizei.

Резюме. Последние изменения в разработке вопросов, касающихся проблемы в полиции, являющейся органом, ориентированным на решение проблем, указывают на полезные моменты, в основном, с точки зрения самого содержания понятия. В статье представлен реляционный взгляд на рассмотрение проблемы безопасности, а также представлены некоторые ключевые достижения в этой области. Используя причинно-следственное и консти- тутивное мышление, а также концепцию сложности проблем, для определения различий между существенной и релятивистской точками зрения была использована перспектива независимости, взаимодействия и сделки. Концепция проблемы анализируется с двух точек зрения. Во-первых, в контексте первоначальных и недавних разработок понятия. Во-вторых, посредством практического применения понятия. В проанализированных данных в основном обладал принцип существенности, и он имеет как преимущества, так и недостатки. Однако, реляцион- ное мышление требует более глубокого понимания вопросов в сфере безопасности. Отказ от содержательного этиса и вопрос, есть ли предопределенные А и Б, и обращение к идее, что без Б не существует А, создает среду для более открытого понимания проблемы в полиции.

Internal Security, July–December 39

SECURITY MANAGEMENT

The Safety Concept for Football Matches

Jarosław Struniawski ORCID: 0000-0001-9671-2317 Police Academy in Szczytno, Poland

Abstract. Organising football matches in Poland is currently a very important issue for the institutions and services responsible for security. The author, on the basis of his professional and scientific experience, has presented a concept of safety in this area. The article analyses in detail the organisational and legal solutions in force in Poland and selected European countries and assesses their effectiveness. The proposed concept provides for the development of organisational and functional requirements that would increase the level of safety during this type of sports events. Implementing the proposed solutions into the current law would enable a harmonised security system to be organised. DOI: 10.5604/01.3001.0014.6673 http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0014.6673

Keywords: law, sports events, police, security, concept

Introduction

The specific nature of football matches naturally leads to the development of particular social risks. The risks correlate with the type of events, the interest of people in them, their location and the infrastructure of the venues and facilities, the appropriate commitment, as well as authorities responsible for their safety, and above all, the behaviour of the participants. The organisation of football matches causes specific problems not only at the time and place of the event or in its immediate surroundings, but also in many other public places, wherever large groups of people may gather. Unfortunately, the very atmosphere of the event does not have a positive impact on all those present, who do not always behave in a predictable and lawful way. The increase in the number of threats is mainly caused by fans who support the opposing teams (e.g. local derby matches). Currently, the major problem for law enforcement authorities is the transport of risk supporters, the pre-arranged fights, as well as the use of pyrotechnic materials and thus the offences the sup- porters commit. If threats prevent people from participating in the events, liability for negligence increases, there is a loss of reputation resulting in long-term damage, and in the case of commercial mass events, there is also a loss of profit from selling the tickets. The threats also undermine the authority of the state, give the impres- sion that it is impossible to prevent violence, and that law enforcement agencies are ineffective in providing security.

Internal Security, July–December 41 Jarosław Struniawski Security of football matches in the Polish legal doctrine

The problem of aggression and hooliganism has accompanied mass sports and cultural events for centuries. The concern for safety at sports venues was already present in ancient sport. At the stadium in Delphi, about 450 B.C., fans were forbid- den to bring weapons and wine-skins to the stadiums and amphitheatres. In order to stop the aggressive spectators and athletes disobeying the rules, the guards were allowed to calm them down with a whip. Those breaking the rules, and thus endangering the safety of others, were escorted out of the tribunes. Organisers of sporting events who were unable to ensure safety were prevented from organis- ing further events. In crisis situations, the army was sent to the stadiums. Many of these methods, although slightly modified, are also used in modern times1. The popularity of mass events, especially sporting events, has been a significant problem for years, imposing specific control measures and methods and developing specific legislative actions. Most Member States of the European Union have specific rules in administrative law on how to organise sporting events, and several of them have internal sports laws. At the same time, efforts have been made for several years to harmonise Member States’ internal law with the European legal regulations. Many times, the impulse for legislative action in different areas and at differ- ent levels has been a real, usually tragic event. The situation was exactly the same with the safety of football matches. The events that were the turning point for the international community were the accidents in the stadiums of Bradford in the UK and Heysel in Brussels2, caused by their participants, as well as the inade- quate security arrangements for these events. Until then, the policy of the European Union, like that of the individual Member States and UEFA (Union of European Football Associations), perceived the problem of safety of football matches, and in particular so-called ‘stadium hooliganism’, as a social problem requiring no specific measures or control methods and no specific legislative action. Since 1985, the safety aspect of football matches has been recognised as requir- ing greater legal commitment on the part of the European Union and calling for special surveillance. At present, the international law governing the issue is, inter alia, the Council of the European Union Resolution of 2016 concerning an updated hand- book with recommendations for international police cooperation and measures to prevent and control violence and disturbances in connection with international football matches, in which at least one Member State is involved (‘EU Football Matches Handbook’)3 and the European Convention on spectator violence and mis- behaviour at sports events, and in particular at football matches4. The other provisions have no legal effect and are political in nature. Nevertheless, they form the basis for national legislation to guarantee the adequate level of security of mass events.

1 Słapek D, Sport i widowiska w świecie antycznym. Warsaw, 2010, pp. 729–733. 2 Compare: Mojet H, The European Union and Football Hooliganism, The International Sports Law Journal (ISLJ), 2005, No. 1–2, p. 69. 3 OJ of the European Union, 2016/C 444/01. 4 Saint-Denis.2016.07.3. Council of Europe Treaty Series No. 218.

42 Internal Security, July–December The Safety Concept for Football Matches

The stadium hooliganism in Poland in the 1990s and the need to adapt legal regulations to international standards resulted in the need to introduce legisla- tive changes in the field of security of mass events, including football matches5. The existing law did not guarantee adequate instruments to effectively combat the growing number of football hooligans at the Polish football stadiums. The Act of 22 August 1997 on the security of mass events was the final outcome of work on the new regulations. The act defined the rights and obligations of the organiser of a mass event, the procedure for issuing permits to host it, security standards, the rules of liability for damage caused during the event and in connection with its organisation, as well as liability for actions violating this legal act. The act deter- mined the rules of proper behaviour of the mass event attendees and imposed terms of attendance to be observed at the event. The football banning order and the obligation to identify participants during mass sports events were also introduced. It should be considered that the 12-year-old legacy of the 1997 Act was a significant step forward in the field of securing mass events in Poland6. In retrospect, however, it turned out that, in the changing reality, its provisions did not correspond to other legal regulations and made it impossible to effectively combat the stadium hooliganism7. New legislation on this issue was launched in 2008. The new law was intended to support entities involved in securing mass events and law enforcement agen- cies in an effective way. The amendment to the law was also driven by the need to ensure appropriate conditions for safeguarding public order in the UEFA EURO 2012 European Football Championship organised in Poland. The current law of 20 March 2009 on the safety of mass events specifies: a) rules of conduct necessary to ensure the security of mass events; b) mass event security measures; c) rules and procedures for issuing permits to host mass events; d) rules of collecting and processing information on the security of mass events; e) rules of liability of organisers for damage caused in connection with the organisation of mass events. The legislator has distinguished two types of mass events, i.e. artistic and enter- tainment events, and sports events, which include football matches. A football match may be held at a stadium or other sports facility where the organiser has provided, in accordance with fire protection regulations and construction law, not less than 1000 seats for spectators. Moreover, there is a possibility to offer standing places during a football match. Their number may not exceed 25% of the total num- ber of seats on the facility, while one seat may only be converted into one standing place, with the possibility of restoring the previous state. On the other hand, if a foot- ball match is classified as a high-risk event (acts of violence or aggression may occur during the event), the number of seats made available by the organiser to persons shall not be smaller than 200. The classification of a mass event as a high-risk mass event is combined with more restrictive rules and requirements for the organis- ers. One of these is providing compatible electronic systems for the identification 5 Struniawski J, Jurczak J, Mikołajczyk Z, Bezpieczeństwo imprez masowych na przykładzie wybranych państw Unii Europejskiej. Szczytno, 2018, p. 21. 6 Sabat M, Euro 2012 w Polsce. Organizacja turnieju oraz zapobieganie zagrożeniom bezpieczeństwa publicznego. Warsaw, 2012, p. 91. 7 Konkol C, Bezpieczeństwo imprez masowych. Komentarz. Warsaw, 2010, p. 21.

Internal Security, July–December 43 Jarosław Struniawski of persons, ticketing, monitoring the person’s presence at the venue and time of a football match and other high-risk mass events, controlling access to specific ven- ues and monitoring the information. The Mass Events Security Act defines the duties and rights of the organiser of a mass event, which is a legal person, a natural person or an organisational unit without legal personality, hosting a mass event. The organiser of mass events is not always the manager of the facility/territory (an owner or a tenant). It is the organiser’s duty to guarantee an appropriate level of security for the persons participating in the event, to provide medical protection, to ensure the appropriate technical condition of the buildings together with technical instal- lations and equipment, in particular fire and sanitary facilities, to indicate escape routes and free access to the relevant emergency services, to ensure permanent communication between the entities involved in securing the mass event, to pro- vide rooms for support services and to ensure order in place and during the event. It is not only the organiser of a mass event, but also the local authorities, provincial governors, the Police, the State Fire Service, medical care services and, if necessary, other relevant services and organisations, who are responsible for ensuring the safety of the event. This law is considered by many to be one of the most restrictive in Europe. How- ever, it has effectively reduced the public order disturbances accompanying such events. This is reflected in the police statistics, which show a constant improvement in security, especially at the Polish stadiums. It should be remembered, however, that the problem of hooliganism has not disappeared, to some extent, it has moved into the public space. The law, like most of the regulations in force, is not perfect. It has many drawbacks and shortcomings, but also important and necessary solutions. It is primarily dedicated to the organisation of football matches, while the method of preparation and implementation of other categories of events and events that do not meet the statutory requirements is quite imprecise. Currently, such events constitute a significant part of all events organised in the country8. This often results in a divergent and incorrect interpretation of the law by their organisers. Moreover, a large number of them do not take into account the recommendations and suggestions of the police. There is insufficient capacity to supervise, control, and impose demands concerning the events.

Recommendations for a football match safety strategy — a guideline

The criterion of the large-scale nature of football matches, as well as the dif- ferent requirements and conditions imposed on them, call for an integrated and uniform security system. When developing a security solution, it is important to take into account the factors that will influence it. These will include, in particular,

8 Struniawski J, Wymogi bezpieczeństwa meczów piłki nożnej nie będących imprezami masowymi. Zeszyty Naukowe Wyższej Szkoły Informatyki, Zarządzania i Administracji w Warsza- wie, Warsaw, 2014, No. 3(28), pp. 340–352.

44 Internal Security, July–December The Safety Concept for Football Matches well-qualified staff responsible for the planning and hosting these events, their par- ticipants, efficient and effective law enforcement, procedures to limit and combat the misbehaviour of participants and to prevent other threats. The existing system for the security of football matches fulfils its essential func- tions in terms of ensuring the safety of participants. However, there are certain loopholes in the legal framework for defining the division of competences and tasks between the various stakeholders in the field of football security and the differ- ent requirements and conditions imposed on them, which directly affect the way in which these activities are organised. Some of the tasks that should be performed by the organisers are imposed on the police. Such a situation results in the police being held responsible and taking over the organiser’s duties, and thus incurring huge costs resulting from their involvement in the process of securing the events. The diagnosed deficiencies triggered the changes, which constitute assump- tions for the concept of security of organised forms of social communities, i.e.: a) developing a safety strategy for football matches; b) defining standards for managing the safety of football matches; c) establishing legal regulations and procedures for the safety of football matches; d) establishing organisational units for Football Match Safety Teams at all levels of public administration; e) developing a database containing a list of persons with football banning orders; f) developing a methodology for preparing an ongoing risk analysis; g) increasing training and prevention activities in the context of counteracting negative crisis situations9. These proposals include a variety of initiatives and actions to improve the secu- rity. These include: legislative process, direct action in connection with the security of football matches, a change in the approach of the police and security services and preventive measures. Taking into account the above, it is advisable to introduce certain organisational and legal changes to improve the functionality of the current solutions. It is rec- ommended to introduce a law on the safety of football matches and to amend certain legal regulations, especially those concerning the division of competences, duties and tasks of organisers, state and private institutions, sports associations, clubs and participants of these events. The new solutions would take into account their specificity and the conditions affecting their safety. The solutions proposed in the Act will enable an efficient organisational process of activities, including the cognition and analysis of security threats, their prevention, as well as reaction to the consequences of threats, if any. The main assumption of the Act, regardless of the category of a football match, is to indicate its organiser as the main entity responsible for the safety of persons and the protection of public order, which, with the appropriate involvement and support of certain institutions, primarily the police and local authorities, can properly fulfil its tasks. However, one should be aware that even the best law is only a tool in the hands of the organisers, law enforcement

9 Struniawski J, Bezpieczeństwo zorganizowanych zbiorowości społecznych. Szczytno, 2018, p. 269.

Internal Security, July–December 45 Jarosław Struniawski agencies and the judiciary, but only its proper application — the unavoidability of punishment and its immediate execution — will contribute to improving security. An important organisational aspect of football matches is to have efficient and effective safety management. An accurate definition of how tasks in the field of planning, organisation, execution and control are to be carried out will make it possible to reduce unfavourable external conditions and to counteract unex- pected incidents during the event. When designing protective measures in this respect, one should take into account not only their effectiveness, but also respect for civil rights, which will allow for a high level of public acceptance. If the approach of law enforcement services to the protection of football matches changes from typically responsive/reactive to proactive, this should result in greater public confi- dence in state institutions, including the police. The implementation of the concept should be supported by both science and proven, global organisational solutions. Its development required a detailed analysis of organisational and legal solutions binding in Poland and selected Euro- pean Union countries and an assessment of their effectiveness10. There is no strategic approach to stereotypical thinking about security. Think- ing about security, we are interested in survival, i.e. enabling the entity to function in normal conditions, and less frequently in enduring crisis conditions. Strategic security management means constructing appropriate strategies of action, their implementation, and current implementation of the strategy adequate to the analysed internal conditions of the organisation’s environment. It is a series of operational and tactical activities, establishing appropriate organisational struc- tures, appropriate motivation for members of the organisation, and monitoring and controlling activities related to the implementation of the assumed strategy11. Strategies contain some element of a well-organised state and society, and thus contribute to the success of a well-run security system that is resistant to break- downs and, above all, to threats that undermine security12. A complete, effective, maximally efficient strategy must take into account both the influence of fore- seeable factors, and the influence of unknown factors which seem impossible to identify. The above need forces, in a way, an attempt to outline the determinants of the strategy, the features whose arrangement will make it possible to identify the necessary requirements13. Ensuring high standards of security in football matches also requires the devel- opment and implementation of a uniform strategy that comprehensively addresses security issues and identifies the best ways for institutions, public services and pri- vate operators to act in this respect. In addition, the strategy should identify practical implementation, promote good practices and increase the effectiveness of preventive solutions. A national strategy for the safety of football matches

10 Based on the research task financed by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education, ‘Managing the security of mass events in selected EU countries’, No. IBiPP-1/2015/P/JS, carried out in the years 2015–2017 (head of research task: J. Struniawski). 11 Stoner J.A.F, Freeman R.E, Management. New York, 1992, p. 437. 12 Jakubczak R, Wiśniewski B (Eds), Wyzwania, szanse, Zagrożenia i ryzyko dla bezpieczeństwa narodowego RP o charakterze wewnętrznym. Szczytno, 2016, p. 238. 13 Fehler W, Bezpieczeństwo wewnętrzne współczesnej Polski. Aspekty teoretyczne i praktyczne. Warsaw, 2012, p. 398.

46 Internal Security, July–December The Safety Concept for Football Matches should therefore be developed and implemented. This will be achieved by reduc- ing the risks associated with football matches, reducing the number of incidents and malfunctions associated with hosting the events; encouraging football match organisers to work together to improve the security of football facilities and their surroundings; creating conditions to encourage greater participation of people in football matches; improving the technical infrastructure of facilities designed to host football matches; improving security within the country in connection with the movement of football fans on public and private transport; and promoting proper behaviour among football fans. The strategy should be based on coopera- tion and collaboration between public administration authorities, football match organisers, but also on many other actors involved and collaborating in order to eliminate threats. To achieve this, emphasis should be placed on the imple- mentation of uniform laws and procedures and their application by all partners for the safety of football matches; the coordination of the tasks and competences of all participants in football matches; the comprehensive preparation of the venue or matches by the organiser; the diligent enforcement of the licensing of football matches (inter alia opinions, vetting, document assessment); constantly analysing safety risks; carrying out educational activities and creating, promoting and updat- ing preventive actions and programmes aimed at football fans, concerning the ability to identify risks and promote proper behaviour and positive attitudes during football matches; combatting violence, as well as preventing aggression at the venue of football matches and elsewhere, by taking persistent action, includ- ing the banning of those who violate the law, from being in the vicinity of these events; working with the media to publicise positive actions taken to improve safety; and controlling activities carried out by the advisory and licensing agencies. Efficient management of the safety of football matches requires the estab- lishment of mass event teams on three administrative levels: central (national), provincial and county levels14. At the national level, the Football Match Safety Team should include the Ministers for Home Affairs and Administration, Sport and others as they deem appropriate, as well as the heads of the team and non-team administration (Presidents of the PZPN and the ) of sports associations. The team should be responsible for initiating, monitoring and giving opinions in this area. In this respect, its tasks include implementing and evaluating the implementation of programmes aimed at ensuring the safety of football matches; and analysing and evaluating actions taken by the relevant authorities and institutions concerning the safety of football matches. In order to have a real and direct impact on the activities of all those responsible for safety, the authority needs to have legislative powers, structure and budget. In addition, it should have the task of establishing and maintaining a national database of persons who have breached the rules of football matches and committed football-related offences. The data should also be supplemented with their image. The database should also contain information on the existing football banning orders (e.g. court bans, stadium bans). This information would allow the organisers, but also the services, to effectively verify persons wishing to participate in the event. It is also the task of the Team to monitor these bans

14 Struniawski J, Bezpieczeństwo…, op. cit., p. 251.

Internal Security, July–December 47 Jarosław Struniawski and to notify persons of the need to refrain from participating in these undertak- ings. Such actions would make people aware that they are not anonymous. At the provincial level, the tasks of the provincial team for the security of football matches should mainly focus on providing support to the entities whose duties concern the security of mass events in the province. High safety standards for football matches should also be ensured by teams established at the district level. They should be composed of representatives of local authorities, the police, paramedics, the State Fire Service and building supervisory authorities, and depending on the nature and type of the football match being played, they should include the facility manager, representatives of road manage- ment, transport management, sanitary inspection and others. The team should be responsible, among other things, for giving permission to arrange the security of football matches, as well as for supervising and controlling all organisational and legal aspects concerning their safety. In certain cases, the organisation of a given project may require other permits, such as the permit to sell alcohol, use the road, or sell food. Team representatives should advise the organisers on the proper prep- aration of the project, but may also request action to achieve satisfactory safety standards. The team should identify the categories of events that require approval for their organisation and the specific technical, personal and tactical requirements needed to secure them. In this regard, it is necessary to cooperate with the organiser on an ongoing basis to ensure that risks are identified and reduced. The organiser’s task should be to provide complete documentation of the event together with the risks and challenges identified by the organiser, both for the participants and the impact on the surrounding area and the inhabitants of a given city. Additionally, the organiser should propose solutions to minimise them. The documentation presented by him/her should allow for an exhaustive analysis and assessment of the application, security plan, or risk assessment, and become excellent evidence for the court in case of an event resulting in the liability of a given institution. The organisers’ actions to ensure the safety of football matches should consist of determining the maximum number of participants and adopting the necessary measures to avoid the risk of overcrowding; setting the opening and closing times of the stadiums; the availability of an adequate number of trained and qualified staff from the organiser’s services; drawing up clear and legible rules and regu- lations concerning the attendance and the legal consequences for any breach of these rules; responding quickly and effectively to crisis situations and removing people disrupting the event; separating groups of participants with a negative attitude towards one another; inspecting people entering the premises to avoid unauthorised access and bringing in prohibited items; preparing the facility — cameras, separating sectors with barriers in order for people to avoid crushing each other in a panic; planning for emergencies, including establishing evacuation possibilities and developing an evacuation plan (taking into account the number and size of exits), routes for the use of medical services and fire brigades; providing adequate medical and fire support; providing a sound system to inform partici- pants; providing catering and an adequate number of toilets; preparing emergency power supply; and ensuring close cooperation between the organiser, the police, health services and private entities (it is recommended that this cooperation be based on written agreements specifying the roles and responsibilities of each

48 Internal Security, July–December The Safety Concept for Football Matches entity). Furthermore, one way to avoid risks during football matches is to provide additional entertainment for participants. In order to make breaks in competitions more attractive, artists’ performances or competitions should be organised. This may help some troublemakers to refrain from inappropriate behaviour. Another recommendation of the safety concept is related to the transport of organ- ised groups of supporters to sports competitions in other cities and during their return. Due to the difficulties in the organisation of football matches, sports clubs together with supporter associations should be involved in ensuring safety in this respect. To achieve this, clubs and associations shall appoint their own staff to secure the safety of their fans’ travelling (in cooperation with the Railway Security Service and the police). Their task is to supervise the behaviour of supporters in the premises of a given mass event — the stands of sports facilities. Therefore, they should arrive well in advance of the opening of the venue to the public in order to receive full instructions on the infrastructure of the venue, safety arrangements and their specific responsibilities. It should be the responsibility of facility and club managers to organise professional and regular training for their staff. This will help to ensure that the procedures set out in the contingency plans are run smoothly. The great responsibility resting on the managers should be supported by professional knowledge and competent experi- ence. Training should also be provided for all those involved in the safety of football matches, as joint exercises of safety procedures may help when various risks arise. Efficient management of the safety of football matches requires standardised documents to be produced by the organisers. It is therefore necessary to issue a Regulation on a safety dossier containing, e.g. specimens of the documents. In addition, publishing a guide for organisers of football matches may seem to be a good solution. This document should indicate in detail the measures and organi- sational undertakings taken to ensure the safety of participants of a mass event, how to draw up a risk analysis, deployment of the security staff and information personnel, the content and form of their training, the development of security procedures, and the terms of cooperation with the police and rescue services. In addition, national sports associations and individual sports clubs should strive to establish so-called Fan Clubs, and launch loyalty programmes. Joining them will enable the purchase of gadgets, T-shirts, scarves or meals during sports competi- tions at special prices, and for those who have collected the most points in these programmes — special price of tickets and their pre-emptive purchase. The above solutions will enable greater identification of participants in mass events. In the process of preparing all forms of mass events, the experience and ‘good practices’ acquired during the organisation of large international mass events should be used. In order to ensure an adequate level of security during these events, it is necessary to take into account integrated security elements, i.e.: 1. Security — activities guaranteeing security, understood as a set of coordinated undertakings, performed by entities and institutions in order to ensure the phys- ical safety of local communities and persons participating in a mass event. 2. Service — activities and measures necessary to ensure security understood as the setting up of conditions for the efficient running of a mass event. 3. Security — a feeling of undisturbed atmosphere of a mass event and a guarantee of peace of mind and the avoidance of events, situations, and circumstances posing a threat to the event and its participants.

Internal Security, July–December 49 Jarosław Struniawski

Police action in securing football matches entails the risk of all participants being perceived and treated in the same way. The use of force against a crowd as a whole should be avoided in a situation where a small number of people threaten public order. Failure to apply this principle may lead to conflicts and an escalation of ten- sion, and negative behaviour by peaceful participants. Individual incidents of their negative behaviour should not be grounds for interrupting or ending a given event and imposing radical restrictions on other participants. The effective identification of individuals in the group and quick separation of those who can disrupt public order from those who behave peacefully allows the police to gain respect and sup- port from other participants in football matches. The strategy of the police during football matches should be based on: profes- sional police protection, in which only previously trained police officers participate; maintaining a proper image of the police by crowd participants; proper and ongo- ing reconnaissance; dynamic risk assessment that affects police tactics; deployment of police officers in a way that does not provoke participants to disturb public order; contact between the police and participants in a friendly, calm manner, respecting the rights of both parties; the presence of ‘friendly uniformed’ officers; avoiding the use of force against the crowd as a whole in a situation where only a small number of people threaten public order; and adopting the principle of a ‘gradual/ progressive’ approach to securing the event, increasing opportunities for commu- nication, dialogue and dynamic risk assessment. The proposed strategy for the safety of football matches should be comple- mented by an integrated police philosophy to enable the safety of participants to be managed efficiently, both in terms of crowd management and control. The philosophy should be based on 3 elements15: 1) Dialogue — means action taken in situations which involve a relatively large group of participants of a certain event. In this case, the objectives to be achieved by law enforcement services include patrolling and monitoring, acquiring information and intelligence and providing various types of sup- port, as well as the legal obligation to provide assistance. 2) De-escalation — means action to be taken in situations of emerging public order disturbances. The task of officers is to assist in resolving disputes, including by responding efficiently to defuse the situation as soon as pos- sible. 3) Determination — means police action in situations of mob violence, combined with the detention of those who break the law and manifest aggression. The rule should be to apply the first two pillars, while in the event of an escala- tion of threats, determination should be used as a last resort. Police efforts should be primarily geared towards addressing the risks associ- ated with organising football matches. Therefore, the activities of Spotters should be continued. This will allow for proper contact with football supporters, in-depth identification and comprehensive risk identification. Another initiative to prevent crisis situations is the establishment of Anti-Conflict Teams in all Provincial Police

15 Based on the philosophy followed by the police and other services at the European Football Championship Portugal 2004.

50 Internal Security, July–December The Safety Concept for Football Matches

Headquarters to resolve difficult situations during mass events. An analysis of their activities clearly shows the effectiveness of their work. The dynamically changing situation during football matches means that not all threats are properly identified. Therefore, it should be the responsibility of all actors involved in securing this type of sporting event to produce an ongoing risk analysis and to respond to new threats during the event. This should be based on: identi- fication of the threats to which participants of events and staff of the organiser/ manager as well as staff of external entities are exposed; identification of persons likely to be exposed to the threat and how that threat may occur; and assessment of the risk itself. Each event should be documented in order to analyse it and imple- ment preventive measures in the future. The Polish law on mass events defines the categories of mass events that require a specific procedure of notification and written consent for their organisation. This obligation depends primarily on the number of participants in a given event, which is not entirely feasible. The precise number of participants is often not associated with potential threats that may occur during these events. Consequently, these threats are the basis for preventive and protective measures. It therefore seems reasonable that when defining the safety categories of football matches, it is impor- tant to take into account the likelihood of threats occurring during the event. The categories of mass events and the related responsibilities of organisers and indi- vidual entities should be based on 5 levels of security, i.e.: 1. Category A — no information on threats; 2. Category B — low risk; 3. Category C — medium risk; 4. Category D — high risk; 5. Category E — very high risk — organisation of a football match without the participation of the visiting team’s supporters16. The classification of a mass event into a given category should be the responsi- bility of the police. However, this should have no major impact on the way in which it is organised and the generally applicable standards for securing it. In particular, it cannot be assumed that the absence of an identified risk, or its low value, will result in exemption from certain rules and procedures and lower security requirements. Another element which may reduce the threat of offences during football matches is the application of football banning orders to their perpetrators. This allows for effective separation of persons posing a threat from those wishing to take part in sporting events in peace and safety. Prohibitions imposed by the courts as a criminal measure should be applied to all football matches. It also seems most sensible to severely and ruthlessly punish financially both the organisers, inter alia for failure to meet their obligations, and participants for any infringement of the law. The perpetrators should be tried and punished immediately after their deten- tion and evidence of their guilt collected. If a financial penalty cannot be enforced against the offender, the court should replace it with community service or arrest. Blatant hooliganism or a re-offence of a criminal act should result in an absolute lifetime ban on participation in mass events. Another sensible solution seems to be the opportunity to impose a ban on the Polish citizens convicted of identical crimes

16 Struniawski J, Bezpieczeństwo…, op. cit., p. 263.

Internal Security, July–December 51 Jarosław Struniawski committed outside of the country and linked to participation in mass events, as well as prohibitions of a preventive nature, adjudicated on the basis of a police applica- tion. Prohibitions and financial penalties should effectively discourage potential perpetrators from hooliganism. Severe financial and criminal penalties and their unavoidability result in greater care in the performance of the duties imposed on them. Participants may also incur additional penalties, i.e.: limitation of social rights, prohibition of possessing weapons subject to a permit, or prohibition against staying in a specific place. The aim should be for sports clubs to issue stadium bans more often, and these should be obligatorily forwarded to the relevant institutions.

Conclusions

The mass character of football matches and the accompanying threats make this issue one of the most difficult and complicated organisational and legal prob- lems in Poland. This is influenced by at least a number of important factors which should be taken into account when designing a security management system in this area. The essence of these undertakings is gathering a large group of people, and on the other hand it poses a great danger. Improper organisation and large numbers of people in a limited area can lead to huge tragedies. Creating a concept for the safety of football matches required a detailed analysis of the organisational and legal solutions in force in Poland and selected European countries and an assessment of their effectiveness. The proposed concept to some extent provides for the creation of organisational and functional requirements that can be implemented in all football matches. Introducing the proposed solutions into the current legal order would allow for a harmonised security system to be organised. This would improve the functionality of these systems (it would clearly indicate the responsibility for their organisation, preparation and implementation), with the benefits of efficient security management. The concept is based, among other things, on the competences and tasks of entities involved in ensuring safety during football matches. An important factor in this process is also the develop- ment of precise rules for their cooperation, which is an essential element of the efficiency and effectiveness of the security system. An effective form of ensuring cooperation is the efficient and reliable circulation of information and participa- tion in joint training in the form of practical exercises. Their implementation is to gather experience, formulate objective conclusions for the future in terms of the knowledge and skills of persons participating in such undertakings, and eliminate various types of threats. The recommended shape of the football match safety system will allow for the development of standards or sets of good practices which would constitute a valuable source of knowledge and solutions, both for organisers and representatives of public administration. This requires, among other things, the development of security management structures and the definition of their competences, tasks and responsibilities. New technologies for security should be used to ensure the efficiency of the proposed solutions, which can certainly have a positive impact on the level of secu- rity. The possibilities offered by unmanned aerial vehicles — drones, which can be used to manage crowds during the security of mass events, can be indicated

52 Internal Security, July–December The Safety Concept for Football Matches here. In addition, facial image scanning and movement monitoring systems are aimed at increasing public security and preventing and eliminating threats from terrorist attacks. It is obviously extremely difficult to identify one ideal way to manage the secu- rity of football matches. There are a large number of variables that determine the structure of organisation, preparation and implementation of a given undertak- ing. However, it is possible to create a framework of security standards that will be functional for all categories of football matches.

References

1. Fehler W, Bezpieczeństwo wewnętrzne współczesnej Polski. Aspekty teoretyc- zne i praktyczne. Warsaw, 2012. 2. Jakubczak R, Wiśniewski B (Eds), Wyzwania, szanse, Zagrożenia i ryzyko dla bezpieczeństwa narodowego RP o charakterze wewnętrznym. Szczytno, 2016. 3. Konkol C, Bezpieczeństwo imprez masowych. Komentarz. Warsaw, 2010. 4. Mojet H, The European Union and Football Hooliganism, The International Sports Law Journal (ISLJ), 2005, No. 1–2. 5. OJ of the European Union, 2016/C 444/01. 6. Sabat M, Euro 2012 w Polsce. Organizacja turnieju oraz zapobieganie zagrożeniom bezpieczeństwa publicznego. Warsaw, 2012. 7. Słapek D, Sport i widowiska w świecie antycznym. Warsaw, 2010. 8. Stoner J.A.F, Freeman R. E, Management. New York, 1992. 9. Struniawski J, Bezpieczeństwo zorganizowanych zbiorowości społecznych. Szc- zytno, 2018. 10. Struniawski J, Jurczak J, Mikołajczyk Z, Bezpieczeństwo imprez masowych na przykładzie wybranych państw Unii Europejskiej. Szczytno, 2018. 11. Struniawski J, Wymogi bezpieczeństwa meczów piłki nożnej nie będących im- prezami masowymi. Zeszyty Naukowe Wyższej Szkoły Informatyki, Zarządzania i Administracji w Warszawie. Warsaw, 2014, No. 3 (28).

About the Author

Jarosław Struniawski, Assoc. Prof., graduate of the National Defence Academy and the Police Academy in Szczytno. In 2012, at the Faculty of Management and Command of the National Defence Academy, he received a PhD degree in defence sciences. He conducts national and international scientifi c research in the area of mass event security. He actively participates in the training of public administration staff at municipal, district, provincial and national levels, including command and executive staff of the Police, State Fire Service, Border Guard, State Protection Service and others. Since 1995, he has been professionally developing his career in the police. His scientifi c interests include commanding within the police, command and control issues, and managing the safety of mass events and public gatherings. He is the author or co-author of several dozen scientifi c articles and 5 monographs in the fi eld of security sciences, primarily on the subject of the security of mass events and public gatherings as well as police operations. He participates in national and international scientifi c research and represents the Police Academy in Szczytno as a speaker at scientifi c conferences. E-mail: [email protected]

Internal Security, July–December 53 Jarosław Struniawski

Streszczenie. Organizacja meczów piłki nożnej w Polsce stanowi obecnie bardzo ważny problem w działaniach instytucji i służb odpowiedzialnych za bezpieczeństwo. Autor, na podstawie swoich doświadczeń zawodowych i naukowych, przedstawia koncepcję bezpieczeństwa dotyczącą przedmiotowej problematyki. W artykule dokonano szczegółowej analizy rozwiązań organizacyjno- prawnych obowiązujących w Polsce i wybranych krajach europejskich oraz oceniono ich efektywność. Proponowana koncepcja przewiduje stworzenie wymogów organizacyjnych i funkcjonalnych, które z pewnością podniosłyby poziom bezpieczeństwa w trakcie tego typu zawodów sportowych. Wprowadzenie proponowanych rozwiązań do obowiązującego porządku prawnego umożliwiłoby zorganizowanie skorelowanego systemu bezpieczeństwa.

Zusammenfassung. Die Organisation von Fußballspielen in Polen ist derzeit ein sehr wichtiges Problem in Aktivitäten der für die Sicherheit zuständigen Institutionen und Dienste. Der Autor stellt auf der Grundlage seiner beruflichen und wissenschaftlichen Erfahrungen ein Sicherheitskonzept zu diesem Thema vor. Im Artikel wurden die in Polen sowie in ausgewählten europäischen Ländern geltenden organisatorischen und rechtlichen Lösungen sorgfältig analysiert als auch deren Wirksamkeit bewertet. Das vorgeschlagene Konzept sieht die Schaffung von organisatorischen und funktionellen Voraussetzungen vor, die das Sicherheitsniveau bei dieser Art von Sportwettkämpfen sicherlich erhöhen würden. Die Einführung der vorgeschlagenen Lösungen in die aktuelle Rechtsordnung würde es ermöglichen, ein korreliertes Sicherheitssystem zu organisieren.

Резюме. Организация футбольных матчей в Польше в настоящее время является очень важной проблемой в деятельности учреждений и органов, которые занимаются обеспечением безопасности. Автор, исходя из своего профессионального и научного опыта, представляет концепцию безопасности по рассматриваемому вопросу. В статье дается подробный анализ организационных и правовых решений, применяемых в Польше и отдельных европейских странах, а также оценивается их эффективность. Предлагаемая концепция предусматривает создание организационных и функциональных требований, что, безусловно, повысит уровень безопасности во время проведения данного вида спортивных соревнований. Внедрение предлагаемых решений в действующий правопорядок позволит организовать соответствующую систему безопасности.

54 Internal Security, July–December Risk Management as a Tool of the Civil Emergency Lanning in the United Kingdom — Comparison With the Polish Approach

Tomasz Zwęgliński ORCID: 0000-0003-2652-8068 The Main School of Fire Service in Warsaw, Poland Chris Arculeo ORCID: 0000-0002-4214-3064 Private Independent Crisis Management Consultant, Poland

Abstract. ‘Europe which protects’ is a very important postulate which is presented by politicians, however, it is well known that the full responsibility for the safety and security of the citizens is the domain of each sovereign country. Therefore, international organisations, such as NATO and the EU, associating countries in one, more or less integrated structure, have only a supportive and facilitating role to this highly important process. This basically means that close cooperation between individual countries is a highly important matter in ensuring the vital aim of citizen protection, especially against major threats and hazards, triggered or impacting in the border context. Such cooperation is impossible as long as those nations do not know and understand each other’s systems. Furthermore, in gaining this understanding of the respective systems, the opportunity exists to learn from each other by implementing the best practices of each other’s realities. The article is an effort to contribute to this learning process by comparison of the risk management processes being a part of broader crisis and disaster management systems in the United Kingdom and Poland. The study was conducted by reviewing and analysing formal documentation and guidance as well as selected literature in this respect. Furthermore, the findings are based on many years of the authors’ experience working in these two systems, reinforced by hundreds of discussions with national experts in the field. As supportive input, selected results of a survey on civil emergency planning in Poland are also presented. The two surveyed systems revealed many similarities in the processes in place in both countries. In general, the purpose of their existence is the same, however, in some cases, there are different terms used or they vary slightly due to organisational or administrative reasons. Both adaptations and developments based on the experiences of the other system are possible, and sometimes even recommended. DOI: 10.5604/01.3001.0014.6675 http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0014.6675

Keywords: crisis, disaster, risk, management, the United Kingdom

Background

Risk management is a valuable tool which stimulates processes of the civil emergency planning, and through them, significantly influences the whole of crisis and disaster management. There is no single obligatory worldwide, or even Europe- wide, approach to crisis and disaster risk management.1 However, there are plenty of good practices which are used in different countries. Risk management meth- ods, as tools of crisis and disaster management, are always tailored to the specific organisational, geographical, demographic and many other circumstances of a

1 Galrão Ramos A, Risk Management Perspectives to approach risk. Proceedings of 2100 Projects Association Join Conferences 1, 2014, pp. 243–249.

Internal Security, July–December 55 Tomasz Zwęgliński, Chris Arculeo given country.2 This is strongly justified by the nature of the hazards and threats which constitute triggers of emergencies.3 Furthermore, in many cases, the hazards and threats are locally driven,4 the same as the resilience of the societies exposed to them.5 Europe is characterised as a variety of cultures, traditions and, to some extent, religions. On the other hand, the complex history of Europe has led to many similarities among the countries, which is proven by the fact that most of the Euro- pean countries are perceived as being part of the western civilization.6 Therefore, it is highly valuable to share the experiences of risk management among different countries in order to learn from each other.7 Such reasoning stands behind the aim of the article, which is presenting the risk management approach utilised in the crisis and disaster management system of the United Kingdom (UK). The results of the survey are later juxtaposed with the key Polish solutions in the relevant field. The UK is a union of countries which has experienced a number of emergen- cies in the past years. There have been floods (2007, 2015, 2019–2020), wildfires, droughts and heatwaves (2013, 2018), hurricanes (2007, 2017) as well as terrorist attacks (2005, 2007, 2017–2019) and many other events registered.8 Therefore, the UK system is considered to be exposed and stressed by a high variety of dif- ferent hazards and threats, at least in recent years. This leads to a conviction that the case represents a well-established, multi checked system, which is worth deeper exploration in order to figure out the strengths and weaknesses, especially in light of comparison with the Polish system. As already said, crisis and disaster management systems are always tailored to the specific conditions, valid for a surveyed country.9 Thus, the nature of the United Kingdom’s constitutional system as well as the present basic numbers on demography and geography have to be explained first. These aspects always influence the crisis and disaster management system in place. The United Kingdom

2 See: Izumi T, Shaw R, Djalante R, Ishiwatari M, Komino T, Disaster risk reduction and inno- vations. Progress in Disaster Science, 2019, Vol. 2, pp. 1–8; Zwęgliński T, Rodriquez Cordero M, Spanish Civil Protection System as a Part of European Union Emergency Response. Internal Security, 2019, Vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 165–177; van Duuren C, Zwęgliński T, Analysis of the Dutch Crisis Response System in the Context of the Common European Union Resilience. Internal Security, 2019, Vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 55–64. 3 Socha R, Współczesne postrzeganie zagrożeń, [in:] Zarządzanie kryzysowe. Teoria, praktyka, konteksty, badania. Wyższa Szkoła Policji, 2011, pp. 19–30. 4 Babiński A, Zagrożenie, [in:] Wiśniewski B, Stawnicka J, Socha R (Eds), Wyzwania, szanse zagrożenia i ryzyko dla bezpieczeństwa narodowego RP o charakterze wewnętrznym. Jakub- czak R, Wiśniewski B (Eds). Szczytno, 2016, pp. 58–64. 5 Kulmala I, Salmela H, Kalliohaka T, Zwęgliński T, Smolarkiewicz M, Taipale A, Kataja J, A tool for determining sheltering efficiency of mechanically ventilated buildings against out- door hazardous agents. Building and Environment, 2016, Vol. 106, pp. 245–253. 6 Huntington S, The Clash of Civilizations? Foreign Affairs, 1993, Vol. 72, No. 3, pp. 22–49. 7 Zwęgliński T, Morgado C, Analytical Approach to Cooperation Between Fire Brigade and the Police — Comparison Study on Base of Polish and Portuguese Experiences. Internal Security, 2018, Vol. 10, No. 1, p. 161–181. 8 O’Brien G, UK Emergency Preparedness: A Holistic Response? Disaster Prevention and Management, 2008, Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 232–243. 9 Wolanin J, Zarys teorii bezpieczeństwa obywateli. Ochrona ludności na czas pokoju. Danmar, 2005, pp. 16–22.

56 Internal Security, July–December Risk Management as a Tool of the Civil Emergency Lanning in the United Kingdom… of Great Britain and Northern Ireland represents the countries of England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. The United Kingdom has a monarch and is a parliamen- tary democracy. The Crown appoints a Prime Minister who then forms a government which acts as the sovereign supreme legislature. A parliamentary term is five years. The United Kingdom Government has devolved powers to the nations within the United Kingdom and Regional Assemblies. There are separate parliaments in England (Her Majesty’s Government) and Scotland (The Scottish Parliament) as well as separate assemblies in Wales, Northern Ireland and London. The Scottish parliament as well as the government of Wales (Welsh Assembly) and the Northern Ireland executive can make legislation regarding devolved matters which covers health and social services, education, justice, police, fire services and housing. The United Kingdom parliament sets and oversees crisis and disaster management in all four countries as a reserved matter, however individual agencies will be governed by their respective country’s legislature — for example, the Scottish Police, fire and ambulance services will be overseen by the Scottish Government. At the level of the union, the governmental department responsible for civil emergencies and contingencies is the Cabinet Office. The United Kingdom has a mixture of two- tier and single-purpose authorities. Generally, shire councils and districts, unitary authorities and major city assemblies are the ones who manage local services such as resilience forums, police and fire services. The total population of the United Kingdom is over 66 million, which is comprised of England, more than 56 million, Scotland, 5.46 million, Wales, 3.15 million, and Northern Ireland with 1.89 million. This number of inhabitants occupy a land mass of approximately 242,000 square kilometres10. Thus, how is the risk management process relating civil emergencies organised in such a complex administrative and organisational environment? Are there any similarities to the system running in Poland? These questions appear to be highly valid in order to fulfil the aim of the article.

Material and methods

The survey was based on a review of strategic and operational documents. For this reasons, legal acts, guidance and planning documentation were selected and analysed towards the given aim of the article. Additionally, a search and a review of the literature related to the surveyed topic as well as semi-formal interviews with experts from different level of administration in both countries taken into account in the article were performed. The orderly results of the analysis on the United Kingdom’s system were composed and juxtaposed with the key elements of the Polish system in order to determine the crucial similarities and differences between the two. In order to complement the overall picture of the research, a questionnaire survey as performed on the civil emergency planning aspects in Poland. The final findings serve as trigger points for further discussions on what can be bilaterally adapted to improve the performance of both of the systems.

10 Electronic source: https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/, accessed: 10.08.2020.

Internal Security, July–December 57 Tomasz Zwęgliński, Chris Arculeo Results

Risk assessment process

The United Kingdom owns relevant legislation in respect to crisis and disaster management. The key legal act is the Civil Contingencies Act launched in 2004. The law requires local administrations to establish Regional or Local Resilience Forums (RRF and LRF) whose duty is to oversee the production and management of Local Risk Registers. The Act defines what is understood in the UK as a civil emergency. As a matter of fact, there are three criteria explaining it, however, which do not have to be jointly fulfilled. Thus, a civil emergency can be an event or situation which threatens serious damage to human welfare (1) or the environment (2) in a place in the United Kingdom. The third definition states that a war, or terrorism, which threatens serious damage to the security (3) of the United Kingdom is obviously also considered an emergency. The legal act is designed to be a single framework for UK crisis and disaster management as well as for civil protection for the 21st century. The act ensures an integrated approach to crisis and disaster management which is based on six fundamental activities: • anticipation; • assessment; • prevention; • preparation; • response; • recovery. On the basis of the Civil Contingencies Act, key tools have been implemented which stimulate crisis and disaster management in the United Kingdom. One of them is the National Risk Register of Civil Emergencies (NRR). The register provides an updated government assessment of the likelihood and potential impact of a range of different civil emergency risks (including naturally and accidentally occur- ring hazards and malicious threats) that may directly affect the UK over the next 5 years. The risk register is reviewed every year and further republished every two years. It is important to mention the fact that the register has a separate module which reviews the risks and threats of a specific sensitive nature: the strictly vital security threats. In addition to providing information on how the UK government and local responders manage these emergencies, the National Risk Register also signposts advice and guidance on what members of the public can do to prepare for these events. As mentioned above, every two years, the UK government produces a classi- fied assessment of the risks of civil emergencies facing people in the UK — this is the National Risk Assessment (NRA). In both the NRA and NRR, how serious the risk of an emergency is depends both on the likelihood of it happening over the next five years and on the consequences or impacts that people will feel if it does. When identifying risks for the NRA and NRR, a ‘reasonable worst case sce- nario’ is chosen which represents a challenging manifestation of the scenario after highly implausible scenarios are excluded. The NRR details generic hazards as listed in Table 1. For example, undertaking a risk assessment of likelihood versus impact and consequences in order to determine the level of risk based on the presented

58 Internal Security, July–December Risk Management as a Tool of the Civil Emergency Lanning in the United Kingdom… definitions of an emergency. In general the identified risks are clustered in three groups. The first two are natural and non-natural hazards, while the third separate group is constituted by terrorism-related events. These groups are further down split onto more less general hazards and threats.

Tab le 1. Hazards identifi ed in the NRR

Natural hazards Non-natural hazards Terrorism

Human diseases, pandemics Major accidents Terrorist attacks on crowded places Flooding: coastal and inland Major industrial accidents Terrorist attacks on infrastructure Poor air quality events Widespread electricity Terrorist attacks failure on transport systems Volcanic hazards Major transport accidents Unconventional terrorist attacks Severe space weather Disruptive industrial action Cyber security and Terrorism Severe weather Widespread public disorder Severe wildfires Animal diseases

Source: own elaboration based on the UK National Risk Register.

Here, a risk assessment methodology is implemented to quantify the identified hazards. The initial steps of the method includes three steps: • collecting background information on the nature of the hazard including scientific knowledge as well as details of previous experiences with the par- ticular type of incident which is part of the risk identification; • assessing consequences that could result from the materialisation of a rea- sonable worst-case scenario of the particular risk; • collecting information covering the planning being done by the govern- ment, the devolved administrations as well as the emergency responders. The identification of civil emergency risks is done by consulting experts in government departments, devolved administrations and beyond, who between them can identify instances of possible major accidents, natural events (hazards) and malicious attacks (threats) that are reasonably likely to happen, and could cause significant harm and disruption in the UK in the period of the upcoming five years. In the recent NRA, this consultation produced a list of about 80 types of events that meet at least one of the three definitions of a civil emergency given in the Civil Contingencies Act. A further 40 potential events are placed on a reserve list. Although, they have been judged not to meet the definition, the team of experts considered that in specific circumstances they may do so in the future. Therefore, these potential events have to be monitored and kept under review. As already said, the identified risks are all kinds of emergencies that meet the definition given in the

Internal Security, July–December 59 Tomasz Zwęgliński, Chris Arculeo act, however, not every conceivable instance of an emergency, and not everyday occurrences. Furthermore, potential emergencies that directly and significantly damage human welfare or the environment somewhere in the UK, but not events that happen overseas (e.g. foreign countries) unless they directly affect the UK are taken into consideration. The risks from the reserved list, besides being kept under review, are also reconsidered for inclusion in the next NRR (and NRA), on the basis of the best available evidence. The NRR and NRA cover only emergency events, and do not include longer-term trends such as technological advances, climate change, or antimicrobial resistance within their risk matrices. The NRA and NRR estimate the likelihood of the identified events happening within a broad range. The likelihood scale increases exponentially by an order of magnitude per step of the scale (i.e. it is logarithmic). For some risk scenarios, data such as historical analysis and numeric modelling can be used to inform estimates of likelihood (especially for naturally and accidentally occurring haz- ards). Scientific expertise is also included to inform the development and review of risks. As possible, a combination of this analysis and expert judgements is used to estimate the approximate likelihood of an event or situation occurring. Since ter- rorist or other malicious attacks are different in nature to the other incidents, their likelihood is assessed in a more subjective manner. The willingness of individuals or groups to carry out attacks is balanced against an objective assessment of their capability — now and, as far as possible, over the next five years. Additionally, the analyses elaborate on the vulnerability of potential terrorist targets. In the impact assessment, again the NRA and NRR take account of the definition of an emergency given in the act. The criteria for these analyses are as follows: • number of fatalities that are directly attributable to the emergency; • illness or injury over the period following the onset of the emergency; • levels of social disruption to people’s daily lives, from an inability to gain access to healthcare or schools to interruptions in supplies of essential ser- vices such as food, water and fuel, and the need for evacuation of individuals from an area; • economic harm — the effect on the economy overall, rather than the cost of repairs; • the psychological impact that emergencies may have, including widespread anxiety, loss of confidence, and outrage that communities may experience. Each of the dimensions listed above is scored on a scale of zero to five. The overall impact is the mean of these five scores. The Civil Contingencies Act places a statutory duty on all agencies to prepare their own and contribute and support multi-agency plans to meet both local and national risk assessments. It requires the production of a local risk register as well as establishing a local resilience forum to develop local response plans and contribute to national planning assumptions and scenarios. In this respect, the act defines agencies and other organisations involved in the UK civil contin- gencies planning and response. These organisations are classified as category one or category two responders (institutions) which determines their statutory duties (Table 2).

60 Internal Security, July–December Risk Management as a Tool of the Civil Emergency Lanning in the United Kingdom…

Table 2. Statutory duties of the category one and category two emergency response organisations

Type of organisation Statutory duties Police Service 1. To respond. 2. To assess risk of emergencies British Transport Police occurring and compile a Community Risk Register at a local level — use this Fire & rescue Authorities to inform Emergency Planning & Business Continuity Planning priorities. 3. To make emergency plans –ensure Ambulance Service effective by exercising and training key National Health Service staff in their roles / responsibilities within Duties the plan. relating to all 4. To warn and inform the public on civil category one

Category one Maritime and Coastguard protection issues. Maintain arrangements and category Agency to provide advice, warnings and info in an two institutions: emergency by involving the media. 1. To co-operate Environment Agency 5. Maintain business continuity plans and share — ensure effectiveness by exercising information for Health Protection Agency and training key staff in their roles / the purposes responsibilities within the plan. of civil protection. Local authorities Duties relating only to Local Authorities: 2. Participate - To promote and raise awareness Utilities Companies: in Local of business continuity within • Telecommunications; Resilience the community. • Electricity; Forums — - To provide advice and assistance • Gas suppliers; principle to local businesses. • Water Suppliers mechanism for - To provide detailed advice on a co-operating Railway Operators one-to-one basis. and sharing Airport Operators information. Ports Operators Category two Strategic Health Authorities Highways Agency Health and Safety Executive Armed Forces Voluntary Sector

Source: own elaboration based on the United Kingdom National and Local Risk Register.

The Civil Contingencies Act requires that information is constantly shared between the institutions in order to enable joint planning, response and training. In this respect, category one and category two responders have a duty to share information with all other responders, no matter which group it represents. Infor- mation sharing is also encouraged as being a good practice, constituting a crucial element of crisis and disaster management and underpinning all forms of co- operation. Therefore, the institutions should share information formally and as part of a culture of co-operation.

Internal Security, July–December 61 Tomasz Zwęgliński, Chris Arculeo

Category one institutions are obliged to conduct commonly shared risks and capacity assessments towards being sure they have, individually and all together, the potential to carry out the statutory duties. Therefore, they monitor whether they: • have an accurate and shared understanding of the risks that they face, so that planning has a sound foundation and is proportionate to the risks; • provide a rational basis for the prioritisation of objectives and work pro- grammes and the allocation of resources; • are able to assess the adequacy of their plans and capabilities, highlight existing measures that are appropriate, and allow gaps to be identified; • facilitate joined-up local planning, based on consistent planning assumptions; • provide an accessible overview of the emergency planning and business continuity planning context for the public and officials; • inform and reflect regional and national risk assessments that support emer- gency planning and capability development at those levels. Furthermore, they assess the risk of an emergency within, or affecting, a geo- graphical area for which each institution is responsible. This risk assessment, for the risks identified in the NRA, must meet one of the following criteria: • the threat or hazard is of a sufficient scale and nature that it is likely to seri- ously obstruct a category one responder in the performance of its functions; • the threat or hazard triggers on the category one responder a need to exer- cise its functions and undertake a special mobilisation towards a specific risk. Thus, as part of business continuity management (BCM), mainly category one responders need to evaluate their emergency planning arrangements and abil- ity to deliver critical functions during those emergencies for which the risks are assessed to be significant (Figure 1).

F igure 1. Business continuity management

Understanding your business: BCM strategies: business Impact and risk assessment tools determining the selection of are used to Identify the critical de live alternative strategies available to rabies and enablers In your mitigate loss, assessing the relative business, evaluating recovery 1 merits of these against the business priorities and assessing the risks 2 environment and their likely which could lead to business effectiveness In maintaining the Interruption and/or damage to organisation's critical functions your organisation's reputation BCM programme Exercising and plan management maintenance: 5 ongoing plan testing, audit Developing the response: and change management of 3 Improving the risk profile the BCP and Its processes through Improvements to operational procedures and practices. 4 Implementing alternative business Establishing the strategies, using risk financing continuity culture: measures (Including Insurance) and Introduction of the BCM process building BCPs by education and awareness of all stakeholders. Including employees, customers, suppliers and shareholders

Source: Civil Contingencies Act 2004.

62 Internal Security, July–December Risk Management as a Tool of the Civil Emergency Lanning in the United Kingdom…

These measures, if a lack of capacity identified, can lead to modification of the responders’ emergency plans. Potential changes in emergency plans are pre- ceded by a six-step process of risk assessment, as presented in Figure 2.

Fig ure 2. Risk assessment process

Source: UK Civil Contingencies Act 2004.

Step 1: Contextualisation

In an initial discussion at the risk assessment working group, category one responders begin by defining the scope of the risk management activity in the context of the Civil Contingencies Act and supporting guidance. They review the process that they are expected to adopt and identify the stakeholders play- ing a role in potential response measures. Key stakeholder groups, so called Risk Assessment Working Groups (RAWG), working on the risk contextualisation, must include the category one responders who share the risk assessment duty, and may include category two institutions with a contribution to the risk assessment process. Moreover, the groups may include the community members with a particular inter- est in the results of the work. It is highly important that category one responders understand, at the outset, the principles and criteria with which risks will be evalu- ated and prioritised. This should prepare them for later stages of the process in which they will need to decide which risks are acceptable and those which must be tolerated, including those which require planning or introducing any changes in the existing plans. For category one responders, an important part of the phase

Internal Security, July–December 63 Tomasz Zwęgliński, Chris Arculeo is to give a local context to the risks by describing the characteristics of the local area that influence the likelihood and impact of an emergency in the community. This is to understand the context better, as well as to establish the vulnerability and resilience of the area to emergencies. To do this, category one responders reflect on the following aspects of their area, considering emerging trends and pos- sible future events, in addition to the current situation. This is done, for example, by addressing such type of questions in following dimensions: • Social: What is the demographic, ethnic and socio-economic composition of the community? Are there any particularly vulnerable groups in the com- munity? How are the various communities geographically distributed within the local area? How experienced is the community at coping with different types of emergencies? • Environment: Are there any particular local vulnerabilities (e.g. poor coastal defences against flooding)? Is the area urbanised, rural or mixed? Are there any sites of special scientific or environmental protection interest? • Infrastructure: How is the infrastructure configured in the area (transport, utilities, business, etc.)? What are the critical supply networks in the area? Are there any sites in the area that are particularly critical for local, regional and national essential services (e.g. telecommunications hubs, health, finance, legal, etc.)? What type of economy does it have? • Hazardous sites: What potentially hazardous sites exist in the area? Where are they in relation to communities or sensitive environmental sites?

Step 2: Risk review and allocation for assessment Taking into account centrally provided guidance in the form of the Local Risk Assessment Guidance (LRAG), each category one responder considers the local context as described during step 1 and identifies those non-malicious hazards that, in their view, present significant risks (i.e. could give rise to an emergency) in their areas over the next five years. These hazards are identified on the basis of experi- ence, research or other information and they are likely to present consequences for which a special mobilisation by the category one responders is required. The Risk Assessment Working Group (RAWG) shares and discusses these hazards at a meet- ing of the Local Resilience Forum (LRF) with a view to agreeing a list of hazards to be assessed. The LRF should endorse the list of hazards, and determine which category one responder will lead the assessment of each hazard on behalf of the group. The responsibilities of the lead assessors include: • assessing the likelihood and impact of each hazard, based on the knowledge of RAWG members, the generic likelihood assessment (where available) and any other relevant information; • liaising with the relevant government departments or agencies; • documenting assessments using the individual risk assessment examples, which will support the Community Risk Register (CRR), containing more detailed information on the assessment; • presenting the likelihood assessment to the LRF and making changes as necessary; • capturing the results of the LRF risk assessment in the CRR; • ensuring that the assessment is adequately described in the CRR.

64 Internal Security, July–December Risk Management as a Tool of the Civil Emergency Lanning in the United Kingdom…

The LRF also needs to decide how any additional hazards proposed by the RAWG should be assessed, whether by the appointment of a lead, delegation or otherwise. When overall risk scores are calculated at a later stage, events that are low in likelihood but high in impact are at the top interest, implying a need for planning since they are not routine incidents. On the other hand, it is still important to keep the planning reason- able. Therefore, at this stage, events that are so low in likelihood that planning cannot be justified are excluded (e.g. asteroids hitting the earth). This is not to say that all low- likelihood, high impact events should be excluded, but a careful judgement is needed about the likelihood below which events will be excluded from the assessment. In contrast to the non-malicious events (e.g. natural disasters), called hazards, which are identified and contextualised at the local level, potential threats (malicious events e.g. potential terrorist attacks) are provided by the central government with a local threat statement containing assumptions about the types and outcomes of the threats for which it is appropriate to plan. These type of information are contained in the LRAG. Neither an assessment of likelihood, nor impact is made by category one responders for the threats suggested by the government since the risk of these events are to be assessed in not the same way as for hazards. The capability and response implications of the threat assumptions are considered alongside the other risks during the risk evaluation phase of the process, and this method is classified.

Step 3: Risk analysis The RAWG lead assessors should consider the likelihood of the non-malicious events (hazards) occurring within the next five years (the same timescale adopted by the UK and regional assessments). The LRAG provided from the central govern- ment establish a basis for this work, however, the local knowledge available in the RAWG and other local organisations, including category two responders, should allow the RAWG to elaborate the assessment, and even to change it, if necessary due to the local context. When assessing the likelihood of a hazard, it is necessary to refer to the description of an outcome of an incident. Without defining the out- come, it is more difficult to assess its likelihood. For example, it is difficult to assess the likelihood of flooding in the next five years without defining the size of the flood incident to be assessed (small-scale floods are more likely than larger-scale floods). The outcome can be defined in various ways. For example, for flooding, it may be appropriate to talk in terms of the area flooded. For many incidents, it may be necessary to use numbers of fatalities. Although both measures — area flooded and fatalities — as well as other identified consequences, are immediate or primary consequences that can be used as proxy measures to describe the out- come of the hazard. Thus, the outcome of a hazard is not the same as its (wider) impact, which is considered later in the process, although there usually is a close relationship between the two. For example, in the case of flooding, two flood events could have the same outcome (e.g. 100 square kilometres flooded) but very different impacts, depending on the precise location of the flooding. Where there is a considerable range in the foreseeable outcomes of a potential hazard, it may be necessary to assess the likelihood (and subsequently impact) of the hazard at multiple outcomes. Consequently, the individual risk assessment allows the lead assessors to record multiple outcomes for each hazard. Although a variety

Internal Security, July–December 65 Tomasz Zwęgliński, Chris Arculeo of outcomes may be considered for a particular type of risk, the LRF may decide at the end that only a small number of them need to be captured in the CRR. Each assessment should be carried out by a group of professionals with a pragmatic mix of evidence and judgement, which should be documented as far as possible. Where appropriate, the assessments of likelihood will be informed by studies on the vulnerability (i.e. susceptibility to damage or harm) and society resilience of the relevant communities (ability to withstand damage or harm in existing circumstances e.g. geographical, cultural, and so on), including the cop- ing capacity of functioning infrastructural, emergency response and other systems. Therefore, it is possible that the generic local assessments of likelihood provided by the central government in the LRAG referring to outcomes of hazard need to be adapted to the findings revealed by the category one responders at the local level. Simply put, category one responders can adopt different outcomes if they feel that this is necessary, but should document their reasons for doing so. It will not be possible for the central government to re-issue the generic assessments with the revised outcomes, but it should be possible to take account of the new out- comes when agreeing the national risk assessment framework in subsequent years. The next stage is to assess the impacts of the hazards. A generic framework is provided for assessing the local impacts of events in a consistent way. Using the impact scales provided, the lead assessors should assess the impact of hazards in their communities. An important aspect is that category one and category two responders as well as other organisations engaged in response should not share risk assessments (either through the LRF or otherwise) if the information in the assess- ment is sensitive (e.g. commercially sensitive or relating to national security) and the responder has reason to believe that to do so would compromise the information. The lead assessors capture the agreed likelihood and impact assessments in the Individual Risk Assessment Forms for consideration by the RAWG.

Step 4: Risk evaluation Once the RAWG has agreed the individual risk assessment forms, the results should be collated and incorporated in the CRR, unless sensitive. The level of risk can then be determined by plotting likelihood and impact scores for each hazard on a risk matrix. The production of a risk matrix is an essential part of the overall pro- cess. Not only does it enable the risk analysis to be interpreted against pre-defined criteria, but it greatly facilitates the communication of the risk assessment. Later on, the risks are given one of four risk ratings (‘Very high’, ‘High’, ‘Medium’ and ‘Low’), which addresses their relative significance for directing emergency planning.

Step 5: Risk treatment CRRs are not an end in themselves, but serve as a means for ensuring a common starting point for responders in their approach to integrated emergency manage- ment — the adoption of coherent strategies and systems for the harmonisation of contingency plans and procedures. At this stage of the risk assessment process, the LRF prioritise risk reduction measures in accordance with the size of the risks and the gaps in the capabilities

66 Internal Security, July–December Risk Management as a Tool of the Civil Emergency Lanning in the United Kingdom… required to respond to those risks (e.g. lacking response capacity). They set the risk priorities and, having evaluated the treatment options, agree a risk treatment plan. All such judgements are recorded in the CRR. The process has a number of stages, which are described below: • assessment of the type and extent of the capabilities required to manage and respond to the hazards; • identification of the current capabilities; • consideration of the gaps and the potential extent of the risk, rating the risk priority; • identification of any additional treatments required to close the capability gap and manage the risk more effectively; • identification of whose responsibility it is to provide the treatment. Note that this may involve a transfer of the risk to an organisation outside the local area; • prioritisation of risk reduction measures for threats follows the same process as for hazards, except that likelihood and impact will not be in the CRR. Nevertheless, a risk priority should be attributed to the treatment required to deal with these threats on the basis of existing capability gaps. The results of each stage should be recorded in the CRR.

Step 6: Monitoring and reviewing Risks are reviewed regularly, although there is no statutory requirement. A full and formal review of all risks on a four-yearly cycle is recommended. However, the risks should be monitored continuously and, where information suggests a potential change in the risks, a risk assessment should be performed and the CRR updated accordingly. This may require special meetings of the LRF, although risk assessment is a standing item on the agendas of the LRFs. The CRR also needs to be updated periodically to reflect changes in the response capability. Consequently, the CRR should be seen as a living document and the work of the LRF as a rolling project. An example of a CRR is presented in the Table 3. Regulations require CRRs to be shared with LRFs in neighbouring administra- tional communities with whom a boundary is shared. In addition, category one responders consider whether there are any specific risks which are to be communi- cated to any LRFs in any other local areas. The Regional Resilience Forums (RRF) are a particularly useful venue for the sharing of risk assessments between local areas. Category one responders are to be able to fulfil their statutory duty commu- nicating all or part of their risk assessments by publishing all or part of the CRR as well as the full or part of a plan. If it is decided that only a part is to be revealed publicly, it includes at least a summary of the risk assessment on which the plan was based (Figure 3). Communicating the risks allow members of the public to mitigate the consequences of particular risks. They should also take into account the princi- ples of effective risk communication as documented on the UK resilience website and consider the security classification of the information and the restrictions on the disclosure of sensitive information (information disclosure of which would be damaging to national security or public safety as well as information which would be harmful to individuals or the commercial interests of any business entity).

Internal Security, July–December 67 Tomasz Zwęgliński, Chris Arculeo

Table 3. Community risk register

Source: London Strategic Emergency Plan, version 3, May 2007.

68 Internal Security, July–December Risk Management as a Tool of the Civil Emergency Lanning in the United Kingdom…

Fi gure 3. London strategic emergency plan

Electronic source: https://www.london.gov.uk/what-we-do/fire-and-resilience/london- resilience-partnership, accessed: 12.07.2020. The Civil Contingencies Act requires category one responders to put in place arrangements to ensure that they continue to exercise their functions in the event of an emergency so far as is reasonably practicable. This exercising should take into account the identified risks and scenarios since naturally the hazards and the threats are events which may result in an emergency. Category one responders should not lose sight of the common supporting infrastructure underpinning these functions. The following guiding principles are used when deciding whether or not a service, activity or function is critical. It is not intended to be a definitive list, but rather a series of useful indicators: • Emergency management/civil protection: functions that underpin the cate- gory one responder’s capability to respond to the emergency itself, and take effective action to reduce, control or mitigate the effects of the emergency. • Impact on human welfare, the environment and security: the significance of ser- vices to the ef fective functioning of the community in the event of an emergency. • Legal implications: statutory requirements on category one responders and the threat of litigation if a service is not delivered, or is delivered inadequately. • Financial implications: loss of revenue and payment of compensation. • Reputation: functions that impact on the credibility and public perception of a category one responder. • Service levels: the act does not require category one responders to continue to deliver their functions at ordinary levels in the event of an emergency. Some critical functions may need to be scaled up, while others (which are non-critical) may need to be scaled down or suspended. Acceptable levels of service in the event of an emergency are a matter for the category one responder itself to determine in the light of its capabilities, constraints and the needs of the community. • Balance of investments: no organisation will be in a position to commit unlimited resources to BCM. It is the role of the category one responder itself

Internal Security, July–December 69 Tomasz Zwęgliński, Chris Arculeo

to decide the level of protection sought in the light of resource availability and appetite for risk. Good business continuity is built on the seven pillars of: 1) Programme — proactively managing the process. 2) People — roles and responsibilities, awareness and education. 3) Processes — all organisational processes, including ICT. 4) Premises — buildings and facilities. 5) Providers — supply chain, including outsourcing. 6) Profile — brand, image and reputation. 7) Performance — benchmarking, evaluation.

Crisis and disaster management structure

The crisis and disaster management structure in the United Kingdom has been adapted to meet the needs and legislative duties of the separate governments result- ing from the devolved administrations. They all follow a similar model. At the local level (determined by local government boundaries, typically a so-called shire county or major city) emergency response planning and training is overseen by the Local Resilience Forum (LRF) usually chaired by the local Police or local authority. The repre- sentatives of all category one and category two organisations are required to attend, support and finance the work and outcomes of the LRF. It is not a hierarchical structure, however, each agency has statutory duties as contained within the UK legislation; for example the Fire and Rescue Service is required by law to respond to fires, rescues and similar humanitarian need.11 The nature of the UK crisis and disaster management is that each LRF should identify, agree and develop integrated response and planning which all agencies are required to support. It is also required that the community to which the LRF is responsible is consulted with regarding these plans. The Local Resilience Forum (LRF) works in tandem with, but not subservient to, a Regional Resilience Forum (RRF) which is responsible for the regional resilience, response, business continuity and planning of its designated region. The RRF is chaired by a government appointed Regional Director. The RRF will have representatives from the category one and category two representatives from within the region who are managing such functions as shown in Figure 4. An example of a crisis and disaster management executive cell in London, the so-called crisis cell, is presented in Figure 5. The final strategic layer is the Crisis Management Committee of the Central Gov- ernment (COBR, the abbreviation stands for Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms). This one is chaired by either the Prime Minister or a minister responsible for the particu- lar crisis. COBR includes representatives of all government ministries and agencies in order to oversee the response and planning of any crises from a strategic per- spective.12 A system of strategic, tactical and operational response structures has been developed as part of an integrated response and management strategy. Known as Gold, Silver and Bronze incident management and embedded into the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme (JESIP) — see Figure 6.

11 Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004, UK Public General Acts, 2004, p. 21. 12 Joint Doctrine: the Interoperability Framework, JESIP Working Together — Saving Lives, edition 2, July 2016.

70 Internal Security, July–December Risk Management as a Tool of the Civil Emergency Lanning in the United Kingdom…

Fi gure 4. Regional Resilience Forum in the structure of crisis and disaster management

Electronic source: https://www.london.gov.uk/what-we-do/fire-and-resilience/london- resilience-partnership, accessed: 15.07.2020.

Fig ure 5. London crisis cell

Electronic source: https://www.london.gov.uk/what-we-do/fire-and-resilience/london- resilience-partnership, accessed: 15.07.2020.

Figur e 6. General scheme for response levels

Source: NHS South Yorkshire & Bassetlaw Strategic Framework Emergency Preparedness, Resilience & Response, December 2011, p. 8.

Internal Security, July–December 71 Tomasz Zwęgliński, Chris Arculeo

JESIP is the government joint doctrine, policy and training programme to increase effective joint response and working to all incidents and disasters within the United Kingdom.13 It is predicated on the five principles, as contained in Figure 7. As part of this system, any agency can alert others and any agency can declare a major incident as part of the pre-planned and agreed policies and guid- ance regarding civil protection response and planning.

Figure 7. JESIP principles

THE FIVE PRINCIPLES

Co-locate Co-locate with commanders as soon as practicably possible at a single, safe and easily identified location near to the scene. learn more

Communicate Communicate dearly using plain English learn more

Co-ordinate Co-ordinate by agreeing the lead service. Identify priorities, resources and capabilities for an effective response, inducing the timing of further meetings. learn more

Jointly understand risk Jointly understand risk by sharing information about the likelihood and potential impact of threats and hazards to agree potential control measures. learn more

Shared Situational Awareness Shared Situational Awareness established by using METHANE and the Joint Decision Model learn more

Source: Flanagan J, Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme: working together saving lives, Journal of Paramedic Practice, 2014, Vol. 6, No. 6.

The overall picture of the emergency response levels is presented in Figure 8.

13 Flanagan J, Joint Emergency Services..., op. cit., pp. 284–287.

72 Internal Security, July–December Risk Management as a Tool of the Civil Emergency Lanning in the United Kingdom…

Figure 8. Emergency response levels

National Catastrophic Coverage – Level 3 Central Serious – Level 1 Cross-Region direction LGD led central response. from COBR COBR not involved Significant – Level 2 Regional Co-ordinated Coverage Local response with GO central response providing two-way led by LGD from channel to central COBR Govt/LGD Cross-Force

Local response only Single Scene

Impact Minimal Parliamentary interest significant parliamentary interest dominating party/national debate

Minimal LGD operational interest through RRT/RO LGD crisis centre collective response Central direction

Minimal LGD policy interest monitoring through RRT LGD actively involved strategic challenge Overwhelming

Source: Responding to Emergencies the UK Central Government Response Concept of Operations, Chapter 6, Responding to an emergency: arrangements in England, Cabinet Office, 2013, Annex B. Legend: Govt — the government LGD — leading government department COBR — the Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms RRT — Rapid Response Team RO — Renewables Obligation

It shows that starting from the regional level, there is already an involvement of the central level, the government or at least with the leading government depart- ment (LGD) which the emergency type belongs to, by two-way communication with the region (a kind of monitoring mode). The higher response levels assume full involvement of governmental entities, however, with proportional engagement and not always with COBR utilisation. The COBR’s involvement is valid only for the most serious emergencies classified as level 2 and level 3, being recognised as national emergencies.

Internal Security, July–December 73 Tomasz Zwęgliński, Chris Arculeo Selected results of a survey on perception of the Polish civil emergency planning system

Research carried by T. Zwęgliński in 2018 on the perception of the civil emergency planning in Poland revealed that, in general, crisis and disaster managers in Poland (n=160) know what type of plans are required by Polish law to be prepared (68.1% confirmed that fact) — Figure 9. However, more than half (55%) supported introduc- ing only one crisis and disaster management plan which will combine and cover all aspects of the process (Figure 10) instead of having many of them somehow more or less related.14 Thus, the majority of managers, however not definitively (55%), are willing to have a more consistent and coherent system of emergency planning in Poland, for example resulting in one document.

Figure 9. Respo nses (n=160) to the question: Do the Polish regulations clearly defi ne the type of plans required to be prepared within the framework of the civil emergency planning?

Figure 10. Responses (n=160) to the question: Do you think there should be only one crisis and disaster management plan at your administrative level of responsibility?

14 Preprint: Results of a survey performed by T. Zwęgliński in 2008 conducted in a research project titled ‘Systemic analyses of planning processes within the framework of security management on different administrative levels’, financed by the Main School of Fire Service, Warsaw, Poland.

74 Internal Security, July–December Risk Management as a Tool of the Civil Emergency Lanning in the United Kingdom…

Further results show that the respondants to the study stated that, in Poland, there are (or ‘rather are’) duplications (84.4%) in different emergency plans, and that the plans are not coherent with one to another in their content (58.7%).

Discussion

Reflections on the comparison of the UK and Polish systems

Similarly to the Polish system, the United Kingdom crisis and disaster man- agement system is based in general on the element of subsidiarity, meaning a bottom-up approach to preparedness and response, based on agreed roles and responsibilities which are contained within the civil contingencies act and asso- ciated legislation and regulations. An important role in both systems is performed by local agencies and experts gathered in the Local Resilience Forum for the UK, and the District Crisis Management Team for Poland. Both of these bodies have rather coordination and advisory functions to the political leaders (e.g. mayors) who are decisive and have a legal competence to manage a crisis or disaster with support of the existing agencies, services, and so on in the area. As it comes to the legal definition of the key term such as ‘emergency’ (in the case of Poland, ‘crisis situation’ — the term which is in the given legal context analogical to ‘emergency’ in the UK), in both countries they are different, however, what could be considered as a common element for them is the level of generalisa- tion. In the UK, as in Poland, the definition is not precise, which naturally creates interpretational dilemma, but on the other hand, also has some advantages. Look- ing from the other side, the level of generalisation could be perceived also as being positive. It reflects better the nature of today’s emergencies, often difficult to be precisely defined and framed. In this respect, a general approach is a strength of the system, making the term capacious and flexible. It might be an organisational strength, at least as long as the authorities, including the government, conduct their responsibilities in line with the constitutional obligations based on the ‘rule of law’. Which is, by the way, something very different than the ‘law to rule’.15 Further, in the UK, non-malicious risks (e.g. natural disasters) called hazards are assessed in line with this bottom-up approach providing local context. How- ever, there is an exception to this rule regarding threats, since malicious events, e.g. terrorist incidents, are somehow assessed by a top-down approach since the central government provides the list of threats to be considered. This devia- tion is fully reasonable due to the fact that the local authorities do not have access to sensitive information possessed by national intelligence agencies, which are crucial in managing such types of threats. Therefore, the national level in these particular cases is better able to feed the regional or local level with appropriate suggestions in order to manage them (assess the risk connected to these events)

15 Fukuyama F, Democracy’s Past and Future: Transitions to the Rule of Law. Journal of De- mocracy, 2010, Vol. 21, No. 1, 2010, pp. 33–44.

Internal Security, July–December 75 Tomasz Zwęgliński, Chris Arculeo in the most optimal manner. In Poland, there is a difference in this aspect.16 Firstly, due to linguistic reasons. In Polish, there is only one term (PL: zagrożenie) for threat and hazard, so the distinction between those two always requires deeper explanation. Secondly, there is not so clear a difference between assessing the risk of malicious and non-malicious events. Malicious threats, e.g. terrorist threats, in Poland obviously are monitored by the intelligence agencies at the national level, which can contribute to the risk assessment in this regard, however, in general, all emergencies are assessed using the bottom-up approach. Here, it is also worth underlining that the threats/hazards taxonomies distinguish a separate group of threats related to terrorism, as well as natural and non-natural hazards. It high- lights how seriously these type of threats are taken as a consequence of the fact that the terrorist risk is perceived to be higher in the UK, than in Poland (which is also proven by the higher number of attacks until now). Currently, in Poland, terrorism incidents are not in any way grouped separately from the other threats/ hazards, however, as the risk increases, perhaps such an approach would get closer attention of experts and practitioners. The overall system of crisis and disaster management in the UK is consistent and coherent, based on the key aspect which is the relevant and consequent risk management process resulting in one emergency plan. Even though the system has a subsidiarity character, which makes it a bit more complicated than a typical hierarchical system, it is regulated by only a few, necessary Acts, where the key one is the Civil Contingencies Act. This is somehow similar to the Polish crisis and dis- aster management system, however, the number of legal acts related to the key normative, which is the Crisis Management Act17, is far more multiplied. As the sur- vey revealed, crisis and disaster managers in Poland prefer, but not in a definite majority, an approach resulting in one emergency plan for one administrative unit. This way of doing things is somehow closer to the present British system. The ‘one plan’ approach used in the UK seems to be an even more relevant solution due to, as the responders of the survey stated, there being duplications in different emergency plans, as well as, the plans not being coherent with to another in the content nowadays. However, in both systems, in the preparatory phase, there is a strong emphasis on consultations and commitments between all involved stakeholders (e.g. response agencies). Obviously, this measure is necessary in order to avoid misunderstandings, gaps and duplications at the response stage, when there is a tremendous shortage of the most needed capacity — time. In the UK, there is involvement of the general public in the risk assessment, and broader management, processes which seem a weaker point in the Polish case. In practice, the general public quite seldom contributes to the risk assessment processes in Poland. Still, it is highly recommended in both systems to work on the broadest possible involvement of the general public into risk management process in order to facilitate the processes of risk communication.18 Such an approach brings

16 Kogut B, Ziobro J, Chosen Problems of Cooperation of Elements of the General Safety System of the Republic of Poland. Bulletin of Lviv State University of Life Safety, 2019, Vol. 20, pp. 53–63. 17 Ustawa z dnia 26 kwietnia 2007 r. o zarządzaniu kryzysowym, Dz.U. 2007, No. 89, item 590. 18 Communicating Risk Guidance, Cabinet Office, London, 2011, pp. 24–62.

76 Internal Security, July–December Risk Management as a Tool of the Civil Emergency Lanning in the United Kingdom… a lot of benefits, especially in the response phase. Secondly, in the UK, the risk assessment methodology to be used at the regional and local levels is presented in the Local Risk Assessment Guidance (LRAG), however, they are based on general recommendations from the central level. In Poland, it looks quite similar, since there is also a general risk assessment method recommended by the Government Centre for Security, however, the way the regional and local authorities run the assessment is up to them. Furthermore, there could also be in this respect in some suggestions issued by higher administrative level to the lower one (e.g. by a province to a district) but these are, like in the British case, guidance, so not legally binding documents. Thirdly, business continuity in the British risk management system is one of the top priorities. It means the public services, including the involvement of private companies, are to be protected as one of the first elements. This approach is also being strongly improved in Poland, which is a very good step forward to avoid the escalation of crises and disasters in the logic of cascading effect phenomena.19 The differences revealed between the systems also relate to the number of crisis and disaster management phases which are considered in the planning processes. While in Poland, there are four of them: prevention, preparedness, response, recovery; in the UK, there are six: anticipation, assessment, prevention, preparation, response, recovery. Even though there are more phases in the UK, as a matter of fact, most of the measures foreseen for each of the phases are also included in the Polish system. Simply put, in Poland, anticipation and assessment are considered to be cross-phase measures which actually contribute to all of the other phases, e.g. to prevention and preparedness. Thus, the naming used does not always influence the content being taken into account. This again reveals the need for common European terminology in the field of crisis and disaster man- agement, which facilitates building common understanding, which is so important for cooperation. Going further, the UK system actually has five levels of crisis and disaster response, while three of them predict management involvement of the govern- ment (or at least some departments). These are emergencies which are considered to bring serious, significant or catastrophic impact on the country. In Poland, according to the National Crisis Management Plan20 and lower level plans, it is reasonable to consider that there are six levels: two self-governmental levels — 1/ municipality and 2/ district, and an additional four governmental levels: starting from 3/ province, and also three types at the national level regarding events with 4/ one leading ministry involvement, 5/ broader government involvement (some ministries involved), and 6/ extraordinary emergency states. In comparison to the UK, there are some similarities e.g. response based on serious, significant and catastrophic events mirrors the national level response in Poland. At the central level, some similarities between the systems can also be iden- tified. One of them is the involvement of the central authorities into crisis and disaster management. For smaller events, they have rather a monitoring

19 Zwęgliński T, Smolarkiewicz M, Gromek P, Efekt kaskadowy współczesnym wyzwaniem zarządzania kryzysowego, Warsaw, 2020. 20 Krajowy Plan Zarządzania Kryzysowego, Rządowe Centrum Bezpieczeństwa, 2018, part B, p. 72.

Internal Security, July–December 77 Tomasz Zwęgliński, Chris Arculeo function. As the emergency increases, the function is expanded to a supporting or even coordination role. When an event generates nationwide consequences, the central level could also perform a management function. In the UK, this is done from a specialised office called COBR, while in Poland, in most cases, it will be done for the National Centre of Rescue and Civil Protection Coordination. Surely, both of these units possess the required means of communication, including classified information flow, and other needed tools to run the process in as optimal as pos- sible a way.

A way forward perspective for the UK system Civil protection in the United Kingdom has no single agency or Government Ministry responsible; it is based on joint risk assessment, planning, training and response underpinned by the National Risk Register and Local register of Civil protection risks required by statute through the requirements of the Civil Con- tingencies Act. This has considerable strengths and relies on all agencies to be responsible and contribute to risk management and development of business continuity planning. The development of the Joint Emergency Services interoperability programme has seen great improvements in interagency response, planning and working, and hopefully this initiative will continue to grow and prosper. However, it would be good practice to maintain a register of excluded risks as an appendix to the CRR. This would allow category one responders to demonstrate that certain risks were considered at the outset but were then discounted for specified reasons (e.g. an assumption that the likelihood was so small that the hazard did not warrant further attention). The nature of crisis is becoming more complex, and many single emergencies can create a domino effect which multiplies the event into a significant crisis. This crisis may become a humanitarian crisis, a security, financial and ultimately a National or International crisis requiring all agencies to work together to over- come and ensure a resilient response. The understanding and utilisation of social media as a communication tool during cries is in its infancy but could, along with other new technologies, be an excellent tool for warning and informing the communities/population regarding Civil protec- tion both in response and planning. Joint risk assessments based on actual and predicted risks and threats is fundamental to effective response, and information and intelligence sharing is an area which has seen great improvements in the United Kingdom over the last 10 years. Lessons learned must be captured as part of the overall risk assessment and response planning arrangements to ensure more effective and appropriate responses are implemented for future crisis response. Unfortunately, significant economic pressure is reducing spending and resource allocation to all Civil protection agencies in the United Kingdom, which will have an impact on planning, training and response. Furthermore, the United Kingdom’s decision to leave the European Union has to have an effect on crisis and disaster management with respect to cross border events, but this impact is as yet unquan- tified.

78 Internal Security, July–December Risk Management as a Tool of the Civil Emergency Lanning in the United Kingdom… Conclusions

Thus, in conclusion, the risk assessment phases in the British crisis and disaster management system can be described as follows: • contextualisation involves defining the nature and scope of the risk and agreeing how the risk management process will be undertaken; • risk evaluation covers the identification of those threats and hazards that present significant risks, analysis of their likelihood and impacts, and the combination of these values to produce overall risk scores; • risk treatment involves deciding which risks are unacceptably high, devel- oping plans and strategies to mitigate these risks, and then testing the plans and any associated capabilities; • criticality: responders should focus on ensuring that they can deliver critical functions. Which of its functions are critical is a matter that can be deter- mined only by the organisation itself, and may depend on the nature of the emergency. However, in relation to the latter, it is important that responders take action to reduce the likelihood of threats and hazards. Responders from category one may decide to do this as part of their treatment of assessed risks, but the Civil Contingencies Act only requires that emergency plans be developed. Prevention and pre-emption lie outside its scope. The act does not require category one responders to take action to reduce the likelihood of threats and hazards. Thus, in both compared systems, the processes of risk management constitute the key component of the overall crisis and disaster management. However, sometimes they are differently named, classified or even realised. All of this strictly depends on the organisational structures, legal regulations and guidance being in place, which by definition are different, e.g. because of historical reasons. Still, the philosophy and the key function of the risk management remains the same in both surveyed cases, even though in some revealed cases, they are achieved by various tools and in different ways, appropriate to each of the countries.

References

1. Babiński A, Zagrożenie, [in:] Wyzwania, szanse zagrożenia i ryzyko dla bezpieczeństwa narodowego RP o charakterze wewnętrznym. Jakubczak R, Wiśniewski B (Eds). Szczytno, 2016. 2. Communicating Risk Guidance, Cabinet Offi ce, London, 2011. 3. Electronic source: https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/. 4. Electronic source: https://www.london.gov.uk/what-we-do/fi re-and-resilience/ london-resilience-partnership. 5. Flanagan J, Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme: working to- gether saving lives, Journal of Paramedic Practice, 2014, Vol. 6, No. 6. 6. Fukuyama F, Democracy’s Past and Future: Transitions to the Rule of Law. Jour- nal of Democracy, 2010, Vol. 21, No. 1, 2010. 7. Galrão Ramos A, Risk Management Perspectives to approach risk. Proceedings of 2100 Projects Association Join Conferences 1, 2014.

Internal Security, July–December 79 Tomasz Zwęgliński, Chris Arculeo

8. Huntington S, The Clash of Civilizations? Foreign Aff airs, 1993, Vol. 72, No. 3. 9. Izumi T, Shaw R, Djalante R, Ishiwatari M, Komino T, Disaster risk reduction and innovations. Progress in Disaster Science, 2019, Vol. 2. 10. Joint Doctrine: the Interoperability Framework, JESIP Working Together — Sav- ing Lives, Edition 2, July 2016. 11. Kogut B, Ziobro J, Chosen Problems of Cooperation of Elements of the General Safety System of the Republic of Poland. Bulletin of Lviv State University of Life Safety, 2019, Vol. 20. 12. Krajowy Plan Zarządzania Kryzysowego, Rządowe Centrum Bezpieczeństwa, 2018. 13. Kulmala I, Salmela H, Kalliohaka T, Zwęgliński T, Smolarkiewicz M, Taipale A, Kataja J, A tool for determining sheltering effi ciency of mechanically ventilated buildings against outdoor hazardous agents. Building and Environment, 2016, Vol. 106. 14. London Strategic Emergency Plan, version 3, May 2007. 15. NHS South Yorkshire & Bassetlaw Strategic Framework Emergency Prepared- ness, Resilience & Response, December 2011. 16. O’Brien G, UK Emergency Preparedness: A Holistic Response? Disaster Prevention and Management, 2008, Vol. 17, No. 2. 17. Preprint: Results of a survey done by T. Zwęgliński in 2008 in frames of research project titled ‘Systemic analyses of planning processes in frames of security management on diff erent administrative levels’, fi nanced by the Main School of Fire Service. Warsaw, 2008. 18. Zwęgliński T, Smolarkiewicz M, Gromek P, Efekt kaskadowy współczesnym wyz- waniem zarządzania kryzysowego. Warsaw, 2020. 19. Responding to Emergencies the UK Central Government Response Concept of Operations, Chapter 6, Responding to an emergency: arrangements in Eng- land, Cabinet Offi ce, 2013. 20. Socha R, Współczesne postrzeganie zagrożeń, [in:] Wiśniewski B, Stawnicka J, Socha R (Eds), Zarządzanie kryzysowe. Teoria, praktyka, konteksty, badania. Szczytno, 2011. 21. Ustawa z dnia 26 kwietnia 2007 r. o zarządzaniu kryzysowym, Dz.U. 2007, No. 89 item 590. 22. van Duuren C, Zwęgliński T, Analysis of the Dutch Crisis Response System in the Context of the Common European Union Resilience. Internal Security, 2019, Vol. 11, No. 2. 23. Wolanin J, Zarys teorii bezpieczeństwa obywateli. Ochrona ludności na czas po- koju. Danmar, 2005. 24. Zwęgliński T, Morgado C, Analytical Approach to Cooperation Between Fire Bri- gade and the Police — Comparison Study on Base of Polish and Portuguese Experiences. Internal Security, 2018, Vol. 10, No. 1. 25. Zwęgliński T, Rodriquez Cordero M, Spanish Civil Protection System as a Part of European Union Emergency Response. Internal Security, 2019, Vol. 11, No. 2.

80 Internal Security, July–December Risk Management as a Tool of the Civil Emergency Lanning in the United Kingdom…

About the Authors

Tomasz Zwęgliński, PhD, Adjunct in the Internal Security Institute, The Main School of the Fire Service, Warsaw, Poland. His main fi elds of interests: crisis and disaster management, CBRN, civil protection. E-mail: [email protected] Chris Arculeo, Formerly Senior Fire and Rescue National Security Advisor, Deputy Assistant Commissioner London Fire Brigade and member of Her Majesty’s Fire Service Inspectorate. E-mail: [email protected]

Streszczenie. ‘Europa, która chroni’ to ważny postulat często prezentowany przez polityków. Jednak wiadomo, że pełna odpowiedzialność za bezpieczeństwo i ochronę obywateli jest domeną każdego z suwerennych państw. Dlatego też organizacje międzynarodowe, takie jak NATO czy UE, zrzeszające państwa w jednej, mniej lub bardziej, zintegrowanej strukturze, pełnią jedynie funkcję wspierającą i ułatwiającą ten bardzo ważny proces. Zasadniczo oznacza to, że ścisła współpraca pomiędzy poszczególnymi państwami jest sprawą najwyższej wagi, by zapewnić osiągnięcie istotnego celu ochrony obywateli, zwłaszcza przed głównymi zagrożeniami, wywołanymi lub oddziałującymi w kontekście ponadnarodowym. Taka współpraca jest niemożliwa tak długo, jak długo strony nie będą wzajemnie znały i rozumiały systemów bezpieczeństwa funkcjonujących u swoich zagranicznych partnerów. Ponadto, gdyby tak się stało, współpracujące państwa mogłyby wzajemnie się od siebie uczyć, wdrażając dostosowane do własnych rzeczywistych warunków najlepsze praktyki partnerów. Artykuł wpisuje się w ten proces przez porównanie podejść do zarządzania ryzykiem, jako elementu zarządzania kryzysowego w Wielkiej Brytanii i Polsce. Badanie zostało przeprowadzone na podstawie przeglądu i analizy formalnych dokumentów, wytycznych oraz wybranej literatury przedmiotu. Ponadto ustalenia opierają się na wieloletnich doświadczeniach autorów, popartych licznymi dyskusjami z krajowymi ekspertami w tej dziedzinie. W artykule zaprezentowano również wyniki badań ankietowych dotyczących procesów planowania cywilnego w Polsce. Z oczywistych względów cel istnienia przedmiotowych systemów jest taki sam, jednak stosowana nomenklatura nie zawsze okazuje się tożsama. Badane systemy ujawniły wiele podobieństw w procesach realizowanych w obu krajach, choć w niektórych przypadkach wykazano istotne różnice podyktowane względami organizacyjnymi lub administracyjnymi właściwymi dla danego państwa. Wybrane spostrzeżenia dają możliwość adaptacji i rozwoju własnych systemów, a czasem nawet są one zalecane.

Zusammenfassung. Europa, das schützt ist ein wichtiges Postulat, das häufig von Politikern vertreten wird. Es ist jedoch bekannt, dass die volle Verantwortung für die Sicherheit und den Schutz der Bürger die Aufgabe jedes souveränen Staates ist. Internationale Organisationen wie z. B. die NATO oder die EU, die Staaten in einer mehr oder weniger integrierten Struktur zusammenfassen, erfüllen daher nur die Funktion, diesen wichtigen Prozess zu unterstützen und zu erleichtern. Dies bedeutet im Wesentlichen, dass eine enge Zusammenarbeit zwischen einzelnen Staaten von größter Bedeutung ist, um sicherzustellen, dass das wichtige Ziel des Schutzes der Bürger erreicht wird, insbesondere vor großen Bedrohungen, die in einem transnationalen Kontext verursacht oder beeinflusst werden. Derartige Zusammenarbeit ist unmöglich, solange sich die Parteien nicht kennen und die Sicherheitssysteme ihrer ausländischen Partner verstehen. Darüber hinaus könnten die kooperierenden Staaten in diesem Fall voneinander lernen, indem sie die Best Practices der Partner umsetzen, die an ihre eigenen tatsächlichen Bedingungen angepasst sind. Der Artikel ist Teil dieses Prozesses, indem er die Ansätze des Risikomanagements als Element des Krisenmanagements in Großbritannien und Polen vergleicht. Der vorliegende Artikel wurde auf der Grundlage einer Überprüfung und Analyse formaler Dokumente, Richtlinien und ausgewählter Literatur zu diesem Thema gewidmet. Darüber hinaus basieren die Ergebnisse auf langjähriger Erfahrung der Autoren, die durch zahlreiche Diskussionen mit nationalen Experten auf diesem Gebiet gestützt werden. Im Artikel wurden auch die Ergebnisse einer Umfrage zu Zivilplanungsprozessen in Polen dargestellt und erörtert. Aus offensichtlichen Gründen ist der Zweck der fraglichen Systeme derselbe, aber die verwendete Nomenklatur erweist sich nicht immer als gleich. Die untersuchten Systeme zeigten viele Ähnlichkeiten in den in beiden Ländern implementierten Prozessen, obwohl in einigen Fällen aufgrund organisations- oder administrationsspezifischer Überlegungen für ein bestimmtes Land erhebliche Unterschiede festgestellt wurden. Ausgewählte Erkenntnisse ermöglichen die Anpassung und Entwicklung eigener Systeme, manchmal werden sie sogar empfohlen.

Internal Security, July–December 81 Tomasz Zwęgliński, Chris Arculeo

Резюме. ‘Европа, которая защищает’ — это важный постулат, часто выдвигаемый политиками. Однако, хорошо известно, что полная ответственность за безопасность граждан является компетенцией каждого суверенного государства. Поэтому, такие международные организации, как НАТО или ЕС, объединяющие страны в единую, более или менее интегрированную структуру, играют лишь вспомогательную и содействующую роль в этом очень важном процессе. В основном из этого следует, что тесное сотрудничество между странами имеет важнейшее значение для обеспечения достижения важной цели защиты граждан, особенно от серьезных угроз в транснациональном масштабе. Такое сотрудничество невозможно до того момента, пока стороны не будут знать и понимать систему безопасно- сти своих зарубежных партнеров. Кроме того, если возникнет такая возможность, сотрудничающие страны смогут учиться друг у друга, используя передовую адаптированную к собственным условиям практику партнеров. Статья посвящена сопоставлению подходов к управлению риском в рамках риск-менеджмента в Великобритании и Польше. Исследование проводилось на основе обзора и анализа официальных документов, рекомендаций и избранной научной литературы. Кроме того, выводы основаны на многолетнем опыте авторов, а также являются результатом дискуссий с национальными экспертами в этой области. В статье представлены также результаты исследования процессов планирования в гражданской сфере в Польше. По понятным причинам цель существования рассматри- ваемых систем одна и та же, но использованная терминология не всегда оказывается одинаковой. Исследованные системы обнаружили много общего в процессах, происходящих в обеих странах, хотя в некоторых случаях указывается на значительные различия по организационным или административным причинам, характерным для данной страны. Применяя некоторые решения можно адаптировать и развивать свои собственные системы, а иногда эти решения они даже рекомендуются.

82 Internal Security, July–December Role of the Police in the Slovak Republic and the Operational Duty

Klaudia Marczyová ORCID: n/a Academy of the Police Force in Bratislava, Slovakia The paper was supported by the Slovak Research and Development Agency Grant No. APVV-17-0217 ‘Service interventions by members of the Police Force and application of the principle of appropriateness from a criminal and an adminis- trative point of view’.

Abstract. The fundamental rights and freedoms, as the highest values in a democratic society, need to be adequately protected, thus states create the mechanisms to protect them. This mechanism of protection of fundamental rights and freedoms also includes the police, especially the Police Force, whose primary task is to protect the life, health, fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens and individuals in the Slovak Republic. The role of the Police Force defining the basic aspects forms the content of this study, with a further focus on the tasks performed by the police. Following the above, the study focusses on the activity of police officers, carrying out service actions and interference with fundamental rights and freedoms. The procedure of the police in carrying out service actions tends to be the subject of further examination due to their appropriateness and legality. This issue is considered highly serious in the society, and recently it has been a subject of not only scientific discussions in the Slovak Republic. Currently, the Academy of the Police Force in Bratislava is carrying out a research project which focussing on service actions with the cooperation of the police experts. The core material is presented in the paper, which aims to point out the basic organisation and activities of the Police Force as the authority responsible for the protection of fundamental rights. The emphasis is put on the selected issues of the police while interfering in human rights and freedoms. Chronologically, from general to specific matters, the paper introduces fundamental rights and freedoms and the police interventions into this area. Theoretical research is supplemented by practical cases, conclusions and possible recommendations for the police practice by the use of several methods, in particular analysis, abstraction and deduction. DOI: 10.5604/01.3001.0014.6679 http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0014.6679

Keywords: police, operational duty, the Police Force, service actions, fundamental rights and freedoms.

Introduction

One of the most important values and features of a democratic state is the guar- antee of fundamental rights and freedoms, respect for, and the establishment of an institutional system ensuring their protection. One of the tasks of the state is the protection of the population, the protection of fundamental rights and free- doms, and the protection of public order. It is in a safe environment where rights and freedoms can be fully useful. The Slovak Republic has established a system of fundamental rights and freedoms represented by both legal and institutional security. Law enforcement authorities, including the Police Force, are also part of the system. Police have an important position in every democratic state. In the area of the Slovak Republic, the police has its historical roots dated to ancient times, either as local police forces or the predecessor of the state police

Internal Security, July–December 83 Klaudia Marczyová forces. It is possible to point out at least the circumstances of the establishment of the current police — the Police Force — in the conditions of the democratic (still common Czechoslovak) state. After significant changes in November 1989, the state was building itself as democratic and legal. It was also an important mile- stone in the creation of the police. The Police Force was established from the Public Security as a part of the National Security Corps by statutory measure of the Presi- dency of the Slovak National Council No. 57/1991 Coll. on the Establishment of the Police Force of the Slovak Republic of 25 January 1991. Its scope and operation was defined by the law of the Slovak National Council No. 204/1991 Coll. on the Police Force of the Slovak Republic. Subsequently, after dissolution of the Czechoslovak Federative Republic and the establishment of an independent Slovak Republic on 1 January 1993, the former Federal Forces were transferred to the Police Force and its powers and activities were regulated by the new Act of the National Council of the Slovak Republic No. 171/1993 Coll. on the Police Force (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Police Force Act’). The Police Force Act was thus based on the experience of the First Czechoslovak Republic, the experience of the German police, and was also based on the principles of the Declaration of the Police (adopted by the Council of Europe, in 1979). The current Act has been amended several times, which was related to the development of the whole society, the foreign policy orientation of the Slovak Republic and its efforts to integrate among the developed countries of the European Union. Some changes over the next years occurred due to the inter- nal socio-political situation in Slovakia, especially in the recent period.

Organisation and tasks of the Police Force

Under the Act No. 171/1993 Coll. on the Police Force, the Police Force is an armed security force carrying out tasks in matters of internal order, security, fight against crime including its organised and international forms, and tasks arising for the Police Force from the Slovak Republic’s international obligations. In carrying out individual activities, the Police Force must act in accordance with the Constitution,1 constitu- tional laws, laws and, consequently, other legal regulations as well as international treaties. The activities of the Police Force are controlled by the National Council of the Slovak Republic (hereinafter also referred to as ‘NC SR’) which is the only constitutional and legislative authority of the Slovak Republic along with the Gov- ernment of the Slovak Republic as the supreme authority of executive power. NC SR also determines the essential content of the police activity, by the already mentioned control activity, the Committee of the National Council for Defence and Security, as a body of the National Council, regularly assesses the activities of the armed forces; performs its own control activities (e.g. parliamentary research), but also its own law-making. The legislative body regularly discusses reports on the security situation, approves the budget including the budget heading for the Min- istry of the Interior of the Slovak Republic and the Police Force, and formulates the concept of state security policy and activities of the police.

1 Constitution of the Slovak Republic No. 460/1992 as amended, is the fundamental law of the state.

84 Internal Security, July–December Role of the Police in the Slovak Republic and the Operational Duty

The organisation of the Police Force is defined by the Police Force Act that also defines its roles. The police force has a clear organisational structure, which defines the powers of individual units, the subordination and belonging of individual units to superior bodies, which also expresses the responsibility of individual units of the Police Force. The Police Force is subordinated to the Minister of the Interior of the Slovak Republic, and its services and units defined by the Police Force Act are managed by the President of the Police Force who is responsible for the performance of his function to the Minister. The President of the Police Force is appointed by the Minister of the Interior on the basis of the selection procedure and after the public hearing done by the Committee of the National Council for Defence and Security, if the Committee recommends his appointment. The selection board consists of seven members. Two members of the board are appointed by the Min- ister of the Interior of the Slovak Republic and each other member of the board is appointed by the General Prosecutor of the Slovak Republic, the President of the Police Force, the Director of the Bureau of the Inspection Service, the Rector of the Police Academy and the trade union with the most members of the Police Force.2 On the basis of the conclusions in the minutes of the commission, the Minister of the Interior introduces to the Committee of the National Council of the Slovak Republic at least three candidates who were evaluated by the commission as suit- able for the post of the President of the Police Force. The Ministry of the Interior of the Slovak Republic announces the selection procedure for the President of the Police Force on its website, and also publishes the CVs of the applicants. Only the person, who fulfils the following criteria, namely that he has been a member of the Police Force3 for at least 10 years and has not been convicted of a criminal offence, may be appointed to the post of the President of the Police Force. Require- ments imposed on the candidate include having completed second level of the tertiary education and specialised police education. In addition to professional qualifications, adequate practical and managerial experience is also required. For at least five years, the applicant had to be a superior who managed at least one member of the Police Force in a superior position. The President of the Police Force should hold the office for four years, with the possibility of being re-elected

2 In the Slovak Republic, there are currently two trade unions of members of the Police Force: Trade Union of the Police in the Slovak Republic and New Police Trade Union. 3 A member of the Police Force in the Slovak Republic may be a citizen older than 21 years. In the case of a Civil Service Cadet, the applicant must be over 18 years of age and shall apply for admission in writing. The member of the Police Force shall be reliable, physically and men- tally fit to perform the service, have achieved the required education for the function, speaks the state language, have permanent residence in the territory of the Slovak Republic, not be a member of a political party or political movement on the date of admission to the civil service and be eligible for legal acts in their entirety. A further condition is that, on the date of admission to the civil service, he/she shall cease the activities which are prohibited from being carried out (in particular, not to perform any other paid function, engage in business or other gainful activity and be a member of the administrative or supervisory bodies of le- gal persons engaging in business… referred to in Act No. 73/1998 Coll. on the Civil Service of members of the Police Force, Slovak Information Service, Prison and Court Guard Service of the Slovak Republic and the Railway Police, as amended).

Internal Security, July–December 85 Klaudia Marczyová no more than twice.4 Legal changes concerning the appointment to the highest police rank and the occupation of the Director of the Bureau of the Inspection Service were prompted by socio-political events and current situation in Slovakia.5 The amendment to the Police Force Act has tightened the conditions for appoint- ment to the post of the President of the Police Force and Director of the Bureau of the Inspection Service. This is intended to strengthen the independence of the police Inspection Service, which is also excluded from the authority of the President of the Police Force. The Police Force performs several tasks. It results from the provisions of the Police Force Act that the Police Force has responsibility: a) to participate in the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms, particularly in the protection of life, health, personal freedom, property and security of people, b) to detect criminal offences and detain their perpetrators, c) to participate in detecting tax evasion, illegal financial operations, money laundering and terrorist financing, d) to conduct criminal investigations, e) to fight against terrorism and organised crime, f) to ensure the personal security of the President of the Slovak Republic, the President of the National Council of the Slovak Republic, the Prime Minister, the President of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic, the Minister of the Interior of the Slovak Republic and other persons defined by law or government, g) to ensure the security of diplomatic missions and other objects defined by law or government and participate in the physical protection of nuclear facilities, h) to ensure the border control of the Slovak Republic, i) to participate in ensuring public order; if it has been violated, it shall take measures to restore it, j) to supervise the safety and fluency of road traffic and participate in its management, k) to detect misdemeanours and detain their perpetrators, and if the specific Act provides, to hear and solve misdemeanours, l) to search for persons and things, m) to provide protection and assistance to endangered witnesses and pro- tected witnesses, n) to perform forensic and expert activity, o) to participate in ensuring the protection of civil aviation, p) to announce violating of the ban on alcoholic beverages and other addictive substance by minors under 15 years or young person under 18 years,

4 Appointment to office as well as termination of the office of the President of the Police Force are regulated in Article 33(a) et seq. of Act No. 73/1998 Coll. on the Civil Service of mem- bers of the Police Force, the Slovak Information Service, the Prison and Court Guard Service of the Slovak Republic and the Railway Police, as amended. 5 Act No. 6/2019 amending Act No. 171/1993 Coll. on the Police Force, as amended. These changes were prompted by the request for police reform and its greater independence in relation to police management itself and investigations of police officers’ criminal offences.

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q) to supervise the safety and fluency of rail transport on the railways, r) to participate in identifying and explaining the causes of threats to the safety and continuity of railway transport, s) to participate in ensuring the security of railway transport of nuclear materi- als, special materials and equipment in cooperation with the carrier.6 Moreover, the Police Force performs other tasks related to the state administra- tion. The performance of tasks by police is also regulated in other acts, e.g. the Act on Residence of Foreigners (Act No. 404/2011), Act on Offences (Act No. 372/1990), and in the Code of Criminal Procedure (Act No. 301/2005). In order to ensure the performance of tasks in several areas, the Police Force is divided into individual units, as follows: • Criminal Police, • Financial Police, • Public Order Police, • Traffic Police, • Protection of Premises, • Border and Foreign Police, • Special police forces, • Inspection Service, • Protection of designated persons, • Railway Police, • Institute of Forensic Science.7 A special part of the Police Force is the Bureau of Inspection Service, with compe- tence for the entire territory of the Slovak Republic, for detecting and investigating criminal offences committed by members of armed security forces. The bureau was established on the basis of changes of law, in 2019. The bureau is managed by the director, who shall be responsible for the performance of his/her function to the government.

Operational duty of the police and service action

A primary task of the police is to protect fundamental rights and freedoms, to protect citizens and society from violent, cruel or otherwise unlawful acts. How- ever, its activities have a significant impact on fundamental rights and freedoms. In the course of his/her operational duties, a police officer is obliged to respect the honour, esteem and dignity of another person, as well as him/herself, and not to allow unfounded detriment or possible violations of this person’s rights or free- doms in connection with his/her activity in excess of what is necessary to achieve the aim pursued by his/her operational activity. In the course of his/her operational duties, a police officer is obliged to respect the ethical code of the policeman8 issued

6 Paragraph 2(1) of Act No. 171/1993 Coll. on Police Force, as amended. 7 Paragraph 4(1) of Act No. 171/1993 Coll. on Police Force, as amended. 8 The ethical code of a Police Force member sets out the basic rules regulating the be- haviour and activities of the police profession. It is a set of rules, a moral standard, principles that should be inherent to each police officer. The ethical code of police officers is available at: Electronic source: www.minv.sk, accessed: 20.03.2020.

Internal Security, July–December 87 Klaudia Marczyová by the Minister. It can be stated that the police interferes significantly in the sphere of fundamental rights and freedoms, but there may be doubts about the clarity of the evaluation, when a police intervention would not be justified or appropriate. The meaning of the concepts of the operational duty and the service action will be pointed out. Operational duty means the activity of the police officer related to the performance of duties set by the Police Force Act or other generally binding legal regulations. The policeman proceeds in the course of the performance of his/ her official duties in accordance with the principle of legality and thus proceeds from a specific authorisation, which is contained in statutory provisions.9 Service action means activity of a police officer set forth by and performed within the scope of the Police Force Act, which directly interferes with the fundamental rights and freedoms of another person. Based on the abovementioned, the concept of an official activ- ity may be regarded as a broader concept since it refers to any activity of a police officer linked to the performance of his/her duties, including ones which do not directly interfere with the fundamental rights and freedoms of an individual. In the course of the service action, a police officer is obliged to respect the principles based on the Police Force Act. Full respect of the principles is a guarantee of suc- cessful performance of the service action and thus protection of legally protected interests, human life, health, property and other values and social relations pro- tected by generally binding legal regulations.10 Abovementioned principles include: — the principle of legality — the obligation of a police officer to proceed and act on the basis of and within the law, — the principle of officiality — the obligation of a police officer to act if a crimi- nal offence or misdemeanour is committed, or if there is a reasonable suspicion of any offence, — the principle of opportunity — its essence lies in the possibility for the police officer to decide how to proceed and what means to use, while respecting and following the previous principles, and so that the intervention is suc- cessful and achieves the pursued aim, — the principle of subsidiarity — constitutes an obligation for others, a liable entity (e.g. a private security service), to act before the police intervene, in consideration of the circumstances, — the principle of speed and decisiveness — the obligation of the police officer to arrive at the place of the intervention as soon as possible and to speed up the performance, and in case of decisiveness, the knowledge of the situ- ation, and the correct choice of the tactics are important, — the principle of adequacy — based on ensuring that the police officer, when using forcible means in performing the service action, causes only an appropriate consequence that corresponds with the seriousness of the violation or threat to the protected interest so that forcible means are not used beyond what is necessary. This principle is reflected in three criteria, namely time adequacy, adequacy of choice of forcible means and intensity of using them,

9 Tittlová M, Medelský J, The Police Force Act. Comment. Bratislava, 2017, p. 76. 10 Nesvadba A, Tactical principles of the performance of the service action, [in:] Aspect of service actions in theory and practice. Bratislava, 2018, p. 97.

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— the principle of vigilance and watchfulness — constant watchfulness of the police officer is required so that the police officer does not put himself at risk of attack when performing the service action, — the principle of decency and tactfulness — represents the behaviour of a police officer, who must not be brutal or rude, and does not reduce the dignity of the person against whom he is intervening.11 The police operates in a number of areas and thus the performance of the service actions interferes in various spheres of fundamental rights and freedoms. Subsequently, the duty of the public order police will be discussed, which, as one of the services of the Police Force, occupies an important place in the protection of public order and internal security in the Slovak Republic. It is also the most numerous service, as the number of police officers included, and it constitutes almost half of the staff of the Police Force, and with its broad spectrum coverage it is the dominant service.12 From a historical point of view, we can speak of a signifi- cant representation of the service of the public order in the police apparatus; it has its traditions also in our territory. The service of the public order fulfil several tasks, particularly it cooperates in the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms, the protection of life, health, personal freedom and security of persons and the protection of property. It uncovers criminal offences and their perpetrators, par- ticipates in ensuring public order, and in case of its breach, it takes measures for its renewal. It also monitors and co-ordinates safety and the smooth flow of traffic, discloses misdemeanours and identifies their perpetrators, and if included in a special statute, investigates and resolves criminal offences. It cooperates in the search for missing persons and things, within a defined range carries out checks of the reports on facts indicating the omission of a criminal offence. The service of the public order, as P. Augustín states, ‘in the society, often seen only as a repres- sive body, is a public order defender’.13 One of its characteristics is naturalness as it performs duties in direct contact with citizens and organisations, and is perceived by the public. Its mission is very broad and important to society. Its main task is to ensure internal security and order. It performs individual duties through several components, such as: through forms of operational duty of the basic units of the public order police of the Police Force, police emergency services, police specialists for working with communities, and volunteer peace officers. The public order police system is based on the fulfilment of duties and providing services and assistance.14 Nowadays, the units of the public order of the Police Force are established at the level of the Presidium of the Police Force, the Regional Police Headquarters and the District Police Headquarters, namely: Presidium of the Police Force — Public Order Police Department — Public Order Police Section — Supervisor of the Activities of Local Police Section — Riverine Section

11 See: Nesvadba A, p. 97. 12 Olekszy J, Historické okolnosti postavenia poriadkovej polície a jej súčasné miesto v rámci Policajného zboru, [in:] Police as security guarantee. Bratislava, 2018, p. 295. 13 Augustín P, The Public Order Police. Bratislava, 2013, p. 39. 14 Hrinko M et.al. Public Order Police Activities. Plzeň, 2020, p. 15.

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Regional Police Headquarters of the Police Force — Public Order Police Department —Motorised Unit —Emergency Police Unit District Police Headquarters of the Police Force — Public Order Police Department — District sections + Police Stations.15 It can be stated that the police, which was, in the past, often perceived as a repressive instrument, a state tool for public order maintenance, a force, is now perceived as a prevention authority, and police officers are now perceived as civil officers serving the society. In the course of its activities, the police not only cooper- ates with other authorities, public authorities, armed security forces …, as follows from the Police Force Act, but also cooperates with communities; and it is also important to build trust in this regard.

Fundamental rights and freedoms as an aspect of service actions

Fundamental rights and freedoms are regulated by international documents, documents adopted by the Council of Europe, the European Union and are also enshrined in the Constitution of the Slovak Republic. Fundamental rights and freedoms are sanctioned, inalienable, imprescriptible and irreversible. They are the highest value of any democratic society and deserve due attention and pro- tection. ‘Every citizen has his/her own definition and his/her own ideas about his/her human rights. However paradoxical it may sound, it is the variability of views which best describes the definition of human rights, because they are inseparable and linked to the originality of each human being.’16 To understand human rights can be dif- ficult for a particular interest group, professional status, etc. Police officers also have a special perspective when assessing human rights from the point of view of their profession, in the tasks they are to perform. In the exercise of their profession, they often see them as an obstacle or a legal condition for the legitimacy of their activi- ties. Knowledge of human rights is very important in the interest of their protection, with an emphasis on their knowledge by police officers. Police officers, on the one hand, protect fundamental rights and freedoms and, on the other hand, interfere with them in the performance of their operation. These interventions, and restric- tions on fundamental rights, take place precisely when the service actions are performed. In connection with the abovementioned principles, we point out that the service action must be performed in accordance with the law (in particular the Police Force Act), it must be a lawful activity of a police officer. It follows that only a law can enact the action of a police officer which interferes with funda- mental rights and freedoms; this action is carried out within the limits of the law, which is given by the law, and at the same time, it is an action that interferes with

15 Electronic source: https://www.minv.sk/?informacie-1, accessed: 22.03.2020. 16 Svák J, Kupcová Z, Fico R, Polícia a ľudské práva. Bratislava, 2000, p. 7.

90 Internal Security, July–December Role of the Police in the Slovak Republic and the Operational Duty the fundamental rights and freedoms of an individual. Thus, the action of the police interferes with rights and freedoms of an individual. The Constitution of the Slovak Republic regulates fundamental rights and free- doms in Chapter II, which is internally divided into eight sections, containing the following categories of rights and freedoms: — fundamental human rights and freedoms (i.e. the right to life, the right of persons to integrity and privacy, the right to own property, the right to inviolability of the home, freedom of movement and residence), — political rights (i.e. freedom of expression and the right to information, the right to petition, the right to association, the right to assembly, the right to participate in the administration of public affairs), — rights of national minorities and ethnic groups (granted to citizens of the Slovak Republic who claim allegiance to one of the recognised national minorities in Slovakia;17 the right to learn the official language, the right to be educated in their language, the right to use their language in official communications, the right to participate in the decision-making in matters affecting the national minorities and ethnic groups; the right to promote their culture together with other members of the minority or group, to dis- seminate and receive information in their mother tongues, to associate in national minority associations, to establish and maintain educational and cultural institutions), — economic, social a cultural rights (i.e. the right to choose one’s own profes- sion, the right to work, the right to education, the right to strike, the right to adequate material security in their elder age, the right to protection of his or her health, the right to free health care, freedom of scientific research), — the right to protection of the environment and of cultural heritage (the right to a favourable environment, the right to full and timely information about the environmental situation), — the right to judicial and other legal protection (the right to a fair legal trial, for example right by procedures laid down by a law at an independent and impartial court, the right to an interpreter). While performing service actions, police activities interfere with several rights, but it can be stated that it comes to a restriction of personal freedom (Article 17(1) of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic), but also the integrity and pri- vacy of a person (Article 2 of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic) or the right to privacy (inviolability of the home of Article 21 of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic), freedom of movement and residence (Article 23(1) of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic). However, it is important to point out that every restriction of fundamental rights and freedoms must be backed up with legal and lawful support. Article 13 of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic implies that fundamental rights and freedoms are limited. Obligations may be imposed: by law or on the basis of law, within its limits, while respecting fundamental rights and freedoms; by international treaty under Article

17 In the Slovak Republic, the following national minorities are recognised: Hungarian, Roma, Czech, Ruthenian, Ukrainian, German, Polish, Moravian, Bulgarian, Croatian, Serbian, Russian, and Jewish.

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7(4) or by government regulation under Article 120(2) (approximation government decree). The limits of fundamental rights and freedoms may be regulated only by law and under the conditions laid down by the Constitution (Art. 13(2) of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic). Legal restrictions on fundamental rights and freedoms must apply equally to all cases that comply with the conditions laid down (Article 13(3) of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic). It is also important to point out Article 13(4) of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic, according to which, in restricting fundamental rights and freedoms, their nature and pur- pose must be followed, and such restrictions may be applied only to the set-out objective. This means that restrictions may not be abused for any purpose other than they were intended. ‘The Constitutional Court, in its decision File No. II. CC 28/96 of 12 May 1997, in assessing the necessity of measures to limit a fundamental right or freedom, assumed that the term ‘necessary’ does not have the flexibility to contain the meaning of the terms ‘useful’, ‘proportionate’ or ‘desirable’. It refers only to the exist- ence of an urgent social need to perform the action… However, a restriction … cannot be considered necessary in a democratic society if it is not proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued; in determining the scope of a restriction, not only the objective pursued by the restriction is important, but also the nature of the right to be restricted.’18

Application problems and recommendations for the police practice

In connection with the police duty, there are cases where the inadequacy and disproportionality of service actions be pointed out. This suggest that not every service action fulfils legal requirements, and not all principles are always respected. This was also the object of the Slovak media criticism, and it is current a social problem. The activity of the police has recently been perceived very sensitively by the general public. It is not always easy to judge the correctness of the police procedure, (il)legality or inadequacy, because each procedure is unique. There may also be doubts about the correct procedure and the appropriate use of the particu- lar forcible means by police officers themselves. That is the topicality, seriousness and urgency of the issue that prompted the scientific and pedagogical staff of the Police Academy in Bratislava (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Academy’) to deal with the field in a broader context. The research team was established not only from scientific-pedagogical university educators of the Academy, but also from a range of experts — representatives of the police practice, who elaborated and introduced the project ‘Service actions of members of the Police Force and application of the princi- ple of appropriateness from a criminal and administrative point of view’.19 The research team has the ambition to contribute to solving this serious problem in cooperation

18 Finding of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic, File No. II. ÚS 28/96 of 12 May 1997. 19 The project was approved by the Slovak Research and Development Agency under number APVV-17-0217.

92 Internal Security, July–December Role of the Police in the Slovak Republic and the Operational Duty with police practice, in order to improve the current situation, and to eliminate cases of violation of the principles while performing service actions. In order to achieve the objective of the project itself, which sets out several tasks, it is appropriate to analyse the legislation regulating the position, tasks, authorisa- tions and duties, or activities of police, as well as any complaints about the police procedure and judicial authorities’ decisions. It is important to acquire knowledge from other countries and, in particular, to gain the experience in application practice. In particular, the principle of appropriateness shall be observed. A service action must be directly appropriate to the unlawful action of a particular person. The experience of police practice suggests that there are several problem areas in relation to the implementation of service actions, ranging from inconsistent (non- transparent) legislation to the lack of forcible means in individual departments. Legislation related to police is made up not only from basic laws (such as the Police Force Act, the Code of Criminal Procedure, etc.), but a number of internal regulations that are also subject to frequent changes, and this is where we perceive a major problem as it is difficult to get oriented in them, and watch these constant changes. The solution is primarily to unify and create transparent legislation, and conse- quently its availability in an acceptable form for police officers. The solution is also offered in the field of education, or in good preparation for police practice, but also other forms of training of police officers themselves in the form of practical training, and in particular, practical presentations of the performance of service actions and the use of forcible means. In addition to selected problems, others have been identified that will also be the subject of research and the search for optimal solutions. They concern not only the theoretical area, but also a wide range of practical issues. Material, technical equipment and the availability of forcible means for police officers also significantly contributed to the success of the realised actions. Similarly, problems could be defined as general, affecting several police officers, and those specific to police departments. In police actions, issues such as the question of language skills also arise. ‘The foreign language requirement is desirable in the case of a person’s escort if he/she is a national of another country.’20 However, the language barrier is not only associated with actions carried out against foreigners, but there are also significant problems with the large national minority, particularly in localities with the Hungarian national minority, and the Roma national minority. These are the most numerous national minorities in Slovakia, and not all citizens — members of a national minority — speak the state Slovak language. The seriousness of the issue is also underlined by some cases which have already been decided by judicial authorities, whether national, general courts or the Consti- tutional Court of the Slovak Republic. The European Court of Human Rights has also dealt with violations of fundamental rights and freedoms in connection with police activities. Police procedure was the subject of a decision in the case of Kontrová v. The Slovak Republic, where the complainant alleged that the police had failed to provide appropriate actions to protect the lives of her children and their private life. On 2 November 2002, the applicant filed a criminal complaint against her

20 Nováková I, Požiadavka použitia cudzieho jazyka pri služobných zákrokoch, [in:] Teo- reické a praktické aspekty služobných zákrokov. Bratislava, 2018, p. 104.

Internal Security, July–December 93 Klaudia Marczyová husband with the Michalovce District Police Department. She accused him of hav- ing assaulted and beaten her with an electric cable. Subsequently, accompanied by her husband, she sought to withdraw the criminal complaint, which makes the conduct of the husband qualified as an offence. On the night of 26 to 27 Decem- ber 2002, a relative of the applicant called the emergency service to report that the applicant’s husband had a shotgun and was threatening to kill himself and the children. The applicant herself made a similar phone call later that night and later also came to the police station. On 31 December 2002, the applicant’s husband shot their two children and himself dead. The applicant alleged that the police, who were aware of her husband’s rude and threatening behaviour, had not taken appropriate measures to protect the lives of her and her children. The European Court ruled that there had been a violation of Article 2 of the Convention — the right to life — in the context of the failure of the competent authorities to ensure the protection of the lives of children, and also violation of Article 13 of the Convention, because the mother was denied the opportunity to claim for compensation.21 As regards the right to life within the meaning of the Convention, it implies that the Conven- tion requires the State not only to abstain from deliberate and unlawful deprivation of life, but also to take appropriate steps to protect the lives of persons under its jurisdiction. There is another case in which the European Court of Human Rights stated a violation of the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. In case of Mižigárová v. Slovakia (Complaint No. 74832/01), the judge- ment was delivered on 14 December 2010 stating that there had been a violation of Article 2 of the European Convention of Human Rights — the right to life. Mrs Mižigárová complained about the death of her husband during detention and the subsequent failure of the Slovak authorities to undertake a thorough and effective investigation into the circumstances surrounding his death. The case took place on 12 August 1999. The police apprehended a man, Mr. Šarišský, Mrs. Mižigárová’s husband, on suspicion of having stolen bicycles. At the time of his arrest, he was in a good health. He was taken to another room for further interrogation by an off- duty officer. During the interrogation, the man suspected of criminal activity was shot in the abdomen and he died after four days in hospital. The accusation of the police officer followed. He was convicted of bodily harm caused by negligence in the course of duty within the meaning of Section 224(1) and (2) of the Criminal Code. The police officer was sentenced to one year’s imprisonment, suspended for a two-and-a-half-year probationary period. The penal order stated that the police officer had failed to secure his service weapon, contrary to the relevant regula- tions, and that, as a result, Mr. Šarišský had managed to draw the weapon from the holster and to inflict with it the lethal injury on himself. The police officer did not challenge the penal order, but he committed suicide on 23 January 2001. The applicant complained to the European Court of Human Rights that her husband died as a result of lethal injury in the course of the police detention, and the Slo- vak authorities failed in undertaking a thorough and effective investigation into the circumstances surrounding his death. The European Court concluded that even if the complainant’s husband had committed suicide in the manner described

21 Complaint No. 7510/04 of 31 May 2007, Kontrová v. Slovensko.

94 Internal Security, July–December Role of the Police in the Slovak Republic and the Operational Duty by the national authorities, they had breached their obligation to take appropriate measures to protect their health and physical integrity during the police deten- tion. The European Court of Human Rights stated inter alia violation of Article 2 of the Convention by the Slovak Republic represented by the police and awarded the applicant damages, namely EUR 45,000 as compensation for damage of non- pecuniary nature and EUR 8,000 for damages of pecuniary nature.22 The descriptions of these example cases are not detailed. The aim is to show that these are indeed serious violations of fundamental rights and freedoms, of the highest value, of human life. Thus, the analysis of specific court decisions is justified to draw the relevant conclusions.

Conclusions and recommendations

It can be stated that the police plays an irreplaceable role in the state sys- tem and among the authorities for law protection. One of the most important and highest priority tasks of the state is the protection of its citizens, protection of fundamental rights and freedoms. These tasks are carried out by police. The Police Force, as an armed security force in the Slovak Republic, is regulated by Act No. 171/1993 Coll. on the Police Force, as amended, where the role, duties and means, including forcible means, are determined. The issue of service actions, as one of the current issues in the Slovak Republic in connection with the activities of the police, was also the subject of interest in this study, as well as the position and basic organisational structure of the police or the Police Force. In this context, some selected realia were pointed out, which highlight the essence of the problem. It focussed on activities of police which also interfere with fundamental rights and freedoms. However, the police procedure is not always assessed as adequate, what is triggered by a number aspects related to legislation and, in particular, problems of application practice. The experience of police officers confirms that it is important to engage in these problems and seek solutions to eliminate these cases. Practice of the courts confirms that there are also violations of the fundamental rights of an individual by police wrongful action. The police procedure itself, the legality and adequacy of service actions are the subject of investigation of this area, but on the basis of the identified problems, it is possible to try to propose solutions or directions of individual areas in an effort to improve the given situation: — from the point of view of police activity, the right to personal freedom is prob- ably the most interfered. For example, the restriction of personal freedom by detention of a person is one of the police officers’ authorisations. Personal freedom, as fundamental human right, is protected by the Constitution of the Slovak Republic, but also by international conventions such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention for the Protection

22 See details: Judgement of 14 December 2010 to complaint No. 74832/01, violation of Art. 2 of the Convention (the right to life) and Art. 14 of the Convention (ban on discrimina- tion), [in:] Justičná revue, Vol. 63, No. 4/2011, The Ministry of Justice of the Slovak Republic, Appendix.

Internal Security, July–December 95 Klaudia Marczyová

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Personal freedom is the fun- damental condition for other rights and freedoms. The personal freedom means the free, unrestricted movement of a person who, at his own decision, may reside or freely leave a certain place23. Article 17 of the Constitution shall not guarantee the absolute inviolability of everyone’s personal freedom. The Constitution shall guarantee everyone that his or her personal freedom must not be restricted otherwise than for the reasons and in the manner set out in Article 17 of the Constitution. On the basis of the abovementioned, increas- ing the education of police officers, with an emphasis on the constitutional and legal limits on the restriction of fundamental freedoms is important, — to draw conclusions and recommendations to prevent and eliminate such infringements, by analysis of juridical decisions or complaints against a police procedure, — to motivate police officers to extend their language skills (depending on their position and police activity), while pointing out that even in relation to members of a national minority, knowledge of the minority language and the environment itself (local knowledge) is an advantage for intervening police officers; — to provide material equipment for members of the police, including forci- ble means, but also camera equipment to ensure video recording of each procedure, as protection for those who are intervening and especially as protection for the police officers themselves, — to initiate changes in the legal level — to unify and clarify, in particular, the internal regulations governing (mostly) inconsistent procedures of police officers in the course of service actions and to develop (update) the method- ology of service actions, — to carry out practical demonstrations of service actions, with their subse- quent analysis and evaluation, within the scope of police practice. Certain recommendations mentioned above have been positively evaluated by experts from the academic and police fields, for instance, the issue of the police officers’ training and the need to modify the training by several internal regula- tions, which determine duties of members of the police as they are not easily read. The presented information, as well as other recommendations, have been pointed out among the scientific community and represent the partial research outcomes which have been published in a collection of papers.24 The Police, as the body for protection of the law, performs one of the most important task of the state. It participates in the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms, but also interferes with them in the course of performing its tasks. Whether all interventions are justified, whether the service meets all legal principles, is the subject of discussions, criticism in the Slovak Republic and, based on social demand and current police practice, also the subject of the project (No. APVV-17- 0217) ‘The Police Force and the application of the principle of appropriateness from

23 Finding of the Constitutional Court, File No. III. 204/02 of 22 January 2004. Electronic source: www.ustavnysud.sk, accessed: 5.03.2020. 24 Hašanová J (Ed.), Application aspects of undertaking service actions. Bratislava, 2019, p. 155.

96 Internal Security, July–December Role of the Police in the Slovak Republic and the Operational Duty the criminal and administrative-legal point of view.’) researched by scientific-pedagog- ical staff of the Academy of the Police Force and professionals from police practice. The study reflects the requirements of current problem solving, and so it is based on an approximation of the role and tasks of the police, with reference to police activity in the context of fundamental rights and freedoms. Moreover, it presents the activities of the public order police as it features a priority status among the police services; members of public order police work in close contact with the citizens and there is series of situations when we witness frequent interven- tions into fundamental rights and freedoms. It was also intended to point out cases where a judicial authority found a violation of a fundamental right by the police procedure. In conclusion, suggestions are outlined for solving defined problems at the de lege lata level, and police practice.

References

1. Act of the National Council of the Slovak Republic No. 171/1993 Coll. on the Po- lice Force as amended 2. Act of the National Council of the Slovak Republic No. 73/1998 Coll. on the Civil Service of Members of the Police Force, the Slovak Intelligence Service, Corps of Prison and Judicial Guard and Railway Police. 3. Augustín P, The Public Order Police. Bratislava, 2013. 4. Complaint No. 7510/04 of 31 May 2007, Kontrová v. Slovensko. 5. Constitution of the Slovak Republic No. 460/1992 Coll. as amended. 6. Decision from 14/12/2010 on the complaint no. 74832/01) about violation of ar- ticle 2 of the Convention (right to life) and article 14 of the Convention, [in:] Justičná revue, Vol. 63, No. 4/2011, Ministry of justice of SR, Appendix. 7. Electronic source: https://www.minv.sk/?informacie-1 8. Electronic source: www.nrsr.sk 9. Electronic source: www.ustavnysud.sk 10. Finding of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic File No. II. CC 28/96 of 12 May 1997. 11. Finding of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic File No. III. CC 204/02 of 22 January 2004. 12. Hašanová J (Ed.), Application aspects of undertaking service actions. Bratislava, 2019, p. 155. 13. Hrinko M et.al. Public Order Police Activities. Plzeň, 2020. 14. Marczyová K, Hašanová J, Strémy T, Šimonová J et al, Policajné právo. Plzeň: Aleš Čeněk, 2019. 15. Nesvadba A, Tactical principles of the performance of the service action, [in:] Aspect of service actions in theory and practice. Bratislava, 2018. 16. Nováková I, Požiadavka použitia cudzieho jazyka pri služobných zákrokoch, [in:] Teoreické a praktické aspekty služobných zákrokov. Bratislava, 2018, p. 104. 17. Olekszy J, Historické okolnosti postavenia poriadkovej polície a jej súčasné mies- to v rámci Policajného zboru, [in:] Police as security guarantee. Bratislava, 2018. 18. Svák J, Kupcová Z, Fico R, Polícia a ľudské práva. Bratislava, 2000. 19. Tittlová M, Medelský J, The Police Force Act. Comment. Bratislava, 2017.

Internal Security, July–December 97 Klaudia Marczyová

About the Author

Klaudia Marczyová, Col. PhD. JUDr. Associate professor at the Department of Public Law, Academy of the Police Force in Bratislava, Slovakia. E-mail: [email protected].

Streszczenie. Podstawowe prawa i wolności jako najwyższe wartości w społeczeństwie demokratycznym muszą być odpowiednio chronione, dlatego też państwa tworzą mechanizmy ich ochrony. Tego rodzaju mechanizmy ochrony podstawowych praw i wolności obejmują również policję, zwłaszcza zaś te siły policyjne, których podstawowym zadaniem jest ochrona życia, zdrowia, podstawowych praw i wolności obywateli w Republice Słowackiej. W rtykule przedstawiono podstawowe zagadnienia dotyczace roli policji, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem wykonywanych przez te formacje zadań. Autor artykułu skupia się na działalności funkcjonariuszy policji, prowadzeniu czynności służbowych oraz ingerowaniu w podstawowe prawa i wolności. Procedura przeprowadzania czynności służbowych przez Policję powinna być przedmiotem dalszej analizy ze względu na ich właściwość i zasadność. Zagdanienie jest uważane przez społeczeństwo za bardzo istotne, ostatnio zaś stało się ono tematem nie tylko dyskusji naukowych w Republice Słowackiej. Obecnie Akademia Sił Policyjnych w Bratysławie we współpracy z ekspertami policji realizuje projekt badawczy, który koncentruje się na czynnościach służbowych. W artykule przedstawiono główne wyniki przeprowadzonych badań oraz podstawową strukturę organizacyjną i działalność Sił Policyjnych jako organu odpowiedzialnego za ochronę fundamentalnych praw. Autor opisując wybrane zagadnienia pracy Policji podkreśla zwraca uwagę na poszanowanie praw i wolności człowieka. W artykule przedstawiono chronologicznie (od kwestii ogólnych do szczegółowych) fundamentalne prawa i wolności oraz działania Policji w tym zakresie. Oprócz rozważań teoretycznych opisano praktyczne przypadki, zaprezentowano wnioski i ewentualne rekomendacje dla praktyki policyjnej przez zastosowanie kilku metod, w szczególności analizy, abstrakcji i dedukcji.

Zusammenfassung. Grundrechte und -freiheiten als die höchsten Werte in einer demokratischen Gesellschaft müssen angemessen geschützt werden, und deshalb schaffen viele Staaten besondere Mechanismen zu ihrem Schutz. In der Slowakischen Republik gehört zu ihnen auch die Polizei, insbesondere jene Polizeikräfte, deren Hauptaufgabe darin besteht, Leben, Gesundheit, Grundrechte sowie -freiheiten der Bürger zu schützen. Im Mittelpunkt des Artikels steht die Rolle der Polizei bei der Ausübung ihrer Aufgaben. Daher konzentriert sich der Autor besonders auf solchen Tätigkeiten von Polizeibeamten, die bei deren Ausübung in die Grund- und Freiheitsrechte eingegriffen wird.Das Verfahren zur Durchführung offizieller Tätigkeiten der Polizei sollte weiter auf ihre Kompetenz und Legitimität hin untersucht werden. Dieses Thema wird in der Öffentlichkeit als sehr wichtig angesehen und war kürzlich Gegenstand wissenschaftlicher Diskussionen in der Slowakischen Republik. Gegenwärtig führt die Polizeiakademie in Bratislava in Zusammenarbeit mit Polizeiexperten ein Forschungsprojekt durch, das sich auf offizielle Aktivitäten der Polizei konzentriert. Die wichtigsten Ergebnisse der Forschung werden in diesem Artikel erörtert, der die grundlegende Organisationsstruktur und die Aktivitäten der Polizei als einer für den Schutz der Grundrechte verantwortlichen Einrichtung aufzeigen soll. Der Schwerpunkt liegt auf ausgewählten Fragen der Polizeiarbeit unter Berücksichtigung der Menschenrechte und -freiheiten. Der Artikel stellt die Grundrechte und -freiheiten und die Aktivitäten der Polizei in diesem Bereich chronologisch (von allgemeinen bis hin zu spezifischen Fragen) dar. Die theoretischen Überlegungen werden durch den Einsatz mehrerer Methoden, insbesondere Analyse, Abstraktion und Deduktion, mit praktischen Fällen, Schlussfolgerungen und möglichen Empfehlungen für die Polizeipraxis angereichert.

Резюме. Основные права и свободы как высшие ценности в демократическом обществе должны надлежащим образом охраняться, поэтому государства создают механизмы для их защиты. Такие механизмы для обеспечения основных прав и свобод распространяются также на деятельность полиции, особенно на эти полицейские силы, основной задачей которых является защита жизни, здоровья, основных прав и свобод граждан в Словацкой Республике. В статье представлены основные вопросы, касающиеся роли полиции с особым учетом задач, выполняемых этими формированиями. Автор статьи уделяет особое внимание деятельности сотрудников полиции, осуществлению служебной деятельности и вмешательству в основные права и свободы. Процедура проведения полицией офици- альных мероприятий должна подвергаться дополнительному анализу в связи с ее компетенцией и легитимностью. Этот вопрос рассматривается обществом как очень важный, и в последнее время он стал предметом не только научных дискуссий в Словацкой Республике. В настоящее время Полицейская академия в Братиславе в сотрудничестве

98 Internal Security, July–December Role of the Police in the Slovak Republic and the Operational Duty

с полицейскими экспертами реализует исследовательский проект, ориентированный на деятельность полиции. В статье представлены основные результаты проведенного исследования, а также организационная структура и деятельность полиции как органа, отвечающего за обеспечение основных прав. Описывая отдельные вопросы работы правоохранительных органов, автор делает особый упор на соблюдение прав и свобод человека. В статье в хронологическом порядке (от общих до конкретных вопросов) излагаются основные права и свободы, и говорится о деятельности полиции в этой области. Кроме теоретических вопросов описываются практические случаи, дела- ются выводы и даются возможные рекомендации для полицейской практики с использованием нескольких методов, в частности анализа, абстракции и дедукции.

Internal Security, July–December 99

Assessment of the National Map of Security Threats as an Important Element in the Process of the Polish Police Managing Public Security in Social Partnership in View of Surveys

Jadwiga Stawnicka ORCID: 0000-0002-0404-5383 The Jerzy Kukuczka Academy of Physical Education in Katowice, Poland Iwona Klonowska ORCID: 0000-0002-3320-5649 Police Academy in Szczytno, Poland

Abstract. Currently, a change in the relations between the Police and the society, taking on the form of a dialogue, can be noted in Poland. The paper describes the operation of the National Map of Security Threats, an important element in the process of public security management implemented by the Polish Police. It presents the operation of the tool and discusses the results of personal research into the assessment of the National Map of Security Threats made by the inhabitants of the Silesian Province. The results are then compared with the results of the nationwide survey carried out by the Polish Police. This article consists of several parts. The first indicates that the National Map of Security Threats is a tool of contact between the public and the Police. Based on information obtained from citizens, the Police may use their force and resources more rationally, and can better plan the service of police officers. Within the framework of the dialogue and feedback obtained by the Police communicating with the public, the elimination of risks is more efficient and effective, which in turn reinforces the public sense of security. The National Map of Security Threats has given citizens the opportunity to speak in situations of threat, preceding the occurrence of threats and enabling the implementation of public expectations related to the formation (co-shaping) of security on the local scale. The second part of the article discusses the legislation governing the operation of the National Map of Security Threats. The National Security Risk Map is a platform for the exchange of information between the Police and the public. This is one of the most important elements of socialisation of the Police. The evaluation of the National Map of Security Threats by the users in the light of conducted surveys was presented. The last part of the article discusses the ‘Operation of the National Map of Security Threats’ project which was implemented in the Opole garrison. This project was completed in 2019. It resulted in studies on the assessment of the functioning of the National Security Risk Map in all units of the Opole garrison. DOI: 10.5604/01.3001.0014.6660 http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0014.6660

Keywords: National Map of Security Threats, Police, security, local community

Introduction

Nowadays, in times of scientific, technical, geo-political and intellectual changes as well as changes to the forms of our lifestyle and surroundings, the Police — as one of the key institutions responsible for ensuring safety and public order — has to integrate with this reality and verify its relationship with the public, as no institution responsible for security is able to operate properly without public support, and it is cooperation between the society and the Police which is most effective in preventing and combatting crime.

Internal Security, July–December 101 Jadwiga Stawnicka, Iwona Klonowska

The observation that the Police are turning towards the public is visible in the mission and perception of the Police formulated through the implementation of the priorities set forth by the National Police Chief for the period 2016–2018, which include increasing the efficiency of Police action to strengthen the coopera- tion with the public and reinforcing the activities benefitting the general public within the framework of Police cooperation with non-governmental organisations and associations. The Polish Police have taken measures whereby they are getting closer to the people, in order to effectively engage in a dialogue with them for the sake of security. An example of such action — besides restoring police stations — is a scheme called ‘The Community Police Officer Getting Closer to Us’, commenced on 20th June, 2016 by the Ministry of the Interior and Administration, whose goal was to emphasise the role of the community police officer in ensuring the secu- rity of the local community thanks to their greater involvement in community affairs and active participation in public consultations through the implementa- tion of ideas and comprehensive change in the approach to community police officers’ work through indication of the trends in the service of community police officers in the areas of human resources, training, social communication, service organisation and modernisation.1 The turn towards the society was also manifested by the launching of the Polish national program entitled ‘The National Map of Secu- rity Threats’ on 13th June, 2016 in Pruszków.2 The following describes the operation of the National Map of Security Threats (hereinafter: the NMST) — an essential com- ponent of public security management implemented by the Polish Police, presents the operation of this tool, and discusses the results of the study into the assessment of the National Map of Security Threats by the inhabitants of Silesia against the back- drop of the assessment in the study conducted nationwide. These results were compared with the results of the nationwide study carried out by the Polish Police.

National Map of Security Threats as a tool of contact between the public and the Police

The NMST was implemented in July 2016 on a pilot basis in three Police gar- risons: the Podlaskie, Pomeranian, and Metropolitan garrisons, and in October 2016, it covered the entire country. The creation of the NMST was preceded by a public con- sultation with the participation of over 217,000 people in Poland.3 The National Map

1 In January 2017, the first nationwide study of community police officers was carried out in 17 garrisons (5400 respondents). The findings of the study are presented in books: Stawnic- ka J, Klonowska I, Rola dzielnicowego w nowoczesnej formacji policyjnej z perspektywy działań edukacyjno-wychowawczych. Legionowo: CSP, 2017; Stawnicka J, Klonowska I, Partnerstwo służb dzielnicowych ze społecznością lokalną na rzecz bezpieczeństwa wewnętrznego z per- spektywy działań społeczno-wychowawczych. Legionowo: CSP, 2017. 2 The functioning of The National Map of Security Threats is discussed in the book: Staw- nicka J, Klonowska I, Krajowa Mapa Zagrożeń Bezpieczeństwa nową formą dialogu polskiej Policji ze społecznością lokalną na rzecz bezpieczeństwa wewnętrznego — w aspekcie społeczno-pedagogicznym. Sosnowiec: Oficyna Wydawnicza Humanitas, 2018. 3 For more information on the role of public consultations in the identification of areas presented on the maps of security threats, Cf.: Stawnicka J, Klonowska I, Krajowa Mapa Zagrożeń …, op. cit., pp. 49–81.

102 Internal Security, July–December Assessment of the National Map of Security Threats as an Important Element… of Security Threats is an IT application consisting of two parts. The first part includes statistics of crimes and offences presented through visualisation and divided into various provinces, counties and municipalities, while the other is an interactive tool for citizens to enable them to add new threats on the NMST4. The National Map of Security Threats is therefore a list of specific, most common security threats for human life and health, property and the public law and order, taking into account the distribution of temporal and spatial threats that have a significant impact on the formation of the sense of security in society. The police dialogue with the society within the framework of the National Map of Security Threats is executed, firstly, by collecting information from police IT systems, secondly, by acquiring infor- mation in the course of direct contacts with the public, representatives of local authorities and non-governmental organisations, and thirdly, through transmission of information by the people during social debates on public security. It needs to be emphasised that social dialogue related to ensuring security also includes other initiatives aimed at encouraging the local community to take action for the ben- efit of widely understood security. Such initiatives include the ‘My Police Station’ and ‘Your Community Officer’ mobile applications. The map of threats includes 25 categories, such as acts of vandalism, home- lessness, dangerous places within water areas, illegal car rallies, improper parking, unguarded railway crossing, poor road infrastructure, destruction of greenery, speeding, alcohol consumption in prohibited areas, drowning, use of narcotic drugs, wrong organisation of road traffic, and begging. In this way, the catalogue of values to be protected was extended and new features were introduced in order to increase the performance of the Police in the field of verification and elimina- tion of threats reported by the public. Functioning of the NMST is a testament to the enrichment of the dialogue of the Police with the public, offering modern solutions in the field of technology and interpersonal communication. Nowadays, the traditional methods and forms of work (direct talks with citizens, responding to incidents, and patrolling the streets) are not sufficient.

Legislation governing the operation of the National Map of Security Threats

The legal acts governing the operation of the National Map of Security Threats include: — Decree No. 768 of the National Police Chief of 14th August, 2007 on the forms and methods of task performance by police officers deployed on patrol duty and the coordination of preventive activities (hereinafter: Decree No. 768),5 — Guidelines No. 3 of the National Police Chief of 14th September, 2016 on the police procedure during the execution of tasks related to the operation of the National Map of Security Threats (hereinafter: Guidelines No. 3),6

4 The letter of 28th July, 2017 (Ref. No. EP-2819/17) signed by the Director of the Uniformed Branch Bureau at the National Police Headquarters introduced a new version of the applica- tion of ‘The National Map of Security Threats’, which also contains an application for mobile devices (smartphones, iPods, etc.). 5 Official Journal of the National Police Headquarters, No. 15, item 119, as amended. 6 Official Journal 2016, item 58.

Internal Security, July–December 103 Jadwiga Stawnicka, Iwona Klonowska

— Guidelines No. 1 of the National Police Chief of 31st July, 2017 amending the guidelines on the police procedure during the execution of tasks related to the operation of the National Map of Security Threats 7. The legal acts governing the operation of the National Map of Security Threats include primarily Decree No. 768 of the National Police Chief of 14th August, 2007 on the forms and methods of task performance by police officers deployed on patrol duty and the coordination of preventive activities (hereinafter: Decree No. 768)8. Decree No. 768 is an Act implementing article 7(1)(2) of the Law of 6th April, 1990 on the Police. It replaced Decree No. 494 of the National Police Chief of 25th May, 2004 on the forms and methods of task performance by police officers deployed on patrol duty9. Guidelines No. 3 of the National Police Chief of 14th September, 2016 on the police procedure during the execution of tasks related to the operation of the National Map of Security Threats (hereinafter: Guidelines No. 3)10 set out a detailed method of procedure for police officers during the execution of specific tasks. § 1 emphasises that Guidelines No. 3 lays down the rules for the designation of coor- dinators on the various organisation levels of Police organisational units and the coordinators’ tasks. They also specify the mode in which to familiarise oneself with the threats plotted out on the National Map of Security Threats and the method of their verification. Guidelines No. 3 discuss the question of how to change the sta- tus of the threats plotted out on the National Map of Security Threats and the way to implement supervision over the execution of tasks related to the operation of the National Map of Security Threats. In Guidelines No. 3, § 2 provides basic definitions used in the document, e.g. the definition of the National Map of Security Threats, national coordinator, provincial coordinator, local coordinator. The National Map of Security Threats has been defined as an IT application which consists of two parts: statistical data and an interactive tool which enables the citizen to post threats on it. The status of the threat is defined, i.e. the stage of the threat posted, stated as: New, Review, Confirmed, Unconfirmed, and the threat category to be selected from the list by the citizen and then posted. The next step is the verifica- tion of the threat referred to as a set of actions taken by police officers, leading to the confirmation or non-confirmation of the presence of the threat posted on the National Map of Security Threats. It was stated in Guidelines No. 3 that it is the national coordinator, the provincial coordinator and the local coordinator who are responsible for coordinating the execution of tasks related to the operation of the Map of Threats. Guidelines No. 3 also specify the duties of the local, provincial and national coordinators (§ 4).

7 The concept of threat maps was introduced by the provisions of § 8 (3) of the Decree No. 768 of the National Police Chief of 14th August, 2007 on the methods and forms of task perfor- mance by police officers on patrol duty and the coordination of preventive activities, which is an executive order to Article 7 (1)(2) of the Act of 6th April, 1990 on the Police, Official Journal of the National Police Headquarters (hereinafter: KGP), No. 15, item 119 as amended, and in- dicates that threat maps are drawn up based on analyses of the state of security and public order made for the purposes of deployment of law enforcement forces for the prevention of crimes, minor offences and for the prevention of antisocial behaviour. 8 Official Journal of the KGP, No 15, item 119 as amended. 9 Official Journal of the KGP, No. 8, item 33. 10 Official Journal, 2016, item 58.

104 Internal Security, July–December Assessment of the National Map of Security Threats as an Important Element…

The operation of the National Map of Security Threats is associated with a spe- cific procedure that is described in Guidelines No. 3. § 5 indicates the order of tasks carried out by the local coordinator, i.e. the appearance on the Map of a threat with the New status, recognition of the category of the threat and its location and draw- ing up a threat verification card. The threat verification card should be made within two days from the date of the threat mapping. The following information is entered on the threat verification card form: the threat category, the approximate location of the threat, the organisational cell in the police organisational unit responsible for the verification of the threat, the time and method of the action taken to verify the threat. The time to verify the threat should not be longer than five days from the time of preparation of the threat verification card, unless this is a particularly justified case. Once the threat verification card is drawn up, the local coordinator changes the status of the threat on the Map of Threats from New to Verification: (§ 7.1). The manager of the organisational cell, upon the receipt of the threat verifica- tion card and becoming familiar with its content, takes steps to verify the threat (§ 9.1). On the threat verification card, the manager of the organisational cell enters information about the confirmation or non-confirmation of the threat (§ 9.3), and the local coordinator changes the status of the threat on the Map of Threats from Verification to Confirmed or Unconfirmed. Upon the confirmation of the pres- ence of the threat, the local coordinator passes a copy of the threat verification card to the manager of the police organisational cell, competent to perform the tasks aiming at the elimination of the confirmed threat. If the confirmed threat has been eliminated and removed from the Map, and another threat is reported, and the threat is of the same category and related to the same place, the local coordina- tor implements the procedure anew (§11). If the local coordinator concludes that the threat mapped out is the result of a joke or a mistake, they may change the sta- tus of the threat from New to the status Unconfirmed (§12.1). Guidelines No. 1 of the National Police Chief of 31st July, 2017 amending the guidelines on police officers’ method of procedure during the execution of tasks related to the operation of the National Map of Security Threats introduced changes to Guidelines No. 3. The first one is the addition of two types of threat status Confirmed (eliminated) and Joke or Mistake (§ 2, section 5). The second change relates to Guidelines No. 1 using the expression verification of the information about the threat, while the Guidelines No. 3 use the expression verification of the threat. The change is characterised by linguistic correctness, as the expression indicates that the information about the presence of the threat is verified. The verb verify is used here in the sense ‘check the veracity, accuracy or authenticity of something’, for example verify hypotheses, negative opinions, verify theories, concepts, beliefs. In addition, the definition of the concept in Guidelines No. 1 determines what this verification involves (a set of activities […] leading up to the confirmation or non- confirmation of the presence of threats). Both in Guidelines No. 3 and in Guidelines No. 1, it is noted that, on the verification card, the local coordinator presents the category of threat and its approximate location, as well as organisational cell in the police organisational unit responsible for the verification of the threat. The local coordinator also indicates the time and method of the action taken in order to verify the threat. In Guidelines No. 1 § 6 (1) (4), it is indicated, however, that the local coordinator shall specify the time to finish the verification of the threat

Internal Security, July–December 105 Jadwiga Stawnicka, Iwona Klonowska rather than the time and method of the action taken in order to verify the threat. This is a really significant clarification, because it moves the focus of the activities of the local coordinator to the final verification of the threat. Another change involves the indication of the person to whom the local coordinator passes the verification card, as in Guidelines No. 1. it was added that the verification card can be transferred either to the manager of the organisational cell of the Police or to another police officer, designated by the head of the organi- sational unit of the Police. If the nature of the posted threat requires verification by police officers of other organisational cells of the Police, the local coordinator passes verification card threats not only to managers of these cells, but also to other police officers designated by the head of the organisational unit of the Police. Similarly, in the event that the existence of the threat has been confirmed, the number of recipients of a copy of the threat verification card is increased. No. 1 specifies and clarifies the activities of the manager of the organisational cell of the Police or another police officer designated by the head of the organisational unit of the Police, which consists of determining the time and method of activities undertaken to verify threats. § 9 (2) states that it is acceptable for police officers who perform tasks associated with the Map of Threats to enter effects of actions directly onto the verification card. Another change in the wording concerned the use of the mental shortcut in con- nection with the expression: status Confirmed (eliminated), rather than a descriptive form of the elimination of the confirmed threat and its removal from the Map of Threats. In Guidelines No. 1 § 3, sections 8 and 9 were added, with wording containing the definition of the concept of the elimination of threats and an indication of what ‘Geoportal’ is as a central point of access to the specified services: 8) elimination of the threat — a set of actions taken by police officers, leading to the eradica- tion of the confirmed threat posted on the Map; 9) Geoportal is a central point of access to the services referred to in article 1 (9) of the law of 4th March, 2010 on the infrastructure of spatial information (Journal of Laws, 2017, item 1382), in the full thematic and territorial range of infrastructure. In § 3, sections 3–8 were added, which indicate that the national coordinator may request from provincial coordinators information on activities undertaken for the benefit of the National Map of Security Threats, and in turn, the provin- cial coordinator may request such information from the local coordinators. The issue of giving, changing and revoking permission to change statuses on the Map of Threats and the obligatory components of such a request was clarified. Also, information was added, according to which the head of the organisational cell responsible for matters of communication and computer science at the National Police Headquarters is responsible for the quarterly input of statistical data received from the heads of the organisational units of the National Police Headquarters: the Office of the National Police Chief, the Uniformed Branch Bureau, the Road Traf- fic Bureau and the Intelligence and Criminal Information Bureau (§ 4a). Upon taking action and eliminating the threat, the manager of the police organisational unit shall immediately inform the local coordinator, who enters a change of status from Confirmed to Confirmed (eliminated) (§ 10 section 2a). In each of the garrisons, provincial commanders issued appropriate legal acts governing the functioning of the NMST in their garrisons. Below are

106 Internal Security, July–December Assessment of the National Map of Security Threats as an Important Element… examples of legal acts governing the functioning of the NMST in selected garrisons. In the Silesian garrison, the way in which the Police perform tasks related to ensur- ing the proper functioning of the NMST is governed by: — decision No. 42/16 of the Commander of the Provincial Police in Katowice of 10.02.2016, on the establishment of the team for the preparation and coordination of the activities related to the operation of the National Map of Security Threats in the Silesian Province; — decision No. 345/2016 of the Commander of the Provincial Police in Katowice of 19.08.2016 on the establishment of the team for the coordination of the activities related to the implementation and functioning of the National Map of Security Threats in the Silesian Province; — decision No. 357/2016 of the Commander of the Provincial Police in Katowice of 29th August 2016 amending the Decision of the Commander of the Provincial Police in Katowice No. 345/2016 of 19 August 2016 on the establishment of the team for the coordination of the activities related to the implementation and operation of the National Map of Security Threats in the Silesian Province; — decision No. 477/2016 of the Commander of the Provincial Police in Katowice of 8.11.2016 on the rules of overseeing the police officers’ performance of tasks related to the operation of the National Map of Security Threats in the Silesian Province. The functioning of the National Map of Security Threats, based on the legal basis quoted in this article, results in the effective coordination of Police activities at the national, provincial, district and municipal levels.

National Map of Security Threats as a platform for the exchange of information between the Police and the public — one of the most important elements of socialisation of the Police

The dialogue function of the National Map of Security Threats is manifested by residents being able to report signals concerning threats over the Internet in an anonymous way and by the Police responding to these reports, i.e. by the veri- fication of each message reported by the citizen and the citizen being able to monitor these responses. Thanks to the information obtained from citizens, the Police may use their staff and resources more rationally, and can better plan the service of police officers. Within the framework of the dialogue and feedback obtained by the Police through communication with the public, the elimination of risks is more efficient and effective, which in turn reinforces the public sense of security. The National Map of Security Threats has given citizens the opportunity to speak in situations of threat, preceding the occurrence of threats and enabling the implementation of public expectations related to the formation (co-shaping) of security on the local scale. This, in turn, enables the Police to perform fast and accurate interventions, and this is where we can see the importance of feed- back in the process of communication between the local community and the Police.

Internal Security, July–December 107 Jadwiga Stawnicka, Iwona Klonowska

Actions taken by the Police are the result of citizens reporting security breaches. The National Map of Security Threats also performs a preventive function by raising con- cerns among lawbreakers. It has received positive reviews as a useful and effective instrument for improving security in local communities. In the dialogue between the Police and the public, it provides an opportunity to make citizens aware of the scale and type of common threats. What is more, the NMST enables efficient management of public security in interinstitutional cooperation and optimal engagement of resources for the performance of official duties by law enforcement institutions. The dialogue between the local community and the Police triggers the self-drive and responsibility of citizens within the area of security and public order, and deepens contacts between the local community and community police officers — it is the citizens that become the source of information about events which require reaction from the Police. The public becomes more active and gets involved in the creation of security in local communities. The NMST is also a tool which diagnoses social problems, as when social debates are conducted, there are discussions on the most important issues diagnosed with the use of the NMST, and social prevention projects are designed in response to the diagnosed security threats.

Evaluation of the National Map of Security Threats by the users in the light of conducted surveys

The National Map of Security Threats has already been assessed several times in the course of the following surveys: — Survey among users of the NMST carried out by the Police in the first quarter of 2017, — Survey among users of the NMST carried out by the Police in the first quarter of 2018, — Assessment of the National Map of Security Threats within the framework of the 10th edition of the Polish Crime Survey, — Assessment of the operation of the NMST in the perception of the inhabit- ants of the Opolskie Province, — Assessment of the operation of the NMST in the perception of the inhabit- ants of the Silesian Province, — Assessment of the operation of the NMST in the perception of the inhabit- ants of the city of Katowice. The first survey on the operation of the National Map of Security Threats was carried out on the www.policja.pl website with the use of a tool — an anony- mous opinion poll questionnaire — in the period of 24.01–03.03.2017, among the NMST users. The questionnaire was filled in by 3433 people. The survey was conducted by the Analyses and Management Control Team of the Office of the National Police Chief. Another evaluation of the NMST was performed in the period of 12.01–07.03.2018, where the sample size was 2421 people. In the period of 01.02–10.03.2018, in turn, a survey based on the PAPI technique (Paper And Pencil Interview) was carried out among the inhabitants of Katowice by the author of this

108 Internal Security, July–December Assessment of the National Map of Security Threats as an Important Element… article, where the sample size was 456 people. The author of this article has car- ried out two projects for the testing of the functioning of the NMST. In the period of 01.09.2017–31.8. 2018, the survey called ‘Safe Katowice. The sense of public security in the perception of Katowice residents’ was carried out among the inhabitants of all of the 22 districts of Katowice. The quantitative survey covered approximately 350 respondents in each district, and direct interviews with the respondents were conducted by the interviewer using the method of interview survey. The second project concerned the operation of the NMST in Opole and was implemented in Humanitas University in Sosnowiec.11 Presented below are selected results of the surveys carried out by the Police in 2017 and 2018 and among the residents of Katowice in 2018 in order to deter- mine trends concerning the assessment of the NMST. In the survey from 2017, respondents were asked 7 questions, and below, a few of them have been selected for analysis.12 The answers to the question about the main reason for visiting the National Map of Security Threats were different in each study. The purpose of reporting a threat prevailed among the responses both during the survey in 2017 (41%), and during the survey in 2018 (55%). Also, the residents of Katowice frequently visit the NMST in order to report a threat, which was the response given by as many as 65.50% of the respondents, whereas visiting the NMST in order to find out what threats were indicated by other residents was declared by 24% of those polled in the survey, by 17% of respondents in the survey of 2018, and by 17.10% of the population of Katowice (2018). One out of five respondents in the survey visiting the NMST to read it had not previously been familiar with this tool. A year later, a smaller percentage of those polled visited the Map to get an idea of what it was (16%). In contrast, among the residents of Katowice in 2018, only one out of ten respondents (11.30%) visited the Map to familiarise themselves with its operation. A much smaller percentage of subjects visited the Map to read the crime statistics (10% in the survey, 7% in 2018, and 4.10% in the survey in Katowice in 2018). Other reasons for visiting the NMST were indicated by 3% of those polled in the survey, 5% in the survey of 2018 and only 2% in the survey conducted in Katowice in 2018. Studies in Katowice confirmed the nationwide rising percentage of respondents who visit the Map in order to report a threat. There is a decrease in the percentage of responses indicating that residents visit the Map to find out what threats other users have indicated, to see statistics on crime, or to familiarise themselves with the Map and the way it operates, which is shown in the following chart.

11 Each of the participants of the seminar has prepared a topic concerning the functioning of the National Map of Security Threats in one of 11 units of the Opole garrison. In the frame- work of the research project, surveys were conducted among participants of social debates in Opole Province in April 2018. The limited spatial framework of this article does not allow of an analysis of the results of all of the surveys. 12 The information on the results of the surveys was obtained from the presentation of the National Coordinator of The National Map of Security Threats — Lt. Col. Dariusz Prządka — ‘The National Map of Security Threats as a tool for dialogue with the society’, delivered at the conference which was held in the Provincial Police Station in Opole on 15.03.2018, and on the basis of the article by Głodziński M and Kłys A — Wyniki sondażu. Policja 997. Special Issue, April 2017, pp. 8–9, and from surveys carried out in 2018.

Internal Security, July–December 109 Jadwiga Stawnicka, Iwona Klonowska

Chart 1. Why do you visit the website of the National Map of Security Threats? Please indicate the main reason

Source: Author’s own study

In the survey of 2017, in response to the question Which categories of the National Map of Security Threats do you consider the most important?, the consumption of alcohol in illegal places was indicated by 24.40% of those polled, illegal parking by 17.20% of respondents, poor organisation of road traffic by 13.90%, and the use of narcotic drugs by 17.40%. In contrast, in the study of 2018, a slightly larger per- centage of respondents (26%) indicated the significance of the category of drinking alcohol in illegal places, also a higher percentage of those polled (22%) indicated illegal parking. The category of Poor traffic organisation was selected by 16% of the surveyed people, and the use of narcotic drugs by 14% of those polled. Among the residents of Katowice, in turn, in the study of 2018, nearly one-third (29.20%) indicated the consumption of alcohol in illegal places, almost the same percentage of subjects (28.30%) selected illegal parking, a much smaller percentage (5.60%) believed that poor traffic organisation falls among the most important categories of the NMST, whereas 11% stated that it is the use of narcotic drugs that is the lead- ing category, cf.: Chart 2.

110 Internal Security, July–December Assessment of the National Map of Security Threats as an Important Element…

Chart 2. Responses to the question Which categories of the National Map of Security Threats do you consider the most important?

Source: Author’s own study

The respondents were also asked how they had learned about the NMST. In the survey, the largest percentage of them (30%) stated that they had learned about the Map from the Internet, from the www.policja.pl website or from the web- sites of police stations. In the survey of 2018, in turn, the percentage of respondents who acquired information about NMST in that way increased. An even greater per- centage of people in Katowice (52%) found out about the NMST from the website of the General Police Headquarters or other Police stations, whereas 29% (survey research), 26% (survey in 2018) and 24% (residents of Katowice) learned about the NMST from other websites. In the survey research, respondents stated that they had learned about NMST from TV (13%), a poster (5%), the radio (4%), leaflets (3%) other sources (18%). In the survey of 2018, in turn, 26% of those polled said that they had learned about the NMST from other websites than those of the Police — from television (12%), from posters (3%), from the radio (3%), from leaflets (2%) and from other sources (19%). The residents of Katowice in 2018 claimed that they learned about the NMST from other websites (24%), from television (5%), from posters (7%), from the radio (7%), from leaflets (2) and from other sources (2%), cf.: Chart 3.

Internal Security, July–December 111 Jadwiga Stawnicka, Iwona Klonowska

Chart 3. Responses to the question ‘How did you learn about the National Map of Security Threats?’

Source: Author’s own study

On 28th July, 2017, new features were introduced in order to facilitate the use of the National Map of Security Threats. One of them was logging out of the application, disabling the automatic removal of threats from the map one month after the time of their posting; adding the status ‘Confirmed (eliminated)’ and ‘Joke or mistake’, adding functionality to display threats about the status ‘Unconfirmed’ for one week from the date of giving such a status and a month from the date of giving the status of ‘Confirmed (eliminated)’, enabling the user posting a threat to include the time of day and days of the week, in addition to the date and time of the event. A significant functionality was to allow the users to post snippets of text (up to 500 characters) and attach up to 3 files with a maximum total size of 5 MB and add in the threat dossier the threat ID, the date of posting the threat and the IP address of the device from which the threat was posted. Among other things, it was also possible to release applications for mobile devices13. The nationwide survey from 2018 evaluated the introduction of these function- alities to the NMST. In response to the question Did you use the new functionalities

13 From the presentation at the conference at the Provincial Police Headquarters in Opole on 15.03.2018 delivered by the National Coordinator of the National Map of Security Threats — Lt. Col. Dariusz Prządka.

112 Internal Security, July–December Assessment of the National Map of Security Threats as an Important Element… while posting a threat on the map? in the nationwide survey (N = 2421), 64% nega- tive and 36% positive answers were obtained, whereas in the survey conducted in Katowice, 55% negative and 45% positive answers were obtained. Respondents also evaluated the possibility of attaching photos, videos, and other attachments. In the nationwide study, as many as 84% of those polled identified the usefulness of this possibility, while 9% rated it as not useful, and 7% of respondents found it difficult to comment on this issue. In contrast, respondents in Katowice also rated the usefulness of this possibility highly (87%), although 5% indicated that the pos- sibility of attaching photos, videos and other attachments is not useful, and for 8%, it was difficult to express their opinion on this issue. In terms of the ability to add a description, the nationwide survey obtained 89% of responses indicating that this possibility was useful, 6% indicated that it was not useful, and 5% said that they found it difficult to judge. In contrast, in the survey conducted in Katowice, as many as 94% of those polled confirmed the useful- ness of adding a description, and only 6% stated that it was hard to answer this question. None of the respondents evaluated the feature as useless. The survey subjects were also asked to make an assessment of the application for mobile devices. In the nationwide survey, 78% of respondents expressed their belief that it was useful, 12% said that it was useless, and 10% said that it was difficult for them to comment on that issue. However, in Katowice, as many as 84% of those polled confirmed the usefulness of the application for mobile devices, 5% claimed it was useless, and 11% said that it was hard to say whether it was useful or useless. The next question concerned the issue of whether the new functionalities would improve the effectiveness of the National Map of Security Threats. In the nation- wide survey, almost three quarters of the respondents answered in the affirmative (73%), the negative answer was given by 11%, and 16% said that ‘it was hard to say’. A higher percentage of the respondents in Katowice answered the question in the affirmative (87%), 3% of respondents in the negative, and the reply: ‘it is hard to say’ was given by 10% of respondents. The subjects in Katowice also listed positive and negative features of the Map. They stressed the fact that the Map let them find out what the biggest threats in their area were, residents could engage in dialogue with the Police and keep them informed about the existent threats, which contributed to improving the threat response time. The importance of anonymity of the applicant was highlighted. The respondents also pointed out a long verification time or the possibility of posting wrong information on the NMST, and raised the problem of inability to use the Map by individuals who do not possess a device with access to the Internet and the lack of sufficient social awareness of the functioning of the Map.

‘Operation of the National Map of Security Threats’ Project in Opole garrison

In the context of the analysis of the National Map of Security Threats opera- tion, I initiated a research project along with the Provincial Headquarters of the Police in Opole, concerning the recognition of the National Map of Security

Internal Security, July–December 113 Jadwiga Stawnicka, Iwona Klonowska

Threats as one of the determinants for shaping the local community, based on the example of the Opole garrison.14 Based on feedback documentation provided by the Opole garrison unit, research project specialists described the operation of the National Map of Security Threats in the given unit, taking into account information about meetings in the unit, debates, ways to promote the Map, ways to post information about the National Map of Security Threats within the given unit, and possible training in the operation of the NMST, if any. Statistical data were subjected to analysis, including the total number of notifications within the unit, and the number of validated notifications. Within the framework of the research project, surveys were carried out among the participants of social debates in the Opole Province. The survey consisted of 17 questions. The inspiration for creating this tool was a questionnaire used in surveys carried out from the 24th January to 3rd March, 2017, in order to compare some of the obtained answers with the answers obtained in surveys and described in one of the sections of this report. This allowed a comparative approach to the assessment of the National Map of Security Threats by its users. In the first question, the project researchers asked the respondents if they knew about the web application of the National Map of Security Threats. Receiving a negative response (I have not heard of it) determined their inability to reply to any further questionnaire questions, while receiving a positive response, either: Yes, I know about it, I’ve used it, and Yes, I’ve heard of it, determines providing answers to the other questions. Answering the second question: Do you know the principles and objectives of the operation of the National Map of Security Threats? the respond- ents had to choose a response from several options. Two of them confirmed good knowledge or very good knowledge of the principles and objectives of the Map operation (Yes, I know them very well, I know them well). Other responses indicated poor knowledge of the principles and objectives of the operation of the National Map of Security Threats (I hardly know them, only by hearsay; I hardly know them, only from the media; I hardly know them, only from other sources). In the case of answers that indicate poor knowledge from other sources, it was necessary to indicate the source of knowledge about the National Map of Security Threats. The last response indicated the lack of knowledge on the topic (I have no knowledge of this topic). In response to the third question, it was necessary to indicate the purpose of vis- iting the National Map of Security Threats. Respondents could choose a response indicating a desire to obtain information concerning the operation of the National Map of Security Threats (I want to learn how the National Map of Security Threats operates), the desire to become acquainted with the threats indicated by other users (I want to see what threats were indicated by other users). Another response option referred to the desire to report a threat (I want to report a threat). Subjects could also

14 The project participants include students of a diploma seminar at the Humanitas University, who under my direction are completing their theses on the operation of the Na- tional Map of Security Threats and, in particular, the operation of the National Map of Security Threats based on the data from the District Police Stations in Brzeg, Głubczyce, Kędzierzyn- Koźle, Kluczbork, Krapkowice, Namysłów, Nysa, Olesno, Opole, Prudnik, Strzelce Opolskie.

114 Internal Security, July–December Assessment of the National Map of Security Threats as an Important Element… choose a response indicating a desire to learn about crime statistics (I want to learn about crime statistics). The last option was associated with an indication of a differ- ent purpose of visiting the National Map of Security Threats. In response to the fourth question, the most important categories of the National Map of Security Threats were to be indicated (from 1 to 3 responses) among the following categories: acts of vandalism, homelessness, wild swimming, wild garbage dump, poaching, minors’ gathering points, dangerous places within water areas, illegal woodcutting, illegal car rallies, incorrect road marking, illegal parking, unguarded level crossings, ungated level crossing, poor road infrastruc- ture, destruction of greenery, navigating quads within the forest areas, speeding, alcohol consumption in prohibited areas, drowning, use of narcotic drugs, grass burning, traffic incidents involving forest animals, abusing animals, poor traffic organisation, begging, I have no opinion. In reply to the fifth question, respondents chose out of the above categories the least significant (from 1 to 3 responses). The respondents also reported the frequency of using the National Map of Security Threats (I used it for the first time, I have used it from 2 to 5 times, I have used it from 6 to 10 times, I have used it more than 10 times). The next question indicated the source of information about the National Map of Security Threats. The respondents chose one of several responses (from the Internet — Police website www.policja.pl; from the Internet — a site other than the Police website www.policja.pl; from the TV; from the radio; from a poster; from a flier; in another way). The subjects assessed the National Map of Security Threats in a general way (rating: very good, good, bad, very bad, it’s hard to say). Then the sub- jects answered a few questions, on a scale of I totally agree, I agree, I tend to disagree, I strongly disagree, It’s hard to say. The questions are as follows: Will the National Map of Security Threats contribute to the decrease in the number of crimes/offences which are particularly burdensome for the society? Will the National Map of Security Threats improve the efficiency of the Police? Do you think the National Map of Security Threats will raise the sense of security among the citizens? Another question concerned the assessment of the National Map of Security Threats in terms of the ease of use (In your opinion, is the National Map of Security Threats easy to use?) Then, an open question was included in the survey: Do you think something should be changed in the operation of the National Map of Security Threats? The final part of the survey contains a question: Is the National Map of Security Threats useful? with three variants of answers (Yes, it’s useful; No, it is not useful; I have no opinion). The subjects were supposed to respond to statements indicat- ing the positive features of the National Map of Security Threats (universality, free access, ease of use, speed of transmission of information), by selecting one of the three answers (Yes, No, I have no opinion). In the next instruction, the respondents were supposed to mention other positive features of the National Map of Security Threats. Then they were to respond to the statement ‘The negative characteristics of the National Map of Security Threats include: inadequate ‘capacity’ of the electronic transmission of information, the need for a computer or another device with Internet access, the lack of individual responses with the choice of answers (Yes, No, I have no opinion), which was followed by a request to list other negative features of the National Map of Security Threats. Then the metrics were included (gender, age, education, social status, place of residence).

Internal Security, July–December 115 Jadwiga Stawnicka, Iwona Klonowska Conclusions

The National Map of Security Threats has become an effective platform for the exchange of information between the Police and the public, providing a valu- able source for acquiring knowledge about social needs related to security. It is the result of an innovative and flexible approach in terms of the means and meth- ods of Police work. Nowadays, traditional methods and forms of work, including direct communication with citizens, police responses and patrolling the streets are not sufficient, since they should be complemented with modern solutions in the field of technology and interpersonal communication. The dialogue of the Police with the public on the operation of the National Map of Security Threats began during the public consultations. The dialogue between the Police and the local community is intensified through regular research into the operation of the National Map of Security Threats, conducted among local communities. The National Map of Security Threats has become a platform for the exchange of information in the field of general security and an essential element of the public security manage- ment process carried out by the Polish Police. It should be stressed that there is a need for the continuous assessment of the operation of the National Map of Security Threats by its users. This enables the improvement of the dialogue with the Police for the sake of internal security. It is essential to highlight the need for the Police to cooperate with the scientific community on the issue of regular research into the assessment of the operation of the NMST by its users. The NMST is a modern and useful tool which reinforces the sense of security among local communities. At the same time, information campaigns concerning the National Map of Security Threats should be intensified so that a higher percentage of citizens are aware of the existence and operation of such a tool. The Map requires a joint action by the Police and local communities. The active exchange of information, the dialogue between the Police and local residents brings continuous positive effects. It should be pointed out that as a con- sequence of the creation of the platform the trust between the Police and the local community has been strengthened.

References

1. Głodziński M, Kłys A, Wyniki sondażu. Policja 997. Special edition, April 2017. 2. Klonowska I, Stawnicka J, Partnerstwo służb dzielnicowych ze społecznością lokalną na rzecz bezpieczeństwa wewnętrznego z perspektywy działań społeczno-wychowawczych. General Police Headquarters. Warsaw, 2017. 3. Maciejczak P, Krajowa Mapa Zagrożeń Bezpieczeństwa w Polsce. Policja 997, 2016, No. 7. 4. Maciejczak P, Polacy ufają Krajowej Mapie Zagrożeń Bezpieczeństwa. An inter- view with Jarosław Zieliński, Secretary of State in the Ministry of the Interior and Administration, Policja 997. Special edition, 2017, No. 9. 5. Minkiewicz D, Funkcje Krajowej Mapy Zagrożeń Bezpieczeństwa w kształtowaniu bezpieczeństwa społeczności lokalnej. Kwartalnik Policyjny, 2017, No. 3.

116 Internal Security, July–December Assessment of the National Map of Security Threats as an Important Element…

6. Polończyk A, Zagrożenia bezpieczeństwa informacyjnego na przykładzie Krajowej Mapy Zagrożeń Bezpieczeństwa, [in:] Batorowska H, Musiał E (Eds), Bezpieczeństwo informacyjne w dyskursie naukowym, Wydawnictwo Uniwer- sytetu Pedagogicznego w Krakowie. Cracow, 2017. 7. Stawnicka J, Dialogiczny wymiar bezpieczeństwa. Rzecz o polskiej Policji. Kato- wice, 2013. 8. Stawnicka J, Klonowska I, Rola dzielnicowego w nowoczesnej formacji poli- cyjnej z perspektywy działań edukacyjno-wychowawczych i profi laktycznych w społecznościach lokalnych. General Police Headquarters. Warsaw, 2017. 9. Stawnicka J, Klonowska I, Krajowa Mapa Zagrożeń Bezpieczeństwa nową formą dialogu polskiej Policji ze społecznością lokalną na rzecz bezpieczeństwa wewnętrznego — w aspekcie społeczno-pedagogicznym. Sosnowiec: Ofi cyna Wydawnicza Humanitas, 2018.

About the Authors

Jadwiga Stawnicka, Professor, an author of more than 170 publications, including 13 scientifi c monographs, including 8 monographs discussing the issue of Police functioning, a member of the Scientifi c Council of Forensic Expertise Institute and national and international associations, a member of the Scientifi c Council of the ‘Policja 997’ magazine. She cooperates with uniformed services in the academic, educational and organisational areas. Her scope of interests includes the issues of: security, communication in management, human aspects of management, strategies of internal and external communication of an enterprise, communication in crisis situations, psychology of confl ict and negotiations, police sciences, organisational culture in the Police, community policing — philosophy of policing, security policy. E-mail: [email protected] Iwona Klonowska, Colonel, Assoc. Prof., Commandant-Rector of the Police Academy in Szczytno, a psychologist, pedagogue, therapist, holder of several majors of post-graduate studies and participant in numerous trainings. In 2018, she obtained a post-doctoral degree in the fi eld of social sciences. She is a long-serving academic teacher. She is authorised to conduct research in Transport Psychology. A certifi ed master of neuro-linguistic programming, a practitioner of aggression replacement training (ART), the editor-in-chief of ‘Policja 997’ magazine, a member of the Scientifi c Council of the Police Quarterly at the Police Training Centre — previously, the editor-in-chief. A member of many national and international societies, a co-organiser of several national and international conferences, a co-author of several scientifi c projects, an academic teacher with many years of experience and an author of dozens of articles and publications. Her scope of interests includes such issues as: security, communication, including communication in management, strategies of internal and external communication of institutions, communication in crisis situations, psychology of police science and organisational culture in the police. E-mail: [email protected].

Streszczenie. Obecnie w Polsce zauważa się zmiany w relacjach ze społeczeństwem o charakterze dialogu. W artykule opisano funkcjonowanie ‘Krajowej Mapy Zagrożeń Bezpieczeństwa’ — istotnego elementu procesu zarządzania bezpieczeństwem publicznym przez polską Policję, wskazano działanie tego narzędzia oraz omówiono wyniki badań własnych oceny ‘Krajowej Mapy Zagrożeń Bezpieczeństwa’ przez mieszkańców województwa śląskiego. Wyniki te zostały porównane z wynikami badań ogólnopolskich przeprowadzanych przez polską Policję. Niniejszy artykuł składa się z kilku części. W pierwszej z nich wskazano, że ‘Krajowa Mapa Zagrożeń Bezpieczeństwa’ jest narzędziem kontaktowania się społeczeństwa z Policją. Dzięki informacjom uzyskanym od obywateli Policja może w sposób racjonalny wykorzystywać swoje zasoby, lepiej planować działania w społecznościach lokalnych. W ramach dialogu i uzyskiwania informacji zwrotnych przez Policję komunikującą się ze społeczeństwem eliminowanie ryzyka jest bardziej

Internal Security, July–December 117 Jadwiga Stawnicka, Iwona Klonowska wydajne i skuteczne, co z kolei — wzmacnia poczucie bezpieczeństwa obywateli. ‘Krajowa Mapa Zagrożeń Bezpieczeństwa’ dała obywatelom możliwość wypowiedzenia się w sytuacjach zagrożenia, poprzedzających wystąpienie zagrożeń i umożliwiających realizację oczekiwań społecznych związanych z kształtowaniem (współkształtowaniem) bezpieczeństwa w skali lokalnej. W drugiej części artykułu omówiono akty prawne regulujące funkcjonowanie ‘Krajowej Mapy Zagrożeń Bezpieczeństwa’. ‘Krajowa Mapa zagrożeń Bezpieczeństwa’ jest platformą wymiany informacji między Policją a społeczeństwem. Stanowi ona jeden z najważniejszych elementów uspołecznienia Policji. Autorki prezentują opinie użytkowników na temat Krajowej Mapy Zagrożeń Bezpieczeństwa w świetle przeprowadzonych badań. W ostatniej części artykułu omówiono projekt ‘Funkcjonowanie Krajowej Mapy Zagrożeń Bezpieczeństwa’, który był realizowany w garnizonie opolskim. Projekt zakończył się w 2019 roku, a jego efektem były opracowania dotyczące oceny funkcjonowania ‘Krajowej Mapy Zagrożeń Bezpieczeństwa’ we wszystkich jednostkach garnizonu opolskiego.

Zusammenfassung. Derzeit ist in Polen eine Veränderung der Beziehungen zwischen Polizei und Gesellschaft in Form eines Dialogs festzustellen. Der Artikel beschreibt die Funktionsweise der nationalen Karte des Sicherheitsrisikos, ein wichtiges Element im Prozess des Managements der öffentlichen Sicherheit, das von der polnischen Polizei durchgeführt wird. Es wird dann die Funktionsweise dieses Instruments vorgestellt und demnächst wurden die Ergebnisse persönlicher Untersuchungen zur Bewertung der von den Bewohnern der schlesischen Provinz erstellten nationalen Karte der Sicherheitsbedrohungen erörtert. Die Ergebnisse werden weiter mit den Ergebnissen der landesweiten Umfrage der polnischen Polizei verglichen. Dieser Aufsatz besteht aus mehreren Teilen. Der erste von ihnen gab an, dass die nationale Karte der Sicherheitsbedrohungen ein Kontaktinstrument zwischen der Öffentlichkeit und der Polizei ist. Dank den von den Bürgern gewonnen Informationen kann die Polizei ihre Gewalt und Ressourcen rationaler einsetzen und dann auch den Dienst der Polizeibeamten besser planen. Im Rahmen des Dialogs und der Einholung von Rückmeldungen von der Polizei, die mit der Öffentlichkeit im Kontakt bleibt, ist die Beseitigung von Risiken effizienter und effektiver, was wiederum das öffentliche Sicherheitsgefühl stärkt. Die nationale Karte der Sicherheitsbedrohungen hat den Bürgern die Möglichkeit gegeben, sich in Notsituationen vor dem Auftreten von Bedrohungen auszudrücken und soziale Erwartungen in Bezug auf die Gestaltung (Mitgestaltung) der Sicherheit auf lokaler Ebene zu verwirklichen. Im zweiten Teil des Artikels werden die Rechtsvorschriften für den Betrieb der nationalen Karte der Sicherheitsbedrohungen erörtert. Die National Security Risk Map ist eine Plattform für den Informationsaustausch zwischen der Polizei und Öffentlichkeit. Dies ist eines der wichtigsten Elemente der Sozialisierung der Polizei. Die Bewertung der nationalen Karte der Sicherheitsbedrohungen von ihren Benutzern wurde im Lichte der durchgeführten Umfragen vorgestellt. Der letzte Teil des Artikels befasst sich mit dem Projekt ‘Betrieb der nationalen Karte der Sicherheitsbedrohungen’, das in der Polizeigarnison von Opole durchgeführt wurde. Dieses Projekt wurde eben 2019 abgeschlossen. Es führte zu Studien zur Bewertung der Funktionsweise der nationalen Karte des Sicherheitsrisikos in allen Polizeieinheiten in Opole.

Резюме. В настоящее время в Польше происходят изменения в отношениях с обществом, основой которых является диалог. В статье описывается функционирование «Карты угроз национальной безопасности» — важного элемента процесса обеспечения польской полицией безопасности населения, дается описание применения данного инструмента, а также обсуждаются результаты анализа исследовнаия «Карты угроз национальной безопасности», проведенного среди жителей Силезского воеводства. Полученные результаты были сопоставлены с результатами национального исследования, проведенного польской полицией. Данная статья состоит из нескольких частей. В первой части отмечается, что «Карта угроз национальной безопасности» является инструментом связи населения с полицией. Благодаря информации, полученной от граждан, полиция может эффективно использовать свои ресурсы и опти- мально планировать свою деятельность на местном уровне. В рамках диалога и получения полицией информации от населения, устранение рисков является более эффективным и результативным, что, в свою очередь, повышает уровень чувства безопасности граждан. «Карта угроз национальной безопасности» предоставила гражданам возможность передать информацию в ситуации возникновения опасности, а также до момента ее возникновения, что позволяет реализовать ожидания общества, связанные с формированием (соформированием) безопасности в локальном масштабе. Во второй части статьи рассматриваются правовые акты, регулирующие применение «Карты угроз национальной безопасности». «Карта угроз национальной безопасности» является платформой для обмена информацией между полицией и населением. Это один из важнейших элементов процесса социального взаи- модействия полиции. Авторы представляют мнение пользователей о «Карте угроз национальной безопасности» в контексте проведенного исследования. В последней части статьи обсуждается проект «Функционирование карты угроз национальной безопасности», который проводился в подразделениях полиции Опольского воеводства. Проект был завершен в 2019 году, и по его итогам были подготовлены материалы по оценке функционирования «Карты угрозы национальной безопасности» во всех подразделениях полиции Опольского воеводства.

118 Internal Security, July–December LAW

Instruments for the Protection of Victims of Natural Disasters in Polish Tax Law

Aleksy Goettel ORCID: 0000-0003-2147-6174 University of Economics and Human Sciences in Warsaw, Poland

Abstract. The destructive impact of natural disasters (and other random events that are usually difficult to predict) is increasingly being felt in all areas of the functioning of modern states. The governments of those countries (often in cooperation with local authorities) take various measures to prevent such events and to minimise their consequences, including helping victims of their occurrence. One way to achieve some of the above intentions — although certainly not of fundamental importance — is the use of tax law instruments, in particular tax preferences. This study is an attempt to analyse and assess these provisions of tax law that allow victims of natural disasters to benefit from preferential tax rules. The study discusses the tax instruments used to help victims of natural disasters used by tax authorities. The analysis shows that the system of tax instruments protecting victims of natural disasters is largely based on discretionary solutions, used only as a result of an appropriate procedure followed by a formal decision of an authorised body (legal act or decision). In light of the studies carried out, it can be concluded in general that the system of tax instruments to protect persons affected by natural disasters requires certain measures to improve its effectiveness. Certain requests in this regard, addressed to the legislature, were generally indicated in the study. The article also presents some specific issues related to the interpretation of the regulations under consideration, including some editorial and terminology doubts. DOI: 10.5604/01.3001.0014.6685 http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0014.6685

Keywords: tax, tax preferences, tax exemption

Introduction Today, there is a belief that the basic tasks of the state are, among others, ensuring a minimum1 of security for its citizens and the implementation of a social function of protecting the poorest2 or otherwise in need of support3. The above tasks of the State are of particular importance in a situation where the risks affecting the popu- lation arise from difficult-to-predict events that are not easily prevented. Such circumstances include random events such as natural disasters caused by the action of forces of nature, i.e. inc. floods, fires, downpours, droughts, extreme temperatures, etc. The assistance provided by the State in such cases serves, of course, not only to direct victims of these incidents, but also to ensure order and internal security. It is extremely important that the protection of victims of natural disasters should be carried out using different methods and means. The State should certainly take coordinated action, the common objective of which is to remove the immediate threat to human life and health, as well as property and the environment. However, this does not end with the state’s task. Another element of the disaster protection

1 Kustra E, Wstęp do nauk o państwie i prawie. Toruń, 1997, p. 57. 2 Seidler G.L, Groszyk H, Malarczyk J, Pieniążek A, Wstęp do nauki o państwie i prawie. Lublin, 1993, p. 58. 3 Nitecki S, Prawo do pomocy społecznej w polskim systemie prawnym. Warsaw, 2008, p. 11.

Internal Security, July–December 119 Aleksy Goettel system is wealth aid. It can be assumed that the wealth aid provided to victims of nat- ural disasters may take in a twofold form. Firstly, these persons are paid various cash benefits from the state budget or budgets of local authorities. Sometimes, however, the protection of persons affected by natural disasters takes a non-monetary form and consists in the transfer of various types of goods, e.g. food, medicines, clothing, cleaning products or meeting housing needs. Secondly, which is of great importance for these considerations, the protection of victims of natural disasters may consist in reducing or abolishing certain public benefits4. As you can see, the effect of sup- port is achieved in this case not by transferring goods that increase a person’s assets, but by removing or reducing the scope of the benefit, the implementation of which would lead to the depletion of his or her assets. It should be emphasised that the use of such forms of aid is of the greatest value in terms of taxation. Among all forced public-law benefits, taxes are of the greatest socio-economic importance. It is worth noting that the state’s abandonment of part of the tax income is due to a number of reasons. Improving the situation of persons affected by natural disasters is just one of many reasons for reducing or abolishing fiscal burdens and which, in general, are connected with the State’s policy on family protection, social care, environmental pro- tection, economic support, etc.5. In the doctrine of tax law, such actions are considered as a manifestation of the implementation of the non-fiscal function of the tax (that is, the function of using tax for purposes other than the collection of public revenue)6. In practice, the tax-based non-fiscal instruments consist primarily of establishing tax reliefs and exemptions7. The above refers to the case of persons who have suffered certain losses as a result of natural disasters, especially property damage. As taxpay- ers, they can count on preferential taxation. Sometimes they avoid tax completely. This article attempts to identify these instruments provided for in Polish tax law, which, by benefiting victims of natural disasters (and other random events), allow them to reduce (sometimes completely) the amount of taxes paid. Further- more, the aim of the study is to critically analyse the solutions in force in this area and to notify (where deemed necessary) possible demands on the legislature.

Prefe rences for victims of natural disasters in Personal Income Tax

The abovementioned tax, governed by the Law of 26 July 1991 on Personal Income Tax8, provides for a significant number of tax preferences. This is due to the fact that natural persons, unlike other categories of taxpayers, have certain

4 Manolakas C, The Tax Law and Policy of Natural Disasters. Baylor Law Review, 2019, Vol. 1, Issue 71, pp. 61–62. 5 Mastalski R, Prawo podatkowe. Warsaw, 2018, p. 36. 6 Ofiarski Z, Ogólne prawo podatkowe. Zagadnienia materialnoprawne i proceduralne. Warsaw, 2010, pp. 30–32. 7 It is worth noting that the non-fiscal function of tax law can also consist, for example, in the application of tax sanctions, dissuasive from certain conduct — Głuchowski J, Polskie prawo podatkowe. Warsaw, 2002, p. 20. 8 Dz. U. of 2019, item 1387 with later amendments.

120 Internal Security, July–December Instruments for the Protection of Victims of Natural Disasters in Polish Tax Law specific characteristics justifying the so-called ‘personalisation’ of tax rules. This per- sonalisation consists in adapting the tax to the individual situation of the taxpayer, in view of, for example, his or her family status, property status, health and other circumstances9. Among all of the reasons why individuals can count on relaxed tax rules, some of them directly concern random events, including natural disasters. The regulations on personal income tax provide for several solutions of particular impor tance for taxpayers who have suf fered cer tain losses as a result of natural disasters. First, the Personal Income Tax Ac t provides that income tax-free benef its are received in the case of individual random events, natural disasters, long-term illness or death: a) from the social fund, the occupational social security fund, from trade union funds or in accordance with separate rules issued by the competent minister, regardless of their amount, b) from other sources — up to an amount not exceeding PLN 6000 in the tax year10. In examining the abovementioned provision, it is easy to note that the extent of the support received by a taxpayer who is the victim of a natural disaster (a random event) depends on the type of source from which the allowance aid is paid. Only allowances paid by name-specified funds or in accordance with sepa- rate regulations issued by the competent minister are subject to a complete tax exemption. As regards allowances from ‘other sources‘, the tax exemption covers only PLN 6000 per tax year. Tax must be paid on excess over this amount. It must therefore be held that the instrument in question is mixed, it constitutes both — a tax exemption and a tax credit. Some controversies relate to the understanding of the concept of ‘benefits‘ mainly due to the fact that the legislature used that term in plural. The official position on this matter was taken by the tax authorities, considering that, since the tax legislation does not define the concept of ‘support’, it must be assumed, in accordance with the Polish language dictionaries, that this is a one-off cash benefit for financial support11. Secondly, similar to the one discussed above, the instrument for the protection of victims of natural disasters consists in exempting from income tax benefits received for single material assistance financed by the State budget or the budgets of local authorities in connection with a random event12. It should be noted that, on the one hand, the material scope of this tax exemption is very broad. It covers not only cash benefits, but also in-kind assistance13 (it must be borne in mind that Polish personal income tax also charges benefits in kind14). At the same time, the phrase ‘in connection with a random event‘ — given the wide range of meanings — allows the tax exemption to be applied to a number of difficult-to-predict circumstances, including, of course, natural disasters. Furthermore, no conditions are provided for in the provisions cited as to the maximum amount (value) of material aid. Therefore,

9 Małecka E, Podatek dochodowy jako regulator dochodów osób fizycznych w Polsce. Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny, 2005, Issue 2, p. 134. 10 Art. 21, § 2, item 26. 11 Pismo Dyrektora Krajowej Informacji Skarbowej z dnia 4 września 2019, 0115-KDIT2- 2.4011.267.2019.1.BK. 12 Art. 21, § 2, item 26a. 13 Pismo Dyrektora Krajowej Informacji Skarbowej z dnia 31 stycznia 2018,0115-KDIT2- 2.4011.369.2017.1.MM 14 Wyrok WSA w Gliwicach z dnia 15 kwietnia 2019, I SA/Gl 293/18.

Internal Security, July–December 121 Aleksy Goettel aid of any amount (value) benefits from a tax exemption. On the other hand, the tax exemption at issue is granted only for one-off financial assistance (which excludes the inclusion of permanent benefits). Moreover, the condition for the benefit of this instrument is to finance aid from a well-defined source, such as the State budget or the budget of a local authority. Thirdly, the provisions of the Law governing personal income tax have a group of tax exemptions which combine a single common feature — they are desig- nated by the municipal council (on the basis of a separate law15) of areas where the construction of new buildings, reconstruction and expansion, reconstruction and superstructure of existing buildings resulting from the need to ensure the safety of people and property is prohibited16. Particularly importantly, the threat to human and property safety in this case must be a consequence of floods, wind, landslides or other elements17. As you can easily guess, this kind of interference by the public authority may lead to a significant restriction of freedom in the use of the prop- erty, even completely preventing the use of the property (including expropriation of a real estate). For this reason, it is provided that the owner of the property may (after fulfilling certain conditions) apply one of the following solutions: a) to claim compensation from the municipality for the damage suffered, b) require the munic- ipality to buy the property or part thereof, c) apply to the mayor or mayor of the city for a change of property (the use of which was restricted by the above prohibition) into a property owned by the municipality. In each of these situations, the owner of the property obtains a taxable profit. In the first situation, the source of income is the amount of compensation paid. In the event of a sale of the property, the source of income is the amount obtained from the sale for consideration, received from the municipality. Whereas, the conversion of the property will be beneficial for the owner if the conversion results in the acquisition of property with a value higher than the value of the property acquired by the municipality and the municipal- ity (under the relevant legislation) exempts him from payment of the surcharge. Given that obtaining an advantage is a consequence of specific events that the owner has no influence on, the legislature considered that those advantages should not be taxed. Fourthly, the provision of support to victims of natural disasters consists in exempting social assistance benefits from income tax18. In this case, it is mainly a matter of exempting special allowances from tax to cover expenditure result- ing from a random event19 and special allowances to cover expenditure relating to a natural or environmental disaster20. Importantly, the above exemptions are granted irrespective of the amount of support provided.

15 Ustawa z dnia 11 sierpnia 2001 o szczególnych zasadach odbudowy, remontów i roz- biórek obiektów budowlanych zniszczonych lub uszkodzonych w wyniku działania żywiołu, Dz. U. of 2018, item 1345 with later amendments. 16 Art. 21, § 2, item 29a. 17 Dz. U. 2018, item 1345, art. 1, item 1. 18 Art. 21, § 2, item 79. 19 Art. 17, § 1, item 6 ustawy z dnia 12 marca 2004 r. o pomocy społecznej, Dz.U. 2019, item 1507 with later amendments. 20 Art. 18, § 1, item 4 Ustawy z dnia 12 marca 2004 r. o pomocy społecznej, Dz.U. 2019, item 1507 with later amendments.

122 Internal Security, July–December Instruments for the Protection of Victims of Natural Disasters in Polish Tax Law Support for victims of natural disasters under the goods and services tax

The tax preferences presented above are only available on income tax and apply only to certain categories of benefits, which are more or less strictly defined. How- ever, it is worth pointing out that victims of natural disasters are usually taxpayers of other taxes as well. The question should therefore be raised: Can a taxpayer who is a victim of a natural disaster (or other random event) receive support on the basis of e.g. consumer taxes? The analysis of the provisions governing the Polish goods and services tax21 clearly shows that there are also certain solutions in that tax which, in fact, pro- vide assistance to victims of natural disasters, although, as characteristic of this instrument, it is not directly addressed to those victims. This is specifically about exempting from taxation imports of goods imported by state organisational units, social organisations or organisational units statutorily set up to carry out charitable activities or to carry out humanitarian aid if the goods are intended to be distributed free of charge to the victims of a natural disaster or made available to the victims of a natural disaster, and remain the property of those units22. Goods imported by rescue units for their purposes in connection with their activities shall also be exempt from tax23. As already mentioned, the instruments providing assistance to victims of disasters provided for in the goods and services tax are not directly implemented by the victims, but by importers. However, it is difficult not to see that the actual addressees of those exemptions are precisely the above victims, since the imported goods are intended to enable them to be assisted. The tax literature emphasises that the tax exemption in question has a wide scope, since the law does not specify what kind of goods are tax-free24. However, the law makes it clear that the tax exemption does not apply to materials and equipment intended for the reconstruction of areas affected by a natural disaster or other disaster, which in turn quite significantly weakens the intended impact of the instrument under consideration25.

Discretionary tax preferences for victims of natural disasters granted by tax authorities

Notwithstanding the tax credits and exemptions provided for in the laws governing individual taxes, the legislature has created the basis for granting tax preferences in the so-called ‘general tax law’, contained primarily in the Act

21 Ustawa z dnia 11 marca 2004 o podatku od towarów i usług, Dz.U. 2018, item 2174 with later amendments. 22 Art. 63, § 1, item 1. 23 Art. 63, § 1, item 2. 24 Bartosiewicz A, VAT. Komentarz, wyd. XIII, Wolters Kluwer Polska, LEX, 2019. 25 Art. 63, § 3.

Internal Security, July–December 123 Aleksy Goettel on the Rule for Taxation Act26). It is important to bear in mind that the general tax law applies to all taxes. However, it is even more important that these provisions establish a number of tax preferences, which are available to, among others, vic- tims of natural disasters. These preferences, generally referred to as tax reliefs, are of a different nature and may consist, for example, of the postponement of the tax payment deadline, the spread of the tax payment in instalments, the redemption (in whole or in part) of the tax arrears and the postponement of the other deadlines foreseen in provisions of tax law27. It should be emphasised that the allowances in question are (in principle) granted by the tax authority at the request of the tax- payer28. However, the most important issue refers to conditions that must be met for a taxpayer to acquire the right to one of the indicated tax preferences. Further consideration should be taken by emphasising that the legislature, when creating rules governing the presented tax reliefs, rightly considered that they should apply in a number of different circumstances, which are sometimes difficult to predict. It was therefore accepted that the conditions for the application of the above instru- ments needed to be formulated in a general manner and in such a way as to ensure the performance of their functions. Consequently, as is apparent from the provi- sions of the Law, it is possible to grant relief to the taxpayer ‘in cases justified by an important interest of the taxpayer or the public interest‘. The answer to the follow- ing questions is, of course, crucial. What should be understood by the ‘important interest of the taxpayer‘ and ‘public interest‘? How do these concepts (if any) involve the protection of victims of natural disasters in tax law? In clarifying the meaning of the phrases ‘important interest of the taxpayer‘ and ‘public interest‘, the administrative courts played a major role. One court judge- ment states, for example, that an important interest of a taxpayer is ‘a situation where, because of extraordinary random cases, the taxpayer is unable to settle the tax arrears. This will include, for example, a loss of earning opportunities, and loss of random property. The public interest is a situation where the payment of tax arrears will necessitate the taxpayer to receive State aid because he or she will not be able to meet their material needs‘29. Another judgement states that ‘[t]he concept of an important interest of a taxpayer cannot be limited to extraordinary situations or random events preventing tax arrears from being settled, since this concept functions in a much broader sense, taking into account not only emergency situations but also the normal economic situation of the taxpayer, the amount of the revenue and expenditure he or she receives and, and in this regard also expenses incurred in connection with the protection of the health of one’s own or immediate family members (medical expenses)30. It is easy to note that, in both of the judgements cited, the courts referred to ‘emergencies‘ and ‘random events‘

26 Ustawa z dnia 29 sierpnia 1997 — Ordynacja podatkowa, Dz.U. 2019, item 900 as amended. 27 Art. 67a, § 1, items 1–3; Art. 48, § 1–2. 28 The name of the tax preferences category under consideration — ‘discretionary allow- ances’ — is due to the fact that their grant is based on the so-called ‘administrative approval (discretion)’ of the tax authority. See more: Dzwonkowski H, Zgierski Z, Procedury podatkowe. Warsaw, 2006, p. 561. 29 Wyrok NSA w Szczecinie z 22 kwietnia 1999, SA/Sz 850/98. 30 Wyrok NSA z dnia 10 marca 2009, I FSK 31/08.

124 Internal Security, July–December Instruments for the Protection of Victims of Natural Disasters in Polish Tax Law as circumstances relevant to granting the tax credit to the taxpayer. Already on the basis of the two court statements, it can be assumed that natural disasters, as random events, may constitute an argument in favour of providing support to the taxpayer in the form of a tax credit. Sometimes, however, in court case-law, one may come across an unequivocal opinion that for the assessment of whether there is a threat to an important taxpayer’s interest or a public interest, the fact of a natural disaster is essential. For example, in one judgement, the court held that ‘[a]ccording to a generally approved hierarchy of values, socio-economic condi- tions in favour of granting relief may, in particular, be situations where, because of extraordinary random cases, the taxpayer is unable to settle tax arrears. This will, for example, be a loss of earning opportunities or loss of random property, such as due to a natural disaster’31. A similar argument is present in many other rulings32. As you can see, there is an undoubted link between the threat of the taxpayer’s interest or the public interest (as a condition for granting the taxpayer a tax credit) and the occurrence of a natural disaster. However, it is appropriate to pay attention to certain issues that require comment. First of all, not every natural disaster has consequences severe enough to speak of a threat to any business. Therefore, the point is not to conclude from the very fact of the occurrence of, e.g., flood or drought, that the interest of the taxpayer who fell victim to it was endangered to the extent that it would grant him or her a tax preference. The jurisprudence of administrative courts clearly emphasises that for a natural disaster to justify the granting of tax relief to a taxpayer, it is necessary to state that this event prevents (in whole or at least in part) payment of the tax33. Another issue is directly related to the one above. The regulations indicate that while in the case of public interest, it is enough for it to be threatened (which is suf- ficient to apply the tax relief), the relief of the taxpayer will be granted only when his or her important interest is threatened. It is not difficult to guess that the assess- ment of the meaning of the ‘important’ interest of the taxpayer is very subjective and causes numerous controversies. Preferential treatment of the public interest over the taxpayer’s interest may also raise some axiological doubts. However, it should be clearly emphasised that from the point of view of the procedure aimed at establishing the existence of the conditions for applying the tax credit, ‘important taxpayer’s interest’ and ‘public interest’ have the status of equivalent conditions34. It should also be noted that the conjunction ‘or’ is used between the terms ‘impor- tant taxpayer interest’ and ‘public interest’. This means that tax relief can be granted in three situations: a) solely because of the ‘important taxpayer’s interest’, b) only because of the ‘public interest’, c) together due to the ‘important taxpayer interest’ and the ‘interest public’. However, in the event of natural disasters, quite often there

31 Wyrok WSA w Szczecinie z dnia 7 listopada 2018, I SA/Sz 281/18. 32 Wyrok WSA w Gorzowie Wielkopolskim z dnia 30 października 2019, I SA/Go 607/19; wyrok WSA w Kielcach z dnia 19 września 2019, I SA/Ke 202/19; wyrok WSA w Łodzi z dnia 25 września 2018, I SA/Łd 292/18. 33 Wyrok WSA w Gdańsku z dnia 15 kwietnia 2014, I SA/Gd 1665/13; wyrok WSA w Kra- kowie z dnia 12 listopada 2014, I SA/Kr 227/14. 34 Orłowski J, Uzasadnienie decyzji w sprawie ulgi w spłacie zobowiązania podatkowego niebędącej pomocą publiczną, [in:] Dowgier R (Ed.), Ordynacja podatkowa. Wokół nowelizacji. Białystok, 2009, p. 184.

Internal Security, July–December 125 Aleksy Goettel is a threat to both types of interest — public and private (e.g. as a result of flooding, the farmer stops operating and is forced to dismiss his employees). It is of course possible that, for example, ‘the taxpayer’s important interest’ will be threatened at the same time as a result of a flood (or other natural disaster) and due to other circumstances. All potential circumstances affect the assessment of whether a tax- payer shall acquire the right to a tax credit.

Support to taxpayers aff ected by natural disasters provided by the Minister of Finance

The tax preferences discussed above are applied only to individual taxpayers. In other words, the granting of a tax credit or tax exemption to the taxpayer takes place in the context of a relationship between him or her and the tax authority, and does not apply to other taxpayers. However, the Polish tax law also establishes a different type of instrument. This is the power of the Minister of Finance to refrain in whole or in part from collecting taxes (the Minister then determines the type of tax, the period during which the omission occurs and the group of taxpayers concerned) and to exempt certain groups of payers from the obligation to collect taxes or tax advances and to set the deadline for payment of the tax35. A character- istic feature of this instrument stems from the fact that it is introduced in the form of a regulation (ordinance), that is to say, a legislative act addressed to a potentially very wide range of taxpayers. It is not difficult to guess that this solution is used exceptionally, in particularly justified cases, due to the rather significant impact on the public finances of the state and local authorities. Similar to the preferences discussed above, the instrument under consideration is used ‘in cases justified by the public interest or of an important interest of taxpayers‘. The reasons why these regulations have been issued vary greatly, as these are social, humanitarian, economic, international and even sanitary or educational considerations. As has already been explained, the occurrence of a natural disaster can undoubt- edly jeopardise both the public interest and the interests of the taxpayer. There should therefore be no doubt that the potential reason for granting a certain category of taxpayers the tax preference in question refers to the negative conse- quences of various natural disasters. It can even be said that the failure to collect a tax under the regulation (ordinance) is a very convenient solution in the event of a natural disaster due to its extensive scope of effects. For example, if hundreds or thousands of taxpayers suffer as a result of a hurricane in a large area of the country, instead of granting individual tax reliefs (which requires conducting separate proceedings causing high costs), an instrument addressed to all of them may be used (by one legal act). The undoubted advantage of this power of the Minister of Finance is not only the fact that it can support thousands of taxpayers at once, but also the fact that this support may apply to any tax. It should be made clear, however, that, paradoxically, the same characteristics of the instrument under

35 Art. 22, § 1–2 ustawy z dnia 29 sierpnia 1997 — Ordynacja podatkowa, Dz.U. 2019, item 900 with later amendments.

126 Internal Security, July–December Instruments for the Protection of Victims of Natural Disasters in Polish Tax Law consideration which show its advantages, can be a source of problems and contro- versies. The adoption of a tax-holding regulation always remains a decision of great political and economic importance. Therefore, as has already been mentioned, this solution has not been used very often so far. A possible abstention by the Minister on the adoption of such a regulation results in the deprivation of assistance to those taxpayers who (if only because of the occurrence of a natural disaster) counted on it. Although the issuing of tax-holding regulations is not very common, interesting examples of such actions in recent years can be identified. In 2009, the Minister of Finance issued a regulation36 which suspended the col- lection of personal income tax on material assistance received from the workplace by persons affected by a natural disaster up to PLN 6000. That preference applied to income received from 1 January 2009 to 31 December 2010. A very interesting example of abandonment to collect taxes in connection with the protection of public safety is the issue of a regulation suspending the collec- tion of income tax on funds received by natural persons, which were allocated from the forest fund to mitigate the threat to public security, including fire risk, in devastated forests not owned by the State Treasury, located in some municipali- ties37. Of course, the tax exemption for the above measures is not synonymous with providing support to victims of a natural disaster or other extraordinary event, but they are interesting examples of using tax instruments to improve public security. A classic example of support for victims of natural disasters by refraining from collecting a tax is a regulation that waives inheritance and donations tax i.a. from taxpayers affected by the strong winds, heavy rainfall or lightning, which occurred in August 2017 in municipalities, as defined in separate legislation38. This omission concerned donations and certain other increments. It is worth recalling that until the end of 1997, and thus before the entry into force of the Act of Rules of Taxation, the Act of 19 December 1980 on tax obligations39 in force at the time, contained similar solutions, giving the right to the Minister of Finance to refrain from collecting taxes due to social considerations. On Septem- ber 19, 1997, the Minister, in accordance with the powers entrusted to him, issued an ordinance40, thanks to which the collection of the tax on goods and services in part exceeding 1% of the tax base, due from sales of, among others, housing projects implemented on the basis of contracts concluded by the President of the Office of Housing and Urban Development on granting housing aid to municipali- ties most affected by floods, was suspended.

36 Rozporządzenie Ministra Finansów z dnia 28 grudnia 2009 w sprawie zaniechania poboru podatku dochodowego od osób fizycznych od niektórych dochodów (przychodów) podatników podatku dochodowego od osób fizycznych, Dz.U. 2009, No. 226, item 1819. 37 Rozporządzenie Ministra Finansów z dnia 8 lutego 2018 r. w sprawie zaniechania poboru podatku dochodowego od osób fizycznych od niektórych przychodów (dochodów) otrzy- manych na łagodzenie zagrożenia bezpieczeństwa publicznego, w tym zagrożenia pożarowego, w zdewastowanych lasach niestanowiących własności Skarbu Państwa, Dz.U. 2018, item 363. 38 Rozporządzenie Ministra Finansów z dnia 23 sierpnia 2017 r. w sprawie zaniechania poboru podatku od spadków i darowizn od niektórych podatników, Dz.U. 2018, item 1871. 39 Art. 8, § 1, Dz.U. 1993, No. 108, item 486 with later amendments. 40 Zarządzenie Ministra Finansów z dnia 19 września 1997 w sprawie częściowego za- niechania ustalania i poboru podatku od towarów i usług, M.P. 1997, No. 63, item 611.

Internal Security, July–December 127 Aleksy Goettel Tax preferences for victims of natural disasters in local taxes (including those established by municipal councils)

The Polish system of local taxes consists almost exclusively of taxes on property (mainly real estate, to a small extent movable goods). This fact is important when it comes to tax policy consisting in the protection of victims of natural disasters, because the above assets of the taxpayer (houses, apartments and their equipment, areas occupied for business, vehicles, industrial infrastructure and many others) are particularly vulnerable (except, of course, the victims themselves) to the effects of natural disasters. It therefore appears that such instruments for the protection of victims of natural disasters should be widely used in taxes on property. This applies in particular to those assets which are intended to safeguard basic needs, in particu- lar housing (houses, apartments) and related to the acquisition of income (assets connected with professional, economic or agricultural activity). However, in the group of local taxes on property, only in the agricultural, tax there is a tax credit for the victims of natural disasters. It allows the tax authority to refrain from establishing a tax or collection in whole or in part, depending on the extent of the losses caused by the natural disaster. It must be clarified that this instrument has certain limitations and disadvantages that significantly reduce its effectiveness41. First of all, this relief is another example of tax preference, the application of which depends on the will of the tax authority, since the right to it does not directly arise from the law. In addi- tion, granting the relief by the tax authority depends on the introduction of a state of natural disaster, which also requires a special procedure. Furthermore, the provi- sions on agricultural tax restrict the application of the relief at issue in principle only during the year in which the state of natural disaster was announced. Another reduc- tion in the amount of the relief is due to the fact that insurance compensation paid to the taxpayer is taken into account when granting it and determining its amount. It should be critically assessed that, apart from the abovementioned relief in agricultural tax (which, as noted, has some disadvantages), in other local taxes (real estate tax, forest tax and tax on means of transport) no preferences were granted to taxpayers in relation to property that has been damaged or completely destroyed as a result of a natural disaster. This is particularly noticeable in the area of real estate tax with regard to property used for running a business, since the property is a source of the taxpayer’s income, and in addition, the tax for such property is often quite high (higher tax rates apply in this situation). One of the manifestations of the so-called tax autonomy of Polish local govern- ment units is the possibility of making local tax regulations42. Of course, the Polish Constitution of 2 April 1997 sets quite clear limits on this autonomy43. Local govern- ment units cannot, for example, impose and abolish taxes, although e.g. they have the right, within certain limits, to decide on the level of rates in some taxes. It is 41 Art. 13c, § 1 Ustawy z 15 listopada 1984 o podatku rolnym, Dz.U. of 2019, item 1265 with later amendments. 42 Dowgier R, [in:] Stanowienie i stosowanie prawa podatkowego w gminach. Białystok, 2007, pp. 56–57. 43 Ruśkowski E, Finanse lokalne w dobie akcesji. Warsaw, 2004, pp. 66–67.

128 Internal Security, July–December Instruments for the Protection of Victims of Natural Disasters in Polish Tax Law widely accepted that the granting of tax autonomy to local authorities is conducive to effective local policy44. It is a very important right of local authorities to establish certain types of tax prefer- ences. Due to the limitations of the Constitution, these powers are limited in principle to exemptions and tax reliefs relating to the subject matter of certain taxes that sup- ply local government budgets. Despite these restrictions, local authorities may use these powers to establish exemptions and tax reliefs of a social nature, including for the benefit of taxpayers, who are victims of various random events. In this way, the leg- islative bodies of local authorities can also support the victims of natural disasters. The analysis of local government resolutions on the issue under consideration confirms that local authorities (in practice municipal councils) establish, although it is uncommon, tax preferences in order to abolish or reduce the fiscal burden borne by victims of natural disasters. As an example, one Polish municipality adopted a res- olution according to which lands and buildings that suffered from flooding in 2010 are exempt from real estate tax45. The council of another municipality adopted an tax credit on agricultural tax covering farm land in which drought, hail, rain, spring frosts, flood, hurricane, lightning, landslides or avalanches have occurred46. One of the municipalities introduced an exemption from real estate tax, under which lands degraded as a result of natural disasters are exempt from real estate tax47.

Conclusions

On the basis of the analysis carried out, it must be made clear that the Polish tax law has solutions that make it possible to provide assistance to victims of natural disasters and other random events. It should be added that these instruments are very diverse. They differ in the scope of victim support (from the full abolition of the tax burden in the case of tax exemptions to only a partial reduction in tax reliefs) and the procedure for implementation — some of the preferences are applied at the request of the taxpayer and others ex officio. Some of the solutions do not reduce the tax burden at all, but benefit, for example, in the form of a postponement of the tax payment period. While some of the solutions examined stem directly from the law, others are set up by local government units and the Minister of Finance. However, it should be made clear that the current system of tax instruments for victims of natural disasters has some drawbacks. Certainly one of its shortcom- ings is, in general, the small number of tax reliefs and exemptions in the rules governing individual taxes. Although the exception is the personal income tax, which provides for several solutions for victims of natural disasters, the protection

44 Jędrzejewski L, Polityka finansowa jednostek samorządu terytorialnego. Gdańsk, 2004, pp. 70–80. 45 Uchwała Rady Gminy w Gierałtowicach z dnia 30 września 2010 w sprawie zwolnienia z podatku od nieruchomości gruntów, budynków i budowli, które ucierpiały na skutek powo- dzi w 2010 roku, No. XLVI/348/10. 46 Uchwała Rady Gminy Pobiedziska z dnia 30 sierpnia 2018 w sprawie ulgi w podatku rolnym na 2018, No. LXIII/573/2018. 47 Uchwała Rady Gminy Stryszawa z dnia 27 listopada 2009 w sprawie zwolnień w po- datku od nieruchomości na terenie Gminy Stryszawa, No. XXXIII/247/09.

Internal Security, July–December 129 Aleksy Goettel of victims of natural disasters is quite limited. The situation of local taxpayers seems particularly inconvenient in this respect. While in the agricultural tax, a relief was granted due to a natural disaster, in the property tax, forest tax and tax on means of transport, such instruments have not been introduced yet. It is also worth noting that, in fact, a rather small group of preferences applied due to the occurrence of a natural disaster stems directly from the tax law. The others are, as has already been said, established by the Minister of Finance or local government units. The problem, however, is that the Minister or local authorities may not express their willingness to establish such a form of assistance to victims of natural disasters, whether for political or financial reasons. This may create a state of uncertainty on the part of taxpayers about the economic consequences of a pos- sible natural disaster or other random event. A similar situation exists in the area of tax reliefs granted by a decision of tax authorities. In this case, taxpayers also cannot be certain about their legal and eco- nomic situation, since the grant of the relief — as explained — depends on the assessment of the tax authority. The authority may disagree with the taxpayer as to the legitimacy of granting the tax relief. In order to improve the system of tax instruments applied to victims of natural disasters (and other emergency random events) and to increase its effectiveness, more tax reliefs and exemptions should be considered, in particular in local taxes. It is worth calling for the legislator to consider, for example, introducing certain tax preferences for the acquisition (whether for consideration or free of charge) of the goods necessary to remove the effects of natural disasters. A separate issue is the quality of the law created. It has been shown that some of the rules govern- ing tax instruments applicable to persons affected by natural disasters are unclear and complicated. It therefore seems appropriate to make a general demand for the continuous improvement of the process of tax law creation, not only with regard to the issues raised in this article.

References

1. Bartosiewicz A, VAT. Komentarz, wyd. XIII. Wolters Kluwer Polska, LEX, 2019. 2. Dowgier R, [in:] Popławski M (Ed.), Stanowienie i stosowanie prawa podatkowe- go w gminach. Białystok, 2007. 3. Dzwonkowski H, Zgierski Z, Procedury podatkowe. Warsaw, 2006. 4. Głuchowski J, Polskie prawo podatkowe. Warsaw, 2002. 5. Jędrzejewski L, Polityka finansowa jednostek samorządu terytorialnego. Gdańsk, 2004. 6. Kustra E, Wstęp do nauk o państwie i prawie. Toruń, 1997. 7. Nitecki S, Prawo do pomocy społecznej w polskim systemie prawnym. Warsaw, 2008. 8. Manolakas C, The Tax Law and Policy of Natural Disasters. Baylor Law Review, 2019, Vol. 1, Issue 71. 9. Mastalski R, Prawo podatkowe. Warsaw, 2018. 10. Ofi arski Z, Ogólne prawo podatkowe. Zagadnienia materialnoprawne i proce- duralne. Warsaw, 2010.

130 Internal Security, July–December Instruments for the Protection of Victims of Natural Disasters in Polish Tax Law

11. Orłowski J, Uzasadnienie decyzji w sprawie ulgi w spłacie zobowiązania podat- kowego niebędącej pomocą publiczną, [in:] Dowgier R (Ed.), Ordynacja podat- kowa. Wokół nowelizacji. Białystok, 2009. 12. Ruśkowski E, Finanse lokalne w dobie akcesji. Warsaw, 2004. 13. Seidler G.L, Groszyk H, Malarczyk J, Pieniążek A, Wstęp do nauki o państwie i prawie. Lublin, 1993. 14. Małecka E, Podatek dochodowy jako regulator dochodów osób fizycznych w Polsce. Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny, 2005, Issue 2.

About the Author

Aleksy Goettel, DSc, professor of the University of Economics and Human Sciences in Warsaw. His main area of research and professional interest is fi nancial law, in particular tax law. He is the author of publications on, among others, relations between tax law and civil and family law. His research also focusses on local taxes. E-mail: [email protected].

Streszczenie. Destrukcyjny wpływ klęsk żywiołowych (i innych zdarzeń losowych, które są zwykle trudne do przewidzenia) jest coraz bardziej odczuwalny we wszystkich obszarach funkcjonowania nowoczesnych państw. Rządy tych krajów (często we współpracy z władzami lokalnymi) podejmują różne środki w celu zapobiegania takim wydarzeniom, minimalizowania ich konsekwencji, w tym pomocy ofiarom ich wystąpienia. Jednym ze sposobów osiągnięcia niektórych z powyższych zamiarów — choć z pewnością nie ma to podstawowego znaczenia — jest stosowanie instrumentów prawa podatkowego, w szczególności preferencji podatkowych. Niniejszy artykuł stanowi próbę przeanalizowania i oceny tych przepisów prawa podatkowego, które umożliwiają ofiarom klęsk żywiołowych korzystanie z preferencyjnych przepisów podatkowych. W badaniu omówiono instrumenty podatkowe stosowane do pomocy ofiarom klęsk żywiołowych wykorzystywanych przez organy podatkowe. Analiza pokazuje, że system instrumentów podatkowych chroniących ofiary klęsk żywiołowych w dużej mierze opiera się na rozwiązaniach uznaniowych, stosowanych jedynie w wyniku odpowiedniej procedury, po której następuje formalna decyzja upoważnionego organu. W świetle przeprowadzonych badań można ogólnie stwierdzić, że system instrumentów podatkowych służących ochronie osób dotkniętych klęskami żywiołowymi wymaga pewnych działań w celu poprawy jego skuteczności. Niektóre wnioski w tym zakresie, skierowane do ustawodawcy, zostały ogólnie wskazane w opracowaniu. Artykuł przedstawia również pewne szczegółowe kwestie związane z interpretacją, stanowiących przedmiot rozważąń, uregulowań, w tym pewne wątpliwości redakcyjne i terminologiczne.

Zusammenfassung. Die zerstörerischen Auswirkungen von Naturkatastrophen und anderen zufälligen Ereignissen, die normalerweise schwer vorherzusagen sind, sind zunehmend in allen Bereichen der Funktionsweise moderner Staaten zu spüren. Die Regierungen dieser Länder ergreifen häufig in Zusammenarbeit mit den lokalen Behörden verschiedene Maßnahmen, um solche Ereignisse zu verhindern und ihre Folgen zu minimieren, einschließlich der Unterstützung der Opfer ihres Auftretens. Eine Möglichkeit, einige der oben genannten Absichten zu erreichen — obwohl dies sicherlich nicht von grundlegender Bedeutung ist — ist der Einsatz steuerrechtlicher Instrumente, insbesondere von Steuerpräferenzen. Dieser Artikel ist ein Versuch, die steuerrechtlichen Bestimmungen zu analysieren und zu bewerten, die es Opfern von Naturkatastrophen ermöglichen, von Steuervergünstigungsbestimmungen zu profitieren. In der Studie werden die Steuerinstrumente erörtert, mit denen die Opfer von Naturkatastrophen von den Steuerbehörden unterstützt werden. Die Analyse zeigt, dass das System der Steuerinstrumente zum Schutz von Opfern von Naturkatastrophen weitgehend im Ermessen liegt und nur aufgrund eines geeigneten Verfahrens angewendet wird, auf das eine formelle Entscheidung einer zugelassenen Stelle folgt. In Anbetracht der durchgeführten Untersuchungen kann allgemein der Schluss gezogen werden, dass das System der Steuerinstrumente zum Schutz der von Naturkatastrophen betroffenen Menschen einige Maßnahmen zur Verbesserung seiner Wirksamkeit erfordert. Einige diesbezügliche Schlussfolgerungen, die an den Gesetzgeber gerichtet waren, wurden in der Studie allgemein angegeben. Der Artikel enthält auch einige detaillierte Fragen im Zusammenhang mit der Auslegung der zu berücksichtigenden Vorschriften, einschließlich einiger redaktioneller und terminologischer Zweifel.

Internal Security, July–December 131 Aleksy Goettel

Резюме. Деструктивное влияние стихийных бедствий (и других случайных событий, которые обычно трудно прогнозировать) все больше замечается во всех областях деятельности современных государств. Правительства стран (часто в сотрудничестве с местными органами власти) принимают различные меры для предотвращения таких событий, сведения к минимуму их последствий, а также для оказания помощи жертвам. Одним из способов достижения некоторых из указанных выше целей — хотя это, безусловно, не имеет основного значения — явля- ется использование инструментов налогового права, в частности, налоговых привилегий. В настоящей статье предпринята попытка анализа и оценки тех положений налогового законодательства, которые позволяют жертвам стихийных бедствий пользоваться льготным налогообложением. В исследовании рассматриваются налоговые инструменты, используемые налоговыми органами для оказания помощи жертвам стихийных бедствий. Анализ показывает, что система налоговых инструментов, защищающих жертвы стихийных бедствий, во многом базирует на решениях, принимаемых по усмотрению сторон и применяемых только в результате выполнения соответствующей процедуры с последующим официальным решением уполномоченного органа. В результате проведенного исследования можно сделать общий вывод о том, что система налоговых инструментов для защиты жертв стихийных бедствий требует принятия определенных мер для повышения ее эффективности. Некоторые предложения, адресованные законодателю, изложены, в общем плане. В статье также представлены некоторые конкретные вопросы, связанные с пониманием рассматриваемых положений, в том числе некоторые редакционные и терминологические сомнения.

132 Internal Security, July–December Role of EU and National Legislation in Shaping Communication in Police Detention Centres

Iveta Nováková ORCID: n/a Academy of the Police Force in Bratislava, Slovakia

Abstract. The study is devoted to a discussion on selected issues relating to the EU and national legislation which determine the process of the mainstream communication with third-country nationals in the Police Detention Centres. The study is a part of the ongoing research project of the Department of Foreign Languages of the Academy of the Police Force in Bratislava and the Bureau of the Border and Foreign Police of the Presidium of the Police Force, Slovakia titled Intercultural Communication with third-country nationals in the Police Detention Centres. The research attempts to find the answer to the following question: What means of intercultural communication (verbal and non-verbal) do police officers use with third-country nationals for mutual understanding, avoiding conflicts and correct adherence to human rights? Following the findings of the intermediate legislative and applied research, the author points out the main reasons which lead to certain difficulties in performing understandable communication in the Police Detention Centres such as loopholes in the EU legislation, non-conformity of the EU and national legislation in using the state (national) vs foreign language in official service communication with third-country nationals whose stay is unauthorised in the territory of the Slovak Republic, and in the EU and the Schengen Area, and their residence or entry into the Schengen Area is detected as irregular and subsequently clarified, with respective accountability. DOI: 10.5604/01.3001.0014.6689 http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0014.6689

Keywords: third-country nationals, Police Detention Centres, language, communication

Introduction

From a historical point of view, migration is a social phenomenon which significantly affects politics, economics, and social aspects, but also the state’s security. It can be perceived ‘as more or less a limited process of the movement of peo- ple — an individual, a family or whole social groups — from one social environment to another defined by state borders’1. There is no unambiguous worldwide definition of illegal migration. The substance of most national definitions is the movement of migrants across the borders of another state and/or residence or work in the terri- tory of another state, in breach of its laws2. The Bureau of Border and Foreign Police of the Presidium of the Police Force of the Slovak Republic characterises the unau- thorised crossing of the state border as an irregular act of crossing or attempting to cross the border of the Slovak Republic regardless of the direction of cross- ing. Irregular residence in the territory of the Slovak Republic includes actions 1 Marczyová K, Právna rovina základných práv migrantov, [in:] Aktuálne problémy migrá- cie v Európe a jej ľudskoprávna dimenzia. Prague, 2016, p. 63. 2 Divínsky B, Nelegálna migrácia — jej podstata, základné črty, význam a trendy v slov- enskom kontexte, [in:] Nelegálna migrácia na slovensko-ukrajinskej schengenskej hranici. Bratislava, 2016, p. 8.

Internal Security, July–December 133 Iveta Nováková of foreigners who stay in the country in breach of the law regardless of whether they have previously legally or irregularly entered or stayed in the territory of the Slovak Republic. Thus, an irregular migrant is a person detained for unauthorised state border crossing of the Slovak Republic or unauthorised residence in its ter- ritory3. Definitions of irregular migration often differ; their nature is based in the uncontrolled and irregular movement of migrants across borders and in the ter- ritory of foreign countries. Balga defines irregular migration as ‘the entry or stay of foreigners in the territory of the state of residence, who do not or no longer fulfil the conditions of entry or residence laid down in the legislation or international agree- ments by which the host state is bound and, in the context of this legal matter, by its national authorities applies the system of sanctions against such foreigners.’4 In the context of mass migration, the aspect of multiculturalism is increasingly emerging, a policy that promotes ethnic and cultural differences. Both state and non-state institutions deal with this matter conceptually, and many government documents operate with concepts such as multiculturalism and the integration of migrants, focussing on the aspect of cultural integration or cultural and religious coexistence of the majority and emerging minority communities. Thus, in the context of mass migration, the concept of culture is often discussed both in theory and in practice. Szarková states that it is the intensity and dynamics of individual cultural elements (as the basis of cultural patterns of behaviour of individuals and whole communities) that also affect the adaptation and gradual integration of migrants into a culturally different environment5. Language or speech is perhaps the most obvious element of culture, which makes up the most visible expression of the cultural pattern in behaviour. Police Detention Centres for foreigners, which are short-term but intensive homes for groups of third-country nationals, can also be considered as such an environment.

Legal situation in the area of statutory regulation on the residence of foreigners in the Slovak Republic

Statutory regulation on the residence of foreigners in the territory of the Slo- vak Republic can be characterised as a ‘complete system of legislation consisting of international law, European law and national legislation of the Slovak Republic’6. The system of legislation gives competence to the state authorities to perform tasks

3 Statistical Overview of Legal and Irregular Migration in the Slovak Republic, Bratislava: Bureau of Border and Foreign Police of the Presidium of the Police Force, 2011–2016. 4 Balga J, Teória služby cudzineckej polície. Bratislava: Academy of Police Force in Bratisla- va, 2003, p. 49. 5 Szarková M, Prvky kultúry ako rizikové faktory integrácie migrantov do majoritnej spoločnosti, [in:] Aktuálne problémy migrácie v Európe a jej ľudskoprávna dimenzia. Prague, 2016, p. 129–130. 6 Balga J, Červenka B, Právne problémy výkonu verejnej správy v oblasti povoľovania pobytu cudzincov, [in:] Politické, ekonomické a právne problémy výkonu verejnej správy v policajnej oblasti: zborník príspevkov z medzinárodnej vedeckej interdisciplinárnej konfer- encie. Bratislava: Academy of the Police Force in Bratislava, 2010, p. 5.

134 Internal Security, July–December Role of EU and National Legislation in Shaping Communication in Police Detention Centres in the area of the foreign regime and guarantees foreigners their rights and imposes obligations on them. Nowadays, the entry and residence of foreigners, the visa area and procedures in the case of unauthorised residence of foreigners in the territory of the Slovak Republic are regulated mainly by the following EU legislation and leg- islation of the Slovak Republic: — Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union (2012/C 326/01); — Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2012/C 326/02); — Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council (EC) No. 810/2009 of 13 July 2009 establishing the Community Code on Visa (L243/1, 15 September 2009); — Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council 399/2016 of 9 March 2016, laying down the Union’s Code on rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code) (L77/1, 22 March 2016); — Council Regulation (EC) No. 539/2001, which sets out the list of countries whose nationals must have a visa when crossing the external borders, and those whose nationals are exempted (EC L81, 21 March 2001); — Council Regulation (EC) No. 1030/2002 of 19 May 2008, laying down a uni- form format for residence permits for third-country nationals (EC L157, 15 June 2002); — Regulation (EU) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (L180/31, 29 June 2013); — Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning irregularly staying third-country nationals (L348/98, 24 December 2008); — Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing interna- tional protection (L180/60, 29 June 2013); — Commission Recommendation (EU) 2017/432 of 7 March 2017 on making returns more effective when implementing the Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (L66/15, 11 March 2017); — Commission Recommendation (EU) of 27 September 2017 on establishing a common ‘Return Handbook’ to be used by Member States’ competent authorities when carrying out return related tasks (C(2017)6505); — Constitution of the Slovak Republic; — Act No. 480/2002 Coll. on Asylum and amendments to certain acts; — Act No. 71/1967 Coll. on Administrative Proceedings; — Act of the Nation Council of the Slovak Republic No. 171/1993 Coll. on Police Force; — Act No. 404/2011 of 21 October 2011 Coll. on Residence of Foreigners and Amendment and Supplementation of Certain Acts laying down, among other things, that the administrative agenda related to the residence of for- eigners is conducted in the state language;

Internal Security, July–December 135 Iveta Nováková

and other acts, regulations, decrees and orders of central government authori- ties and organisational acts related to governance. Within the meaning of Article 1 of Act No. 404/2011 Coll. on Residence of For- eigners (hereinafter Act on Residence of Foreigners), this Act regulates: — scope of authority of the Police Force in ensuring control of the borders of the Slovak Republic and in the area of foreigners’ residence in the territory of the Slovak Republic, — scope of the public authorities in the domain of visas, — conditions of entry of foreigners into the territory of the Slovak Republic and conditions of departure of foreigners from the territory of the Slovak Republic, which are not regulated by a specific regulation or an international agreement by which the Slovak Republic is bound, — conditions of residence, — issuance of the documents for foreigners, — record of persons and the control of residence, — administrative expulsion and the ban on entry, — third-country national detention and placement into a facility, — police transportation of third-country nationals across the territory of the Slovak Republic and police escort of third-country nationals from the terri- tory of the Slovak Republic, — airside transit of third-country nationals across the territory of the Slovak Republic, — rights and duties of persons during border control and residence, — offences at the section of the border control or residence. A foreigner is a person who does not have a specific citizen relationship with the state in whose territory he or she is in, but usually has a citizen relationship with another state, which means that he or she is a foreign national7. According to the Act on the Residence of Foreigners, a foreigner is anyone who is not a citizen of the Slovak Republic. This general category is divided into special categories of foreigners: EU citizens, third-country nationals, an EU citizen’s family member. Any person who is not a Slovak citizen and is a national of a Member State is con- sidered an EU citizen within the meaning of Article 3 of the Act on the Residence of Foreigners.Within the meaning of Article 4 of the Act on the Residence of For- eigners, a third-country national is anyone who is not a Slovak citizen or a citizen of the Union; a stateless person is also considered to be a third-country national. A family member of an EU citizen, while being a third-country national, is given a more favourable status by a family relationship with an EU citizen in this regard. His or her privileges consist in the fact that such a national is regarded as a citizen of the European Economic Area (EEA) and, with respect to residence, is granted all of the advantages of an EEA citizen. The condition is that this person accompanies or joins an EEA citizen while residing in the Slovak Republic8.

7 Potočný M, Mezinárodní právo veřejné, 2. propracované a doplněné vydání. Prague, 1978, p. 179. 8 Odler R, Šandalová M, Červenka B, Repetitórium kontroly hraníc a pobytu cudzincov. Academy of Police Force in Bratislava, 2015, p. 115.

136 Internal Security, July–December Role of EU and National Legislation in Shaping Communication in Police Detention Centres Linguistic factors in intercultural communication

The English word ‘alien’ defines a person who comes from another country, i.e. ‘someone who lives in a country of which they are not a legal citizen’9. The meaning of its adjective form refers to someone strange and not familiar, disturbing or dis- tasteful. For instance, the Russian language uses the word ‘иностранец’ to define a person who comes from another country. According to Sartori, an alien differs from domestic inhabitants to which we are used to because he/she represents dif- ferences originating from the outer world and he/she is strange for us. In his works, Sartori further divides those differences into four groups: language differences, differences related to customs and manners, religion differences and ethnicity dif- ferences. We consider a person different when he/she speaks another language or when he/she lives according to the customs, traditions and manners of his/her country of origin or when he/she professes another religion. Whereas people can overcome the first two differences (if they want to); the other two differences sug- gest problems10. In the environment of the Police Detention Centres, third-country nationals are very often perceived as aliens, in the meaning that they behave and speak differently. On-duty police officers repeatedly face enormous obstacles when they need to communicate concrete information to detained foreigners since they do not speak the same language. The mutual communication and understand- ing, therefore, have been running into conflicts. The English word ‘communication’ comes from Latin word ‘communicare’ which means to share or to participate. The base of this word is formed by the adjective ‘communis’ which means common. Therefore, communication can be defined as making something common for both eminent and percipient. Through com- munication, we share thoughts, ideas and feelings in commonly understandable ways. The original meaning has been preserved until nowadays but has also been modified, and in present times, we use the word ‘communication’ to mean ‘to under- stand’. Mistík and Škvareninová declare that communication is performed at every place where people meet up and the more people that meet up, the more variable and complex communication processes that take place11. Cambridge dictionary defines communication as the act of communicating with people. Communication is also defined as the exchange of information and the expression of feeling that can result in understanding, the process of sharing information, especially when this increases understanding between people12. According to Miriam Webster dictionary, ‘communication’ is defined as follows: — a process by which information is exchanged between individuals through a common system of symbols, signs, or behaviour, exchange of information, — personal rapport, — information communicated: information transmitted or conveyed,

9 Electronic source: https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/alien, accessed: 12.12.2019. 10 Sartori G, Pluralizmus, multikulturalizmus a prisťahovalci. Dokorán. Prague, 2011, p. 146. 11 Mistík J, Škvareninová O, Štylistika a rétorika. Law Faculty, Comenius University in Bratisla- va, 1992, p. 5–6. 12 Electronic source: https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/communication, accessed: 12.12.2019.

Internal Security, July–December 137 Iveta Nováková

— a verbal or written message.13 Language may be defined as a complex system of communication which basically consists of sounds produced by speech organs as material and perceiv- able information carriers. Language serves first of all as a communication tool for persons. As a means of communication, language is a social phenomenon and can be creatively used until it becomes an obstacle to understanding. Without lan- guage, people would have been wandering about the wild woods and would never have been able to make stone tools14. Common and similar features of languages which arise from their common origin are a key element for combining languages into language families. Linguists have enumerated some 300 genetic units of lan- guages with 140 language families which contain more than one language. The rest is formed by isolated or sole languages. We need to add that language families count not only living languages but also dead languages. At present, English is the most widespread language, the so-called ‘lingua franca’ of world communication primarily among people whose mother tongue is different. English is moreover considered the basic language platform for international busi- ness and official communication. The policing environment is not an exception. For most police joint missions, international police organisations, international boards and platforms for international cooperation, English is the main language of mutual communication. Even though most police officers deployed in the Police Detention Centres have very good command of the English language, mainstream everyday communication runs into conflicts as approximately 95% of detained third-country nationals do not speak English. According to the findings of numerous multicul- tural studies focussing on intercultural or cross-cultural communication, cultural differences of third-country nationals are mostly visible in the language of com- munication. Pisciová declares that one of the most important features of national identity is the aspect of the territory, which means that detained foreigners are interconnected with their region, country. English is not the lingua franca for them. English is not a part of their basic maturity, the idea of third-country nationals is to support their domestic languages. Concerning the police tasks and duties in the Police Detention Centres, i.e. in the multicultural environment, a key mis- sion is to guarantee the protection of foreigners’ rights and security. On the other hand, detained foreigners tend to follow their own cultural rules which are not always in line with the rules of the facility. Understanding multicultural situations, knowledge of individual cultures, and effective mediation in crisis situations may lead to avoiding conflicts. When communicating with detained foreigners, it is expected that police officers would be able to initiate and maintain contact with them, to overcome mistrust, to be patient, decisive, and objective while adhering to the ethics of behaviour. Very often, the mainstream communication is affected by language barriers.

13 Electronic source: https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/communication, ac- cessed: 12.12.2019. 14 Genzor J, Jazyky sveta. Lingea, 2015, p. 15–32.

138 Internal Security, July–December Role of EU and National Legislation in Shaping Communication in Police Detention Centres Practical diffi culties in mainstream communication in the Police Detention Centres

According to the study developed by the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs of the European Parliament, Slovakia has primarily been con- sidered as a transit country for migrants hoping to penetrate further into Western Europe to find better socio-economic conditions, rather than a final destination15. If the police unit in Slovakia decides to detain a third-country national, it shall imme- diately issue a detention decision to that third-country national and place him/her into the facility. The ‘facility’ means the Police Detention Centre for Foreigners. Two such facilities supervised by the Ministry of Interior have been established in the Slovak Republic territory. The first one is located in Sečovce, Trebišov district, in the Košice region. The second one is located in Medveďov, Dunajská Streda district, Trnava region. Unlike the Police Detention Centre for Foreigners in Medveďov, the Police Detention Centre for Foreigners in Sečovce is a facility where families with minors or minors accompanied by a legal representative can be placed. The common procedure and conditions for the placement of detained foreigners in accom- modation facilities of the Police Detention Centre for Foreigners are regulated by the Regulation of the Ministry of the Interior of the Slovak Republic No. 98/2018 on the procedure for placing foreigners in the Police Detention Centre for Foreign- ers, as amended. Table 1 presents the numbers of detained third-country nationals in both Police Detention Centres (Sečovce, Medveďov) for the period between 2014– 2019. The numbers increased in 2015 during a migration crisis. In the forthcoming years, the numbers slightly decreased and balanced. In total 2,766 third-country nationals were detained and placed in the Police Detention Centres in 2014–2019.

Table 1. Number of detained third-country nationals placed in the Police Detention Centres in 2014–201916

Police Detention Police Detention Centre Year Total Centre in Medveďov in Sečovce 2014 217 194 411 2015 543 515 1,058 2016 187 225 412 2017 131 138 269 2018 176 245 421 2019 97 107 204 Total 1,342 1,424 2,766

15 Electronic source: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/ join/2007/393275/IPOL-LIBE_ET(2007)393275_EN.pdf, accessed: 11.12.2019. 16 Statistical Overview of Legal and Irregular Migration in the Slovak Republic, Bratislava: Bureau of Border and Foreign Police of the Presidium of the Police Force, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019.

Internal Security, July–December 139 Iveta Nováková

Graph 1 illustrates the placement of the third-country nationals into the two Police Detention Centres in Slovakia. With respect to territory, there are higher numbers for the Police Detention Centre in Medveďov, as the Police Detention Cen- tre in Sečovce is located close to the Slovak-Ukrainian border which is the eastern EU border with strict police controls and supervision.

Figure1. Placement of third-country nationals in the Police Detention Centres in 2014–201917

Source: Author’s own work

The composition of third-country nationals in the Police Detention Centres according to state nationality is statistically analysed by the Bureau of Border and Foreign Police every half year. However, the statistics only show the numbers of expelled or released foreigners. The most frequent home countries of detained third-country nationals for the years 2014 and 2019 are Syria, Afghanistan, Kosovo, India, Iraq, Ukraine, Serbia, Pakistan, and Vietnam. Graph 2 illustrates the propor- tional division of state nationalities for the selection period. In general, mainstream communication between police officers (border guards) and third-country nationals placed in the Police Detention Centres for Foreigners has not been fully developed and established at the international level. There is not a single regulation which would determine the exact model of such communica- tion. Within the meaning of Article 13 section 3 and 4 of Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning irregularly staying third- country nationals, the third-country national shall have the possibility to obtain legal advice, representation and, where necessary, linguistic assistance. The Member States shall also ensure that the necessary legal assistance and/or repre- sentation is granted on request, free of charge under relevant national legislation. Within the meaning of Article 12 section 1 a) and 1 f) of Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection, Member States shall ensure that all applicants enjoy the guarantees such as being informed in a language which

17 Statistical Overview of Legal and Irregular Migration in the Slovak Republic, Bratislava: Bureau of Border and Foreign Police of the Presidium of the Police Force, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019.

140 Internal Security, July–December Role of EU and National Legislation in Shaping Communication in Police Detention Centres

Figure 2. Proportional division of state nationalities

Source: Author’s own work they understand or are reasonably supposed to understand of the procedure to be followed and of their rights and obligations during the procedure and the possible consequences of not complying with their obligations and not cooperating with the authorities. Besides this, they shall be informed of the result of the decision by the determining authority in a language that they understand or are reason- ably supposed to understand when they are not assisted or represented by a legal adviser or other counsellor. The two directives determine a list of other obligations for the Member States. One such obligation refers to a bond to provide information on the rules applied in a particular detention centre, on the rights and obligations of third-country nationals and it is recommended that such information shall be provided within 24 hours upon a third-country national’s detention. ‘Most EU citizens speak the English language, for 16% of EU citizens, English is the mother tongue and for other 31%, English is the official language’18. In line with the national legislation, the national (state) language in Slovakia has been deter- mined as the official language. Article 3 section 1 of the Act of The National Council No. 270/1995 Coll. on the State Language of the Slovak Republic stipulates the use of the state language in official communication: The state authorities, territorial self-government authorities, other bodies of public administration, the legal persons established by such public authorities and the legal persons established by law shall use the state language in their official communication. Article 6 sections 1, 2, 3 stipulate the use of the state language in the Armed Forces, Armed Corps and Fire Brigades: (1) All service communication in the armed forces, the Police Corps, the Slovak Infor- mation Service, the Prison and Justice Guard Corps of the Slovak Republic, the Railway

18 Binderová M, E-moduly z anglického jazyka pre dopravnú a poriadkovú políciu, [in:] Policajná teória a prax, Vol. 3. Bratislava: Academy of the Police Force, 2017, p. 10.

Internal Security, July–December 141 Iveta Nováková

Police, the Fire and Rescue Corps and in municipal police corps shall be performed compulsorily in the state language. (2) The entire administrative paperwork and docu- mentation of the armed forces, armed security corps, other armed corps and fire brigades shall be kept in the state language. (3) The provision of subsection (1) shall not apply to air-force communications in air traffic and to the international activities of the armed forces and armed corps. The Act further states that mutual communica- tion in judicial proceedings, administrative proceedings, proceedings before law enforcement authorities, as well as the rulings and minutes of courts, administrative authorities and law enforcement authorities, shall be performed and issued in the state language. Considering Slovakia, during our intermediate research, we have noticed substantial problems with providing the linguistic assistance set in the Directive 2008/115/EC. ‘Thanks to the fact that the EU is a multilingual and multicultural body, translation plays an important role in its intercultural and multilingual or multicultural communication settings and consequently influences translation processes and transla- tion products’19. Difficulties were observed for the availability of sworn interpreters for certain required languages (based on actual needs, composition and state nationalities of detained foreigners as well for everyday communication when the assistance of a sworn interpreter is not a must since this communication refers to a mutual exchange of information between police officers and detained third- country nationals. In this respect, we do not refer to official administrative acts where the presence of a sworn interpreter is a must. Firstly, let us look at arising problems with the availability of sworn interpreters. For instance, Kurdish interpret- ing experts listed in a table of sworn interpreters under the Ministry of Justice of the Slovak Republic, residing in the eastern part of the country are not available for the detention centre in Sečovce. Due to work overloads and taking into account several hours for the transport of such an interpreter from the western part of the country (Bratislava region) into the eastern part (approximately 6 hours), it seems complicated to ensure the presence of an interpreter in time. It is possible to use the service of an ‘internal interpreter’ not listed under the Ministry of Justice of the Slovak Republic, but in the eastern part of the country, there is no such interpreter of the Kurdish language who would have a good command of the Slovak language. Therefore, recently, Police Detention Centres in Slovakia have been using the ser- vice of interpreting experts with no command of the Slovak language: they would interpret from Kurdish into English and, in parallel, other interpreters from English to the Slovak language would complete the translation bridge. Nevertheless, such procedures do not lead to a mutual understanding as the message interpreted may be easily lost. Secondly, there seem to be even more complex difficulties in everyday communication. As stated above, a detained third-country national may remain in the detention centre for 6 up to 12 months. During that time, he/ she needs to communicate his/her thoughts, wishes, problems to a stand-by police officer. During our research, we have found out that concerning everyday individual contacts between police officers and third-country nationals, there is a need for

19 Nikolajová Kupferschmidtová E, Legal Translation in the EU Context: A Brief Introduc- tion to the Practical Consequences of the Multilingual Regime of the EU, [in:] Guldanová Z (Ed.) Kontexty súdneho prekladu a tlmočenia VI. Bratislava, 2018, p. 120.

142 Internal Security, July–December Role of EU and National Legislation in Shaping Communication in Police Detention Centres verbal exchange of information which is impossible to be covered by the services of sworn interpreters (everyday presence on the spot). Such an exchange of infor- mation is carried out for two main purposes: to provide and obtain information for/ from detained persons on common, ordinary matters. During the applied research, we have identified these areas of mainstream communication: —Reception —Daily Routine — Shopping — Catering —Kids’ Room — Free Time Activities — Visits —Unrest, Riots — Health Care — Psychological Assistance The study on the Conditions in centres for third-country nationals (detention camps, open centres as well as transit centres and transit zones) with a particular focus on provisions and facilities for persons with special needs in the 25 EU mem- ber states developed by the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs of the European Parliament identified certain language/communication problems for Slovakia — problems concerning medical care were observed due to the lack of interpreters and failures in the system concerning decisions to transfer patients to the hospital which were sometimes made by the hospital director and not the doctor. The study points out that detainees suffer from many psychological disorders, primarily linked to their imprisonment and the wait, and recommends to improve the access to healthcare and interpreters20.

Conclusion

The Slovak authority responsible for the detention of third-country nationals — the Bureau of Border and Foreign Police of the Presidium of the Police Force — is responsible for the safety, health, well-being and exercising the rights of the detained foreigners. For the effective accomplishment of their mission, Police Detention Centres need to identify and follow communication-focus practices that enable the police officers to work in a supportive environment when dealing with / communicating with third-country nationals. The study explored the EU legis- lation, which determines that a Member State shall provide linguistic assistance to third-country nationals (for official procedures) though the details are not further specified. However, the mainstream everyday communication (when detainees and police officers do not speak the common language) is not determined in any legal regulation and it is up to a Member State to decide on the best practices. Clear communication is essential for identifying health and psychological problems, daily requests for shopping, catering, free time activities, visits, problems leading to riots

20 Electronic source: h t t p s : / / w w w . e u r o p a r l . e u r o p a . e u / R e g D a t a / e t u d e s / e t u d e s / j o i n / 2 0 0 7 / 3 9 3 2 7 5 / I P O L - L I B E _ E T ( 2 0 0 7 ) 3 9 3 2 7 5 _ E N . p d f , acessed: 10.12.2019.

Internal Security, July–December 143 Iveta Nováková and unrest. This communication becomes challenging and results in a list of recom- mendations for the detaining authorities. Our research findings confirm the fact that despite the existing difficulties, police officers are willing to enhance their knowl- edge and would welcome the involvement of national authorities in delivering, for instance, intercultural trainings, non-European language trainings, special diction- aries, etc. so that the communication and thus well-being of detained third-county nationals is ensured. Despite non-existing regulations specifying the performance of the mainstream communication in the Police Detention Centres, police officers must be fully competent to fulfil their tasks. Their competence shall include ‘the ability to implement complex requirements with the use and mobilising of psycho-social sources (including skills and attitudes) in the specific environment’21.

References

1. Balga J, Červenka B, Právne problémy výkonu verejnej správy v oblasti povoľovania pobytu cudzincov, [in:] Politické, ekonomické a právne problémy výkonu verejnej správy v policajnej oblasti: zborník príspevkov z medzinárodnej vedeckej interdisciplinárnej konferencie. Bratislava, 2010. 2. Balga J, Teória služby cudzineckej polície. Bratislava, 2003. 3. Binderová M, E-moduly z anglického jazyka pre dopravnú a poriadkovú políciu, [in:] Policajná teória a prax, Vol. 3. Bratislava, 2017. 4. Divínsky B, Nelegálna migrácia — jej podstata, základné črty, význam a trendy v slovenskom kontexte, [in:] Nelegálna migrácia na slovensko-ukrajinskej schen- genskej hranici. Bratislava, 2016. 5. European Parliament. The conditions in centres for third country national (de- tention camps, open centres as well as transit centres and transit zones) with a particular focus on provisions and facilities for persons with special needs in the 25 EU member states. Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Af- fairs, 2007. Electronic source: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ etudes/join/2007/393275/IPOL-LIBE_ET(2007)393275_EN.pdf 6. Genzor J, Jazyky sveta. Lingea, 2015. 7. Marczyová K, Právna rovina základných práv migrantov , [in:] Aktuálne prob- lémy migrácie v Európe a jej ľudskoprávna dimenzia. Praha, 2016. 8. Meždejová K, Aspekt určenia náročnosti odborného textu vo výučbe cudzieho jazyka, [in:] Aplikované jazyky v univerzitnom kontexte IV. The Institute of For- eign Languages, Technical university in Zvolen, 2017. 9. Mistík J, Škvareninová O, Štylistika a rétorika. Bratislava, 1992. 10. Nikolajová Kupferschmidtová E, Legal Translation in the EU Context: A Brief Intro- duction to the Practical Consequences of the Multilingual Regime of the EU, [in:] Guldanová Z (Ed) Kontexty súdneho prekladu a tlmočenia VI. Bratislava, 2018. 11. Odler R, Šandalová M, Červenka B, Repetitórium kontroly hraníc a pobytu cudz- incov. Bratislava, 2015.

21 Meždejová K, Aspekt určenia náročnosti odborného textu vo výučbe cudzieho jazyka, [in:] Aplikované jazyky v univerzitnom kontexte IV, The Institute of Foreign Languages, Techni- cal university in Zvolen, 2017, p. 136.

144 Internal Security, July–December Role of EU and National Legislation in Shaping Communication in Police Detention Centres

12. Potočný M, Mezinárodní právo veřejné, 2. propracované a doplněné vydání. Praha, 1978. 13. Sartori G, Pluralizmus, multikulturalizmus a prisťahovalci. Dokorán. Prague, 2011. 14. Statistical Overview of Legal and Irregular Migration in the Slovak Republic, Bratislava: Bureau of Border and Foreign Police of the Presidium of the Police Force, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019. 15. Szarková M, Prvky kultúry ako rizikové faktory integrácie migrantov do majorit- nej spoločnosti, [in:] Aktuálne problémy migrácie v Európe a jej ľudskoprávna dimenzia. Praha, 2016.

About the Author

Iveta Nováková, PhD, Assoc. Prof., Academy of the Police Force in Bratislava, Slovakia. Scientifi c interests: language for specifi c purposes, internal security. Email: [email protected]

Streszczenie. W artykule są omawiane wybrane zagadnienia dotyczące z prawodawstwa unijnego i krajowego, które determinują proces głównego nurtu komunikacji z obywatelami państw trzecich w policyjnych ośrodkach zatrzymań. Artykuł jest częścią trwającego projektu badawczego Katedry Języków Obcych Akademii Policji w Bratysławie oraz Biura Policji Granicznej i ds. Obcokrajowców Prezydium Policji, zatytułowanego Komunikacja międzykulturowa z obywatelami państw trzecich w policyjnych ośrodkach zatrzymań. W ramach badań podjęto próbę znalezienia odpowiedzi na poniższe pytanie: Jakich środków komunikacji międzykulturowej (werbalnej i niewerbalnej) używają policjanci z obywatelami państw trzecich w celu wzajemnego zrozumienia, unikania konfliktów i właściwego przestrzegania praw człowieka? Na podstawie wyników pośrednich badań legislacyjnych i stosowanych procedur autor wskazuje główne przyczyny, które prowadzą do pewnych trudności w prowadzeniu zrozumiałej komunikacji w policyjnych ośrodkach zatrzymań, takie jak luki w prawodawstwie UE, niezgodność prawodawstwa UE i ustawodawstwa krajowego w zakresie używania języka państwowego (krajowego) i obcego w komunikacji służbowej z obywatelami państw trzecich, których pobyt na terytorium Republiki Słowackiej, UE i strefy Schengen jest niedozwolony, a ich pobyt lub wjazd do strefy Schengen jest wykrywany jako nielegalny, a następnie wyjaśniany z zachowaniem odpowiedniej procedury.

Zusammenfassung. Der Artikel erörtert ausgewählte Fragen zur EU- und nationalen Gesetzgebung, die den Prozess des Hauptstroms der Kommunikation mit Drittstaatsangehörigen in polizeilichen Gewahrsamseinrichtungen bestimmen. Der Artikel basiert auf dem Forschungsprojekt Interkulturelle Kommunikation mit Drittstaatsangehörigen in Polizeigewahrsamzentren, das von der Abteilung für Fremdsprachen der Polizeiakademie in Bratislava und dem Büro für Grenz- und Ausländerpolizei des Polizeipräsidiums durchgeführt wird. Die Forschung hat versucht, die folgende Frage zu beantworten: Welche Mittel der interkulturellen Kommunikation (verbal und nonverbal) setzen Polizeibeamte mit Drittstaatsangehörigen ein, um die Konflikte des jeweils anderen zu verstehen und dann die Menschenrechte angemessen zu respektieren? Auf der Grundlage der Ergebnisse der indirekten legislativen Forschung und der angewandten Verfahren weist die Verfasserin auf die Hauptgründe hin, die zu spezifischen Schwierigkeiten bei der Durchführung einer verständlichen Kommunikation in den Polizeigewahrsamzentren führen, wie z.B. Lücken in der EU-Gesetzgebung, Unvereinbarkeit der EU- und nationalen Gesetzgebung über die Verwendung der staatlichen (nationalen) und fremden Sprache in der offiziellen Kommunikation mit Drittstaatsangehörigen, deren Aufenthalt in der Slowakischen Republik als auch in der EU sowie in dem Schengen-Raum nicht erlaubt ist und deren Aufenthalt oder Einreise in den Schengen-Raum als illegal erkannt wird, und dann gemäß dem entsprechenden Verfahren ermittelt.

Резюме. В статье обсуждаются вопросы законодательства ЕС и национального законодательства, определяющие процесс основного общения с гражданами третьих стран в полицейских изоляторах временного содержания. Статья является частью текущего исследовательского проекта Кфедры иностранных языков Полицейской академии

Internal Security, July–December 145 Iveta Nováková

в Братиславе и Бюро пограничной полиции и полиции по делам иностранцев Полицейского управления под названием ‘Межкультурное общение с гражданами третьих стран в полицейских центрах временного содержания’. В ходе исследования была предпринята попытка найти ответ на следующий вопрос: Какие средства межкультурного общения (вербального и невербального) используют сотрудники полиции с гражданами третьих стран для того, чтобы понимать друг друга, избегать конфликтов и надлежащим образом соблюдать права человека? На основании результатов исследований законодательства и применяемых процедур указывается на основные причины, которые приводят к определенным трудностям в общениии в полицейских изоляторах временного содержания, таким как пробелы в законодательстве ЕС, несоответствие законодательства ЕС и национального законодательства об использовании государственного (национального) и иностранного языков в официальной служебной коммуникации с гражданами третьих стран, пребывание которых на территории Словацкой Республики, а также на территории ЕС и Шенгенской зоны не разрешено, а их проживание или въезд в Шенгенскую зону определяется как незаконное, и впоследствии — выясняется при условии соблюдения надлежащих процедур.

146 Internal Security, July–December Security of Public Financial Resources and the Public Procurement Procedure — Analysis of Transparency and Characteristics of Procedures Based on Research

Andrzej Józef Kozłowski ORCID: 0000-0002-1993-6525 Police Academy in Szczytno, Poland Iwona Z. Czaplicka-Kozłowska ORCID: 0000-0003-4268-0510 University of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn, Poland

Abstract. The subject of the study is an analysis of the procedures related to the selection of the most advantageous offer in the process defined in the public procurement law. Pointing out the essence of the problem in the area of public financial resources management, attention was paid first of all to legal solutions, their number of changes since the first act was passed in 1994, and to the essence of public financial resources management in the surrounding reality. Based on an analysis of Internet resources randomly selected from more than 50 local governments, mainly districts of large Polish cities, the transparency of public procurement procedures was assessed. Thus, with regard to a particular district, the methods of case study and expert analysis were used in scientific evaluation of the public procurement phenomenon. Then, on the basis of the literature and analysis of the surrounding reality, changes were indicated, the introduction of which will improve public procurement. The results of the research in particular boroughs were used to diagnose the research problem related to transparency in public procurement proceedings and to achieve the objective, which was to develop a state diagnosis and proposals of changes ensuring an increase in the level of utilisation of public financial resources. It was assumed in the study that proper management of public financial resources in the area of expenses, especially those covered by public procurement law, eliminates excessive debt and thus creates security in the area of local financial resources. At the end of the study, recommendations were presented to eliminate the identified shortcomings in the legal solutions and functioning public procurement procedures. DOI: 10.5604/01.3001.0014.6690 http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0014.6690

Keywords: public procurement, financial security, local government, openness, transparency

In a country well governed, poverty is something to be ashamed of. In a country badly governed, wealth is something to be ashamed of. Confucius

Introduction

The separation of the sector managing resources of the common good in organ- ised societies entailed an obligation for citizens to pay public tribute to the common budget and the need to develop rules to influence the use of these resources. The basis for proper organisation of the whole system of managing public financial resources in liberal democracies is to build procedures based on transparency on the income and expenditure side. Such a procedure not only reveals decisions and all documentation, but also seeks to present them in such a way as to make

Internal Security, July–December 147 Andrzej Józef Kozłowski, Iwona Z. Czaplicka-Kozłowska them readable, and thus to enable citizens to keep constant social control over the use of these resources. In order to ensure and implement the principles of social responsibility of an organisation such as a borough council (tier of self-govern- ment), it is first and foremost necessary to arm this organisation with knowledge about its resources. It should also be emphasised that the financial security of the whole public sector and its individual components can be ensured by full access of the citizens to understandable procedures and legible documents. This also translates into strengthening the citizens’ conviction about the need to contribute their resources to the public sector, rather than seeking to avoid paying public tribute, e.g. by expanding the system of unregistered money circulation. Convinc- ing the citizens about the features of the functioning of the public sector and the honesty and high qualifications of the administrators of these financial resources translates into the financial security of the state and citizens. The study addresses the problem related to the procedures of public financial resources management in the area of implementation of tasks specified in the income and expenditure plan adopted at the borough, local government level. Proper expenditure of the financial resources at a local government’s disposal, enriches the resources of common good and also creates a safe level of disposal of these resources. The properly developed technology of spending money and the public procurement procedure specified in legal regulations1, for undertak- ings related to the disposal of a specific financial resource, aims at rationalisation and stabilisation in the area of local finance. It also ensures the security of local financial resources threatened by the need to seek additional resources as an own contribution to investment undertakings financed from European Union funds2. The use of public procurement procedures and, above all, their transparent presen- tation, guarantees the security of local financial resources, as it translates into social control and social responsibility. In this paper, research using Internet resources in the form of Public Information Bulletins (BIPs) for recent years has been carried out, mainly of local governments of cities and boroughs in Poland. The aim of the study is to indicate, in the system of the law in force, the areas of positive and nega- tive functioning. Improper functioning of public procurement may translate into a crisis of local financial resources, including the observed excessive debt in banks, which violates the financial security of local government and its members.

Importance of public procurement in creating fi nancial security of public sector organisations

An efficiently managed state is characterised by the high awareness and convic- tion of the citizens about the need to pay public tribute to the central and municipal or borough budgets. This conviction is also a result of positive assessment of the

1 Ustawa z dnia 29 stycznia 2004 — Prawo zamówień publicznych, wcześniej ustawa z dnia 10 czerwca 1994 roku o zamówieniach publicznych. 2 Cf. Nogalski B, Kozłowski A.J, Czaplicka-Kozłowska I.Z, Financial Security of the public sector versus the indebtedness of local self-government. Internal Security, 2018, Vol. 10, Issue 1.

148 Internal Security, July–December Security of Public Financial Resources and the Public Procurement Procedure… administrators of these resources directing them to the implementation of socially desired and accepted tasks. Therefore, it can be assumed that the amount of rev- enues of the public sector depends on the attitudes of citizens shaped by those in power at each level. If these resources are improperly disposed of, they may change and form a negative assessment, which may lead to a procedure of unreg- istered money circulation and a search for opportunities not to pay public tribute or even corruption, nepotism or protection3. In this area, the answer to the question of what is the reason for a decrease or increase in income and also the character- istics of using public financial resources should be sought. Therefore, the public procurement system can be analysed and evaluated within the causes and effects that translate into the attitudes of citizens, and also those of the administrators of these financial resources. Within the causes, we have, above all, an incorrectly or properly structured law, so an incorrectly or properly structured system affect- ing the procedures and behaviour of the administrators of public funds and also the behaviour of citizens and suppliers of all kinds of products to the public sector. An improperly structured system of public procurement, hence, on the one hand, the illegibility of many decisions, the complexity of procedures, and the frequent volatility of the law, and on the other hand, the lack of consistency in adopting transparent procedures, leads to pathologies in the management of public finan- cial resources. A properly constructed system of public procurement results from the state’s activity in spending public funds and translates into the assessment of decision-making bodies at every level in the structure of state management. The needs of the public sector are growing rapidly, and recent years, in connection with the implementation of projects co-financed by the European Union4, have brought about an intensification of public sector organisations’ undertakings aimed primar- ily at the development of communication infrastructure, municipal infrastructure including, among others, sewage systems, and local roads, as well as investments in the area of education and culture. The huge size of the public procurement mar- ket is evidenced by the fact that in 2017, the value of contracts awarded in Poland under Article 22(2) of the Public Procurement Law was more than PLN 163 billion5. Spending public money has always generated interest among all those who contribute to the public purse. In order to prevent the spending of public funds in a hasty, ill-considered or even dishonest way, procedures have always been sought to prevent these phenomena. Therefore, a system has been created to regu- late the way public sector organisations award contracts, with the aim of ensuring the most beneficial use of public financial resources. This system is supposed to guarantee the contractors of tasks for the public sector a selection procedure based on substantive criteria and not on unchecked or even unclear preferences

3 Cf. Kozłowski A.J, Czaplicka-Kozłowska I.Z, Świrska A, The Phenomenon of Corruption in Public Sector Organizations. Local Government Case Studies from the Warmia and Mazury Regions of Poland. Hyperion International Journal of Econophysics & New Economy, 2016, Vol. 9, Issue 1, pp. 117–141. 4 Cf. Kozłowski A.J, Czaplicka-Kozłowska I.Z, Anna R, Wykorzystanie funduszy Unii Europejskiej a zadłużenie samorządów gminnych, [in:] Studia Mazowieckie, 2017, XI/XXVI, No. 1, pp. 29–42. 5 Sprawozdanie Prezesa Urzędu Zamówień Publicznych o funkcjonowaniu systemu zamówień publicznych w 2017 Warsaw, czerwiec 2018 r. Electronic source: https://www.uzp. gov.pl/, accessed: 22.01.2019.

Internal Security, July–December 149 Andrzej Józef Kozłowski, Iwona Z. Czaplicka-Kozłowska developed by representatives of public administration. However, not only public administration bodies are obliged to apply the provisions on public procurement, but also other entities more or less dependent on the state, as well as private enti- ties, if they somehow participate in spending public funds, or enjoy special rights granted by the state6. It should be stressed that the distinguishing feature of public procurement compared to other civil contracts is that they are performed in the public interest and financed by public funds7. When analysing the use of public financial resources in territorial self- governments, and especially boroughs, it is necessary to pay attention not only to the procedures aimed at the rational use of these resources, but also at the impact of these procedures on the general education of citizens about money and public financial resources. It should be stressed that financial management in a borough is a complex process consisting of making various and interrelated decisions and actions by their constituent and executive bodies to maximise the economic and social effects in accordance with the adopted current and strategic goals. Therefore, it is not only financial administration, but also conducting financial policy and budget management of a management oriented unit. Such management is characterised by self-governments with professional staff, using a wide range of instruments in the form of development strategies, long-term programmes and investment plans, budget forecasts, financial assembly of investments, credit- worthiness and financial liquidity of the self-government unit. The essence of such professionalism is making decisions depending on the changing external and inter- nal conditions of the local government unit’s functioning8. When managing local financial resources in the area covered by public procurement, it is necessary, above all, to comply with the legal standards set out in the Act on Public Procurement. The basic form of spending money from the commune budget is a tender for the performance of a given service or purchase of the indicated product. Conduct- ing such a procedure should be based on the principle of transparency, which should strengthen the principle of openness (disclosure of the entire procedure in the BIP), legalism (proceedings in accordance with the law) and then the principle of writing and using the Polish language, the principle of impartiality and objec- tivity, equal treatment, and finally the principle of limited and unlimited tender. Adhering to these principles reduces the risk of corrupt practices and also reduces the risk of allegations of misspending public money9. This is why, above all, the prin- ciple of transparency, which requires that a clear public procurement procedure be conducted, is a condition for ensuring the correct course of proceedings aimed at selecting the most advantageous offer. Non-compliance by the contracting authority, and hence the disposer of public financial resources, with the standards expressed in the regulations defining the rules for spending public funds may have

6 Cf. Miemiec W, Zagadnienia finansowo prawne zamówień publicznych w działalności jed- nostek samorządu terytorialnego. Prawnicza i Ekonomiczna Biblioteka Cyfrowa. Wrocław, 2013. 7 Wieloński M, Realizacja interesu publicznego w prawie zamówień publicznych. Warsaw, 2012, p. 155 ff. 8 Kozłowski A.J, Czaplicka-Kozłowska I.Z, Transparentność zarządzania finansami lokal- nymi, QNT Systemy Informacyjne. Cracow, 2014, pp. 40–41. 9 Sroka J.M, Odpowiedzialność społeczna sektora publicznego w procesie zamówień publicznych, Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny we Wrocławiu. Wrocław, 2013, p. 215.

150 Internal Security, July–December Security of Public Financial Resources and the Public Procurement Procedure… negative effects in the area of local development. It may also translate into a viola- tion of public finance discipline and, as a consequence, into proceedings that will involve criminal liability10. The systemic transformation initiated in 1989 also covered the area of public sector financial management, including public expenditure. In the procedure aimed at introducing the principles of rational management characterising modern social and economic systems to the management of public financial resources, it is possible to distinguish first of all the public finance reform preceding the public pro- curement reform. The first step was the enactment of the Budget Law Act of January 5, 1991, which defined the general principles and mode of collecting the financial resources covered by the state budget and borough budgets and allocating those resources to financing tasks resulting from the functions of the state and borough11. It was only 3 years later that the Public Procurement Act was adopted12, which was amended by the Public Procurement Law of 29 January 200413. In the area of public resources management and the changes that took place after 1989 in the area of disposing of public finances, it is necessary to indicate the adoption of the Act of 26 November 1998 on public finances14, reforming the management of public financial resources and, above all, the Act of 6 September 2001 on access to public information15. The idea of the Act on access to public information was to make public the procedures related to the collection and spending of public financial resources, which was to be a guarantee to prevent cases of improper management of these resources. Since the adoption of the current public procurement law in 2004, it has under- gone so many changes that it was decided to publish the consolidated text of the law16. Such a large number of changes indicate the imperfection of the existing solu- tions and it should be believed that further changes shaping the principles of public procurement will take place in the near future. It may be assumed that the detailed provisions of the Act in the face of the changing world and the principles shaping relations between people and organisations will lead to further changes in public procurement law. The definition of the principles of awarding public contracts in Chapter 2 of the Act, due to the lack of transparency, and therefore open- ness and legibility in proceedings, makes the provisions of this Act very flawed.

10 Rekomendacje postępowań antykorupcyjnych przy udzielaniu zamówień publicznych. Centralne Biuro Antykorupcyjne. Warsaw, 2014. 11 Ustawa z dnia 5 stycznia 1991 roku Prawo budżetowe, Dz.U. 1991, No. 4, item 18, amended the Budget Law passed on 3 December 1984. 12 Ustawa z dnia 10 czerwca 1994 roku o zamówieniach publicznych, Dz.U. 1994, No. 76, item 344. 13 Ustawa z dnia 29 stycznia 2004 roku Prawo zamówień publicznych, Dz.U. 2004, No. 19, item 177 — tekst jednolity, Dz.U. 2018, item 1986, 2215. 14 Ustawa z dnia 26 listopada 1998 roku o finansach publicznych, Dz.U. 1998, No. 155, item 1014 amended by the Public Finance Act of 27 August 2009, Dz.U. 2009, No. 157, item 1240. 15 Ustawa z dnia 6 września 2001 roku o dostępie do informacji publicznej, Dz.U.2009, No. 112, item 1198. 16 Warsaw, 16th October 2018, item 1986: Obwieszczenie Marszałka Sejmu Rzeczypospo- litej Polskiej z dnia 3 października 2018 w sprawie ogłoszenia jednolitego tekstu ustawy — Prawo zamówień publicznych.

Internal Security, July–December 151 Andrzej Józef Kozłowski, Iwona Z. Czaplicka-Kozłowska

It is indisputable that such principles as maintaining fair competition and equal treatment (Article 7 paragraph 1), openness of the procedure (Article 8 paragraph 1) and conducting the procedure in writing (Article 9 paragraph 1) and in Pol- ish (Article 9 paragraph 2) form the basis for the procedure aimed at selecting the most advantageous tender, provided that these provisions are strengthened by the transparency of procedures. At present, the greatest disadvantage of the Act in force is the recognition of the most advantageous offer as, first of all, the one which presents the most advantageous balance of price or cost (Article 2.2.5) and, as research indicates, most often it is the price or cost which determines the selec- tion of the most advantageous offer. Public procurement in Poland is a very important element of economic and social reality, as in 2017, according to the Public Procurement Office, it accounted for about 8.23% of the gross domestic product. At the same time, the value of public contracts awarded at that time amounted to PLN 163.2 billion and the total number of contracts amounted to almost 140,000, 86% of which were contracts under open tenders. Compared to the previous year, this was an increase of over 4%. The category of construction works, on the other hand, accounted for 44% of the value of contracts awarded under this procedure17.

Table 1. Public procurement by modes in 2014–2017

Years / percentage of orders Procurement mode 2014 2015 2016 2017 Open tender 82.19 83.39 81.80 86.10 Restricted tender 0.74 0.83 0.70 0.40 Negotiations with announcement 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.05 Competitive dialogue 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 Negotiations without announcement 0.21 0.13 0.10 0.14 Free-handed order 13.42 11.75 13.42 9.67 Price inquiry 3.14 3.55 3.59 3.29 Innovation Partnership - - 0.00 0.01 Electronic bidding 0.21 0.27 0.33 0.32

Source: Sprawozdanie Prezesa Urzędu Zamówień Publicznych o funkcjonowaniu systemu zamówień publicznych w 2017 r. Urząd zamówień Publicznych, Warsaw 2018, p. 34.

The close link between public procurement and the public interest, which is rooted in the existence of public finances and public funds, should be stressed as a direct systemic and legal premise for public procurement law to apply. The use of public financial resources takes place according to various principles and rules defined in the law which differ from the private sector. The introduction of public procurement institutions, specific for spending public money, is a result

17 Sprawozdanie Prezesa Urzędu Zamówień Publicznych o funkcjonowaniu systemu zamówień publicznych w 2017, Urząd zamówień Publicznych. Warsaw, 2018.

152 Internal Security, July–December Security of Public Financial Resources and the Public Procurement Procedure… of these differences. On the other hand, the purpose of expenditures made under the public procurement procedure is or should be in the public interest, because the funds are drawn from public sources of income. It is also necessary to stress the importance of public procurement institutions in the area of financial security, ensuring the proper use of public financial resources and preventing financial crimes occurring in the area of relations between the buyer and the seller. It is in the area of spending public financial resources, including the planning and construc- tion procedure, that the cause of pathology in public procurement and rational use of these resources can be seen.

Analysis of public procurement procedures in local governments

The subject of the study is the analysis of procedures for selecting the most advantageous offer on the basis of information published in Public Information Bulletins on the websites of borough offices. The analysis was mainly based on infor- mation published in the Public Information Bulletins on the websites of selected boroughs. The analysis referred not only to documents related to the procedure, but also analysed resolutions and executive acts of local self-government bodies relating to the management of local financial resources, including in particular annual budget plans and reports. The basic subject of the study was the analysis of the public procurement procedure, with particular attention paid to transpar- ent access to all documentation related to the selected investment project or to public procurement in general. According to the Act on Access to Public Informa- tion, everyone has the right to information, and public authorities and entities which perform public tasks are obliged to place public information in an official ICT publication, called the Public Information Bulletin18. In search of an answer to the question of whether the most advantageous offer was selected, an attempt was made to analyse the procurement procedure, including first of all the proto- cols showing the decisions taken and also the agreements defining the rules for the execution of the public contract. As part of the analysis of the selection of the most advantageous offer, the financial values presented in the public contract were analysed, as well as the type and location of the public contractors. The characteristics of the selection of public procurement procedures presented in the Public Procurement Law were also analysed. The analysis shows that in selecting the contractor, the open tender procedure was used first and foremost. It was important from the point of view of the conducted research to determine the research methodology, including the rules that were applicable to the persons selected and prepared to conduct the analysis. Due to the fact that these were officers of uniformed services, contact with employees of offices and organisations representing the parties to the public contract was prohibited. Those conduct- ing the research were prepared to carry out the analysis; in particular, they were

18 Art. 8 ustawy z dnia 6 września 2001 roku o dostępie do informacji publicznej, Dz.U. 2018, item 1330, 1669.

Internal Security, July–December 153 Andrzej Józef Kozłowski, Iwona Z. Czaplicka-Kozłowska introduced to the knowledge of public procurement, public finance and openness in public management. The basic source on the basis of which the analysis of pub- lic procurement was conducted was the Public Information Bulletins, including the documents describing individual stages of the public procurement procedure and the documents specifying the financial management and staffing levels, especially the qualifications of the persons employed on the part of the ordering party. The aim of the study was to indicate the characteristics of the public pro- curement procedure and, in particular, transparency, which translated into easy access to documents that were legible and comprehensible to recipients (borough inhabitants). The analysis rejected all suggestions relating to obvious examples of infringements of the law and procedures that might indicate a pathology in the management of public financial resources. Therefore, the research problem referred to the transparency of management and not to pathology defined as corruption, nepotism, or protection in the area of public procurement. The result of the analysis (Table 2) of public finance management in public pro- curement procedures is the identification of many weaknesses in the presentation of documents on the Public Information Bulletin website. First of all, the following was found: — illegibility of many documents, complexity and incomprehensible financial and accounting language presented in financial documents, in the whole public procurement procedure from the moment of entry in the income and expenditure plan to the report on budget implementation; — lack of many documents characterising and describing the different stages of public procurement, including decisions by management and bodies with public financial resources; — the dominance of the financial criterion (price) in the award of the contract and less attention paid to the quality, timeliness and guarantees of the product, service or investment delivered (in one municipality, the offer to transport children was won by a company with old cars that had the mini- mum technical conditions for transport safety, quality and timeliness); — errors in some documents and their lack of correction on the PIB website; — tender of only one bidder, so there was no competition (in one case, it was found that the municipal company, and therefore the contracting authority of the public contract, had won); — PIB often failed to find the documents defining the various stages of public procurement; — illegible plans of revenues and expenditures of boroughs, local-governments and organisations performing tasks in the area of the public sector, resulting in the lack of clear information on planned projects whose implementation requires the use of one of the public procurement procedures; — existence of apparent transparency, placing documents in a way that makes them difficult to read, the lack of document titles in the PIB and limiting one- self to numbering in the nomenclature, which makes it necessary to browse through countless documents, which, with the slow speed of the PIB web- site, creates difficulties in accessing information; — selection of a contractor based on a formally defined price makes local companies in a commune providing a service, product or investment often

154 Internal Security, July–December Security of Public Financial Resources and the Public Procurement Procedure…

lose out to monopolists in the area of specific tasks — in fact, such an offer is more expensive for the commune when one takes into account the local budget revenues from taxes and fees of the local company; — amount specified in the announcement is often underestimated, which leads to renegotiation of contracts in the course of the task — usually, in such a case, there is no clear justification for choosing such an offer and the legiti- macy of changes in the contract and the price of the task; — short deadline for selecting a contractor, which in the case of investment tasks carried out over a longer period of time (e.g. road, infrastructure or bor- ough real estate projects) raises suspicion of price collusion as well as a lack of information about undertakings preceding the investment project (previ- ously prepared plans, projects, cost estimates, etc.); — public procurement proceedings often show an insufficient state of knowl- edge of those who decide and make decisions, especially when it relates to the latest technologies on which the final product will be based; — most often, there is a lack of justification for the execution of the task and a reduction of the decision to the lowest price; — observations of the construction works performed, especially on local roads, indicate inadequate decisions within the scope of the guarantee of the works performed ( It often starts again soon after the road is completed, repaired or modernised).

Table 2. Subject of the public procurement in selected boroughs

Lp. Borough Subject of the order ( procurement) repair of an over 40-year-old car for over PLN 230,000 for 1Bełchatów the City Guard 2 Białystok street lighting 3 Bytom school playground 4 Chęciny building of a fire station 5 Chrzanów rebuilding of a pavement 6 Czarnków rebuilding of a road 7 Dobra rebuilding of a street 8 Duszniki transfer of children to school investment based on citizens’ budget — bicycle racks 9Gdańsk at school 10 Gliwice equipment purchase for a Rescue Centre 11 Gniezno cemetery parking 12 Grabów rebuilding of a borough road 13 Grudziądz construction of public transport infrastructure 14 Janów winter road maintenance 15 Kaczory modernisation of a kindergarten 16 Kostrzyn Wielkopolski sports hall 17 Kościan sewerage system

Internal Security, July–December 155 Andrzej Józef Kozłowski, Iwona Z. Czaplicka-Kozłowska

18 Krotoszyce road reconstruction 19 Krotoszyn thermomodernisation of a daycare centre 20 Kunice road surface repair 21 Kutno sewerage system 22 Lubicz transfer of children to school 23 Luboń waste collection and disposal 24 Łódź materials promoting the voivodeship 25 Nowy Sącz thermomodernisation of a school — project development 26 Oborniki Śląskie purchase of a fire engine 27 Ostrołęka rebuilding of a street 28 Pabianice air conditioning of a wedding hall 29 Pieńsk playground 30 Piotrowice street lighting 31 Przodkowo reconstruction of a borough road 32 Przysucha district road renovation 33 Pszczew road reconstruction 34 Pszów property value assessment 35 Rokicina reconstruction of a water supply system 36 Rozprza road renovation 37 Siemianowice Śląskie playground 38 Sosnowiec Installation of light signals near a school 39 Stara Biała building of a new borough road 40 Starogard Gdański street reconstruction 41 Stęszew borough road 42 Swarzędz purchase of a fire engine 43 Śrem school sports field 44 Świdnik parking lot 45 Świecie nad Osą road reconstruction 46 Turek pavement reconstruction 47 Warlubie district road reconstruction 48 Warszawa PG Wodnej Wody Polskie — purchase of computer software 49 Wilamowice purchase of a lightweight rescue and firefighting vehicle 50 Witkowo road reconstruction 51 Władysławów waste 52 Wojciechów street lighting 53 Wolsztyn reconstruction of training and recreation facilities 54 Zamość building of a new road 55 Żyraków historic manor house renovation

Source: own research results

156 Internal Security, July–December Security of Public Financial Resources and the Public Procurement Procedure…

Pursuant to the Act on Combatting Unfair Competition of 16 April19, an entity ordering the performance of a specific task, including local government, is obliged to reject an offer if its submission constitutes a manifestation of unfair competi- tion within the meaning of the provisions on combatting unfair competition or if the offer submitted contains an abnormally low price in relation to the subject of the order. The local government must also reject an offer if the action of the competitor is in conflict with the law and good practices constituting a threat or infringement of the interest of another entrepreneur or customer. The area of public expenditure, due to the lack of transparency in planning and reporting on the implementation of financial plans, is exposed to many temptations aimed at creating procedures that deplete public resources and enrich persons and entities in an unauthorised manner. In the case of public procurement, prohibited vertical agreements may occur, the purpose (direct or indirect) of which may be to set prices (price collusion) and other products of purchase or sale (services)20. The purpose of such a price col- lusion may also be to restrict or control the production of services or sales, as well as technical progress or investment21. Price collusion may also occur within local governments, especially borough authorities22. It should be stressed that restrictive agreements have a negative impact on the market, its participants and consumers by regulating prices (growth, stabilisation, timing, rebates and level of differentia- tion depending on the market), service quotas and market shares, market sharing and customer allocation23. Undertakings entering public procurement contracts are more likely to agree on joint and profitable decisions than to take economic action alone, which is exposed to high risk24. Irregularities in the implementa- tion of public expenditure carried out using the procedures set out in the Public Procurement Law may be evidenced by the poor quality of the task performed, the short time between the announcement of the tender and its award, a small number of companies joining the tender and also low qualifications of persons conducting or supervising the tender procedure.

Conclusions — Recommendations

Analysing the research problem undertaken in the study, relating to the proper management of public financial resources on the expenditure side and procedures implemented primarily on the basis of the public procurement law and the law defining openness and access to public information, the lack of compliance by local

19 Ustawa z 16 kwietnia 1993 roku o zwalczaniu nieuczciwej konkurencji. Dz.U. 2018, item 1330, 1669. 20 Klenowska K, Porozumienia ograniczające konkurencję, [in:] Powałowski A (Ed.), Leksykon prawa konkurencji. 100 podstawowych pojęć. Warsaw, 2010, p. 214. 21 Jurkowska-Gomułkowska A, Zakaz porozumień ograniczających konkurencję, [in:] Skoczny T (Ed.), Ustawa o ochronie konkurencji i konkurentów. Warsaw, 2014, p. 269. 22 Wojtczak D, Porozumienia wertykalne. Warsaw, 2013, p. 10. 23 Nowobilski A, Podmiotko S, Zakaz porozumień ograniczających konkurencję w kontekście wolności gospodarczej. Przegląd Prawnicy Europejskiego Stowarzyszenia Stu- dentów Prawa ELSA Poland, 2015, t. III, p. 80. 24 Jurczyk Z, Kartele w polityce konkurencji Unii Europejskiej. Warsaw, 2012, pp. 162–163.

Internal Security, July–December 157 Andrzej Józef Kozłowski, Iwona Z. Czaplicka-Kozłowska governments and public sector organisations with the basic principle of access to pub- lic information should be stressed above all, which is readability (comprehensibility by citizens) and easy accessibility on the Public Information Bulletin website. Therefore, the basic reasons for the defects in the Polish public procurement system are primarily: — Lack of transparency in the management of public finances, especially the establishment of clear revenue and expenditure plans at the lowest level in the state management structure; — lack of unfettered access to public information, especially decisions and pro- cedures in the area of using public financial resources; — low qualifications of managers in the area of the public sector, especially in the area of financial management, which results from an improperly defined and functioning incentive system; — low level of knowledge about money, finances and especially public finances of citizens, which results from improperly implemented, starting from pri- mary school, curricula, which translates into the inability to read financial plans and procedures, and thus the possibility of exercising social control over the performance of tasks by public sector organisations. Such a system of public procurement and management of public financial resources makes it possible for weak companies to win, offering technologically obsolete services and investments with a short guarantee period, as exempli- fied by continuous and frequent repairs of newly built roads. Therefore, in order to improve the principles of managing public financial resources, it is necessary to implement transparent procedures based on clear documents specifying the various stages of the public procurement procedure. Changes in public pro- curement law should aim at: — Moving away from the decisive role of the formal price dimension in the selection of a contractor in favour of final effectiveness (not everything that has a lower price is cheaper, e.g. execution of a more expensive public con- tract by a local company accrues benefits in the form of income to the local budget from particular taxes, and a higher investment price should translate into a long period of failure-free operation); — pay attention to the as-built guarantee period, especially for road and munic- ipal infrastructure — at present, modernisation or renovation is often carried out after 5–10 years; — creating a central register (website) of public procurement and placing all announcements there, and their placement time should not be shorter than 2 weeks (creating a central office or strengthening the current Public Procurement Office to conduct ongoing supervision over public procure- ment procedures and especially their readability); — make sure that every citizens’ enquiry ends with a clear answer and that any lack of an answer or delay ends with a disciplinary or financial penalty and even dismissal from office; — implement legible budgets by activity based primarily on objectives and measures of public expenditure, which will increase the efficiency of the use of financial resources in public procurement; — extending the time for submitting offers (number of days between the date of announcement of the tender and the last day of submission of offers)

158 Internal Security, July–December Security of Public Financial Resources and the Public Procurement Procedure…

and the time for taking a decision (number of days from the last submission of an offer to the date of announcement of the outcome of the procedure — e.g. up to 2 weeks), the number of certificates required from tenderers, the description of the contract (number of characters in the description), the qualifying criteria used (number of characters in the description), increas- ing the role and number of non-price criteria used for evaluating offers and striving for at least 2–3 tenderers to participate in each contract. In order to ensure the proper use of local financial resources, including increasing the level of security of the local budget, it is necessary to take measures to eliminate the phenomena which generate the risk of fraud in public procurement. Therefore, the most important measure is to implement transparency in the decision-making procedure for selecting the most advantageous offer. Transparency of the pro- cedures will lead to the assessment of citizens and also supervisory bodies of the properties of managing public financial resources.

References

1. Jurczyk Z, Kartele w polityce konkurencji Unii Europejskiej. Warsaw, 2012. 2. Jurkowska-Gomułkowska A, Zakaz porozumień ograniczających konkurencję, [in:] Skoczny T (Ed.), Ustawa o ochronie konkurencji i konkurentów. Warsaw, 2014. 3. Klenowska K, Porozumienia ograniczające konkurencję, [in:] Powałowski A (Ed.), Leksykon prawa konkurencji. 100 podstawowych pojęć. Warsaw, 2010. 4. Kozłowski A. J, Czaplicka-Kozłowska I.Z, Transparentność zarządzania fi nansami lokalnymi, QNT Systemy Informacyjne. Cracow, 2014. 5. Kozłowski A. J, Czaplicka-Kozłowska I. Z, Raczkowska A, Wykorzystanie funduszy Unii Europejskiej a zadłużenie samorządów gminnych, [in:] Studia Mazowieckie, 2017, XI/XXVI No. 1. 6. Kozłowski A.J, Czaplicka-Kozłowska I.Z, Świrska A, The Phenomenon of Cor- ruption in Public Sector Organizations (Local Government Case Studies from the Warmia and Mazury Regions of Poland). Hyperion International Journal of Econophysics & New Economy, 2016, Vol, 9, Issue 1. 7. Miemiec W, Zagadnienia finansowo prawne zamówień publicznych w działalności jednostek samorządu terytorialnego. Wrocław, 2013. 8. Nowobilski A, Podmiotko S, Zakaz porozumień ograniczających konkurencję w kontekście wolności gospodarczej. Przegląd Prawnicy Europejskiego Stowarzy- szenia Studentów Prawa ELSA Poland, 2015, t. III. 9. Rekomendacje postępowań antykorupcyjnych przy udzielaniu zamówień pub- licznych, Centralne Biuro Antykorupcyjne. Warsaw, 2014. 10. Sprawozdanie Prezesa Urzędu Zamówień Publicznych o funkcjonowaniu syste- mu zamówień publicznych w 2017 r. Urząd zamówień Publicznych. Warsaw, 2018. 11. Sroka J. M, Odpowiedzialność społeczna sektora publicznego w procesie zamówień publicznych, Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny we Wrocławiu. Wrocław, 2013. 12. Ustawa z 16 kwietnia 1993 roku o zwalczaniu nieuczciwej konkurencji. 13. Ustawa z dnia 10 czerwca 1994 roku o zamówieniach publicznych. 14. Ustawa z dnia 26 listopada 1998 roku o fi nansach publicznych. 15. Ustawa z dnia 27 sierpnia 2009 roku o fi nansach publicznych.

Internal Security, July–December 159 Andrzej Józef Kozłowski, Iwona Z. Czaplicka-Kozłowska

16. Ustawa z dnia 29 stycznia 2004 roku — Prawo zamówień publicznych. 17. Ustawa z dnia 3 grudnia 1984 roku — Prawo budżetowe. 18. Ustawa z dnia 5 stycznia 1991 roku — Prawo budżetowe. 19. Ustawa z dnia 6 września 2001 roku o dostępie do informacji publicznej 20. Warsaw, 16th October 2018, item 1986: Obwieszczenie Marszałka Sejmu Rzeczy- pospolitej Polskiej z dnia 3 października 2018 w sprawie ogłoszenia jednolitego tekstu ustawy — Prawo zamówień publicznych. 21. Wieloński M, Realizacja interesu publicznego w prawie zamówień publicznych, Wydawnictwo Wydziału Dziennikarstwa i Nauk Politycznych Uniwersytet Warszawski. Warsaw, 2012 22. Wojtczak D, Porozumienia wertykalne. Warsaw, 2013.

About the Authors

Andrzej Józef Kozłowski, post-doctoral degree in the fi eld of economic science, in the discipline of management sciences — professor of the Police Academy, Szczytno. He specialises in the issue of management of public sector organisations, especially the issues of transparent fi nancial management and fi nancial security. He is the author of several monographs and dozens of scientifi c articles published in Poland and abroad. He has experience in the work of the state administration at the regional and supra-regional level, he managed, inter alia, Regional Centre for Administration Training covering 17 voivodships, the Regional Scientifi c Association, and he has conducted his own business activities related to teaching staff and fi nancial consulting. E-mail: [email protected] Iwona Zofi a Czaplicka-Kozłowska, PhD in economic sciences, assistant professor at the Faculty of Organisation and Management at the University of Warmia and Mazury, Olsztyn. Scientifi c issues: human resources management, description of posts and evaluating work at the public administration offi ces and organisational units of the public sector. She conducts classes and lectures in human resources management, modern methods of human resources management and human capital management on full-time, part-time and post-graduate studies, as well as seminars. She is the author and co-author of thematic publications, mostly monographs and scientifi c articles. Poland. E-mail: [email protected]

Streszczenie. Przedmiotem opracowania jest analiza procedur związanych z wyłonieniem najkorzystniejszej oferty w procesie określonym prawem zamówień publicznych. Wskazując istotę problemu w obrębie zarządzania publicznymi zasobami finansowymi, zwrócono przede wszystkim uwagę na rozstrzygnięcia prawne, ich wielość zmian od uchwalenia pierwszej ustawy w 1994 roku oraz na istotę zarządzania publicznymi zasobami finansowymi w otaczającej nas rzeczywistości. W oparciu o analizę zasobów internetowych wybranych losowo ponad 50 samorządów terytorialnych, głównie gminnych, dokonano oceny transparentności postępowań o udzielenie zamówień publicznych. Tym samym, w odniesieniu do poszczególnych gmin, wykorzystano metodę studium przypadku i analizy eksperckiej w naukowej ocenie zjawiska zamówień publicznych. Następnie na podstawie literatury oraz analizy otaczającej rzeczywistości wskazano zmiany, których wprowadzenie usprawni zamówienia publiczne. Wyniki badań w poszczególnych gminach posłużyły do zdiagnozowania problemu badawczego odnoszącego się do transparentności w postępowaniu o zamówienia publiczne i osiągnięcia celu, jakim było wypracowanie diagnozy stanu i propozycji zmian zapewniających podniesienie poziomu wykorzystania publicznych zasobów finansowych. Przyjęto w opracowaniu, że właściwe zarządzanie publicznymi zasobami finansowymi w obszarze wydatków, szczególnie objętych prawem zamówień publicznych, eliminuje nadmierne zadłużenie i tym samym tworzy bezpieczeństwo w obszarze lokalnych zasobów finansowych. W końcu opracowania zaprezentowano rekomendacje zmierzające do wyeliminowania stwierdzonych nieprawidłowości w rozwiązaniach prawnych oraz funkcjonujących procedurach zamówień publicznych.

160 Internal Security, July–December Security of Public Financial Resources and the Public Procurement Procedure…

Zusammenfassung. Gegenstand der vorliegenden Studie ist die Analyse von Verfahren zur Auswahl des besten Angebots in dem im Vergaberecht festgelegten Prozess. Um das Problem im Bereich der Verwaltung der öffentlichen Finanzmittel zu verdeutlichen wurde vor allem auf die rechtlichen Lösungen, d.h. auf die Anzahl der Änderungen seit der Verabschiedung des ersten Gesetzes im Jahre 1994 und auf das Wesen der Verwaltung der öffentlichen Finanzmittel in der umgebenden Realität hingewiesen. Die Transparenz des öffentlichen Beschaffungswesens wurde auf der Grundlage einer Analyse von Internetressourcen bewertet, die nach dem Zufallsprinzip von mehr als 50 territorialen Selbstverwaltungen, hauptsächlich von Gemeinden, ausgewählt wurden. In Bezug auf einzelne Gemeinden wurde daher bei der wissenschaftlichen Bewertung des Phänomens des öffentlichen Beschaffungswesens die Methode der Fallstudie und der Expertenanalyse verwendet. Auf der grundlegenden Literatur sowie der Analyse der umgebenden Realität wurden dann Änderungen angezeigt, deren Einführung das öffentliche Beschaffungswesen verbessern würde. Die Ergebnisse der Forschung in einzelnen Gemeinden wurden verwendet, um das Forschungsproblem im Zusammenhang mit der Transparenz in öffentlichen Beschaffungsverfahren zu diagnostizieren und das Ziel zu erreichen, eine Diagnose des Staates zu entwickeln und Änderungen vorzuschlagen, die eine Erhöhung des Einsatzes öffentlicher Finanzmittel gewährleisten. In der Studie wurde davon ausgegangen, dass eine ordnungsgemäße Verwaltung der öffentlichen Finanzmittel im Bereich der Ausgaben, insbesondere derjenigen, die unter das Gesetz über das öffentliche Beschaffungswesen fallen, eine übermäßige Verschuldung beseitigt und somit Sicherheit im Bereich der lokalen Finanzmittel schafft. Am Ende der Studie wurden Empfehlungen vorgelegt, um die festgestellten Unregelmäßigkeiten bei rechtlichen Lösungen und die funktionierenden Verfahren für das öffentliche Beschaffungswesen zu beseitigen.

Резюме. Целью настоящей статьи является анализ процедур, связанных с выбором наиболее выгодного предложения в рамках процедуры, предусмотренной законом о государственных закупках. С целью показать сущность проблемы в сфере управления государственными финансовыми ресурсами, в первую очередь, рассматривались законодательные решения, количество внесенных изменений с момента принятия первого закона в 1994 году, а также сущность управления государственными финансовыми ресурсами с учетом окружающей действительности. На основе анализа интернет-ресурсов свыше 50 территориальных органов самоуправления, в основном гминных, отобранных в случайном порядке, проведена оценка транспарентности процедур государственных закупок. В связи с этим, при научной оценке существования феномена госзакупок отдельных гмин был использован метод изучения конкретного случая и экспертного анализа. Затем, на основе литературы и анализа существующей действительности определя- ются изменения, внедрение которых повысит эффективность госзакупок. Результаты исследования, проведенного в гминах, были использованы для определения проблемы, связанной с прозрачностью процедур государственных закупок, а также для достижения цели, которая состояла в существующих процедур, а также возможных изменений, направленных на повышение уровня использования государственных финансовых ресурсов. В статье предполагается, что надлежащее управление государственными финансовыми ресурсами в области расходов, особенно теми, которые предусмотрены законом о государственных закупках, исключает чрезмерную задолженность и тем самым создает безопасность в области местных финансовых ресурсов. В конце статьи изложены рекомендации по устранению выявленных ошибок в законодательстве и процедурах государственных закупок.

Internal Security, July–December 161

Training System of Polish Police Offi cers — in the Past and Today

Dominik Hryszkiewicz ORCID: 0000-0001-5343-162X Uniwersity of Warmia and Mazury

Abstract. One of the most important areas of activity of the Police, which plays a fundamental role in shaping the internal security of the state, is the educational activity of training centres for these formations. Although they do not deal directly with performance of statutory tasks, their importance in the area of, among other things, the quality of services, the development of formation’s culture and its identity, and elitism is undisputed. The overriding role of police education is to prepare highly specialised staff in strategic areas of combatting crime. This staff will effectively perform the statutory tasks of the formation, connected, among others, with the protection of state security and the public order, protection of human life, health and property, as well as widely understood criminological prophylaxis. For a very long time, education has been a fundamental and universal determinant of human development. Educational activity is the basic condition determining, first of all, the moral development of a person. Pedagogical activity is a function of cultural development of societies and an opportunity to overcome prejudices and stereotypes. The position of education in the structure of the state’s objectives determines its development in the long term in practically all areas. This study is an attempt to systematically look at one of the elements of the internal security subsystem of the state, which is modern police education. The system of training and in-service development of the Police in Poland has been a subject of great interest for many years. Currently, the Polish Police are on the verge of major organisational changes which will also result in structural changes in the educational system. The system of training of the largest uniformed formation of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration is the basis for effective and professional training of the police personnel in all kinds of executive and managerial positions. The current solutions in this area are an effect of a specific evolution both in the organisational and structural dimensions. The author’s intention is to present the issues of Polish police officer training from the moment of the establishment of the State Police to the present day, with particular attention paid to the way of organising the system of training and in-service development of police officers. DOI: 10.5604/01.3001.0013.2171 http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0013.2171

Keywords: system, training, police, security, organisation

Introduction

One of the most important areas of activity of the Police, which plays an essen- tial role in the security system, is the educational activity of the training system for this formation. Although it does not deal directly with the performance of the statutory tasks of the police, its importance is enormous, especially in the area of development of the formation’s culture, its identity and elitism. The primary role of education is to prepare highly specialised staff that will effectively perform duty tasks related to, among other things, the protection of state security and public order, the protection of life and health of people and property, as well as widely understood criminological prophylaxis. Since time immemorial education, has been a fundamental and universal determinant of human development. It has accompanied humankind for centuries and is a variable of its security, sustainability and continuity in the development of its basic characteristics. Educational activity is a basic condition determining first of all the moral development of a person,

Internal Security, July–December 163 Dominik Hryszkiewicz equipping him/her with basic ethical competences. Educational activity is a func- tion of the cultural development of each society. The position of education in the structure of the state’s objectives determines its development in the long run in practically all areas. This study is an attempt at a synthetic look at one of the ele- ments of the internal security subsystem of the state, which is the police education from 1919 to the present day.

Training of the State Police offi cers

In July 1919, the Legislative Sejm passed a law on the State Police which replaced the central formations protecting the population and taking care of the public order. The ranks of the newly formed Police included, among other things, members of local organisations dealing with civil protection and members of the People’s Militia and Municipal Police. The creation of the State Police as a national service in the reborn Poland was one of the basic elements of the consolidation of the newly created state power. The first years after regaining independence were a very turbulent period which caused the State Police to achieve its final organisational shape in July 1922. The need to train a large number of officers arose. The literature on the subject indicates that the system of training of the State Police officers can be divided into two periods: 1919–1928 and 1928–1939.1 In the years 1919–1928, in the structure of the State Police Headquarters, there was a Department III which was responsible for training police officers. It was responsible for establishing police schools and supervising the training process. The biggest problem of the newly created training system was the lack of prepared teaching staff. The training was conducted by two types of schools: • a three-month theoretical-practical school established at the State Police Headquarters — consisting of two departments for senior officers as well as class II sergeants and class I sergeants, • theoretical-practical schools created at the district headquarters — created on the basis of the model of the school at the State Police Headquarters, designed for class II sergeants and police constables. The Regional Commander who carried out his tasks through one of the subordinate higher officers was responsible for the training and organisation of the schools. Supervision of the theoretical and practical school at the State Police Head- quarters and of district schools was exercised by the department of the State Police Headquarters, competent in the matters of police training. The teaching staff consisted of instructors dealing with training in investigative service, service instructions and military training. Teachers and representatives of the justice sys- tem were also recruited to conduct classes. In addition to providing theoretical knowledge, there were features such as the rule of law, obligation, etc. A candidate for the school had to be at least 23 years old and not more than 45 years old. The first ones to be sent to the training were the newly recruited police officers who

1 Winnicki G, System szkolenia funkcjonariuszy Policji Państwowej. Kwartalnik Policyjny, 2014, Vol. 2, p. 132.

164 Internal Security, July–December Training System of Polish Police Offi cers — in the Past and Today had previously served in the People’s Militia, Municipal Police or Gendarmerie2. The police officers delegated to the school were equipped with uniforms and weapons by their headquarters. They covered half of the cost of food from their own emolu- ments. The police officers sent to the senior officers’ ward had to hold a secondary school-leaving certificate, except for class I sergeants who could be sent for training for their merits despite a lack of the mentioned certificate. However, due to a lack of staff, exceptions were made to this rule and to the age criterion. The decision to delegate the officers to school was made by the Commander-in- Chief on the basis of the district lists sent to the school. In order to unify the process of training of lower State Police staff in the districts, the rules of the organisation of district schools and training programmes were based on the theoretical-practical school of the State Police Headquarters. The three-month training in a theoretical- practical school at the district headquarters and the State Police Headquarters was obligatory for all newly admitted and serving police officers. The biggest problems of the system of training officers were material shortages and a shortfall of staff of qualified instructors. The efficiency of the new system was not high. State Police officers came from various backgrounds and security institutions. It quickly became apparent that the curricula needed to be unified. The Pedagogical Council was established, but due to the economic crisis and insufficient financial outlays, its activities did not bring the expected result. In 1924, the police education system was reorganised. The police training was divided into three stages: • basic training for constables — lasted six weeks and included basic knowl- edge of policing, • training for sergeants — lasted three months and, to a limited extent, included some training content dedicated to higher rank officers, • training for higher rank officers — offered by a newly established Police School in Warsaw. It lasted five months and included issues related to crimi- nal law, administrative law, official instructions, criminal investigation, police drill, horse riding, shooting, weapons and study on Poland. A considerable increase in crime, including political crime, initiated educational activities for police officers of criminal and political services. The course for female police intelligence officers from the sanitary and moral service was first conducted in 1925 at the Police School in Warsaw.3 After the May coup, the new state police executives started to introduce police education reform. As a result, trainings offered by the school for commissioned officers and schools for constables were suspended. The whole emphasis of the changes was placed on the unification of the curriculum and preparation of the teaching staff. In 1927–1928, 86 police officers were trained as part of a course for school instructors at the Police School in Warsaw.4 Police trainings were mainly offered by police schools. However, a large number of newly recruited officers could not be trained only at schools at that time. A need to introduce new solutions — temporary trainings for the aforementioned officers at their police stations — emerged. The training was assigned to county instructors

2 Ibid., p. 133. 3 Ibid., p. 134. 4 Ibid., p. 135.

Internal Security, July–December 165 Dominik Hryszkiewicz who were responsible for the constant development of the skills and knowledge of county police officers. County instructors had to have high professional and moral qualifications. To become county instructors, they had to complete two- months of training. Central courses for county instructors were introduced and sets of coursebooks for conducting training courses at police posts and stations were developed and handed over to all state police units. They encompassed the issues of administrative law, organisation of authorities and offices, criminal proceedings, criminal investigation, official instructions as well as issues related to gas and air defence. The system of training and professional development at police stations was based on lectures and officers’ own work. Each county instructor answered to his/her county police chief or deputy chief. The instruction of training at the sta- tions defined the duties of police chiefs and of county instructors as well as county police chiefs in the area of professional training. The main task of county police chiefs in this respect was to systematically control the professional preparation of subordinate police officers. Such inspections were carried out on the basis of a quarterly plan for checking the status of training conducted by county instruc- tors. Instructors visited the stations in accordance with the adopted plan.5 The state police authorities highly valued the role of county instructor. The State Police Head- quarters kept a personal register of county instructors and they had to be informed about any changes or dismissals from the position of instructor. On the other hand, each police station chief was obliged to conduct a regular training of 4 hours a week for the subordinate police officers. Such trainings involved, among other things, writing a paper on a topic assigned by the police station chief6 twice a month. In 1928–1939, instead of district schools, three schools for constables in Żyrardów, Piaski near Sosnowiec and Mosty Wielkie7 were established. Their task was to provide general training for constables. The schools’ commandants reported to the State Police Headquarters. In Warsaw, the School for State Police Commissioned Officers was established. In 1929, first specialist courses for female police officers and criminal investigation department officers were organised. Regulations concerning ranking of specialist courses in the police education system were introduced as well. In 1929– 1939, many of such courses were carried out. In 1935, a special three-month training for commissioned officers of the Polish Army who joined the State Police8 was conducted. As a result of the establishment of the women’s police, trainings for female police officers were organised in the field of trafficking of women and children as well as in vice police-related issues. Great importance was attached to maintaining the effectiveness of the criminal investigation department. Criminal investigation courses were organised for constables and commissioned police officers. In Febru- ary 1934, a six-week criminal investigation study was organised for regional police chiefs. Another important stage in the creation of a modern police training system was the development of regulations on the organisation of state police schools of 24 April 1931. Two types of professional training were organised: • general policing,

5 Winnicki G, op. cit., p. 141. 6 Ibid., p. 141. 7 Misiuk A, Historia Policji w Polsce. Od X wieku do współczesności. Warsaw, 2008, p. 120. 8 Ibid., p. 120.

166 Internal Security, July–December Training System of Polish Police Offi cers — in the Past and Today

• specialist courses in criminal investigation. In 1936, a new law introduced the following types of training: — regular courses at police schools, — special courses at police schools or regional headquarters, — special courses at the personnel reserve battalion. The Police School Commission was also established as an opinion-forming body on training and education matters at the State Police Headquarters in Warsaw. The task of the Commission was to develop school curricula for all types of courses and provide opinions on staff training issues. Andrzej Misiuk notes that ‘in 1927– 1939, the system of police education at the European level was consistently built’.9

Training police offi cers today — challenges and perspectives

One of the most important elements of the state’s internal security is the way police training institutions are organised. Within the present structure of police education, there are: the Police Academy in Szczytno, Police Training Centre in Legionowo, Police School in Słupsk, Police School in Piła, and Police School in Kato- wice. Within the structure of police schools, the leading institution is the Police Academy in Szczytno. It is the only police training organisational unit supervised by the Minister of Internal Affairs. Its activity is based on two legal sources: the Police Act and the Higher Education Act. The Police Academy in Szczytno is one of the oldest training institutions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration. The academy’s professional identity and its characteristic ‘resistance to indoc- trination’ resulted in, as it seems, the decision to establish the Police Academy in Szczytno in 1990 in the premises of the existing educational centre. Since the beginning of its training activity, the academy’s priority was to train commis- sioned officers and executive staff of the Citizens’ Militia, and since 10 September 1990, to develop the professional competence of future Polish police commissioned officers. Currently, its main educational tasks in the area of police training include: police training for university graduates, basic police training, supervision of training activities of other police schools, various forms of central professional develop- ment and training for other institutions responsible for internal security, as well as conducting selected stages of police recruitment.10 The second police education centre of high importance is the Police Training Centre in Legionowo. This police training unit was established on 27 August 1990 by the order of the Minister of Internal Affairs, taking over the staff and resources of several formerly disbanded schools of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In 1992, the Police School for Dog Handlers and Dog Training in Sułkowice was also incorpo- rated into the structures of the Centre, and in 1998, the Centre for Specialist Police Training was established within the structure of the Centre. The Police Training

9 Misiuk A, op. cit. p. 121. 10 Gawroński P, Hryszkiewicz D, Truchan R.J, System szkolenia w Policji i Straży Granicznej. Funkcja założona i rzeczywista. Szczytno, 2015, pp. 11–12.

Internal Security, July–December 167 Dominik Hryszkiewicz

Centre in Legionowo is one of the oldest schools of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Until 1990, the Home Affairs Academy was located there. Since 1990, the Centre has been a vocational school offering specialist training and professional development for uniformed police officers. Its basic training tasks include basic police training, specialist training in road traffic, specialist training in pyrotechnics, specialist train- ing in cynology, language training and police recruitment. The third police school is the Police School in Piła. It is a unit with well-established tradition that specialises in educational activities. It was established by the order of the chief commander of the Citizens’ Militia of 24 September 1954. At that time, it was given the name of the Non-Commissioned Officers’ School of the Citizens’ Militia. For over fifty years, it has been systematically developing its training identity in two areas, i.e. operational intelligence and investigations. Since its establishment, developing the competence of police officers serving in Criminal Departments has been its basic area of training activity. Currently, the main part of its activity is the implementation of basic police training. The school also conducts trainings for organisational units of banks, insurance companies and other services. The fourth training unit of the Polish Police is the Police School in Katowice. It is the latest training unit in the structure of police training and professional development systems in Poland. It was established on 6 January 1999 on the basis of Directive No. 1/99 of the Police Chief. The teaching, administrative and material potential of the training centre of the Regional Police Headquarters in Katowice and the Riot Police in Katowice was used in order to establish the School. It is the only entity in police education which does not have a clear tradition in training and, therefore, a precisely defined identity. While analysing the types of teaching tasks carried out by the Police School in Katowice and the scope and the form of its educational activities, it appears that the school is developing towards training uniformed police officers. Therefore, it is becoming a typical crime prevention- oriented school. Its students are mostly policemen from the Silesian garrison. Its main tasks include the implementation of basic police training and various forms of professional development in the crime prevention area. It is noteworthy that, nowadays, expanding the scope of school activities in the area of road traffic police- men training is being discussed more often.11 The fifth school in the Polish Police organisational structures is the school in Słupsk. It is the oldest training centre for the Police, and, previously, for the Citizens’ Militia. It is noteworthy that the first commissioned officer courses of the Citizens’ Militia took place at this school. It was not until 1954 that the Commissioned Offic- ers’ School of the Citizens’ Militia was moved to Szczytno, where the Commissioned Officers’ School of the Citizens’ Militia, named after General Franciszek Jóźwiak ‘Witold’, was established. The Police School in Słupsk was established on June 1, 1945 by the Commander-in-Chief of the Citizens’ Militia as a Training Centre for the Citi- zens’ Militia. In the middle of 1954, the Commissioned Officers’ School of the Citizens’ Militia was moved to Szczytno, and the non-commissioned officer training, to Piła. On December 13, 1954, the Training Centre for the constables of the Citizens’ Militia was established; it existed until the middle of 1957, when the Non-Commissioned Officers’ School of the Citizens’ Militia was established, later renamed to the Citizens’

11 Ibid., p. 14.

168 Internal Security, July–December Training System of Polish Police Offi cers — in the Past and Today

Militia School. Since 10 August 1990, the school has been functioning as an organi- sational unit of the Police.12 The Police School in Słupsk has been systematically developing its training identity for over twenty years, specialising in professional training for the uniformed police. Its modern, basic forms of activity include, among other things, the implementation of basic police training, specialist training in the field of crime prevention, and in-service training and professional development for community police officers. It has been a very important element of educational activity in the Polish Police in recent years due to the priorities of the Ministry of the Interior and Administration and the Chief of the Police concerning the revival of the real role and image of the community police officer in local communities. When analysing the system of training and professional development in the Pol- ish Police, one must take into account the forms of vocational education of police officers. They are a consequence of a synthesis of three groups of variables. The first are the outcomes of training needs analyses, the findings of public opinion polls and the inspection conclusions of many institutions, as well as educational needs reported by the local units of this formation. The second group consists of motives for undertaking such activity by police officers and employees of the Police. They concern the development of various levels of competence, i.e. acquisition of basic professional skills and the development of the existing ones. The third group com- prises teaching features and properties of a particular school or police training centre. In the police training subsystem which is a major part of the education system, subordinate to the minister of internal affairs in accordance with the laws regulating teaching activity of police schools, two basic forms of training and development can be mentioned. The first ones are vocational courses, and the second, profes- sional development. The group of vocational courses includes: basic police course and courses for university graduates. The basic police course in the Police is a vocational training course ab initio. Its basic feature is development of the basic professional skills of newly recruited officers. It equips future police officers with the general and basic qualifications necessary for service in basic executive posi- tions. The main role of this training is to introduce candidates for police officers to the area of basic tasks, rights and responsibilities. It encompasses a general scope of subjects representing the most important areas of police activity, especially in the area of the uniformed police service. It is currently the most important form of vocational training in the Police. Failure to complete this training results in expul- sion from service. On the other hand, graduation entitles a policeman to serve in practically all police departments, of course holding basic executive positions. Training for university graduates is the second form of vocational training in the Police. It is called commissioned officers’ training. Its task is to prepare officers to perform tasks at the level of at least the lowest so-called commissioned officers’ rank group. It is open to police officers in service with several years of professional experience. Since 2008, its subject matter has also been of a general nature. The programme of this training includes all areas of police activity. There are training objectives concerning police operational intelligence, investigative and logistic activities. Its completion entitles an officer, after fulfilling certain conditions, to take the exam in order to be promoted to the first commissioned officer’s rank.

12 Ibid., p. 13.

Internal Security, July–December 169 Dominik Hryszkiewicz

Both of these forms of vocational training are full-time courses. In particularly justified cases, the Chief of the Police may allow the police officer to undergo train- ing as guided independent study. The second group are forms of professional development aimed at improvement, compensation and change of students’ professional qualifications. They constitute the largest group of training proposals in the general offer of all such educational activities in the Police. They include specialist courses where police officers and civil- ian employees are familiarised with knowledge that is specifically related to their daily work. These courses are strictly profiled and addressed to a specific recipient. In the system of training and in-service training in the Police, there are three basic forms of in-service training, separated by the subject which organises them: • central in-service training — organised and carried out at Police schools and the Police Academy in Szczytno, • local in-service training — organised and carried out by the organisational units of the Police or cells of these units, • external in-service training — organised and carried out by non-police organisations. In-service training in the Police is also conducted in a stationary system and via distance e-learning. Intensive work is currently underway to expand the e-learning system due to the high training needs of the Police. Basic training is the longest and has the widest range of subjects. In-service training is a short, intensive and specialist educational undertaking. On the other hand, training for university graduates (commissioned officer training) is an elite form of education addressed to officers scheduled to perform leadership functions at various levels of management in the Police. The education system in the Police consists of schools with clearly defined specialisations, which are a manifestation of stable identity and a defined strategy of development. It should be stressed, however, that despite the attempts to develop the police education system, no specific strategy has been defined. Specialisa- tion of individual units is often a central decision, determined by current needs.

Task-based didactics in the training of police offi cers

While raising the issue of the police training system, it is impossible to omit issues related to task-based teaching, which is of particular importance in shap- ing professional competences. Task-based teaching is currently the basic tool that builds the professional competences of representatives of many formations, includ- ing officers of state services such as the Police, the Fire Service, and the Border Patrol. Its details and identity are determined by its three basic features. The first of them are didactic tasks, which result, among others, from the natural distribution of formation tasks contained in various normative acts. The results of the process of identification of training needs and social survey research as a function of social responsibility are another important source of the content of teaching tasks. The second feature comprises the participants of the in-service training environ- ment. In the theory of adult education, the key place is occupied by the student,

170 Internal Security, July–December Training System of Polish Police Offi cers — in the Past and Today i.e. the client. He/she is the author of the training activity design, its participant and the main reviewer of the system’s effectiveness. Being the cause of this multi- faceted and systematised activity, he or she achieves the status of the subject, i.e. a person with many rights and freedoms. The student as an active participant of the in-service training is characterised by specific motives of undertaking training activ- ity. His or her main motivation is the willingness to acquire specialist knowledge and specific professional skills. He or she treats participation in in-service training as a form of activity which enables solving problems and business tasks. The second important component of the training process is the didactic employee. His or her didactic activity is thoroughly standardised13. The third important feature is the methodological workshop. It makes use of the achievements of general didactics and of vocational and adult education. It chooses the methodological solutions that enable the achievement of goals of service and do not undermine the assumptions of the model of the formation and the paradigm of the service relationship, service subordination and culture of the order or command. In general didactics, it uses terminology and methodology of research, in in-service didactics — it implements tasks, functions, forms and motives of under- taking self-education. In these circumstances, it becomes a kind of in-service training methodology of the uniformed formations. It is noteworthy that task-based teach- ing cooperates with many sciences in order to achieve the tasks entrusted to it.14 Task-based teaching has many functions. In principle, they can be divided into two groups. The first group consists of functions related to scientific activity; the second group includes those related to typical educational, didactic and training activities. The functions of task-based teaching, understood as a scientific-research cat- egory, include:15 • the diagnostic function — its purpose is critical insight into the educational system, e.g. the system of in-service training of the police formation, search for dependencies and interdependencies between training systems, • the descriptive function — its activities focus on interpretation and causality of phenomena occurring in the in-service education system of the Ministry of Interior Affairs and Administration. It describes the features and norms of the training environment with particular emphasis on criticism of these decisions. Attention is drawn to their connection with the paradigms of andragogy and pedagogy, or lack of thereof, • the prognostic function — its tasks include designing theoretical conse- quences of applying specific educational solutions, • the research function — its aim is to investigate different elements of the training reality of the formation, • the exploratory function — its tasks include explaining, interpreting the rea- sons for applying specific solutions and searching for their natural sources in the theory of adult education. The system of training and professional development to which the newly employed police officers are subjected differs significantly from the educational

13 Gawroński P, Hryszkiewicz D, Truchan R.J, op. cit., p. 40. 14 Ibid., p. 41. 15 Ibid., p. 47–49.

Internal Security, July–December 171 Dominik Hryszkiewicz forms to which they have been subjected in the previous ‘civilian’ education. It requires adaptation of new officers to a specific organisational culture and a new model of professional existence. It is currently one of the biggest challenges for the modern system of professional development of the Polish Police.

Conclusion

An effective system of training and professional development of a formation as big as the Police — the largest organisation in the internal security system of the state — plays an essential role in the effectiveness of the institution’s work. The aim of the author was to show, to a limited extent, the evolution that the system has expe- rienced since the very beginning of its creation, i.e. since 1919. It is impossible to omit here a number of historical turbulences which directly influenced the current shape of the Polish Police. In the situation of a thorough reconstruction of this formation in the interwar period, as in the case of other institutions, when certain stabilisation in the structures of the state had already occurred, the breakout of the Second World War completely eliminated further opportunities for development in all areas of the functioning of the Polish state. After the war, there was a change in the political sys- tem which affected the shape of the police formation as well. The Act on the Police of 6 April 1990 restored the Police ‘guardianship’ towards the society, completely changing its social image. The political changes after 1990 caused fundamental organisational changes in the Police. A new organisational model of the Police in Poland was created, which resulted in adjusting the model of police officers’ edu- cation to the real needs of this formation and new social expectations in this area.

References

1. Gawroński P, Hryszkiewicz D, Truchan R.J, System szkolenia w Policji i Straży Granicznej — funkcja założona i rzeczywista. Szczytno, 2015. 2. Gawroński P, Policyjna dydaktyka zadaniowa — struktura, cechy i wybrane uwa- runkowania. Policja, 2008, No. 2. 3. Hołyst B, Policja na świecie. Warsaw, 2014. 4. Misiuk A, Historia Policji w Polsce. Od X wieku do współczesności. Warsaw, 2008. 5. Perz G, Wybrane zagadnienia historii Policji. Legionowo, 2013. 6. Winnicki G, System szkolenia funkcjonariuszy Policji Państwowej. Kwartalnik Policyjny, 2014, Vol. 2.

About the Author

Dominik Hryszkiewicz, retired police offi cer, dr habil. Author and co-author of numerous national and international publications in the area of internal security. His scientifi c interests include the issues of information management security, training systems for uniformed services and eff ective intra-organisational communication in hierarchical formations. E-mail: dominik. [email protected].

172 Internal Security, July–December Training System of Polish Police Offi cers — in the Past and Today

Streszczenie. System szkolenia i doskonalenia zawodowego Policji w Polsce jest od wielu lat przedmiotem ogromnego zainteresowania. Obecnie polska Policja stoi u progu bardzo istotnych zmian organizacyjnych, których konsekwencją będą również zmiany strukturalne w obrębie szkolnictwa policyjnego. System szkolenia największej formacji mundurowej MSWiA stanowi podstawę skutecznego i profesjonalnego wyszkolenia kadr policyjnych, na wszelkiego rodzaju stanowiskach wykonawczych i kierowniczych. Obecne rozwiązania w tym zakresie są efektem swoistej ewolucji zarówno w wymiarze organizacyjnym jak i strukturalnym. Intencją autora jest przybliżenie problematyki szkolenia polskich policjantów od momentu powstania Policji Państwowej do czasów współczesnych ze szczególnym zwróceniem uwagi na sposób zorganizowania systemu szkolenia i doskonalenia zawodowego funkcjonariuszy.

Zusammenfassung. Das System der Ausbildung und beruflichen Weiterentwicklung der Polizei in Polen ist seit vielen Jahren ein Thema von großem Interesse. Derzeit steht die polnische Polizei vor sehr bedeutenden organisatorischen Veränderungen, deren Folge auch strukturelle Veränderungen in der Polizeiausbildung sein werden. Das Ausbildungssystem der größten uniformierten Formation des Innen- und Verwaltungsministeriums ist die Grundlage für die effektive und professionelle Ausbildung des Polizeipersonals in allen Arten von Führungs- und Führungspositionen. Die aktuellen Lösungen in diesem Bereich sind das Ergebnis einer spezifischen Entwicklung, sowohl in organisatorischer als auch in struktureller Hinsicht. Der Autor beabsichtigt, die Fragen der Ausbildung polnischer PolizeivollzugsbeamtInnen vom Zeitpunkt der Einrichtung der Staatspolizei bis zum heutigen Tag zu behandeln, wobei der Organisationsmethode des Ausbildungssystems und der beruflichen Fortbildung eine besondere Aufmerksamkeit zu widmen ist.

Резюме. Система подготовки и повышения квалификации сотрудников полиции в Польше на протяжении многих лет является предметом особого внимания. В настоящее время польская полиция находится на пороге очень важных организационных изменений, которые приведут также к структурным изменениям в системе полицейского образования. Основой эффективной и профессиональной подготовки сотрудников полиции всех видов исполнитель- ных и управленческих должностей является система подготовки кадров крупнейшей форменной службы органов Министерства внутренних дел и администрации. Существующие в настоящее время решения в этой области являются результатом специфической эволюции как в организационном, так и в структурном плане. Цель автора заключалась в более подробном рассмотрении вопросов подготовки польских полицейских с момента создания государственной полиции до сегодняшнего дня с особым учетом способа организации системы профессиональной подготовки и повышения квалификации сотрудников полиции.

Internal Security, July–December 173

CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINALISTICS

Potential Use of Structured Analytical Techniques in Building Investigative Versions

Wojciech Filipkowski ORCID: 0000-0001-6248-0888 Faculty of Law University of Bialystok, Poland

Abstract. The aim of this study is to present the possibilities of using structured analytical techniques in building investigative versions. They may relate to ongoing criminal or operational proceedings, but also allow verification of versions created for the purposes of supervision or evaluation of other proceedings. In this area, the study complements and at the same time extends the existing knowledge in the field of forensic tactics. The author presented the current state of knowledge on the methods of building criminal versions and the theoretical justification for the introduction of these techniques to the practice of law enforcement agencies in this aspect. An outline of the methodology of the application of analytical techniques in the construction of new and verification of existing research methods is also presented. This study is based on the author’s speech at the 3rd National Scientific Conference entitled ‘Police X Files’ organised by the Faculty of Law and Administration University of Lodz from September 26th–28th, 2018. DOI: 10.5604/01.3001.0014.6691 http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0014.6691

Keywords: structured analytical techniques, criminal intelligence analysis, investigative version, forensic tactics

The publication was financed by the Minister of Science and Higher Education as part of the grant for scientific research or development work awarded to the Faculty of Law of the University of Białystok.

Introduction

The concept of structured analytical techniques (UTA) was developed by two former analysts of the United States Central Intelligence Agency — R. J. Heuer jr. and R. H. Pherson.1 The motive for this intellectual effort was the experience in intel- ligence work and the training of subsequent years of analysts, not only for the CIA. They noted two basic approaches to data and information analysis.2 The first one is intuitive and fast, but it is often the result of unconscious thought processes. How- ever, through individual cognitive errors and prejudices, it can produce distorted results which are difficult to verify. The second approach is typically analytical, which means unrushed, consistent and thoughtful action, producing explainable, rational results. It has the character of various quantitative and qualitative tech- niques depending on whether or not we have numerical data, taking into account

1 Heuer R.J jr., Pherson R.H, Structured Analytic Techniques for Intelligence Analysis, ed. 2, SAGE. Thousand Oaks, 2015, p. XIX–XX. 2 Ibid., p. 19 and next.

Internal Security, July–December 175 Wojciech Filipkowski the application of critical thinking, empirical verification of data and information, referring to expert (field) knowledge and the title UTA. The following specific characteristics of UTA can be provided: • they reduce the impact of prejudices on the analytical process, but do not replace a completely intuitive thinking process; • they are not a panacea for errors and prejudices, but help to reduce their frequency and severity, which increases the efficiency and quality of the final results of the analytical process; • they enable analysts to think more precisely about analytical problems, and any biases are not ‘taken for granted’, but are clearly examined and, if possible, verified or falsified in a specific case; • they extend and identify the range of possible options for consideration and tools to be used by the analysts, including those that are not obvious; • in particular, the group of techniques for the analysis of competing hypoth- eses implies the identification of alternative hypotheses and the focus on refuting (rather than confirming) the hypotheses and systematically analysing the evidence. The developers of this approach presented 8 basic areas of application of struc- tured analytical methods according to the criteria of analytical purpose.3 • Decomposition and Visualisation, • Idea Generation, • Scenarios and Indicators, • Hypothesis Generation and Testing, • Assessment of Causes and Effects, • Challenge Analysis, • Conflict Management, • Decision Support. Already, such a cursory presentation of the scope and features of UTA provides a basis for examining and assessing their suitability for law enforcement authori- ties in the course of criminal proceedings. It concerns, in particular, the issue of the principles and methods of construction of the forensic version. It also seems that the knowledge of these analytical techniques may be extremely useful in proceedings concerning unresolved criminal cases, when the statute of limitations for their pros- ecution is approaching. In the English-speaking nomenclature, they are called, cold cases, and in Polish conditions they are dealt with by the so-called police Archives X.

Essence of the forensic (investigative) version

The issue of the forensic (investigative) version4 is one of the basic elements of the forensic department, which is its tactics.5 Building a forensic version is a creative act which is difficult to formalise.6 However, this study attempts to present argu-

3 Ibid., pp. 24–26. 4 Widacki J, Konieczny J, Rozdział V. Wersja śledcza, modus operandi, analiza kryminalna — teoretyczne podstawy śledztwa, [in:] Widacki J (Ed.), Kryminalistyka, Wyd. 3. Warsaw: Beck C H, 2016, p. 71.

176 Internal Security, July–December Potential Use of Structured Analytical Techniques in Building Investigative Versions ments indicating the potential of analytical techniques in this area. In spite of their degree of formalisation, they are treated as analyses of a qualitative nature. These techniques fit into the basic principles, process and methods of version creating.7 On the basis of the literature on the subject, many definitions of this term can be indicated, which are of similar scope of meaning.8 T. Hanausek described it as ‘the result of thought processes in the form of a guess, which is an alternative attempt to explain an event, its cause, circumstances and course’.9 K. Juszka, defines it as ‘the result of thought trials of law enforcement agencies conducted in the course of a criminal case in the form of a hypothesis, constituting an alternative attempt to explain a specific event, its part or circumstances or the mechanism of its occur- rence, in particular the causative factor’.10 E. Gruza, on the other hand, defines it as a process of thought, which is the translation, by means of hypotheses, of an alleged state of affairs, not established by the senses, which, together with the circum- stances revealed, may serve as an explanation for a given fact as a consequence of the state of affairs under consideration.11 B. Hołyst defines the forensic version as a hypothetical assumption by law enforcement agencies as to the nature of the event, the course and objectives and motives of the action.12 Moreover, he raises the importance of logic in its creation. In more synthetic and practical terms — according to J. Widacki and J. Konieczny — it is a hypothesis relating to the course of a part or the whole of a criminal event, built for the purposes of the detection process.13 The common elements of the presented definitions include two activi- ties: making hypotheses about the whole or selected circumstances of the event and their verification or falsification of the result of the thought processes on the basis of the data or information available (evidence in criminal proceedings).14 These processes are carried out by a process authority. Its side goal is to organise the knowledge of a specific crime.15

5 Cf. Hołyst B, Kryminalistyka, Ed. 13. Warsaw: Wolters Kluwer, 2018, p. 101 and Girdwoyń P, Wersje kryminalistyczne, O wykrywaniu przestępstw. Warsaw: Wydawnictwa Prawnicze PWN, 2001, p. 11. 6 Hołyst B, Kryminalistyka, … op. cit., p. 91. 7 Juszka K, Wersja kryminalistyczna. Cracow, 1997, p. 119–141and next. 8 See more for of terminology: Girdwoyń P, op. cit., p. 15 and next. See also: Ważny A, Wersje śledcze, Niektóre kwestie związane z wersja śledczą. Prokurator, 2001, No. 2–3, p. 84 and next; and Juszka K, Wersja nieprawdopodobna, [in:] Błachut J, Szewczyk M, Wójcikiewicz J (Ed.), Nauka wobec przestępczości, Księga ku pamięci Profesora Tadeusza Hanauska. Cracow, 2001, p. 87 and next. 9 Hanausek T, Kryminalistyka, Zarys wykładu, ed. V. Cracow, 2005, p. 94. 10 Juszka K, Wersja kryminalistyczna, …, op. cit., pp. 44–46. 11 Gruza E, Planowanie postępowania przygotowawczego i wersja kryminalistyczna, [in:] Gruza E, Goc M, Moszczyński J, Kryminalistyka — czyli rzecz o metodach śledczych. Warsaw, 2011, p. 81. 12 Hołyst B, op. cit., p. 92. 13 Widacki J, Konieczny J, p. 71. 14 It is also worth noting that the version is a kind of assumption based on probability. Cf. Juszka K, Wersja nieprawdopodobna, op. cit., pp. 88–89; and Gotowicz A, Kryminalistyka w procesie karnym — procedura weryfikacja wersji kryminalistycznych. Problemy Współczesnej Kryminalistyki, 2003, t. 7, part 2, p. 307. 15 Gotowicz A, Kryminalistyka w procesie karnym …, op. cit., p. 308.

Internal Security, July–December 177 Wojciech Filipkowski

The present study focuses on the general-methodological and psychological aspect of examining the forensic version at the stage of its creation and verifica- tion or falsification.16 The first aspect concerns the version as a quasi-scientific hypothesis, which is based on the overall knowledge available and can be veri- fied empirically. The second aspect, which is both important and underestimated, is the use of creative thinking when building and checking versions. At the same time, it is conditioned, among other things, by the subjective characteristics of the creative entity17 — its education, life and professional experience, characteristics of character, culture of work in a given state body, etc.

Version building process

From among the principles of version building, according to J. Widacki and J. Konieczny (called by them the rules), the following two should be pointed out in the context of their considerations: always creating more than one version (alterna- tive versions), which promotes the effectiveness of the detection process and its rationalisation, and creating verifiable versions — i.e. its assumptions are possible to reveal, taking into account common sense and the available possibilities for action.18 K. Juszka points to the following model process steps: • collecting and evaluating partial information, • creating version bases, • making version assumptions, • checking the version, • version evaluation. It seems that UTA, due to its versatility depending on their type, can be used at the stage from creation to checking and evaluating the prepared version.

Version building methods and location of UTA

According to K. Juszko, the forensic version building method is ‘a relatively applied set of guidelines for data selection and handling in creating and checking version assumptions’.19 It also indicated the following methods20: inference from information materials, inference by analogy21, analysis of the perpetrator’s motive, answers to the so-called permanent questions (seven golden forensic questions),22 statistical, cybernetic and computer-based. Mr. Girdwoyn, on the other hand, pre- sented their broader catalogue, referring to logic, mathematics and cyber tools,

16 Girdwoyń P, p. 54. 17 Ibid., p. 54. 18 Widacki J, Konieczny J, p. 72. 19 Juszka K, Wersja kryminalistyczna …, op. cit., p. 143. 20 Ibid., p. 144. 21 In the case of UTA, the technique of a structured analogy is written about. 22 A modified version of the starbursting technique is used here. It allows the use of seven gold forensic questions. See: also Girdwoyń P, p. 173.

178 Internal Security, July–December Potential Use of Structured Analytical Techniques in Building Investigative Versions the social sciences and forensic tactics.23 All of these should, in A.Ważny’s opinion, lead to versions that are logical, dialectic, individual and verifiable.24 The abovementioned methods are also more or less taken into account by other authors.25 However, they are already of a classical nature. UTA, on the other hand, is a set of universal guidelines concerning the practical aspect, but according to their theoretical assumptions dictated by the psychology of cognition and praxeology.26 This is due to the attribute of ‘structured’, i.e. background which is constructed, connected according to some plan, organised. These are primarily techniques of a qualitative nature, used in the absence of any data or parts of it, for making decisions also in situations of uncertainty or ignorance on the part of the decision-maker. P. Girdwoyn mentioned — besides logical methods,27 mathematical-cyber and forensic tactics — also those related to the social sciences. These include brainstorming and related techniques and thinking on two levels.28 The present study assumes the presentation of subsequent, more practical, structured analytical techniques. The UTA list by R. J. Heuer jr. and R. H. Pherson’s list is relatively long, and includes 48 detailed descriptions of methodologies of their application.29 For the purpose of this study, we should especially focus on 4 groups of techniques: • decomposition and visualisation, • making and checking the hypotheses, • assessment of causes and effects, and • competitive analysis of the hypotheses. The author’s interpretation of these techniques in the context of their potential use in the process of building forensic versions is presented below. The first one concerns research activities of an initial character, where the aim is to spread the task, research problem into basic factors and look at each of them separately, as well as to visualise the data and information held and the processes involved in the perpetrators of crimes, as well as law enforcement agencies. • Initial list of tasks (Getting Started Checklist). Before the substantive development of a version in a specific case begins, one should think about a few preliminary and basic issues and look for answers to such questions as, e.g. Why are we dealing with it? What is the main problem of this case? Why is it important? What was the result of previous actions? Who commissions the analysis and for what purpose? Who is interested in the results? Who

23 Girdwoyń P, op. cit., p. 141. 24 Ważny A, p. 86. 25 See: Hanausek T, pp. 49, 96; Hołyst B, op. cit., p. 92 and next; and Widacki J, Konieczny J, p. 71 and next. 26 Girdwoyń P, op. cit., p. 168. 27 Ważny A, p. 86. 28 Girdwoyń P, p. 167 and next. 29 In the Polish literaturę they have been characterized in detail in the context of their use in the strategic analysis: Chlebowicz P, Filipkowski W, Dokument opisujący opracowaną, wzorcową metodykę wykonania analizy strategicznej dla Straży Granicznej, [in:] Woźniakowska-Fajst D (Ed.), Przestępczość cudzoziemców, Materiały szkoleniowe, Analizy i scenariusze zajęć. Warsaw, 2017, p. 50 and next.

Internal Security, July–December 179 Wojciech Filipkowski

should be met? What sources of data and information should be chosen? And how should we access them? • Issue Redefinition. At the initial stage of version development, and more specifically during its planning, it is important to define the main problem and specific problems. This can also help when conducting analyses, when there is a fear of deviating from the main axis of considerations, when dealing too much with side threads, or when the investigators get ‘stuck’ in their delib- erations. It consists of a number of techniques, e.g.: reformulating the problem, extending or narrowing the scope of the problem, shifting the emphasis to another element, event or circumstance, reversing the problem by 180°. • Chronologies and Timelines. For the purpose of the decomposition of events and actions taken, they can be arranged in chronological order. Timelines are a visualisation of this order. It helps to determine e.g. cause- effect relationships, duration of events, frequency of their occurrence. At the same time, the occurrence of too long periods between known events may suggest that something happened then, which the version-maker does not know about, and which needs to be filled in. • Network Analysis is a commonly used method in criminal analysis.30 In particular, it concerns the possibility of describing the relations between analytical objects — persons, events, objects, places, etc. — on the basis of a large amount of data, e.g. telecommunications. • Mind Maps and Concept Maps. These methods visualise the way of thinking of a single person or a group of people on a given topic, rela- tions between objects. It usually consists of the main topic, idea, problem and other objects connected in any way and briefly described • Process Maps and Gantt Charts. These methods are widely used in business. In the analytical activities of law enforcement and the secret services, they are usually used to track, analyse or monitor the activities of foreign agencies (e.g. development of an atomic programme), criminal or terrorist groups (e.g. modus operandi analysis), but also to plan their own activities (especially Gantt charts). The second group of techniques concerns an indispensable skill that every officer conducting operational or criminal proceedings should possess, i.e. the abil- ity to make and test hypotheses. • Hypothesis Generation. This term covers extensive versioning methods ranging from simple to very complex techniques (Multiple Hypotheses Generator) using other analytical techniques, in order to generate all pos- sible hypotheses on the basis of the available data, information or evidence, and to assess their probability and reliability • Diagnostic Reasoning. This technique helps to answer the questions: How can new data, information or evidence be interpreted in an alternative way, and How can these interpretations affect the verification or falsification of forensic versions, or be the basis for building new ones, or are they not relevant to the whole process.?

30 Dreżewski R, Filipkowski W, Sepielak J, The Application of Social Network Analysis Algorithms in a System Supporting Money Laundering Detection. Information Sciences, 2015, Vol. 296, p. 18.

180 Internal Security, July–December Potential Use of Structured Analytical Techniques in Building Investigative Versions

• Argument Mapping. This technique — first of all — helps to illustrate the main version based on articulated premises, which in turn are based on data, information or evidence gathered in the case. Secondly, it illustrates the key premises that exist in opposition to the main thesis, which are based on data, information, or evidence that is opposite (e.g., from the opposite side). Thirdly, counter-arguments to rebut data, information or counter- argument are sought. If there are visible deficiencies in the latter, it means that the main version is insufficiently argued, it can be rebutted and conse- quently a new one must be built. • Deception Detecting. This technique should be used when there is a sus- picion that someone is misleading the investigators. In this case, an analysis is recommended in four areas: Does the person have the motive, opportunity and means to mislead others? How has the person behaved so far? How is his or her credibility as a source of information or evidence assessed? And how is the confrontation with other data, information and evidence collected so far in the proceedings going? The third group of techniques serves the purpose of a thorough analysis of the relationship between events in such a way that some will be the causes and others the effects. The following techniques — like most of UTA — allow for a creative approach to the assessment of one’s own or someone else’s reasoning in order to, among other things, find errors that may have contributed to the failure of actions taken so far during operational or criminal proceedings. • Key Assumptions Check. The investigators must make an inventory all of the assumptions they made during the preparation of a given version and select those that are of key importance. If it turned out to be false, the version would fail. The remaining assumptions, even if they were false, would not fundamentally change the assessment of causes and effects of the events • Structured Analogies.31 Similarity between different past events and cases is sought on the basis of clearly defined criteria resulting from the collected data, information or evidence concerning e.g. the profile of an unknown perpetrator, his modus operandi. • Role Playing. The members of the team may ‘play’ the role of individual persons taking part in the analysed event, play its course, adopt the way of thinking of the perpetrator, victims, etc. At this point, they may notice a similarity with the task of a person performing forensic profiling. • Red Hat Analysis. The newly developed version is the result of a kind of ‘playing the role of the perpetrator’ by the members of the team that are not conducting the proceedings. It answers the following questions: How would they react in such a situation? Why would they react in this way if they were the perpetrator? And what would they be guided by? The next step is to confront the main and red helmet version, searching for differences and their causes. • Outside-In Thinking. Those drafting the version should be aware that the conduct of criminal proceedings may be influenced by factors external

31 Cf. Girdwoyń P, pp. 148–149, Hanausek T, p. 94, Hołyst B, pp. 96–98, and Juszka K, Wersje kryminalistyczne, …, op. cit., p. 146.

Internal Security, July–December 181 Wojciech Filipkowski

to it, such as political, cultural, social, technical, etc. These could lead to incor- rect findings or interpretations by officers, to incorrect assessment of cause and effect. It should also be assessed what data, information or evidence would indicate such a situation. A final, fourth group of techniques facilitates the search for alternative versions of events based on the same set of data, information or evidence.32 • Pre-mortem Analysis. An analysis shall be made of the weakest (in terms of the most risky, least defensible) interpretations of data, information or evidence made by the team. This is used to determine those interpreta- tions that may cause the prepared version to be rejected by the prosecutor or court, or challenged by the opposing party in the future. • Structured Self-Critique. First of all, it is a prepared set of questions to be answered by version developers in the context of its weaknesses. Secondly, it will allow further action to be taken to neutralise the weaknesses revealed and strengthen the credibility of the adopted version. • What if? Analysis. An analyst should ask himself or herself the question ‘What if’, undermining in turn certain prior findings based on data, informa- tion or evidence. Thus creating alternative, probable versions. • High Impact/Low Probability Analysis (HILP)33 — versions are prepared which are unlikely or even improbable, but which at the same time would have the most serious consequences for the perpetrator, the victim, the offic- ers conducting the proceedings or for the course of the whole proceedings. • Devil’s Advocate.The person (e.g. supervisor, court authority) focuses his attention on pointing out errors in the prepared version, shows alternative interpretations of data, information or evidence. • Red Team Analysis. A team of people prepare their alternative version in parallel to the version preparation team, which are then confronted and assessed for accuracy and reliability.

Conclusion

To sum up, the following UTA features can be pointed out, which can be consid- ered as an asset to the intuitive approach to building forensic versions, about which, among others, P. Girdwoyn wrote.34 These include:35 • to present the whole process well: from analysing problems, data, infor- mation and evidence to reaching the conclusions which are the basis for decisions, because it is transparent and verifiable, • to facilitate the process of finding errors during the analysis — there is no room for randomness here,

32 The need to build alternative variants is one of the rules or principles of version building according to: Widacki J, Konieczny J, op. cit., p. 72. 33 See: on the usefulness of creating improbable versions and different types of prob- abilities — Juszka K, Wersja nieprawdopodobna…, op. cit., pp. 89–90. 34 Girdwoyń P, p. 169. 35 Konieczny J, Zagadnienia wprowadzające, [in:] Konieczny J (Ed.), Analiza informacji w służbach policyjnych i specjalnych. Warsaw, 2012, pp. 16–17.

182 Internal Security, July–December Potential Use of Structured Analytical Techniques in Building Investigative Versions

• The methodology for the use of UTA is described in the form of algorithms of conduct, step-by-step, in order to minimise human and institutional con- straints and limit the impact of extra-authoritarian factors on the analysis, • as in scientific research methods — maximising an objective approach to the problem under investigation as it is based on proven research methods, • The possibility of their use in the development of IT solutions supporting the process of individual analyses and version-building. • The assumption of the thoroughly described methodologies of the above- mentioned analytical techniques is not to enslave or incapacitate the people who use them, but to neutralise potential errors in their use. Their selection, adjustment and application in a particular case or sentence depends on the creative approach of these people to their actions. On the margin of the conducted deliberations, it should be emphasized that this is an area of knowledge and skills which, in the author’s opinion, should be attended by students of such faculties as law, criminology, forensic science, national or internal security. The UTA universality allows for their application both in the analysis of problems and the search for solutions of a legal, forensic (such as the title construction of forensic versions), related to security, crime, or more broadly in conducting research of a descriptive, exploding, predictive and pre- sumptive nature. At the same time, the knowledge and skills acquired in the course of learning can be successfully used in the future professional work of students in the public or private sector. Therefore, according to the author, the learning of forensic tactics should be extended to include structured analytical techniques.

References

1. Chlebowicz P, Filipkowski W, Dokument opisujący opracowaną, wzorcową metodykę wykonania analizy strategicznej dla Straży Granicznej, [in:] Woźniakowska-Fajst D (Ed.), Przestępczość cudzoziemców, Materiały szkoleni- owe, Analizy i scenariusze zajęć. Warsaw, 2017. 2. Dreżewski R, Filipkowski W, Sepielak J, The Application of Social Network Analy- sis Algorithms in a System Supporting Money Laundering Detection. Informa- tion Sciences, 2015, Vol. 296, p. 18 . 3. Girdwoyń P, Wersje kryminalistyczne, O wykrywaniu przestępstw. Warsaw, 2001, p. 11. 4. Gotowicz A, Kryminalistyka w procesie karnym — procedura weryfi kacja wersji kryminalistycznych. Problemy Współczesnej Kryminalistyki, 2003, t. 7, part 2, p. 307. 5. Guza E, Planowanie postępowania przygotowawczego i wersja kryminalistyc- zna, [in:] Gruza E, Goc M, Moszczyński J, Kryminalistyka — czyli rzecz o meto- dach śledczych. Warsaw, 2011. 6. Hanausek T, Kryminalistyka, Zarys wykładu, ed. V. Cracow, 2005 7. Heuer R.J jr., Pherson R.H, Structured Analytic Techniques for Intelligence Analy- sis, ed. 2, SAGE. Thousand Oaks, 2015, p. XIX–XX. 8. Hołyst B, Kryminalistyka, Ed. 13. Warsaw, 2018, p. 101. 9. Juszka K, Wersja kryminalistyczna. Cracow, 1997.

Internal Security, July–December 183 Wojciech Filipkowski

10. Juszka K, Wersja nieprawdopodobna, [in:] Błachut J, Szewczyk M, Wójcikiewicz J (Ed.), Nauka wobec przestępczości, Księga ku pamięci Profesora Tadeusza Hanauska. Cracow, 2001. 11. Konieczny J, Zagadnienia wprowadzające, [in:] Konieczny J (Ed.), Analiza infor- macji w służbach policyjnych i specjalnych. Warsaw, 2012. 12. Ważny A, Wersje śledcze, Niektóre kwestie związane z wersja śledczą. Prokurator, 2001, No. 2–3. 13. Widacki J, Konieczny J, Rozdział V. Wersja śledcza, modus operandi, analiza kryminalna — teoretyczne podstawy śledztwa, [in:] Widacki J (Ed.), Kryminal- istyka, Wyd. 3. Warsaw, 2016.

About the Author

Wojciech Filipkowski, dr hab. in legal sciences, professor University of Bialystok. His scientifi c interests: criminology, criminalistics, criminal law. E-mail: w.fi [email protected].

Streszczenie. Celem niniejszego opracowania jest przedstawienie możliwości wykorzystania ustrukturyzowanych technik analitycznych w budowaniu wersji śledczych. Mogą dotyczyć zarówno bieżących postępowań karnych lub operacyjnych, ale także pozwalają na weryfikację wersji stworzonych na potrzeby kontroli lub oceny innych postępowań. Na tym obszarze opracowanie stanowi uzupełnienie i jednocześnie poszerzenie dotychczasowej wiedzy w zakresie taktyki kryminalistycznej. Autor przedstawił bieżący stan wiedzy na temat sposobów budowania wersji kryminalistycznych oraz teoretyczne uzasadnienie dla wprowadzenia tychże technik do praktyki organów ścigania w tym aspekcie. Zaprezentowano także zarys metodyki zastosowania technik analitycznych przy budowie nowych oraz weryfikacji istniejących metod badawczych. Niniejsze opracowanie bazuje na wystąpieniu Autora podczas III Ogólnopolskiej Konferencji Naukowej pt. ‘Policyjne Archiwa X’ zorganizowanej przez Wydział Prawa i Administracji Uniwersytet Łódzki w dniach 26–28.09.2018 r.

Zusammenfassung. Das Ziel dieser Studie ist es, die Möglichkeit des Einsatzes von strukturierten Analysetechniken bei der Erstellung von Untersuchungsversionen vorzustellen. Sie können sowohl laufende strafrechtliche oder betriebliche Verfahren betreffen, ermöglichen aber auch die Überprüfung von Versionen, die zum Zweck der Kontrolle oder Auswertung anderer Verfahren erstellt wurden. Der Artikel ergänzt und erweitert gleichzeitig das vorhandene Wissen auf dem Gebiet der forensischen Taktik. In der Studie wurden einerseits der aktuelle Stand des Wissens über die Möglichkeiten des Aufbaus forensischer Versionen und die theoretische Rechtfertigung für die Einführung dieser Techniken in die Praxis der Strafverfolgungsbehörden in diesem Bereich und andererseits ein Überblick über die Methodik der Anwendung analytischer Techniken bei der Konstruktion neuer und der Überprüfung bestehender Forschungsmethoden präsentiert. Dieser Beitrag stützt sich auf dem vom Verfasser während der 3. wissenschaftlichen Konferenz ‘X Polizeiarchive’ gehaltenen Vortrag, die von der Fakultät für Recht und Verwaltung der Universität Lodz vom 26.-28.09.2018 veranstaltet wurde.

Резюме. Цель настоящей статьи — представить возможность использования структурированных аналитических методов для построения следственных версий. Они могут касаться как текущего уголовного или оперативного расследования, так и проверки версий, созданных в целях контроля или оценки других расследований. В этой обла- сти данная статья пополняет и одновременно расширяет накопленные знания в области криминалистической методики. Автор представляет современное состояние знаний о способах построения криминалистических версий и теоретическое обоснование внедрения этих методов в практику правоохранительных органов в данной области. Кроме того, в статье представлен обзор методологии по использованию аналитических методов при создании новых и верификации существующих исследовательских методов. Данная статья основана на выступлении автора во время III Национальной польской научной конференции на тему «Полицейские архива Х», организованной Кафедрой права и административным Лодзинского университета с 26 по28.09.2018.

184 Internal Security, July–December Prospects of International Harmonisation in the Sphere of Forensic Document Examination in Penal Proceedings

Adrian Szumski ORCID: 0000-0001-8723-5651 University of Wroclaw, Poland

Abstract. The paper concerns the problem of international harmonisation in the sphere of forensic document examination in penal proceedings. Progressive ‘internationalisation’ of penal cases demands that some unified standards be found in terms of the instruments being used in penal proceedings. It also affects research performed by forensic document examiners. Various techniques of forensic document examination exist, as well as various views on the value of opinion of an expert witness, and differentiated legal regulations in respective countries. Also, methods concerning verification of the skills of experts in the field of forensic document examination are different in particular countries. Such a state of affairs provokes reflections on whether opinions formulated by expert witnesses from various countries might be considered as really equivalent. It seems that it is not exactly so, and it should be ascertained that such a situation is definitely negative. Thus, there arises the necessity of at least partial harmonisation of rules in this scope, at the international level. This paper is an attempt to answer the question of if opportunities for such harmonisation exist, and if so, in which fields of matters concerning forensic document examination it is possible. DOI: 10.5604/01.3001.0014.6692 http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0014.6692

Keywords: expert witness, forensic document examination, handwriting, penal proceedings.

Introduction

Contemporary penal proceedings increasingly include an ‘international fac- tor’. The freedom of movement (which concerns E.U. member countries above all) is more frequently resulting in cases where a citizen of one country faces trial in other country, being accused of a crime committed there. Another examples of ‘internationalisation’ of penal cases are instances of using help of foreign specialists from various branches, who might be appointed by the court to play the role of an expert witness in such cases. Moreover, law enforcement services (e.g. the police) in the process of collecting the evidence, also increasingly often use various forms of help, offered either by law enforcement services of other countries or by international entities (like, for example, Interpol). The criteria of a fair trial, which should be applied in all cases, are connected not only with the existence of clear and unanimous legal regulations, but also with the need of using clear rules of activity of subjects taking part in penal proceed- ings (it concerns such entities as a court, a prosecutor, a defence counsel, as well as an expert witness). Here, a special responsibility rests with the court, because it decides whether particular piece of evidence shall be admitted or not. Everyone needs a guarantee that they will be judged in a fairly and neutral way. In turn, the abovementioned examples of using various forms of international assistance

Internal Security, July–December 185 Adrian Szumski

(in particular, the aid of foreign experts) provoke reflections if such clear rules in fact exist, and whether opinions formulated by expert witnesses from various countries are really equivalent. When it comes to forensic document examination, the answer to this question is ambiguous. Here, legitimate questions might con- cern several matters. The way of defining a document is the first of them. In this respect, it is worth noticing that the views of scientists in respective countries are similar. For example, in the United States, a document is defined broadly, as ‘any material containing marks, symbols, or signs that convey meaning or a message to someone’1. Representatives of forensic science in Poland2 also define a document broadly, as opposed to the representatives of Polish penal law doctrine who have not worked out any consent in this respect so far. Admittedly, the Polish Penal Code contains (in Article 115 §14) a definition of a document, but this definition raises doubts in practice. Main disputes concern the approach to a document as a piece of evidence in court proceedings, namely if we should treat it as material evidence or another kind of evidence. In some countries, difficulties appear regarding the definition of a document, but it is not a matter of concern for them (an example of such a country is South Africa)3. The next problem concerns the methods used by forensic document examiners. It is worth noticing that even within one country, there is no unified standard in this respect. For example, in Poland, it is the sole competence of a particular expert witness to choose an appropriate method which will be used during the research conducted by him or her in a particular case4. Difficulties might concern, for instance, handwriting examination, since in this kind of examination, we can dis- tinguish two major approaches: the first one (expressed by W. R. Harrison, among others), which assumes that in the course of such research, only objective features of the handwriting shall be taken into consideration, and the second one (repre- sented, for example, by B. Pfanne) which allows not only technical procedures to be used, but also interpretation of the graphology of the writings being examined to be taken into consideration5. The third important issue is the approach of a court to results of forensic docu- ment examination. Again, a problem arises here regarding handwriting expertise. Since, in several countries (including Poland) the view prevails that such expertise is scientific in character, but, for example, in the United States, handwriting expertise is not treated as scientific evidence6. Differences of opinions concerning the sci- entific character of handwriting expertise can result in differentiated approaches

1 Hilton O, Scientific Examination of Questioned Documents. New York, 1982, p. 3. 2 For example, Czeczot Z and Tomaszewski T define a document as ‘Any object which con- tains some content having a form of writing, drawing or picture either handmade or made by using an appropriate device (for instance a typewriter or a printer’, for more information, see: Czeczot Z, Tomaszewski T, Kryminalistyka ogólna. Toruń, 1996, p. 272. 3 See: Snyman C.R, A Draft Criminal Code for South Africa: With a Commentary. Cape Town, 1995, p. 123. 4 Judgement of the Polish Supreme Court, 10.05.1982. II KR 82/82, OSNKW 1982, No. 10-11, item 78. 5 Czeczot Z, Tomaszewski T, op. cit., p. 284. 6 Gruza E, Mańkowski D, Ekspertyza pismoznawcza ‘po amerykańsku’, [in:] Cieśla R (Ed.), Współczesna problematyka badań dokumentów. Wrocław 2015, p. 96.

186 Internal Security, July–December Prospects of International Harmonisation in the Sphere of Forensic Document Examination… of courts towards using such expertise in penal proceedings. An additional factor which complicates this issue is that in various countries, three different approaches have been created regarding the admissibility and usage of new types of scientific evidence in court proceedings7: • conservative approach (which exists in such countries as Germany and the Netherlands), whereby it is not allowed to admit new types of evidence in court proceedings at all, or it is possible, but only to a very limited scale; • liberal approach (accepted in the United States of America) in which new types of evidence can be admitted after meeting specific criteria; • lack of general and specified criteria concerning the admissibility of new types of evidence (such an approach exists in Poland). Thus, if a result of an expert witness examination should be treated not as typical evidence but as ‘new scientific evidence’, a problem will arise in terms of establish- ing unified criteria of its admissibility in court proceedings, just because of various approaches to such kind of evidence. The last of the key problems concerning forensic document examinations are the different standards in terms of verifying the qualifications of experts. In some countries (e.g. Poland), there is still a lack uniform rules in this scope. Thus, respective scientific institutes check experts’ qualifications according to their own criteria; it hap- pens even that such qualifications are not checked at all, neither formally, nor de facto8.

Harmonisation of terminology and methods used in forensic document examination

The abovementioned problems concerning differentiated approach to questions connected with forensic document examination within various countries incline to reflection on opportunities for at least partial international harmonisation in this sphere. Now, in which of the abovementioned areas do such opportunities exist? Regarding first of the aforementioned matters (i.e. definition of a document) it seems that it is impossible to create a universal definition of this term. This is the case because the definitions of a document which exist in forensic science and in the legal regulations of respective countries have been shaped under the influence of long-term practice, and they have been affected by legal and cul- tural factors, as well as by the development of civilization. As it was mentioned before, various approaches exist to defining a document in forensic science and in respective branches of law. A little bit broader possibili- ties, however, exist in the scope of harmonisation of the methods used by forensic document examiners, and in fact certain actions in this respect have already been undertaken. One of the entities active in this field is the Scientific Working Group for Forensic Document Examination (SWGDOC) from the United States. It gathers

7 Dzierżanowska J, Studzińska J, Kryteria oceny dowodu z opinii biegłego w orzecznictwie sądów powszechnych i Sądu Najwyższego. Roczniki Nauk Prawnych, 2015, Tom XXV, No. 2, p. 24. 8 Kegel Z, Ekspertyza i jej wykonawca, [in:] Kegel Z (Ed.), Współczesna kryminalistyka i nauki pokrewne w administracji. Wałbrzych, 2013, p. 148.

Internal Security, July–December 187 Adrian Szumski forensic document examiners who represent forensic laboratories from this country at federal, state and county levels, as well as private practitioners. Meetings of this group take place at the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia9. So far, SWGDOC has published 21 standards concerning forensic document examination10: • Standard for Examination of Altered Documents; • Standard for Examination of Documents Produced with Liquid Ink Jet Technology; • Standard for Examination of Documents Produced with Toner Technology; • Standard for Examination of Dry Seal Impressions; • Standard for Examination of Fracture Patterns and Paper Fiber Impressions on Single-Strike Film Ribbons and Typed Text; • Standard for Examination of Handwritten Items; • Standard for Examination of Mechanical Checkwriter Impressions; • Standard for Examination of Rubber Stamp Impressions; • Standard for Examination of Typewritten Items; • Standard for Indentation Examinations; • Standard for Minimum Training Requirements for Forensic Document Examiners; • Standard for Non-destructive Examination of Paper; • Standard for Physical Match of Paper Cuts, Tears, and Perforations in Forensic Document Examinations; • Standard for Preservation of Charred Documents; • Standard for Preservation of Liquid Soaked Documents; • Standard for Scope of Work of Forensic Document Examiners; • Standard for Test Methods for Forensic Writing Ink Comparison; • Standard for Use of Image Capture and Storage Technology in Forensic Document Examination; • Standard for Writing Ink Identification; • Standard Terminology for Expressing Conclusions of Forensic Document Examiners; • Terminology Relating to the Examination of Questioned Documents. From 2000 to 2012, SWGDOC published their standards through American Soci- ety for Testing and Materials International (currently ASTM International), however in 2012, SWGDOC stopped publishing their standards through ASTM and began self-publishing their standards11. The main aim of standards established by SWGDOC is to unify issues concern- ing forensic document examination at the domestic level (i.e. in the United States) but it seems that at least some of them might be useful also for the wider region. It might concern, for instance, unifying certain definitions used in forensic docu- ment examination.

9 Lewis J.A, Forensic Document Examination: Fundamentals and Current Trends. Oxford — San Diego 2014, p. 110. 10 Published standards. Electronic source: https://www.swgdoc.org/index.php, accessed: 27.11.2019. 11 About us. Electonic source: https://www.swgdoc.org/index.php/about-us, accessed: 27.11.2019.

188 Internal Security, July–December Prospects of International Harmonisation in the Sphere of Forensic Document Examination… Courts’ approach to results of forensic document examination

Referring to the third problem, namely the approach of a court to the results of a forensic document examination, opportunities of harmonisation at the interna- tional level seem to be broader. In spite of considerable differences in approaches to this issue (already mentioned before), certain attempts have been undertaken to create unified criteria for assessing the evidence; in particular, the so-called Daubert Standard has been intensively promoted. The standard is a result of the United States Supreme Court case of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., and it allows scientific evidence to be admitted if the following criteria are met12: • whether the theory or technique in question can be and has been tested; • whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication; • whether the known or potential error rate is acceptable; • the existence and maintenance of standards controlling its operation; • whether it has attracted widespread acceptance within a relevant scientific community. The Daubert Standard is also deeply rooted in the two cases that came after Daubert, namely General Electric Co. v. Joiner13 and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael14. Together, these cases addressed the appellate standard of review of a trial court’s admissibility ruling and applied the Daubert Standard to nonscientific expert tes- timony15. It also concerns the opinion of a forensic document examiner (including a handwriting expert). It seems that the Daubert Standard is universal enough, and it might be helpful in the activity of the administration of justice in various countries. Nevertheless, one should remember that it also has some disadvantages. In particular, one should agree with a view expressed in the literature that the first of the abovementioned criteria (i.e. testability of a theory or technique) is ambiguous, and so, it is marginally (if at all) helpful to the judge when it comes to evaluation of the opinion of an expert witness16. Also the last criterion (widespread acceptance within a relevant scientific community) is inaccurate. Since, the question arises as to how many experts rep- resenting a particular discipline must accept a given theory if we want to be sure that this criterion has been met. To that end, a proposal exists to verify the criterion of widespread acceptance by answering the following questions17:

12 United States Supreme Court case Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., de- cided June 28, 1993 [509 U.S. 579 (1993)]. 13 United States Supreme Court case of General Electric Co. v. Joiner, decided December 15, 1997 [522 U.S. 136 (1997)]. 14 United States Supreme Court case of Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, decided March 23, 1999 [526 U.S. 137 (1999)]. 15 The Daubert Standard: A Guide To Motions, Hearings, and Rulings. Electronic source: https://www.theexpertinstitute.com/the-daubert-standard-a-guide-to-motions-hearings- and-rulings/, accessed: 27.11.2019. 16 Wójcikiewicz J (Ed.), Ekspertyza sądowa — zagadnienia wybrane. Warsaw, 2007, p. 20. 17 Widacki J (Ed.), Kryminalistyka. Warsaw, 2008, p. 424.

Internal Security, July–December 189 Adrian Szumski

• Whether the given method is proposed by a person who is an authority among the scientific community and conducts their research in a significant scientific institute; • Whether the suggested method had been described in significant scientific literature before; here it is especially important if such a description con- cerned: — theoretical and scientifically testable assumptions of the given method, as well as a methodology of utilising this method; — diagnostic value of the method and its efficiency (understood to mean an empirical established percentage of both correct and incorrect conclusions, and, eventually, the percentage of the lack of a conclusion by using such method, as well as circumstances having impact on releas- ing incorrect conclusions); • whether the given method was or is used in judicial or investigative activity in those countries which are considered to be leading in the world in terms of the level of science and technique in general, and forensic science in par- ticular, as well as in terms of the protection of human rights. The answers to the abovementioned questions certainly facilitate ascertaining if there is common acceptance of particular method in a given case, although further doubts might also arise here (e.g. what does the term ‘significant scientific literature’ mean? Again, it is a highly subjective criterion). When judging the usefulness of the Daubert Standard in the context of the inter- national harmonisation of forensic document examination, it is worth mentioning that the standard should not be treated indiscriminately. Some infringements which appear in the activity of American administration of justice suggest that acceptance of such a conventional criteria as those constituting the Daubert Standard cannot substitute commonsense thinking and a comprehensive approach to the problem under research18.

Harmonisation of standards concerning qualifi cations of forensic document examiners

Finally, when it comes to the last of the aforementioned problems concerning the international standardisation of forensic document examination (differential standards in terms of verifying qualifications of experts being specialised in such examinations) it should be ascertained that there are certain opportunities in this matter, since, even at present, specialised entities exist which certify candidates as expert witnesses in this area, at the international level. Some of such enti- ties are: American Board of Forensic Document Examiners (ABFDE) and Board of Forensic Document Examiners (BFDE), both operating in the United States. The objectives of the first of the abovementioned organisations are to establish, enhance, and maintain standards of qualification for those who practice forensic document examination and to certify, as qualified specialists, those voluntary

18 Gurgul J, Paradygmaty kryminalistyki. Prokuratura i Prawo, 2017, No. 2, p. 140.

190 Internal Security, July–December Prospects of International Harmonisation in the Sphere of Forensic Document Examination… applicants who comply with the requirements of ABFDE. The process of verifying the skills of applicants, if successful, ends by them being issued a Certificate of Qual- ification in Forensic Document Examination. Such a certificate is valid for a period of five years, and is renewable at the end of that period according to the standards currently applicable in the field set forth by the organisation; these standards con- cern active participation in case examination or other duties relating to the field of forensic document examination, and fulfilling the recertification requirements of earning at least forty continuing education credits as established by the Board during the five-year renewal period (credits are earned by such activities as demon- strating registered attendance at Board-recognised forensic meetings, participating in scientific programs of those meetings, publishing articles in Board-recognised journals, etc. Credits may also be earned by providing written summaries of appro- priate journal articles and/or passing a written/practical examination)19. In such a way, ABFDE strives to adopt a comprehensive approach, by identifying those persons professing to be specialists in forensic document examination who possess the requisite qualifications and competence20. In turn, BFDE is an organisation established to administer a professional certifi- cation program designed to evaluate the knowledge, practical skills and abilities of forensic document examiners. Of course, this organisation also created their own criteria for issuing certificates21. Such a certificate is granted for a five-year period, and every fifth year, the individual must renew his or her certification through par- ticipation in the Certification Renewal Program22. Criteria which enable the renewal of a certificate concern attendance at professional conferences, seminars, work- shops, in-service training, and completing courses offered by institutions in allied professions, above all23. It is worth noticing that both of the abovementioned entities work under the supervision of the Forensic Specialties Accreditation Board (FSAB) which accredits forensic specialty certification boards. While FSAB accreditation is not mandatory, it is an important step towards the consolidation and unification of certification in the forensic sciences. Currently, the abovementioned ABFDE and BFDE are the only entities in the area of forensic document examination which are accredited by FSAB24. Apart from those two organisations, an important role among the entities which gather forensic document examiners is played by American Society of Questioned Document Examiners (ASQDE). Its aim is to foster education, sponsor scientific research, establish standards, exchange experiences, and provide instruction in the

19 ABFDE Rules and Procedures Guide, p. 31. 20 Ibid., p. 1. 21 For more information see: Eligibility requirements. Electronic source: http://www.bfde. org/page55/application.html, accessed: 27.11.2019. 22 Testing. Electronic source: http://www.bfde.org/testing.html, accessed: 27.11.2019. 23 For more information on the renewal of a BFDE certificate, see: Recertification. Electronic source: http://www.bfde.org/recertification.html, accessed: 27.11.2019. 24 Harralson H.H, Developments in Handwriting and Signature Identification in the Digital Age. New York, 2013, p. 119.

Internal Security, July–December 191 Adrian Szumski field of questioned document examination, and to promote justice in matters that involve questions about documents25. The above, brief characteristics of entities which gather forensic document examiners show that their areas of activity are similar, and it should be ascertained that they play an important role from the point of view of development of this field of forensic science. In spite of the fact that they are private entities, the system of certification created by them, as well as their care about the prestige and reli- ability of the certificates released by them prove that the individuals who have obtained such a certificate possess, in principle, the necessary skills to be an expert witness26.

Conclusions

To conclude, one should accept that certain opportunities of international harmonisation in the sphere of forensic document examination do exist. Currently, it seems that it might concern chiefly the area connected with international certifi- cation of forensic document examiners, which would contribute to raising the level of qualification of experts, as well as to creating moderately unified criteria for those who would apply to be expert witnesses. At present, such harmonisation is rather limited (e.g. certification provided by ABFDE is practically limited to permanent residents of the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand), but it is possible that such actions will be widened in the future. A chance of at least partially bringing the views closer together also exists when it comes to the terminology used in forensic document examinations, although a definition of a document is still a considerable problem, and it would probably not be possible to conclude a unified definition in the short term. While, as was men- tioned before, the views of representatives of forensic science in various countries are similar in this scope, discrepancies in regulations of penal law are still a problem. In turn, certain opportunities exist in the field of harmonisation of research meth- ods, and standards established by SWGDOC might be a good starting point for further coordination in this respect. By contrast, harmonisation of the rules of admissibility of evidence resulting from a document in penal proceedings is possible owing to dissemination of the Daubert Standard, still bearing in mind its disadvantages. Also, one should remember that an important problem regarding deeper harmonisation is the considerable differ- ences of regulations of penal procedural law in various countries. Nevertheless, such attempts should be undertaken. Bringing closer the standards of admissibility of evidence resulting from a document in penal proceedings to the maximum extent possible would certainly be positive from the point of view of the rule of fair trial, and simultaneously, it would positively affect the perception of an expert wit- ness, as well as the whole administration of justice among societies.

25 About the ASQDE. Electronic source: http://www.asqde.org/about/about.html, accessed: 27.11.2019. 26 Gruza E, Mańkowski D, op. cit., p. 103.

192 Internal Security, July–December Prospects of International Harmonisation in the Sphere of Forensic Document Examination… References

1. ABFDE Rules and Procedures Guide. 2. About the ASQDE, http://www.asqde.org/about/about.html 3. Czeczot Z, Tomaszewski T, Kryminalistyka ogólna. Toruń, 1996. 4. Dzierżanowska J, Studzińska J, Kryteria oceny dowodu z opinii biegłego w orzecznictwie sądów powszechnych i Sądu Najwyższego. Roczniki Nauk Prawnych, 2015, Tom XXV, No. 2. 5. Electronic source: https://www.swgdoc.org/index.php/about-us 6. Eligibility requirements, Electronic source: http://www.bfde.org/page55/applica- tion.html 7. Gruza E, Mańkowski D, Ekspertyza pismoznawcza ‘po amerykańsku’, [in:] Cieśla R (Ed.), Współczesna problematyka badań dokumentów. Wrocław, 2015. 8. Gurgul J, Paradygmaty kryminalistyki. Prokuratura i Prawo, 2017, No. 2. 9. Harralson H. H, Developments in Handwriting and Signature Identification in the Digital Age. New York, 2013. 10. Hilton O, Scientifi c Examination of Questioned Documents. New York 1982. 11. Judgement of Polish Supreme Court, 10.05.1982. II KR 82/82, OSNKW 1982, No. 10-11, item 78. 12. Kegel Z, Ekspertyza i jej wykonawca, [in:] Kegel Z (Ed.), Współczesna kryminali- styka i nauki pokrewne w administracji. Wałbrzych, 2013. 13. Lewis J.A, Forensic Document Examination: Fundamentals and Current Trends, Oxford — San Diego 2014. 14. Published standards. Electronic source: https://www.swgdoc.org/index.php 15. Recertifi cation. Electronic source: http://www.bfde.org/recertifi cation.html 16. Snyman C.R, A Draft Criminal Code for South Africa: With a Commentary. Cape Town, 1995. 17. Testing. Electronic source: http://www.bfde.org/testing.html 18. The Daubert Standard: A Guide To Motions, Hearings, and Rulings. Electronic source: https://www.theexpertinstitute.com/the-daubert-standard-a-guide-to- motions-hearings-and-rulings/ 19. United States Supreme Court case Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., decided June 28, 1993 [509 U.S. 579 (1993)]. 20. United States Supreme Court case General Electric Co. v. Joiner, decided Decem- ber 15, 1997 [522 U.S. 136 (1997)]. 21. United States Supreme Court case Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, decided March 23, 1999 [526 U.S. 137 (1999)]. 22. Widacki J (Ed.), Kryminalistyka. Warsaw, 2008. 23. Wójcikiewicz J (Ed.), Ekspertyza sądowa — zagadnienia wybrane. Warsaw, 2007.

About the Author

Adrian Szumski, PhD, dr habil., University of Wrocław, Institute of International Studies. Scientifi c interests: criminology, criminalistics, material criminal law, criminal procedure, international police cooperation. E-mail: [email protected]

Internal Security, July–December 193 Adrian Szumski

Streszczenie. Artykuł dotyczy problemu międzynarodowej harmonizacji w zakresie badania dokumentów kryminalistycznych w postępowaniach karnych. Postępująca ‘internacjonalizacja’ spraw karnych wymaga znalezienia pewnych ujednoliconych standardów w zakresie środków stosowanych w postępowaniach karnych. Dotyczy to również badań prowadzonych przez specjalistów ds. dokumentacji kryminalistycznej. Istnieją różne techniki badania dokumentów kryminalistycznych, jak również różne poglądy na wartość opinii biegłego oraz zróżnicowane regulacje prawne w poszczególnych krajach. Ponadto, metody weryfikacji umiejętności ekspertów w dziedzinie badania dokumentów kryminalistycznych są różne w poszczególnych krajach. Taki stan rzeczy skłania do refleksji, czy opinie sformułowane przez biegłych z różnych krajów mogą być uznane za rzeczywiście równoważne. Wygląda na to, że nie do końca tak jest i należy stwierdzić, że taka sytuacja jest zdecydowanie negatywna. Pojawia się więc konieczność przynajmniej częściowej harmonizacji przepisów w tym zakresie, na szczeblu międzynarodowym. Niniejszy dokument jest próbą odpowiedzi na pytanie, czy istnieją możliwości takiej harmonizacji, a jeśli tak, to w jakich obszarach spraw dotyczących badania dokumentów kryminalistycznych jest to możliwe.

Zusammenfassung. Der Artikel befasst sich mit dem Problem der internationalen Harmonisierung bei der Untersuchung von forensischen Dokumenten in Strafverfahren. Die fortschreitende ‘Internationalisierung’ von Strafsachen erfordert es, einige harmonisierte Standards für Maßnahmen in Strafverfahren zu finden. Dies gilt auch für Recherchen, die von Spezialisten für forensische Dokumentation durchgeführt werden. Es gibt unterschiedliche Techniken zur Untersuchung forensischer Aufzeichnungen, sowie unterschiedliche Ansichten über den Wert eines Gutachtens und unterschiedliche gesetzliche Regelungen in verschiedenen Ländern. Darüber hinaus sind die Methoden zur Überprüfung der Fähigkeiten von Experten für forensische Aufzeichnungen von Land zu Land unterschiedlich. Bei diesem Zustand fragt man sich, ob die von Experten aus verschiedenen Ländern formulierten Meinungen wirklich als gleichwertig angesehen werden können. Es scheint, dass dies nicht ganz der Fall ist, und es sollte festgestellt werden, dass diese Situation definitiv negativ ist. Es besteht daher die Notwendigkeit einer zumindest teilweisen Harmonisierung der Regeln in diesem Bereich auf internationaler Ebene. Dieses Dokument ist ein Versuch, die Frage zu beantworten, ob es Möglichkeiten für eine solche Harmonisierung gibt und, wenn ja, in welchen Bereichen von Fällen, die die Untersuchung von forensischen Dokumenten betreffen, dies möglich ist.

Резюме. В статье рассматривается проблема международной стандартизации при исследовании криминалисти- ческих документов в ходе уголовного расследования. Прогрессивная «интернационализация» уголовных дел требует выработки некоторых унифицированных стандартов в отношении мер в уголовном производстве. Это также отно- сится к исследованиям, проводимым специалистами в области криминалистической документации. Существуют разные методы изучения криминалистических материалов, а также разные мнения о значимости экспертного заключения и разные законодательные регулирования в разных странах. Кроме того, в каждой стране существуют свои методы оценки квалификации судебно-медицинских экспертов, занимающихся проведением судебно-медицин- ских экспертиз. В связи с этим возникает вопрос, можно ли рассматривать экспертное заключение, составленное экспертами из разных стран, в качестве действительно эквивалентного. Кажется, что это не совсем так, и следует отметить, что ситуация безусловно имеет негативный оттенок. Таким образом, возникает необходимость хотя бы частичной стандаризации норм в этой области на международном уровне. Данная статья представляет собой попытку ответить на вопрос о том, существуют ли возможности для такой стандаризации, и если да, то в каких областях, связанных с экспертизой криминалистических документов, она возможна.

194 Internal Security, July–December ANTI-TERRORISM

Beijing Convention and Beijing Protocol. Changes in the International and Legal Model for Combatting Aviation Terrorism

Tomasz Aleksandrowicz ORCID: 0000-0002-3419-5577 Police Academy in Szczytno, Poland

Abstract. The article deals with the issue of the Beijing reform of international criminal aviation law. The author analyses the relevant applicable international law and confronts it with the new legal regulations adopted at the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) conference in Beijing in 2010. As a result, the author states that the basic change involves the expansion of the catalogue of acts subject to criminalisation as well as the expansion of the circle of persons participating in or supporting actions involving the commission of acts that pose a threat to the safety of civil aviation; the system also specifies the responsibility of collective entities (the so-called ‘Al Qaeda’ clause). The author is deeply convinced that the development of the Tokyo-Hague-Montreal-Beijing system, which is part of the whole international legal system of combatting terrorism, including its financing, is fully justified. The new regulations also make this system more coherent. It is also worth adding that the adoption of the Beijing Convention and the Beijing Protocol is part of the implementation of the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy adopted by the United Nations. DOI: 10.5604/01.3001.0014.6693 http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0014.6693

Keywords: aviation safety, Beijing reform, aviation terrorism, international law

Introduction

Threats to the safety of international civil aviation emerged almost at the same time as international air transport.1 The intensification of such threats at the end of the 1960s resulted in the international community’s response to create interna- tional legal regulations within the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) aimed at ensuring the safety of international civil aviation through cooperation between different states in the field of prosecuting the perpetrators of crimes that pose such risks, which involved the introduction of the concept of aviation security.2 Within a quarter of a century (1963–1988), a system called the Tokyo-Hague-Mon- treal system was established.3 It was the international community’s response to ‘the

1 See: Aleksandrowicz T, Liedel K, Zwalczanie terroryzmu lotniczego. Wybrane zagadnie- nia i źródła prawa międzynarodowego. Szczytno, 2010, p. 11. 2 See: Biskup K, Bezpieczeństwo operacji lotniczych w dobie współczesnego świata. Studia z zakresu Prawa, Administracji i Zarządzania UKW, 2013, Vol. 3, pp. 137–150; Myszona- Kostrzewa K, Bezpieczeństwo lotnictwa cywilnego w świetle prawa międzynarodowego. Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego, 2014, No. 11, pp. 137–150. 3 The name is derived from the names of the three international legal regulations: the Tokyo Convention, the Hague Convention and Montreal Convention together with its

Internal Security, July–December 195 Tomasz Aleksandrowicz proliferation of unlawful acts, in particular acts of terrorism, on aircraft and in rela- tion to aircraft and aviation infrastructure’.4 The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 on New York and the Pentagon fun- damentally changed the nature of the threat from aviation terrorism. In 2001, ICAO recommended the preparation of a reform of the Tokyo-Hague-Montreal system, which resulted in the adoption of two new regulations at the Beijing conference on 10 September 2010: The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts affecting the Safety of Civil Aviation (known as the Beijing Convention) and the Additional Protocol to the Hague Convention (Beijing Protocol).5 Primary sources call it the Tokyo-Hague-Montreal-Beijing system.6 The aim of the article is to establish the scope and direction of the changes in the international legal model for combatting terrorism introduced by the Beijing reform. The basic method to achieve this goal is to carry out a legal analysis.

Tokyo-Hague-Montreal system

The Tokyo Convention shall apply to offences under criminal law and to acts which, whether or not they are criminal offences, endanger or are likely to endan- ger an aircraft, persons or property on board, or acts which are contrary to order and discipline on board (Article 1 § 1). The general aim of the Convention was to oblige the Contracting States to take legal action against acts of aircraft terrorism,

Supplementary Protocol. The first one is a Convention on offences and certain other acts committed on board aircraft, signed in Tokyo on 14 September 1963. Dz.U. 1971, No. 15, item 147, annex; United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 704, No. 10106, ICAO Doc 8364; the second one is the Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, signed in the Hague on 16 December 1970. Dz.U. 1972, No. 25, item 181, annex; United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 860, No. 1235, ICAO Doc 8920; the third part of the name comes from Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, signed in Montreal on 23 September 1971. Dz.U. 1976, No. 8, item 37, annex; United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 974, No. 14118, ICAO Doc 8966 and Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Vio- lence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, signed in Montreal on 24 February 1988, supplementing the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, signed in Montreal on 23 September 1971. Dz.U. 2006, No. 48 item 348. United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 1589, No. 14118, ICAO Doc 9518l. 4 Żylicz M, Prawo lotnicze międzynarodowe, europejskie i krajowe, 2nd edition. Warsaw, 2011, p. 99. 5 Convention on The Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation signed in Beijing on 10 September 2010, ICAO Doc 9960; Protocol Supplementary to the Con- vention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, signed in Beijing on 10 September 2010, ICAO Doc 9959. Texts of the two acts: Electronic source: https://www.icao.int/secretariat/ legal/Pages/TreatyCollection.aspx, accessed: 17.03.2020. 6 Żylicz M, op. cit., p. 95. See: Aleksandrowicz T, Postępowy rozwój prawa międzynarodowego a bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowego lotnictwa cywilnego, [in:] Galicki Z, Myszona-Kostrze- wa K (Eds), 50 lat konwencji tokijskiej — bezpieczeństwo żeglugi lotniczej z perspektywy przestrzeni powietrznej i kosmicznej. Księga dedykowana Profesorowi Markowi Żyliczowi. Warsaw, 2014, pp. 48, 50.

196 Internal Security, July–December Beijing Convention and Beijing Protocol. Changes in the International and Legal Model… not to define the concept of the offence of seizure of aircraft. However, despite this approach, in Article 11 §1 of the Convention, which reads ‘When a person on board has unlawfully committed by force or threat thereof an act of interference, seizure, or other wrongful exercise of control of an aircraft in flight or when such an act is about to be committed, Contracting States shall take all appropriate measures to restore control of the aircraft to its lawful commander or to preserve his control of the air- craft’. This convention formulates for the first time the elements of seizure of aircraft. The Hague Convention, unlike the Tokyo Convention, clearly defines constitu- ent elements of the offence covered by this agreement. According to Article 1, ‘an offence is committed by any person who on board an aircraft in flight unlawfully, by force or threat thereof, or by any other form of intimidation seizes, or exercises control of, that aircraft, or attempts to perform any such act or is an accomplice of a person who performs or attempts to perform any such act’. The specification of constituent elements of the offence contained in Article 1 of the Hague Convention is similar to that contained in Article 11 of the Tokyo Convention, except for acts of disruption of aircraft operation. However, the Hague Convention goes much further in its effort to determine the constituent elements of the offence. It also criminalises the attempt to seize or take control of an aircraft and complicity with a person who has committed or attempts to commit such an act. In addition, the characteristics of the offence of ‘violence or threat of vio- lence’ (reiterated after the Tokyo Convention) expands to include the use of any other form of threatening behaviour. The Montreal Convention contains the widest catalogue of behaviour consid- ered to be criminal acts. Article 1 defines the offences covered by this agreement as follows: 1. Any person commits an offence if he or she unlawfully and intentionally: a) performs an act of violence against a person on board an aircraft in flight if that act is likely to endanger the safety of that aircraft; or b) destroys an aircraft in service or causes damage to such an aircraft which renders it incapable of flight or which is likely to endanger its safety in flight; or c) places or causes to be placed on an aircraft in service, by any means whatsoever, a device or substance which is likely to destroy that aircraft, or to cause damage to it which renders it incapable of flight, or to cause damage to it which is likely to endanger its safety in flight; or d) destroys or damages air navigation facilities or interferes with their oper- ation, if any such act is likely to endanger the safety of aircraft in flight; or e) communicates information which a person known to be false, thereby endangering the safety of an aircraft in flight. 2. Any person also commits an offence if he or she: a) attempts to commit any of the offences mentioned in paragraph 1 of this Article; or b) is an accomplice of a person who commits or attempts to commit any such offence. The Supplementary Protocol to the Montreal Convention introduces in its Article 1 a new paragraph 1 bis, according to which ‘Any person commits an offence if he or she unlawfully and intentionally, using any device, substance or weapon:

Internal Security, July–December 197 Tomasz Aleksandrowicz

a) performs an act of violence against a person at an airport serving interna- tional civil aviation which causes or is likely to cause serious injury or death; or b) destroys or seriously damages the facilities of an airport serving international civil aviation or aircraft not in service located thereon or disrupts the services of the airport, if such an act endangers or is likely to endanger safety at that airport.’ The Montreal Convention criminalises all acts listed therein — whether acts of violence on board an aircraft in flight (Article 1(a)) or acts of air sabotage (Article 1(b–e)) — subject to the existence of an element common to all of these cases, which is a threat to the safety of the aircraft in flight. The terms in flight and in service used in the abovementioned conventions are relatively precisely defined. Most acts of aviation terrorism occur on board an aircraft in flight or threaten, or may threaten the safety of that aircraft in flight, and therefore the location where the offences to which the rules apply have been committed is essential as a crite- rion for determining their actual scope. At the same time, the criterion of a crime scene under international law is closely linked to the criterion of the time when such an offence is committed. The time element is a kind of supplement to the scene element, appearing in the convention provisions in the form of such concepts as ‘aircraft in flight’ and ‘aircraft in service’. Article 11 of the Tokyo Convention provides as a premise for action by contracting states to restore or maintain control of aircraft by its lawful commander, the unlaw- ful seizure of aircraft in flight or an intention to do so. The convention assumes in Article 1(3) that ‘for the purposes of this convention, an aircraft is considered to be in flight from the moment when power is applied for the purpose of take-off until the moment when the landing run ends’. However, pursuant to Article 5(2) (in the chapter on aircraft captains’ authority), an aircraft is considered to be in flight ‘at any time from the moment when all its external doors are closed following embarkation until the moment when any such door is opened for disembarkation’. Granting the aircraft’s captain the rights set out in the convention earlier than those set out in Article 1(3) is particularly appropriate here, since Article 11 also concerns preparation for illegal seizure of aircraft. Moreover, for the purposes of the chapter on the privileges of the aircraft’s captain, the convention has further extended the concept of aircraft in flight temporarily, under which: ‘in the case of a forced landing, the provisions of this chapter shall continue to apply with respect to offences and acts committed on board until competent authorities of a state take over the responsibility for the aircraft and for the persons and property on board.’ The Hague Convention has taken the definition of the concept of aircraft in flight from Article 5 § 2 of the Tokyo Convention. However, unlike the Tokyo Convention, this term is not specific and does not refer to just one chapter. Similarly, the rule on forced landing applies to the whole convention. The Montreal Convention defines aircraft in flight by analogy. In addition to the already-known concept of aircraft in flight in aviation law, the Montreal Convention introduces a new concept of ‘aircraft in service’, used as a time criterion for committing offences such as destruction or damage to an aircraft or the placing of equipment or substances causing such effects on it. Article 2(b) provides that ‘an

198 Internal Security, July–December Beijing Convention and Beijing Protocol. Changes in the International and Legal Model… aircraft is considered to be in service from the beginning of the preflight prepara- tion of the aircraft by ground personnel or by the crew for a specific flight until twenty-four hours after any landing; the period of service shall, in any event, extend for the entire period during which the aircraft is in flight.’ In the Montreal Convention, contrary to the Hague Convention, there is no uniform definition of the location where the offences covered by this agreement are committed. In the case of the Hague Convention, analogous acts, including cooperation, were committed only ‘on board an aircraft in flight’ (Article 1). In turn, the Montreal Convention uses this criterion only for the act specified in Article 1(1) (a), i.e. an act of violence against a person on board an aircraft in flight. Other crimi- nal acts — defined in Article 1 § 1 point b÷e, the attempt to commit them (Article 1 § 2 point a) and cooperation with a person who has committed or is attempting to commit such acts (Article 1 § 2 point b) — have no indication of a place that limits the scope of the crime. Such a definition of criminal acts is an advantage of this agreement, as it strengthens its provisions compared to the Hague Convention. Developed over nearly thirty years, the Tokyo-Hague-Montreal system has shaped the basic international legal mechanisms for combatting aviation terrorism. It should be borne in mind that, although the real aim of the system was primarily to combat acts of terrorism, its provisions apply to all criminal acts that threaten the security of international civil aviation, regardless of the motives of the perpetra- tors. It is therefore a system based on the criminalisation of a terrorist act and the legal procedures applicable to such recognition; it must therefore be regarded as a constituent element of international criminal law.7 Under this scheme, states have made a number of commitments to combat aviation terrorism, in particular: • to oblige states to penalise acts that threaten the security of international civil aviation and severely punish the perpetrators of such acts; • to oblige the state to which the aircraft belongs to establish criminal jurisdic- tion over acts committed on board the aircraft; • to make it possible for the state to exercise jurisdiction over such acts by the state having sovereignty over the airspace, e.g. when the offence has an effect on its land territory or compromises its security; • to oblige states to cooperate in countering these threats, among others, in the form of information exchange and legal assistance, including extra- dition.8 It is worth noting that the abovementioned regulations are part of the so-called sectoral conventions — conventions adopted within the framework of the United Nations which typify particular categories of terrorist attacks (e.g. hostage-taking, attacks on diplomats etc.).9 After all, it is characteristic that these legal norms typi- fied individual crimes in an objective manner, not dealing at all with the subjective side of the act, remaining only when it is stated that these acts must be committed illegally and intentionally. This means that the motives of the perpetrator and his or her actual aims were irrelevant to the existence of the crime; this put terrorist acts 7 See: Królikowski M, Wiliński P, Izydorczyk J, Podstawy prawa karnego międzynarodowego. Warsaw, 2008, p. 140ff. 8 See more: Aleksandrowicz T, Terroryzm międzynarodowy. Warsaw, 2015, pp. 66–69; Aleksandrowicz T, Liedel K, pp. 29–36. 9 Aleksandrowicz T, Terroryzm międzynarodowy, op. cit., p. 66.

Internal Security, July–December 199 Tomasz Aleksandrowicz and acts committed with other motives at one legal level, which made it possible to avoid disputes about the legal definition of a terrorist offence,10 and individual conventions were built almost in the same way, differing only in the modus operandi of the perpetrators. This situation continued until 1999, i.e. until the adoption of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, which — for the purposes of the system created by the sectoral conventions — introduced a definition of a terrorist act.11 Article 2 stipulates that the offence is financed by the execution of ‘(a) an act which constitutes an offence within the scope of and as defined in one of the treaties listed in the annex; or (b) Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a gov- ernment or an international organisation to do or to abstain from doing any act.’ The annex referred to in paragraph (a) contains a list of the sectoral conventions, i.e: 1. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, signed in The Hague on 16 December 1970; 2. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, signed in Montreal on 23 September 1971; 3. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internation- ally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 14 December 1973;12 4. International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 17 December 1979;13 5. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, adopted in Vienna on 3 March 1980;14 6. Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, signed in Montreal on 24 February 1988; 7. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Mari- time Navigation, signed in Rome on 10 March 1988;15 8. Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Plat- forms located on the Continental Shelf, signed in Rome on 10 March 1988;16 9. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 15 December 1997.17

10 These disputes prevented the adoption of the General Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism within the United Nations in the 1970s. See: Ibid. 11 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in resolution 54/109 of 9 December 1999. United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 2178, No. 38349. 12 Dz.U. 1983, No. 37, item 168, annex; United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 1035, No. 15410. 13 Dz.U. 2000, No. 106, item 1123, annex; United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 1316, No. 21931. 14 Dz.U. 1989, No. 17, item 93, annex; United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 1456, No. 24631. 15 Dz.U. 2000 No. 129, item 635, annex; United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 1678, No. 20004. 16 Dz.U. 2000 No. 22, item 211, annex; United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 1678, No. 20004 (Both the Convention and its Protocol were published in UNTS under the same number). 17 Dz.U. 2007 No. 66, item 438; United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 2149, No. 35517.

200 Internal Security, July–December Beijing Convention and Beijing Protocol. Changes in the International and Legal Model…

It is therefore clear that the Tokyo-Hague-Montreal system is part of a larger whole, the international legal system for combatting terrorism developed within the United Nations.

Beijing Convention and Beijing Protocol

The Beijing Convention — while retaining in almost unchanged form the acts included in the Montreal Convention and its Supplementary Protocol — signifi- cantly expands their material scope, obliging states or parties to criminalise new acts. First of all, two issues should be noted: the use of aircraft as a means of com- bat (as in the case of the attack on the World Trade Center) and the use on board of an aircraft in service weapons of mass destruction or explosives, and the dumping or launching of such loads. These issues are covered by the provisions of Article 1(1) (f) to (h) of the Beijing Convention, which says that any person commits an offence if that person unlawfully and intentionally: uses an aircraft in service of the purpose of causing death, serious bodily injury, or serious damage to property or the envi- ronment; or releases or discharges from an aircraft in service any BCN weapon or explosive, radioactive, or similar substances in a manner that causes or is likely to cause death, serious bodily injury or serious damage to property or the environ- ment; or uses against or on board an aircraft in service any BCN weapon or explosive, radioactive, or similar substances in a manner that causes or is likely to cause death, serious bodily injury or serious damage to property or the environment. In addi- tion, the Convention criminalises acts relating to civil aviation activities that serve other criminal activities, including those of a terrorist nature. Article 1(1)(i) states that any person who unlawfully and intentionally transports, causes to be transported, or facilitates the transport of, on board an aircraft; any explosive or radioactive material, knowing that it is intended to be used to cause, or in a threat to cause, with or without a condition, as is provided for under national law, death or serious injury or damage for the purpose of intimidating a population, or compelling a gov- ernment or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act; or any BCN weapon, knowing it to be a BCN weapon; or any source material, special fissionable material, or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, knowing that it is intended to be used in a nuclear explosive activity or in any other nuclear activity not under safeguards pursuant to a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency; or any equipment, materials or software or related technol- ogy that significantly contributes to the design, manufacture or delivery of a BCN weapon without lawful authorisation and with the intention that it will be used for such purpose. Subject to punishment is also a person who threatens to commit any of the offences or unlawfully and intentionally causes any person to receive such a threat, under circumstances which indicate that the threat is credible (Article 1(3)). The penalty is also applicable to assistance. Article 1(5)(b) states that the following are offences, when committed intentionally: contributing in any other way to the com- mission of one or more offences by a group of persons acting with a common purpose, and such contribution shall either: be made with the aim of furthering

Internal Security, July–December 201 Tomasz Aleksandrowicz the general criminal activity or purpose of the group, where such activity or purpose involves the commission of an offence; or is made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit an offence. Intentional accompliceship is also considered a crime (Article 1(4)(b): Any person also commits an offence if that person unlaw- fully and intentionally assists another person to evade investigation, prosecution or punishment, knowing that the person has committed an act that constitutes an offence, or that the person is wanted for criminal prosecution by law enforce- ment authorities for such an offence or has been sentenced for such an offence. Not only an attempted offence (Article 1(4)(a)), but also preparation when agreeing with one or more other persons to commit an offence (Article 1(5)(a)) is punishable. As far as phenomenal forms are concerned, the Beijing Convention introduces criminalisation of executive perpetration (Article 1(4)(b): Any person also commits an offence if that person organises or directs others to commit an offence. It should be noted that the provisions concerning threats, preparation, accom- pliceship, abetting, assistance and accessory are regulated in identical terms in both the Beijing Convention and the Beijing Protocol. The Beijing Protocol — apart from the unification of the above issues with the Beijing Convention — extends the scope of the offence of hijacking of an air- craft. Above all, this offence can be committed not only when the aircraft is in flight, but — a much broader concept — also when it is in service. Article 1(1) of the Protocol clearly states that any person commits an offence if that person unlaw- fully and intentionally seizes or exercises control of an aircraft in service by force or threat thereof, or by coercion, or by any other form of intimidation, or by any technological means. As Jan Walulik points out that this means that the place where the offence was committed is no longer restricted to the aircraft and that the seizure and exer- cise of control can be carried out not only by various forms of violence, but also by technical means.18 The introduction of such a solution is undoubtedly a response to the threat of remote control over the aircraft, e.g. in the form of hacking into the computer system and blocking the possibility of pilots taking action. In concluding this brief review of the scope of the regulations in question, one cannot overlook the fact that both the convention and the protocol introduce the same ‘Al Qaeda’ clause,19 that is, the rules governing the liability of collective entities (Article 4 of the Convention and Article 4 of the Protocol): 1. Each State Party, in accordance with its national legal principles, may take the necessary measures to enable a legal entity located in its territory or organ- ized under its laws to be held liable when a person responsible for management or control of that legal entity has, in that capacity, committed an offence set forth in Article 1. Such liability may be criminal, civil or administrative.

18 Walulik J, Po reformie pekińskiej — zakres kryminalizacji i wskazania dla ustawodawcy polskiego Galicki Z, Ewolucja konwencji tokijskiej — od Tokio do Pekinu, [in:] Galicki Z, Myszona-Kostrzewa K (Eds), 50 lat konwencji tokijskiej …, op. cit., p. 250. 19 The term ‘Al Qaeda clause’ has already gained citizenship in Polish- and English-lan- guage scientific literature. See: Kuc O, Klauzula Al Kaidy: bezpieczeństwo żeglugi powietrznej a odpowiedzialność podmiotów zbiorowych, [in:] Galicki Z, Myszona-Kostrzewa K (Eds), 50 lat konwencji tokijskiej…, op. cit., pp. 75–84.

202 Internal Security, July–December Beijing Convention and Beijing Protocol. Changes in the International and Legal Model…

2. Such liability is incurred without prejudice to the criminal liability of individuals having committed the offences. 3. If a State Party takes the necessary measures to make a legal entity liable in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article, it shall endeavour to ensure that the applicable criminal, civil or administrative sanctions are effective, propor- tionate and dissuasive. Such sanctions may include monetary sanctions. The primary sources note in this context that the ratio legis of the introduction of the ‘Al Qaeda’ clause into the international aviation terrorism regime is related to the desire to adapt it to the existing solutions in the fight against terrorism and organised crime. In this context, mention should be made of the provisions of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, already mentioned above, and of the Convention against Transnational Organised Crime.20 The ‘Al Qaeda’ clause in the Convention and the Beijing Protocol is equiva- lent (in the same wording) to Article 5 of the Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and Article 10 of the Convention against Transnational Organised Crime.21

Principles of the Beijing Convention and Protocol

The Beijing Convention, once it enters into force, will take precedence over the Montreal Convention and its Supplementary Protocol. In turn, the Beijing Pro- tocol will constitute a single instrument with the Hague Convention and both will have to be interpreted together.22 When analysing the principles of both documents and their mutual relations with the conventions in force, it should be noted that the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties apply here.23 This is because it is difficult to exclude a situation in which some states — parties to the existing conventions (i.e. the Hague and Montreal conventions) — do not join the Beijing Convention and the Beijing Protocol, and some states ratify them. International law is created and binding upon the will of states, so a given state is, as a rule, bound by those norms of international law in respect of which it has made a declaration of will to assume the obligations arising from them. This problem is solved by the pro- visions of Article 30 of the Law of the Treaties (Application of successive treaties

20 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations of 15 November 2000. Dz.U. 2005 No. 18, item 158. United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 2225, No. 39574. 21 See more: Kuc O, op. cit., p. 77ff. 22 See: Postępowy rozwój prawa międzynarodowego…, op. cit., p. 58; Galicki Z, Ewolucja konwencji tokijskiej — od Tokio do Pekinu, [in:] Galicki Z, Myszona-Kostrzewa K (Eds), 50 lat konwencji tokijskiej…, op. cit., p. 27; Walulik J, Po reformie pekińskiej — zakres kryminalizacji i wskazania dla ustawodawcy polskiego, [in:] Galicki Z, Myszona-Kostrzewa K (Eds), 50 lat konwencji tokijskiej…, op. cit., p. 241; Pekińska reforma lotniczego prawa karnego — geneza, istota, rekomendacje. Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny, Rok LXXV, 2013, Issue 3, p. 42. 23 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties developed in Vienna on 23May 1969, annex; United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 1155, No. 18232.

Internal Security, July–December 203 Tomasz Aleksandrowicz relating to the same subject-matter), in particular, paragraphs 3 and 4. The following provisions shall apply that when all of the parties to the earlier treaty are parties also to the later treaty but the earlier treaty is not terminated or suspended, the earlier treaty applies only to the extent that its provisions are compatible with those of the later treaty. When the parties to the later treaty do not include all of the parties to the earlier one: a) as between states parties to both treaties the same rule applies as in para- graph above; b) as between a state party to both treaties and a state party to only one of the treaties, the treaty to which both states are parties governs their mutual rights and obligations. The entry into force of the Beijing Convention and Protocol does not therefore imply an automatic repeal of the Hague and Montreal Conventions. The applica- tion of the old Roman principle according to which lex posteriori derogat legi priori is related to significant limitations in international law resulting, among others, from the principle par in parem non habet empire.24

Conclusions

The Beijing reform of international criminal aviation law is an almost academic example of a progressive development of international law that is dealt with when there is a gap in a positive international law which, due to the development of the international situation and, as in the present case, new threats to aviation security, requires the adoption of new regulations.25 This finding is confirmed by the pre- amble to the Beijing Convention, which explicitly states that new types of threats against civil aviation require new concerted efforts and policies of cooperation on the part of states; and in order to better address these threats, there is an urgent need to strengthen the legal framework for international cooperation in preventing and suppressing unlawful acts against civil aviation. The adoption of new international regulations analysed in this article has affected the establishment of the Tokyo-Hague-Montreal-Beijing system to combat aviation terrorism. The basic change consists in expanding the catalogue of acts subject to criminalisation, as well as in expanding the circle of persons deemed to be participating in or supporting actions consisting in committing acts that pose a threat to the security of civil aviation; this system also specifies the responsibility of collective entities (the so-called ‘Al Qaeda’ clause). As Marek Żylicz points out, ‘The new convention not only consolidates the pro- visions contained in the former convention and its protocol, but also contains a number of amendments aimed at extending the scope and increasing the effec- tiveness of the prosecution of all unlawful acts detrimental to the safety of air transport, airports and air navigation — other than the hijacking of aircraft. This

24 See more: Shaw M.N, Prawo międzynarodowe publiczne. Warsaw, 2006, pp. 535–536; Czapliński W, Wyrozumska A, Prawo międzynarodowe publiczne. Zagadnienia systemowe, 2nd edition. Warsaw, 2004, pp. 477–478. 25 See: Alekandrowicz T, Postępowy rozwój…, op. cit., pp. 48–49.

204 Internal Security, July–December Beijing Convention and Beijing Protocol. Changes in the International and Legal Model… takes into account the various activities of criminals using the latest technological developments. Liability shall also cover the various behaviours which encourage the preparation of unlawful acts or the concealment of offenders.’26 In conclusion, it should be emphasised that the system for combatting aviation terrorism constitutes a part of the entire international legal system for combatting terrorism, including the fight against its financing. The new regulations also make the system more coherent. It is also worth adding that the adoption of the Beijing Convention and the Beijing Protocol constitute a part of the implementation of the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy adopted by the United Nations.27 International practice will show whether the new regulations will also increase its effectiveness in prosecuting and punishing perpetrators of terrorist acts.

References

1. Aleksandrowicz T, Postępowy rozwój prawa międzynarodowego a bezpieczeń- stwo międzynarodowego lotnictwa cywilnego, [in:] Galicki Z, Myszona-Ko- strzewa K (Eds), 50 lat konwencji tokijskiej — bezpieczeństwo żeglugi lotniczej z perspektywy przestrzeni powietrznej i kosmicznej. Księga dedykowana Profe- sorowi Markowi Żyliczowi. Warsaw, 2014. 2. Aleksandrowicz T, Terroryzm międzynarodowy. Warsaw, 2015. 3. Aleksandrowicz T, Liedel K, Zwalczanie terroryzmu lotniczego. Wybrane zagad- nienia i źródła prawa międzynarodowego. Szczytno, 2010. 4. Biskup K, Bezpieczeństwo operacji lotniczych w dobie współczesnego świata. Studia z zakresu Prawa, Administracji i Zarządzania UKW, 2013, Vol. 3. 5. Galicki Z, Ewolucja konwencji tokijskiej — od Tokio do Pekinu, [in:] Galicki Z, Myszona-Kostrzewa K (Eds), 50 lat konwencji tokijskiej — bezpieczeństwo żeglugi lotniczej z perspektywy przestrzeni powietrznej i kosmicznej. Księga dedykowana Profesorowi Markowi Żyliczowi. Warsaw 2014. 6. Czapliński W, Wyrozumska A, Prawo międzynarodowe publiczne. Zagadnienia systemowe, 2nd edition. Warsaw, 2004. 7. Królikowski M, Wiliński P, Izydorczyk J, Podstawy prawa karnego międzynarodowego Warsaw 2008. 8. Kuc O, Klauzula Al Kaidy: bezpieczeństwo żeglugi powietrznej a odpowiedzialność podmiotów zbiorowych, [in:] Galicki Z, Myszona-Kostrzewa K (Eds), 50 lat konwencji tokijskiej — bezpieczeństwo żeglugi lotniczej z pers- pektywy przestrzeni powietrznej i kosmicznej. Księga dedykowana Profesorowi Markowi Żyliczowi. Warsaw 2014. 9. Myszona-Kostrzewa K, Bezpieczeństwo lotnictwa cywilnego w świetle prawa międzynarodowego. Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego, 2014, No. 11. 10. Shaw M.N, Prawo międzynarodowe publiczne. Warsaw, 2006. 11. Walulik J, Po reformie pekińskiej — zakres kryminalizacji i wskazania dla usta- wodawcy polskiego, [in:] Galicki Z, Myszona-Kostrzewa K (Eds), 50 lat konwencji

26 Żylicz M, op. cit., p. 85. 27 United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, UN Doc. A/RES/60/288, 20 Septem- ber 2006.

Internal Security, July–December 205 Tomasz Aleksandrowicz

tokijskiej — bezpieczeństwo żeglugi lotniczej z perspektywy przestrzeni powi- etrznej i kosmicznej. Księga dedykowana Profesorowi Markowi Żyliczowi. War- saw 2014. 12. Walulik J, Pekińska reforma lotniczego prawa karnego — geneza, istota, reko- mendacje. Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny, Rok LXXV, 2013, Issue 3. 13. Żylicz M, Prawo lotnicze międzynarodowe, europejskie i krajowe, 2nd edition. Warsaw, 2011. 14. Konwencja o przestępstwach i niektórych innych czynach popełnionych na pokładzie statku powietrznego, signed in Tokyo on 14 September 1963. Dz.U. 1971, No. 15, item 147, annex; (Convention on off ences and certain other acts committed on aircraft board). United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 704, No. 10106, ICAO Doc 8364. 15. Konwencja o zwalczaniu bezprawnego zawładnięcia statkami powietrznymi, signed in the Hague on 16 December 1970. Dz.U. 1972, No. 25, item 181, annex; (Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft). United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 860, No. 1235, ICAO Doc 8920. 16. Konwencja o zwalczaniu bezprawnych czynów skierowanych przeciwko bezpieczeństwu lotnictwa cywilnego, developed in Montreal on 23 September 1971. Dz.U. 1976, No. 8, item 37, annex, (Convention for the Suppression of Un- lawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation). United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 974, No. 14118, ICAO Doc 8966. 17. Protokół o zwalczaniu bezprawnych czynów przemocy w portach lotniczych obsługujących międzynarodowe lotnictwo cywilne, developed in Montreal on 24 February 1988, supplementing Konwencję o zwalczaniu bezprawnych czynów przeciwko bezpieczeństwu lotnictwa cywilnego, signed in Montreal on 23 September 1971. Dz.U. 2006, No. 48 item 348, (Protocol for the Suppres- sion of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation). United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 1589, No. 14118, ICAO Doc 9518l. 18. Międzynarodowa Konwencja o zwalczaniu fi nansowania terroryzmu przyjęta przez Zgromadzenie Ogólne Narodów Zjednoczonych dnia 9 grudnia 1999. Dz.U. 2003, No. 269, item 2619; (International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in resolution 54/109 of 9 December 1999). United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 2178, No. 38349. 19. Konwencja Narodów Zjednoczonych przeciwko międzynarodowej przestępczości zorganizowanej, przyjęta przez Zgromadzenie Ogólne Narodów Zjednoczonych dnia 15 listopada 2000 r.. Dz.U. 2005 No. 18, item 158; (United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime). United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 2225 No. 39574. 20. Konwencja Wiedeńska o Prawie Traktatów sporządzona w Wiedniu dnia 23 maja 1969. Dz.U. 1990 No. 74, item 439, annex, (Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties). United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 1155, No. 18232. 21. Konwencja w sprawie zapobiegania i karaniaprzestępstw przeciwko osobom korzystającym z ochrony międzynarodowej, w tym przeciwko dyplomatom. Dz.U. 1983, No. 37, item 168, annex; (Convention on the Prevention and Punish-

206 Internal Security, July–December Beijing Convention and Beijing Protocol. Changes in the International and Legal Model…

ment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 14 Decem- ber 1973). United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 1035, No. 15410. 22. Międzynarodowa konwencja o walce z przestępstwem wzięcia zakładników. Dz.U. 2000, No. 106, item 1123, annex. 23. International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, adopted by the Gen- eral Assembly of the United Nations on 17 December 1979. United Nations Trea- ty Series, Vol. 1316, No. 21931. 24. Konwencja o ochronie fi zycznej materiałów jądrowych. Dz.U. 1989, No. 17, item 93, annex. 25. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, adopted at Vienna on 3 March 1980. United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 1456 No. 24631. 26. Konwencja w sprawie przeciwdziałania bezprawnym czynom przeciwko bezpieczeństwu żeglugi morskiej. Dz.U. 2000, No. 129, item 635, annex. 27. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, done at Rome on 10 March 1988. United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 1678, No. 20004. 28. Protokół o zwalczaniu bezprawnych czynów skierowanych przeciwko bezpieczeństwu platform umieszczonych na szelfie kontynentalnym. Dz.U. 2000, No. 22, item 211, annex. 29. Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Plat- forms located on the Continental Shelf, done at Rome on 10 March 1988. United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 1678, No. 20004. 30. Międzynarodowa konwencja w sprawie zwalczania terrorystycznych ataków bombowych. Dz.U. 2007, No. 66, item 438. 31. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 15 December 1997. United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 2149, No. 35517. 32. Convention on The Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civ- il Aviation done at Beijing on 10 September 2010, ICAO Doc 9960. Electronic source: https://www.icao.int/secretariat/legal/Pages/TreatyCollection.aspx 33. Protocol Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Sei- zure of Aircraft, done at Beijing on 10 September 2010, ICAO Doc 9959. Electron- ic source: https://www.icao.int/secretariat/legal/Pages/TreatyCollection.aspx. 34. United Nations Global Counter — Terrorism Strategy, UN Doc. A/RES/60/288, 20 September 2006.

About the Author

Tomasz Aleksandrowicz, Full Professor, Police Academy in Szczytno, Department of Internal Security. Former Dean of the Faculty of Administration of the Aleksander Gieysztor Academy of Humanities. Member of the Centre for Terrorism Research and the Institute of Information Analysis of Collegium Civitas in Warsaw. Former offi cer of the Polish secret service, member of the Advisory Team to the President of Poland, member of the Strategic Team of the National Security Review. Author of over 100 scientifi c papers on various aspects of national and international security, terrorism, information analysis theory. E-mail: [email protected].

Internal Security, July–December 207 Tomasz Aleksandrowicz

Streszczenie. Artykuł poświęcony jest kwestii pekińskiej reformy międzynarodowego prawa lotniczego karnego. Autor poddaje analizie dotychczas obowiązujące przepisy prawa międzynarodowego w tym zakresie konfrontując je z nowymi regulacjami prawnymi przyjętymi podczas konferencji Międzynarodowej Organizacji Lotnictwa Cywilnego (ICAO) w Pekinie w 2010 r. W rezultacie autor stwierdza, że podstawowa zmiana polega na rozszerzeniu katalogu czynów podlegających kryminalizacji, jak też rozszerzeniu kręgu osób uczestniczących czy też wspierających działania polegające na popełnianiu czynów stanowiących zagrożenie dla bezpieczeństwa lotnictwa cywilnego; w systemie tym znalazło się także miejsce dla określenia odpowiedzialności podmiotów zbiorowych (tzw. klauzula Al Kaidy). W przekonaniu autora zasadne jest zatem stwierdzenie o powstaniu systemu tokijsko — hasko — montrealsko — pekińskiego, który wpisuje się w cały prawnomiędzynarodowy system zwalczania terroryzmu, łącznie ze zwalczaniem jego finansowania. Nowe regulacje powodują także większą spójność tego systemu. Warto też dodać, że przyjęcie Konwencji Pekińskiej i Protokołu Pekińskiego stanowią część implementacji Globalnej Strategii Przeciwdziałania Terroryzmowi przyjętej przez Organizację Narodów Zjednoczonych.

Zusammenfassung. Der Artikel wurde der Reform des internationalen Luftfahrtstrafrechts in Peking gewidmet. Der Autor analysiert die in diesem Zusammenhang bestehenden Bestimmungen des Völkerrechts sowie konfrontiert sie mit den neuen gesetzlichen Bestimmungen, die auf der Konferenz der Internationalen Zivilluftfahrt-Organisation (ICAO) in Peking 2010 verabschiedet wurden. Infolgedessen stellt der Autor fest, dass die grundlegende Änderung darin besteht, den Katalog der Kriminalisierungsakte zu erweitern sowie den Personenkreis zu erweitern oder auch solche Aktivitäten zu unterstützen, die darin bestehen, Handlungen zu begehen, welche eine Bedrohung für die Sicherheit der Zivilluftfahrt darstellen. Dieses System enthält auch einen Ort, an dem die Haftung von kollektiven Einheiten definiert wird (die sogenannte Al-Qaida-Klausel). Nach Ansicht des Autors ist es daher gerechtfertigt zu sagen, dass das System Tokio-Haag-Montreal-Peking geschaffen wurde, das ein Teil des gesamten internationalen Rechtssystems zur Bekämpfung des Terrorismus einschließlich seiner Finanzierung wurde. Die neuen Vorschriften machen dieses System auch kohärenter. Es ist auch erwähnenswert, dass die Annahme des Pekinger Übereinkommens und des Pekinger Protokolls ein Teil der Umsetzung der von den Vereinten Nationen verabschiedeten globalen Strategie zur Terrorismusbekämpfung sind.

Резюме. Статья посвящена Пекинской реформе международного уголовного авиационного права. Автор анализирует существующие положения международного права в этой области и сравнивает их с новыми правовыми нормами, принятыми на конференции Международной организации гражданской авиации (ICAO) в Пекине в 2010 году. В связи с этим автор утверждает, что основное изменение заключается в расширении каталога деяний, подлежащих криминализации, а также в расширении круга лиц, участвующих или поддерживающих действия, связанные с совершением деяний, создающих угрозу безопасности гражданской авиации; система также включает определение ответственности коллективных субъектов (так называемая клаузула «Аль-Каиды»). В связи с этим автор убежден, что вполне оправданнной является система токио-хаско-монреальско-пекинской системы, котороя входит в состав всей международно-правовой системы борьбы с терроризмом, в том числе с его финансированием. Новые положения обеспечивают также более эффективную деятельность этой системы. Стоит также добавить, что принятие Пекинской конвенции и Пекинского протокола является частью процесса имплементации Глобальной контртерро- ристической стратегии, принятой Организацией Объединенных Наций.

208 Internal Security, July–December CYBERSECURITY

Cybercrime in Automotive Security in the 21th Century

Milan Marcinek ORCID: n/a Academy of the Police Force in Bratislava, Slovakia

Abstract. Intelligent transportation systems introduce smart technology to civil transportation infrastructure. Modern services depend on the use of information technology systems. Cybersecurity plays an important role in the ongoing development of information technology. Enhancing cybersecurity and protecting critical information infrastructures are essential to each national security. Nowadays, vehicles are equipped with electronic security systems that automatically call the emergency service operator in case of an accident. This safety system combines different technology in order to ensure vehicle safety. When you are unconscious, the system informs the rescuers where the accident happened. They arrive at the scene of the accident within a few minutes. The introduction of this system in vehicles results from Regulation (EU) 2015/758 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2015 on type-approval requirements for the deployment of the 112 on-board eCall system and amending Directive 2007/46/ EC. Nevertheless, there is concern that this could expose connected cars with their passengers to potential risks from online threats. Scientific development for the security of our vehicles has also raised the possibility of misuse of vehicle data. It is seen that e-threats have become the leading threats in the further deployment of e-services in the society of the 21st century. DOI: 10.5604/01.3001.0014.6694 http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0014.6694

Keywords: cybercrime, cybersecurity, crime, eCall, driver, electronic device, GPS, road, vehicle, driver, injury, safety, security

Introduction

The Internet has become one of the fastest-growing areas of the modern world. The demand for connectivity has led to the integration of computer technology into products that have usually functioned without it, such as cars and buildings. Cybercrime and cybersecurity are issues that can hardly be separated in an inter- connected environment1. The fact that the 2010 United Nations General Assembly resolution on cybersecurity addresses cybercrime as the major challenge under- lines this. Making the Internet safer protects the users, which has become crucial to the development of new services in government policy. Deterring cybercrime is an integral component of a national cybersecurity and critical information infra- structure protection strategy. In particular, it includes the adoption of appropriate

1 Cybercrime often has an international dimension. The term cybercrime defines a range of offences, not only traditional computer crime. It also covers offences with any relation to networks and also single computer systems. It is activity in which computers or networks are targets of criminal activities.

Internal Security, July–December 209 Milan Marcinek legislation against the misuse of the intelligent transport system for criminal or other purposes and activities intended to affect the integrity of national critical infrastructures. At the national level, this responsibility required coordinated action related to prevention, preparation, response and recovery from incidents on the part of government authorities, the private sector and citizens. At the international level, this entails cooperation and coordination with relevant partners. The formula- tion and implementation of a national framework and strategy for cybersecurity thus requires a comprehensive approach. Cybersecurity strategies help to reduce the risk of cybercrime. The development and support of cybersecurity strategies are a vital element in the fight against cybercrime. The legal, technical and institutional challenges posed by the issue of cybersecurity are global and far-reaching, and can only be addressed through a coherent strategy taking into account the role of different stakeholders and exist- ing initiatives, within a framework of international cooperation. The World Summit on the Information Society recognised the real and significant risks posed by inad- equate cybersecurity and the proliferation of cybercrime. The Global Cybersecurity Agenda has seven main strategic goals, built on five work areas: • Legal measures — focuses on how to address the legislative challenges posed by criminal activities committed over ICT networks in an internation- ally compatible manner. • Technical and procedural measures — focuses on key measures to promote the adoption of enhanced approaches to improve security and risk manage- ment in cyberspace, including accreditation schemes, protocols and standards. • Organisational structures — focuses on the prevention, detection, response to and crisis management of cyberattacks, including the protection of criti- cal information infrastructure systems. • Capacity building — focuses on elaborating strategies for capacity-building mechanisms to raise awareness, transfer know-how and boost cybersecurity on the national policy agenda. • International cooperation — focuses on international cooperation, dialogue and coordination in dealing with cyberthreats2. As it seems, a comprehensive approach against cybercrime is needed. Consider- ing only the technical measures, any crimes cannot be prevented. International cooperation, such as international dialogues, cooperation and coordination in deal- ing with possible future cyberthreats in this area is also crucial. Sufficient legislation and a legal framework is an essential part of each cybersecurity strategy.

eCall System

Among the intelligent transport systems, eCall consists of information and com- munication technology located either in a vehicle or transport infrastructure. It serves to optimise and manage road transport, increase road safety and continuity,

2 Electronic source: www.itu.int/osg/csd/cybersecurity/gca/pillars-goals/index.html, ac- cessed: 2.05.2019.

210 Internal Security, July–December Cybercrime in Automotive Security in the 21th Century improve the management and maintenance of roads, improve public transport services and reduce the negative impact on the environment. It provides transmis- sion, collecting, processing and exchange of information among service providers, traffic information providers and transport infrastructure users.3 The eCall system is a European initiative intended to bring rapid assistance to motorists involved in a collision anywhere in the European Union. The eCall system is mandatory in all new cars within the EU after April 2018. The concept of eCall was presented in 1999 by European civil servant Luc Tytgat, at the launching of the Galileo project, by the European Commission. The year before, 170 experts met in Brussels, invited by the Commission, to analyse the European dependence on the American GPS system, and also to gather civilian applications/propositions.4 As it seems, these plans aim at the mandatory introduc- tion of eCall across the EU. In general, all new models of passenger cars and light commercial vehicles will be equipped with the eCall system as well as the necessary infrastructure in order to properly receive and process eCall. Data obtained through eCall enable rescue services to provide assistance to drivers and passengers faster. The European Commission introduced eCall, a groundbreaking initiative intended to bring rapid and automatic assistance to motorists involved in incidents anywhere in the European Union. Industry coalitions such as ERTICO, Europe’s Intelligent Transportation System organisation, European Member States and ITS industry leaders around the globe are working hard to develop and deploy new technologies and strategies to meet the eCall challenge. To meet the challenge of developing a Pan-European eCall program, ERTICO and its member organisa- tions supported the EU-funded Harmonised eCall European Pilot programmes, also known as HeERO. The HeERO 1, HeERO 2 and iHeERO programmes began in 2011 and will continue. They contain interoperable eCall programs in all participating EU regions, which are synchronised across country and network borders. Due to HeERO, eCall has been successfully pre-deployed in several regions according to European Norms using 112 as the pan-European PSAP emergency call number. A 112-based emergency call relies on an automatically established two-way emergency call to a Public Safety Answering Point (PSAP) call centre immediately following an incident or after man- ual activation. The Cinterion Machine-to-Machine (M2M) module solution reliably sends the collected MSD to a PSAP via cellular networks. In addition, the module establishes an automatic hands-free voice call so PSAP staff can gather additional information from the involved passengers. The call helps determine what emer- gency services are needed so early responders arrive at the scene of an incident fully informed and prepared to help as needed.5

3 Marcinek M, Simulation of crisis situations of the national and international crisis management system as a support for crisis managers’ education, [in:] Nehody s hromadným postihnutím osôb. International Congress. Žilina, 2011, pp. 33–35. 4 Marcinek M, Linka tiesňového volania eCall v podmienkach Slovenskej republiky. The emergency line eCall in the Slovak Republic, [in:] Bezpečnostné fórum 2015. I. Zväzok: zborník vedeckých prác. Banská Bystrica, 2015, pp. 161–165. 5 The European Commission estimates that eCall is expected to reduce emergency response times by 50% in rural areas and 40% in urban areas.

Internal Security, July–December 211 Milan Marcinek

eCall works on an upgraded Europe-wide interoperable PSAP infrastructure, and is installed or embedded in M2M communication devices in all vehicles. In the event of a serious road incident, the In-Vehicle Equipment (IVE) must be able to automatically dial 112 and reliably communicate incident details over wireless networks. These details are collectively defined as the minimum set of data (MSD) and include: • time of the incident, • cause of activation, • GPS coordinates, and • VIN.6 eCall can also be activated manually. The mobile network operator (MNO) identifies that the 112 call is an eCall from the ‘eCall flag’ inserted by the vehicle’s communications module. The MNO handles the eCall like any other 112 call and routes the call to the most appropriate emergency response centre — Public Safety Answering Point (PSAP). The PSAP operator will receive both the voice call and the MSD. The information provided by the MSD will be decoded and displayed on the PSAP operator screen. At the same time, the operator will be able to hear what is happening in the vehicle and talk with the occupants of the vehicle if pos- sible. This will help the operator ascertain which emergency services are needed at the accident scene (ambulance, fire, police) and rapidly dispatch the alert and all relevant information to the right service(s). The European standards do not specify whether eCall is provided by using an embedded network access device (GSM mod- ule) or using nomadic or portable equipment, i.e. mobile phone, however, in the pan European eCall operating requirements, it is defined that: • the solution is robust and will normally survive a crash; • the quality of service of the in-vehicle equipment, including communica- tions equipment, is reliable.7

Data Protection in-Vehicle Systems

On 26 November 2012, the European Commission produced a draft Regulation regarding the ‘harmonised provision for an interoperable EU-wide eCall’ to take place by 1 October 2015.8 Some EU countries initiated a discussion regarding the impact eCall would have on privacy and data protection. Moreover, other discussions dealt with mandatory installation of Event Data Recorders (EDR). This gadget is known as a black box, and especially in the context of aircraft, as a flight

6 Marcinek M, Euro-NCAP a simulácie nárazov automobilov — crashtesty, [in:] Rozvoj teórie bezpečnostných rizík a tvorba krízových scenárov [elektronický zdroj]. Zborník z kon- ferencie s medzinárodnou účasťou, ktorá je súčasťou plnenia integrovanej vedeckovýskumnej úlohy A PZ v Bratislave, 5.12.2013. Akadémia Policajného zboru v Bratislave. Bratislava, 2014, pp. 210–214. 7 The most reliable solution is a fully embedded system with an embedded GSM module, embedded SIM, and the ability to manage the devices over the air. 8 European Union, Draft Regulation No. 305/2013. Electronic source: http://eur-lex.europa. eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32013R0305&from=EN, accessed: 14.11.2019.

212 Internal Security, July–December Cybercrime in Automotive Security in the 21th Century data recorder. In the car, the term may be similar to the term with a camera. None- theless, there really is a black car box that records your every move. It contains important information about the course of the journey, when we use a flight accident as an example, which can reveal what has happened. Truthfully, EDR has existed in cars for a longer time. It served mainly as a source of information for airbags in order to activate them. Consequently, the unit improved and began to collect a lot of other information. Nowadays, we can learn not only vehicle’s speed and location, but also the pedal positions and the position of the steering wheel. As an example, in the United States, there is mandatory deployment of EDR units for cars. Some manufacturers have already put EDR into their cars in Europe. Certainly, the companies do not discuss this integrated mystery. The problem with EDR is also how to access the data. This requires not only special hardware and soft- ware, but also real knowledge of the issue.9 EDR is probably installed in most modern cars. The data are collected only for automakers to help them improve the vehicles. It is also essential to explain the important distinction between eCall and EDR. While the eCall system may not record the location of the car constantly, EDR does have that capability. There are concerns that the EDR’s ability to gather extensive data can and will be misused, as: • the data could be accessed by hackers to track an individual’s location. • insurance companies can use this to promote personalised insurance quotes by recording how individuals drive. • police forces have already started using eCall systems to track suspicious motorists. The European Commission has stated that the purpose of eCall is to help miti- gate the consequences of serious road accidents across the EU.10 Both systems are, however, similar to each other. Naturally, there are differences between eCall and EDR. The eCall system has been designed to send in-vehicle emergency calls using the EU emergency tel- ephone number: 112. EDR is fitted in vehicles when they are manufactured. The eCall system may be installed after that. EDR can also not be switched off once it is installed in the vehicle. It is important to note that technology similar to eCall can already be purchased by individuals if they wish to voluntarily install it in their vehicle. The European Commission has stated that the MSD includes the exact loca- tion of the crash, time and vehicle description.11 According to a report by the European Telecommunications Standards Institute, the MSD also includes the driving direction resulting from accurate satellite-based data.12 This data is necessary in order to enable the emergency services to assess

9 In some US states, EDR data may be used to investigate an accident in a court, some of which may be used without the consent of the owner of the vehicle. In Europe, however, such a possibility does not yet exist, even though this theme is becoming more widely discussed. 10 The European Commission, eCall: automated emergency call for road accidents manda- tory in cars from 2015. Electronic source: http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/kallas/ headlines/news/2013/06/ecall_en.htm, accessed: 15.09.2019. 11 European Commission. Electronic source: http://www.imobilitysupport.eu/ecall/, ac- cessed: 15.09.2019. 12 ETSI, What is eCall? Electronic source: www.ietf.org/proceedings/87/slides/slides-87- ecrit-1.ppt, accessed: 15.09.2019.

Internal Security, July–December 213 Milan Marcinek the seriousness of the accident. Additionally, the report states that the EDR will record for 20 seconds before the accident and 10 seconds after. The European Com- mission has not made any remarks regarding what recording will take place before and after an event. The opinions say that it is unclear whether or not this data will be included in the MSD as standard. If the MSD does include data before and after the incident, this means that the EDR is not passive. In order to obtain data prior to the incident, the EDR must be recording and erasing continuously. As the EDR has the ability to record the vehicle’s exact location, if it is hacked, detailed informa- tion about the driver’s location and journey details would then be available.13 The information in the MSD lets the emergency services know the exact location of the vehicle.14 The European Commission has called for eCall devices to be fitted in all new types of passenger and light commercial vehicles, such as small vans, with the Commission estimating that ‘2033 will see full penetration of the technology.’15 As a result, the use of EDR and eCall will become a mandatory part of vehicles, as, once it has been installed drivers, will be unable to remove the technology. EDR can also not be switched off once they have been installed in the vehicle.

Conclusions

The simple definition of cyber crime is ‘crimes directed at a computer or a com- puter system’. The nature of cyber crime, however, is far more complex. It may appear from different sources. However, one thing remains the same. It is data, not the system that is its target. Investigating crimes against data means we have to investigate the crime scene: the computer system. That is the place where we col- lect the evidence of the crime against the data. To find a starting point, though, it may be difficult compared to other forms of crime, i.e. burglary, murder, theft etc. Moreover, we may find that there are few good clues to start with. There may be no obvious signs. Another aspect of cybercrime is that nobody wants to admit that it has happened to them. Statistically, computer criminals have less than a 1% chance of being caught, prosecuted, and convicted of their deeds. That does not mean that we cannot fight against this crime effectively. It only means that we have to work smarter and harder. Cyber crime can result in confidential information

13 According to an article in The Sunday Times, this type of data has already been used by the police to track motorists. It states that some INTERPOL members are using the eCall system for surveillance operations. 14 Confusingly, there appears to be differing statistics available from the European Com- mission on how effective eCall could be. One estimate notes that when fully deployed, eCall could save up to 2,500 lives a year, ease the severity of road injuries and reduce congestion due to speeding up emergency response times by 40% in urban areas and 50% in the coun- tryside. However, an alternative European Commission estimate is that eCall could save up to 747 lives each year once fully deployed and that emergency response times in urban areas will increase by 60%. 15 European Scrutiny Committee, Twelfth Report of Session 2013–14. Electronic source: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmeuleg/83-xii/8310.htm, accessed: 13.08.2019.

214 Internal Security, July–December Cybercrime in Automotive Security in the 21th Century being compromised; affecting the price of the victim’s publicly traded shares. It can be an attack on a corporation’s marketing information, causing misinformation to be communicated to the sales force. Misinformation is an element of intelligence that has application in the business world. It consists of altering or creating informa- tion to give a false impression about a target’s activities, financial situation, or future plans. Safety has become a top interest for both new-car manufacturers and custom- ers. Car manufacturers have been developing technology to help prevent accidents and significantly reduce the risk of injury and death in the event that you are involved in a collision. It is important that your vehicle can provide you with maxi- mum protection in an accident. How safe a car is can be determined by a number of factors. Following the measures foreseen in the Transport White Paper 2001, the situation of road safety has improved. Road fatalities have declined by more than 19 % since 2013 in the EU. However, with thousands of deaths and millions injured, roads remain the least safe mode of transport. New vehicle technology offers potential benefits, but the driver is a critical factor, especially among teens and older drivers. Vehicle safety features have become a part of almost every car model. Car manufacturers have integrated different safety system units in order to provide occupant protection. There are also systems for theft protection. One single unit is installed with some improvisations in order to make it impossible for the thieves to disable these systems. Furthermore, new visions plan new technologies that would reduce the deaths and injuries caused by road accidents. One of the goals is to integrate advanced technology into cars to prevent driving accidents caused by alcohol. Sensors in the car’s seats and gearshift will detect alcohol through the driver’s perspiration and prevent the vehicle from being driven. Additionally, a camera will watch the driver’s eyes. If it detects signs of drowsiness or drunkenness, the car will issue a voice alert to the driver and tighten the seat belt as a wake-up call. While this futuristic concept car may not be hitting the highways just yet, it is interesting to see what future will bring in car security systems in order to prevent external threats on the roads. Finally, no connected computer system is 100% guaranteed secure in terms of invulnerability and the integrity of the data it holds. Some of the risk can be balanced by allocating security resources to where it is needed most at any given period. Identifying the motivating factors behind cyber-attacks can prove an effective toll in countering cyber-crime. For the automotive sector, such motives might include, i.e. access to online automotive apps and services that contain banking records, general personal identification data as social media usernames and passwords, insurance and tax data useful for identity theft or international travel permits etc. These motives may also include illegal access to intellectual property, sabotage or degrading of vehicle and connected system performance, terrorism with disabling vehicles as part of an attack, and vehicle identification re-assignment in the case of stolen cars. A series of events should be proposed to identify these common challenges and threats in the modern automotive indus- try and cybersecurity’s issues in transport. However, these events should provide an environment to encourage mutual cooperation and research within the industry in order to provide safety, security and innovation in the 21st century.

Internal Security, July–December 215 Milan Marcinek References

1. Commission Staff Working Paper, Impact Assessment, Accompanying the docu- ment, Commission Recommendation on support for an EU-wide eCall service in electronic communication networks for thetransmission of in-vehicle emer- gency calls based on 112 (‘eCalls’). Brussels, 8.9 2011. 2. eCall — saving lives through in-vehicle communication technology, General fact sheet 49. European Commission, October 2011. 3. Electronic source: ec.europa.eu/information_society/activities/esafety/ecallstan- dards 4. Electronic source: http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/kallas/headlines/ news/2013/06/ecall_en.htm 5. Electronic source: http://ec.europa.eu/transport/road_safety/projects/doc/ve- ronica2_fi nal_report.pdf 6. Electronic source: ht t p : / / e u r - l e x . e u r o p a . e u / l e g a l - c o n t e n t / E N / A L L / ? u r i = C E L E X : 52 0 0 9 D C 0 4 3 4 7. Electronic source: www.itu.int/osg/spu/spam/legislation/Background_Paper_ ITU_Bueti_Survey.pdf 8. Electronic source:www.prime-project.eu/community/furtherreading/studies/ IDTheftFIN.pdf 9. Environment and E-Application Department, ITU Telecommunication Develop- ment Bureau., September, 2012 10. ETS 185 — Convention on Cybercrime Environment and E-Application Depart- ment, ITU Telecommunication Development Bureau, September, 2012. 11. Gercke M, Understanding cybercrime: phenomena, challenges and legal re- sponse, Understanding cybercrime: phenomena, challenges and legal response, 12. Marcinek M, Dworzecki J, General Vehicle Safety Systems overview: chapter I, [in:] Safety Engineering: Selected Aspects.New York: Iglobal Writer Inc., Pro Pomerania Foundation Poland, 2014. 13. Marcinek M, Dworzecki J, Technical Aspects of use of Selected Specialist Equip- ment Intended for Road-Side Rescuing, 1. Edition. New York: Iglobal Writer Inc., Pro Pomerania Foundation Poland, 2015. 14. Marcinek M, Euro-NCAP a simulácie nárazov automobilov — crashtesty, [in:] Rozvoj teórie bezpečnostných rizík a tvorba krízových scenárov [elektronický zdroj]. Zborník z konferencie s medzinárodnou účasťou, ktorá je súčasťou plne- nia integrovanej vedeckovýskumnej úlohy A PZ v Bratislave, 5.12.2013. Aka- démia Policajného zboru v Bratislave. Bratislava, 2014. 15. Marcinek M, Linka tiesňového volania eCall v podmienkach Slovenskej repub- liky. The emergency line eCall in the Slovak Republic, [in:] Bezpečnostné fórum 2015. I. Zväzok: zborník vedeckých prác. Banská Bystrica, 2015. 16. Marcinek M, Simulation of crisis situations of the national and international crisis management as a support for crisis managers’ education, [in:] Nehody s hromadným postihnutím osôb. International Congress. Žilina, 2011. 17. The EU legislation in the Directive 2012/36/EU.

216 Internal Security, July–December Cybercrime in Automotive Security in the 21th Century

About the Author

Milan Marcinek, Ing, PhD. has been a lecturer at the Department of Public Administration and Crisis Management at the Police Academy in Bratislava since 2009. He has been the author and coauthor of several academic publications, exercises books, studies, articles and research projects in Slovakia and abroad. He has over 20-year experience in the fi eld of security and protection. He is a holder of various certifi cates and attestations as a specialist and crisis manager in Slovakia and abroad. E-mail:

Streszczenie. Inteligentne systemy transportowe wdrażają inteligentną technologię do infrastruktury transportu cywilnego. Nowoczesne usługi są uzależnione od wykorzystania systemów informatycznych. Bezpieczeństwo cybernetyczne odgrywa ważną rolę w ciągłym rozwoju technologii informatycznych. Wzmocnienie bezpieczeństwa cybernetycznego i ochrona krytycznej infrastruktury informatycznej mają zasadnicze znaczenie dla bezpieczeństwa każdego kraju. Obecnie pojazdy są wyposażone w elektroniczne systemy zabezpieczeń, które w razie wypadku automatycznie wzywają operatora pogotowia ratunkowego. Ten system bezpieczeństwa łączy w sobie różne technologie w celu zapewnienia bezpieczeństwa pojazdu. W przypadku utraty przytomności, system informuje ratowników o miejscu wypadku. Docierają oni na miejsce wypadku w ciągu kilku minut. Wprowadzenie tego systemu w pojazdach wynika z rozporządzenia Parlamentu Europejskiego i Rady (UE) 2015/758 z dnia 29 kwietnia 2015 r. w sprawie wymogów dotyczących homologacji w odniesieniu do wdrożenia pokładowego systemu eCall 112 i zmieniającego dyrektywę 2007/46/WE. Niemniej jednak istnieje obawa, że takie powiązanie samochodów z ich użytkownikami może narazić ich na ryzyko związane z zagrożeniami internetowymi. Postęp technologiczny w zakresie bezpieczeństwa naszych pojazdów spowodował pojawienie się możliwości niewłaściwego wykorzystania danych dotyczących pojazdów. Zagrożenia elektroniczne stały się głównymi zagrożeniami podczas wdrażania e-usług w przestrzeni społecznej XXI wieku.

Zusammenfassung. Intelligente Transportsysteme implementieren intelligente Technologie in die zivile Verkehrsinfrastruktur. Moderne Dienstleistungen sind auf den Einsatz von Informationssystemen angewiesen. Cybersicherheit spielt eine wichtige Rolle bei der kontinuierlichen Weiterentwicklung der Informationstechnologien. Die Stärkung der Cybersicherheit und der Schutz kritischer Informationsinfrastrukturen sind für die Sicherheit eines jeden Landes unerlässlich. Derzeit sind die Fahrzeuge mit elektronischen Sicherheitssystemen ausgestattet, die im Falle eines Unfalls automatisch den Notdienstbetreiber anrufen. Dieses Sicherheitssystem kombiniert verschiedene Technologien, um die Fahrzeugsicherheit zu gewährleisten. Im Falle einer Bewusstlosigkeit informiert das System die Retter über den Unfallort. Sie treffen innerhalb weniger Minuten an der Unfallstelle ein. Die Einführung dieses Systems in Fahrzeugen ergibt sich aus der Verordnung (EU) 2015/758 des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates vom 29. April 2015 über die Typgenehmigungsanforderungen für die Umsetzung des bordeigenen eCall112-Systems und zur Änderung der Richtlinie 2007/46/EG (im Folgenden „Verordnung (EU) 2015/758‘). Es besteht jedoch die Befürchtung, dass eine solche Verbindung zwischen Autos und ihren Nutzern die Risiken im Zusammenhang mit Internet-Bedrohungen aussetzen könnte. Der technologische Fortschritt in der Sicherheit unserer Fahrzeuge hat dazu geführt, dass ein Missbrauch von Fahrzeugdaten möglich ist. Im Gegensatz dazu sind elektronische Bedrohungen bei der Einführung von E-Services in der Gesellschaft des 21. Jahrhunderts zu einer großen Gefahr geworden.

Резюме. Интеллектуальные транспортные системы внедряют интеллектуальные технологии в гражданскую транспортную инфраструктуру. Современные услуги зависят от использования информационных систем. Кибербезопасность играет важную роль в постоянном развитии информационных технологий. Укрепление кибер- безопасности и защита важнейшей информационной инфраструктуры имеют огромное значение для безопасности каждой страны. Сегодня автотранспорт оборудован электронными системами безопасности, которые автома- тически в случае возниконвения ДТП вызывают диспетчера скорой помощи. Эта система безопасности объединяет различные технологии для обеспечения безопасности транспортного средства. В случае потери сознания, система информирует о месте аварии спасателей, которые прибывают на место происшествия в течение нескольких минут. Внедрение этой системы в транспортных средствах является результатом принятия Европейским парламентом

Internal Security, July–December 217 Milan Marcinek

и Советом Регламента (ЕС) 2015/758 от 29 апреля 2015 года о стандартах сертификации для установки бортовой системы eCall 112 и о внесении поправок в Директиву 2007/46/EC. Тем не менее, существует опасение, что это может привести к тому, что данные о автомобилях и их владельцах будут подвергаться потенциальным рискам, связанным с онлайновыми угрозами. Научные разработки в области безопасности наших автомобилей также предполагают возможность незаконного использования данных о транспортном средстве. Оказывается, что э-угрозы стали ведущими видами опасности при внедрении э-услуг в общественном пространстве 21 века.

218 Internal Security, July–December NEW TECHNOLOGIES

Selected Security Information Systems

Jarosław Radosław Truchan ORCID: 0000-0002-7315-3580 Police Academy in Szczytno, Poland

Abstract. At present, one of the main areas ensuring the proper functioning of services responsible for security is ICT systems, which are used to obtain, store and process relevant information and to support the performance of statutory tasks. When carrying out their statutory tasks, the Polish police use centralised, advanced IT systems and databases, e.g. the National Police Information System (hereinafter referred to as the KSIP). At the same time, the development of technology generates the need to constantly modify this line of activity. The necessity of being adaptable to the ever-changing environment has encouraged the Police Academy in Szczytno and its partners to launch the project entitled: Information and analysis system to support risk management when planning and carrying out police operations (hereinafter referred to as the SIA). Innovative in nature, the project is being implemented based on, among others, expert interviews conducted among police commanding officers. The SIA is being built using the data collected and stored in the police ICT systems and obtained from other sources. The works will result in the development of a possibly full application with planning and decision-making mechanisms and forecasting algorithms, which will provide information on probable successes and necessary investments in possible scenarios of police activities to be undertaken in a specific situation of massive disturbance to public order and safety. The proposed solution is the IT system that serves both as a presentation and simulation of possible incidents in the virtual environment. The author presents the functioning of selected modern ICT systems, and their role and importance in supporting decision-making processes when ensuring public order and safety. DOI: 10.5604/01.3001.0014.6695 http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0014.6695

Keywords: information systems, analysis, strategy, leadership, security.

Introduction

A newly formed type of community, the information society, owing to the inten- sive development of technology in the second half of the twentieth century, is defined as a society in which information is a key element of any activity of the state and a main factor of change. Today, information is the most important element of any effective operation carried out by services responsible for state security, the police force included. IT solutions1, digital and satellite communications, GPS2, GIS3, advanced optoe- lectronics (night vision, infrared, etc.), directional microphones, detectors, scanners,

1 IT (Information Technology) — whole range of issues, methods, resources and activities related to processing information. 2 (GPS) Global Positioning System — full name: GPS–NAVSTAR (Global Positioning System — Navigation Signal Timing And Ranging) — a satellite navigation systems created by the United States Department of Defense, covering the entire globe. 3 (GIS) Geographic Information System — information system for entering, collecting, processing and visualising geographical data, one of the functions of which is to support

Internal Security, July–December 219 Jarosław Radosław Truchan sensors and Unmanned Flying Systems are modern technologies that have set- tled for good and still create today’s reality. They are effectively used by agencies responsible for the state security sector (e.g. the police) and the civil service. Why are we surrounded by modern technology? The answer is simple, with its help, we act more effectively, which saves time which can then be used to carry out the assigned tasks. Not only the security of the state but also the life and health of its citizens depend on the information and time of police response to incidents. Unfortunately, due to their creativity and uncontrolled access to modern technolo- gies, criminals already operate globally in the sphere of the information society. As a polysemantic concept, security is understood differently and […] ‘today there is basically no area of activity, either material or immaterial, in which security would not play an important role’4. Security is a state valued by the individual, nation and international community, and it is a superior value for people and states, and subject to special protection. The protection of security is provided for by Arti- cle 5 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2 April 19975, which states that: ‘The Republic of Poland guards the independence and inviolability of its territory, ensures freedom and human and civil rights and the safety of its citizens, guards its national heritage and ensures environmental protection, guided by the principle of sustainable development’. To carry out the aforementioned responsibilities, the Polish state has established many institutions. One of them is the police force, which is a uniformed and armed formation, whose officers serve and protect the community, and maintain public order and safety while performing their duties in accordance with the Police Act6, such as: • protection of life and health, and property against unlawful attacks on these goods, • protection of public order and safety, ensuring peace and quiet in public places and transport, in road traffic and waters for public use. The abovementioned police responsibilities are performed on the basis of avail- able forces and resources, among which the national and international ICT systems which occupy a prominent place.

Police and non-police information systems

Currently, a crucial role in the functioning of services responsible for security is played by ICT systems, whose effectiveness has a fundamental impact on officers’ access to the information based on which decisions are made in the due process of commanding. Police command is — ‘command — a commander’s targeted activity, car- ried out as part of police operations, ensuring a high capability for police forces and resources to achieve the target of the operations, which is characterised the decision-making process. 4 Kaczmarek J, Bezpieczeństwo. Myśl Wojskowa, 1998, Vol. 6, p. 5. 5 Dz.U. 1997 , No. 78, item 483. 6 Ustawa o Policji z dnia 6 kwietnia 1990. Dz.U. 1990 , No. 30, item 179 as amended.

220 Internal Security, July–December Selected Security Information Systems by particular decisions made by one man/woman who takes responsibility for them, and by the precise assignment of tasks that need to be performed and supervised’7. [Order No. 20 of the National Police Chief of 13 July 2020 on methods and forms of preparation and performance of police operations as regards emergencies]. Theoretically developed and verified in practice, command rules are general standards of rational conduct which determine the most reasonable (rational) methods of the activity of command and control centres (commanders and regular officers) while preparing and carrying out police operations. They are often a crite- rion for assessing the correctness of the operations carried out, and they are also a set of practical guidelines for choosing an appropriate method of acting. The knowledge of and compliance with them enable commanders to act effectively when protecting public order and safety, while the negligence of which may lead to operational failures, loss of property, and in extreme cases, loss of life of police officers or third parties8. Effective command can therefore be ensured nowadays through the use of mod- ern IT systems, which is strictly related to the current exchange of information. This applies to both international and national systems that use police and non- police databases. The multidimensional character of modern threats determines the need for such institutions as the police to have access to information from various institutions whose character is of less interest to the police. The main international security database is Interpol’s communications system, which provides the EU Member States (including Poland) and their officers with constant and fast communication and, at the same time, supports law enforcement agencies in their fight against all forms of crime. Another system used by the police is the Schengen Information System (here- inafter referred to as the SIS), in which certain legally defined categories of wanted persons and items are processed, whose records are entered into the system by the Schengen Member States. Building this system was a challenge because of the nature and type of the data collected, processed and made available. The introduction of the system was also a technical and legal challenge as it had to comply with the Member States’ legisla- tions. The SIS evolved and now its second generation is operational, which was introduced mainly owing to the enlargement of the Schengen area and for certain technical reasons, i.e. the quantity, capacity and quality of data. In Poland, of crucial importance is the National Police Information System (here- inafter referred to as the KSIP), which covers all police levels throughout the country. The KSIP is a source of information about: “1) persons suspected of committing indictable or fiscal offences, which is stored in the form of: a) a procedural record, b) an arrest record,

7 Zarządzenie Nr 20 Komendanta Głównego Policji z dnia 13 lipca 2020 w sprawie metod i form przygotowania i realizacji działań policyjnych w związku ze zdarzeniami szczególnymi. 8 Michniak J.W, Dowodzenie w operacjach antykryzysowych i połączonych. Warsaw, 2005, p. 66.

Internal Security, July–December 221 Jarosław Radosław Truchan

c) a wanted person record, d) a criminal record, e) an identity check record, f) a preventive or punitive measure record; 2) juveniles committing prohibited acts such as indictable or fiscal offences, which is stored in the form of: a) a procedural record, b) an arrest record, c) a wanted person record, d) a criminal record, e) an identity check record, f) a preventive or punitive measure record; 3) unidentified persons or persons attempting to hide their identity, as well as unidentified dead bodies, which is stored in the form of: a) a record of circumstances under which the N.N. person was discovered, b) a record of circumstances under which the N.N. dead body was disco- vered, c) an arrest record, d) a criminal record; 4) persons posing a threat, referred to in the Act on persons posing a threat, hereinafter referred to as ‘persons posing a threat’, which is stored in the form of: a) a criminal record of ‘a person under preventive supervision’, b) a criminal record of ‘a person placed in the National Centre for Prevent- ing Dissocial Behaviour’, c) an arrest record, d) an identity check record; 5) wanted persons hiding from law enforcement agencies and judicial authori- ties, which is stored in the form of: a) a wanted person record, b) an arrest record, c) an identity check record, d) a criminal record; 6) missing persons, which is stored in the form of: a) a search for a missing person record, b) an identity check record; 7) persons referred to in Article 10(1) of the Act on counter-terrorist operations, which is stored in the form of: a) a criminal record of a person under Article 10 section 1 point 1 of the Act on counter-terrorist operations, b) a criminal record of a person under Article 10 section 1 point 2 of the Act on counter-terrorist operations, c) a criminal record of a person under Article 10 section 1 point 3 of the Act on counter-terrorist operations, d) a criminal record of a person under Article 10 section 1 point 4 of the Act on counter-terrorist operations,

222 Internal Security, July–December Selected Security Information Systems

e) a criminal record of a person under Article 10 section 1 point 5 of the Act on counter-terrorist operations, f) an identity check record; 8) persons: a) indicated in an application filed under the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, agreed at The Hague on Octo- ber 25, 1980. (Dz.U. 1995, item 528, item 1999, item 1085), hereinafter referred to as ‘The 1980 Hague Convention’, who have abducted a per- son that is subject to parental authority or is taken care of, or who have detained or are hiding the person, hereinafter referred to as ‘persons abducting, detaining or hiding a juvenile within the meaning of the 1980 Hague Convention’, b) obliged by a court decision to remove a person that is subject to parental authority or is taken care of, in cases where the court or other authorised body has requested the police to establish the whereabouts of the person to be removed on the basis of the decision, hereinafter referred to as ‘persons obliged to remove a juvenile’, which is stored in the form of a search for a person record, specifying the purpose of the search as ‘Establishing the whereabouts of the abductor (detaining, hiding a juvenile or obliged to surrender the juvenile) in connection with parental abduction (The 1980 Hague Convention)’, and in the form of an identity check record; 9) kidnapped or detained juveniles within the meaning of the 1980 Hague Convention or subject to removal pursuant to the decision referred to in par- agraph 8(b), hereinafter referred to as ‘juveniles kidnapped or detained within the meaning of the 1980 Hague Convention or subject to removal pursuant to the court decision’, which is stored in the form of: a) a search for a missing person record, specifying the purpose of the search as ‘Establishing the whereabouts of a juvenile in connection with parental abduction (The 1980 Hague Convention)’, b) an identity check record; 10) persons arrested by the police as part of the exercise of police powers referred to in Article 15 (1) points 2–3 or Article 15a of the Police Act, includ- ing other persons than those specified in points 1–5, 7 and 11, which is stored in the form of an arrest record; 11) offenders of crimes against property, persons suspected of committing them and those found guilty and punished for the crimes, which is stored in the form of: a) an offender record, b) an arrest record, c) an identity check record”9, and also about ‘items, objects, documents, firearms, monuments (including works of art)’10.

9 Zarządzenie Nr 70 Komendanta Głównego Policji z dnia 2 grudnia 2019 w sprawie Krajowego Systemu Informacyjnego Policji. Dz.U. 2019, item 114. 10 Ibid.

Internal Security, July–December 223 Jarosław Radosław Truchan

The KSIP is the central police information system which became operational at the beginning of 2003. The KSIP ICT systems have the ability to cooperate with other systems made available to the police. Through the KSIP ICT systems, the police have access to databases such as SEWiK — Accident and Collision Records System, PRIM — Police Register of Major Events, Records — drivers violating road traffic reg- ulations, Weapons — Records of Lost Weapons, RDO — Register of Identity Cards. The KSIP ICT systems enable information to be obtained, collected and pro- cessed by means of data teletransmission, including personal data, from such databases as: “1) Central Database of Persons Deprived of Liberty, maintained under the pro- visions of the Act on Prison Service of 9 April 2010 (Dz. U. 2019, items 1427, 1608, 1635 and 2020), referred to in the KSIP as ‘Noe.NET’ or ‘Osadzony’; 2) Central Register of Drivers, maintained under the provisions of the Road Traffic Law; 3) Central Register of Vehicles, maintained under the provisions of the Road Traffic Law; 4) National Official Register of National Economy Entities, maintained under the Act on Public Statistics, called ‘REGON’ in the KSIP; 5) registers kept under the provisions of the Act on the population register of 24 September 2010 (Dz. U. 2019, item 1397), including the PESEL (Personal Identification Number) register and the register of residents, called ‘PESEL’ in the KSIP; 6) Register of Identity Cards, maintained under the provisions of the Act on Identity Cards of August 6, 2010 (Dz. U. 2019, items 653 and 730), called ‘RDO’ in the KSIP; 7) central register of issued and invalidated passports, kept under the provi- sions of the Act on passport documents of July 13, 2006 (Dz. U. 2018, item 1919 and 2019 item 730), called ‘CEWiUP’ in the KSIP; 8) Schengen Information System (SIS) within the meaning of Article 2(15) of the Act on the participation of the Republic of Poland in the Schengen Informa- tion System and the Visa Information System of 24 August 2007; 9) Visa Information System (VIS) within the meaning of Article 2(16) of the Act referred to in point 8; 10) Integrated Records System administered by the Border Guard and main- tained under the provisions of the Border Guard Act of 12 October 1990 (Dz. U. 2019, item 147, as amended, called ‘ZSE SG’ in the KSIP; 11) National Court Register kept under the provisions of the Act on the National Court Register of August 20, 1997 (Dz. U. 2019, items 1500, 1655 and 1798), called ‘KRS WWW’ in the KSIP; 12) national collection of registers, records and lists in matters of foreigners called ‘System POBYT’, kept under the provisions of the Act on foreigners of 13 December 2013 (Dz. U. 2018, items 2094 and 2399, and 2019, items 577 and 622); 13) registers in matters of local border traffic carried out under the provisions of the Act referred to in point 12, called ‘MRG WWW’ in the KSIP; 14) European Vehicle and Driving Licence Information System (EUCARIS) within the meaning of Article 15 of Council Decision 2008/616/JHA of 23 June

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2008 on the implementation of Decision 2008/615/JHA on increasing cross- border cooperation, particularly in combatting terrorism and cross-border crime (Dz. Urz. UE L 210 of 6 August 2008, p. 12) and enabling the exchange of information within the scope and under the rules set out in the provisions of Article 145j(1)(3) and (4) of the Police Act and Articles 80 to 80r of the Road Traffic Law; 15) databases of the International Criminal Police Organisation — Interpol, maintained under the rules established by the organisation, including the personal database (Nominal), Stolen and Lost Travel Documents Data- base (SLTD), Stolen Motor Vehicles Database (SMV) and Stolen Administrative Documents Database (SAD), called ‘Interpol’ in the KSIP; 16) Register of Sex Offenders, including the Register with restricted access referred to in the provisions of the Act on Counteracting Threats of Sex Crime of 13 May 2016 (Dz. U. 2018, item 405 and 2019, items 730 and 1820), referred to as ‘RSPTS’ in the KSIP; 17) central register of cases related to the performance of work by foreign- ers on the territory of the Republic of Poland, kept under the provisions of art. 90c of the Act of 20 April 2004 on employment promotion and labour market institutions (Dz. U. 2019, items 1482, 1622 and 1818), called the ‘Sys- tem of Monitoring of Work and Stay for Work of Foreigners on the Territory of the Republic of Poland’, called ‘MPPC’ in the KSIP; 18) register of yachts and other vessels of up to 24 m in length, kept under the provisions of the Act of 12 April 2018 on the registration of yachts and other vessels of up to 24 m in length (Dz. U. item 1137, and 2019, item 1716), called ‘REJA24’ in the KSIP; 19) databases on products and packaging and on waste management, main- tained under the provisions of the Act on waste of 14 December 2012 (Dz. U. 2019, items 701, 730, 1403 and 1579), called ‘BDO’ in the KSIP”11. Among the abovementioned systems, the following ones deserve special atten- tion: — Accident and Collision Records System (hereinafter referred to as the SEWiK) is a database operating within the KSIP, which is accessible to all police departments. The details collected in the SEWiK are used to obtain regular information about the state of road traffic safety. It is also possible to perform group analyses from the previous year or month, taking into account details such as the number of accidents and their consequences, types, causes, time and place of their occurrence, offenders and victims involved. The SEWiK ICT system is an application including such modules as the incident scene, vehicle description, persons involved and others. — Police Register of Major Events (hereinafter referred to as the PRIM), with collected details about major events and improvement of the effectiveness of threat recognition, as well as about the planning of forces and resources when such events are organised and policed. The Police Register of Major Events is an integral part of the National Police Information System and con- sists of such modules as: event, type, venue and organiser.

11 Zarządzenie Nr 70, op. cit.

Internal Security, July–December 225 Jarosław Radosław Truchan

— Command Support System (hereinafter referred to as the SWD) has, among others, such functions as: • processing recorded incidents, • processing operations — includes defining operations and other activi- ties related to the management of operational sources and resources, • sending messages to access points and collecting information about their readings and responses, • permanent and analytical reporting, and printouts, • roadblock support — includes defining, starting and monitoring the roadblock conditions, • checking items and persons in databases, • dispatching and briefing patrols for duty, • managing sources and resources — includes recording of forces and resources and monitoring their current state, • cooperation with other ICT systems. The basic information areas of the SWD include activities and instructions which contain details about police activities, among which there are the following: • incidents, • roadblocks, • operations. Moreover, the SWD includes a section for addresses and items containing information about provinces, towns, streets, numbers of buildings, properties and premises, facilities such as restaurants and cinemas, as well as a section for algo- rithms in the form of a catalogue of activities to be performed, a section for messages containing sent and received messages, and a section for checking ID and stor- ing data about people’s ID checks, item checks, vehicle and document checks. Central Register of Vehicles and Drivers Information System (hereinafter referred to as the CEPiK) is a database that contains information about vehicles registered in Poland. The system also collects details about drivers holding a Polish driving license. The CEPiK contains two registers: • Central Register of Vehicles (hereinafter referred to as the CEP), which contains vehicle details, information about vehicle documents, information about current and previous owners and holders of vehicles, information about de-registration or disposal of vehicles, information about compul- sory insurance, and information about vehicle technical inspection with the recorded state of the vehicle meter. • Central Driver’s Register (hereinafter referred to as the CEK), i.e. a database with information on persons who are licenced to drive motor vehicles, as well as per- sons who have their driving licence endorsed and persons with driving bans. It should be noted that there is a National Contact Point at the Central Register of Vehicles, which facilitates the exchange of information with relevant national contact points of other EU Member States and with national authorised entities — as regards details about vehicles and their owners or holders. Contact points provide information about drivers who have committed such traffic offences as fail- ure to comply with the speed limit, driving without a seat belt, carrying a child without a safety seat, failure to comply with traffic lights or signs to stop the vehicle, or driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs.

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The Polish police also uses the information system called the National Criminal Information Centre (hereinafter referred to as the KCIK) This system has three basic functions: • recording; involves collecting criminal information about committed crimes, perpetrators, items, entities, bank accounts and securities accounts that may be somehow related to a particular crime, • coordinating; involves generating information for the owner of a criminal record about the reading of a criminal record by another entity or about any modifications made to the record, • informative; involves processing orders and inquiries from authorised enti- ties based on the KCIK databases. To meet the expectations of the public, a tool has been created that allows for a clear presentation to local communities of the scale and type of threats and institutions responsible for ensuring public order and safety, which is known as the security threats map. Security threats maps should be treated as an impor- tant element of the public safety management process, implemented as part of an interinstitutional and social partnership. The maps are also to be used for the optimal allocation of service equipment and personnel resources, in particular, for making decisions on the creation of police stations and posts. The National Security Threats Map is based on information catalogued in the three following areas: • information stored in the police IT systems, • information obtained from the public at the meetings with citizens, rep- resentatives of local government, non-governmental organisations, etc., and during social debates on public safety, • information obtained from citizens (Internet users) using the information exchange platform. The information includes selected categories of crimes and minor offences, as well as threats which, subjectively perceived by residents, negatively affect their sense of security12.

Information and analysis system to support risk management when planning and carrying out police operations

The constant development of technology puts pressure on people to adapt themselves to the ever-changing environment. To meet new challenges, innovative solutions are needed. The consortium, composed of: • Police Academy in Szczytno, • War Studies University, • Naval Academy, • Institute of Security Technologies MORATEX, • Astri Polska Sp. z o.o. 12 Electronic source: http://www.policja.pl/pol/mapa-zagrozen-bezpiecze/33880,dok. html, accessed: 28.05.2020.

Internal Security, July–December 227 Jarosław Radosław Truchan

is involved in the implementation of the project entitled: Information and analy- sis system to support risk management when planning and carrying out police operations13 (the SIA). As an innovative undertaking, the project is being implemented, among others, on the basis of expert interviews conducted among police officers at the command levels of the West Pomerania, Pomerania and Podlasie provinces. The survey has showed that there is a need to implement modern ICT solutions. Therefore, the SIA is being built using data collected and stored in the ICT police systems, and obtained from other sources so that the works will result in a possibly full application with planning and decision-making mechanisms and forecasting algorithms, providing information on probable successes and necessary investments in possible scenarios of police activities undertaken in a specific situation of massive disturbance to pub- lic order and safety. The proposed solution is an IT system that functions both as a presentation and simulation of possible incidents in the virtual environment. The system will make it possible for users to compare operational situations by presenting the recommended forces and resources, methods and tactics of operation for particular scenarios, as well as by getting the user acquainted with the elements of security infrastructure (including the length, width and structure of the surface of passageways; entrances and exits to buildings; technical security elements). The system will also allow users to complete the data based on the infor- mation received from the field. While carrying out activities, the users will be able to introduce changes resulting from an actual course of action. Using historical data and algorithms developed on their basis, the system will compare the entered data with the historical and expert data and then display a message informing about recommended operations or similar previous operations and their results. In addition, the system will be fully modifiable and scalable, which will make it easier to be adapted to any further recipients’ needs. The system will cover, among other things, the operations’ planning of preven- tive activities, anti-terrorist operations, and will be equipped with a training module. The SIA will support the planning and performance of police activities in real- life and training conditions. On the basis of the initial situation introduced into the system, possible objects (police units, available resources, cooperating units), using basic scenarios of conducting operations by police forces, cooperating enti- ties, people and crowds, and based on the prepared event trees and scenarios, the system will support making decisions according to the adopted evaluation criteria or will make a comparison of organisational and tactical solutions proposed by the decision-maker. It will enable the development and evaluation of possible and justified scenarios of police units’ activities. It will include necessary geospatial information imported from the selected existing databases (including those con- cerning the control of ship movements). The system will provide users with: • assessment of a public order and safety situation, 13 The work has been carried out as part of the project entitled ‘Information and analysis system to support risk management when planning and carrying out police operations’, No. DOB-BIO7/02/01/2015. The project is financed by the National Centre for Research and De- velopment as part of the competition 7/2015 for the execution and financing of projects in the field of scientific research or development work for national defence and security.

228 Internal Security, July–December Selected Security Information Systems

• support in decisions to be made through accessible databases and models that facilitate assessment and forecasting of the situation in progress, • support in multi-criteria assessment of the situation and suggesting possible scenarios for solving decision-making problems faced by police units, • access to up-to-date and reliable information resources needed to make decisions, • opportunity to analyse the situation to identify and indicate the develop- ment of threats to public order and safety in the area of responsibility of the system user, • improvement of the quality of training offered to officers responsible for making decisions. The effect of the system’s work will be information on the risk of success and necessary investments in possible scenarios of police operations in a specific situation of a threat to public order and safety.

Figure 1. Information and analysis system elements

Source: Author’s own work

Given the above figure, the planning module includes all activities related to the response to a specific crisis situation and preparation of police operations to be carried out as regards preventive and counter-terrorist activities. The performance module includes current verification of planned operations, introduction of changes in the process of commanding a given operation consider- ing the changing situation, and updating planned operations considering their actual course. Activities related to the performance will be available to the activities of both riot control units and counter-terrorist squads. The training module comprehensively covers all aspects of the planning and per- formance of operations, and is accompanied by a moderator panel that makes it possible for users to add extra incident scenarios and introduce changes into the main incident, directly affecting the planned activities and forcing changes in currently made decisions. The training conducted in situations being very similar to real ones and immediate assessment of the method of commanding through the virtual envi- ronment’s response to the decisions made means that the trainees will immediately see the results of their good and bad decisions. The module will also allow the train- ees to check their knowledge and skills acquired based on relevant legal guidelines and procedures, and on coordination of operations, and mutual cooperation. The objective of the training is to improve police operations commanders’ practical skills when performing their duties at command posts. The essence

Internal Security, July–December 229 Jarosław Radosław Truchan of the training is to practice specific activities in accordance with the applicable procedures established for particular threats to public order and safety, undertaken by police operations commanders, as long as a certain degree of mastery is achieved to effectively deal with tactical or strategic situations. The training includes such aspects as: collecting and analysing information by the commander of a police operation, making operational calculations, variants of the methods of using forces and resources, performing covert assignments in the virtual area in terms of organ- ising and performing command, synchronising operations and improving skills in using technical means of command. All of the aforementioned system modules will be able to carry out typical spatial analyses, i.e. measurements of ranges, distances and areas. In addition, the system will allow trainees to carry out network analyses in the form of searching for the quickest route, classification of individual street sections according to their capacity, etc. The system will allow officers to develop a concept of security matrices that can be used in police operations oriented at the maintenance of public order and safety. It will increase the quality of training of officers responsible for making decisions by facilitating the assessment of decisions and activities undertaken by trainees, and their consequences, and will indicate rational operational scenarios in the given situation.

Conclusions

The development of modern technologies supporting the Polish police while performing their strategic assignments is interdisciplinary in nature and covers many aspects. Ensuring public order and safety is strictly related to the process of undergoing constant changes which mainly result from the continuous development of tech- nology and changes in international relations. Considering the above, the notion of state security is understood as the result achieved in the area of organised defence and protection against external and internal threats, defined as the ratio of defence potential to the scale of threats14. The article attempts to characterise selected applicable systems supporting police work, which have been identified by experts as reasonable to be imple- mented into the project entitled ‘Information and analysis system supporting risk management when planning and carrying out police operations’ (the SIA). The functional properties of the system make it applicable as a support tool for decision-makers (police operations commanders) while performing their activi- ties, enabling them to identify and reflect the sources and development of threats to public order and safety, as well as the activities of the available police resources, in the context of their assignments. It should be noted that the effectiveness of police operations depends largely on the rapid flow of information. Storing, processing and using information system resources properly are very important elements in ensuring public order and safety,

14 Wiśniewski B, Prońko J, Ogniwa ochrony państwa. Warsaw, 2003, p. 46.

230 Internal Security, July–December Selected Security Information Systems because the automated data flow and rapid exchange of information significantly improves the effectiveness of threat recognition, force and resource planning, and supports police services in analysing incidents. At the same time, it should be emphasised that the conducted research indicates the need for the utilitarian and subjective use of ICT systems. Therefore, in the author’s opinion, while performing activities targeted at ensuring public order and safety, it is justified to conduct research, considering the regional character of the phenomena, and create relevant research teams, which will enable reli- able results to be obtained which will determine the selection of adequate forces and resources while performing particular assignments.

References

1. Bogdalski P, Information and analysis system supporting risk manage- ment during the planning and implementation stage of Police activities — the essence and possibilities of use for teaching purposes. Internal Security, 2018, Vol. 10, Issue 1. 2. Electronic source: http://www.policja.pl/pol/aktualnosci/132771,Krajowa-Mapa- Zagrozen-Bezpieczenstwa-funkcjonuje-w-calej-Polsce.html 3. Electronic source: h t t p : / / w w w . p o l i c j a . p l / p o l / m a p a - z a g r o z e n - b e z p i e c z e / 3 3 8 80,dok . h t m l 4. Kaczmarek J, Bezpieczeństwo. Myśl Wojskowa, Vol. 6, 1998. 5. Michniak J.W, Dowodzenie w operacjach antykryzysowych i połączonych. War- saw, 2005. 6. Nepelski M, Struniawski J (Eds), Zarządzanie bezpieczeństwem imprez masowych i zgromadzeń publicznych. Tom 2 — wymiar organizacyjno-praktyc- zny. Szczytno: Wyższa Szkoła Policji, 2016. 7. Oszywa W, Urządzenia i systemy zabezpieczenia kryptografi cznego w łączności radiowej, [in:] Mierczyk Z (Ed.), Nowoczesne technologie systemów uzbrojenia. Warsaw, 2008. 8. Siemianowski T, Truchan J.R, Kordalewski K, Wybrane systemy informacyjne wspierające działania Policji, [in:] Wilk-Woś Z, Stępiński M (Eds), Bezpieczeństwo i zarządzanie kryzysowe. Zarządzanie bezpieczeństwem. Łódź-Warsaw, 2017. 9. Stępiński M, Teoretyczne i prawno-organizacyjne uwarunkowania decyzji dowódczych w Policji. Szczytno, 2015. 10. Struniawski J, Dowodzenie w trakcie operacji policyjnych w zakresie imprez masowych i zgromadzeń publicznych. Szczytno, 2014. 11. Ustawa o Policji z dnia 6 kwietnia 1990. Dz.U. 1990, No. 30, item 179 as amended. 12. Wiśniewski B, Description of Security Systems — a few Refl ections. Internal Se- curity, 2019, Vol. 11, Issue 1. 13. Wiśniewski B, Prońko J, Ogniwa ochrony państwa. Warsaw, 2003. 14. Zarządzenie Nr 20 Komendanta Głównego Policji z dnia 13 lipca 2020 r. w sprawie metod i form przygotowania i realizacji działań policyjnych w związku ze zdarzeniami szczególnymi. 15. Zarządzenie Nr 70 Komendanta Głównego Policji z dnia 2 grudnia 2019 w sprawie Krajowego Systemu Informacyjnego Policji. Dz.U. 2019, item 114.

Internal Security, July–December 231 Jarosław Radosław Truchan

About the Author

Jarosław R. Truchan, Maj., hab. dr, director of the Institute of Security Sciences of the Faculty of Security and Legal Sciences at the Police Academy in Szczytno. Author of publications in the fi eld of internal security, information systems, and state border protection. Active participant and creator of scientifi c life in the area of internal security. Active participant of national (Frontex Agency) and foreign trainings (among others, in the USA, , Slovakia, Finland, Ukraine, and Lithuania). Speaker at many national and international conferences, where he presented his papers and gave lectures on internal security, defence and public order. Organiser and co- organiser of numerous trainings, scientifi c and practical seminars, national and international conferences. Expert of the Government Security Centre. E-mail: [email protected]

Streszczenie. Obecnie jednym z głównych obszarów, zapewniających właściwe funkcjonowanie służb odpowiedzialnych za bezpieczeństwo są systemy teleinformatyczne, które wykorzystuje się w zakresie pozyskiwania, gromadzenia i przetwarzania informacji oraz wsparcia procesu realizacji ustawowych zadań. Polska Policja, realizując swoje ustawowe zadania, wykorzystuje scentralizowane rozbudowywane systemy informatyczne, jak również posiada wspólne zbiory danych, takie jak: Krajowy System Informacyjny (KSIP). Jednocześnie realia związane z rozwojem technologii ustawicznie generują potrzebę stałej modyfikacji tego kierunku aktywności. Potrzeba dostosowywania się do wciąż zmieniającego się otoczenia wpłynęła na rozpoczęcie przez Wyższa Szkołę Policji w Szczytnie wspólnie z partnerami realizacji projektu pt.: System informacyjno-analityczny wspomagający zarządzanie ryzykiem podczas planowania i realizacji działań Policji (SIA). Projekt, będący innowacyjnym przedsięwzięciem, jest realizowany między innymi na podstawie wywiadów eksperckich, przeprowadzonych wśród policjantów szczebla dowódczego. Do budowy SIA wykorzystuje się zbiory danych zebranych i gromadzonych w systemach teleinformatycznych Policji oraz pozyskane z innych źródeł, efektem prac zaś będzie budowa możliwie pełnej aplikacji z mechanizmem planistyczno-decyzyjnym oraz algorytmami prognozowania, dostarczającej informacje w zakresie prawdopodobieństwa powodzenia i niezbędnych nakładów związanych z możliwymi wariantami działań Policji w konkretnej sytuacji zbiorowego naruszenia bezpieczeństwa i porządku publicznego. Proponowane rozwiązanie — to system informatyczny, który spełnia zadania zarówno prezentacji, jak i symulowania zdarzeń w wirtualnym środowisku. Autor przybliża funkcjonowanie wybranych współczesnych systemów teleinformatycznych, przedstawia ich rolę i znaczenie w zakresie wsparcia procesu decyzyjnego w zapewnieniu bezpieczeństwa i porządku publicznego.

Zusammenfassung. Einer der Hauptbereiche, die das ordnungsgemäße Funktionieren der für die Sicherheit verantwortlichen Dienste gewährleisten, sind derzeit IKT-Systeme, die zur Beschaffung, Sammlung und Verarbeitung von Informationen und zur Unterstützung des Prozesses der Erfüllung gesetzlicher Aufgaben eingesetzt werden. Die polnische Polizei nutzt bei der Erfüllung ihrer gesetzlichen Aufgaben zentralisierte, erweiterte IT-Systeme und verfügt über gemeinsame Datensätze, wie z.B.: Nationales Informationssystem (KSIP). Gleichzeitig erzeugen die mit der Entwicklung der Technologie verbundenen Realitäten ständig die Notwendigkeit einer ständigen Änderung dieser Tätigkeitsrichtung. Die Notwendigkeit, sich an das sich ständig verändernde Umfeld anzupassen, hat die Einleitung des Projekts der Polizeiakademie in Szczytno zusammen mit ihren Partnern u. d. T.: Informations- und Analysesystem zur Unterstützung des Risikomanagements bei der Planung und Durchführung von Polizeimaßnahmen (SIA) hervorgerufen. Das Projekt, bei dem es sich um ein innovatives Unterfangen handelt, wird u. a. auf der Grundlage von Expertenbefragungen von Polizeibeamten auf der Führungsebene durchgeführt. Für die Erstellung der SIA werden Daten verwendet, die in den Informations- und Kommunikationssystemen der Polizei gesammelt und erfasst sowie aus anderen Quellen gewonnen werden, während die Arbeiten die Erstellung einer möglicherweise vollständigen Anwendung mit einem Planungs- und Entscheidungsmechanismus und Prognosealgorithmen bewirken, die Informationen über die Erfolgswahrscheinlichkeit und die notwendigen Ausgaben im Zusammenhang mit möglichen Varianten von Polizeiaktivitäten in einer spezifischen Situation der kollektiven Verletzung der öffentlichen Sicherheit und Ordnung liefern. Die vorgeschlagene Lösung ist ein IT-System, das sowohl die Aufgaben der Präsentation als auch der Simulation von Ereignissen in einer virtuellen Umgebung erfüllt. Der Verfasser präsentiert die Funktionsweise ausgewählter zeitgenössischer IKT-Systeme, ihre Rolle und Bedeutung bei der Unterstützung des Entscheidungsprozesses zur Gewährleistung der öffentlichen Sicherheit und Ordnung.

232 Internal Security, July–December Selected Security Information Systems

Резюме. В настоящее время одним из основных направлений, обеспечивающих эффективную деятельность служб, отвечающих за безопасность, являются системы ИКТ, которые используются для получения, сбора и обработки информации, а также для поддержки процесса выполнения законных задач. Польская полиция при выполнении своих уставных задач использует централизованные, расширенные ИТ-системы, а также имеет общие базы данных, такие как: Национальная информационная система полиции (KSIP). Одновременно, условия, связанные с развитием техно- логий, обусловливают необходимость постоянной модификации этого направления деятельности. Необходимость адаптации к постоянно меняющимся условиям стала причиной создания Полицейской академией в г. Щитно вместе с партнерами проекта: Информационно-аналитическая система, обеспечивающая управление рисками во время планирования и реализации полицейской операции (ИАС). Этот инновационный проект реализуется, в частности, на основе экспертных интервью, проведенных среди сотрудников полиции на уровне начальства отделений. Для построения ИАС используются полученные и хранящиеся в информационных и коммуникационных системах полиции данные, а также данные, полученные из других источников. Результатом работ станет построение возможно полного приложения, предоставляющего возможность планирования и принятия решений, алгоритмами прогнозирования, информацией о вероятности успеха и необходимых затратах, связанных с возможными вариантами деятельности полиции в конкретной ситуации массового нарушения общественной безопасности и правопорядка. Предлагаемое решение представляет собой ИТ-систему, обеспечивающую выполнение задач как по презентации, так и по моде- лированию событий в виртуальной среде. Автор представляет отдельные современные ИКТ-системы, описывает их роль и значение в процессе поддержки принятия решений по обеспечению общественной безопасности и порядка.

Internal Security, July–December 233

Use of Selected Geospatial Tools for the Purposes of Reconnaissance

Maciej Antoni Zaorski ORCID: 0000-0001-9814-2581 Pomeranian Academy in Słupsk, Poland

Abstract. The implementation of modern tools in the military system constitutes an important step in supporting the decision- making process. The impact of new GIS technologies is important for the assessment of the battlefield1. According to assumptions, reconnaissance is a continuous process that crowns the assessment of the opponent and of the battlefield. Site assessment is an element of the command process where the conclusions of the task analysis includes an assessment of the potential opponent together with his modus operandi and an assessment of the environment2. As part of the Information Preparation of the Battlefield (hereinafter referred to as IPB), the identification of threats and limitations has an impact on the identification of potential approach routes, traffic corridors and maneuvers in assigned areas and lanes3. The end result is the determination of the maneuverability of forces and resources owned or those of the opponent. The information is to relate to the impact of the terrain components on the scope and nature of conducted activities, and the hydrometeorological conditions are to relate to the impact on the terrain, equipment, and people4. As far as it regards the analysis of the environment and the opponent, it is possible to apply modern technologies to shorten the time for the analyses performed within the ongoing decision-making process. DOI: 10.5604/01.3001.0014.6696 http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0014.6696

Keywords: recognition, modern technologies, GIS systems

Introduction

Geographic Information System (GIS), refers to medium and small-scale maps where the information is on a scale of 1:10,000 or more5. J. Ładsz, on the other hand, refers to GIS as a term that includes references to geographical data as well as to the field of geoinformation6 and GIS methods and techniques. The system i.a. gathers, collects, analyses and makes available spatial data with accompanying descriptive information about features7. The space in which the data is identified may be three-dimensional or two-dimensional, and GIS itself allows for the integration of data from different sources, processing of data into a convenient form, and crea- tion of data representation in the space8. Digital data are very accurate, and their

1 Pyszny K, Przybyła C, Spatial information systems in strategic environmental assess- ments. Poznań, Regional Directorate for Environmental Protection in Poznań, 2016, p. 54. 2 Kręcikij J, Wołejszo J (Eds), Podręcznik dowódcy batalionu. Warsaw, 2006, p. 90–92. 3 Kręcikij J, Wołejszo J, Prusiński N (Eds), Podręcznik oficera sztabu. Warsaw, 2009, p. 89–91. 4 Scheffs W, Process of informational battlefield preparation for emergency response operations. Scientific Journals of the National Defense Academy, 2013, Vol. 1(90), p. 83–84. 5 Pyszny K, Przybyła C, op. cit., p. 6. 6 Ładysz J, GIS technology in safety engineering. Wrocław, 2015, p. 13. 7 Ibid., p. 172. 8 Ibid.

Internal Security, July–December 235 Maciej Antoni Zaorski use significantly improves the work of staff and subordinate units. From the point of view of terrain assessment, it is important to use the Numerical Land Covering Model, using new technologies, i.e. unmanned aerial vehicles or satellite data9.

Selected analytical programs and their applicability to analysis

For specific activities during IPB, not only commercial tools available on the civil market, but also generally available, so-called open source tools may be used. There are many companies offering software, i.a. Harris (ENVI software), ESRI (ArcGISPRO, ArcView, and a whole range of accompanying software such as IPB: Military Tools for ArcGIS), Agisoft (Photoscan), Pix4D S.A. (Pix4D), Manifold Software Limited (Manifold), Blue Marble Geographics (Global Mapper), etc. Furthermore, there are open source solutions, such as: QGIS, Saga GIS, and Fugro Viewer10. The evaluation of the software’s usefulness depends not only on its functional capabilities, but also on the user’s skills (his or her knowledge, experience, ability to quickly learn how to use the software and experiment with data sets and software). Performing activi- ties in the right order allows the intended goals to be achieved without the need to purchase expensive software. In addition to the knowledge and functionality of the software, the spatial and non-spatial data sets are important elements. With- out databases that are valuable from the point of view of an analyst, the GIS system is empty. The quality of the computer hardware used, and the capabilities of the software and database content constitute important elements11. A number of open source software tools, such as QGIS, and in particular its latest version 3.14, may come in handy. This allows for analytical work using different data

9 The Head Office of Geodesy and Cartography describes the Numerical Terrain Covering Model as ‘a discrete (spot) representation of the surface of the land with objects, such as build- ings, trees, bridges, viaducts and other infrastructure elements, protruding above it’. For example, the ENVI software allows for the creation of visibility zones using data such as the Numeri- cal Terrain Coverage Model and the height of an object to be observed, e.g. guard towers. Moreover, in 2010, Dąbrowski R, Orych A and Walczykowski P described the potential of using satellite images in military reconnaissance. More Electronic source: http://www.gugik.gov.pl/ pzgik/zamow-dane/numeryczny-model-pokrycia-terenu, accessed: 25.06.2020; Dąbrowski R, Orych A, Walczykowski P, Evaluation of the possibility of using high-resolution satellite images in image recognition, Vol. 21. Archive of Photogrammetry, Cartography and Remote Sensing, 2010, p. 75–77. 10 Open Source, i.e. open source software, where the author of the software grants the right to change and distribute under an open source license. More: Electronic source: https://opensource.org/osd, accessed: 25.06.2020. 11 Under the GIS system, the following elements together may be considered a set of in- terrelated elements: software, people, hardware, data and procedures. More: Kwiecień J, GIS system in spatial analyses of forest areas in the municipality of Osielsko. Management of Na- ture Conservation in Forests, Vol. 2, Tuchola, 2008, p. 192; Puchacz J.M, Human — the weakest element? Arcana GIS, 2013. Electronic source: https://www.arcanagis.pl/czlowiek-najslabszy- element/, accessed: 25.06.2020.

236 Internal Security, July–December Use of Selected Geospatial Tools for the Purposes of Reconnaissance sets (e.g.: vector and raster). Additionally, individual plug-ins allow for data analysis taking into account, i.a., the Numerical Terrain Model12. In QGIS, creating a map is simple, and an experienced user should not find doing so difficult. Working with database sets improves the analysis without the need to use an external network. Another piece of free software is FUGRO VIEWER. It allows for analysing data taken e.g. from photogrammetric raids from both unmanned aerial vehicles and air- planes. Analyses that may be performed are simple, allowing for analysing the height of wooded areas, buildings, or the width of roads, bridges, etc. In the course of site assessment, the program shows three-dimensional objects.

Figure 1. Example of data analysis in FugroViewer software

Source: Own development. The program allows for the analysis of objects including the height of buildings, bridges and tunnels during operation.

ArcView and ArcGIS PRO by ESRIA are popular commercial analysis software. These may be used to perform analyses using both simple and complex methods. The number of additions allows for a greater number of analyses, e.g. for site assess- ment. Once created, the methodology of site assessment allows the user to save it and then use it in different areas with the same or different values. This means that, e.g. a sea coast assessment variant can be calculated with different values. The designated areas are executed and saved in databases in such a way that they may be made available to other users or may restrict unauthorised access. As in QGIS, the user may add military tactical marks and thus create a clear map for individual team members participating in the IPB. 12 The Central Office of Geodesy and Cartography describes the Numerical Land Model as ‘...a discrete (spot) representation of the topographical height of the terrain surface, to- gether with an interpolation algorithm enabling its shape to be reproduced in a given area’. More: Electronic source: http://www.gugik.gov.pl/pzgik/zamow-dane/numeryczny-model- terenu , accessed: 25.06.2020.

Internal Security, July–December 237 Maciej Antoni Zaorski

Figure 2. Example of data analysis in ArcView software using data from a Phantom 4 quadrocopter

Source: Own GIS software analysis of an area with quite considerable heights. Data from the Phantom 4 quadrocopter raid and Precisonmapper and ArcView software were used. An unmanned air raid was carried out for a given area and the data obtained were used for height analyses of the area. In perspective, they may be used to determine e.g. approach paths for particular types of equipment. Knowing the weaponry of the own forces and the potential opponent, the program may create data of possible and impossible areas (e.g. with too large slopes or hills) through individual queries.

Figure 3. Example of a map made in ArcVIew software

Source: Own ArcView software analysis for the Słupsk Poviat. Open Street Map data and own data created based on selected SQL queries were used. The highlighted road sections are only an example of executing a SQL query based on tabular data for a given task.

HARRIS ENVI is another type of commercial software that may be used. It allows for the temporary analysis of satellite or aerial photographs, as well as the detection

238 Internal Security, July–December Use of Selected Geospatial Tools for the Purposes of Reconnaissance of objects with a specific spectral reflection in the images, which allows the user to automate the speed of searching for the desired objects and compare aerial/ satellite images taken on different dates.

Figure 4. Comparison of two satellite images for further analysis

Source: Own ENVI software analysis for the Rytel area. Top: Satellite data from November 2018; bottom: from May 2017.

Figure 5. Satellite images for the area of Pomorskie and Kujawsko-Pomorskie Voivodeships

Source: Own ENVI software analysis for the area of the Chojnice Poviat. Left: satellite data from November 2018; right: from May 2017. Right: there are changes in the field after strong winds.

Internal Security, July–December 239 Maciej Antoni Zaorski

Figure 6. Automatic detection of terrain changes in satellite images

Source: Own ENVI software analysis for the Chojnice area. Right: satellite data from Novem- ber 2018; left: from May 2017. The area in light green is the automatic remote sensing of changes in the photos. Such an activity allows for the calculation of the square-kilometer area of changes in forestation or floodings, as well as e.g. changes in equipment.

The software that may be used for analytical projects is AGISOFT PHOTOSCAN or PIX4D. With their use, it is possible to create point clouds and 3D models from photos; this, in turn, makes it possible to visualise the areas of operation. Of the selected software presented above, some, such as Pix4D, Photoscan, Fugro Viewer (but only as a preview of ESRI, ENVI and even QGIS data), may be used as 3D object modelling software. In the above example, 3D is understood as the ability to visualise the terrain with the height of buildings and field obstacles for analytical purposes. The capabilities of the commercial software allow for the performance of analyses of buildings taking into account their mass and the area on which they are located. This allows the development of technology, especially unmanned aerial vehicles collecting data in an appropriate format.

240 Internal Security, July–December Use of Selected Geospatial Tools for the Purposes of Reconnaissance

Figure 7. Photo from a drone raid in the Rytel locality

Source: Own analysis in Fugro Viewer software. The raid performed in September 2017 with a DJI Phantom 4 quadrocopter. The highest elements are visible in red. These are piles of trees broken due to strong winds.

Example of using geospatial software with data acquired from the Central Offi ce of Geodesy and Cartography in ArcGIS PRO software

As an example, a simple simulation of the use of spatial data within the IPB was performed. The place of landing of a potential opponent was adopted, and the route of his forces and means was determined by using a simple algorithm. As part of the defense analysis, the most convenient places of the opponent’s landing were selected. The simulation uses data obtained from the Central Office of Geodesy and Car- tography under license No. DIO.DFT.DSI.DDZ.7211.12890.2015_EN_N. BDOT 10k data were used. The ESRI ArcGIS ver. ArcGIS PRO software was used for analysis. As an example, an action in the area of the Słupsk Poviat limited by Lędowo — Wicko — Słupsk was designed. The following were excluded: bridges up to 15 metres long, exclusively made of reinforced concrete material with a width of over 5 metres13. In the adopted area, the program indicated 66 objects which met the above cri- teria. Finally, the accepted data indicated potential routes of the enemy march.

13 These limitations are included in the table with attributes to vector data in accordance with the Annex to the Regulation of the Minister of Interior and Administration of 17 November 2011 on the database of topographic objects and the database of general geographic objects. More: Annex to the Regulation of the Minister of the Interior and Administration of 17 November 2011 on the database of topographic objects and the database of general geographic objects, as well as standard cartographic studies. Vol. 1. Annex to No. 279, item 1642, of 27 December 2011.

Internal Security, July–December 241 Maciej Antoni Zaorski

Figure 8. Analysis of selected route variants in ArcGIS PRO software

Source: Own analysis in ArcGIS PRO software. BDOT 10k data obtained from the Central Office of Geodesy and Cartography under license No. DIO.DFT.DSI.DDZ.7211.12890.2015_EN_N were used. In the map composition, the area of the Słupsk Poviat was marked with a division into communes with places excluding the course of the forecast route.

Figure 9. Analysis of selected route variants in ArcGIS PRO software

Source: Own analysis in ArcGIS PRO software. BDOT 10k data obtained from the Central Office of Geodesy and Cartography under license number DIO.DFT.DSI.DDZ.7211.12890.2015_EN_N were used. In the map composition, five different route variants were marked, where 1 is the starting point and 2 is the destination point. Some of these routes in selected sections are the same; the destination points are selected randomly.

242 Internal Security, July–December Use of Selected Geospatial Tools for the Purposes of Reconnaissance

Modern technologies allow for the use of an unmanned aerial vehicle and the recording of a film that can be used in the ArcGIS PRO software. This program allows the user to record films during the flight as well as to make live or post-flight trans- missions. Those videos indicate, i.a., the coordinates of selected objects marked during the flight. The program shows the route of the air raid along with the alti- tude, which with the appropriate setting of the unmanned aerial vehicle parameters also provides the possibility to create a terrain map. It allows for the detection of changes in the terrain, e.g. road trafficability or other terrain changes. The pos- sibility of connecting a thermal imaging camera allows for the search for objects in a densely forested area or at night. The above software may be used to indicate coordinates, allowing for marking objects on the map and passing the data to other users. Relevant coordinates and times are provided if an object or a photo cut out of a recorded video is indicated on the map.

Figure 10. Film analysis in LineVision Desktop software compatible with ArcGIS PRO

Source: Own analysis in LineVision Desktop. Film made in the area of the Damnica Forest District. The raid allows for the detection of changes in the field, such as illegal tree felling. Right side: the route of the flight together with the settings of its parameters.

Methodology of environmental assessment analyses — automation of tasks for the purpose of preparation of action variants.

The multilayered data in the QGIS or ArcView/ArcGIS PRO software allows for more freedom in the analytical process, and especially in the automation of activities. The application of the described tools for environment analysis allows for the following: • correctly symbolised data allows for the clear identification of individual elements on the map;

Internal Security, July–December 243 Maciej Antoni Zaorski

• Thanks to labelling, objects on layers may be clearly identified (depending on the user, there may be single labels, labels of all elements, or of a selected type); • The user may automatically specify a query using SQL and display objects with the required attribute or features during the analysis. Additionally, the user may create queries in the right order and perform analytical activi- ties such as creating an analysis of the slope of the terrain to determine the routes of observation of the vehicles of own forces and potential oppo- nents; • During the analysis, the user may plot a convenient model of the area to be observed, taking into account the height of the trees and the model where we will be visible. This may be done by collecting and analysing satellite images, flight pictures from UAVs or data from other types of reconnaissance. The integration of software and its mobility allow for showing the collected data in real time. The updating of the transmitted information takes place in cyberspace14. The software for chemi- cal analysis also allows for the integration of data and the possibility of forecasting danger zones not only for the military but also for the civilian population15.

Final conclusions

There are various tools that are useful during the IPB. Spatial analyses would not be possible with the operations of a program alone. They result from con- tinuous work, training, database creation, and integration of hardware, software and procedures with other elements in the Armed Forces structures. The essence is to automate analytical activities and to create data models relevant for the opera- tion of one’s own and the opponent’s forces. It is reasonable to equip analytical cells with new tools; however, the costs of their purchase and staff training should be taken into consideration. The data should be stored and updated in closed networks. Such tools are useful in the process of reconnaissance in both military and civil structures responsible for security. Moreover, the analysis of satellite images or pic- tures and films collected during unmanned aerial vehicle flight allows for constant analysis of changes in the observed area.

14 Internet connectivity may be provided by specially adapted unmanned objects not susceptible to external interference on a secure and encrypted band. More Electronic source: https://www.internetsociety.org/blog/2018/07/internet-drone-and-balloon-projects-move- forward/; Mozaffari M, Saad W, Bennis M, Nam Y-H, Debbah M, A Tutorial on UAVs for Wireless Networks: Applications, Challenges, and Open Problems. Electronic source: https://arxiv.org/ pdf/1803.00680.pdf. 15 The ALOHA program allows the user to create chemical contamination ranges and ex- port contamination visualization on a map in KML or shape format. Author’s note.

244 Internal Security, July–December Use of Selected Geospatial Tools for the Purposes of Reconnaissance References

1. Annex to the Regulation of the Minister of the Interior and Administration of 17 November 2011 on the database of topographic objects and the database of general geographic objects, as well as standard cartographic studies. Vol. 1. Annex, No. 279, item 1642, of 27 December 2011. 2. Dąbrowski R, Orych A, Walczykowski P, Evaluation of the possibility of using high-resolution satellite images in image recognition. Vol. 21. Archive of Photo- grammetry, Cartography and Remote Sensing, 2010. 3. Electronic source: http://www.gugik.gov.pl/pzgik/zamow-dane/numeryczny- model-pokrycia-terenu 4. Electronic source: http://www.gugik.gov.pl/pzgik/zamow-dane/numeryczny- model-terenu 5. Electronic source: https://www.internetsociety.org/blog/2018/07/internet- drone-and-balloon-projects-move-forward/ 6. Electronic source: https://www.opensource.org/osd 7. Kręcikij J, Wołejszo J (Eds), Podręcznik dowódcy batalionu. Warsaw, 2006. 8. Kręcikij J, Wołejszo J, Prusiński N (Eds), Podręcznik ofi cera sztabu. Warsaw, 2009. 9. Kwiecień J, GIS system in spatial analyses of forest areas in the municipality of Osielsko. Management of Nature Conservation in Forests. Vol. 2, Tuchola, 2008. 10. Ładysz J, GIS technology in safety engineering. Wrocław, 2015. 11. Mozaff ari M, Saad W, Bennis M, Nam Y-H, Debbah M, A Tutorial on UAVs for Wire- less Networks: Applications, Challenges, and Open Problems. Electronic source: https://arxiv.org/pdf/1803.00680.pdf 12. Puchacz J.M, Human — the weakest element? Arcana GIS, 2013. 13. Pyszny K, Przybyła Cz, Spatial information systems in strategic environmental assessments. Poznań, 2016. 14. Regulations of Tactical Operations of Armored and Mechanized Subunits of the Armored and Mechanized Forces (platoon — company — battalion). Warsaw, 2009. 15. Scheff s W, Process of informational battlefi eld preparation for emergency response operations. Scientifi c Journals of the National Defense Academy, 2013, Vol. 1(90). 16. Training Programme for Armored, Mechanized and Motorized Subunits of Ar- mored Forces. Warsaw, 2017. 17. Trochimiuk M, Military terrain assessment and its geographical support. Defense: Scientifi c Journals of the Faculty of Management and Command, 2016, Vol. 1.

About the Author

Maciej Antoni Zaorski, MA, Pomeranian Academy in Słupsk, Poland. Scientifi c interests: modern technologies, GIS systems, energetic security, critical infrastructure security. E-mail: maciej. [email protected]

Streszczenie. Wdrożenie nowoczesnych narzędzi w systemie militarnym jest istotnym krokiem w zakresie wsparcia procesu decyzyjnego. Wpływ nowych technologii GIS ma istotne znaczenie na ocenę pola walki. Przyjmuje się, że rozpoznanie jest procesem ciągłym, który wieńczy ocenę przeciwnika i pola walki. Ocena terenu jest elementem procesu dowodzenia, gdzie wnioski z analizy

Internal Security, July–December 245 Maciej Antoni Zaorski zadania zawierają m.in. ocenę potencjalnego przeciwnika wraz z jego sposobem działania oraz ocenę otoczenia16. W ramach informacyjnego przygotowania pola walki identyfikacja zagrożeń i ograniczeń ma wpływ na określenie potencjalnych dróg podejścia, korytarzy ruchu i manewru w przydzielonych rejonach i pasach17. Efektem końcowym jest określenie możliwości manewru sił i środków własnych lub przeciwnika. Informacja dotyczyć będzie wpływu elementów składowych terenu na zakres i charakter prowadzonych działań, a warunki hydrometeorologiczne dotyczyć będą oddziaływania na teren, sprzęt i ludzi18. Dla analizy środowiska i przeciwnika możliwe jest zastosowanie nowoczesnych technologii w celu skrócenia czasu dla wykonywanych analiz w ramach trwającego procesu decyzyjnego.

Zusammenfassung. Die Implementierung von modernen Werkzeugen in das militärische System ist ein wichtiger Schritt zur Unterstützung des Entscheidungsprozesses. Der Einfluss neuer GIS-Technologien ist wichtig für die Beurteilung des Schlachtfelds. Es wird davon ausgegangen, dass die Aufklärung ein kontinuierlicher Prozess ist, der die Einschätzung des Gegners und des Schlachtfeldes krönt. Die Bodenbeurteilung ist ein Element des Führungsprozesses, bei dem die Schlussfolgerungen der Aufgabenanalyse eine Beurteilung des potenziellen Gegners zusammen mit seiner Arbeitsweise und eine Beurteilung der Umgebung umfassen[1]. Im Rahmen der Informationsvorbereitung des Kampffeldes (nachfolgend IPPW) hat die Identifizierung von Bedrohungen und Begrenzungen einen Einfluss auf die Identifizierung von potenziellen Annäherungen, Verkehrskorridoren und Manövern in zugewiesenen Bereichen und Fahrspuren[2]. Im Endeffekt wird die Manövrierfähigkeit von Kräften und Ressourcen des eigenen oder gegnerischen Unternehmens bestimmt. Die Informationen betreffen den Einfluss der Elemente des Geländes auf den Umfang und Charakter der durchgeführten Aktivitäten, und die hydrometeorologischen Bedingungen betreffen den Einfluss auf das Gelände, die Ausrüstung und die Menschen[3]. Für die Analyse der Umgebung und des Gegners ist es möglich, moderne Technologien zu nutzen, um die Zeit für die Analysen im laufenden Entscheidungsprozess zu verkürzen.

Резюме. Внедрение современных инструментов в военную систему является важным шагом в поддержке процесса принятия решений. Влияние новых GIS-технологий важно для оценки поля боя. Предполагается, что разведка — это непрерывный процесс, который завершает оценку противника и поля боя. Оценка территории — это элемент командного процесса, в котором результаты анализа задания включают в себя оценку потенциального противника вместе с его способом действия и оценку окружающей среды. В рамках информационной подготовки поля сражения определение опасности и ограничений оказывает влияние на определение потенциальных маршрутов подхода, транспортных путей и проведения маневров в отведенных зонах и полосах движения. Конечным результатом является определение способности к управлению собственными силами и ресурсами или ресурсами противника. Информация будет касаться влияния характеристик территории на объем и характер проводимых мероприятий, а гидрометеорологические условия будут тесно связаны с территорию, оборудованием и человеческим потенциалом. Для анализа окружающей среды и противника можно применять современные технологииб которых применеие сокращает время анализа, проводимого в рамках продолжающегося процесса принятия решений.

16 Kręcikij J, Wołejszo J, Podręcznik dowódcy …, op. cit., p. 90–92. 17 Kręcikij J, Wołejszo J, Prusiński N (Eds), Podręcznik oficera …, op. cit., pp. 89–91. 18 Scheffs W, Proces informacyjnego przygotowania pola walki na potrzeby operacji reagowania kryzysowego. Zeszyty Naukowe AON, 2013, No. 1(90), pp. 83–84.

246 Internal Security, July–December CASE STUDY

Achievements of the American Judiciary and Law Enforcement Agencies in Combatting Gangsterism (With Particular Emphasis on Motorcycle Gangs)

Wiesław Pływaczewski ORCID: 0000-0001-6172-5644 Police Academy in Szczytno, Poland

Abstract. The article deals with the issue of controlling gangsterism, with particular emphasis on motorcycle gangs. The author presents current motorcycle crime in the United States. The main part of the study contains the characteristics of the most important police services and other agencies involved in combatting gangs in the United States. The conclusions of the article include some recommendations with regard to the opportunities for the Polish law enforcement agencies to use international experience in fighting motorcycle crime. DOI: 10.5604/01.3001.0014.6697 http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0014.6697

Keywords: motorcycle gang, origins of motorcycle gangsterism, controlling motorcycle gangs in the United States, international police cooperation.

Current situation of motorcycle gangsterism in the United States

Despite enormous changes on the world map of gangsterism, it is the United States that still remains the main area of activity for motorcycle gangs. This is mainly due to the turbulent history of the motorcycle movement and the emergence of ‘one- percent’ structures (one-percenters) in motorcycling. The term refers to the event that is of fundamental importance to the history of motorcycle gangs. The name ‘one- percenters’ includes those clubs/gangs which after 1947, i.e. after the turbulent events in Hollister (USA), withdrew from an official trend of activity typical of motorcycle clubs gathered around the American Motorcyclist Association (hereinafter: the AMA) and opted for a confrontational approach1. The aforementioned date is directly related to the incidents that occurred during the AMA rally in California. In view of a large number of people attending the event, its organisers decided not to allow those participants who were not members of the association to participate in tradi- tional races. Outraged by the decision of the rally’s management, the motorcyclists

1 Pływaczewski W, Gangi motocyklowe. Od wydarzeń w Hollister po współczesne prze- jawy przestępczości zorganizowanej. Warsaw: Difin, 2018, p. 48.

Internal Security, July–December 247 Wiesław Pływaczewski who were eliminated from the competition decided to organise competitive races and use the streets of Hollister for that purpose. Their decision resulted in far-reach- ing consequences for the whole movement of motorcycle lovers. The rally ended in a kind of organisational paralysis and, what is more, in a police response. Initiated by the members of the Boozefighters Motorcycle Club and the Pissed Off Bastards of Bloomington (hereinafter: the POBOB), the acts of violence and vandalism were described by the local sheriff as outlaw acts, i.e. against the law. Being afraid of public condemnation, the AMA decided to officially distance themselves from the scan- dalous incidents. The rally spokesperson blamed independent motorcyclists for the Hollister events. His statement: ‘99% of motorcyclists are decent citizens and only 1% are not’ had a decisive influence on the split within the American motorcycle movement and the emergence of a new counter-culture of ‘one-percent’ motor- cyclists, which in turn resulted in a breakup of the motorcycle movement, and thus in the emergence of a new rebellious fraction outside of the AMA’s structures2. It needs to be emphasised that on the North American continent, the slogans of club fraternity have hit a particularly fertile ground, since the idea of loving the unrestricted freedom the motorcycle symbolises is particularly close to the Amer- icans. Therefore, it should be clearly highlighted that most American motorcycle organisations strongly distance themselves from any attempts to associate them with illegal activities. According to police statistics, about 1500 club structures are internationally recognised as motorcycle gangs3, about 900 of which operate in the United States. The so-called clubs of the Big Three4 play a dominant role in the motor- cycle community, and they include Hell’s Angels MC, Bandidos MC and Outlaws MC. In addition, there are other gangster organisations outside of the USA that have taken over the activity patterns and symbols of Hell’s Angels MC, and these are as follows: Mongols MC, Vagos MC, Rebels MC and Pagans MC5. A unique, almost monopolistic, position among one-percent motorcycle gangs has been attributed to Hell’s Angels MC (hereinafter: HAMC)6, due to the gang’s historical conditions, organisational potential and attractive programme offer which includes opportunities to collec- tively experience exciting adventures, together with those involving committing crimes. The attractiveness of such proposals means that clubs which identify them- selves with the ideology and symbolism of HAMC have been established in Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Asia (Japan, South Korea) and, of course, in Europe7.

2 Ibid., p. 38. 3 See: Haut F, Organized crime on two wheels. Motorcycle gangs. International Criminal Police Review, 1999, No. 474–475. 4 In publications on motorcycle gangs, more and more often the term Big Five appears, which includes, apart from Hell’s Angels MC, Bandidos MC and Outlaws MC, two other clubs/ gangs, i.e. Pagans MC and Sons of Silence MC. 5 Hayes B, One-Percenter Encyclopedia, MBI Publishing Company. Minneapolis, 2011, p. 256ff. 6 ‘Sonny’ Barger R, Zimmerman K, Zimmerman K, Hell’s Angels. The Life and Times of Sonny Barger and the Hell’s Angels Motorcycle Club. New York: Harper Collins Publishers Inc., 2000, p. 3ff. 7 See: Pływaczewski W, Gangi motocyklowe w Europie. Przeciwdziałanie zjawisku mo- tocyklowego gangsteryzmu z perspektywy międzynarodowej współpracy policyjnej, to be published.

248 Internal Security, July–December Achievements of the American Judiciary and Law Enforcement Agencies in Combatting Gangsterism…

It should be noted that the expansion of American-origin clubs in many European countries results in numerous conflicts of interest with local gangster structures, which leads to so-called gang wars, where the ‘old’ and ‘new’ gangs become involved. An example of such a conflict is the Great Nordic Biker War that broke out in 19908. Gangster wars are primarily focussed on economic aspects, which, in practice, results in a forcible takeover of the disputed areas. At present, local European gangs have become strong enough to demand from their competitors respect for their independence and to share criminal proceeds more widely than ever before. Gang experts point out that this is the first step to making local organi- sations independent of international clubs/gangs of American origin. An example of such a process is also the Great Nordic Biker War that broke out in 19909. As far as the American situation is concerned, it is enough to recall a tragic incident that took place in Altamont in 1969. During the concert of a well-known band, the Rolling Stones, some motorcycles belonging to members of the HAMC gang were damaged, which resulted in fights between the concert security guards and event attendees, who were gang members, and in stabbing to death of an 18-year-old concert participant. Under the initial investigation, a HAMC gang member was charged with the murder10. Despite the acquittal of the suspect, the allegation he faced initiated a whole series of police actions targeted at con- trolling the American gangs. Huge numbers of weapons and explosives as well as large quantities of drugs were seized and secured. The police actions revealed the criminal face of HAMC, although the gang had tried to create a new image for themselves before, primarily by promoting prosocial initiatives. The Altamont incident resulted in the leaders of the motorcycle underground being detained and charged, which weakened the ethos built by the American gangs of noble motorcyclists for many years to come. What really surprised the American public were bloody events in the city of Waco, Texas. In May 2015, there was a regular battle, where firearms and other dangerous objects such as chains, knives and baseball bats were used. About 200 motorcyclists were involved in the battle. The fight was initiated by a minor quarrel at a premises, which ended with a confrontation outside. During the clashes, 9 persons involved in the fight were killed and 18 injured. According to the police, the number of vic- tims would have been much higher if it had not been for the counter-terrorist squad from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives who responded to the incident. It should be stressed that victims of such clashes are often casual observers. Fortunately, during the shooting in Waco, no bystander was killed, which, as the police experts claimed, constituted a peculiar phenomenon, given the dynamics and intensity of the shooting incident11.

8 Lauchs M, Bikies in Europe, [in:] Pływaczewski E.W, Guzik-Makaruk E.M (Eds), Current Problems of the Penal Law and Criminology. Warsaw, 2017, p. 566. 9 Ibid. 10 Barker T, Biker Gangs and Transnational Organized Crime, Anderson Publishing. Waltham, 2015, p. 40. 11 Słabisz A, Groźne gangi motocyklowe w USA. Niespokojni jeźdźcy — na harleyach, ponad prawem. Electronic source: https://wiadomosci.wp.pl/grozne-gangi-motocyklowe- w-usa-niespokojni-jezdzcy-na-harleyach-ponad-prawem-6027654238352513awiadomości, accessed: 10.05.2020.

Internal Security, July–December 249 Wiesław Pływaczewski Preventing motorcycle gangsterism from the perspective of the American judiciary and law enforcement agencies

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives

The leading role in the fight against motorcycle gangsterism is played by the American government agency operating within the structure of the Depart- ment of Justice called the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms end Explosives (hereinafter: the ATF). In 2000, the agency, together with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (hereinafter: the FBI), completed a two-year special operation con- ducted under the code name ‘Even’. Its goal was to smash the Mongols MC gang from San Fernando. The police operation resulted in arrests made for 54 people who were charged with, among other things, drug-related crimes and murders12. In 2008, ATF agents arrested more than 60 members of the aforementioned gang as part of another operation codenamed ‘Black Rain’13. At the same time, an attempt was made to issue an official ban on the use of the gang’s logo and name14. Another operation aimed at smashing the drug underground controlled by HAMC ended in success and, consequently, several illicit laboratories used for large-scale drug production were dismantled15.

Federal Bureau of Investigation Another service which stands out in the fight against motorcycle gangs is the Federal Bureau of Investigation (hereinafter: the FBI). This US government agency deals with crimes beyond the jurisdiction of a given state. The bureau cooperates with other federal agencies, including the US Customs and Border Protection, US Immigration and Customs Enforcement, US Marshals Service, and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives16. The Federal Bureau of Investigation also acts as a primary counter-intelligence agency to monitor and foil harmful activities of other countries’ intelligence ser- vices operating in the territory of the United States, as well as to control potential and actual violations of the US intelligence laws by American and foreign agents. The FBI also performs its tasks outside of the territory of the United States, coop- erating with the police, intelligence and security services of other countries. In this regard, FBI agents are authorised to apprehend and interrogate persons suspected

12 Queen W, Under and Alone. The True Story of the Undercover Agent Who Infiltrated America’s Most Violent Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs. Random House Publishing Group, 2007, p. 277. 13 American Bar Association. Annual Review of Intellectual Property Law Developments, 2009, p. 183. 14 The attempt was unsuccessful though. 15 Lavigne Y, Byłem Aniołem Piekła. Okrutny świat morderców na harleyach. Warsaw, 2006, p. 53. 16 Electronic source: https://www.fbi.gov/, accessed: 04.07.2020.

250 Internal Security, July–December Achievements of the American Judiciary and Law Enforcement Agencies in Combatting Gangsterism… of serious crimes in the countries (as part of extraordinary renditions) which have concluded separate agreements with the United States. As mentioned before, the FBI works closely with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives. FBI agents participate in almost all major operations related to controlling the most dangerous motorcycle gangster organisations. The joint efforts of these two government agencies, particularly against ‘one-percent’ motorcycle gangs, seem to confirm the fact that this type of crime is no longer seen as a local or state problem within the United States, but has become an important challenge for the American members of the public, and law enforcement agencies and judicial authorities in particular. It should also be noted that both institutions’ agents, as experts in the field of motorcycle gangs, are actively involved in trainings organised by foreign law enforcement agencies. Undoubtedly, as evidenced by reports issued periodically by the FBI, the agency’s involvement in activities related to preventing so-called motorcycle crime illustrates the scale of gangster crime and the effects of operations carried out by the National Gang Intelligence Centre, operating within the FBI17.

National Gang Intelligence Centre The centre was established in 2005 to support the activities carried out by the Federal Bureau of Investigation officers in their response to the growing threat posed by gangs18. The National Gang Intelligence Centre (hereinafter: the NGIC) is based in Washington DC and serviced by analysts from a number of the US federal agencies involved in crime prevention. Therefore, those agencies’ data- bases are accessible to all of their employees, and due to the information available, the centre provides them with analytical and surveillance-related support. The NGIC’s priority is to identify those gangs that pose a serious threat to the security of the United States. Gangster structures involved in organised crime are of particular interest to the centre. The activities of the NGIC are integrated with the Safe Streets Gang, another FBI unit dealing with street gangsterism. The NGIC is especially interested in the most dangerous categories of crime related to gang activity, in particular terrorism, counterintelligence, cybercrime, corruption, organised crime, white collar crime and violent crime. It needs to be pointed out that the centre issues regular reports on the activ- ity of American gangs and their links with international criminal structures. For example, the ‘National Gang Report’ (NGR) of 2015 includes, among other things, detailed characteristics of the activities of the American and international motorcy- cle gangs19. Additionally, the report indicates close links between such structures and organised economic crime. It should be noted that the NGIC provides up-to- date gang information to all American agencies dealing with crime prevention.

17 See: U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, Evaluation and Inspec- tions Division, ‘A Review of the Department’s Anti-Gang Intelligence and Coordination Centers’, Washington DC, I -2010-001, November, Washington DC, 2009. 18 Electronic source: https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/violent-crime/gangs/ngic, accessed: 14.10.2017. 19 Federal Bureau of Investigation, ‘2015 National Gang Report — NGR’. Washington, 2016, pp. 22–26.

Internal Security, July–December 251 Wiesław Pływaczewski

The information often takes the form of in-depth criminal analyses, whose compi- lation starts from rich databases of particular gangster activities20. Undoubtedly, the NGIC can serve as an example of making various agencies effectively involved in the fight against gangsterism, including that identified with motorcycle gangs. The attractiveness of the NGIC lies in its servant role towards many federal, state and local agencies. An extremely important tool used by agents operating within 160 task forces for safe streets is the ‘Enterprise Theory of Investigation’ (hereinafter: the ETI) that allows local law enforcement agencies to integrate their activities, at the street level, with such advanced solutions as monitoring, financial analysis and 3D technology devices/tools. The ETI makes it possible to efficiently link local investigations with complex police operations against organised criminal networks operating throughout the country21. It goes without saying that the idea of the ‘Safe Street’ task forces extends the cooperation and communication between federal, state and local law enforcement agencies. At the same time, it enables the ser- vices to improve their efficiency and, which is also very important from the point of view of the European Union police services, prevents investigative activities from being duplicated. The problem has also been signalled by the Polish law enforce- ment agencies’ representatives. Therefore, the American experience in this area may become useful in solving competence disputes that arise from time to time between particular public services, some of which directly affect the adopted tactics of controlling motorcycle gangs22. Another extremely important and effective initiative established on the basis of the American police experience is the task force for combatting transnational gangs called the Transnational Anti-Gang Task Force (hereinafter: the TAG). The group’s goal is to prevent the expansion of transnational gangs, mainly of Latin American origin, which are beginning to threaten the security of the United States, including such criminal organisations as ‘Mara Salvatrucha’ (MS-13) and ‘18th Street’. According to FBI data, such organisations are present in almost every state and they are gradually becoming more and more influential23. For this reason, the priority for agents implementing the objectives of the TAG is to recognise the areas of opera- tion, structure and gang leaders and, together with local services, to crack down on gangster structures in their homeland, i.e. Central America. For the time being, their activities cover three countries: El Salvador, Nicaragua and Guatemala. It is known that these countries provide logistics and human resources for the afore- mentioned gangs. Other countries, such as Costa Rica, Panama and Belize, have also joined the programme. Operating on their territory, the TAG units collect intel- ligence to support investigations conducted in the USA24.

20 Electronic source: https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/national-gang-report-2015.pdf/ view, accessed: 14.10.2019. 21 Electronic source: https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/violent-crime/gangs, accessed: 05.04.2020. 22 See: Pływaczewski W, Lubiewski P (Eds), Współczesne ekstremizmy. Geneza, przejawy, przeciwdziałanie. Olsztyn, 2014, pp. 128–130. 23 See: Hagan F.E, Daigle L.E, Introduction to Criminology. Theories, Methods and Criminal Behavior, SAGE Publication, edition 10. City Road, 2018. 24 Electronic source: http://file.lacounty.gov/SDSInter/lasd/144940_PoliceDiplomacyBook. pdf, accessed: 04.04.2020.

252 Internal Security, July–December Achievements of the American Judiciary and Law Enforcement Agencies in Combatting Gangsterism…

Every year, TAG specialists train police officers from the abovementioned countries in gang-control methods. In addition, they cooperate on a regular basis with the American liaison officers from the local FBI units. The cooperation primar- ily involves attempts to improve the exchange of intelligence and opportunities to share experience as part of the transfer of best practices. It should be empha- sised that the TAG also supervises the Central American Law Enforcement Exchange (hereinafter: the CALEE)25, which is addressed to the representatives of the Ameri- can and Central American law enforcement agencies, and its objective is to gather the best experience and to support police operations targeted at strengthening gangster prevention techniques and improving law enforcement.

Controlling motorcycle gangs from the perspective of American Non-Governmental Organisations

National Gang Crime Research Center

The National Gang Crime Research Centre (hereinafter: the NGCRC) was estab- lished in 1990. The centre operates on a non-profit basis and conducts extensive research and educational activities in the field of informing the American society about the dangers caused by gang activities. The NGCRC disseminates the results of its research in the form of reports and other publications, and offers training and consulting services. For instance, the NGCRC undertook extensive research on prison gangs in 2012. An important area of interest for the centre are school gangs, especially those present in public schools, motorcycle gangs included. A significant part of the research being undertaken is focussed on the develop- ment of a proper way of presenting the threats resulting from the activities of gangs and their leaders in the media. The centre organises regularly held conferences, at which topics related to combatting crime typical of motorcycle gangs are discussed26. There is no doubt that if the representatives of the Polish research insti- tutions and services dealing with combatting gangsterism were involved in some projects initiated by the NGCRC, they would learn more about the American experi- ence and could substantially benefit from it in Poland.

International Outlaw Motorcycle Gang Investigators Association International Outlaw Motorcycle Gang Investigators Association (hereinafter: the IOMGIA) was founded in 1974 in the United States. The main goal of the organisation is to provide knowledge of the dangers arising from the activities

25 Electronic source: h t t p s : / / a r c h i v e s . f b i . g o v / a r c h i v e s / n e w s / s t o r i e s / 2 0 0 9 / n o v e m b e r / c al e e _ 1 1 1 0 0 9 , accessed: 10.04.2020. 26 See: Gaines L.K, Miller R.L, Criminal Justice in Action. The Core. Boston: Cengage Lear- ning, 2016, p. 485.

Internal Security, July–December 253 Wiesław Pływaczewski of motorcycle gangs. The association primarily deals with educational activity undertaken in a network of training and development centres. Originally, similar local and regional centres operated in the USA alone. For some time now, they have also covered other continents, including Europe (Europe Training Institute). The training courses and workshops conducted by the IOMGIA are primarily based on case studies, and their objective is to expose the true face of criminal organisations which try to use the motorcycle club formula. An important part of the programmes of the trainings in question are issues concerning the globalisa- tion of the phenomenon of crime gangs, and workshops aimed at learning about the specific nature of individual motorcycle criminal organisations, including proper recognition of the methods and techniques of disguise used by gangs. The association can only be joined by persons over 18 years of age, of good repute, who have never broken the law and, above all, have never belonged to a gang, especially a motorcycle gang. The training courses organised by the IOM- GIA are addressed primarily to representatives of law enforcement agencies and judicial authorities. It goes without saying that the organisation in question is an interesting example of educational activities undertaken to prevent crime. It is worth adding that some of the training facilities where motorcycle gangs in the United States are researched operate within the National Alliance of Gang Investiga- tors Associations and the Central Coast Gang Investigators27.

Controlling motorcycle gangs in Poland — opportunities to take advantage of the American experience in the area of combatting gangsterism Real threats related to the increase in so-called motorcycle crime worldwide oblige the Polish law enforcement agencies to take necessary preventive actions. Above all, such undertakings must be aimed at organising trainings and specialist workshops addressed to prosecutors and officers of the Police, Border Guard, Road Transport Inspection and Public Security Agency, whose main challenge is to identify and smash motorcycle and supporter gangs identifying themselves with extreme ideologies28. The similarities between the subculture of motorcycle gangs and football hooligans seem to confirm that both phenomena should be analysed together, emphasising the uniqueness of each one. The leading role in training activities should be played by those experts who, within the structures of the indicated entities, act as coordinators who specialise in combatting extreme crime. In par- ticular, it concerns police officers dealing with criminal football hooligans who are actively involved in so-called hate crimes. Given the Polish police, due to the exist- ing potential of criminal departments at provincial police headquarters which focus their activities on the fight against the aforementioned criminal structures, it seems obvious that the problems of motorcycle gangs will not be marginalised anymore29. It should be remembered that the number of ‘one-percent’ motorcycle

27 Electronic source: www.nagia.org, accessed: 05.12.2019. 28 Pływaczewski W, Lubiewski P (Eds), Współczesne ekstremizmy…, op. cit., pp. 128–130. 29 One should remember the role the police uniformed branch plays in performing crime prevention activities against motorcycle gangs.

254 Internal Security, July–December Achievements of the American Judiciary and Law Enforcement Agencies in Combatting Gangsterism… clubs operating legally in Poland is growing at an alarming rate. Almost all of the largest international motorcycle structures defined as one-percenters have already had their own individual divisions or clubs playing supportive roles30. It cannot be denied that some of the motorcycle organisations that fit into the formula of a motorcycle club/gang operate illegally or hide their activities, posing as already legalised motorcycle clubs. The most powerful organisational network is that of HAMC31. Apart from legal divisions, there is one support club in Poland called Head Hunters MC32. In addition, HAMC also has structures applying for the status of prospects33. It needs to be noted that the greatest antagonists of the Hell’s Angels, i.e. Bandidos MC, have not been established in Poland yet. However, their support club, Inquisitors MC Poland, has become operational recently34. Outlaws MC has an extensive structure as well. In 2017, there were seven divisions of this organisation (Outlaws MC South, Outlaws MC Słupsk, Outlaws MC Southside Słupsk, Outlaws MC Szczecin, Outlaws MC Warsaw, and Outlaws MC Goleniów)35. Among other clubs of American origin, the support club Warlocks MC, operating under the name Warrlocks MC Poland, deserves special attention36. The appearance of the very first structures referring to the heritage of Australian and New Zealand clubs on the motorcycle map of Poland should also be noted, and Rebels of Road MC Poland is one of them37. An extremely expansive motorcycle organisation is also the German club Gremium MC. It is one of a few such structures that does not originate from American clubs/gangs. The event that made the Polish law enforcement agencies aware of, to some extent, the logistic potential of the American motorcycle clubs was the HAMC rally in Rynia38. The agencies do not seem to have fully used all legal arguments to prevent the event

30 In gang/motorcycle club jargon, the term ‘support’ refers to those organisations whose members are outside the basic gang structures and the leaders of classic gangs employ them for special tasks, in particular those involving a high risk of being identified by the police. The activity is also often considered as a kind of practical training for candidates who seek membership of target criminal structures. Alternatively, support organisations are also known as puppet clubs. 31 Electronic source: http://hells-angels.pl/pl/linki, accessed: 12.04.2020. 32 Electronic source: http://headhuntersmc.pl/, accessed: 14.05.2020. 33 The term ‘prospects’ or ‘strikers’ includes candidates joining a gang. They shall have a trial period of one to three years before they become full members of the structure. During this time, the candidate has a guardian and undergoes various types of tests to check the fit- ness of the candidate and to eliminate the risk of possible police agents or spies representing competing structures entering the gang. 34 Electronic source: http://www.inquisitorsmc.pl/kontakt.html, accessed: 15.05.2020. 35 Electronic source: http://www.outlawsmc.pl/, accessed: 12.04.2020. 36 Electronic source: https://web.facebook.com/pg/warrlocksmc/about/, accessed: 9.05.2020). The Warrlocks MC club/gang was founded in 1967 in Philadelphia (Pennsylvania). It gained a large number of members after the Vietnam War. Only white men may belong to it. Foreign branches of the gang operate in many countries, including Germany and England. 37 Electronic source: https://www.rebelsofroad.pl/index.php/pl/, accessed: 9.11.2019. 38 The meeting took place on 3–5 June 2016. The ‘Hell’s Angels World Run’ is a regular event that takes place once a year. Due to the fact that American immigration services make it difficult for HAMC members from abroad to attend such meetings, they are organised in other countries as well.

Internal Security, July–December 255 Wiesław Pływaczewski from happening. What is more, the event was extremely important for HAMC for image reasons. It must not be forgotten that until now, the HAMC has been imple- menting its global strategy of taking control over new locations in Central and Eastern Europe in an extremely thoughtful and consistent manner39. It can therefore be stated that participation in the rally in Rynia was HAMC’s strategic objective, of which the Polish authorities had no proper understanding. Paradoxically, when compared to other foreign rallies, which often involve bloody clashes between conflicting clubs, the event took place in a good atmosphere, undisturbed by any serious incident. Many crime analysts fully confirm Europol’s opinion that the creation of the new HAMC structures, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, is part of a well-organised plan to create a new route for smuggling not only drugs, but also people and weapons40. It should be highlighted that there has recently been a significant increase in the activity of organisations associated with American gangs and their twin (local) structures in the former post-Soviet Asian republics. Both in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, their law enforcement agencies have been observing increased activity of gangster motorcycle structures41. It should be remembered that these countries have a long history of being a logistical and human resource base for drug gangs. The leading agency responsible for coordinating operations against the motorcycle underground is the Police Central Bureau of Investigation. It seems that the previous involvement of the agency in covert activities, including special operations targeted at exploring the motorcycle underground in Poland, was not successful enough to be able to fully recognise gangster circles associated with some motorcycle clubs42. The agency’s interest in so-called motorcycle issues is incidental rather than systemic in nature. The problems occur occasionally when other issues related to the crackdown on organised criminal structures, in particular the so-called supporter gangs, are dealt with43. Therefore, it would be advisable to offer training to a certain group of Police Central Bureau of Investigation offic- ers, who could in the future constitute the personnel and expertise base for future police cells to be focussed primarily on combatting motorcycle gang crime. The most effective covert surveillance tools used by police forces worldwide in their fight against organised motorcycle crime include special operations44. Therefore, attention should be paid to the need for permanent cooperation between the Police Central Bureau of Investigation and foreign services, which have been using such tools for a long time in their fight against motorcycle gangs. There is no doubt that it is the American police with their relevant experience in combat- ting motorcycle gangs that should be the closest and, at the same time, a strategic partner for the Polish law enforcement agencies, as well as similar services from Ger- many, Great Britain and Scandinavian countries. Therefore, they should be indicated

39 Europejski Urząd Policyjny, ‘Przegląd Europolu — Sprawozdanie ogólne z działalności Europolu’, Urząd Publikacji Unii Europejskiej, Luksemburg 2011. 40 Barker T, Outlaw Motorcycle Gang as Organized Crime Group. London: Springer, 2014, p. 45. 41 Ibid. 42 Pływaczewski W, Gangi motocyklowe. Od wydarzeń w Hollister …, op. cit., p. 102ff. 43 Ibid., p. 98. 44 See: Mądrzejowski W (Ed.), Śnieżko S, Majewski P, Zwalczanie przestępczości. Wybrane metody i narzędzia. Warsaw, 2017, p. 20.

256 Internal Security, July–December Achievements of the American Judiciary and Law Enforcement Agencies in Combatting Gangsterism… as a strategic partner for future cooperation. In particular, the experience of the abovementioned American Office of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives seems impressive. According to Police Central Bureau of Investigation data, mem- bers of the Polish motorcycle gangs supply Western European structures with drugs, including mainly synthetic drugs produced in Poland, such as amphetamine and ecstasy45. More and more often, cocaine and heroin are also smuggled. Until recently, the activity was carried out by single motorcyclists (called lone riders), often operating outside of larger criminal structures. Their recruitment took place during joint rallies or rallies with Western European motorcyclists with links to crimi- nal structures. Today, this activity has almost entirely been taken over by organised criminal gangs. It should be remembered that at the beginning of the 21st century, the American Federal Bureau of Investigation warned the Polish law enforcement agencies that Black Pistons MC, as an official representative of Outlaws MC, was trying to locate their structures in Poland. As is known, Outlaws MC have well- operating divisions in twenty US states, as well as in Belgium, Canada, Germany, Great Britain and . The first Polish motorcycle gang to have been cracked by the Polish police was Road Runners, which identified with Pagans MC. The gang operated in Silesia. Its members carried out assaults and robberies, by attacking major locations of competing motorcycle clubs46. It needs to be emphasised that undertakings addressed to the general public play an extremely important role in preventive actions being performed by the police. Therefore, as part of crime prevention activities, police operations targeted at cooperating with motorcycle clubs and their representatives should be intensified, for instance with the Polish Motorcycle Association and the Congress of the Polish Motorcycle Clubs. So far, relations between the police and representa- tives of these entities have raised a number of objections. It seems that this results from the fact that there are still too few experts in the police and other public services who specialise in issues related to motorcycle gangs. The above-indicated initiatives should also target schoolchildren, who constitute a potential human resource base for gangster structures, in particular motorcycle gangs. In this respect, an important partner for the police in the implementation of crime prevention programmes should be school authorities, for whom so-called street pathologies already exist, and they will become a bigger challenge in the years to come47. The situation can be confirmed by the respondents’ previous opinions on threats related to motorcycle clubs’ activities. It turns out that as much as 70% of the respondents do not perceive this form of activity as a threat to public order. Paradoxically, these opinions are extremely different when criminal gangs are taken into account. It turns out that pejorative opinions refer to the very name of the structure, subject to the analysis, and not its activity, which justifies the need to launch the aforementioned crime prevention initiatives48.

45 Electronic source: http://cbsp.policja.pl/cbs/aktualnosci/134298,Odpowiedza-za- handel-amfetamina-i-ekstazy-policjanci-CBSP-zatrzymali-9-osob.htm, accessed: 15.04.2020. 46 Electronic source: http://nysa.naszemiasto.pl/artykul/tajemnice-piekielnych-aniolow- czyli-gangi-motocyklowe-w,3886097,art,t,id,tm.html, accessed: 11.04.2020. 47 Fraser A, Gangs and Crime. Critical Alternatives. London: SAGE Publications, 2017, pp. 80–82. 48 See: Pływaczewski W, Gangi motocyklowe. Od wydarzeń w Hollister…, op. cit., p. 123.

Internal Security, July–December 257 Wiesław Pływaczewski

It needs to be admitted that the scope of police involvement in their fight against crime related to motorcycle gangs is quite limited since it is mainly based on infor- mation from the Bureau of International Police Cooperation, provided by foreign entities cooperating with the Polish police. Undoubtedly, as has been already highlighted above, some information about motorcycle gang activity is more often present in investigations conducted by the Police Central Bureau of Investigation and other units of the Criminal Investigation Department at various levels. Given the Bureau of International Police Cooperation, for obvious reasons, this involve- ment is limited to providing individual national police services with expertise assistance and sharing international agreements, recommendations and current inquiries about specific cases in progress to foreign police institutions. This activity also involves the Polish obligations being met as regards foreign partners (Interpol, Europol, Schengen Area, BALTCOM). It should be emphasised that serious investigations have been assigned to be carried out by the Police Central Bureau of Investigation. On the other hand, the issue of prevention, as police regulations say, has been dispersed by assigning it to different police departments or services (uniformed branch, CID and fraud squads, road traffic, corruption departments, etc.)49. Even a brief description of the above model of how particular types of services operate proves that there is a lack of a specialist unit responsible for coordinat- ing activities related to preventing and combatting motorcycle crime at the level of the National Police Chief and the services subordinated respectively. However, if such a unit were to be established in the future, it would have to be located within the structures of the Police Central Bureau of Investigation, despite numer- ous organisational reservations. Such a hierarchy of police structures would not necessarily result in the future cooperation being limited to tackling organised gangster crime only. On the contrary, such a unit should be responsible for analysing and coordinating all aspects of motorcycle gangs’ activity and for sharing current information with other relevant agencies in accordance with their competence. All of them should be involved in creating a strategy to prevent threats arising from the expansion of motorcycle gangs in Europe. It would be also appropriate to make significant competence adjustments in this regard, which would ensure wider participation of the Polish police in international undertakings. In light of the proposals presented, the absence of the Polish police in certain operations against motorcycle gangs initiated by Interpol and Europol, for example in the ‘Project Rockers’ operation, may be at least surprising. It is obvious that such initiatives present a unique opportunity to learn about specific foreign police operations targeted at preventing new forms of crime. It should be noted that considerable opportunities arising from the police, judicial and prosecutorial international cooperation concerning motorcycle gangs are of such great significance that it is worth striving for and taking advantage of them in the future. According to experts, so-called motorcycle crime will soon force law enforcement agencies become increasingly involved. At present, criminal proceeds generated by motorcycle gangs are comparable to those com- ing from the most profitable areas of modern crime. As J. Gołębiowski points out,

49 Organisational status of the National Police Headquarters as of 30.01.2019.

258 Internal Security, July–December Achievements of the American Judiciary and Law Enforcement Agencies in Combatting Gangsterism… the abovementioned phenomenon will force the police to radically change both their perception of destructive phenomena associated with organised gang crime and the need to use modern forensic tools in their fight against the crime, both at the stage of covert and investigative activities being conducted50. The current level of knowledge of law enforcement officers of the threats related to the activities of motorcycle gangs, especially those structures whose activity has been recorded in Western Europe, is not entirely satisfactory. Although the results of the survey conducted by the author indicate that the knowledge among police officers was at least good, it should be highlighted that only police officers who had already completed relevant training (studies) or who were directly involved in com- batting the crime in question were subject to the survey. It should also be noted that only a limited number of respondents took part in the survey51. The aforementioned initiatives should be referred to the requirement to con- stantly raise the level of criminological and forensic knowledge by representatives of all services dealing with crime prevention (prosecutors, police officers, customs officers, Border Guard officers). The example of motorcycle gangs proves that without proper education at all levels of the hierarchy of command and areas of activity of the entities in question, it will be difficult to understand the unique character of the analysed phenomenon, and develop effective methods and forms of preventing their symptoms. It would therefore be advisable for the training offer to be systematically updated and supplemented with the content the police have not been interested in so far, in particular with the so-called complementary areas, i.e. situations where, apart from typical gang crime, additional criminological categories of crimes emerge, such as cross-border and organised crime, drug trafficking, money laundering, corruption, etc52. Given the motorcycle subculture, problems typical of the area of criminal psychology and the sociology of deviance are of crucial importance. For example, understanding the complex processes accompanying the commission of hate crimes, recorded by law enforcement agencies in cases against members of motorcycle gangs, requires in-depth knowledge of the human psyche and cultural environment53. The uniqueness of the cases makes police officers obliged to use all of the latest achievements in conducting investigations and covert activities54. All the more so because the gangs’ participation in the structure of crime, as the author has tried to present above, will be constantly increasing a year after year55.

50 See: Jasiński W, Mądrzejowski W, Wiciak K (Eds), Przestępczość zorganizowana. Fenomen. Współczesne zagrożenia. Ujęcie praktyczne. Szczytno, 2013, p. 571ff; see: Horosiewicz K, Współpraca policjantów z osobowymi źródłami informacji. Warsaw, 2015, p. 97ff. 51 Pływaczewski W, Gangi motocyklowe. Od wydarzeń w Hollister…, op. cit., p. 123. 52 See: Porwisz M, Sprzedajność funkcjonariusza Policji. Aspekty normatywne i krymino- logiczne. Szczytno, 2017. 53 Duda M, Przestępstwa z nienawiści. Studium prawnokarne i kryminologiczne. Olsztyn, 2016, p. 312ff. 54 See: Gruza E, Psychologia sądowa dla prawników. Warsaw, 2012; see: Gruza E, Czynności operacyjno-rozpoznawcze, [in:] Gruza E, Goc M, Moszczyński J (Eds), Kryminalistyka — czyli rzecz o metodach śledczych. Warsaw, 2008, pp. 61–77; Taracha A, Czynności operacyjno-roz- poznawcze. Aspekty kryminalistyczne i prawnodowodowe. Lublin, 2006, pp. 118–119. 55 Ibid.

Internal Security, July–December 259 Wiesław Pływaczewski

Considering the noticeable weaknesses of the Polish police in terms of their future-oriented approach to crime related to motorcycle gangs, it seems that the American model of preventing the phenomenon presented herein may be a good example to follow, provided its unique character is also taken into account, due to its different legal system, for example. To sum up, it should be stated that the overall activity of the Polish police in the area of controlling crime related to motorcycle gangs appears to be quite limited at present. On the other hand, the number of public authorities and institutions which, due to their statutory competences, should deal with the indicated issues is constantly growing, which in turn should raise justified concerns about the effec- tiveness of the future strategy for combatting gangsterism. It is noticeable that there is a lack of a single entity that would undertake the task of coordinating activi- ties related to controlling the crime in question in a competent and comprehensive manner. Therefore, the ideas and proposals presented in the article may constitute an appropriate starting point for discussion on new solutions to the subject matter.

Conclusions

The considerations included in the article seem to confirm the fact that police international cooperation in combatting motorcycle gangs constitutes one of the most important crime prevention tools. Becoming increasingly profes- sional and international as regards their area of operation, and which is reflected by the seizures of new illegal markets (drugs, arms trafficking, money laundering, prostitution), the aforementioned agencies need to take advantage of the experi- ence of some foreign services combatting organised crime, and undoubtedly motorcycle gangsterism, especially those actively involved in their fight against motorcycle crime posing a major challenge for them to face. Therefore, the achieve- ments of both the American judiciary and law enforcement agencies may be a valuable source of experience for the Polish services as well, which still remain at the initial stage of learning about the specific character of motorcycle crime. At the same time, it should be noted that apart from typical police methods and resources used in their fight against motorcycle gangs, very good knowledge of the law is also needed, in particular criminal procedural (evidential), admin- istrative and constitutional law. The analysis of numerous disputes between the American police and law firms representing motorcycle clubs/gangs seems to be extremely instructive cognitive material. It allows national law enforcement agencies to avoid the mistakes which have repeatedly prevented those illegal structures from their delegalisation both in the United States and Western Europe. It must not be forgotten that these organisations actually form an integral part of international motorcycle gangs. On the other hand, they are often set up under completely different names than their original structures, which of course is intended to make the prosecution less alert. The delegalisation of one structure results in their members joining another legally operating division. This proverbial ‘cat-and-mouse’ game often destroys the covert and procedural achievements of law enforcement agencies.

260 Internal Security, July–December Achievements of the American Judiciary and Law Enforcement Agencies in Combatting Gangsterism…

As has been emphasised above, an important element of police officers’ readi- ness to conduct investigations into so-called motorcycle crimes is providing them with professional training. In this respect, the Polish police should closely cooper- ate with domestic and foreign institutions, whose achievements have been widely presented in the article. One of the good initiatives addressed to police officers and prosecutors is train- ing manuals published by individual police institutions. They include information on initial investigations conducted in various cases related to motorcycle gangs. As part of specialist training courses, the authors of the publications offer training to future state service officers. An example of such recommended forms of training can be specialist courses organised in police schools for students who are trained in tactics and techniques of fighting various types of crime and economic crime. Such classes are conducted, among others, at the Police Academy in Szczytno, Police Training Centre in Legionowo and at the police schools in Słupsk, Piła and Katowice. There is no doubt that a permanent point of such trainings should be workshops conducted also by foreign experts specialising in combatting gang crime56. A model example of such forms of trainings can be seminars organised by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation on criminal and legal aspects of com- batting organised crime. Consideration should also be taken into the extension of the curriculum of the courses offered by the abovementioned training centres and to include issues related to the phenomenon of extremism associated with motorcycle gangs. Research projects undertaken by the author of the paper, which are part of the curriculum of professional development of police students at the Police Academy in Szczytno, correspond to the previously presented package of crime prevention activities57. It should be added that, in most cases, they are addressed to those officers who are directly involved in combatting various forms of gangsterism. The remarks presented in the article, referring to the specific character of gangs and the way they are viewed by the US police forces, would not be complete without some reference to theoretical achievements of criminology. Criminological con- cepts make it possible to understand the origins of such organisations and to help law enforcement and judicial authorities to develop effective crime prevention strategies. It should be remembered that the involvement of gangs in the structure of global crime is systematically growing, which also justifies the need to scientifi- cally study the aetiology and forms of such a dangerous social phenomenon58.

56 Such classes are carried out, among others, at the Police Academy in Szczytno in the field of study: Criminology. 57 Since 2019, the author has been carrying out a research task: ‘Police cooperation in combatting motorcycle gangsterism — international experiences of law enforcement agencies and the Polish situation’. One of the results of the undertaken research is a study on ‘Motorcycle gangs in Europe. Counteracting the phenomenon from the perspective of international police cooperation’, to be published. 58 See: Hagen F.E, Introduction to Criminology Introduction. Theories, Methods and Crimi- nal Behavior. City Road: SAGE Publication, 2013, p. 11ff.

Internal Security, July–December 261 Wiesław Pływaczewski References

1. American Bar Association. Annual Review of Intellectual Property Law Develop- ments, 2009. 2. Barker T, Biker Gangs and Transnational Organized Crime, Anderson Publishing. Waltham, 2015. 3. Barker T, Outlaw Motorcycle Gang as Organized Crime Group. London: Springer, 2014. 4. Duda M, Przestępstwa z nienawiści. Studium prawnokarne i kryminologiczne. Olsztyn, 2016. 5. Electronic source: http://fi le.lacounty.gov/SDSInter/lasd/144940_PoliceDiploma- cyBook.pdf 6. Europejski Urząd Policyjny, ‘Przegląd Europolu — Sprawozdanie ogólne z działalności Europolu’, Urząd Publikacji Unii Europejskiej. Luksemburg, 2011. 7. Federal Bureau of Investigation, ‘2015 National Gang Report — NGR’. Washing- ton, 2016. 8. Fraser A, Gangs and Crime. Critical Alternatives. London: SAGE Publications, 2017. 9. Gaines L.K, Miller R.L, Criminal Justice in Action. The Core. Boston: Cengage Learning, 2016. 10. Gruza E, Czynności operacyjno-rozpoznawcze, [in:] Gruza E, Goc M, Moszczyński J (Eds), Kryminalistyka — czyli rzecz o metodach śledczych. Warsaw, 2008. 11. Gruza E, Psychologia sądowa dla prawników. Warsaw, 2012 12. Hagan F.E, Daigle L.E, Introduction to Criminology. Theories, Methods and Crimi- nal Behavior, SAGE Publication, edition 10. City Road, 2018. 13. Hagen F.E, Introduction to Criminology Introduction. Theories, Methods and Criminal Behavior. City Road: SAGE Publication, 2013. 14. Haut F, Organized crime on two wheels. Motorcycle gangs. International Crimi- nal Police Review, 1999, No. 474–475. 15. Horosiewicz K, Współpraca policjantów z osobowymi źródłami informacji. War- saw, 2015. 16. Jasiński W, Mądrzejowski W, Wiciak K (Eds), Przestępczość zorganizowana. Fenomen. Współczesne zagrożenia. Ujęcie praktyczne. Szczytno, 2013. 17. Lauchs M, Bikies in Europe, [in:] Pływaczewski E.W, Guzik-Makaruk E.M (Eds), Current Problems of the Penal Law and Criminology. Warsaw, 2017. 18. Lavigne Y, Byłem Aniołem Piekła. Okrutny świat morderców na harleyach. War- saw, 2006. 19. Mądrzejowski W (Ed.), Śnieżko S, Majewski P, Zwalczanie przestępczości. Wybrane metody i narzędzia. Warsaw, 2017. 20. Pływaczewski W, Gangi motocyklowe. Od wydarzeń w Hollister po współczesne przejawy przestępczości zorganizowanej. Warsaw: Difi n, 2018. 21. Pływaczewski W, Lubiewski P (Eds), Współczesne ekstremizmy. Geneza, prze- jawy, przeciwdziałanie. Olsztyn, 2014. 22. Porwisz M, Sprzedajność funkcjonariusza Policji. Aspekty normatywne i krymi- nologiczne. Szczytno, 2017. 23. Queen W, Under and Alone. The True Story of the Undercover Agent Who Infi l- trated America’s Most Violent Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs. Random House Pub- lishing Group, 2007.

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24. ‘Sonny’ Barger R, Zimmerman K, Zimmerman K, Hell’s Angels. The Life and Times of Sonny Barger and the Hell’s Angels Motorcycle Club. New York: Harper Collins Publishers Inc., 2000. 25. Taracha A, Czynności operacyjno-rozpoznawcze. Aspekty kryminalistyczne i prawnodowodowe. Lublin, 2006.

About the Author

Wiesław Pływaczewski, Full professor of legal sciences at the University of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn, specialization in criminal law and criminology. Head of the Department of Criminology and Forensic Science at the Faculty of Law and Administration of the University of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn. Member of the International Police Executive Symposium, American Society of Criminology, member of the European Society of Criminology, Polish Society of Criminology and member of the Polish Criminal Society. He is the author of over 250 scientifi c publications (published in domestic and foreign periodicals). In 2008 he received a special award from the President of the International Police Executive Symposium (IPES). Co-initiator and signatory of the Scientifi c Forum ‘Podlasie-Warmia and Mazury’. Main areas of scientifi c interest: contemporary trends in crime (including organized crime) in Poland and in the world, crime against the natural human environment, illegal art market, so-called CITES crime. E-mail: [email protected]

Streszczenie. Artykuł dotyczy problematyki przeciwdziałania zjawisku gangsteryzmu, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem gangów motocyklowych. Autor przedstawia obraz współczesnej przestępczości motocyklowej w Stanach Zjednoczonych. W zasadniczej części opracowania zawarto charakterystykę najważniejszych służb policyjnych oraz innych podmiotów, które zajmują się zwalczaniem gangów w Stanach Zjednoczonych. Natomiast w podsumowaniu artykułu znalazły się propozycje dotyczące możliwości wykorzystania przez polskie organy ścigania międzynarodowych doświadczeń w zakresie walki z motocyklową przestępczością.

Zusammenfassung. Der Artikel befasst sich mit der Problematik der Bekämpfung des Phänomens des Gangstertums, mit besonderem Augenmerk auf Motorrad-Gangs. Der Autor zeichnet ein Bild der zeitgenössischen Motorradkriminalität in den Vereinigten Staaten. Der Hauptteil der Studie enthält die Merkmale der wichtigsten Polizeidienststellen und anderer Einrichtungen, die sich mit der Bekämpfung von Banden in den Vereinigten Staaten befassen. In der Zusammenfassung des Artikels finden sich jedoch Vorschläge, wie die polnischen Strafverfolgungsbehörden die internationalen Erfahrungen bei der Bekämpfung der Motorradkriminalität anwendenatomiast können.

Резюме. Статья посвящена проблемам противодействия бандитизму, с особым рассмотрением вопросов, связанных с деятельностью байкерских банд. Автором представлена картина современной мотопреступности в Соединенных Штатах Америки. Основная часть исследования содержит характеристики важнейших полицейских служб и других структур по борьбе с бандитскими группировками в США. В заключительной части статьи содержатся предложения, касающиеся возможности использования польскими правоохранительными органами международного опыта в области борьбы с мотопреступностью.

Internal Security, July–December 263

Selection of Police in Europe: Comparing the Hungarian and Polish Systems

Gergely Mogyoródi ORCID: 0000-0002-1598-305X National University of Public Services,

Abstract. Over the past few years, due to the growing needs of personnel, the Hungarian police has faced recruitment challenges. Although there is a high demand for new recruits, the standards of the entry requirements are relatively strict and difficult to meet. The question is whether the requirements are still serving the needs of the organisation. The objective of this study was to learn a different practice by comparing the Hungarian and Polish selection methods to assist in improving and to find applicable methods for the selection procedure of the Hungarian police.There are many similarities between the two countries, and following from this, it was assumed that the selection of police is also similar, and therefore the attributes could be compared. To analyse the topic, for contextual purposes, as they determine the mentioned characteristics, both the organisational and the educational attributes were studied as well. Researching the topic, the relevant literature was analysed. Data that could not be collected from the literature was collected by a questionnaire sent to Cepol and to a liaison officer, and an interview was also performed with a Polish police officer who volunteered for the study. The research indicates that both forces apply physical, medical and psychological requirements in the same regard, but with territorial and policing-cultural specifics. It was found that Poland and Hungary struggle with the number of fit applicants, but neither country uses modern selection methods that could have a positive effect on selecting the new recruits. DOI: 10.5604/01.3001.0014.6698 http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0014.6698

Keywords: police recruitment, entry requirements, comparison study

Introduction

Since 2010, the number of police in Hungary has increased from 33,450 to 38,5131. Due to a recruitment campaign that was launched in the recent years to handle the changing trends in illegal immigration, this enlarging procedure is still ongoing, the purpose of which being to increase the number of staff by 3,000 new recruits. Attracting enough applicants, and selecting those who meet the strict and rela- tively difficult entry requirements by keeping the professional standards defined by law is a challenging mission, the problem of which can be considered as the basis of this research. The question is whether the methods used during the selection still represent the needs of the police and whether the professional standards are not confronting the interests of the organisation. It is unnecessary to emphasise the need of police because here it is equal to find a good number of eligible applicants to accomplish the organisational requirements. The entry standards of Hungarian police are defined in different acts. Such standards can be categorised as personal, educational and eligibility criteria (physi- cal, psychological and medical) which will be discussed in detail in this paper. The requirements should be in line with the philosophy of the police organisation while the policing strategy depends on political, economic and demographic variables,

1 Official number of police in Hungary in 2017.

Internal Security, July–December 265 Gergely Mogyoródi besides ‘a plethora of other variables influencing policing in a country, area or precinct.’2 This suggests that the entry requirements and the selection procedure of police are unique and characterised by the attributes (such as historical traditions, democratic systems and political cultures, languages and civil religions3 of a particular state. Despite policing being mainly shaped by the abovelisted national specifics, in Europe, there are a lot of common values that have become central to being European: human rights, democratic belief systems4 which also have an influence on policing in a country. For instance, according to the Article 23 of the European Code of Police Eth- ics (European Code 2001): ‘Police personnel shall be able to demonstrate sound judgement, an open attitude, maturity, fairness, communication skills and, where appropriate, leadership and management skills. Moreover, they shall possess a good understanding of social, cultural and community issues.’ It suggests that the European police forces should seek those applicants who are at least able to meet these specifications. Following from these thoughts, it is assumed that police forces in Europe (independently from the organisational specifics) should rule the eligibility criteria in a similar way. On the other hand, it is assumed that these criteria, set according to professional requirements, are chang- ing flexibly when there is a high demand for staff. Why should these criteria be discussed and compared? Composing the question differently, why should the eligibility criteria of police in Hungary be compared with the those of the Polish police? Firstly, so far, this topic was has not been studied in the relevant Hungarian literature, thus this can be considered as addressing a deficiency. Secondly, the purposes of comparison in the field of policing are: to gain informa- tion about similar items abroad, to gain scientifically based knowledge of the facts of different practices, to compare local developments with others, to gain more understanding of each other in Europe, and to understand better one’s own activities.5 Reverting to the second question, there are so many social, cultural and politi- cal similarities between Hungary and Poland. The similarities can also be observed in the model of the public administration6 or the police organisation, and therefore it was presumed that some attributes could be compared and contrasted. Besides, interviews indicated that in Poland in 2017, the number of Police vacan- cies were increased by 1,000. It was also indicated therein that it was becoming more difficult to recruit police trainees, but at the same time, according to the report of Goclowski & Witenberg7, employee turnover has been increasing (even among the new recruits) because of the bad working conditions and low-salaries. 2 Roelfose C, Comparative Policing: Theory and Praxis. Internal Security, 2015 Vol. 7, Issue 2, p. 245. 3 Jaschke H-G, Bjørgo T, Romero F.B, Kwanten C, Mawby R, Pagon M, Perspectives of Police Science in Europe. 2007. Electronic source: www.cepol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/website/ Research_Science/PGEAPS_Final_Report.pdf, p. 159, accessed: 12.09.2019. 4 Jaschke, p. 159. 5 Jaschke, p. 164. 6 (Linder, 2018, pp. 19–20) 7 Goclowski M, Witenberg K, Polish policemen protest demanding pay rises. 2018. Electronic source: www.reuters.com/article/us-poland-protests/polish-policemen-protest- demanding-pay-rises-idUSKCN1MC1RT

266 Internal Security, July–December Selection of Police in Europe: Comparing the Hungarian and Polish Systems

For this reason, as in the Hungarian police, the Polish police also faced problems of attracting applicants, which highlights the need of such comparative studies.

Research topic

The objective of this paper is to describe and analyse what the entry requirements of the Hungarian and the Polish police are; what the differences and similarities between these two systems are. Besides this, the article will also discuss and describe the organisational and edu- cational background of these forces to understand what exert an influence on the criteria.

Research method

The selection of police has a lot of facets; therefore this topic could be approached and analysed from different perspectives. These perspectives can be medical, psychological and physical, or they could also be examined according to the thesis of organisation theories. Taking into consideration the interdisciplinarity of this topic, each discipline of science has its own influence on the eligibility criteria and the selection procedure, therefore it could be discussed separately with a different point of view highlighting their own role and importance. What method should be used to approach the topic? Police science is an applied science and ‘deals with the knowledge police man- agement needs to do its job’ and has a specific ‘European approach’. ‘The main point of a European approach to Police Science will be the comparison of structures.’8 Following this approach, the topic was analysed by the comparative method. To learn what the similar structures are and to get to know the background of the dif- ferences, the research will focus on giving a detailed overview and will not examining each item explicitly. Roelfose9 says that to compare policing systems, it is necessary to reflect on how religion, culture, politics and other factors determine the polic- ing model of a particular state, region or community, but because of the limitation, this paper will make no mentions of these, and will focus mainly on the entry requirements and consequentially on the organisational and the educational background of the Hungarian and Polish police forces. Concerning the difficulties of the comparison, it must also be highlighted that besides the similarities of the Hungarian and Polish police, there are many differences which can be barriers to performing the comparison in particular questions (for exam- ple, police education). Data collection was performed through the relevant literature, questionnaires and interviews, which were conducted10 in English. Both the questionnaire and the

8 Jaschke, p. 164. 9 Roelfose C, p. 246. 10 In May and July 2017, March 2018. The questionnaires were sent to Cepol and to a li- aison officer to get official answers while the interview was performed with a Polish police

Internal Security, July–December 267 Gergely Mogyoródi interviews were structured by open questions which related to the organisational (including the educational) specifics and the selection procedure. The composition of this paper will be the following. First, the organisational, thereafter the educational specifics of the countries will be discussed. These will be followed by the recruitment methods and the entry requirements. The article will be brought to an end with the conclusion.

Concepts used in the article

Entry requirements mean the complex personal, educational and eligibility criteria for entering the police. Eligibility means that someone is fit to be a policeperson e.g. medically, physi- cally or psychologically. Selection procedure is the process where the applicants are examined to deter- mine whether they meet the entry requirements.

Main part

Structure and staff of Hungarian and Polish police

At this part of the paper, many things could be mentioned and compared, but here, the only aim is to list those characteristics (organisational model, the role, the staff categories and the number of police) which serve the contextual purpose. First, it must be emphasised that the Hungarian and the Polish police are armed and uniformed forces. Both police models are centralised (centrally commanded); the controlling and overseeing mechanism is done by their respective Ministry11. Analogously, the roles (e.g. protection of public order or property, detecting crimes, and others) determined in their national police act presents similarities, with the exception that in Hungary, the border policing unit is a part of the police service, while in Poland, the Border Guards have their separate organisation. Similarly, the service is divided into three levels (local, territorial and central) in compliance with the administrative (geographical: voivodeships in Poland, counties in Hungary) areas and a number of different services (riot police and other specialised units). The territory and population of Poland is significantly larger, but the number of sworn officers per 100,000 person is far lower12. The categories of police ranks are constructed the same way: sergeants, warrant officers, officers, senior officers and generals. officer who volunteered. 11 The Ministry is the Ministry of Interior in Hungary, and the Ministry of Interior and Ad- ministration in Poland. 12 In Poland, there are 258 officers per 100,000 inhabitants, in Hungary this number is 340. Mazzocco, 2017.

268 Internal Security, July–December Selection of Police in Europe: Comparing the Hungarian and Polish Systems

The ratio of women among the sworn officers and the ratio of employed non- officer staff categories (public officials or employees) are higher in Hungary. The total number of police, the pattern of staff categories and the male–female ratio of sworn officers are summarised in the chart below.

Table 1. Pattern of staff categories and the male–female ratio of sworn offi cers

Hungary13 Poland14 Total number of police 38,51315 103,30916 Female officers (% of total) 8,696 (22.58) 15,843 (15.33) Male officers 29,817 87,466 Non-officer staff categories 12,706 24,620

Source: Author’s own elaboration.

Training systems

The training system of Polish police is a two-tier system that includes a basic vocational training (conducted in Katowice, Piła and Słupsk) and a higher academic course (Police Academy in Szczytno). After being admitted to the service, the new recruits are directed to basic training which is compulsory for all new trainees regardless their educational and professional background (note that this is the only compulsory training course which is prepared by police). The program is modular and based on the required theoretical knowledge and professional skills to perform official tasks. Training for university graduates is also prepared by police to perform official tasks in positions where higher professional qualifications are required. This educa- tion is not compulsory. Both the basic vocational training program and the training for university gradu- ates program are determined by the Chief Commander of the Police. The Hungarian police training system is basically a two-tier system as well which includes vocational training courses conducted at police schools (Adyliget, Körmend, Miskolc and Szeged). The other components of police education are the tertiary educational courses (Ba, Ma and PhD) conducted at the National Uni- versity of Public Services (hereinafter: NUPS) Law Enforcement Faculty. In contrast to the Polish system, in Hungary, not all new recruits are directed to basic (vocational) training. Those applicants who are admitted to one of the vocational schools can start their career as a sergeant; while completing a full- time law enforcement Ba course at NUPS, the applicant can commence the career as an officer (lieutenant).

13 Official number of police in Hungary in 2017. 14 Data of 1 February 2018. 15 Official data of last year (2017). 16 On 1 February 2018, the number of police vacancies was 5,117.

Internal Security, July–December 269 Gergely Mogyoródi

Due to the contrast in the commencement of career in service, only the sta- tistical data of the basic training courses can be compared. Basically, the criteria are the same for the police school and NUPS applicants as well. Whenever there is a significant additional condition or difference between the criteria of the police school and the NUPS, it will be indicated in the text.

Recruitment Concerning the recruitment, the methods used to attract applicants are analysed below. As was observed, the recruitment toolboxes of both systems are very similar. The recruitment procedures/campaigns are advertised on the central website of the police or on other electronic services such as Facebook. Other activities include press and poster campaigns. The applicants can search for information relating to the role of police or the tasks carried out on the website of police. A tool which assists the applicants to decide by self-assessment questions whether they are fit for the role of police was not found in any of the systems. Such a tool was developed by the College of Policing (UK) and is called ‘Pre-application Questions for New Police Constables’, which may be a good solution for preventing the early drop-out of candidates.

The application The below chart summarises and compares the terms of application in Poland and in Hungary.

Table 2. Terms of application in Poland and in Hungary

Poland Hungary17 Be a Polish citizen of good repute. Be a Hungarian citizen, have full capacity, be at least 18 years old. Not convicted by a final court sentence of a Clean criminal record and fair life conduct. crime or fiscal offence. Have full public rights. Permanent Hungarian residence. Have at least high school graduation. Have at least high school graduation. Be physically and mentally able to serve Agrees to restrict fundamental rights. in armed forces. Provide a guarantee of secrecy. Give allowance to handle personal data and controlling the fair life conduct. Source: Author’s own elaboration.

In Poland, when applying for admission, the candidates submit the required documents at a competent Metropolitan HR department (office for selection) of Police. The selection procedure begins with the submission of such documents.

17 According to the NUPS website: applicants of NUPS must not be older than 25 years in the year of application. Beyond this, applicants must have a B2 level language exam either from one of the of- ficial languages of the EU or from Ukrainian, Serbian, Romany, Bayash and Russian, or Chinese.

270 Internal Security, July–December Selection of Police in Europe: Comparing the Hungarian and Polish Systems

In Hungary, the application must be posted or lodged in person in the police schools, while the NUPS applicants must apply electronically through the website of the competent authority. Applying to the service, both police forces require the necessary documentation (application form, completed personal questionnaire) to be filled in and copies of certificates (educational, etc.) to be attached. Additionally, the Polish police requires the military service book (if the candidate is obliged to perform military service), while police schools requires the CV of the candidate. The application process in Poland is continuous. For the candidates, the selection procedure begins when the application and its annexes are submitted at the com- petent unit of voivodeship’s police HQ. Applications in Hungary for the courses of the police school and the NUPS must be lodge by February of the given year.

Selection procedure and eligibility criteria The procedure has a competitive nature. Its purpose to determine whether the candidate is suitable and meets the requirements. The selection procedures consist of the following stages which are summarised in the following chart.

Table 3. Stages of selection procedure

Poland Hungary18 Stages and the unit responsible for the stage Submitting the application documents at the competent Submitting the application documents police unit at the competent police unit Literacy written test/ Literacy written test/ Police training unit Police school Physical fitness test/ Physical fitness test/ Police training unit Police school Preliminary determination of minimal Psychological test points to be earned during the procedure. Interview/ Psychological and medical examination/ Carried out by a team (composed of 2–4 people) which Carried out by the competent police is appointed by the competent supervisor of the qualifica- unit according to the residence of the tion proceedings in the police headquarters of voivodeship. applicant Medical examination/ Hearing of applicant/ Medical commission of the Ministry of Interior Police school and Administration Vetting Vetting

Source: Author’s own elaboration 18

18 In the stages of the NUPS selection procedure, there are slight differences, such as: applicants do not have to write a literacy test. The points to be collected during the recruit- ment depend on the results of graduation subjects. Additional points can be collected with language exam or sport results. Because of the differences, the comparison will only be per- formed between the basic training (vocational school) courses.

Internal Security, July–December 271 Gergely Mogyoródi

Each of the aforementioned stages could be discussed separately with a differ- ent approach (for example, comparing the requirements of medical examinations). As is indicated above, here, the objective was only to see what the principals were and what the philosophy was. Discussing the submission of the application documents, the literacy test or the vetting procedure are not the key issues of this article, and therefore a few thoughts will be mentioned only briefly about these stages. The submission of documents was presented among the application conditions. The literacy test is simply focussing on checking the general knowledge mainly on the characteristics of the national administration and governance. The aim of vetting is simply to conduct the necessary verifications analysing all security aspects that might be unfit for the service. The physical fitness test in Poland is an obstacle course that consists of running, somersault, carrying a prone figure, hurdling, sit-ups, jumping obstacles, throw- ing a medicine ball and shuttle running. The requirements are the same for males and females, the course has to be performed in less than 1 minute and 41 seconds. The Hungarian physical fitness test includes the following exercises: The compul- sory exercise is a 2,000 metre run, and four additional exercises have to be chosen from the following six: push-ups, hand-climbing, bench press, 4X10 metre shuttle run, standing jump and sit. During each exercise, the applicants collect points from which a minimum has to be achieved. The requirements vary based on the age and sex of the applicant (descending from the younger to the older, while female applicants have lower requirements).

Table 4. Results of physical test

Poland Hungary19 Number Number Number Number Year of successful of successful of applicants of applicants applicants applicants 2014 32,509 24,131 3,060 2,088 2015 18,237 14,676 3,138 2,041 2016 19,109 15,008 2,839 2,119 2017 19,333 15,173 1,893 1,461

Source: Author’s own elaboration.19

The medical examination in Poland is conducted by physicians (orthopedist, cardiologist, neurologist, psychologist, psychiatrist, gynecologist, etc.) who assess the health status of the recruit on the basis of the medical examination, results of additional, specialist and psychological tests, medical history, medical records resulting from observations in the treatment of the person, outpatient and sanitary treatment, other medical documents relevant to make an assessment, and post-acci- dent protocols that might be crucial to the content of the judgement. The purpose of this stage is to decide whether the candidate is fit for the police service or not.

19 Statistics of police schools.

272 Internal Security, July–December Selection of Police in Europe: Comparing the Hungarian and Polish Systems

The main principles (the method of assessment) of the Hungarian medical examination are the same as in Poland. During this stage, the examined areas20 are weight, body height, body mass index (BMI index) and body proportions, the skin, dentures, circulatory, respiratory, abdominal organs, the nervous system, sensory organs, joints, musculature and bones, and physical and mental disabilities.

Table 5. Results of medical test.

Poland Hungary21 Number Number Number Number Year of successful of successful of applicants of applicants applicants applicants 2014 3,621 2,795 2,088 1,584 2015 3,311 2,720 2,041 1,573 2016 4,539 3,904 2,119 1,715 2017 4,360 3,721 1,461 1,221

Source: Author’s own elaboration.21

Both the Polish and the Hungarian police apply psychological tests which are conducted in written and oral form. In Poland, the following are examined during the evaluation: intellectual pre- dispositions, social behaviour, stability, work attitudes. It consists of a computer test and a conversation with a candidate which concerns experiences, attitudes and predispositions based on the results of the computer test. In Hungary, the examinations are related to the personality, the psychological balance, the skills, the deviances and path stimulation. Accordingly, personality tests, intelligence tests, paper-based and instrumental attention surveys are used, while the exploration is performed in a complex way.

Table 6. Results of psychological test

Poland Hungary22 Number Number Number Number Year of successful of successful of applicants of applicants applicants applicants 2014 22,010 6,353 1,584 1,291 2015 19,493 5,876 1,573 1,303 2016 17,295 5,424 1,715 1,518 2017 14,820 5,086 1,221 1,102

Source: Author’s own elaboration.22

20 The examination shall extend to other areas. 21 Statistics of police schools. 22 Statistics of police schools.

Internal Security, July–December 273 Gergely Mogyoródi

In both systems, it is necessary to obtain a positive result from all of the above steps to be placed on the ranking list (the list of candidates awaiting admission to service). Admission depends on the number of points23 collected by the candidate and the number of people planned to be accepted in a given period. The rank- ing order depends on the total number of points received (from the highest score to the lowest). The chart below summarises the number of applicants and the admitted applicants.

Table 7. Number of admitted applicants

Poland Hungary24 Number Admitted Number Number of successful Year of applicants applicants of applicants applicants 2014 31,036 4,015 3,060 1,004 2015 22,621 3,005 3,138 998 2016 22,445 5,048 2,839 1,200 2017 23,814 4,111 1,893 877

Source: Author’s own elaboration.24

While the Polish police maintains a reserve list of eligible candidates, in Hungary, there is no such tool. In Hungary, the results of the examination are valid for one year, but the recruitment procedure has to be retaken if the candidate is not admitted. A candidate can be dismissed from the procedure if they fail to submit the requested documents, meet the personal requirements, complete any of the stages of the recruitment procedure or participate in the stages of the procedure. In Hungary, if the applicant fails any of the examinations, the failed examination can be retaken after one year. In Poland, there are different rules for the repetition of stages: submission after 6 months, physical test after 6 months, psychological test after 12 months, interview after 6 months, psychological ability test after 12 months, vetting after 12 months. There is always the question of what reflects the effectiveness of the selection procedures. From one point of view, it can be a sign of effective selection if the new recruit is able to perform during the training and adapt to the new sphere. In Hungary, the common reasons for candidates dropping out during the train- ings are: failure of performing the training requirements, family reasons, better terms of employment abroad, termination of probation, and heavy physical work- load. In Poland, the reasons for dropping out are: failure to perform the training requirements, and disciplinary offences. The chart below presents the number of persons who dropped out during the basic training course.

23 Extra points can be also earned for education (such as having a Master’s degree) and other skills. 24 Statistics of police schools.

274 Internal Security, July–December Selection of Police in Europe: Comparing the Hungarian and Polish Systems

Table 8. Number of candidates who drop out during the basic training course

Year Poland Hungary25 2015 133 139 2016 332 153 2017 265 96

Source: Author’s own elaboration.25

The Polish selection procedure is regulated by an order of the Ministry of Interior and Administration. Between July 2005 and January 2018, the selection procedure was modified six times. The regulation was last modified in February 2017 and concerned the evaluation points as the number of points to be earned for the secondary police vocational school was increased from 2 to 4. In Hungary, the selection and the eligibility criteria are defined by law as well. Efforts are being made to render the selection into a competency-based selection.

Conclusions

It is obvious that not all of the aspects of the police organisation, the education and the entry requirements were described and compared. There are many aspects which are unfit for comparison because of their nature, e.g. the higher police educa- tion in Poland and in Hungary. Basically, the aim of the above summary was to find and compare those charac- teristics which represent the philosophy of policing, the education and the principles of the entry requirements to show that the eligibility criteria are almost similar. Comparing the entry requirements, the research has shown that in both Hun- gary and Poland, the requirements are organised around the following categories: personal, educational and eligibility criteria.

Figure 1.

Personal requirements

Medically, physically and Educational psychologically requirements eligible

Source: Author’s own elaboration.

25 Statistics of police schools.

Internal Security, July–December 275 Gergely Mogyoródi

In the aforementioned categories, among the compared attributes, there were a large quantity of similarities and a smaller number of differences which will not be repeated here. It is apparent that both the medical and the psychological examinations are focussing on the clinical aspects and avoiding the use of modern HR solutions such as an online pre-application test or an assessment centre. The latter solutions are used as selection methods in the UK. Both the Polish and the Hungarian police are facing recruitment challenges, but from the collected data, it was unable to be proven that the entry requirements have been or will be changed in order to increase the number of applicants. So far, both forces are maintaining their own standards, but the question is whether they can maintain them in the future or if they will have to be changed to succeed in recruiting the desired number of staff. There are current, real examples the personal requirements being altered in order to enlarge the number of police. For instance, the police of Brandenburg are hiring Polish citizens to provide the necessary staff (Chazan, 2018).

References

1. 1994. évi XXXIV. törvény a rendőrségről. 2. 2015. évi XLII. törvény a rendvédelmi feladatokat ellátó szervek hivatásos ál- lományának szolgálati jogviszonyáról. 3. 57/2009. (X. 30.) IRM–ÖM–PTNM együttes rendelet egyes rendvédelmi szervek hivatásos állományú tagjai egészségi, pszichikai és fi zikai alkalmasságáról, kö- zalkalmazottai és köztisztviselői munkaköri egészségi alkalmasságáról, a szol- gálat-, illetve keresőképtelenség megállapításáról, valamint az egészségügyi alapellátásról. 4. Chazan G, German police open up to applicants from Poland. 2018. Electronic source: www.ft.com/content/9f62345e-43a7-11e8-93cf-67ac3a6482fd 5. Electronic source: www.researchgate.net/publication/307819606_Comparative_ Policing_Theory_and_Praxis 6. European Code of Police Ethics (2011). 7. Goclowski M, Witenberg K, Polish policemen protest demanding pay rises. 2018. Electronic source: www.reuters.com/article/us-poland-protests/polish-police- men-protest-demanding-pay-rises-idUSKCN1MC1RT 8. Jaschke H-G, Bjørgo T, Romero F.B, Kwanten C, Mawby R, Pagon M, Perspectives of Police Science in Europe. 2007. Electronic source: www.cepol.europa.eu/sites/ default/fi les/website/Research_Science/PGEAPS_Final_Report.pdf. 9. Kerezsi K, Pap András L, Rendészet, tudomány, doktori iskola. n.d., Electronic source: http://real.mtak.hu/36930/1/341ny_doktori_iskola_korr_pal.pdf 10. Linder Viktória, Nemzetközi trendek a közszolgálatban. Budapest, 2014, Elec- tronic source: https://cmsadmin-pub.uni-nke.hu/document/vtkk-uni-nke-hu/ nemzetkozi-trendek-a-kozszolgalatban.original.pdf 11. Mazzocco V, Hrvatska ima dvostruko više policije nego u vrijeme Jugoslavije. 2017, Electronic source: www.index.hr/vijesti/clanak/samo-bugarska-i-spanjols-

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ka-imaju-vise-policajca-od-hrvatske-cuva-nas-dvostruko-vise-plavaca-nego-u- jugoslaviiji/997840.aspx 12. Polish Police Act. 13. Pre-application Questions for New Police Constables. Electronic source: www. ncalt.com/pre-join 14. Roelofse C, Comparative Policing: Theory and Praxis, Internal Security, 2015 Vol. 7, Issue 2. 15. The English Version of the Website of Polish Police. Electronic source: www.polic- ja.pl/pol/english-version/4889,Polish-National-Police.html 16. The Website of Hungarian Police. Electronic source: www.police.hu 17. The Website of Interpol: Member Countries — Poland. Electronic source: www. interpol.int 18. The Website of National University of Publics Service. Electronic source: http:// felveteli.uni-nke.hu/rtk/felveteli-kovetelmenyek/

About the Author

Gergely Mogyoródi, PhD student, head of department, International Law Enforcement Centre. National University of Public Services, Hungary. Scientifi c interest: law enforcement. E-mail: [email protected].

Streszczenie. W ciągu ostatnich kilku lat, ze względu na rosnące potrzeby kadrowe, węgierska policja stanęła w obliczu wyzwań związanych z rekrutacją. Chociaż istnieje duże zapotrzebowanie na nowych rekrutów, to jednak standardy dotyczące wymagań wstępnych są stosunkowo surowe i trudne do spełnienia. Pytanie brzmi, czy wymagania nadal służą potrzebom organizacji? Celem tego badania było poznanie innej praktyki doboru poprzez porównanie węgierskich i polskich metod selekcji, aby poprawić i znaleźć odpowiednie metody dla tej procedury w policji węgierskiej. Pomiędzy krajami istnieje wiele podobieństw i w związku z tym przyjęto, że procesy doboru w policji również są podobne, a zatem można je do siebie porównać. W celu analizy tematu, dla celów kontekstowych, które to decydują o wymienionych cechach, zbadano również cechy organizacyjne i edukacyjne. Badając temat przeanalizowano odpowiednią literaturę przedmiotu. Dane, których nie można było zebrać z literatury, zostały zebrane za pomocą kwestionariusza wysłanego do CEPOL-u i do oficera łącznikowego, przeprowadzono również wywiad z polskim policjantem, który zgłosił się do badania jako ochotnik. Badania wykazały, że obie formacje stosują wymogi fizyczne, medyczne i psychologiczne w tym samym zakresie, ale z różną specyfiką terytorialną i policyjno-kulturową. Stwierdzono, że Polska i Węgry mają problem z liczbą odpowiednich kandydatów, ale żaden z krajów nie stosuje nowoczesnych metod selekcji, które mogłyby mieć pozytywny wpływ na wybór nowych kandydatów.

Zusammenfassung. In den letzten Jahren sah sich die ungarische Polizei aufgrund des wachsenden Personalbedarfs mit Rekrutierungsproblemen konfrontiert. Obwohl es eine starke Nachfrage nach Neueinstellungen gibt, sind die Standards für die Aufnahmebedingungen relativ streng und schwer zu erfüllen. Die Frage ist, ob die Anforderungen noch den Bedürfnissen der Organisation entsprechen. Ziel dieses Aufsatzes ist es, durch den Vergleich des ungarischen und polnischen Auswahlverfahrens eine andere Auswahlpraxis kennen zu lernen, um geeignete Methoden für dieses Verfahren in der ungarischen Polizei zu verbessern und zu finden. Es gibt viele Gemeinsamkeiten zwischen den Ländern und deshalb wurde angenommen, dass auch die Auswahlverfahren für die Polizei ähnlich sind und daher miteinander verglichen werden können. Auch organisatorische und pädagogische Merkmale wurden für kontextbezogene Zwecke untersucht, die diese Merkmale bestimmen. Die einschlägige Literatur zu diesem Thema wurde gründlich analysiert. Daten, die aus der Literatur nicht erhoben werden konnten, wurden mit Hilfe eines Fragebogens gesammelt, der an die EPA und den Verbindungsbeamten geschickt wurde, und mit einem polnischen Polizeivollzugsbeamten wurde auch ein Interview geführt, der sich freiwillig für die Studie gemeldet hatte. Die Untersuchung zeigte, dass beide Formationen die physischen,

Internal Security, July–December 277 Gergely Mogyoródi medizinischen und psychologischen Anforderungen im gleichen Umfang anwenden, jedoch mit unterschiedlichen territorialen und polizeilich-kulturellen Merkmalen. In Polen und Ungarn wurde festgestellt, dass es ein Problem mit der Zahl der geeigneten Bewerber und Bewerberinnen gibt, aber keines der beiden Länder verwendet moderne Auswahlmethoden, die sich positiv auf die Nachwuchsauswahl auswirken könnten.

Резюме. В течение последних нескольких лет венгерская полиция сталкивается с проблемами при наборе персонала в связи с растущими кадровыми потребностями. Несмотря на высокий спрос на новых сотрудников, стандарты в отношении условий приема на работу являются относительно строгими и их выполнение затруднено. Вопрос состоялся в том, удовлетворяют ли эти требования все же потребности организации? Цель настоящего исследо- вания — изучить другую практику отбора путем сравнения венгерских и польских методов отбора, для улучшния и находки подходящих методоа для проведения этой процедуры в венгерской полиции. Между странами существует много общих черт, и поэтому предполагалось, что процессы отбора в полиции также схожи и, следовательно, могут сравниваться друг с другом. Для анализа темы были также изучены организационные и образовательные характеристики с целью определения контекста, который влияет на эти характеристики. При исследовании темы анализировалась соответствующая литература. Данные, которые не удалось получить из литературных источ- ников, были собраны с помощью анкеты, отправленной в CEPOL и офицеру связию Кроме того, было также проведено интервью с офицером польской полиции, который вызвался добровольцем для участия в исследовании. Исследования показали, что обе службы предъявляют физические, медицинские и психологические требования в одинаковой сте- пени, но с разными территориальными и полицейско-культурными особенностями. Было установлено, что Польша и Венгрия сталкиваются с проблемой количества соответствующих кандидатов, но ни одна из стран не использует современные методы отбора, которые могли бы оказать положительное влияние на отбор новых кандидатов.

278 Internal Security, July–December Portrayal and Attributes of Serial Killers and Some of the Most Notorious Ones

Ürmösné Gabriella Simon ORCID: 0000-0001-9284-9578 National University of Public Service, Hungary

Abstract. Serial killers have always been in the centre of interest for the reason why they murder umpteen victims without self- control, remorse or a sense of guilt. They stalk stealthily and have the capacity to continue their massacre for ages via diverse countries and states. In this study, I intend to widen my previous study on serial killers with more cases and more background information about the roots of their amok from both the psychological aspect and from the aspect of the damage to the frontal lobe, the role of the hypothalamus, the limbic system, and the ventromedial prefrontal cortex as well as the size of the amygdala which enhance the aggressive behaviour and contribute to uncontrolled sadism. I highlight the vital impact of childhood traumas, humiliation, neglect and the principal elements of family history. I comprise some of the most notorious psychopaths and cluster the common traits of these perpetrators. The role of superiority, maintaining power, manipulation, disability in physical characteristics, profit-making, sensation-seeking, deficiencies in empathy, pathological need to control others and attention-seeking are crucial factors as well. According to psychologists, having a grandiose sense of their own self-worth, narcissistic attitude, and addictive personalities may all contribute to murders. DOI: 10.5604/01.3001.0014.6699 http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0014.6699

Keywords: serial killer, traits, psychopath, childhood trauma, most disreputable

motto: ‘We are serial killers, your sons, husbands, we are everywhere.’ Ted Bundy

Attributes in general

There is little more terrifying than those who hunt, stalk and snatch their prey under the cloak of darkness. These hunters search not for animals, but for the touch, taste, and empowerment of human flesh. They are cannibals, necrophiles, and mon- sters, and they walk among us. They are people living among society, going about their day-to-day activities until nightfall. They are the fathers, husbands, and some of the churchgoing members of the community. A serial killer is a person who murders three or more people over a period of more than 30 days, with a ‘cooling off’ period between each murder, and whose motivation for killing is largely based on psychological gratification1. The motives for these murders according to the FBI include anger, thrill, attention or financial gain. Macdonald has set up a triad by which he characterised the childhood of serial killers as potential psychopaths. He highlighted bedwetting, arson and torturing

1 Douglas et al., Crime classification manual: A standard system for investigating and classi- fying violent crimes. San Francisco, John Wiley and Sons: 2006, [in:] Belügyi Szemle 2014/2. Híres Bűnügyek, tanulságos nyomozások, Lehoczki Ágnes: Donászi és Nagy esete a narcizmussal.

Internal Security, July–December 279 Ürmösné Gabriella Simon of animals as appalling phenomena2. They may exhibit varying degrees of mental illness, psychopathy and/or sociopathy, which may contribute to their homicidal behaviour. They were often abused — emotionally, physically and/or sexually — by a family member3. There was deficiency in their raising: some of them were dressed like girls as being boys, neglected, or had sadistic parents4. Smooth talking, egocentric and grandiose, lack of remorse or guilt, lack of empa- thy, deceitful and manipulative, shallow emotions, impulsive, poor behaviour controls, need for excitement, lack of responsibility, early behaviour problems and adult antisocial behaviour characterise most of them5.

Key traits and clustering According to criminologists, there are five key traits that the most notorious murderers have in common. These range from being egotistical to manipulative and charming. Studies have found a link between damage to the brain’s frontal lobe and changes in the amygdala in criminal serial killers. Other psychologists link the behaviour to early childhood abuse or drugs6. Serial killers typically have a real affinity with power, even when they’ve been caught and know the game is up. Intent on exert- ing some kind of control over the people around them, they often hold back bits of crucial information in a bid to maintain power over the situation, gain attention and assert a warped sense of authority. They can also be characterised as a power junkie, a manipulator, an egotistical bragger, a superficial charmer, and even an aver- age Joe. Apparent vulnerability, and the need to please have been used effectively time and time again by serial killers as a way of hiding a sinister personality. Some of the world’s best known serial killers have a frightening ability to manipulate those around them, pressing the right buttons in order to present themselves in a false light. Serial killers are also often able to manipulate a situation in order to pass the blame for their actions, using hot-button issues of the day or medical psy- chological research to try to explain their actions. Doctor Harold Shipman, for example, used his position as a medical expert to manipulate his patients into treatments that ultimately killed them while posing as a caring member of society. Jeffrey Dahmer also referred to carrying out a medical experiment on human beings, while injecting their skulls. Other experts have found some common traits of serial killers. These traits help the police identify their possible suspects. These typical serial killer characteristics are as follows: They are found to be intelligent and have above average intel- ligence. Most serial killers are found to have families and steady jobs. Some have

2 Innes B, Bűnös elmék. Skandi — Wald Könyvkiadó. Budapest, 2007. 3 Kováts D, Az egyéni agressziótól a terrorizmusig, [in:] Csernyikné Póth Ágnes, Fogarasi Mihály (szerk.) Kriminálpszichológia. Budapest, Rejtjel Kiadó, 2006. 4 Douglas J.E, Mindhunter: Inside the FBI’s Elite Serial Crime Unit. Kindle Edition:1998. 5 Rosewood J, The Big Book of Serial Killers: 150 Serial Killer Files of the World’s Worst Murderers (An Encyclopedia of Serial Killers), 2017. 6 Kovats D, Szenvedélybetegségek és a háttérben álló pszichológiai hatások, [in:] Csernyikné Póth Á, Fogarasi M (Eds), Kriminálpszichológia. Budapest, Rejtjel Kiadó, 2006, p. 287.

280 Internal Security, July–December Portrayal and Attributes of Serial Killers and Some of the Most Notorious Ones trouble keeping a job and generally carry out menial jobs. These killers are often from divorced families where the father left the mother. They are bought up by their mothers who have domineering personalities. They often come from fami- lies with a criminal, psychiatric or alcoholic background. These children are often abused emotionally, sexually and physically, especially by a close family member or acquaintance7. There is a high rate of suicide attempts among the serial killers. These serial killers have been found to be interested in voyeurism, sadomasochism, and fetishism since an early age. It has been found that 60% of serial killers wet their beds even after they reached the age of 12. Many have been fascinated and involved with torturing animals or setting fires. Most of them were bullied as children and some were involved in cases of petty crimes such as theft, vandalism, etc. As you can see, the psychological characteristics of a serial killer are based on any form of sexual or emotional abuse in childhood. These serial killers try to enact and replay their victimisation and behave as the aggressor. Sometimes, the physi- cal characteristic of the serial killer causes him to murder. Any form of disability or physical characteristics like bow legs, stammering, short stature, etc. that causes them to be bullied in childhood. This makes them vengeful and they seek revenge from people who they suppose are better looking or better able than they are. One can never say what makes a serial killer a killer. But, these traits help narrow down possible suspects. Other researchers theorise that damage to the frontal lobe, the hypothalamus and the limbic system can cause extreme aggression, loss of control, and poor judgement8. Henry Lee Lucas, a serial killer, was found to have extreme brain damage in these regions. The brain study at the University of Wisconsin, Madison also noticed a drop in connectivity between the amygdala and the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC).These regions process negative stimuli into negative emotions and responses. When connectivity is low, people have lower levels of empathy and aren’t easily ashamed by their actions. Some serial killers have been diagnosed by psychologists as psychopaths, suf- fering from an antisocial personality disorder (ASPD)9. This makes them unlikely to conform to social norms, irritable and aggressive and lack remorse. Brain scans of rapist and serial killer Brian Dugan showed a lack of activity in the regions associ- ated with empathy and remorse. Others have been diagnosed as psychotic. Serial killers are typically classified in two ways — one based on motive, the other on organisational and social patterns. The motive method is called Holmes typol- ogy, for Ronald M. and Stephen T. Holmes, authors of textbooks on serial murder and violent crime. The FBI explained that not every serial killer falls into a single type, and these classifications don’t explain what leads someone to become a serial killer. However, according to Holmes typology, serial killers can be act-focussed, and kill quickly, or process-focussed, and kill slowly. For act-focussed killers, killing is about the act itself. Visionary murderers in this group hear voices or have visions 7 Farkas J, Psychological Assessment of Children by Forensic Experts, [in:] Homoki- Nagy M, Hajdú J (Eds), Ünnepi kötet dr. Zakar András c. egyetemi tanár 70. születésnapjára. Szeged: Szegedi Tudományegyetem Állam- és Jogtudományi Kar, 2017, pp. 55–64. 8 Kováts D, op. cit. 9 Ibid.

Internal Security, July–December 281 Ürmösné Gabriella Simon that direct him to do so, while Missionary murderers believe they are meant to get rid of a particular group of people. Alternatively, process-focussed serial killers get enjoyment from the torture and death of their victims. Lust killers derive sexual pleasure from killing, Thrill killers get a ‘thrill’ from it and Gain killers murder because they believe they will profit in some way. Power killers wish to be in charge of life and death. Psychologists divide serial killers into categories. There are killers who are ‘act-focussed’ — these people typically kill because they feel like they’re on some kind of crusade, for example, ‘to rid the world of prostitutes’. Killers who are ‘process-focussed’ are the more sadistic variety. They enjoy watching people suffer, so they usually torture their victims before killing them. Power killers can be said to have a sort of god complex. They kill slowly because the ability to decide how and when their victims will die makes them feel empowered. Most killers who sexually assault their victims aren’t motivated by lust, they’re motivated by the feel- ing of power that they get from the act. The FBI explained: “Psychopathy is a personality disorder manifested in people who use a mixture of charm, manipulation, intimidation, and occasionally violence to control others, in order to satisfy their own selfish needs. “Psychotic: By compari- son, psychosis is when a person loses sense of reality10. The conditions share certain traits, but typically psychopaths are manipulative and know right from wrong, while psychotics suffer from delusions. Bodysnatcher Ed Gein believed he needed the parts of the women he killed in order to become a woman himself. Nicholas Salvador, 25, was put on trial for beheading a woman he believed was ‘Hitler back from the dead’. He was suffering from paranoid schizophrenia at the time. Although not a serial killer, this highlights the differences in the types of killers. However, all of these findings fail to reveal why other people with similar brain abnormalities or personality traits aren’t serial killers. Furthermore, the cause of this brain damage is also not known or confirmed. As the FBI concluded: The relationship between psychopathy and serial killers is particularly interesting. All psychopaths do not become serial murderers. Rather, serial murderers may possess some or many of the traits consistent with psychopathy. Psychopaths who commit serial murder do not value human life and are extremely callous in their interactions with their victims. This is particularly evident in sexually motivated serial killers who repeatedly target, stalk, assault, and kill without a sense of remorse. However, psychopathy alone does not explain the motivations of a serial killer. Considering psychopathy or antisocial personality, a psychopath is born that way — the impulse control and emotional centers of his or her brain are under- developed. By contrast, antisocial personalities are learned, and usually develop during an abusive or neglected childhood. Now, this does not mean serial killers are insane, which is why the ‘not-guilty by reason of insanity’ defence rarely works for a serial killer. Serial killers know very well the difference between right and wrong, they just don’t care. Also called ‘sociopaths’, people with antisocial personality dis- order ‘show no regard for right and wrong’ and often possess other qualities that are common to serial murderers, such as a lack of remorse, callous or manipulative behaviour, and impulsivity. But it’s also important to note that not all sociopaths are killers — in fact the vast majority of them are not.

10 Kováts D, op.cit.

282 Internal Security, July–December Portrayal and Attributes of Serial Killers and Some of the Most Notorious Ones 1.2. Core classification

Serial killers can be clustered into diverse groups, one of which is the organised one, whose characteristic features are the following: — Single, white males are the perpetrators —Employment difficulties — Unstable family history — Often abandoned by their fathers and raised by their mothers — Criminal, psychiatric and alcoholic histories — Abuse histories — High rates of suicide attempts — Interested in voyeurism, fetishism and sadomasochistic pornography — Have a history of inappropriate bed wetting — Fascinated with fires — Sadistic activity/torturing small animals — Above average intelligence —Methodological — Lure victims, sometimes by pretext, inspire confidence, adapt well — Maintain control over the crime scene — Follow their crimes in the media — Usually socially adequate, sometimes having a spouse and children — Commit thoroughly elaborated crimes — Dispose of incriminating evidence — When captured, their acquaintances characterise them as being peaceful — Attempt to evade capture, mislead the authorities, and incriminate someone else (fake suicide note) — Do not always act in the heat of the moment — React appropriately in unexpected situations — Improve their method of perpetration — Keep some of the personal properties of the victim as a trophy, in order to recall the phases of the commitment — Love to prolong the pain and suffering of their victims — Imagine killing their victims and get pleasure out of it — They are actually premeditated crimes — Organised killers take all precautions before killing their victim — So confident that they are ready to be interviewed by the police without fear. The traits of the disorganised ones are as follows: — Low IQ Impulsive — Murder when the opportunity arises — Rarely dispose of the body, usually leaving the body where they found it. — Introverted, lack of friends, withdrawn, lonely, little interest in hobbies and social interactions — Lack of premeditation — Do not specialise in a certain victim type — Pounce on the victim, without any warning — After the death of the victim, they perform rituals (maiming, cannibalism, necrophilia)

Internal Security, July–December 283 Ürmösné Gabriella Simon

— In motion all the time, therefore they easily avoid being captured — Seem weird and odd to acquaintances — Not aware of the consequences of the murder, sometimes, they have murky memories about the victims — Sexually perverted — Feel anxiety during the crime — Make mistakes during the perpetration — Deform the corpses — Often live alone and have poor or moderate social skills — These people often have problems dating or never date — Unorganised serial killers are generally high school drop-outs and have very poor hygiene11. In some cases, the organised features turn into disorganised ones as the number of murders increases. In the beginning, they act cautiously, yet, as soon as their compulsive behaviour overcomes them, they become careless and impulsive. Criminal investigator Stephen J. Giannangelo calls the ‘calm, purposeful behaviour’ of a serial killer ‘predatory aggression’, comparing it to the aggressive behaviour of carnivores. Predatory animals kill to satisfy a need, so there isn’t any rage behind the action. In other words, a serial killer kills because he thinks he needs to, while other killers may kill because they are provoked12. A person who has a ‘predatory aggressive personality’ believes other people are inferior, which makes it easy for him to justify hurting or preying on others. Serial killers don’t have normal human empathy, but they’re very good at pretending like they do. Serial killers are manipulative, but they’re also very good at making sure you don’t know you’re being manipulated. People who commit serial crimes, especially serial rape and murder, often do so because they’re trying to feel something. This is called ‘sensation-seeking’ behaviour. There may be a genetic component to it. A 1997 study that looked at the behaviour patterns of twins raised in separate households found that both sensation-seeking behaviour and impulsivity were not matters or nurture, but of nature. In other words, it’s a quality that many serial killers are born with. Children who are shamed or humiliated or are punished disproportionately can develop a propensity for cruelty as a direct result of that abuse13. Neglect, too, is a big factor because when children don’t experience empathy from a parent or caregiver, they sometimes don’t develop the ability to empathise with others. Kids who come from unstable homes — moving frequently, being shuttled between foster homes, etc. — may feel like they have no control over their lives, and as a double whammy also don’t have time to develop real relationships with their peers. So not only do they have control issues, they also have deficiencies in empathy simply because they have so few friendships with which to learn and develop the sense of empathy that all normal human beings possess. This lack of empathy combined with a patho- logical need to control others is a deadly combination. 11 Ürmösné S.G, Technical English for Officers. Dialóg Campus Kiadó. Budapest, 2018. 12 Giannangelo S.J, Real-Life Monsters: A Psychological Examination of the Serial Mur- derer, 2012. 13 Farkas J, A kötődés szerepe és jelentősége a személyiségfejlődésben. Határrendészeti Tanulmányok, 2017, Vol. 14, Issue 3, pp. 97–117.

284 Internal Security, July–December Portrayal and Attributes of Serial Killers and Some of the Most Notorious Ones

Serial killers almost always lack remorse. Most of the time, though, the lack of remorse is directly related to the killer’s lack of empathy. If you’re unable to empathise with someone who is afraid or in pain, you aren’t going to feel much (if any) remorse about ending that person’s life. Serial killers in particular are often described as emotionally vacant and incapable of forming meaningful personal relationships. Psychopathic killers in particular tend to have a grandiose sense of their own self-worth, so investigators can use praise to get them talking. Interviewers might praise them for their intelligence or for their skill at outwitting investigators. Chil- dren are inherently narcissistic and must be taught the rules of social behaviour, but when children grow up physically but remain in a state of immaturity, they can become extremely dangerous people. Serial killers, on the other hand, might also have addictive personalities, but when those addictive personalities are combined with qualities like narcissism, emotional emptiness, and an inability to feel remorse, it’s not hard to guess what that might lead to. Ted Bundy displayed these characteristics when stalking and killing his victims, and was known to have turned to drugs and alcohol in prison once he no longer had the ability to engage in murder. Other killers, like Israel Keyes, have also been described as ‘addicted to murder’.

Some of the most notorious ones from a diachronic perspective

Gilles de Rais, born in 1404, is the ‘predecessor’ to the modern serial killers. Rais was a military captain, commanded by St. Joan of Arc, who shortly after, began his killing spree. He was accused of 80 to 200 cases of torture, rape, and murder. Although some historians believe that his crimes rose to 600 cases (as most of the bodies were either buried or burned with all of their belongings). These victims ranged from 6 to 18, including both sexes, however Rais generally used to prefer boys, but would settle for young girls if circumstances called for it. Rais would lure young boys who had blonde hair and blue eyes to his residence. There, his victims were raped, tortured, and mutilated. One of Rais’ servants, Henriet, would aid him as his accomplice in collecting the young boys and witnessing the massacre as well. Rais would often take a bath in his victims’ blood and other times watch and take pleasure as Henriet tortured them. Vlad Drakul (Tepes): (1431–1476) In his childhood, he was a political refugee with the Turkish sultan, where he kept tabs on many ways of torture. During his sub- sequent rein of 1456, the nightmare began. He impaled, skinned, cooked, baked, burnt, hung, beheaded and disemboweled men, buried them alive, or crucified them. He reigned with special cruelty and psychopathic elements. People were so afraid of him that even golden mugs were placed on squares and no one dared to steal them. He invited peasants for a feast in a stable where he locked them in and set it on fire. Erzsébet Báthory (1560–1614) was so vain that she broke all of the mirrors in her castle, and obsessively wanted to preserve her youth and rosy skin, in the medieval

Internal Security, July–December 285 Ürmösné Gabriella Simon ages. When her younger noble lover left her, she punched her servant so hard that her blood splashed on her, and then she noticed the ‘blessing’ effect of the blood on her skin. From that point, the amok started, and she began to torture several virgins, and hung them on the ceiling, so that they would bleed to death. She was bathing in their blood, and drank from it, to rejuvenate herself. No one knows whether she was locked in her castle for political reasons (her wealth and high treason) or as a punishment for her massacre. Jack the ripper, aka the Whitechapel Murder (1888) slit the throats of pros- titutes of the East-End and removed their internal organs with the preciseness of a surgeon. The name came into being because the victims had organs missing and judging by the procedure, the killer seemed to have surgical experience. Jack the Ripper, who was later believed to be a single person, killed female prostitutes in the slums of London between 1888–91. His last murder was committed in his house, where he removed all of the internal organs of his victim, and put them around the dead body, while the music was on. He was never caught, and every- body was a suspect at that time: he was said to be a policeman, crazy doctor, Russian secret agent, lunatic midwife, and even the oldest grandson of Queen Victoria. In 2014, with the help of a DNA sample, a 23 year old Polish immigrant barber was said to have committed the atrocities, according to an analysis of DNA extracted from a silk shawl, a piece of forensic evidence allegedly found at the crime scene. Dr. Louhelainen managed to extract 7 incomplete fragments of DNA, and tried to match their sequences with the DNA from the living descendants. He insists on his revelation, while others are still sceptical about the result14. Jesse Pomeroy (1859–1932) is the youngest serial killer in American history. A great number of boys were arrested on suspicion of killing the son of Mrs. Paine, of Chelsea, a suburb of Boston, including little Tracy Hayden, Johnny Balch, Harry Austin, George Pratt and other children, but were subsequently discharged. Finally, suspicion fell upon a boy named Jesse Pomeroy, a twelve-year-old youth who lived with his widowed mother, a poor dressmaker, on Broadway Street, South Boston. He was positively identified by several of the children he had tortured, and as it was proven beyond all doubt that he was the much-sought youth, he was sentenced to serve the remainder of his youth at the West Borough Reform School. According to the custom, if the boys confined at this school were exemplary in their behaviour and the authorities felt confident that the good conduct would continue after their release, they were often released on probation, providing they had a good home to go to. Unfortunately this was done in Pomeroy’s case on February 6, 1874. On April 22, 1874, the body of a four-year-old boy named Horace Mullen was found in a marsh near Dorchester, a suburb of Boston15. The body was horribly mutilated, the head being nearly severed from the body, upon which there were thirty-one knife wounds. From this point, there was no excuse for Pomeroy, no matter that previously, mainly adults had been accused of these child murders. An examina- tion was then performed, and it was found that Pomeroy was perfectly sane, but was naturally a fiend and derived pleasure from torturing others. Pomeroy’s sentence was commuted to life in prison in solitary confinement. He was 16 years

14 Ürmösné S.G, The traits and the thrill of serial killers. Internal Security, 2015, Vol. 7, Issue 2. 15 Duke T.A, Celebrated Criminal Cases of America. San Francisco, 1910.

286 Internal Security, July–December Portrayal and Attributes of Serial Killers and Some of the Most Notorious Ones and 9 months old. Pomeroy remained incarcerated in the Charlestown State Prison. Pomeroy made 10 or 12 ‘determined attempts’ to escape, and handmade tools were frequently found in his possession. A prison warden reported finding rope, steel pens and a drill that Pomeroy had concealed in his cell or on his person. In prison, Pomeroy claimed that he taught himself to read several foreign languages, includ- ing Arabic, and one visiting psychiatrist found that he had learned German with ‘considerable accuracy’. He wrote poetry and argued with prison officials over his right to have it published, and he studied law books and spent decades composing legal challenges to his conviction and requests for a pardon16. John George Haigh: the Acid Bath Murderer (1909–1949) lured his victims into his workshop, where he struck them down with an axe, dismembered them, and disposed of the incriminating evidence in acid. He corresponded with the vic- tims’ parents, and requested money in the name of the dead person. When he ran out of money, he killed again. His eager helpfulness and some teeth which couldn’t be dissolved, revealed him. Sometimes, he preserved some properties from his victims, and out of curiosity, he tasted his victims’ blood, and while the acid was dissolving the body parts, he was enjoying tea in the nearby teahouse. John George Haigh operated during the 1940s. He was convicted of the murders of 6 people, although he claimed to have killed 9. He was a professional conman, who lured wealthy people by charm and deceit into to a warehouse where he killed them. Later he would dissolve their bodies in sulphuric acid then forge papers to sell their pos- sessions and collect their life savings. He was sentenced to death and hung in 1949. Henry Lee Lucas was born August 23, 1936 to an alcoholic couple. His mother would occasionally work as the neighbourhood prostitute to run the house while his father (who had no legs due to a freight train accident) would drown himself in alcohol all day. The Lucas family had 9 children, out of which some were given away to relatives, foster homes, and certain institutions. After his father’s death (fatal case of pneumonia), Henry would always be subject to his mother’s cruelty and beatings. Five days after after striking his mother with a knife, he was arrested and boasted about raping his mother’s corpse. Henry also had an accomplice, Ottis Toole, who participated in over 100 murders with him. Aileen Wournos: The Monster. While working as a prostitute, Aileen killed seven men in Florida for their money and confessed to shooting them, claiming all of them had either raped or attempted to rape her. Her parents separated before her birth, and her father later spent time in mental hospitals for child molestation. When Wuor- nos was four years old, she and her brother were sent to live with her grandparents. In her early teens, she spent time at a home for unwed mothers and then dropped out of school and turned to prostitution. She was subsequently arrested numerous times on charges that included armed robbery, cheque forgery, and auto theft. She may have killed an eighth motorist in the same period. Arrested in early 1991, she admit- ted to the killings but claimed that she acted in self-defence after the men assaulted her. She later pleaded guilty to three more of the murders and admitted that she had killed for profit and not in self-defence. She died in 1992 by lethal injection. Tsutomu Miyazaki: The Human Dracula acquired more names due to his hideous acts. Some of them were The Otaku Murderer, The Little Girl Murderer

16 Ibid.

Internal Security, July–December 287 Ürmösné Gabriella Simon or Dracula Miyazaki. The reason for this being that he abducted little girls, killed them and indulged in sexual activities with their corpses. On one occasion, he not only drank the victim’s blood, but ate her hand as well. He also preserved body parts as trophies and sent postcards to the families describing the murder. His father committed suicide and Miyazaki was hung in 2008, aged 45. Luis Garavito Le bestia: the Colombian is probably one of the world’s worst serial killers. He confessed to the torture, rape and murder of 147 young boys. But the number is believed to be over 300. He was found guilty on 139 counts, which should amount to 1,853 years in prison, but Columbian law limits it to 30, which is what he was sentenced to in 1999. He may be released earlier for cooperation and good behaviour. Alexander Pichushkin: The Chessboard Killer was also known as the ‘Bitsa Park Maniac’. His targets were homeless men whom he lured to his house with vodka. He is believed to have killed 49 people, most of them with repeated ham- mer blows to their heads, afterwards inserting a vodka bottle into the gaping skull wound. He initially said he wanted to complete the number of squares on a chess- board and kill 64 people. Also, it is believed that he was in competition with another Russian serial killer, Andrei Chikatilo, who was convicted in 1992 of 53 killings. It was the very same year Alexander started killing. Dennis Rader: The BTK Murderer murdered 10 people in Wichita, Kansas. He even sent letters to police taunting them under his alias, BTK, which stood for ‘Bind, Torture, Kill’. His technique was to stalk his victims before breaking into their homes, binding their limbs and finally strangling them. He disappeared in 1988, but re-emerged in around 2005 when he sent a floppy disc to the press which helped in tracing him. Rader confessed to his crimes and is serving 10 consecutive life sentences with the earliest release date possible on February 26, 2180. He sent sixteen written communications to the news media over a thirty-year period, taunt- ing the police and the public. He was married with two children, was a Boy Scout leader, served honorably in the U.S. Air Force, was employed as a local government official, and was president of his church. Paul Knowles: The Casanova Killer used his charm to convince his victims believe him and later killed them. He killed a total of 18 people, although the count might be higher. His victims included men, women and children. The man from Florida was eventually killed by an FBI agent in 1974 when he was trying to escape. Pedro Rodriguez Filho: The Brazilian Maniac. Pedro was convicted in 2003 of the murder of at least 71 people and was then sentenced to 128 years impris- onment. He was only 14 when he committed his first killing. He wreaked havoc on local drug dealers in revenge for his girlfriend’s killing while he was imprisoned. In prison, he even executed his own father, who was also serving time for murder. Filho went onto kill at least 47 inmates while imprisoned. His continued killings have led to his sentence to be increased to 400 years imprisonment. There are many more other notorious serial killers in the world, such as Henry Howard Holmes, John Wayne Gacy, Theodore Robert Bundy, the Zodiac killer, Ed Gain, Andrej Romanovics Chikatilo, Pedro Lopez, Albert Fish, Jeffrey Dahmer, Gary Ridgway etc. who were itemised in my previous study on serial killers17.

17 Ürmösné S.G, The traits and the thrill of serial killers. Internal Security, 2015, Vol. 7, Issue 2.

288 Internal Security, July–December Portrayal and Attributes of Serial Killers and Some of the Most Notorious Ones Conclusion

As we can see, personality disorders, exhibiting predatory behaviour, being manip- ulative, possessing sensation-seeking behaviour, childhood abuse, having a need for control, not showing remorse, trying to fill an emotional void, enjoying having power over others, being vain and narcissistic, and having an addictive personality can all contribute to becoming a serial killer. There is a physical, psychological as well as moral barrier that prevents us from turning into animals. However, there are indi- viduals who have trouble controlling these wild urges. Many were bullied as children and some were involved in cases of petty crimes such as theft and vandalism. Any form of disability or physical characteristics that cause them to be bullied in child- hood could be a stimulating factor. This makes them vengeful and they seek revenge from people who they suppose are better looking or better able than they are. The FBI says there are between 25 and 50 active serial killers in the United States at any given time. Although they are considered monsters, family history, genes, damage to the frontal lobe, and the size of the amygdala and hormones could be contributing factors to their behaviour. No one is said to be born a monster according to experts. Childhood trauma, upbringing and the environmental circum- stances contribute to a great extent to becoming a serial killer. As a consequence, all of us are responsible for how we treat our companions.

References

1. Douglas J, Burgess W.A, Burgess G.A, Ressler K.R (Eds), Crime classifi cation man- ual: A standard system for investigating and classifying violent crimes. John Wi- ley and Sons, San Francisco, 2006, [in:] Belügyi Szemle, 2014, Vol. 2. 2. Douglas J.E, Mindhunter: Inside the FBI’s Elite Serial Crime Unit. Kindle Edition, 1998. 3. Duke T.A, Celebrated Criminal Cases of America. San Francisco, 1910. 4. Electronic source: http://www.historicalcrimedetective.com/jesse-pomeroy- americas-youngest-serial-killer/ 5. Electronic source: https://opinionfront.com/characteristics-of-serial-killer 6. Electronic source: https://opinionfront.com/top-serial-killers 7. Electronic source: https://www.britannica.com/biography/Aileen-Wuorno 8. Electronic source: https://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-3169359/ How-spot-serial-killer-Criminologists-reveal-fi ve-key-traits-common-notorious- murderers.html 9. Electronic source: https://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/serial-murder 10. Electronic source: https://www.grunge.com/110562/traits-serial-killers-eerily- common/ 11. Electronic source: https://www.scoopwhoop.com/world/most-evil-serial-kill- ers/#.xym208xzk 12. Electronic source: https://www.thisisinsider.com/common-traits-of-serial-kill- ers-2018-5 13. Farkas J, A kötődés szerepe és jelentősége a személyiségfejlődésben. Határren- dészeti Tanulmányok, 2017, Vol. 14, Issue 3.

Internal Security, July–December 289 Ürmösné Gabriella Simon

14. Farkas J, Psychological Assessment of Children by Forensic Experts, [in:] Ho- moki-Nagy M, Hajdú J (Ed) Ünnepi kötet dr. Zakar András c. egyetemi tanár 70. születésnapjára. Szeged: Szegedi Tudományegyetem Állam- és Jogtudományi Kar, 2017. 15. Giannangelo S.J, Real-Life Monsters: A Psychological Examination of the Serial Murderer, 2012. 16. Innes B, Bűnös elmék, Skandi — Wald Könyvkiadó. Budapest, 2007. 17. Kováts D, Az egyéni agressziótól a terrorizmusig, [in:] Csernyikné Póth Ágnes, Fogarasi Mihály (Eds) Kriminálpszichológia. Budapest: Rejtjel Kiadó, 2006. 18. Kováts D, Elmebetegségek és személyiségzavarok a bűncselekmények hát- terében — Igazságügyi pszichiátria, [in:] Csernyikné Póth Á, Fogarasi M (Eds), Kriminálpszichológia. Budapest: Rejtjel Kiadó, 2006. 19. Kováts D, Szenvedélybetegségek és a háttérben álló pszichológiai hatások, [in:] Csernyikné Póth Ágnes, Fogarasi Mihály (Eds), Kriminálpszichológia. Budapest: Rejtjel Kiadó, 2006. 20. Rosewood J, The Big Book of Serial Killers: 150 Serial Killer Files of the World’s Worst Murderers (An Encyclopedia of Serial Killers). 21. Ürmösné S.G, Technical English for Offi cers. Dialóg Campus Kiadó. Budapest. 2018. 22. Ürmösné S.G, The traits and the thrill of serial killers. Internal Security, 2015, Vol. 7, Issue 2.

About the Author

Ürmösné Dr. Gabriella Simon, PhD, National University of Public Service on the Faculty of Law Enforcement in Budapest for 22 years. Field of scientifi c interest: ESP topics, technical English, psycholinguistics, sociolinguistic, genderlinguistics, Greek-Hungarian bilinguals. She is an assistant professor, and the Head of the Centre for Foreign and Technical Languages. Besides her Applied Linguistic PhD studies and researches mainly in psycholinguistics and genderlinguistics at the ELTE University Faculty of Humanities, she has been indulged in the study of technical English for law enforcement offi cers and ESP topics, for 22 years. She has published an ESP dictionary with the lexemes of technical terms, and two course books for law enforcement offi cers, comprising ESP issues, and she has issued 12 publications on ESP materials as well. She has already issued 12 publications on Applied Linguistics, including studies, reviews, diploma works and her PhD dissertation. E-mail [email protected]

Streszczenie. Seryjni zabójcy zawsze znajdowali się w centrum zainteresowania miedzy innymi z tego powodu, że zabijają kolejne ofiary bez samokontroli, wyrzutów sumienia czy poczucia winy. Tropią ukradkiem ofiary i są w stanie kontynuować swoje zbrodnie przez długie lata na terenie wielu krajów. W niniejszym opracowaniu Autorka przedstawia poszerzone poprzednie własne badania na temat seryjnych zabójców, prezentując kolejne przypadki i informacje na temat przyczyn ich zachowań, zarówno w aspekcie psychologicznym, jak i w kontekście uszkodzeń płata czołowego, roli podwzgórza, układu limbicznego i brzuszno- przyśrodkowej kory przedczołowej, a także wielkości migdałków, które wzmacniają agresywne zachowanie i przyczyniają się do niekontrolowanego sadyzmu. Podkreślono również istotny wpływ urazów z dzieciństwa, upokorzeń, zaniedbań i zasadniczych elementów historii rodzinnej. W artykule przedstawiano sylwetki najbardziej znanych psychopatów, z uwzględnieniem ich wspólnych cech, omówiono rolę kompleksu wyższości, potrzeby posiadania władzy, manipulacji, niepełnosprawności fizycznej, ukierunkowania na zysk, poszukiwania wrażeń, braku empatii, patologicznej potrzeby kontrolowania innych i skupiania na sobie uwagi. Według psychologów, czynniki takie jak: rozbudowane poczucie własnej wartości, narcyzm i osobowość nałogowca mogą być również motywami popełniania tego typu przestępstw.

290 Internal Security, July–December Portrayal and Attributes of Serial Killers and Some of the Most Notorious Ones

Zusammenfassung. Serienmörder stehen seit jeher im Mittelpunkt des Interesses, unter anderem weil sie ohne Selbstkontrolle, Reue oder Schuldgefühle aufeinanderfolgende Opfer töten. Sie spüren die Opfer heimlich auf und können ihre Verbrechen über viele Jahre in vielen Ländern fortsetzen. In dieser Arbeit stellt die Autorin ihre eigenen erweiterten früheren Forschungen über Serienmörder vor, präsentiert nachfolgende Fälle und Informationen über die Ursachen ihres Verhaltens, sowohl in psychologischer Hinsicht als auch im Zusammenhang mit Schädigungen des Frontallappens, der Rolle des Hypothalamus, des limbischen Systems und des abdominal-medialen präfrontalen Cortex sowie der Größe der Mandeln, die aggressives Verhalten verstärken und zu unkontrolliertem Sadismus beitragen. Der bedeutende Einfluss von Kindheitstrauma, Demütigung, Vernachlässigung und wesentlichen Elementen der Familiengeschichte wurde ebenfalls hervorgehoben. Der Artikel stellt die Profile der berühmtesten Psychopathen vor und berücksichtigt dabei ihre gemeinsamen Merkmale, diskutiert die Rolle des Überlegenheitskomplexes, des Machtbedürfnisses, der Manipulation, der körperlichen Behinderung, der Gewinnorientierung, der Suche nach Eindrücken, des Mangels an Empathie, des pathologischen Bedürfnisses, andere zu kontrollieren und die Aufmerksamkeit auf sich selbst zu richten. Nach Ansicht von Psychologen können auch Faktoren wie: entwickeltes Selbstwertgefühl, Narzissmus und die Persönlichkeit eines Süchtigen Motive für die Begehung dieser Art von Verbrechen sein.

Резюме. Серийные убийцы всегда были в центре внимания, так как они убивают очередных жертв без самоконтроля, жалости и чувства вины. Они незаметно выслеживают жертвы и способны продолжать совершать свои преступле- ния на протяжении многих лет во многих странах. В статье Автор представляет дополнительные результаты собственного исследования на тему серийных убийц, рассказывая о других очередных случаях преступлений и приводя данные о причинах поведения маньяков как в психологическом плане, так и в контексте травм лобной доли, роли гипоталамуса, лимбической системы, брюшной и медиальной префронтальной коры, а также о размерах миндалин, которые повышают агрессивность поведения и способствуют неконтролируемому садизму. Кроме того, подчер- кивается значительное влияние детских травм, унижения, пренебрежительного отношения и важнейших фактов из жизни семьи. В статье представлены профили самых известных психопатов, с учетом их общих черт, обсуждается роль комплекса превосходства, потребности во власти, манипуляции, физическая неполноценность, ориентация на извлечение выгоды, поиск впечатлений, отсутствие эмпатии, патологическая потребность контролировать других и фокусировать внимание на собственной персоне. По мнению психологов, такие факторы, как: развитая само- оценка, нарциссизм и личность наркомана могут также стать мотивами совершения данного вида преступлений.

Internal Security, July–December 291

HISTORY

Women Police in Interwar Poland in the Light of Reports From Inspections Carried Out by Stanisława Paleolog

Piotr Gołdyn ORCID: 0000-0003-4382-6526 Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań, Poland

Abstract. Although the genesis of women police dates back to 1925, not much information on the activities of this formation has been preserved until today. It is known that it was established on the initiative of the Polish Committee for the Fight Against Trafficking in Women and Children and its main goal was to fight prostitution, to prevent women from being taken out of the country and exploited for work as prostitutes, and later also to take care of children. The formation was supervised by lt. Stanisława Filipina Paleolog. Her duties included controlling female police officers in terms of their task performance, as well as taking care of new candidates. In the article, on the basis of archival documents, the author analyses control reports and protocols drawn up during that period, on the basis of which it is possible to reconstruct, at least partially, the history of Polish female police officers in the late 1930s. DOI: 10.5604/01.3001.0014.6700 http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0014.6700

Keywords: women police, State Police, Stanisława Paleolog, Second Polish Republic

In 1925, on the initiative of the Polish Committee for the Fight against Trafficking in Women and Children, women’s police force was established in Poland1. It was intended to combat the trade of, as it was then referred to — ‘a living commodity’. It was therefore supposed to prevent prostitution and transportation of young girls and women from Poland for exploitation in brothels, mostly in South America. The direct supervision over policewomen was given to Stanisawa Filipina Paleolog2. As the head of the Women Police Department, Stanisława Paleolog conducted inspections of women’s sections in various criminal investigation departments. Thanks to the quite detailed but concise inspection protocols she drew up, it is possible to illustrate not only her own work, but also activities of female police officers in several Polish cities. The 4th Brigade of Łódź Investigation Office was inspected by Stanisława Pale- olog on September 14, 1935. She noted in the inspection protocol that the number

1 Archiwum Akt Nowych, Ministerstwo Opieki Społecznej, sygn. 189, Protokół posiedzenia Komitetu Walki z Handlem Kobietami i Dziećmi of 28/XI 1924, p. 17. 2 More on women police in, among others: Paleolog S, The women Police of Poland (1925–1939), Westminster 1957; Głogowski A, Kobieca Policja Państwowa II RP w walce z międzynarodowym handlem ludźmi. Cracow-Warsaw, 2014; Misiuk A Policja kobieca II Rzec- zypospolitej na tle międzynarodowym. Przegląd Policyjny, 1992, No. 4, pp. 92–102; Gołdyn P, Od misji dworcowych do policji kobiecej, [in:] Łaszewski R, Sprengel B (Eds), Od straży oby- watelskich do policji. Służby porządkowe na ziemiach polskich w XX wieku. Włocławek, 2007.

Internal Security, July–December 293 Piotr Gołdyn of police constables in the investigative service should be increased to 25. She also stated that the uniformed policewomen had not been equipped with rub- ber truncheons yet. Most often, in the detention centre, there were children from the poorest environments in Łódź who, living in cramped and dirty rooms, were brought up without any manners or hygienic care. Moreover, the children were rather lazy and not used to work. Hence, Paleolog believed that: Forcing detainees to clean up the detention facility and maintain personal order on their own can greatly contribute to arousing their love of order and overcoming their innate laziness3. In 1936, such an inspection was also carried out in the Sanitary and Vice Section of the Investigation Department in Kalisz. This section was quite modest in terms of human resources — one intelligence officer dealt with all intelligence mat- ters related to the fight against prostitution and sexual crimes. As a result of the inspection, Stanisława Paleolog concluded that the state of prostitution in Kalisz and related crimes was very serious. There were 51 registered prostitutes, although the list indicated 111. Sixty of them had left or died. It was not possible to deter- mine the number of disorderly houses in the town. To sum up, she stated that due to the quite significant indecency in Kalisz, the work of one intelligence officer was insufficient. Therefore, it was advisable to delegate two policewomen to work in Kalisz4. The control of the 6th Women’s Brigade of the Criminal Department in Warsaw was carried out by Paleolog in the period from May 10 to 31, 1937. It was a large unit, as there were 57 persons. Out of this number, 34 women worked in the criminal section and 21 in the uniformed service. Two policewomen were assigned to the registration office. The vast majority of the female police officers were prop- erly trained in their work. They were armed with FN cal 6.35 handguns and had 14 rounds of ammunition each. As Stanisława Paleolog noted, the weapons were rather obsolete and the checks were conducted irregularly. She ordered the brigade manager to carry out weapon inspections once every two weeks5. The discipline of the policewomen as well as of the brigade leader was assessed more harshly by Paleolog. Many of them disregarded official orders, and did not maintain the standards that were set by orders. In turn, health condition was main- tained at a sufficient level, although a few policewomen were notoriously ill, which in this case forced Paleolog to issue a separate report. The manager considered rooms occupied by the policewomen to be kept clean, but she had a lot of concerns about the supervision of a room for detainees and equipment. She made a lot of comments about the work of the criminal brigade. She pointed out that the town was divided into nine parts and the policewomen patrolled it quite often. Unfortunately, these patrols usually took place between 9 p.m. and midnight, and after midnight, they were no longer sent to the streets, so the prostitutes who wanted to avoid examination by the sanitary and welfare commission appeared

3 Archiwum Akt Nowych w Warszawie, Komenda Główna Policji Państwowej, dopływ, sygn. 1285, Protokół kontroli, p. 227, (hereinafter: AAN, KGPP). 4 Ibid., pp. 58–59. 5 Ibid., pp. 138–139.

294 Internal Security, July–December Women Police in Interwar Poland in the Light of Reports From Inspections… on the streets at that very time. This in turn influenced the spread of venereal dis- eases in the capital. Paleolog also had reservations about the liquidation of secret disorderly houses. She believed that their detection and liquidation was not very effective, while those that were closed were ‘lower category‘ and were run by pimps and prostitutes well-known to the police. All the more so because she also passed on the information about suspicious premises to the brigade leader herself: I found a lack of initiative in the work of the Women’s Brigade and I have the impres- sion that the reduction in the number of revealed suspicious premises is not the result of improved work performance in this area, but probably the result of a lack of initiative in the disclosure of new centres of prostitution, as well as a complete lack of observa- tion of pimps and procurers during patrols. I found that these activities are not carried out by regular or special patrols. The brigade conducts hardly any investigations on its own initiative, as well as those that have arisen as a result of confidential information. They only conduct cases that have arisen from police reports or have been sent from other units. In investigations into the abandonment of a child, the brigade is very often limited to questioning the individual who found or brought the child. The brigade usually does not investigate and does not try to explain whether the abandonment was a result of poverty or malice6. Policewomen were also inspected in Paleolog’s hometown of Lviv. The con- trol took place from 1 to 3 December 1937. The women’s section consisted of 10 constables in the criminal service and 9 in the uniformed one. Senior constable Janina Wronianka was the head of the detention centre. Female police officers were separated not only in terms of service but also location. The criminal service was located in the building of the Regional Police Headquarters, while the uniformed police officers had their headquarters on Kazimierzowska Street7. When evaluating training level, she noticed that it is rather good. However, she pointed out to 2nd lt. Tarnawski that it would be necessary to train female police officers in regulations concerning the fight against prostitution and juvenile crime. According to her, it was also necessary to acquaint officers with social actions on these issues8. Paleolog also noticed the work of the policewomen. She welcomed the fact of its effectiveness. Each of the female police officers identified at least one clandestine prostitute a week. There were no incidents of unjustified detentions. She was simi- larly satisfied with the work of the female police officers in the detention centre, but regretted that there was a shortage of places in juvenile care facilities in Lviv. She concluded her protocol with such a remark: The policewomen take active part in social work in the ‘Police Family‘ Association and sports club, participating in various performances, choirs, events etc. One police- woman is a secretary in the ‘Police Family‘. This work positively influences their intellectual development and provides them with healthy entertainment9.

6 Ibid., p. 144. 7 AAN, KGPP, p. 447. 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid.

Internal Security, July–December 295 Piotr Gołdyn

The Poznan women’s police brigade was controlled by Stanisława Paleolog from 23 to 26 February 1938. The unit consisted of 8 female police officers from the intelligence service, and 6 from the uniformed one. As she noted, the health of the female police officers was good, there were no disciplinary penalties against them, and the condition of the premises was very good and neat. Overall, the work of the female police officers was assessed as good. Paleolog had a few comments about the organisation of the detention centre. She suggested introducing small amenities, such as putting an electric lock on the gate and a so-called Judas hole in the front door. This would provide greater security for the female police officers, especially those on night duty10. From 21 to 25 April 1938, such an inspection was conducted in Vilnius. At that time, the women’s brigade in that city consisted of 16 women, seven of whom were in the criminal service and nine in the uniformed one. The leader of the brigade was senior warrant officer Jadwiga Jastrzębska. Stanisława Paleolog noted that the training of the police women was good, and that apart from general courses, they were also trained to control prostitution. The policewomen kept their weapons in good order, although ‘the gun barrels had cancer‘. Thanks to the effectiveness of the female police officers from Vilnius, 33 out of 75 disorderly houses had been liquidated. All of the female policewomen were patrolling suspicious premises. Paleolog included in the inspection protocol the following remarks: It is necessary to develop more self-initiative in the criminal work of female police officers and to better organise intelligence activities among prostitutes, waitresses, host- esses, etc. In order to check the performance results of individual policewoman more easily, I have recommended to record all of the news and information they have gained through their own initiative11. Moreover, the policewomen were also on duty in the detention centre. They worked shifts, patrolled the streets, and one of them was a prosecutor at the Juve- nile Court in Vilnius12. Stanisława Paleolog gave guidance to the section manager, particularly with regard to showing more initiative on her own, to increase the ability to organise intelligence activities among the ‘suspicious element‘. She also noted that several policewomen could be trained in this area13. In May 1938, Stanisława Paleolog controlled the results of a training course conducted for a group of newly recruited policewomen. 24 female police officers were hired, but 22 women turned up for the training course. Two of them resigned and two other candidates were accepted in their place. Next, Paleolog reported: The newly recruited policewomen constitute a training platoon, which is being trained at the School for State Police Commissioned Officers at 56 Krochmalna Street, whose commander is a PC Leszczyńska Wladyslawa, who also lives in the barracks during the training course.

10 Ibid., pp. 265–267. 11 Ibid., pp. 16–19. 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid.

296 Internal Security, July–December Women Police in Interwar Poland in the Light of Reports From Inspections…

The platoon was divided into 2 groups. One of them is undergoing a practical train- ing course in the criminal department of the Women’s Brigade and the other in the general department of the uniformed platoon; both of them are getting acquainted with the work of each department under the direction of the instructors assigned. The training course is conducted in accordance with the instructions developed for the cur- rent 9-month course for officers — women. Physical exercises are conducted by PC Leszczyńska Wladyslawa, while the drills are carried out by warrant officer Rutkowska Wanda. The exercises take place at the gym at the School for State Police Commissioned Officers. The platoon receives food in the barracks, and it is very good. They pay for it in accordance with the calculation of the relevant commission at the School for State Police Commissioned Officers. On holidays and Sundays, the platoon visits the city and its surroundings. Recently, together with the members of Officers’ Club of the State Police, the policewomen visited Wilanów. In order to get an easier understanding of the material, the practicing policewomen submit daily reports on the activities carried out, in which they report what they have learned and their impressions of the criminal element they encountered during their service. These reports, as well as my and the Brigade Leader’s observations, show that the new female police officers, in terms of their intellectual level, willingness to work and ideological attitude, present good material14.

The female recruits’ health condition was a bit worse, according to her. Two of them were excluded from the training course. One of them had dull hearing after scarlet fever and was threatened with complete deafness. The other one had thyroid problems, which made her nervous and unstable15. A training course for female police officers took place in Lviv in the same month. Nine out of ten women who wanted to join the service came to the course, one resigned from police work. Stanisława Paleolog noted that the course followed accepted instructions and the new female police officers were good material. They showed great willingness to work and great interest, and were also smart and well versed in issues concerning their work. During her stay in Lviv, Stanisława looked at the work of the detention centre and found that there was a shortage of school supplies and that the pyjamas designed for minors were very damaged and torn. They needed repair. Paleolog applied for the amount of 100 zloty for the sewing of thirty pairs of pyjamas by the ‘Police Family‘ Association for the charges of the detention centre16. May 1938 was a very active month for Paleolog, due to training courses con- ducted for female police officers. After visiting courses in Warsaw and Lviv, she also went to Łódź, where a course for fourteen women cadets had begun. These were women assigned to the Investigation Department, to the 4th (female) brigade. They were supposed to undergo practical training and were placed in the power plant’s building at 72 Kilińskiego Street. Paleolog decided that the building was suitable for this type of course, and in her report she wrote, among other things:

14 KGPP, dopływ. sygn. 1286, Report, p. 22. 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid., p. 23.

Internal Security, July–December 297 Piotr Gołdyn

As I have stated, most trained police officers are physically and intellectually completely satisfactory. They quickly show orientation, great interest and willingness to work. On 6th of May this year, there was a solemn swearing-in of the policewomen, at which the State Police commissioned officers from the Regional Headquarters and the Investigation Office were present. Before the oath, I said a few words about the meaning of the oath, which was taken from the police officers by the Regional Police Chief who also spoke to the platoon17.

It is worth noting at this point that in all of the cities mentioned above, police officers started a nine-month course which consisted of three parts. The first one, lasting from May 2 to July 1, 1938, was a practical training. The next stage was a theoretical training lasting from July 2 to November 30, 1938. The whole cycle ended again with practical training, already conducted in women brigades, which lasted from December 1, 1938 to January 31, 193918. As part of the theoretical training, the policewomen were acquainted with vari- ous issues, including forensic science, investigative service techniques and social issues. In the latter area, Stanisława Paleolog was also active, giving lectures for 24 hours. Fifteen hours of the lecture concerned issues related to the fight against prostitution and trafficking in women. She devoted five hours to the fight against pornography, and four hours to the issues of the fight against drug trafficking and drug addiction19. Paleolog was also the author of instructions for practical training for police- women in women’s brigades. As mentioned earlier, the duration of the course was scheduled for nine months, in three stages. As she wrote in the manual: The practical training of police officers is intended to comprehensively prepare them for their duties in both the general service and the criminal service, and should therefore take place alternately, half of the period, i.e. one month, they practice in the criminal ser- vice, the other half in the general service. Practical service during the training is basically 8 hours a day, with at least 2 times a week on night duty. All students are to be barracked, and immediately trained in barrack order and discipline20. This practical part included drills and gymnastics, for half an hour every morn- ing, alternatively. Paleolog instructed that the drills should take place in civilian clothes, but the policewomen should wear navy blue berets, brown gloves and black half-heeled shoes, with heels not higher than 3–4 centimetres. During the drills, the female police officers practiced the positions of: at attention, saluting, reporting, assembling, turning motions and marching. The second area of training was the criminal service, which included, among other things, all of the assistance to the sanitary and vice supervision of prostitutes; all police activities related to the fight against crime; control of women’s arrests and the ability to perform personal searches on women. The last and third area was the general service, i.e.

17 Ibid., p. 24. 18 Ibid., p. 27. 19 Ibid., p. 40. 20 Ibid., p. 42.

298 Internal Security, July–December Women Police in Interwar Poland in the Light of Reports From Inspections… combating juvenile delinquency, caring for abandoned children and ‘acting in rela- tion to schoolchildren’, as Paleolog put it. She also wrote in the manual: During the first stage of the training, policewomen should be treated as raw mate- rial, definitely not suitable for independent work. All official activities during this period are carried out under the supervision of a senior, suitably qualified female police officer or, if necessary, a male police officer, who acts as an instructor. This service is to be per- formed without weapons, which should not even be assigned to cadets. If the trainer of the student has to be on duty, the student must assist them21. At the end of this part of the training, Paleolog suggested that the Regional Police Chiefs should issue each cadet with a qualification opinion, which should include such elements as mental qualifications, professional qualities, personal qualities and physical qualities (stamina at work, physical health and appearance). This was intended to help determine whether the students meet the requirements22. According to Paleolog, the practical course after the theoretical part, i.e. the third part of the whole training, should include such elements as office work, especially that which directly constituted the women’s brigades’ activities. She also saw the need for the trainees to become independent through limited interference by the instructors. As a result, the policewoman should be completely independent in performing activities provided for in the area of duty. At the end of this stage of training, the chiefs were to issue opinions again, which would be binding in terms of admission or not to police service23. The issue of training within the criminal service was developed in another ver- sion of the manual prepared by Paleolog. It is worth quoting here a longer fragment of this manual. It shows how Paleolog approached the issue of female police offic- ers’ training, especially in terms of control over prostitution and human trafficking, which were a priority for her. Training in the criminal police service should take into account the following: 1) all activities in the sanitary and medical supervision over prostitutes, falling within the scope of the duties of the sanitary and vice teams, in particular; a) duty at the Sanitary and Vice Department and at sanitary and welfare offices, and presence at sanitary and welfare commissions in order to familiarise oneself with the tasks of these authorities and with the (social) element that passes through them. b) disclosure of women who engage in clandestine prostitution. This will include observations, intelligence and interviews, and detention of these women. Cadets’ attention should be paid to the sources from which the information about women who engage in clandestine activities comes from, the need to check the truthfulness and basis of the suspicions and charges made, and finally the discreet performance of these activities and a humane response to the victims of prostitution. Training in reporting on prostitutes detained for the first time should be complete and accurate.

21 Ibid. 22 Ibid. 23 Ibid.

Internal Security, July–December 299 Piotr Gołdyn

c) supervising registered prostitutes with regard to their sanitary obligations and the regulations of order that apply to them. This will include activities such as: searching for and forcibly bringing prostitutes who are evading medical checks to the sanitary and welfare offices; preventing prostitutes from moving in large numbers on the streets of the city and in pro- hibited hours and places; checking homes of prostitutes, public houses, clandestine disorderly houses, hotels, etc. for the purpose of searching for prostitutes who are evading medical checks; and finally, discreetly bringing prostitutes to premises at sanitary and welfare offices or to police custody; training in reporting violations of the law in this area to the administrative authorities24.

She also suggested that, while dealing with prostitutes, the cadets should be given an opportunity to apply ‘prevention and rehabilitation’25. She also developed a range of qualifications that were to be assessed by the regional police chiefs. In terms of mental qualifications, the following elements were to be assessed: mental clarity, sense of direction, intelligence, perceptiveness, and other special abilities. In the case of professional qualities, the following were important: initiative, energy, and executive, managerial and edu- cational skills. Behaviour in the service, attitude towards colleagues and superiors, discipline, diligence, enthusiasm for work and duty, and ideals were also taken into account. Personal qualities, according to Paleolog, included: personality, sense of humour, courage, good manners, life experience, but also how they behave off duty, in their private life. The last group to be assessed were physical qualities, including strength, appearance and endurance. Resistance to disease was also an important issue. She highlighted the morals of female candidates for service, especially their relations with men and making inappropriate friendships26. On 3 December 1938, she began an inspection in Cracow. Thus, it is known from the inspection protocol that there were 6 people working in the section in the city, including one man. The head of the section was Franciszka Fiedorówna. The section also included warrant officer Stanisława Rakoczy, but in fact she worked as a typist at the Cracow City Police Headquarters27. Stanisława Paleolog was satisfied with the health condition of the female police officers, but she noted that two of them were quite often ill, and that they had been away for several weeks. She also defined the scope of service of the female police officers from Cracow. The report shows that they were patrolling day and night, try- ing to disclose so-called clandestine prostitutes, but also to catch those who evaded sanitary checks. In addition, the police officers carried out investigations, controlled clandestine meeting places, and inspected and observed catering establishments, especially those that were suspected of having been involved in prostitution. The effects of the policewomen’s work did not escape Paleolog’s attention. According to the protocol, in 1938 alone, they detained one hundred and fifty women for 24 Ibid., p. 45. 25 At that time, the term ‘rehabilitation’ referred to tasks of resocialisation, here of prosti- tutes. 26 Ibid. 27 KGPP, sygn. 148, Protokół kontroli, pp. 2–4.

300 Internal Security, July–December Women Police in Interwar Poland in the Light of Reports From Inspections… secret prostitution, i.e. those who were not registered. For various offences and eva- sion of sanitary control, 459 prostitutes were detained. They also found 91 people who were wanted for various reasons28. Police officers in Cracow kept a register and an album of prostitutes, and scru- pulously recorded suspicious premises and people suspected of pimping. Their superiors also had a good opinion of the female police officers, which Stanisława noted in the following way: The City Police Chief and the Head of the Criminal Department give a good opinion of the work of the women’s section, emphasising the great diligence, ideals and managerial skills of the head of the section, senior warrant officer Fiedorówna, who was awarded the Cross of Merit this year, and received a commendation in written form and 50 złoty reward. Another policewoman was assessed negatively and was even reprimanded. Her behaviour was inappropriate both on and off duty, which had a negative impact on the perception of the women’s police section. Paleolog requested a disciplinary procedure against this female police officer29. In March 1939, Stanisława Paleolog, who at that time had the rank of lieuten- ant of the State Police, made a business trip to Pomerania. She visited such cities as Toruń, Bydgoszcz and Gdynia. In a special protocol, she reported on the work of policewomen in Pomerania, which consisted mainly in getting to know the area and the criminal world of Pomerania, setting up diaries and registering prostitutes and suspicious premises. In Toruń and Bydgoszcz, female police officers from the criminal service conducted cases of minors and schoolchildren, due to lack of female police officers in uniformed service. In Toruń and Gdynia, detention centres were run by public institutions, which took over the tasks of female police offic- ers, but also cooperated closely with the police in this respect. As Paleolog noted: During my stay in Toruń and Gdynia, conferences were held in order to agree on the regulations for these institutions, as well as to define a strict framework for police coopera- tion with their executives. It therefore became necessary to draw up additional regulations for female police officers, as the regulations for police detention centres are insufficient30. She also expressed her appreciation for the work of police officers in Pomerania, who, although working not for long, had already achieved some success. For example, in Toruń, 30 clandestine prostitutes had been disclosed, all of whom were suffering from venereal disease. In Gdynia, a gang of minors, who were stealing coal from port wagons, was cracked. She also noticed that the appearance of female police officers in Toruń and Bydgoszcz had an inhibiting effect on the behaviour of young people. Therefore, the notification to the Ministry of Religious Denominations and Public Enlightenment about the behaviour of schoolchildren in Pomerania is, in my opinion, outdated at the moment, because after some time, relations will certainly change for the better, and such an intervention could spoil the good relations between the police and the school authorities in Pomerania31.

28 Ibid. 29 KGPP, sygn. 148, Protokół kontroli, pp. 1–3. 30 KGPP, dopływ, sygn., 1285, Protokół kontroli, p. 544. 31 Ibid., p. 545.

Internal Security, July–December 301 Piotr Gołdyn

She then asked the Chief of State to cancel the Police Chief’s order on the above matter. She also suggested allocating the amount of PLN 100 from the Women Police Department fund to help to arrange a policewomen control room at the emergency shelter for children in Gdynia32. In April 1939, she went to Lublin. This time not as an inspection authority, but as a member of the recruitment committee for local candidates to the police. There were three female police officers going through the recruitment process. Two of them were disqualified; one for health reasons, and the other because of a bad opinion. So only one was accepted into the service. According to the report submitted to the head of the central investigative service, Paleolog carried out a minor inspection of female police officers’ work in the sanitary and vice section and concluded the following: the section head is the senior warrant officer, Adam Fiedorczuk. The sec- tion also includes: senior PC Rzezakowa Helena, senior PC Gać Leokadia, PC Sałustowicz Maria and PC Marszałkówna Helena. There are 100 registered prostitutes in Lublin, and 200 secretly practising prostitution. The Sanitary and Welfare Commission does not function, so no preventive and rehabilitation work is performed on women suspected of practising prostitution33. During her stay in Lublin, she also took part in a meeting initiated by capt. Makowski — the Police Chief in Lublin. The meeting was also attended by rep- resentatives of administrative and local government authorities, and concerned the issue of begging and vagrancy of minors of a significant scale in the city. Children were accosting passers-by, but they were also soliciting men for these prostitutes. Despite catching minors in large numbers, they had to be dismissed due to the lack of appropriate care facilities. During the meeting, a proposal was put forward to establish a detention centre in Lublin, and thus to assign eight uniformed female police officers to the city. In addition, it was planned to set up a juvenile care facility34. When analysing the work and reports, as well as the notes made by police female investigators, she came to this conclusion regarding servants, especially those working in Jewish homes. At that time she wrote in her report the following: A characteristic feature of Lublin is that female servants in Jewish homes are exploited by their employers in such a way that they do not receive any financial remuneration but only housing and living, and they are forced to earn money for clothes working as prosti- tutes. Therefore, after all-day work, they take to the streets in the evening. In many cases, however, they are forced to give themselves freely to their employers or their sons. They do not report it to the police for fear of losing their jobs35. This is what the Polish women police at the end of the 1930s looked like. Stanisława Paleolog controlled not only the work of female police officers who were already in service, but also those who were just learning to do so. Her experience, gained from the army and later the police, allowed her to draw some conclusions

32 Ibid. 33 Ibid., p. 611. 34 Ibid., p. 614. 35 Ibid., k. 615.

302 Internal Security, July–December Women Police in Interwar Poland in the Light of Reports From Inspections… about the activities of this formation. Certainly, the information contained in the reports and protocols analysed above shed some light on women in the State Police of the Second Polish Republic.

References

1. Archiwum Akt Nowych, Komenda Główna Policji Państwowej. 2. Archiwum Akt Nowych, Ministerstwo Opieki Społecznej, sygn. 189, Protokół po- siedzenia Komitetu Walki z Handlem Kobietami i Dziećmi of 28 XI 1924. 3. Ganzel-Kowalska A, Milicja Obywatelska Kobiet w latach 1918–1922 we Lwowie. Przegląd Policyjny, 1992, Vol. 1. 4. Głogowski A, Kobieca Policja Państwowa II RP w walce z międzynarodowym handlem ludźmi. Cracow–Warsaw, 2014. 5. Gołdyn P, Od misji dworcowych do policji kobiecej, [in:] Łaszewski R, Sprengel B (Eds), Od straży obywatelskich do policji. Służby porządkowe na ziemiach pol- skich w XX wieku. Włocławek, 2007. 6. Misiuk A, Policja kobieca II Rzeczypospolitej na tle międzynarodowym. Pr zegląd Policyjny, 1992, No. 4. 7. Misiuk A, Policja Kobieca w II Rzeczypospolitej na tle międzynarodowym. Przegląd Policyjny, 1992, Vol. 1, No. 4. 8. Paleolog S, The women Police of Poland (1925–1939). Westminster, 1957. 9. Sprengel B, Stanisława Filipina Paleolog — oficer Wojska Polskiego i Policji Państwowej, [in:] Służba Polek na frontach II Wojny Światowej. Part 4. Toruń, 2000. 10. Sprengel B, Stanisława Paleolog — organizatorska polskiej policji kobiecej. Przegląd Policyjny, 2000, Vol. 3–4.

About the Author

Piotr Gołdyn, dr hab., professor of Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań. A theologian, historian, teacher. Editor-in-chief of the journal POLONIA MAIOR ORIENTALIS. He is the author of over three hundred popular, academic for the general public, and scientifi c articles, as well as the author and editor of over thirty monographs. Research interests: history of education in the national and regional context, biography and history of women’s police. E-mail: [email protected].

Streszczenie. Mimo że geneza policji kobiecej sięga roku 1925 r. to dnia dzisiejszego nie zachowało się zbyt wiele informacji na temat działalności tej formacji. Wiadomo, że powstała ona z inicjatywy Polskiego Komitetu Walki z Handlem Kobietami i Dziećmi, a jej głównym celem było zwalczanie nierządu, przeciwdziałanie wywożeniu kobiet poza granice kraju i wykorzystywanie do pracy w charakterze prostytutek, później również opieka nad dziećmi. Nadzór nad powstałą formacją sprawowała komisarz Stanisława Filipina Paleolog. Do jej obowiązków należało kontrolowanie policjantek w służbie w zakresie wykonywanych przez nie zadań, jak również troska o nowe kandydatki W artykule na podstawie archiwalnych dokumentów Autor analizuje sporządzane w tym okresie raporty kontrolne i protokoły, na podstawie których możliwe jest przynajmniej fragmentaryczne odtworzenie dziejów polskich policjantek z końca lat trzydziestych XX wieku.

Internal Security, July–December 303 Piotr Gołdyn

Zusammenfassung. Obwohl die Entstehungsgeschichte der Frauenpolizei bis ins Jahr 1925 zurückführt, sind bis heute nicht viele Informationen über die Aktivitäten dieser Formation erhalten geblieben. Es ist bekannt, dass sie auf Initiative des polnischen Komitees für die Bekämpfung des Frauen- und Kinderhandels gegründet wurde und ihr Hauptziel darin bestand, gegen Unordnung zu kämpfen, als auch zu verhindern, dass Frauen außer Landes gebracht und dann als Prostituierte ausgebeutet werden, bzw. später auch für die Betreuung von Kindern sorgen müssten. Die Kommissarin Stanisława Filipina Paleolog wurde mit der Polizeiausbildung von Polizeianwärterinnen beauftragt. Zu ihrer Aufgaben gehörte nicht nur die Betreuung von Polizeianwärterinnen sondern auch die Aufsicht über Polizistinnen im Dienst. Auf der Grundlage von Archivdokumenten wurden im Artikel sämtliche Kontrollberichte und Protokolle, die zu dieser Zeit erstellt wurden, erörtert. Das Hauptziel war es, eine zumindest fragmentarische Rekonstruktion des Berufswerdegangs von polnischen Polizistinnen Ende 30er Jahre des 20. Jhs. wiederherzustellen.

Резюме. Несмотря на то, что история женской полиции берет свое начало еще в 1925 году, до сегодняшнего дня сохранилось мало информации о деятельности этого формирования. Известно, что оно было создано по инициативе Польского комитета по борьбе с торговлей женщинами и детьми, и его основная цель заключалась в борьбе с про- ституцией, предупреждении вывоза женщин из страны и их эксплуатации в качестве проституток, а в дальнейшем также в обеспечении присмотра за детьми. Надзор за деятельностью формирования осуществлялся комиссаром Станиславой Филипиной Палеолог. Ее обязанности включали как контроль женщин-полицейских на службе с точки зрения выполняемых ими задач, так и помощь новым сотрудникам. В настоящей статье автор опираясь на архивные документы, проводит анализ отчетов о контроле и протоколов, составленных за данный период, на основании которых возможным является хотя бы частичное восстановление истории польских женщин-полицейских конца 30-х годов ХХ века.

304 Internal Security, July–December MISCELLANEA

Etiquette, Diplomatic Protocol and Savoir-Vivre as the Code of Conduct for Police Offi cers

Beata Bekulard ORCID: 0000-0002-6409-4718 Police Academy in Szczytno, Poland

Abstract. Principles of good manners are associated with courtesy, politeness, tact, good behaviour standards, or savoir-vivre. They include a set of specific rules of conduct that are approved of by a given community. Because courtesy plays an important role in shaping interpersonal relations, the knowledge of etiquette by officers of the services subordinate to and supervised by the Minister of the Internal Affairs and Administration in Poland is the basis for functioning in day-to-day service. Unfortunately, the notions and principles of etiquette are often confused with the principles of an official ceremonial protocol in business pragmatics. This article features the basic principles which should be followed, and not only by every police officer. After all, ignorance of the rules of protocol may lead to our being ridiculed, along with the force which we represent, both in professional and private life. DOI: 10.5604/01.3001.0014.6701 http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0014.6701

Keywords: etiquette, protocol, diplomatic protocol, ceremonial protocol, savoir-vivre, uniformed services, law enforcement officer

Introduction

‘Anyone who adheres to the principles of diplomatic protocol and etiquette is always seen as worthy of attention and trust. Good manners very often decide on professional and private success, and knowledge thereof makes it possible to maintain independence and freedom in all circumstances and situations. In turn, ignorance of these principles and social standards most often leads to confusion and ridicule not only of the country we come from, but above all, of ourselves’.1 The knowledge of etiquette by law enforcement officers is the basis for function- ing in day-to-day service. Unfortunately, the notions and principles of etiquette are often confused with the principles of an official ceremonial protocol in business pragmatics.

1 Bortnowski A.W, Współczesny Protokół Dyplomatyczny Savoir-Vivre i Ceremoniał w Praktyce. Toruń, 2012.

Internal Security, July–December 305 Beata Bekulard Diplomatic protocol, ceremonial rules, etiquette and savoir-vivre

In the modern sense of the term, ‘protocol’ indicates a code of courteousness which combines diplomatic forms, ceremony and etiquette. One should always bear in mind that the concepts of protocol, ceremonial rules and etiquette are not synonymous, although in many cases, they may overlap: • Diplomatic protocol regulates relations between states and their represent- atives, defines the rules of conduct and behaviour of diplomats, the standards applicable to official contacts with the authorities of the state of accredita- tion, as well as to mutual relations between diplomatic missions of other states in a given capital city. The diplomatic protocol also regulates mutual contacts between persons representing a particular state as well as institu- tions and offices. It is part of international diplomacy and courteousness; • Ceremonial protocol serves to organise official ceremonies, especially state and intra-organisational ones; • Etiquette is the observance of behavioural standards and dress code in pub- lic situations; • Savoir-vivre (from French: savoir — to know, vivre — to live; ‘knowledge of life’) — refinement, good manners, le bon ton, social niceties, knowledge of currently applicable customs, social forms and rules of courtesy accept- able to a given group. As can be seen from the above definitions, it is not so easy to differentiate between these rules and concepts, especially as they are applied accordingly in the different departments of the uniformed services. The most important thing is to always follow the principle of priority, which is of great importance in all official contacts, and private ones, e.g. when introducing and bidding goodbye to guests, shaking hands, making seating arrangements at the table and at conferences, etc. Following this principle facilitates mutual relations, thus avoiding fundamental errors, misunderstandings and tactlessness.

Greeting and bidding goodbye versus shaking hands The principle of priority shall be applied as early as when shaking hands, i.e. the per- son of the highest rank or being the highest in the hierarchy offers their hand first regardless of the sex. In addition, the priority applies to the following arrangements: — a woman before a man; — an older person before a younger one; — a superior (a male one) in the workplace in relation to everyone regardless of their gender and age, with a woman being the first to offer her hand to her superior in a private situation; — this form of greeting should be accompanied by a handshake, which can express respect, affection, friendship but also pride, indifference or even disregard. In many situations, shaking hands is considered to be a kind a distinction. A per- son can feel offended if they are greeted by someone who does not shake their hand. Sometimes people shake hands negligently, touching another person’s hand

306 Internal Security, July–December Etiquette, Diplomatic Protocol and Savoir-Vivre as the Code of Conduct for Police Offi cers only with their fingertips, which is always perceived as being inelegant or even rude. When shaking hands, one should also remember about the following: — The handshake should be energetic and quite firm. — It should be accompanied by eye contact. — A nice, kind, polite smile is advisable. — One should lean forward slightly during the welcome. — The handshake should last 3–4 seconds. — The welcome can be also accompanied by a phrase expressing pleasant emotions involved in meeting the person, e.g. ‘Pleased to meet you’. The most common mistakes when shaking hands are: — Giving an emotionless handshake which is not accompanied by a smile and eye contact. — Looking sideways, up or down, or talking to another person at the same time or holding the other hand in one’s pocket. — Shaking the hand up and down several times. — Giving a ‘glove-like’ handshake, which consists in embracing the greeted person’s hand with both hands (this handshake can be used among people who know each other very well). — Giving a limp handshake, where no pressure whatsoever is applied. — A woman offering her hand which is raised too high, thus indicating that she is expecting a kiss. — Kissing a woman’s hand during official ceremonies or on every possible occasion. This can be done in Poland for a mother, wife, fiancée. In other countries, kissing a woman’s hand can be seen as ridiculous or even bearing a sign of sexual harassment! One of the frequently used forms of courtesy is greeting or saying hello with a bow when it is not possible to shake hands. It is generally accepted that: — a man bows to a woman — with no exceptions whatsoever, even if the man is a superior, — a younger person bows to an older one, — a subordinate bows to a superior, — a person walking bows to a person standing up, and a person driving a car — to a person walking, — a person approaching those already there. To continue, the principle of priority also applies to forms of address. People who are in an official relationship with each other, when they meet for the first time or are unknown to each other, address each other using the following forms: pronoun ‘you’, Sir/ Madam, or the appropriate title, e.g. ‘Captain’, ‘Rector’, ‘Doctor’, ‘Professor’. No one, regardless of their position, age, gender or any merit, may address another person ‘as you’ without their consent! Proposing and changing to a less official form of address, e.g. calling a person by their first name or by using the pronoun ‘you’, shall be subject to similar rules as when introducing oneself and shaking hands, i.e. priority shall be given to: — a person most senior in terms of rank, hierarchy or position, — a superior before a subordinate, — an older person before a younger one, — a woman before a man.

Internal Security, July–December 307 Beata Bekulard

Equally important as remembering a person’s title is remembering the names of the people we are introduced to. One should make an effort to remember the names (both first and last ones) mentioned during introductions because if mispronounced or for- gotten altogether at the next contact, such a situation will be treated as tactlessness. Therefore, it is worth keeping in mind the rules which make it easier to remember names: — if a name is not remembered, you can ask for it to be repeated (but only right after the introduction); — one can ask for a business card or discreetly write down a person’s name; — if one cannot remember somebody’s name at the next meeting, one can admit the fact, but it is important to add a detail with which this person is associated, e.g. one can say: ‘Your speech at the lecture last week made a great impression on me, but I am sorry I do not remember your name’. When addressing a person, either in personal contact or in writing, one should also follow some rules. To address a director, minister, chairperson, or president, we say: Director (minister, chairman/chairwoman, president) + surname. Also in writing, although here, capital letters are used: Director (Minister, Chairman/ Chairwoman, President). Deputies of these people are addressed in the same way. It is absolutely unacceptable to say: Deputy Director (deputy minister, deputy chair- man/chairwoman, vice-president). It is also appropriate to use these titles for people who once held these positions. Ex-presidents are entitled to lifetime titles — such a person is always referred to as: Mr. President! A professor, where the position is retained, is addressed by using the title of their office. A doctor and habilitated doctor are addressed with the title of doctor (although for a habilitated doctor, this is a titular downgrade). In Poland, there are additional titles: the title of Excellency, which is given to the Head of State, the Prime Minister, ministers and ambassadors in official situa- tions, and the so-called the purples (bishops collectively) and archbishops dressed in purple; a cardinal wearing purple is an eminence. If the hierarchs of the Church are not wearing purple robes, they are simply addressed as: bishop, archbishop, cardinal. The other title is the title of Magnificence (sounding as noble as Excel- lency), which is used to address the rector of a university, but only in a particularly solemn situation or moment, and in writing. On a day-to-day basis, the title of Rec- tor is used. It should be stressed that one is obliged to remember the title of the person one has been introduced to, because the fact of the title being confused or forgotten is considered to be an etiquette ‘transgression’ or a gaffe.

Visiting cards Business pragmatics knows the principle of becoming acquainted through the exchange of business cards. Their look and even format cannot be random, but rather uniform for each service. They are used to facilitate contacts when meeting people and conducting correspondence. In modern diplomatic practice, visiting cards are no longer sent for the purpose of making acquaintances, but are exchanged with newly introduced persons at the first opportunity. However, one should bear in mind the rigid hierarchy of positions, which is also characteristic of the Police, so a lower-ranking officer should not be the first to hand out a business card to a higher-ranking officer unless explicitly asked to do so. Once handed over,

308 Internal Security, July–December Etiquette, Diplomatic Protocol and Savoir-Vivre as the Code of Conduct for Police Offi cers the cards should be clean and free of the slightest signs of damage. They are sup- posed to be exchanged in a discreet way at the end of the conversation, and should be read immediately upon receipt in the presence of the handing person and only then pocketed. By no means are they to be exchanged at the table while eating! Contemporary language also knows additional meanings of the word ‘visiting card’ — in the Polish language, it can be understood figuratively as a ‘showcase’, i.e. it can embody or represent a feature of the institution in which we work. This metaphoric functioning of this term shows to what extent an appropriate business card — just like clothing — can be indicative of its owner. Its proper and elegant design will ensure that when looked at by a given business partner, most often long after the meeting took place and when the memory of the first contact has faded, it will be a business card which will bring back the memory of the meeting. This is why a pretentiously designed, tacky, sloppy or stained card will surely spoil the positive image that a given person has managed to create. Visiting cards have standard dimensions of 90x50 mm, i.e. they have the shape of a horizontally extended rectangle. The graphic layout of a business card should be simple and the amount of information provided should decrease depending on the status of the person using it, i.e. the more important a person is, the less infor- mation should be given. Visiting card are printed on one side of a rigid cardboard, which is usually white. (Bilingual business cards printed double-sided are a wrong design — if one needs business cards in foreign languages, they should be printed on one side, each business card separately in a given language). The cardboard can be smooth or have a rough, decorative texture. The details should be printed in a single colour, usually a black ink, using no more than two types or font sizes to distinguish the name. Convex printing may be used for the institution’s logo and may therefore be in colour, but this is the only colour touch permitted on visiting cards, provided that the colour is the same as the original logo. No medley, both when it comes to paper selection and printing, is regarded as elegant. The most leg- ible graphic layout is the one in which the logo of the institution is placed in the top left-hand corner and next to it, centrally on the card, is the name of the institution. In the middle of a business card, there is the name and surname together with profes- sional and scientific titles (academic title from doctor and above), below the position of the card holder. In the bottom corners of the card, there is the address of the insti- tution and contact details (provided they are written without spelling or punctuation errors), which can be separated by a thick or thin line.

Talks and con versations Etiquette also dictates the rules of holding talks. One should always express one’s thoughts clearly and precisely in order to be understood by the recipient of the mes- sage. This requires not only the exact pronunciation and accentuation of words, but also the observance of grammatical and syntactical forms, as well as the proper sound of the voice. The quality of a conversation is determined by its content, i.e. what is being said, but the way in which conversations are conducted is not without significance. The tone of a conversation is an important factor that has a great influence on its course. It can even change the meaning of the words being uttered, because it can be expressed both seriously, jokingly, mockingly, courteously and sharply. It should be remembered that

Internal Security, July–December 309 Beata Bekulard one of the logical and linguistic errors is the use of pleonasms (i.e. tautological redun- dancies — expressions where one element contains the same content as the other one), e.g.: to reverse back, public democracy, wrong mistake, to continue on, to return back, mutual cooperation, kill oneself to death, an authentic fact, in the month of May. Sometimes, foreign words and phrases are used during discussions, most frequently ones coming from Latin, French, German or English. Please be careful, because their use can cause misunderstandings as the interlocutor may not understand their meaning, or may misinterpret them. Conversation-makers can also lay themselves open to ridi- cule if they uses words or phrases which they do not understand or mispronounce, i.e. : ‘Ad rem’ — (Latin) to the point, ‘Ad hoc’ — (Latin) on an interim basis, without prior preparation, ‘Faux pas’ — (Fr.) blunder, gaffe.

Telephone conversations Nowadays, there are a lot of telephone conversations during the day, some of which replace direct contact, so in order for them to have the desired effect, i.e. to convey information precisely and to communicate without any misunderstand- ing, callers should: — Speak distinctly, focussing on the subject of the conversation, which has a clearly planned beginning, and try to ensure that nothing interferes with it. — Pronounce words slowly, especially technical terms. — Modulate the timbre according to the topic and content of the conversation. — Answer the phone within up to five rings and wait for the phone to be answered within the same time span of five signals.

At the table We often take part in organised, occasional events, hence it is important to know the table seating arrangements. Seating people around the table appropriately is a difficult and responsible task. It requires the principle of priority, and careful consid- eration and tactfulness so as not to offend anyone and ensure that everyone feels good. Everywhere and at all times, the following general rules for seating guests at the table should be followed: — men and women are to be seated alternately; — seat spouses opposite each other rather than together; — always seat fiances together; — strangers or people who do not know each other well are seated together; — do not seat together persons who are in conflict or who dislike each other; — the first position of honor for a man is always to the right of the hostess; — the first position of honor for a woman is always to the right of the host; — the second position of honour for a man is next to the woman sitting next to the host; — the second position of honour for a woman is next to the man sitting next to the hostess. The host will sit in the middle or at the head of the shorter side of the table to have all of the guests in view and observe the work of the waiters. Opposite

310 Internal Security, July–December Etiquette, Diplomatic Protocol and Savoir-Vivre as the Code of Conduct for Police Offi cers the host, the most important guest is to be seated. The guest who is the next in sen- iority shall take seat no. 1, which is to the right of the host, while the seat to the left of the host shall be taken by the guest no. 2 on the list of guests. To the right of the main guest, will sit co-host number I and to the left of the main guest, co-host no. II, as shown in the Figure below:

Fig. 2. Table seating arrangements

Source: Electronic source: https://pl.pinterest.com/pin/432978951650396172/, accessed: 5.08.2020.

Internal Security, July–December 311 Beata Bekulard Table setting guidelines

— all types of napkins are used for wiping hands and the mouth; — only cloth and cellucotton napkins are used to protect clothing from staining; — when reaching for a glass or wine glass, always wipe your mouth and hands so as not to leave greasy or lipstick marks, and do the same when leaving the table; — before leaving the table, cloth and cellucotton napkins should be folded inwards in a manner preventing crumbs from falling onto the table and then placed on the table, on the left-hand side of the place setting; — tissue paper napkins are also left on the table, folded inwards and placed on the left-hand side of the place setting; they are not put in any dishes whatsoever!; — cutlery (knives, forks, spoons, teaspoons) intended for each guest should always come from a single set and be placed in the correct order of use, starting from the outside towards the plate as shown in the Figure below:

Fig. 3. Example of a table setting during formal events.

Source: Electronic source: https://pl.pinterest.com/pin/173599760613848474/, accessed: 5.08.2020

Functions and formal events

Functions are the most important kind of social meeting, which gathers a group of people around a common ‘table’. Their purpose is usually to celebrate an impor- tant event in the company of valued or respected people, those we love, friends or contractors. Parties are an opportunity to make contacts and meet new people, to have interesting conversations — not only on business and professional topics

312 Internal Security, July–December Etiquette, Diplomatic Protocol and Savoir-Vivre as the Code of Conduct for Police Offi cers

— and food goes perfectly well with this. Therefore, it is worthwhile to take a look at what types of functions and special events there are, because they can be either formal or private and can be divided into two types, taking place: 1) sitting down: — a breakfast (lunch), — a buffet lunch, — a banquet, — a coffee and tea break, — a reception; 2) standing up: — a cocktail party (usually a two-hour event can be held at noon at the ear- liest and not later than early in the evening. The optimal time for a cocktail party is either lunchtime, i.e. 1:00–3:00 p.m., or immediately after work, i.e. conventionally after 5:30 p.m.); — a buffet party (organised in the afternoon or evening, can be regarded as a simplified form of a reception proper, except that buffet parties do not have a table seating arrangement, allowing guests to sit down freely in different social compositions); — a glass-of-wine party (is a form of celebrating a name day, promotion or another important event which one wants to spend in the company of colleagues, taking place after work has finished, usually lasting no more than half an hour); — aperitif (a meeting aimed to whet the appetite before eating, when guests introduce themselves to one another and have loose conversa- tions; the signal to end the aperitif is the opening of the official part of the main reception); — a garden meeting, e.g. a garden party, barbecue or a grill party (the rules are the same as for buffet parties).

Invitation to a formal event — Guests are invited to parties and special events in person, by phone, letter or invitation card. Each invitation should include the following elements: — who is inviting (alone or with his wife, to let guests know if the spouse should be taken into account when giving gifts); — who is invited (alone or with one’s spouse, so that there will not be any mis- understandings when the person invited arrives at the ceremony); — the exact date and length of the occasional party (event); — the form of the party (breakfast, lunch, cocktail, concert, etc.); — in whose honour or on what occasion the reception is given; — the venue; — the dress code; — in what form the invitation is to be confirmed: a) the request for confirmation is indicated in the right-hand corner with a French abbreviation: R.S.V.P. — respondes s’il vous plait — mean- ing: ‘please respond to the invitation’. Before the reception, it is very common to establish by telephone whether the invited person will

Internal Security, July–December 313 Beata Bekulard

be able to attend the event, and only then is the invitation sent, just for confirmation purposes, with the R.S.V.P. crossed out, instead of which an abbreviation P.M. — pour memoire (from Latin: pro memoria — for memory) is written by hand; b) an invitation note — En cas d’empechement/regrets only — indicates a reply if the person is unable to attend the event. Participation in an official ceremony obliges one to dress appropriately. The principles of dress code, which should be observed, are as follows: — When choosing an outfit, always take into account the type of fabric, its quality and cut. — Keep the outfit in perfect order — all of the items of one’s clothing should at all times be clean, well ironed and free of odours, such as tobacco. — When choosing what to wear, one should take into account one’s figure, height, complexion, etc.

Official dress — Outfits depend on the nature and type of the ceremony, the level of protocol and time of day (one should follow the request of the hosts, who specify the type of clothing in the invitation, usually in the form of a note in the bottom left- or right-hand corner of the invitation). — The absence of any mention of an outfit indicates that formal dress will be required. — As mistakes in dress etiquette cannot be fixed, it is best to maintain a good mood and pretend that nothing serious has happened. a) Men’s outfits are closely related to women’s outfits. — Jacket — a suit or a formal dress — Tailcoat — a long evening dress or a ball gown — Dinner jacket — a formal dress, a very decorative or long dress Women’s formal outfits — Before 7 p.m. — a formal dress or a suit — After 7 p.m. — a formal dress or another one specified in the invitation — Men’s formal clothing should be completely dark and single-coloured and should consist of a cuff shirt fastened with cufflinks and a tie to match, preferably plain, without any patterns b) The most common mistakes in men’s outfits. — Failure to maintain the correct harmony between the different parts of the outfit (multicolour clothing). — Wearing clothes which do not take into account the time of day, the type of celebration, and which sometimes disagree with the note on the invitation. — Wearing an unbuttoned jacket or waistcoat when walking and standing up. — Gaping collar. — Shoes which do not match the outfit, e.g. brown shoes worn with a formal outfit. — Wearing a tie which is too short, too long or badly knotted. — Creased or not very fresh outfit. — Wearing socks which are too short or the wrong colour.

314 Internal Security, July–December Etiquette, Diplomatic Protocol and Savoir-Vivre as the Code of Conduct for Police Offi cers

— Pockets are stuffed with various items. — Keeping one’s hands in one’s trouser pockets. — Wearing glasses, a pen or a comb in a buttonhole. — Trouser legs or jacket sleeves are too short. c) The most common mistakes in women’s outfits. — Failure to maintain the correct harmony between the different parts of the outfit, accessories or decorative items. — Wearing clothes which do not take into account the time of day, the type of celebration, and which disagree with the note on the invitation. — Wearing a hat every day and for every occasion. — Wearing too much makeup, numerous ornaments, large or very low neck- lines, too short or very tight-fitting trousers, skirts or dresses. — A careless hairdo which does not match the type of look and the time of day. — Wearing culottes. — Very long and brightly painted fingernails. — Lack of tights or stockings. — Excessive use of perfume or wearing perfume which is not well suited to the time of the day.

Precedence of positions

Precedence of the top positions of authority in the Republic of Poland:

The basis for the precedence of positions in Poland is the Constitution of the Republic of Poland and the relevant regulation by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, according to which the most important officials are: —President — Speaker of the Sejm — Speaker of the Senate — President of the Council of Ministers — Vice Marshal of the Sejm and Senate — Vice presidents of the Council of Ministers — Ministers — members of the Council — Chief Justice of the Constitutional Tribunal — First Chief Justice of the Supreme Court — Chief Justice of the Supreme Administrative Court — President of the Supreme Audit Office —Ombudsman — Ombudsman for Children — President of the Institute of National Remembrance — Chairpersons of Parliamentary committees — Members of parliament —Senators — Chief of the Chancellery of the President of the Republic of Poland

Internal Security, July–December 315 Beata Bekulard

— Chief of the Chancellery of the Sejm and Senate — Chief of the Chancellery of the Prime Minister — Secretaries of state

Precedence government and local government administration positions in provinces (voivodeships) — Province governor (voivode), —Province marshal, — Presidents of provincial assemblies (voivodeship sejmik), — Provincial vice governors, — President of the Government Accounting Office, — Presidents of the Local Government Appeal Board, — Vice President of the Provincial Board, — Vice President of the Provincial Assembly, — Members of the Provincial Board, — Provincial councillors, — Director-General of the Provincial Office, —Provincial Treasurer.

Precedence of local government posts in the counties — County governor, — President of the County Council, — County vice governors, — Vice presidents of the County Council, — Members of the County Board, — County councillors, — County Secretary, —County Treasurer.

Precedence of positions in the communes (municipalities): — Head of the commune/mayor, — President of the commune council (municipal council), — Deputy heads of the commune (municipality), — Vice presidents of the commune council (municipality council), — Commune councillors/municipality councillors, — Secretary of the commune (municipality), — Treasurer of the commune (municipality), — Village administrators, — Head of the district (neighbourhood) council board, — Deputy head of the district (neighbourhood) council board, — Members of the district (neighbourhood) council board, — Members of the village council, — Members of the district (neighbourhood) council.

316 Internal Security, July–December Etiquette, Diplomatic Protocol and Savoir-Vivre as the Code of Conduct for Police Offi cers Conclusions

Good manners, good upbringing and correctitude — they are all the essence of protocol and mean nothing more than kindness towards people, courteousness, tolerance and control of emotions. These impeccable forms of behaviour should be ingrained and inculcated in people from early childhood. However, if a person was not lucky enough to be taught good manners in their family home, it can be made up for. The very desire to be correct and polite is already commendable, and the willingness to learn the principles described in the article will certainly increase the level of professional competence.

References

1. Orłowski T, Protokół dyplomatyczny. Ceremoniał & etykieta. Warsaw, 2010. 2. Bortnowski A.W, Współczesny Protokół Dyplomatyczny Savoir-Vivre i Ceremoniał w Praktyce. Toruń, 2012. 3. Pietkiewicz E, Savoir-Vivre dzisiaj. Warsaw, 1990.

About the Author

Beata Bekulard, police major, PhD in linguistics, specialisation: social communication; head of the Foreign Languages Department at the Police Academy in Szczytno. As an academic teacher at the Police Academy, she teaches social communication. Author of publications on social communication and internal security, deputy editor-in-chief of the Internal Security Journal. E-mail: [email protected]

Streszczenie. Zasady dobrego wychowania kojarzą się z uprzejmością, byciem grzecznym, taktem, dobrymi manierami, bon tonem czy savoir-vivre’em. Obejmują zbiór określonych reguł zachowania, które są aprobowane przez daną społeczność. Grzeczność bowiem pełni ważną funkcję w kształtowaniu relacji międzyosobowych dlatego znajomość etykiety przez funkcjonariuszy służb podległych i nadzorowanych przez Ministra Spraw Wewnętrznych i Administracji w Polsce to podstawa w funkcjonowaniu w codziennej służbie. Niestety pojęcia oraz zasady etykiety często mylone są z zasadami ceremoniału służbowego w pragmatyce służbowej. W niniejszym artykule Autorki przedstawiły podstawowe zasady, którymi powinien kierować się każdy funkcjonariusz i nie tylko, bowiem nieznajomość zasad protokołu może zarówno w życiu zawodowym jak i prywatnym doprowadzić do ośmieszenia siebie oraz formacji którą reprezentujemy.

Zusammenfassung. Die Regeln guter Manieren sind mit Freundlichkeit, Takt, Bon-Ton oder savoir-vivre verbunden. Sie enthalten eine Reihe spezifischer Verhaltensregeln, die von einer bestimmten Gemeinschaft genehmigt werden. Gute Manieren spielen eine wichtige Rolle bei der Gestaltung von zwischenmenschlichen Beziehungen, deshalb die Kenntnis der Etikette durch PolizeibemtInnen, die dem polnischen Innen- und Verwaltungsminister unterstellt sind und von diesem überwacht werden, die Grundlage für das Funktionieren im täglichen Dienst bildet. Vorstellungen und Prinzipien der Etikette werden oft mit den Prinzipien der Dienstzeremonie in der Dienstpragmatik verwechselt. In diesem Artikel stellten die Autorinnen die Grundprinzipien vor, die von jedem Beamten befolgt werden sollten, weil die Unkenntnis von Protokollsregeln sowohl im beruflichen als auch im privaten Bereich dazu führen kann, dass wir uns selbst und die von uns vertretene Formation lächerlich machen können.

Internal Security, July–December 317 Beata Bekulard

Резюме. Правила хорошего тона ассоциируются с вежливостью, воспитанностью, тактом, хорошими манерами, бонтоном или savoir-vivr. Они включают в себя набор конкретных правил поведения, которые одобрены обществом. Поскольку вежливость играет важную роль в формировании межличностных отношений, знание этикета сотрудниками служб, подчиняющихся Министру внутренних дел и администрации в Польше, является основой в ходе повседневной служебной деятельности. К сожалению, понятия и правила этикета часто путают с нормами официального служебного церемониала. В настоящей статье Автор раскрывает основные правила, которым должен следовать каждый сотрудник не только потому, что незнание правил протокола может привести к возникновению неловкой ситуации как в профессиональной, так и в частной жизни, но прежде всего потому, чтобы не оказаться объектом шуток над самим собой и формированием, которое он представляет.

318 Internal Security, July–December Professional Career Choice and Career Start in Regards to the Expectations of Hungarian Law Enforcement Higher Education and of the Law Enforcement Organs

Ákos Erdős ORCID: 0000-0001-9805-3511 Adrienn Magasvári ORCID: 0000-0002-3737-0246 Andrea Szabó ORCID: 0000-0002-8224-4089 National University of Public Service, Hungary

Abstract. The aim of this study is to present the Faculty of Law Enforcement of the National University of Public Service and the admission process awaiting the members of generation Z — and within it, those who wish to apply for officer cadet status — as well as the drop-out rates and their causes following successful admission, and also the prerequisite base competences expected within the framework of public service and in law enforcement. The young applicants admitted to the Faculty of Law Enforcement are supposed to represent a significant proportion of the future reinforcement of the professional service personnel, thus the member of generation Z not only stand at the gates of higher education but at the gates of the law enforcement labour market, too. Through our study, we would like to highlight the correlations emerging between the competence-based expectations of the law enforcement organs from the young career starters and the university admission process as well as the individual wishes of the applicants, and the level of contrast or synergy of the physical and intellectual status of the students in this matter. From this perspective, the question may arise whether it is necessary to implement any changes in the set of conditions, expectations or attitudes regarding the higher educational training or in the starting phase of the law enforcement career path. DOI: 10.5604/01.3001.0014.6702 http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0014.6702

Keywords: personnel reinforcement, generational characteristics, skills, abilities, professional service

Introduction

The Faculty of Law Enforcement of the University of Public Service — similarly to its legal predecessor, the Police College — undertakes the unique task of con- ducting law enforcement training in Hungary. The Faculty fulfills the task of training graduate young professionals, commissioned officers, public servants and officials primarily for state law enforcement organs, such as the Hungarian Police Force, the Hungarian Prison Service, the National Tax and Customs Administration, the National Directorate-General for Disaster Management, the Immigration and Asylum Office as well as for private security firms. According to the career path tracking system about 98% of the university graduates get a job offer. The reason behind this great figure is that the officer cadet students — police, cus- toms or disaster management officers — pursue their studies holding a study contract with the contracting law enforcement organisations, which undertake

Internal Security, July–December 319 Ákos Erdős, Adrienn Magasvári, Andrea Szabó the responsibility of hiring them after graduation; the migration-profile training is also based on a scholarship contract system, while the security studies gradu- ates mostly get jobs either at private personal and property protection security firms, at nature protection guards’ organisations, at armed security personnel firms, or in various positions offered by the public land management agency. All of this highlights the fact that the 98% hiring rate of the new graduates is due to the schol- arship contracts, and may also be a consequence of the specially customised training scheme provided for the needs of the law enforcement and security organisations. A successful career start may also be determined by various factors. The genera- tional characteristics of the young applicants aiming to become law enforcement agents, the admission process of the law enforcement higher education, and the first year experiences of the law enforcement training together have a significant impact on the outcome of who will actually be able to start practicing their profes- sion. Thus, in the following pages, we present the form and manifestations of these determinants within the Hungarian law enforcement higher education system, relying on our own research findings.

Generational characteristics, special expectations

First of all, it is primarily necessary to investigate the attitudes, basic features, competences of the members of the generation who at present or in the near- future tend to apply for law enforcement higher education or would likely show up in the law enforcement career system, and whether these attributes correlate with the expectations and prerequisites of the law enforcement organisations. It is nevertheless a fact that forming a competitive public service scheme and law enforcement administration is not only a matter of economic policy measures. Appropriate state operation demands the existence of a suitable quantity and qual- ity of human resources, as well. Consequently, a competitive future law enforcement administration needs a qualified, skillful labour force. For the appropriate high level law enforcement service provision, we need to address the problem of generation shift, and the skillful members of the new generation must be attracted to the pub- lic service sector and should be preserved and kept there, as well.1 To cope with these ensuing problems, it is indispensable that the law enforcement and state administration organisations should deal with human resource reinforcement issues as being of outstanding importance. There have not been any surveys for quite a long time regarding the compe- tence prerequisites from the job applicants aiming to serve in the public service sector. Project No. KÖFOP 2.1.5-VEKOP-16-2016-0001 entitled ‘Strategic support of personnel reinforcement within the competitive public sector’ was elaborated to address this specific problem2, also sharing an important element — among

1 Szabó S, Biba S, A munkáltatói márka szerepe a közszolgálatban, különös tekintettel az y-z generációra. Munkaügyi Szemle online (6), 2015, p. 17. Electronic source: http://www. munkaugyiszemle.hu/sites/default/files/elofizetes/02961506.pdf, accessed: 27.09.2019. 2 Under the guidance of the Ministry of the Interior, the research on base-competences was launched in 2016 as the project code-named KÖFOP-2.1.5–VEKOP-16-2016-0001 and en- titled ‘Strategic support of the personnel reinforcement in the competitive public service’.

320 Internal Security, July–December Professional Career Choice and Career Start in Regards to the Expectations of Hungarian… others — amely the establishment of the basis for a competence-based admission process system.3 Within the framework of the preselection phase of the project, under the super- vision of the Ministry of the Interior, so-called base-competence research was initiated in 2017, aiming to define the unified admission competence framework for anyone interested in entering the public service. The research group, after acquainting themselves with the primary literature analysis and organisational experiences aiming to reveal the base-competences, called for the method of applying focus-group interaction as well as of half-struc- tured interviews and questionnaire-based data collection. The research survey involved the examination of both the law enforcement and state administration leaders as well as their colleagues with directing functions in the organisations. Following the content-based analysis of the interviews, the research-group compiled a competence list of 19 elements with special behavioural attributes attached. The questionnaire focussed on the primary opinion of the people in charge — in managing, coordinating, supervising, controlling and leadership positions — on the ideal attributes, personal characteristics and set of competences for people who wish to be hired in the public service sector (specifically within state administration or law enforcement). The questionnaire was fully completed by a total of 1,443 colleagues and as a result, a competence list of 10 attributes and their manifestation patterns has been proposed. Finally, following the guided conversations conducted within the focus-group, the definition of each competence was elaborated, together with the behavioural patterns attached to them. Since the research aimed to define both the public service base competences and the specialised law enforcement and state administration competences, multiple composition focus-groups had to be set up. As a result of the work of the focus-groups, a 12-element competence list was elaborated, which was welcomed by all parties and was acceptable and applicable in all special fields involved. The results of the research do properly reflect what kind of attributes, compe- tences, skills and personality traits the leaders of the public service organisations consider important (see: Table 1). But what about the features of the present career starter generation? In what ratio do they manage to comply with these expectations? Since they are already members of generation Z, with different attitudes, viewpoints and habits of the mind. They tend to be the children of smaller, nuclear families having mothers with the highest average age. With the increasing importance of individualism and of self-achievement, these people tend to share narcissistic personality traits, too. Furthermore, their social compliance and integration skills appear to be diminishing constantly, and they also seem to be less and less tolerant4. The current career starters are less motivated by the stability and reliability of their professions, moreover they wish for a large range of career choices and alternative 3 Malét-Szabó E, Hegyi H, Hegedűs J, Szeles E, Ivaskevics K, Rendőri alapkompetenciák az egységes közszolgálati alapkompetenciák tükrében. Rendőrségi Szemle, A rendőrség Tudományos Tanácsának folyóirata, I. évfolyam, 1. szám, 2017, p. 24. 4 Twenge J.M, Campbell S.M, Generational differences in psychological traits and their impact on the workplace. Journal of Managerial Psychology, 2008, Vol. 23, No. 8, pp. 862–877.

Internal Security, July–December 321 Ákos Erdős, Adrienn Magasvári, Andrea Szabó directions.5 Their self-esteem is much stronger than of those from the previous gen- erations, and consequently their expectations tend to be much higher, as well. They expect high wages and quick career advancement, because quite often, they over- estimate their own performance.6 Typically, these young people come to the labour market with considerably higher wage expectations that can be fulfilled within the public service sector only through the commissioned professional service and by the state administration officials, while on the other hand, state administra- tion officials’ pay checks tend to be falling behind those of the business sector.7 Workplaces abounding in success, versatile experiences and tasks, recognition and quick feedback, appropriate treatment and response, preferably instantly, seem to be of utmost importance for them. Not getting what they expect, they tend to swap jobs and positions quickly, since workplace adherence, discipline, respect for rules and authority are not supposed to be their strength. They do not really seem to be persistent, and also lack stamina and the strength to face failures, yet their self-esteem is fairly high, which results in a low level of commitment. Therefore, it reveals that the organisational expectations, needs and wishes of the career starters do not seem to be in perfect harmony and concord.

Characteristics of the offi cer cadet legal status and of the admission process into law enforcement higher education

To elaborate further on the topic, it seems to be indispensable to briefly outline the newly implemented legal status within the law enforcement higher education system, which is meant to be called the officer cadet status. Most likely, everyone has already heard the revered wisdom from the older generation that ‘A smooth sea does not make a skilled sailor’. Naturally, we tend to hear this proverb when we complain about the hardships of life, work or educa- tion. The moral of the old wisdom tends to refer to the realisation that one’s body, soul and spirit8 and overall personality can be improved and developed properly

5 Hazafi Z, Néhány gondolat a közigazgatás munkaerő-piaci versenyképességéről. Hadtudomány XXV. évfolyam, elektronikus különszám. HR Megoldások a XXI. században — nemzetközi kitekintéssel — fókuszban a közszféra és a magánszféra című szakmai-tudományos konferencia, 2015. p. 15. Electronic source: http://mhtt.eu/hadtudomany/2015/2015_elek- tronikus_kulonszam/4_HAZAFI_ZOLTAN.pdf, accessed: 28.11.2019. 6 Magasvári A, What is a good entrant into the labour market? Tudásmenedzsment, 2018, Vol. 19, No. 2, p. 128. Electronic source: http://btk.pte.hu/sites/btk.pte.hu/files/files/xix. evf_.2.szam_.pdf, accessed: 26.11.2019. 7 Krauss F.G, A civil közigazgatás bérrendszerének megújulása és fenntarthatósága. Bu- dapesti, 2019. Kereskedelmi és Iparkamara Gazdasági Szolgáltatások Tagozat, XX. Tanácsadó Osztály, 2016, pp. 99–101. 8 ‘According to Socrates — claimed by Safranski — everything should possess conscious- ness so as to be good…’, [in:] B, Kognitív esztétika, mint pszichológiai határhelyzet (avagy olvasta-e Nietzsche Kierkegaard–t?) Kritische Zeiten — Zeitschrift für Humanwissenschaften. 2015, T. 6, Vol. 1–2, Januar-Juli, Wien, p. 37.

322 Internal Security, July–December Professional Career Choice and Career Start in Regards to the Expectations of Hungarian… against a certain level of hardship, challenges and probes, and as a result of these, the human perseverance, resilience and problem solving skills can also improve.9 This proverb may be absolutely true for the newly admitted students with the officer cadet status launched in 2016 of the Faculty of Law Enforcement of the National University of Public Service, since they must face challenges they have never encountered before in their lives. It could be the permanent uniform obligation even during in-class studies, or the morning line-up, the continuous shooting practice and physical prep-train- ings, as well as the late-afternoon classes.10 The officer cadet status constitutes a special transition between the previously applied student and professional commissioned servicemen status. We can find versatile forms of evidence to prove this claim in legal directives and internal regula- tions concerning the establishment and the rights and duties of the officer cadets, precisely until the terms under which this legal relationship would cease, and further- more, it contains directives concerning its relationship to other student legal statuses in similar institutions.11 Thus, the officer cadet may be placed in a special legal status category very similar but not identical to the commissioned service people’s legal relations. The legal status of the officer cadets proves to be a new legal institution aiming to provide new legal guar- antees for the students as well as to support them financially and facilitate their studies. The officer cadet student, by signing the scholarship contract, pledges to follow his/her studies according to his/her best skills and abilities. The law enforcement organisation pledges to support the studies of the officer cadet, to hire him/her after a successful graduation as well as to offer him/her an appropriate professional position within the organisation. Consequently, the officer cadet and student legal status must be equivalent and both must be valid along the whole length of the studies. Cessation of any of the two may result in losing the other’s legal status, as well. Naturally, as a primary prerequisite, to initiate officer cadet status, first of all, the student must be admitted into the law enforcement higher education system. The university admission process shows no alteration whatsoever from the other valid higher educational admission processes. Some conditions, though, must be emphasised, e.g. for the full-time law enforcement training schemes, only those Hungarian citizens may apply who are aged above 18 years but are under 25 years in the year of admission, and possess permanent residency in Hungary. Most of the full-time educational schemes have the prerequisite from the applicants to possess an intermediate (B2) level state-accredited complex language certificate or an equivalent Matura exam certificate12. This seems to be

9 Mikolicz G, Teher alatt nő a pálma. Sub pondere crescit palma. Electronic source: http:// www.bibliaszov.hu/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=66%3Ateher-alatt-n- a-palma&Itemid=21, accessed: 12.11.2019. 10 Szabó A, Sub pondere crescit palma, avagy a pénzügyőr tisztjelölt erőpróbája, [in:] Dobák I, Hautzinger Z (Eds), Szakmaiság, szerénység, szorgalom: Ünnepi kötet a 65 éves Boda József tiszteletére Budapest, Magyarország: Dialóg Campus Kiadó, Nordex Kft., 2018, p. 599. 11 Ibid., p. 600. 12 Since 2016, applicants must have a lg. certificate from any of the official languages of the EU or from Ukrainian, Serbian, Boyash, Lovaric, Russian or Chinese languages.

Internal Security, July–December 323 Ákos Erdős, Adrienn Magasvári, Andrea Szabó reasonable as the cadets at the Faculty of Law Enforcement will usually not have the opportunity to develop their foreign language skills when they start working as commissioned officers, while, in many cases, they need them for work.13 Some experts do claim that the best way to improve and deepen the foreign language knowledge of the students would be to make them attend a foreign language course in each semester in any chosen language.14 Furthermore, it is also impor- tant to highlight that in the case of full-time officer cadet applicant students, they must pass a strict physical, psychological aptitude test. Failing any part of this test, even with outstanding educational records, excludes the applicant from the law enforcement admission process. Finally, as part of the admission process, there is also a personal professional aptitude interview assessing the applicant’s personal motivation for the law enforcement profession as well as checking/revealing any causes that might exclude him/her from this special career choice. The officer cadet, after the successful admission process, may start his/her law enforcement base training, when the law enforcement organisation sets a six-month long trial period. During the trial period, both parties may arbitrarily and straight- forwardly cease or step away from the contract. Moreover the officer cadet’s legal status must be ceased in the case that the cadet does not comply with the basic requirements of the law enforcement training due to his/her personal fault.15

Experiences of the admission process and of the law enforcement basic preparation training

The experiences of the previous years (2016–2018) have already demonstrated that the members of generation Z tend to identify and comply even with the basic pre- requisites of the law enforcement admissions process and the demands of the newly established officer cadet legal status with difficulties. Quite a considerable number of students do not want to or cannot overcome these strict requirements and chal- lenges. Analysing the results of the admission process and the findings of the first period of the law enforcement training, we have come to confirm the following claims. The drop-out rate at the physical aptitude test is continuously rising each year. In 2016, 30.9% of the applicants, and in 2017, 24.4% received an unfit (failed) qualification along the physical aptitude test, while in 2018 the disqualification ratio rose to 43%. Presumably, the reasons behind the significant proportion of unfit applicants for the physical aptitude tests must be multiple. What is certain is the fact stemming

13 See the results of the survey conducted within the border policing branch of the Hun- garian Police: Borszéki J, A Rendőrség határrendészeti feladatokat ellátó állományának idegen nyelvi ismeretei és érdeklődése a nemzetközi határrendészeti tevékenységek iránt, [in:] Szelei I, Berki G (Eds), A hadtudomány és a 21. század. Tanulmánykötet, 2015, pp. 163–196. 14 Nikolov M, Az idegen nyelvek tanulása és a nyelvtudás. Magyar Tudomány. A Magyar Tudományos Akadémia folyóirata. Alapítva: 1840. 2011/9. Budapest, 2011. p. 1056. Electronic source: http://www.matud.iif.hu/2011/09/04.htm, accessed: 17.11.2019. 15 Szabó A, A tisztjelölti jogállás sajátosságai, [in:] Erdős Á (Ed.), Integrált pénzügyőri ismeretek Kezdő I pénzügyőrök kézikönyve. Budapest, Magyarország: Magyar Rendészet- tudományi Társaság Vám- és Pénzügyőri Tagozat, 2018, p. 303.

324 Internal Security, July–December Professional Career Choice and Career Start in Regards to the Expectations of Hungarian… from the authentic representative national survey carried out among Hungarian school children showing that Hungarian kids sadly enough pursue an extremely static lifestyle poor in any kind of physical activity.16,17 Another reason might be that the applicants may not prepare for the examina- tions and tests, do not test their skills and fitness, endurance, and in some cases they are not really aware of their physical performance and abilities or they tend to overestimate those. My previous research findings have clearly revealed that adolescents have con- sistently overestimated their activities and physical performance — even four times higher than actual reality would demonstrate.18,19 However, the health status and psychical aptitude test results reflect a more favourable situation. The numeric data from the previous years do confirm that among the applicants for law enforcement officer training, the ratio of physically or psychologically unfit students has been shrinking. From the students showing up at health and psycho- logical examinations, 24.3% received unfit status in 2016, while in 2017, it was 21%, and in 2018, only 19% of them proved to be unfit for service. Finally, the last phase of the admission process is supposed to be the profes- sional aptitude interview or an orientative discussion. The experiences reflect that from among the participants in these orientative discussions, the ratio of unfit qualified applicants does not reach even 1% (in 2016, 1.08%; in 2017, 0.97%; in 2018, 0.63% of the applicants). All the same, the first really feasible manifestation of the discrepancy between the expectations of the law enforcement professional services and the ones of the members of generation Z emerges during the first 5-week-long basic law enforce- ment training period. Along the first 5-week-long session, the training takes place under strict rules — even the first weekend must be spent confined together in the institution for the enlisted personnel. The numeric feedbacks and experiences of the previous years do confirm our assumption that during this first 5-week-long basic preparatory training session of the law enforcement training, increasing numbers of students decide to leave the officer cadet profession. Each year, on average 15.8%, of the officer cadets’ personnel leave the institution, particularly during the first 5-week training session (in 2016, 11.9%; in 2017, 16.2%; while in 2018, 19.4%).

16 Németh A, Fizikai aktivitás és képernyőhasználat, [in:] Németh A, Költő A (Eds), Egészség és egészségmagatartás iskoláskorban 2014. Az Iskoláskorú gyermekek egészségmagatartása elnevezésű, az Egészségügyi Világszervezettel együttműködésben megvalósuló nemzetközi kutatás 2014. évi felméréséről készült nemzeti jelentés. Nemzeti Egészségfejlesztési Intézet. Budapest, 2014, pp. 31–45. 17 World Health Organization Global recommendations on physical activity for health. WHO Press. Genava, 2010. 18 Csányi T, A fiatalok fizikai aktivitásának és inaktív tevékenységeinek jellemzői. (Charac- teristics of the physical actions and inactive activities of young people). Új Pedagógiai Szemle, 2010, Vol. 60, Issue 3–4, pp. 115–128. 19 Mcmurray R.G, Ring K.B, Treuth M.S, Welk G.J, Pate R.R, Schmitz K.H, Pickrel J.L, Gonza- lez V, Almedia M.J, Young D.R, Sallis J.F, Comparison of two approaches to structured physical activity surveys for adolescents. Medicine & Science in Sports & Exercise, 2004, Vol. 36, Issue 12, pp. 2135–2143.

Internal Security, July–December 325 Ákos Erdős, Adrienn Magasvári, Andrea Szabó

To reveal the possible reasons for the early leavers and the high drop-out rate, we carried out a content analysis based on the reports filled out by the discharging officer cadets, and as a result, we obtained 65 feedbacks fit for evaluation.20 From the officer cadets in the sample, 50 persons used to belong to the Police Force, 13 persons to the National Tax and Customs Administration, and 2 more students to the National Directorate-General for Disaster Management personnel, and they decided to give up their studies and leave those organisations during the first 5-week training session. These officer cadets took part in the basic law enforcement preparatory training on average for 6.7 days. As a result of our content-analysis, we came to the conclusion that the various discharging reasons may fall into the following 5 categories (Groups of reasons for career drop-out): 1. Low level of sense of duty and compliance with the rules; 2. Wrong career choice; 3. Exaggerated personal pledge; 4. Health unfitness; 5. Miscellaneous. Behind the category of low level of sense of duty and compliance with the rules lies the primary reason correlated with rejecting the duties, obligations stemming from the law enforcement profession’s basic features as well as of the officer cadets’ primary characteristics. Almost one-third (35.3 %) of the leaving cadets claimed this reason as the pri- mary cause for completing their discharge declaration. Based on the previously mentioned observations, we might as well assume that the low level of compli- ance with the rules and sense of duty tightly correlates with the primary features of members of generation Z. We have listed in the wrong career choice category all those factors which could be traced back to external impacts, such as the influence of parents or an imma- ture and unprepared decision for the law enforcement career choice. Some of the students ending up in the wrong career choice category had deliberately applied for the law enforcement profession on superficial and ill-considered grounds. Moreover, some other groups of students obeyed external pressure, predominantly from their parents, when signing up for law enforcement training. This kind of cause emerged in 29.2% of the discharging reasons. A significant amount of the career leavers (23 %) explained their withdrawal from this profession claiming to be unprepared or unfit to properly comply with the require- ments of the law enforcement profession (personal overburden or exaggerated pledge). Another group of reasons in 29.3 % behind the drop-out students proved to be their unfit health condition. Students who got injured during the prepara- tory session and could not carry on with the training also fall into this category. Furthermore, we have also listed here the cadets who possessed some previously concealed diseases, symptoms or injuries which emerged or were revealed in the course of the training tasks. Finally, all of those reasons which could not be listed into any of the categories from above fall into the miscellaneous category (7.6 %). 20 Erdős Á, A rendészeti tisztté válás első nehézségei. A gyermeki elképzelések találkozása a realitással. Manuscript, under construction, 2018.

326 Internal Security, July–December Professional Career Choice and Career Start in Regards to the Expectations of Hungarian… Conclusions

On the one hand, in our study, we have intended to present the current situa- tion of Hungarian law enforcement higher education. On the other hand, we have also wished to pinpoint one of the major challenging phenomena that Hungarian law enforcement higher education must face, namely the difficulties of integrating members of generation Z into the law enforcement structures and all of the other jeopardising factors. The research findings published in the study paper may also foster a better under- standing of the importance for Hungarian law enforcement officer training as well as for the entire law enforcement profession of analysing the primary generational features, attitudes, and visions of the young people who wish to apply for the law enforcement career. The kind reader might as well get some other guidelines, hints concerning the possible or desirable changes, transformations which should be imple- mented in terms of training, admission process, practical expectations and sets of criteria in the matter, since it clearly reveals that the skills, abilities and attitudes of the young people show considerable discrepancies with both the organisational and the training requirements. Furthermore, since the members of generation Z have already knocked on the doors of the labour market, both the law enforcement higher education and the human resource management bodies of the law enforce- ment organisations must take into consideration the generational features of the applicants; moreover their expectations and demands ought to be tackled. We must be ready to take new measures in the preparatory training, and the law enforce- ment organisations should also change their integrational and retention strategies.

Table 1. Unifi ed public service competences

Rank Name Definition No. Recognises the situations apt for decision-making, Decision-making I. and based on the available information, makes the most skills optimal decision in that circumstance. So as to fulfill and perform his/her tasks, he/she coordinates II. Co-operation his/her actions and behaviour with others. Recognises and comprehends his/her own and other Emotional people’s emotional states, and is able to cope properly III. Intelligence with the actions stemming from these emotions according to the situation. During task execution, is able to recognise, preserve IV. Responsibility and undertake the consequences of his/her actions and decisions, and is able to report on them. Is able to perform the objectives of the organisation Resoluteness, V. resolutely, taking into account his/her capacities self-confidence and opportunities. Is able to fulfill his/her tasks responsibly and cautiously, VI. Efficient labour and to optimally apply and adopt his/her resources at hand.

Internal Security, July–December 327 Ákos Erdős, Adrienn Magasvári, Andrea Szabó

Is able to communicate properly and clearly in speech Communication VII. and writing according to the situation, and to interpret skills and comprehend others’ communication. Conflict Is able to apply such a style and manner in an antagonistic VIII. management situation through which the conflict can be mitigated. Based on his/her knowledge and experiences, is able IX. Self-reliability to carry out his/her allocated task without continuous direct control and supervision. Is able to identify and offer solutions to emerging problems. Problem-solving X. From the possible alternatives, is able to select the best skills solution for the optimal outcome. Psychological Is capable of preserving and performing his/her operability XI. resilience even in challenging, difficult situations. Obedience, Is capable of adopting, accepting and properly XII. Discipline implementing the rules and norms addressed to him/her.

Source: Malét-Szabó E, Hegyi H, Hegedűs J, Szeles E, Ivaskevics K, Rendőri alapkompetenciák az egységes közszolgálati alapkompetenciák tükrében. Rendőrségi Szemle, A Rendőrség Tudományos Tanácsának folyóirata, I. évfolyam, 1. szám, 2017, pp. 66–68.

References

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328 Internal Security, July–December Professional Career Choice and Career Start in Regards to the Expectations of Hungarian…

13. Szabó A, Sub pondere crescit palma, avagy a pénzügyőr tisztjelölt erőpróbája, [in:] Dobák I, Hautzinger Z (Eds), Szakmaiság, szerénység, szorgalom: Ünnepi kötet a 65 éves Boda József tiszteletére Budapest. Magyarország: Dialóg Cam- pus Kiadó, Nordex Kft., 2018 14. Mikolicz G, Teher alatt nő a pálma. Sub pondere crescit palma. Electronic source: http://www.bibliaszov.hu/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=6 6%3Ateher-alatt-n-a-palma&Itemid=21 15. Balassa B, Kognitív esztétika, mint pszichológiai határhelyzet (avagy olvasta- e Nietzsche Kierkegaard–t?) Kritische Zeiten — Zeitschrift für Humanwissen- schaften. 2015, T. 6, Vol. 1–2, Januar-Juli, Wien. 16. Twenge J.M, Campbell S.M, Generational diff erences in psychological traits and their impact on the workplace. Journal of Managerial Psychology, 2008, Vol. 23, No. 8. 17. Hazafi Z, Néhány gondolat a közigazgatás munkaerő-piaci versenyképességéről. Hadtudomány XXV. évfolyam, elektronikus különszám. HR Megoldások a XXI. században — nemzetközi kitekintéssel — fókuszban a közszféra és a magánszféra című szakmai-tudományos konferencia, 2015. p. 15, Electronic source: http://mhtt. eu/hadtudomany/2015/2015_elektronikus_kulonszam/4_HAZAFI_ZOLTAN.pdf 18. Krauss F.G, A civil közigazgatás bérrendszerének megújulása és fenntarthatósá- ga. Budapesti Kereskedelmi és Iparkamara Gazdasági Szolgáltatások Tagozat, XX. Tanácsadó Osztály, 2016. 19. Szabó S, Biba S, A munkáltatói márka szerepe a közszolgálatban, különös tekin- tettel az y-z generációra. Munkaügyi Szemle, 2015, Vol. 6. 20. Electronic source: h t t p : / / w w w . m u n k a u g y i s z e m l e . h u / s i t e s / d e f a u l t / fi l e s / e l o fi z e t e s / 0 2 9 6 1 5 0 6 . p d f 21. Magasvári A, What is a good entrant into the labour market? Tudásmenedzs- ment, 2018, Vol. 19, No. 2. 22. Electronic source: http://btk.pte.hu/sites/btk.pte.hu/fi les/fi les/xix.evf_.2.szam_ ERDŐS, Ákos: A rendészeti tisztté válás első nehézségei. A gyermeki elkép- zelések találkozása a realitással. Manuscript, under construcition, 2018.

About the Authors

Ákos Erdős, Assistant lecturer of the Department of Customs and Finance Guard, Faculty of Law Enforcement, National University of Public Service, Budapest, Hungary, Ph.D. student of the Doctoral School of Law Enforcement, Substance Abuse Consultant, Finance Guard Major at the National Tax and Customs Administration. Academic/research interests: law enforcement, addiction. Email: [email protected] Adrienn Magasvári, Lecturer of the Department of Customs and Finance Guard, Faculty of Law Enforcement, National University of Public Service, Budapest, Hungary, Ph.D. student of the Doctoral School of Public Administration Sciences, Finance Guard Lieutenant-Colonel at the National Tax and Customs Administration. Academic/research interests: law enforcement, human resource management, generation management. Email: [email protected] Andrea Szabó, PhD, Assoc. Prof., Head of the Department of Customs and Finance Guard, Faculty of Law Enforcement, National University of Public Service, Budapest, Hungary, Finance Guard Colonel at the National Tax and Customs Administration. Academic/research interests: law enforcement higher education, customs offi cers’ higher education. Email: [email protected]

Internal Security, July–December 329 Ákos Erdős, Adrienn Magasvári, Andrea Szabó

Streszczenie. Celem niniejszego artykułu jest przedstawienie Wydziału Prawa i Administracji Państwowej Wyższej Szkoły Służby Publicznej oraz procesu rekrutacji na studia przedstawicieli pokolenia Z, którzy chcą jednocześnie ubiegać się o status kadeta. Autorzy prezentują wskaźniki rezygnacji ze studiów i ich przyczyny po pomyślnym przyjęciu kandydata, a także podstawowe kompetencje wymagane w służbie publicznej i organach ścigania. Młodzi kandydaci przyjmowani na Wydział Prawa i Administracji mają stanowić istotną część przyszłej kadry w służbie publicznej, dlatego też przedstawiciel pokolenia Z nie tylko stoje u progu wyższej uczelni, ale także wchodzi na rynek pracy organów ścigania. Dzięki przeprowadzonym badaniom Autorzy pragną zwrócić uwagę na pojawiające się korelacje pomiędzy oczekiwaniami organów ścigania dotyczącymi kompetencji młodych osób rozpoczynających karierę zawodową a procesem przyjmowania na studia oraz indywidualnymi życzeniami kandydatów, a także poziomem kontrastu lub synergii stanu fizycznego i intelektualnego studentów. Może zatem pojawić się pytanie, czy jest konieczne wprowadzenie jakichkolwiek zmian w zakresie warunków, oczekiwań lub postaw dotyczących kształcenia na poziomie wyższym, czy też w początkowej fazie ścieżki kariery w organach ścigania.

Zusammenfassung. Das Ziel dieses Aufsatzes ist es, die Fakultät für Recht und Verwaltung der Nationalen Universität für den öffentlichen Dienst und das Aufnahmeverfahren, das die Mitglieder der Generation Z erwartet — und innerhalb dessen diejenigen, die sich für den Offiziersanwärterstatus bewerben wollen — sowie die Abbruchquoten und ihre Ursachen nach erfolgreicher Aufnahme, sowie die vorausgesetzten Basiskompetenzen, die im Rahmen des öffentlichen Dienstes und in der Strafverfolgung erwartet werden, zu erörtern. Die jungen Bewerber*innen, die an der Fakultät Recht und Verwaltung zugelassen werden, sollen einen bedeutenden Teil der zukünftigen Verstärkung des Personals des professionellen Polizeidienstes darstellen, also die Mitglieder der Generation Z stehen nicht nur an den Toren der Hochschulbildung, sondern auch an den Toren des Arbeitsmarktes der Rechtspflege. Mit unserer Studie möchten die Autoren die Zusammenhänge aufzeigen, die sich zwischen den kompetenzbasierten Erwartungen von Strafverfolgungsorganen an die jungen Berufsanfänger und dem Hochschulaufnahmeverfahren sowie den individuellen Wünschen der Bewerber ergeben, sowie den Grad des Kontrastes oder der Synergie des physischen und intellektuellen Status der Studenten in dieser Angelegenheit. Daher kann sich die Frage stellen, ob es notwendig ist, irgendwelche Änderungen in der Reihe von Bedingungen, Erwartungen oder Einstellungen in Bezug auf die Hochschulausbildung oder in der Anfangsphase des Berufsweges der Strafverfolgungsbehörden zu implementieren.

Резюме. Целью данной статьи является представление информции о деятельности Факультета права и адми- нистрации Государственной высшей школы общественной службы и процессе набора представителей поколения Z, желающих одновременно обращаться за получением статуса курсанта. Авторы представляют данные о количестве случаев и причинах подачи заявления на увольнение после успешного приема кандидата, а также об основных компетенциях, необходимых для работы в государственных и правоохранительных органах. Молодые кандидаты, поступившие на Юридический и административный факультет должны стать важной частью будущих кадров госу- дарственной службы, поэтому представитель поколения Z не только стоит на пороге университета, но и выходит на рынок труда правоохранительных органов. Благодаря проведенному исследованию Авторы хотят обратить внимание на существующие связи между ожиданиями правоохранительных органов относительно компетенций молодых людей, начинающих свою профессиональную карьеру, и процессом приема и индивидуальными пожеланиями поступающих, а также уровнем контраста или синергии между физическим и интеллектуальным состоянием студентов. В связи с этим может возникать вопрос о необходимости изменения условий, ожиданий или отношения к высшему образованию, а также на начальном этапе карьеры в правоохранительных органах.

330 Internal Security, July–December Thoughts on Road Traffi c Control

Róbert Major ORCID: 0000-0002-8571-4592 Gábor Mészáros ORCID: 0000-0001-9862-5276 National University of Public Service, Hungary

Abstract. The safety of travel on public roads is one of the most important issues to be developed in Hungary and in the European Union. The authors conducted a survey on the current state of the topic in Hungary. They examine the actions undertaken in traffic safety and traffic control in the past years in the country. Vehicle drivers consider regulations on speed limits and overspeeding to be less respectable and acceptable. The absolute transgression of the speed limit, also known as overspeeding, significantly increases the risk of accidents, and also adds to the severity of accidents, considering the majority of the traumas and the occurrence of fatalities in these accidents. Overspeeding is the greatest problem point in road traffic safety issues such as speeding, drunk driving and the use of passive road traffic safety gear. Considering the fatal road accidents in Hungary, it has become evident that the number of absolute overspeeding cases is significantly increasing. Overspeeding plays a significant role in the severity of the accident, especially in cases of unprotected travellers, pedestrians and cyclists. Traffic control is part of influencing the awareness and education of safe travelling. Police traffic control and accident prevention programmes aim to decrease the number of victims of road traffic accidents. DOI: 10.5604/01.3001.0014.6703 http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0014.6703

Keywords: road traffic, accident prevention, overspeeding, research of accident causes, education, traffic control

Introduction

In contemporary criminology and the fight against criminality, it has been stated that most criminal cases cannot be prevented only by the means of legal regulation. To set up effective crime prevention, legal and extralegal instruments are needed. The fight against criminal cases committed in traffic has to be considered as part of the fight against criminal cases as a whole. In Hungary, accidents that cause seri- ous injuries which take more than eight days to heal are considered to be offences. Accidents that cause injuries healing in less than eight days or only a loss of goods are only considered to be motoring offences under the law since these cases are judged to be less harmful to the society than the previously mentioned ones. The degree of the injury caused in the accident is irrelevant, however, from the perspective of prevention efforts. Therefore, we need to state that it is more important to emphasise the efforts made in preventing the accidents rather than the prevention of guilt in the prevention of motoring deviances. It is evident that we have to aim at decreasing the severity of the accidents with the introduction of passive means of security and the forcing of their use. Safety of common road traffic is an important social interest. The following of traffic rules and the prediction that they are also followed by co-drivers are the two basic terms of safe and uninterrupted traffic. On the other hand, it is also needed that the traffic participants should be patient and considerate to each other. (Preamble of dictate on the road traffic regulation)

Internal Security, July–December 331 Róbert Major, Gábor Mészáros Main Part

Despite the introduction to the road traffic rules of unambiguous instructions to follow, it is a fact that in the years following the millennium, the number of the victims of lethal road accidents is three times more than the number of victims of crime attempted against persons every year. Analysing the reasons for the traffic accidents, it can be stated that they show a sim- ilar distribution every year. The majority of accidents involve exceeding the speed limit. These cases include both absolute and relative exceeding of the speed limit. It is noticeable that in Hungary, accident statistics consist of accidents causing per- sonal injury without considering them to be guilty of a motoring offence. In a more thorough analysis, it can be noticed that the exceeding of the speed limit that caused the accident was a relative kind of exceeding. (Source of the statistic data is the police- men taking action at the site of the crime. Since he or she is serving data preceding the calculations of an expert, there can be significant mistakes in the data provided). Second main cause of accidents is breaking the rules of precedence. Breaking the rules of changing directions and turning are also causes of accidents1.

Table 1. Causes of accidents in Hungary

Road ĨĂƵůƚ͕ etc. Mechanical fault of the vehicle Fault of a passenger Fault of a pedestrian Other fault of the driver Careless driving rregular change of direĐƟŽŶ͕ turn͕ mode of travelling Not giving precedence Irregular overtaking Speeding and driving too slowly

Source: own study

Police traffic control is the state’s visible and hidden observatory presence in public road traffic. Police road traffic control affects the citizens’ behaviour in a way that it makes them aware of the risk that they might go through visible or hidden means of traffic control. Traffic control is justified by the fact that most of the road traffic accidents happen because drivers break the applicable rules. This fact necessitates the fight against accidents, which is implemented via the actions undertaken by the authorities in order to prevent those cases of breaking the rules that lead to road traffic accidents. For this reason, the police are part of the lifelong learning process that aims to develop the proper behaviour of the participants of road traffic.

1 Source of dates: Hungarian Central Statistical Office.

332 Internal Security, July–December Thoughts on Road Traffi c Control

In order to free both the police as an organisation and police people from frustration, it is important to consider that participants of traffic worldwide see police as maintainers of smooth traffic, but they are against visible or hidden means of road traffic control, as well as taking action against those who overspeed. One must understand though that a significant proportion of road traffic participants demands both of the abovementioned police activities. The different perspectives of the two groups is not accidental — it comes down to their different road traffic roles, interests and various behaviours. This makes it reasonable to gain and main- tain the trust and support of the second group. This is of primary importance because nobody is able to produce perfect, obedient behaviour. All of those who are part of the obedient road traffic group occasionally break the rules, only more rarely and under circumstances of reduced risk. At the recording of a police control action, it is important to consider the dangerousness of the act, which affects both the person and the society. There is no doubt that there is a tight correlation between stationary incidents and mobile incidents. The lack of a penalty on stationary incidents (especially irregular parking cases) encourages drivers to infringe or even break the law at their own dis- cretion. They judge those rules that are inconvenient to them as superfluous, while they take the convenient rules as valuable and valid. Arbitrary interpretation of the law becomes replaced by arbitrary application of the law. This is why one must not neglect any infringement that is committed by a police officer. It is indisputable that mobile breaches of the law are the most perilous to road traffic, therefore the pre- vention of such mobile breaches of the law has to be emphasised to a great extent. The consideration of the effectiveness of police actions is a constant dilemma. It is questioned whether the traffic police is effective in those cases where it controls the greatest possible amount of participants of traffic or sanctions the great- est number of participants of traffic compared to the number of actions taken in a given period of time. From the fundamental principle, it can be stated that this set of questions are based on a false hypothesis, so they can badly mislead the per- ception and judgement of effectiveness. If the activity aims to prevent accidents, then the indices cannot be other than the number of accidents that were prevented. Combined with other means of traffic control, road checks have major impor- tance among traffic police activities. They aim at preventing accidents and securing the flow of traffic. This dual purpose originates in the basic purpose of traffic, that is, the need for locomotion. The prevention of road traffic accidents is served by the revealing of burdens of the flow of traffic together with the preventing and the counteracting the breaches of the law. Police presence cannot be passive — it has to be an active presence and com- prised of real activity. Naturally, the active counteracting action must be preceded by an observing, analysing process, since this is the only way to initiate an effective intervention. The main missions of traffic control can be concluded as the following: — supporting the constant flow of traffic; — ensuring that the traffic rules are obeyed; — revealing accidents and other breaches of the law, apprehending the con- travener; — education of traffic safety.

Internal Security, July–December 333 Róbert Major, Gábor Mészáros Supporting the fl ow of traffi c

The main purpose of traffic is locomotion. Participants of traffic have a basic need for rapidness and safety of locomotion. As traffic volumes increase, there is a growing need for traffic safety, as well as the smooth flow of traffic. The traffic participants are keely aware of whether the traffic flow is smooth or stop- start. Constant movement of the traffic means more than a perception of comfort and a prevention of conflicts: it also has a economic impact. Stopping and restarting the car repeatedly means a loss of time with more fuel consumption and a higher level of pollution. There is a wide range of equipment for the securing of the flow of traffic, but they all require a police officer as an active helper to the traffic. Since traffic is a compli- cated system, it is a common fact that the police officer cannot perceive the starting cause of a traffic jam because it typically originates a significant physical distance from him or her. It is also a basic statement that road conditions, mostly the capacity of intersections, limits police actions. Common police tasks in the support of the flow of traffic are counteracting and removing the present burdens on the traffic which they can perceive, and if this is not feasible, the guidance of traffic becomes needed. The most common bur- dens are caused by the vehicles or the road conditions. Broken down vehicles can become burdens on the road. In such cases, drivers must be commanded and even helped to remove the vehicle from the road. It often happens in cases with property damage that drivers cannot come to a solution, and they cause congestion while they debate for a long time.

Ensuring that the traffi c rules are obeyed

Traffic rules exist to support traffic safety. The aim of setting such rules is to secure safety and maintain order. One of the most important traffic policing tasks of the police is ensuring that the traffic rules are obeyed. Most unfortunately, obedient behaviour of participants of traffic can only be achieved by condition- ing the of fear of punishment in the drivers. Fear of punishment is only effective if it theoretically eventuates in every case and becomes real, in practical reality, as often as possible and needed. This includes the premise that neither the police force nor a police officer should neglect a single case of breaking the law. The implementation of a sanction follows a police action in disobedient cases, outside police powers. The perception of a case of a breach of the road rules is based on the police officer’s knowledge and competence in the representation and documentation of the rules concerning the case2. The lack of such competences is the responsibil- ity of the police officer’s leadership since the police is a hierarchical organisation. This is the central point which organises a system of trainings and further trainings, and control of enforcement.

2 If this condition is not met, it provides a justification for the breaker of the law to ques- tion the police action’s rightfulness. This might easily lead to a citizen-police officer debate.

334 Internal Security, July–December Thoughts on Road Traffi c Control Revealing accidents and other breaches of the law, apprehending the contravener

The police has a mission to clarify the circumstances of the accident and to inves- tigate the facts relating to it as soon and as possible and in as much detail as possible. This activity is not included in traffic control, but the revealing of cases that break the law is exemplary. Police patrol only conduct the procedure at an accident when it is less severe than simple personal injury. When the accident causes more serious injuries, specially trained accident forensics perform the investigation of the scene with special equipment. The mission of traffic control is not only beneficial in road traffic policing but in external areas of policing too. It also helps in detecting criminals that used vehi- cles for committing their crime or detecting the vehicles used by criminals and the logistic issues connected to them.

Education of traffi c safety

Road traffic control is part of the process of safe traffic education. Voluntary obe- dience to the law can be favoured by well fulfilled control. Whenever the controlled person appreciates the necessity of control together with the fact that break- ing the law is dangerous for him or her and the other participants of the traffic, and obeying the rules is for his or her own and others’ safety, the educating effect of police road traffic control is efficient. For example, it is important to highlight at a control action that a driver must have a driving license because those drivers who are not trained to have a license are dangerous to others. Another case is where the medical certificate of the driving license is not valid, since medical examination helps drivers to take part in traffic in the best health condition, in order to preserve their and other travelers’ safety. In both cases, drivers can be convinced of this. All those actions that serve only to demonstrate power and not accident pre- vention cause an opposite effect. This is well demonstrated by cases when e.g. a driver is pulled over on a rural road at night far from a built-up area and the police officer asks him or her to get out of the car and show all of his or her documents. In the end, the driver is fined because he or she is not wearing a safety vest. Traffic policing of the police, especially traffic control, has to be part of the educational process in obedient traffic behaviour. Guidance of traffic activity on roads is an important mission of the police. A police officer has to follow the rules of road traffic. Participants of traffic are reluctant obey rules that are not adhered to by the police officers themselves. It is also difficult to select the person to be controlled from within a large group of law breakers. The controlled one nearly always complains that he or she is the only one stopped and not the others. In these cases of traffic control, the police officer needs several skills: communication competence, professional knowledge, situational awareness skills, and he or she has to act in a decisive manner. The natural condition of the situ- ation is that the police officer needs to remain polite and dominate the situation. The police officer can never be rough or violent without a reason — neither verbally

Internal Security, July–December 335 Róbert Major, Gábor Mészáros nor physically. This is extremely demanding in a situation when the police offic- ers’ competence is being questioned. The police officer has to reflect by his or her appearance that he or she represents order. This is why his or her clothing and his or her physical appearance has to be maintained in order to meet the expectations of citizens all the time. The application of the abovementioned theories and methods are likely to sup- port the real effectiveness of police road traffic control.

References

1. Irk F, Közlekedésbiztonságunk jelene és jövője. Belügyi Szemle, 2012, Vol. 11. 2. Major R, A közlekedésrendészet, [in:] Korinek L (Ed), Értekezések a rendészetről. Budapest, 2014. 3. Major R, Mészáros G, Traffi c Safety in Hungary, [in:] Pavol A; Bohus Ch (Eds), Pre- venciaako nástroj na znízenie dopravnej nehodovsti. Bratislava, 2015. 4. Major R, Mészáros G, The Current Questions of Police Speed Control. Magyar Rendészet, 2016, Vol. 2.

About the Authors

Róbert Major, Dr, associate professor, pol. colonel. National University of Public Service, Faculty of Law Enforcement, Department of Public Safety. E-mail: [email protected] Gábor Mészáros, assistant professor, pol. lieutenant colonel. National University of Public Service, Faculty of Law Enforcement, Department of Public Safety. E-mail: [email protected]

Streszczenie. Jednym z najważniejszych zagadnień, które należy poruszyć jest bezpieczeństwo podróżowania po drogach publicznych zarówno na Węgrzech, jak i w Unii Europejskiej. Autorzy przeprowadzili sondaż w celu zbadania obecnego stanu bezpieczeństwa w ruchu drogowym na Węgrzech. Przedmiotem ich zainteresowania są działania podjęte w zakresie bezpieczeństwa i kontroli ruchu drogowego w minionych latach. Kierowcy pojazdów uważają, że rozporządzenia dotyczące ograniczenia prędkości i nadmiernej prędkości jazdy są mniej zasadne i akceptowalne. Bezwzględne przekroczenie ograniczenia prędkości, znane również jako nadmierna prędkość, znacznie zwiększa ryzyko wypadków, jak również przyczynia się do zwiększenia ich dotkliwości, na co wskazuje zarówno większość z odniesionych w tych wypadkach urazów, jak i liczba ofiar śmiertelnych. Spośród wykroczeń drogowych takich jak nadmierna prędkość, jazda po pijanemu i zastosowanie się do biernych środków bezpieczeństwa w ruchu drogowym, największym problemem jest przekroczenie prędkości. Biorąc pod uwagę liczbę śmiertelnych wypadków drogowych na Węgrzech, stało się oczywiste, że liczba przypadków bezwzględnego przekroczenia prędkości znacznie wzrasta. Nadmierna prędkość odgrywa znaczącą rolę pod względem stopnia dotkliwości wypadku, szczególnie w przypadku niezabezpieczonych podróżnych, pieszych i rowerzystów. Kontrola ruchu drogowego jest elementem wpływającym na świadomość i edukację w zakresie bezpiecznego podróżowania. Policyjne programy kontroli ruchu drogowego i zapobiegania wypadkom mają na celu zmniejszenie liczby ofiar wypadków drogowych.

Zusammenfassung. Eine der wichtigsten Fragen, die es zu klären gilt, ist die Sicherheit im öffentlichen Straßenverkehr sowohl in Ungarn als auch in der Europäischen Union. Die Autoren führten eine Umfrage durch, um den aktuellen Stand der Verkehrssicherheit in Ungarn zu untersuchen. Gegenstand ihres Interesses waren die Maßnahmen, die in den vergangenen Jahren auf dem Gebiet der Verkehrssicherheit und der Verkehrssteuerung ergriffen wurden. Die Autofahrer halten die Regelungen zu Tempolimits und Geschwindigkeitsüberschreitungen für weniger legitim und akzeptabel. Absolute Geschwindigkeitsüberschreitung, auch als

336 Internal Security, July–December Thoughts on Road Traffi c Control

Raser bezeichnet, erhöht sowohl das Unfallrisiko als auch die Schwere der Unfälle erheblich, was sich sowohl an den meisten erlittenen Verletzungen als auch an der Zahl der Todesopfer zeigt. Von den Verkehrsdelikten wie Geschwindigkeitsübertretungen, Alkohol am Steuer und passive Sicherheitsmaßnahmen im Straßenverkehr ist die Geschwindigkeitsübertretung das größte Problem. Angesichts der Zahl der tödlichen Verkehrsunfälle in Ungarn wird deutlich, dass die Zahl der absoluten Geschwindigkeitsüberschreitungen deutlich zunimmt. Eben die Geschwindigkeit spielt eine wesentliche Rolle für die Unfallschwere, insbesondere bei ungesicherten Reisenden, Fußgängern und Radfahrern. Die Verkehrssteuerung ist ein Element, das das Bewusstsein und die Aufklärung über sicheres Fahren beeinflusst. Die polizeilichen Verkehrsüberwachungs- und Unfallverhütungsprogramme zielen darauf ab, die Zahl der Verkehrsunfallopfer zu reduzieren.

Резюме. Одним из важнейших вопросов, который предстоит рассмотреть, является безопасность движения на дорогах общего пользования, как в Венгрии, так и в Европейском Союзе. Авторы провели исследование с целью изучения нынешнего состояния безопасности дорожного движения в Венгрии. Предметом их интереса являются меры, принятые в последние годы в области обеспечения безопасности дорожного движения и контроля за соблюдением пра- вил дорожного движения. Водители транспортных средств считают правила ограничения и превышения скорости менее легитимными и приемлемыми. Абсолютное превышение ограничения скорости, т.н. превышение скорости, значительно увеличивает риск ДТП, а также их серьезность, о чем свидетельствуют как большое число травм и погибших. Из всех нарушений правил дорожного движения, таких как превышение скорости, управление транспорт- ным средством в нетрезвом состоянии и прменение мер пассивной безопасности на дороге, наибольшую проблему представляет именно превышение скорости. Учитывая количество погибших в ДТП на дорогах в Венгрии стало ясно, что количество случаев превышения скорости резко увеличивается. Скорость играет значительную роль с точки зрения серьезности ДТП, особенно для недостаточно защищенных пассажиров, пешеходов и велосипедистов. Контроль за дорожным движением — это элемент, влияющий на сознательность и образование в области безопасного движения. Полицейские программы по управлению дорожным движением и предупреждению дорожно-транспортных происшествий направлены на снижение числа жертв дорожно-транспортных происшествий.

Internal Security, July–December 337

Internal Security Reviewers’ List Volume 11-12

ASAYONAK Borys Military Academy of the Republic of Belarus BABIŃSKI Aleksander Police Academy in Szczytno, Poland BOLTIVETS Sergij State Institute for Family and Youth Development , Ministry of Family, Youth and Sport of Ukraine in Kiev, Ukraine ČENTÉŠ Jozef Comenius University in Bratislava, Slovakia CYMERSKI Jarosław State Protection Service, Poland CZUPRYŃSKI Andrzej WSB Academy in Dąbrowa Górnicza, Poland DAWIDCZYK Andrzej Police Academy in Szczytno, Poland DWORZECKI Jacek General Tadeusz Kościuszko Military Academy of Land Forces in Wrocław, Poland ESKRIDGE Chris W. University of Nebraska-Lincoln, USA FALECKI Janusz Pedagogical University of Cracow, Poland FRANCHUK Vasyl Lviv State University of Life Safety, Ukraine GIKIEWICZ Magdalena Main School of Fire Service in Warsaw, Poland GONTAR Zoriana Lviv State University of Life Safety, Ukraine GWARDYŃSKI Robert WSB Academy in Dąbrowa Górnicza, Poland HOLMES Stephen University of Central Florida, USA HOŁUB Adam Police Academy in Szczytno, Poland JAŁOSZYŃSKI Kuba Police Academy in Szczytno, Poland JUREWICZ Justyna University of Łódź, Poland JUSTYŃSKI Krzysztof Komenda Wojewódzka Policji w Katowicach KACZMARCZYK Barbara General Tadeusz Kościuszko Military Academy of Land Forces in Wrocław, Poland KACZMAREK Waldemar War Studies Academy in Warsaw, Poland KÁŠA Peter University of Prešov, Slovakia KOCAN Stefan University of Security Manageent in Kosice, Czech Republic KORNEIKO Alex National Academy of Internal Affairs, Ukraine KOVAL Ganna Lviv State University of Life Safety, Ukraine KOZIŃSKI Mieczysław Ateneum-University in Gdansk, Poland KRASNODĘBSKI Grzegorz Polish Naval Academy ‘Heroes of Westerplatte’, Poland KRÓLIKOWSKI Hubert Jagiellonian University in Cracow, Poland LAUCHS Mark Queensland University of Technology, USA LUBIEWSKI Paweł Police Academy in Szczytno, Poland LUKIANETS Valentina National Academy of Internal Affairs, Ukraine LUPALO Oleksandr National Academy of Internal Affairs, Ukraine MAJER Piotr University of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn, Poland MARKOVIC Vesna University of New Haven, USA MISIUK Andrzej Warsaw University, Poland MITREVA Petra University of National and World Economy, Sofia, Bulgaria MOCIOI Ionel-Alin Police Academy Alexandrou Ioan Cuza, Romania MORAWSKI Wojciech Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń, Poland PANTYA Peter University of Public Service, Hungary PASTUKH Igor National Academy of Internal Affairs, Ukraine PETROVA Tsvetana Academy of the Ministry of Interior, Republic of Bulgaria PIECZYWOK Andrzej Kazimierz Wielki University in Bydgoszcz, Poland ŁYŻWA Aneta University of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn, Poland POPIS Janusz Higher Engineering School of Work Safety and Organization in Radom, Poland POVSTYN Oksana Lviv State University of Life Safety, Ukraine PROŃKO Jarosław Jan Kochanowski University in Kielce, Poland PURAITE Aurelija Mykolas Romeris University, Lithuania PUUSALU Jaanika Estonian Academy of Security Sceinces, Estonia RATUSHNYJ Roman Lviv State University of Life Safety, Ukraine SAMILO Andrii Lviv State University of Life Safety, Ukraine SIKORSKI Tomasz University of Szczecin, Poland SIMONOVIC Branislav University of Kragujevac, Serbia SINKEWYCZ Jewhen Bohdan Khmelnytsky National University of Cherkasy, Ukraine SMOLARKIEWICZ Marcin Main School of Fire Service in Warsaw, Poland SOBOTOWA Lydia Technical University of Kosice, Slovakia SOCHA Robert WSB Academy in Dąbrowa Górnicza, Poland SOKOŁOWSKI Grzegorz Pontifical Faculty of Theology in Wroclaw, Poland SOUTO Miguel Abel University Santiago de Compostela, Spain STAWNICKA Jadwiga The Jerzy Kukuczka Academy of Physical Education in Katowice, Poland STRELTSOV Volodymyr Kharkiv Regional Institute of Public Administration, Ukraine SUVE Priit Estonian Academy of Security Sciences, Estonia SZCZUREK Tadeusz Military University of Technology in Warsaw, Poland VASYLENKO Olena National Academy of Internal Affairs, Ukraine VEIĆ Petar University of Rijeka, Croatia WIŚNIEWSKI Bernard WSB Academy in Dąbrowa Górnicza, Poland YAKOVCHUK Roman Lviv State University of Life Safety, Ukraine ZACHKO Oleg Lviv State University of Life Safety, Ukraine ZAMIAR Zenon International University of Logistics and Transport in Wroclaw, Poland ZUBAŃSKA Magdalena WSB Academy in Dąbrowa Górnicza, Poland ZUBRZYCKI Waldemar Police Academy in Szczytno, Poland Editorial Policy

Types of Submissions Accepted The Internal Security will publish research papers, articles, materials and documents, discus- sions, announcements, reviews and commentaries on court decisions regarding the problems of law and order protection and the protection of human life, health and public property against illegal acts, natural and man-made disasters as well as against technical incidents. Ethical Issues The research described in submitted manuscripts that involves human subjects, including healthy volunteers, must adhere to the principles of the European Convention of Bioethics. Research involving animals must adhere to the European Convention for the Protection of Vertebrate Animals Used for Experimental and other Scientific Purposes. All investigations involving humans or animals reported in Internal Security must be conducted in conformity with these principles. In addition, all investigations involving humans or animals must be approved by an appropriate institutional review committee. Authors should ensure that they have written entirely original works, and if they have used the work or words of others, that this has been appropriately cited or quoted. Plagiarism in all its forms constitutes unethical publishing behavior and is unacceptable. To verify originality, submitted manuscripts are checked by the originality detection service Strikeplagiarism.com. Ghostwritten manuscripts will be rejected. Authorship should be limited to those who have made a significant contribution to the conception, design, execution, or interpretation of the submitted manuscript. All those who have made significant contributions should be listed as co-authors. Where there are others who have participated in certain substantive aspects of the submitted manuscript, they should be acknowledged or listed as contributors.

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Editorial Contact Information Contact person: Małgorzata Jasińska Postal address: Police Academy in Szczytno ul. Marszałka Józefa Piłsudskiego 111 12-100 Szczytno, Poland Tel.: +48 47 733 5016 Fax: +48 47 733 5057 E-mail: [email protected]

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