Fighting Corruption in the Italian City-State Uption Have a Certain Repetitive Quality

Home , Signoria

History of apotheosis in the new feudalism of ally, as many of the chapters in this 1d present have been unwilling to enforcement) of public policy: these 7 .ector, reproducing the circumstances [, if the "problem of the personal" is Fighting Corruption in the Italian City-State uption have a certain repetitive quality. Perugian Officers' End of Term Audit (sindacato) in the Fourteenth Century GMENTS m the insights of John Sabapathy, Mihály G. Geitner te Late Medieval and Eady Modern Italy .ondon, and of course the ANTICORRP he anonymous reviewers for this volume. If Italian city-states could be said to have stumbled into autonomy, they certainly worked hard to retain it. 1 Political elites sought stability externally by increasing the volume of trade, expanding diplomatic relations and building up military capacity, while internally they began fostering practices of office rotation, regular elections, isolating officials and upholding strict criteria of eligibility. To present-day eyes some of the latter procedures in particular may appear to be prow-democratic and progressive, placing these nascent polities on a fast track to modern statehood. Yet, putting teleological interpretations aside, most scholars would now agree that, in their immediate context, these measures were mostly products of distrust, designed co break away from cities' internecine pasts and obviate power grabbing by a single family-dan or interest group. Indeed, the most emblematic office of the communal era-namely the (mostly foreign) podestà-was appropriated as a creative solution to power sharing among new and distrustful elites. That these checks and balances would not survive the test of time is a historical fact, a process traced on numerous levels, both locally and regionally, "from commune to signoria."2 Renaissance Human- ism, it is often forgotten, flourished not only during repeated bouts of plague, but also under more or less benign forms of despotism, not republicanism. Nonetheless, and as political historians and scientists have long noted, some paradigmatic aspects of good government that crysralized in the communal era accompanied cities' transition into territorial states, maritime republics and authoritarian signorie. It is one aspect of this legacy, namely the relation between accountability of office and political legitimacy, which this paper seeks to highlight. Specifically, it proposes to explore the institution of sindacato, or the audit of urban officials at the end of their term, and how it defined and reflected contemporary ~pproaches to increasing transparency and fighting corruption. From a legal and institutional perspective, sindacato was a direct and well-documented mechanism for defining accountability and curbing corruption in and beyond the Italian city- s~ce_.3 This hardly amounts to arguing that it was the only, or even the most e cienr, way to safeguard what was perceived as good government, be it in theory or praccice.4 Yet the regulations governing its execution and the records left by its 104 Anticorruption in History practitioners provide a unique opportunity to explicate the historical relatio between thinking about, and acting to protect, the public good in an era oft;s or: associated with ambivalence between the private and public spheres. n an The first two parts of this chapter examine the nexus of auditing and anticorruption from a comparative peninsular perspective, and how it fits into normative discourses at the time about accountability, the role of government and the bene commune (common good). The third and central part of this paper analyses a rich and still untapped set of records from one city, Perugia, covering most of the fourteenth century. It is a first attempt to begin filling an enormous lacuna in this field-namely the execution of sindacato. With the partial exception of Florence and to an even lesser extent Genoa, audit procedures have been studied almos; entirely on the basis of normative texts such as guides for rulers and urban statutes.s These certainly provide insights about best practices in medieval urban government, but they cannot be, and given the available records need not be, viewed in isolation from documents of practice. Perugia therefore presents a rich case study, one that can provide a stepping-stone to further explorations in the field, including an important comparative perspective in and beyond Italy. The conclusion, finally, will propose what this joint perspective can tell us about the relations between fighting corruption and state-building, and whether historicizing this nexus can throw fresh light on the pre/modern divide.

ANTICORRUPTION POLICY IN THE ITALIAN PENINSULA

Notwithstanding its well-preserved sindacato records, Perugia is hardly unique in peninsular terms. A survey of one hundred discrete collections of Italian urban 11 statutes, in and out of print and covering the period 1250-1500, yielded forty-six pertinent texts representing forty different cities (see the appendix at the end of the chapter). With great consistency, these passages deal directly with audit procedures undergone by commune officials, especially, but not exclusively, the podestà and his famiglia or professional entourage, and later to the capitano del popolo, a second major urban executive. Broadly speaking, these rubrics prescribe the procedure's schedule and goals, the officers and private individuals falling under its jurisdiction and the range of punishments that could be meted out. What actually constitutes good conduct among officials tends to be defined in other statutes, which deal with specific offices. This division allows sindacato-related texts to focus on who is eligible to oversee the audit and their remuneration, who may lodge complaints against officials (how and when) and what consequences convictions might entail. The texts vary in detail, at times with significant implications, and governments revised them continuously, in some cases well beyond the communal period. But to what extent did these prescriptions explicitly situate the office and its procedure as a means to fight corruption? Although forty-six statute collections in our sample prescribe auditing procedures, merely six invoke the term corruptie (corruption). These instances moreover Fighting Corruption in the Italian City-State 105 'istory explicate the historical relations only intermittently overlap in meaning, differ in terms of prescribed punishments , the public good in an era often and infrequently appear in the immediate context of sindacato. Approaching the concept of corruption from the perspective of the audit thus does not provide a ! and public spheres. the nexus of auditing and antic- comprehensive survey of its meanings in the pertinent prescriptive literature. Yet, :tive, and how it fits into normative since this paper participates in a larger effort to historicize anticorruption, it seemed worthwhile briefly to consider how these rubrics employ the term and to what ! role of government and the bene al part of this paper analyses a rich degree it is embedded semantically in local approaches to defining and dealing with ty, Perugia, covering most of the deviant officials, those who expose themselves to malfeasance or non-officials filling an enormous lacuna in this pursuing such goals. 1 The earliest statute in our sample to employ the term corruptio hails from Viterbo 1 the partial exception of Florence, icedures have been studied almost (1237-38) and it concerns the actions of a judge or high official (iudex). Given the uides for rulers and urban statutes.5 absence of any formal distinctions between the executive, legislative and judicial ~actices in medieval urban govern- branches of government in this period, commune officials often presided over a ible records need not be, viewed in court or at least a summary judicial procedure. In this case, the legislators warn that therefore presents a rich case study, a judge whose decision was influenced by a cash bribe (pretio) may no longer r explorations in the field, including adjudicate cases and will have all of his goods confiscated. Whoever bribed a judge 6 eyond Italy. The conclusion, finally, directly or through a third party would suffer a similar fate. tell us about the relations between The rubric posits symmetry between corruptors and corrupted by prescribing ,hether historicizing this nexus can their equal monetary punishment, and specifies money as one kind of bribe or illegitimate incentive driving corruption. This approach contrasts with the next mention of corruption in our sources, namely the 1286 statutes of Pisa:

Should we come upon ... someone who corrupted anyone or who seeks or sought to OLICY IN THE corrupt, with money or in any other way, anyone among our judges or soldiers, for his NSULA own sake or that of another, we shall punish him and fine him between ten and one hundred lire, according to the severity of the affair and the rank of the person." records, Perugia is hardly unique in The symmetry informing the previous paragraph is noticeably absent. Instead, the discrete collections of Italian urban focus is on the corruptor, whose victim can be any member of the podestà's period 1250-1500, yielded forty-six entourage, including his military personnel. Moreover, bribes now comprise gifts es (see the appendix at the end of the in money or kind, and fines range between 10 and 100 lire, according to the specific es deal directly with audit procedures circumstances of the offense and the rank of the offender. A rubric from a different .ut not exclusively, the podestà and his set ~f statutes issued in Pisa that year deals with the city's Elders, who are strictly to the capitano del popolo, a secon~ forbidden from receiving any gift. Indeed, any of them is to be put to death if found .ese rubrics prescribe the procedu~e s to be corrupted by money (pecunia), a penal severity defended by referring to the dividuals falling under its jurisdicuon E~ders' political prominence, which in turn renders such acts most damaging to meted out. What actually constitutes P1san public good. 8 ned in other statutes, which deal with Three later laws defining or otherwise illuminating the term corruption broaden ato-related texts to focus on who is the scope and diversity of approaches in this period even further. In 1325, neration, who may lodge ~omplain_f Florentine legislators addressed themselves to what they decried as a prevalent onsequences convictions might entai · phenomenon: ficant implications, and governments l beyond the communal period. But to b .. tnc~ many in the city of Florence are accustomed to engage in corruption, by situate the office and its procedure as a n mg Judges, vicars and the podestà of the city of Florence and members of their ;~courages with money or gifts, it is ordained that no one from the city or region of . · roced- Jur sample prescribe aud tung P h_orence or any other person of whatever condition, may dare or presume to seduce, by . moreover unself or through an intermediary, the lord podestà, anyone from his entourage, :orruption). T he se instances 106 Anticorruption in History

a sergeant or any official of the commune of Florence with money or fraudulent gifts or in any other way, or attempt to give or donate something to those officials so they would do or commit something against the honor of the lord podestà and the commune of Florence. And should anyone act to the contrary, he is to be fined one hundred lire, more or less according to the wish of the lord podestà, considering the facts of the case and the status of the persons involved in committing the deed and those of whom they wished to corrupt.9 The Florentine text is the most expansive yet, especially in terms of potential objects and means of corruption. Here we can find echoes of the Pisan statutes' allusion to the city's common good, as the text puts any official or non-official in a position to engage in corrupt acts, broadly (circularly?) defined as anything harming the podestà's and city's honor. A similarly inclusive approach emerges from a law promulgated by the commune ofMontepulciano. In 1337 it too threatened anyone attempting to corrupt a podestà, judge, or any other official with a fifry-lire fine. A double fine applies to any of the aforementioned officials for allowing themselves to be corrupted, albeit without defining what that meant.l'' A final example, from fourteenth-century Rieti, sets much clearer boundaries for what can be considered a corrupt act-a contrast with the Florentine rubric that is further underscored when considering the Florentine focus on the corruptor to the exclusion of the corrupted. In Rieti:

Should anyone corrupt or attempt to corrupt, by means of money or gift, any official or judge regarding any legal procedure or quarrel brought before him, be it civil or criminal, he is not to be punished. And the corrupted official will be fined one hundred lire and be removed from his duty immediately. 11

Despite its focus on corrupted judges, the text is less limiting than it would seem at first sight. To recall, diverse officials could arbitrate in legal matters, and the clear indication that corruption charges apply to both civil and criminal cases underscores just such practices. Still, the scope is a narrowly judicial and professional one, ignoring the kind of venality that other office holders could engage in. And it is the failed professional who is eliminated from the judicial roster, while the agent of corruption is ostensibly left unscathed. One way to explain the asymmetry-which echoes observations made in this volume by John Watts and André Steiner-is that the statute sought to protect the existing system by giving the public good a very technocratic face, whose occasional blemish could be almost surgically removed. Far from being conclusive or exhaustive, the foregone survey merely sought to underscore the breadth and diversiry of approaches that various communes took at different times to define and fight against corruption. Such diversity was thus hardly limited to the Islamicate world, as discussed by Maaike van Berkel in Chapter 4 of this volume. In both contexts, however, the variety of approaches does not detract from the shared view of corrupt practices as undermining the public good, and the idea that procedures for bringing officials to account were a common means developed to protect it. Fighting Corruption in the Italian City-State 107 History ence with money or fraudulent gifts or EVIDENCE FROM DIDACTIC LITERATURE ~ something to those officials so they rr of the lord podestà and the commune How, if at all, did the statutes examined above share in other normative discourses ·ary, he is to be fined one hundred lire, on fighting corruption, and specifically their treatment of sindacato? One med- odestà, considering the facts of the case ium through which medieval political thinkers propounded ideas about public tting the deed and those of whom they officials' accountability was didactic literature.12 To keep us intellectually and polit- ically close to the Italian urban context, I deliberately chose to focus on two acclaimed yet, especially in terms of potential treatises hailing from it, without detracting from the importance of more general :an find echoes of the Pisan statutes' Mirrors of Princes and earlier political treatises, not to mention religious instruction. xt puts any official or non-official in a The first and most obvious point of departure is Giovanni da Viterbo's Liber de rcularly?) defined as anything harming regi,mine civitatum-a major Latin political treatise probably composed in the iclusive approach emerges from a law 1240s, ostensibly by an experienced podestà.s? Reflecting on how to prepare the iano. In 1337 it too threatened anyone well-rounded ruler, Da Viterbo reiterates the importance of virtue as a key to my other official with a fifty-lire fine. success, perhaps in response to a prevailing emphasis on skills and experience. As a tioned officials for allowing themselves commune's chief executive, the podestà's main priority was to assemble the best at that meant. 10 entourage around him, not only from a technical point of view, but also, and Rieti, sets much clearer boundaries for perhaps especially, from a moral one. And it is here that corruption comes to the ontrast with the Florentine rubric that fore. A podestà's judge for instance cannot be corrupted ("corrumpi non possit"), e Florentine focus on the corruptor to and his notaries likewise ought to be erudite, knowledgeable and experienced, as well as incorruptible.14 As for exemplifying corruption, the author claims to have witnessed numerous by means of money or gift, any official or podestà being shamefully ejected from their office "on account of malice and evil urel brought before him, be it civil or deeds, petty corruption and the clandestine exchange of money, and other depraved ,rrupted official will be fined one hundred extortions of goods by judges and notaries."15 While the passage provides no ely.11 definition of corruption, it is clear that as an umbrella term it leaves room for a .ext is less limiting than it would seem at wide range of behaviors that exceed the professional sphere emphasized by some of .ild arbitrate in legal matters, and the the statutes examined above. Judges and notaries remain an important focus, but apply to both civil and criminal cases greed and lack of transparency generally are major concerns, which made holding scope is a narrowly judicial and profes- onto public office untenable. hat other office holders could engage in. Another influential treatise, Brunetto Latini's Li Livres dou Trésor (1264?) deals iminated from the judicial roster, while directly with accountability among the podestà's men. By raising the topic of ft unscathed. One way to explain the corruption, the work encourages the aspiring ruler to keep his underlings from harm's way as follows: nade in this volume by John Watts and to protect the existing system by giving 0st Let them not be on intimate terms with anybody, and let them take care not to be vhose occasional blemish could be alm corrupted by money, or by women or by anything else, and if they behave otherwise, I say that the lord fpodestà] must punish them more harshly than the others [i.e. the ve the foregone survey merely sought co city's residents or subjects], for a more grievous punishment falls on your own Jp'ro aches that various communes too kM associates than on those who must keep our commandments. 16 .n st corruption. S uc h d"r versi. ry was thu. s ·k Berkel in Government officials must be kept to a higher standard, according to Latini, and as discussed by M aai e van . f proaches are therefore to be punished more severely for the same offense as compared with :exts, however, th e variety o a~ . the regular citizens. It is unclear, however, if his main concern here is to protect the of corrupt practices as undermining ~mmo~ good or the office's reputation, since the passage is mostly focused on es for bn. ngm. g o ffi c1i al s to accou nt were a nmulanng proper behavior and discipline within the podestà's entourage. Indeed, 108 Anticorruption in History

protecting the value of the office is to Latini an end in and of itself, and to accomplish this the worthy podestà must be scrupulous about his conduct and a standing. Accordingly he must: See to it chat justice is not sold for money, for the law says chat he who does this should be condemned like a thief. He should also be careful not to be intimate with his subjects, for through this he falls into scorn and suspicion. Similarly he should avoid receiving presents from anybody within his jurisdiction, because all men who receive gifrs or services have sold their freedom and are obligated, as they would be for a debt. Also, let him avoid taking private counsel from anyone in the city, or going riding with him, or going to his house to eat or drink or to do anything else, because this gives rise to suspicion of him and envy of his citizens. 17 Although Latini may appear here to be striving more for a semblance of incorrupt- ibility than its practice, it is nonetheless clear than certain kinds of associations were seen as corrupting because they threatened to compromise a podestà' s autonomy. As a pillar of good government in this period, the ruler's independence and social isolation participated in ensuring public trust and wellbeing, and keeping the floodgates of narrow political interests closed. De regimine civitatum's treatment of sindacato specifically is brief and telling, for it tends to construe the procedure as an opportunity to demonstrate the podestà's worth (for instance, by coming forth to declare a misstep), rather than as a fail-safe mechanism to detect or curb corruption. Accordingly, it stresses that holding an official accountable for his actions is not so much a barrier to success as the ultimate proof of one's virtue.18 This somewhat forced emphasis on showcasing virtue can be read as a response to what must have been widespread concerns among acting podestà regarding the sindacato procedure's vulnerability to politicization and its potentially dire consequences for outgoing officials. It is small wonder therefore that Da Viterbo stresses the importance of swift transitions between podestà, not over-extending sindacato (LIV) or withholding the exiting entourage's salary unduly (LXIV). Each of these interventions was evidently legal, but could nonetheless cast a shadow over officials' reputation and threaten their employability while simultaneously undermining a city's chances to attract high-quality officials in the future. These two widely circulating texts join numerous urban statutes to attest the role corruption played in defining the pitfalls of good government generally and designing the practice of sindacato in particular. It remains to be seen what documents of practice can tell us about the application of sindacato and the degree to which its executors were interested in curbing what contemporaries defined as corruption.

AUDIT PRACTICES IN PERUGIA

The state archive of Perugia, a major Umbrian commune from the twelfth century onwards, allows us to reconstruct audit procedures on a concrete basis by juxtaposing legal and administrative records. Between 1250 and 1350 in particular, Perugia was Fighting Corruption in the Italian City-State 109 z History a thriving city-state and an autonomous Guelf ("pro-papal") stronghold, which :ini an end in and of itself, and to 19 e scrupulous about his conduct and later fell directly under papal rule. Sindacato procedures predate and continued throughout and beyond this period, as attested both by the city's normative sources and its administrative records of practice, which we will look at in turn . ae law says that he who does this ~houl~ The city's 1279 statutes and their vernacular redaction of 1342 contain elaborate Je careful not to be intimate with his instructions on end-of-term audits, as distinct from those regulating officials' 1d suspicion. Similarly he should avoid conduct generally, very much in line with the statute collections we have examined risdiction, because all men who receive above.20 As a rule, the statutes state that, within eight days of stepping down, the e obligated, as they would be :o~ a de?t. podestà and capitano are to be scrutinized. Responsible for the procedure is a sindaco t anyone in the city, or going ~1di~g w1_th (sindicus and later maggior sindicus), a Perugian citizen elected by the city's maggior > do anything else, because this gives nse 7 consiglio and representatives of each of the city's five neighborhoods (or porte) for the duration of a podestà's term (normally a twelve-month period). An eligible ing more for a semblance o~ i~corrupt- sindaco must own property or goods adding up to at least two hundred lire and he r than certain kinds of associations were must wait (just like the podestà and capitano) at least ten years between stints, 0 compromise a podestà' s autonomy. As during which time he cannot have held an office subject to auditing. One notary d the ruler's independence and social and a judge share the sindaco's workload, and all three may not be closely related t;ust and wellbeing, and keeping the to the city's ranking chamberlain or stewards. A sindaco's salary amounts to twenty- ed. five /ire-equal to that of his judge-while their notary is to earn fifteen lire. They lacato specifically is brief and telling, f~r may accept nothing further from anyone during their term under a fine of fifty lire pportunity to demonstrate the pori:sta s and termination of their office. Their decisions may not be contested and their ::lare a misstep), rather than as a fail-safe sentences are final. Anyone summoned by this office must report at the appointed Accordingly, it stresses that holdi~g an time or else be declared contumacious. much a barrier to success as the ultimate In theory, once the podestà steps down, the sindaco has three days to announce forced emphasis on showcasing virtue any charges he wishes to raise against the outgoing officer, his entourage or anyone have been widespread concerns among employed in an official-that is to say public-capacity during his term. This ·ocedure's vulnerability to politicization declaration (technically known as a fitis contestatio) is done in the first instance on r outgoing officials. It is_ ~mall wonder the basis of existing records regarding any official or private citizen exercising public mportance of swift tr~s'.nons betwee~ power (ba/ia) anywhere in the city and throughout the Perugian contado or subject !) or withholding the exmng entourages countryside. An important exception to this rule are previous auditors, who "must :rventions was evidently legal, but c~1d not be examined or audited in any way" (examinari vel sindicari non debeant ullo putation and threaten their em?loyab1~1ry modo).21 The relatively brief period of three days and the privileging of official 's chances to attract high-quality officials records in the preliminary investigation suggest the limited access and thus transparency of such procedures from beyond officialdom. m numerous urban statutes to attest the Moreover, the sterile zone in which the sindaco operates appears to have been ,itfalls of good government generally and more apparent than real. A subsequent rubric already delivers the actual prosecu- .ular. It remains to be seen what doc~e~: tion of the podestà and capitano from his hands to those of a committee of six )n of sindacato and the degree to ~hich I judges. And while the latter must consult with the sindaco or his judge, the . contemporaries defined as corrupoon. extension of the case into the next administrative term meant the process is in practice handled by a later podestà, not an independent auditor and, at any rate, not the one who brought forward the original charges. Once the sindaco announces he i~tends to prosecute and why, the process enters a very public phase, CES IN PERUGIA ;h~m a]]Utin~ which evidence for and against the plaintiffs and potentially new elfth century egauons-presumably also regarding officials not yet named by the sindaco-- nbrian commune from t h e tw ·J!lg . b . uxtapüS begi~ to surface. Indeed, it is hard to imagine injured and interested parties rocedures on a concrete b asis Y J . ;~1id was ng their tongue even that long. n 1250 and 1350 in particular, Perug1a 110 Anticorruption in History

The statutes outline that the sindaco must notify defendants personally within two days if they are in the city or three days if they reside in the countryside. They in turn are to present themselves before the sindaco or his judge and swear an oath that they are ready to be examined. Both steps are important from a legal point of view since the announcement of a fitis contestatio and a defendant's initial response to it greatly limit both parties' options, rendering contumacy for instance (all but an admission of guilt). A failure to respond while under examination is to be fined: fifty lire in the case of a podestà and capitano, forty lire for other officers and twenty. five lire for stewards. If convicted and fined, officials must pay within eight days. The statutes establish sindacato as an integral duty of the city's officers, lasting fifteen days after a podestà steps down and at least thirty days from the end of a capitano' s tenure. Accordingly they insist that the podestà, capitano and their famigliari may not seek pre-emptive absolution, but, rather, must wait in Perugia until the audit is completed, under pain of a one hundred lire fine. Failure to pay this fine should result in the amputation of the podestà' s or the capitano' s tongue. By extricating themselves from their offices in this illicit way, they will have lost-both symbolically and physically-any right to respond to their charges, let alone pronounce any more judgments.22 Under less extreme circumstances, they are to prepare guarantors who are responsible to pay any fine announced by the sindaco within three days. Last but not least from this study' s perspective, the 1279 statutes underscore the illegality of offering officers or entourage members any form of payment beyond their stated salary, under pain of fifty lire or the severing of a tongue. Any layperson or clergyman, local or foreign, attempting to influence an officer's action or judgment by offering or promising sexual or material favors (ru.fianançe vel trame- çarie) will pay quadruple the regular fine, while the podestà and capitano are to be fined one hundred lire for failing to uphold the law. This rubric is immediately and likely intentionally followed by another strict prohibition against the podestà's or capitano' s seeking special permission to punish beyond the remit of the statutes or in any way that is at odds with them. Two points can be stressed regarding the relevant rubrics in the statutes' 1342 redaction, as compared to the previous text. First, they widely expand the (maggior) sindaco's jurisdiction, which now covers a variety of criminal and civic offenses well beyond that of officials' misconduct. Second and perhaps relatedly, they emphasize how crucial the social isolation of the commune' s officials must be on the grounds of impartiality and corruptibility. Assuming the sindaco's broader remit does not reflect a diminishing concern for official misconduct, the new emphasis can be explained as a prophylactic measure meant to reduce the pressure officials were under from local stakeholders, especially now that the sindaco had more to do without more help. These and other hypotheses can be tested against the office's documents of practice, which have left solid traces in Perugia's state archive. The maggior sindaco's surviving records comprise seventeen registers, intermittently covering the years 1332-1390. Statistically, this is a modest part of what would have been the original series. Assuming one register was produced for each administrative term of six n History Fighting Corruption in the Italian City-State 111 ,t notify defendants personally within months (as seems to have been standard practice in and beyond Perugia), a if they reside in the countryside. They complete run for this period would have amounted to 116 registers-nearly sindaco or his judge and swear an oath seven times more than the extant series. Moreover, some of the registers are rather :ps are important from a legal point of fragmentary, consisting of several folia, while others are more or less completely .tatio and a defendant's initial response preserved. In total there are 575 folia or an average of nearly sixty-eight sides per :ring contumacy for instance (all but an register (see Figure 7 .1). If the average length of the fullest three registers (n = 82) is hile under examination is to be fined: used as an index, around six percent of what would have been the entire original forty lire for other officers and twenty- series (9,512 folia) is currently at our disposal. Nonetheless, the Perugian series is ' officials must pay within eight days. likely the largest of its kind for anywhere in Italy before the sixteenth century, and a egral duty of the city's officers, lasting rather legible one at that. at least thirty days from the end of a The earliest record of a Perugian sindacato dates to 1332, when a certain Lando chat the podestà, capitano and their de Pellatis of Montecatino oversaw the proceedings. It contains the sentencing of rtion, but, rather, must wait in Perugia · a one hundred lire fine. Failure to pay Register fols. Total Charges" Acquittals Convictions Unclear :he podestà's or the capitano's tongue. By and year cases! (% of cases) (% charges) (% charges) outcome :his illicit way, they will have lost-both 4 (1332) 2 1 (100%) 0(0%) 1 (100%) 0 o respond to their charges, let alone less extreme circumstances, they are to 5 (1335) 8 5 5(100%) 4 (80%) 1 (20%) 0 pay any fine announced by the sindaco 6 (1335) 4 38 30 (79%) 30 (100%) 0 (0%) 0 7 (1336) 20 7 6 (86%) 3 (50%) 3 (50%) 0

,ective, the 1279 statutes underscore the 8 (1346) 47 20 2 (10%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 2 members any form of payment beyond 22 68 3 (4%) 2 (66.6%) 1 (33.3%) 0 r the severing of a tongue. Any layperson 9 (1347) .ng to influence an officer's action or 10 (frag.) 15 7 0 (0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0 or material favors (rufianançe vel trame- 11 (1348) 96 28 16 (57%) 7 (43%) 8 (50%) while the podestà and capitano are to be 12 (1357) 6 0 0 (0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0 i the law. This rubric is immediately and 13 (1358) 13 0 0 (0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0 trice prohibition against the podestà's or 14 (1377) 46 149 2 (1%) 0 (0%) 2(100%) 0 mish beyond the remit of the statutes or 15 (1377) 42 177 0 (0%) 0(0%) 0 (0%) 0 :he relevant rubrics in the statutes' 1342 16 I (1386) 59 683 2 (0.3%) 2 (100%) 0(0%) 0 :t. First, they widely expand the (maggi.or) 16 II (1386) 48 635 17 (3%) 0(0%) 17 (89%) 0 variety of criminal and civic offenses well 18 (1388) 82 367 67iH(l8%) 1 (2%) 66 (98%) 0 .nd and perhaps relatedly, they emphasize 19 (1390) nmune' s officials must be on the grounds 67 190 0 (0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0 ting the sindacos broader remit does not 20 (1390) 18 54 0 (0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0 l misconduct, the new emphasis can be Total: 17 575 2429 151 (6%) 49 (32%) 99 (66%) 3 (2%) ant to reduce the pressure officials were i Excluding general and group inquests of officials, which invariably result in absolution. y now that the sindaco had more to do Only what appear to be developed, non-generic allegations were counted. Individuals accused 1.n the same case were counted separately. .u. . Indl vi"d ual s accused in the same case were counted separately tested against the office's documents ~f •1 cl . . dun ud'."' fifty-five aggregate cases (in four groups) ag:ûnst rural co_mmunes for neglect of :rugia' s state archive. The maggior sindaco s ty, which could act as a proxy for but 1s not necessarily an alleganon of corruption. :gisters, intermittently covering the Y~~ F· : part of what would have been the origin_ ~e 7.1. Prosecution of Officials' Malpractice by the Perugian Sindaco, 1332-1390. rr:,- Axchi . di uced for each administrative term of s!lC · vio Stare di Perugia, U Maggior Sindaco Esecutore e Utile Conservatore, reg. 4-20. 112 Anticorruption in History

Abatengo Angeli of porta santa Croce, who acted as tax collector on behalf of the commune during the previous year. His records, scrutinized by the sindacato notary during an inquest (inquisitio), indicate that just over 480 lire he had collected never found its way into the city's coffers. Abatengo is summoned to respond to the charges but never appears. On 27 April, after rather considerately deducting Abatengo's and his notary's salary of twelve lire each, the sindaco sentences the contumacious tax collector in absentia to a roughly quintuple fine of 2,282 lire, nineteen saldi and three denarii. 23 Nothing in this register suggests the fine was ever paid or the culprit absolved, a constant frustration accompanying the study of coun records, and the bane of historians of crime and punishment in premodern Europe. By contrast, the next available register, dating to 1335, documents numerous charges brought to the attention of and then pursued by the maggior sindaco Pietro ser Franchesco di Pantiaticis of Pistoia, The allegations concern a broad range of commune officials, lay and religious, operating in the city and its hinterland. A long list of stewards, builders, tax collectors, prison custodians, guild priors, their aides and numerous other soprastanti are individually and collectively accused of having "dolose et fraudulenter"-abused, neglected and variously acted against the statutes. The document then relates more specifically when and in what capacity these men worked for the city, but as yet without articulating what the actual infraction/s might have been. Finally, the judge announces that: We proceed against each and every one of them ex officio, [that is, by an inquisitorial procedure, on the grounds that they had committed] theft, embezzlement, simony and made illicit gains; that they had done what they should not have and neglected what they should have done ... did not distribute what they should have distributed or returned what they should have returned ... and many other things. 24 Here we finally encounter an unequivocal if still general statement about official misconduct, including offenses easy to identify as mismanagement or outright private appropriation of public resources-the classic modern definition of corruption. Given the length of the list, which names many dozens of officials, we are likely dealing with a legal formality that required the sindaco to be comprehensive, if not exhaustive at the outset. To recall, a licit prosecution depended on the official's timely naming of anyone he intended to proceed against and the production of a litis contestatio. The hypothesis is largely confirmed by the second half of the same paragraph, which swiftly absolves all those just named: Wherefore a solemn inquest was conducted against each and all of them [i.e., the officials named in the previous list] and an interrogation of witnesses. And they were not found guilry of anything comprising this inquest. The accounts of each and all were reviewed and calculated by the commune accountant, [etc.].25 In other words, this is a record of compliance meant to reassure the public of the sindaco's due diligence and recapitulate the commune's notion of what its officers' accountability amounts to. But whether this also attests to the local officials' clean hands is quite another question. Each of the extant registers contains the same comprehensive lists followed by the same blanket acquittals. In order to trace if and when the sindaco acrually -tion in History Fighting Corruption in the Italian City-State 113

who acted as tax collector on behalf of h d d from this type of inquisitio genera/is to a specific prosecution, it is : records, scrutinized by the sindacato no t e procee e to read through all the charges subsequently raised; a task that becomes :hat just over 480 lire he had collected ntary ever ne~eSS:r densome with the massive expansion of the sindaco's remit, dating to 1342 <\ b atengo is summoned to respond to h qUJte Jur st At any rate, as Figure 7.1 shows, the relative share of official miscon- ~ ~ - . .pril, after rather considerately deduc/ e at all adons drops sharply from the 1340s onwards, even as the registers duct eg d 26 twelve lire each, the sindaco sentences ~g better preserve . to a roughly quintuple fine of 2,282 l' e become hat of those few who did get caught in the sindaco's net? Here, too, ing in this register suggests the fine was tre, . . . ever B~t a7s are not uncommon. Still in 1335, two men, ser Lello di Andrea and rusrranon accompanymg the study of co acquitt . di Martini, charged with embezzlement during the sindacato of 1326, me and punishment in premodern Euro Urt ser Pucci~ned and acquitted. Torpinuccio Taducci, a lay friar from porta Sole, :er, dating to 1335, documents nurner!: w.e red rbe exth e commune to supervi· se some pu bl1" c wor ks , was lik ewi· se c h arge d w1" th then pursued by the maggior sindaco Pietr hirde I y acquitted of embezzlement and technical mismanagement. The same an ater . , . . T~e ~egatio~s concern a broad range ~ o Pellolo Andrucci of porta sant Angelo, charged by a previous sindaco of 0 happene d t ~ratmg m the city and its hinterland. A Ion ming unused funds and absolved in the present sindacato. None of these pn. son custo dr" ans, gm" Id pn· ors, th eir aid g not retu· cidentally, and despi· te the statutes ' m· si· stence, were full y processe d b y t h er· r vidually and collectively accused of havines cas. es· , alm sindaco. Bringing officials to account could evi" de nt 1y b e a s l ow process. 27 ongm . ected and variously acted against the stat~ As the rable above also relates, however, for every acqUit:al there. w_ere, on pecifically when and in what capacity these e two convictions. Almost regardless of the caseload, a high conviction rate out articulating what the actual infraction/s averag ' · th 1 al d · 1. s no rmal , which contrasts sharply with the outcomes of o. er eg proce. ures m iounces that: Perugia and elsewhere across_ Italy. 28 For our purposes this underscor~s either the ,f them ex officio, [that is, by an inquisitorial relative vulnerability of officials brought up on such charges, how senously these ommitted] theft, embezzlement, simony and specific charges were taken or bo~. As aut~ors of di?ac~ic literature on the topic at they should not have and neglected what duly noted, serving communal regimes certainly had its nsks, a structural problem bure what they should have distributed or also underscored by other chapters in this section of the book. ... and many other things. 24 As for the offenses themselves, the sindaco's focus was almost uniquely on embezzlement. Allegations framed in more specific terms than dereliction of ,cal if still general statement about official duty, deal with failure to pay or pay back public money, misuse of funds or , identify as mismanagement or outright disappearing revenue collected under official capacity, a restum et residuum ranging ,-the classic modern definition of corrup- from several lire to several hundred lire. 29 Of course, peculation hardly exhausted h names many dozens of officials, we are contemporaries' notions of what constituted a violation of public office or corrup- ·equired the sindaco to be comprehensive, if tion. For instance, as David Chambers and Trevor Dean have shown for fifteenth- licit prosecution depended on the official's century Ferrara, at least four kinds of deviance were named as "explicitly corrupt :> proceed against and the production of a behaviour" among public officials: namely, fiscal and material profiteering by confirmed by the second half of the same ise just named: officials; deliberate abuse of the judicial apparatus for private gain; the exploitative use of courts by people outside it; and "customs" perpetuated by bribery that .ted against each and all of them [i.e., the helped create loopholes in the justice system through which acquittals became very n interrogation of witnesses. And they were common.30 Podesta also violated prohibitions by informally networking with local this inquest. The accounts of each and all elites (often through their wives), by marriage or by embarking on various business nune accountant, [etc.].25 ventures, activities which were strongly condemned in both the didactic literature and liance meant to reassure the public of the urban statutes, as we have already seen. In Perugia, however, all of these behaviors :he comrnune's notion of what its officers' except the first were either absent, went undetected or simply did not concern the this also attests to the local officials' dean 1'11Zggior sindaco for the better part of a century. Some political historians and scientists ;:r fin~ _this a surprising fact, given that we are dealing with a more rather than the same comprehensive lists followed by . Pantcipatory regime than in Perrara'! Others, of course, would not assume or o trace if and when the sindaco actually strive to demonstrate such a correlation in the first place. 32 114 Anticorruption in History

A few observations before moving to situate Perugia in a broader context. Firs all those charged by the sindaco are men, be they religious or lay. This may see~ to obvious given that officialdom in this period was predominantly a male dornain 12 But women too could have strong private interests and there remains the possibi!i~ gri• of women acting as corrupting agents. Normative sources certainly mention sexual as well as material favors as forms of corruption, and numerous women were in a sin position to offer either or both, directly or as intermediaries. And yet wornen re remain completely absent from Perugian records of practice-a state of affairs au cutting across virtually all the case studies discussed in this volume. Second and to perhaps least expected given sindacato's modern reputation, cases could drag on (or to be ignored) for many years rather than swiftly conclude within the allotted fifteen or thirty days. And by that point the investigation was mostly out of the accusing ~ de sindaco's control, exposing the flaws of an intensive audit process as opposed to an 1 ongoing one. Finally, there is a striking absence from these records of podestà themselves, as well as other (especially foreign) entourage members. Most of th those charged are either low-ranking officers or tax collectors from Perugia.ê> Is it d possible that Perugia was so consistently blessed with upright top officials? Or are an the sources and the mechanisms they purport to document engaged in covering as well as uncovering official misbehavior? d At any rate, these observations collectively chime in with the statutes' emphasis th on financial responsibility as a regime's key concern, and presumably that of the of population at large. What the sources certainly seek to stress is that auditors' main ge task was to ensure taxes were duly paid, collected and deposited. As such they lend greater credence to Victor Crescenzi's understanding of the procedure as mainly ar driven by good accounting, not political strife. 34 And although the two impetuses p1 are hard to tell apart, it seems that as long as this basic need was met, auditors could, e and likely did, turn a blind eye to deviancy at the margins they defined, especially as I their resources came under increasing pressure from around the middle of the fourteenth century.

CONCLUSIONS

Moritz Isenmann, the foremost student of sindacato, hailed it as "doubtless the most widespread form of public monitoring [Amtskontrolle] in late-medieval and early-modern Europe."35 After being introduced among the Italian communes in the late-twelfth century, the practice spread to France, the Holy Roman Empire, Iberia and the Papal States, and by the early-sixteenth century similar procedures were implemented in the Americas. Yet taken from the collective perspective developed in this section of our volume, sindacato augmented rather than replaced traditional forms of accountability, be they top-down, horizontal or bottom-up. Among the former two in the Middle Ages and Renaissance, one can list visitations, ' commonly practiced within the monastic/clerical world and provincial and regional chapters of religious orders. 36 Among the latter category, meanwhile, one can include ad-hoc procedures such as petitions and supplications, which continued n History Fighting Corruption in the Italian City-State 115 37 ite Perugia in a broader context. First, to operate in England, France, and the Middle East. Louis IX (St. Louis; : they religious or lay. This may seem 1214-70) even developed a hybrid form-initiated by a king, but meant to identify d was predominantly a male domain. grievances shared by commoners mainly against the local nobility.38 erests and there remains the possibility In the Italian context, modern scholars' efforts have collectively established that iative sources certainly mention sexual sindacato cannot be coupled historically with one type of political system, including tion, and numerous women were in a republicanism: auditing could support, in form if not in substance, far more ,r as intermediaries. And yet women authoritarian regimes, which also employed such practices to buttress their claims records of practice-a state of affairs to legitimate rule. In other words, audits neither typify transparent and participa- discussed in this volume. Second and tory polities, nor do they necessarily clash with and undermine despotism. This is lern reputation, cases could drag on (or supported by the stability of the audit in the transition from commune to signoria 39 tly conclude within the allotted fifteen undergone by numerous Italian city-states in the fourteenth century. Clearly, the jgation was mostly out of the accusing deeper roots of this procedure presented it as a significant enough emblem of ntensive audit process as opposed to an legitimate rule. absence from these records of podestà More importantly in the context of our larger project (see the Introduction to oreign) entourage members. Most of this volume), the existence of documented audits does not in itself guarantee a high rs or tax collectors from Perugia.33 Is it degree of transparency or act as an efficient buffer against corruption at the rneso- essed with upright top officials? Or are and macro levels. Indeed, mechanisms to promote transparency and visibility-be on to document engaged in covering as they ancient, medieval or modern-never lack ambiguity in the sense that the documents and activities belying them conceal as well as reveal.t'' It is difficult :ly chime in with the statutes' emphasis therefore to assess a government's relative degree of corruption merely on the basis :y concern, and presumably that of the of documentary practices. As John Sabapathy aptly puts it, "[b]etter documented 41 tinly seek to stress is that auditors' main government does not mean better government" -a maxim easily applicable to llected and deposited. As such they lend the present-day's compliance culture. Moreover, as Maurizio Viroli and others have derstanding of the procedure as mainly argued, the rise of despotism in early Renaissance Italy can be seen as epitomizing a trife. 34 And although the two impetuses process of corruption, that is, it served as the utmost manifestation of harnessing an 42 s this basic need was met, auditors could, entire state apparatus to the needs of an individual family, corporation or party. at the margins they defined, especially as In such contexts, the implementation of sindacato communicates a relative increase ressure from around the middle of the in centralized patrimonial power rather than imposes limits on it. Yet it remains a valid question whether, even under such regimes, the procedure helped reduce what Monika Bauhr has dubbed "need" (as distinct from "greed") corruption, and accordingly, participated in presenting those in power as pursuing citizens' everyday concerns.43 JSIONS In summary, while a patent concern for accountability of office can certainly be of sindacato, hailed it as "doubtless the documented for Italian city-states and later despotic regimes, it offers a weak or at ring [Amtskontrolle] in late-medieval ~d least very partial signal of embarking on a path to modern, Euro-American state- roduced among the Italian communes in building, let alone of a participatory democracy. As Sabapathy illustrates, statism- ead to France, the Holy Roman Empire, or a particular Weberian paradigm tying bureaucratization and the modern nation sta :arly-sixteenth century similar proced~es t~-:---has done much to skew historians' views on how to gather evidence for ~t taken from the collective perspecuv: polmcal centralization. To some extent, the link encourages premodern historians sindacato augmented rather than replace such as myself to question the historical validity of Weber's (and his followers') hey top-down, horizontal or botto~-up. ~serv~tions, while perhaps unwittingly accepting his (or to be fair, a certain . 1· . 1· tauons, f ebenan) paradigm of the state. Either way, the importance of accountability ~s and Renaissance, one can rst vis . al 0 :/clerical world and provincial and region offic~ can wax and wane independently of political centralization, rendering the latter category, meanwhile, on~ ~ corruption in turn a problematic litmus test for the broadening or narrowing of power bases. dons and supplications, which conunue 116 Anticorruption in History ACKNOWLEDGMENT

Earlier drafts of this chapter greatly benefited from the insights of John Sabaparhy, Mihaly Fazekas, Frances Andrews, the participants of the Late Medieval and Early Modern Italy Seminar at the Institute of Historical Research, London, and of course the Anticorrp research group and conference participants and the anonymous reviewers for this volume.

APPENDIX: SINDACATO REGULATIONS IN ITALIAN CITY-STATE STATUTES, 1250-1500

Ordered alphabetically by city 9. S e (1 AMELIA

1. "Gli statuti trecenteschi di Amelia," ed. Laura Andreani, Renzo Civili and Rita Nanni, in Amelia e i suoi statuti medieuali, ed. Enrico Menestè et al. (Spoleto: Centro italiano di studi sull'alto Medioevo, 2004), 367-754: 1330 statutes, 4 (370-1); 1346 statutes, 18 (567-8), 29 (573-4); fourteenth-century fragment, 10 (716-18).

BADIA TEDALDA

2. Gli statuti quattrocenteschi di Badia Tedalda e di Pratieghi, ed. Myriam Laurenti and Paola Mariani Biagini (Florence: All'Insegna del Giglio, 1992), Badia Tedalda, LVII (53-4).

BERGAMO

3. Lo statuto di Bergamo del 1353, ed. Giuliana Forgiarini (Spoleto: Centro Italiano di Studi sull'Alto Medioevo, 1996), Collado I, X-XV (38-42).

BOLOGNA

4. Statuti di Bologna dell'anno 1288, ed. Gina Fasoli and Pietro Sella, 2 vols. (Vatican City [Rome]: Biblioteca Apostolica Varicana, 1937-39), II, II (1:43-5); V, CLI (516-21). 5. Lo Statuto del Comune di Bologna dell'anno 1335, ed. Anna Laura Trombetti Budriesi, 2 vols. (Rome: Instituto Storico Italiano per il Medio Evo, 2008), I, 23-4 (1:49-64); II, 21 (102). 6. Gli Statuti del Comune di Bologna degli anni 1352, 1357; 1376, 1389 (Libri I-III), ed. Valeria Braidi, 2 vols. [successively numbered] (Bologna: Deputazione di Storia Patria per le Province di Romagna, 2002), 1352 and 1357 statutes, I, 21 (51-65); III, 12 (116-35); 1376 and 1389 statutes, I, 12 (385-8), II, 22 (615-34), 30 (679-80). n in History Fighting Corruption in the Italian City-State 117 EDGMENT BORGO SAN LORENZO from the insights of John Sabapathy, Mihaly . Statuti del/a Lega del Borgo a San Lorenzo di Mugello ed. Fllippo Bellandi, Fausto 7 f the Late Medieval and Early Modern Italy Berti and Mario Mantovani (Florence: Leo S. Olschki, 1984), 12 (61-2). irch, London, and of course the Anticorrp

1d the anonymous reviewers for this volurne. BRA

8. Gli antichi Statuti di Bra, MCDLXI, ed. Edoardo Mosca (Bra: Editrice Artistica Piemontese, 1994), XXIII (103-5) . . EGULATIONS IN ITALIAN rUTES, 1250-1500 CASTIGLIONE DI SOPRA 9, Statuti dei comuni di Castel.franco di Sopra (1394) e Castiglione degli Ubertini (1397), ed. Giulia Cacnerani Marri (Florence: Leo S. Olschki, 1963). Castiglione statutes, 4 (176-7).

ELIA

Laura Andreani, Renzo Civili and Rita Nanni, COLLI VAL D'ELSE Enrico Menestö et al. (Spoleto: Centro italiano ·-754: 1330 statutes, 4 (370-1); 1346 statutes, 10. Statuta antiqua communis Collis Vallis Else (1307-1407), ed. Renzo Ninci (Rome: entury fragment, 10 (716-18). Insdruro Storico Italiano per il Medio Evo, 1999), 2 vols., 1307 statutes V-VI (22-6), L (65-7), XLV (150); 1351 statutes, III (223-7), XIII (245), XXVIII (260-1). rEDALDA tdalda e di Pratieghi, ed. Myriam Laurenti and CUNEO nsegna del Giglio, 1992), Badia Tedalda, LVII 11. Le addictiones agli Statuti di Cuneo del 1380 (1384-1571), ed. Davide Sacchetto (Cuneo: Società per gli Studi Storici della Provincia di Cuneo, 1999), 547 (73).

GAMO ;iuliana Forgiarini (Spoleto: Centro Italiano di DERUTA latio I, X-XV (38-42). 12. Statuto di Deruta in volgare dell'anno 1465, ed. M. Grazia Nico Ottaviani (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1982), III, 118 (267-8).

,OGNA

. Gina Fasoli and Pietro Sella, 2 vols. (Vatican EMPOLI Vaticana, 1937-39), Il, Il (1:43-5); V, CLI l3. Empoli: Statuti e riforme, ed. Fausto Berti and Mauro Guerrini (Empoli: Comune di Empoli, 1980). Statutes of the popolo of Sant'Andrea (1416-41), XXXIII (80-1); 'anno 1335, ed. Anna Laura Trombetti ~u~;; Statutes ofEmpoli (1428), XXII (173-4) . .no per il Medio Evo, 2008), I, 23-4 (1.49 li anni 1352, 1357; 1376, 1389 (Libri I-!11p~' '; · di Scona at FIGLINE imbered] (Bo 1 ogna: D eputazwne UI 12 14 1352 and 1357 statutes, I, 21 (5l-65); j · Statuti di Figline, ed. Fausto Berti and Mario Mantovani (Figline: Blanche Grafica 80 :, 12 (385-8), II, 22 (615-34), 30 (679- . Edizioni, 1985), 1408 statutes, CXXXIII (81). 118 Anticorruption in History

FLORENCE 15. Statuti de/la Repubblica Fiorentina, ed. Romolo Caggese, rev. ed. Giuliano Pinto Francesco Salvemini, and Andrea Zorzi (Florence: Leo S. Olschki, 1999), Capitan~ 24. statutes 1322-5, I, I (1:12-14); II, VII (86-8); V, LIII (230-1); Podesta statutes 1325, I, I (2:7-8); II, LVIIII (118). 16. Statuta populi et communis Florentiae ... anno salutis MCCCCXV, 3 vols. (Freiburg: Michael Kluch, 1778-83), I, LXII (1 :72-7); Tractatus ordinamentum iustitiae, VIII 25. (416); V, XLV (2:553-4); Tractatus N, LXXIV (3:663-7). 26.

FOSSATO 17. Li Statuti medievali do Fossato, ed. and trans. Luigi Galassi (Assisi: Minerva, 2000), pre-1390 statutes CXCV (189), CCXXV (200-3), CCXXVII (203), CCXXX (205-6); 1406 statutes, LII-LIII (241-2). I 27.1

L'AQUILA 18. Statuta Civitatis Aquile, ed. Alessandro Clementi (Rome: Instiruto Storico Italiano per il Medio Evo, 1977), 31 (34-5), 187 (136-7). 28.

LUCCA 19. Statute del Comune di Lucca dell'anno MCCCVIII, ed. S. Bongi (Lucca: Giusti, 1867), reprinted as Statutum Lucani communis, an. MCCCVIII, presentazione di Vito Tirelli (Lucca: Maria Pacini Fazzi, 1991), II, 1 (51-4). 29

MASSA E COZZILE 20. Lo Statuto di Massa e Cozzile del 1420, ed. Antonio Lo Conte and Elena V annucchi (Florence: Polistampa, 2006), I, 15 (37-8).

3 MONTEPULCIANO 21. Statuto del Comune di Montepulciano (1337), ed. Ubaldo Morandi (Florence: Le Monnier, 1966), I, XXX (47-8), N, I-LXV (285-336).

MONTEVETTOLINI 3 22. Statuti di Monteuettolini, 1410, ed. Barbara Maria Affolter and Manila Soffici (Ospedaletto [Pisa): Pacini, 2001), I (46-7), XXIIII (75).

MONTOPOLI 23. Statuto del Comune di Montopoli (1360), ed. Bruno Casini (Florence: Leo S. Olschki, 3 1968), I, 2 (63-4), II, 99 (202-3), III, 107 (282-3). ~ory Fighting Corruption in the Italian City-State 119

PADUA , Caggese, rev. ed. Giuliano p· S ti del comune di Padova del sec. XII all'anno 1285, ed. Andrea Gloria (Padua: :e: Leo S. Olschki, 1999) Ca _into, 24. /;cchetto, 1873), I, viii, 94-109 (37-40). . . ' pitan , V, LIII (230-1), Podesta st 0 atutes PERUGIA lutis MC~CCXV, 3 vols. (Freibu S tttto del comune di Perugia del 1279, ed. Severino Caprioli, 2 vols. (Perugia: .ctatus ordmamentum iustitiae VJtg: 25 r (3:663-7). ' II · ~:putazione di Sroria Patria per l'Umbria, 1996), 131-41 (1:146-58). Statuto del comune e del popolo di Perugia del 1342 in uolgare, ed. Mahmoud Salem 2 6 · Elsheikh, 3 vols. (Perugia: Deputazione di Storia Patria per l'Umbria, 2000), I, 4 (1:21-33), 15 (65-74), 20 (88-101); III, 26 (2:62). rigi Galassi (Assisi: Minerva, 2000) J0-3), CCXXVII (203), CCXXx PIANCASTAGNAIO . Il Com1me medievale di Piancastagnaio ei suoi statuti, ed. Alessandro Dani (Siena: Il 27 Leccio, 1996), 1432 (?) statutes, I, I (4-5); V, CXXIII (124). ti (Rome: Instituto Storico Italiano -7). PI STOIA 28. Breve et ordinamenta populi pistorii (1284), ed. Lodovico Zdekauer (Milan: Hoepli, 1891), reprinted in Statuti pistoiesi del secolo XIII. Studi e testi vol II, ed. Renzo Nelli and Giuliano Pinto (Pistoia: Società Pistoiese di Storia Patria, 2002), I, 'VIII, ed. S. Bongi (Lucca: Giusti, XXV-XXVIII (17-18); II, XLV (76), CXV (104), CLXXXX-CLXXXXVI r, an. MCCCVIII, presemazione di (138-43), CLXXXXVI II-CCIIII (144-9), CCVII-CCXI (150-3). Il, 1 (51-4). 29. Statutum Potestatis Comunis Pistorii (1296), ed. Lodovico Zdekauer (Milan: Hoepli, 1888), reprinted in Statuti pistoiesi del secolo XIII.Studie testi vol III, ed. Renzo Nelli and Giuliano Pinto (Pistoia: Società Pistoiese di Storia Patria, 2002), I, VIII LE (12-14). nio Lo Conte and Elena Vannucchi

PONTE A SIEVE 30. Statuti del Ponte a Sieve, ed. Paola Benigni and Fausto Berti (Pontassieve: Comune di ,;JO Pontessieve, 1982), Statuta legarum Ghiaceti Montis Lauri et Rignani (1402), ed. Ubaldo Morandi (Florence: Le V (44-6), XL (64). .85-336).

RAVENNA lNI ffi' 31. Statuto ravennate di Ostasio da Polenta (1327-1346), ed. Umberto Zaccarini Maria Affolter and Manila So a (Bologna: Deputazione di Storia Patria per le Province di Romagna, 1998), I, 3 XIIII (75). (16-20).

RIETI .no Casini (Florence: Leo S. Olschki, 3 2 0 5t · f . atuto de_lla Città di Rieti dal secolo XIV al secolo XVI, ed. Maria Caprioli (Rome: tl 32-3). S tuto Stanco Italiano per il Medio Evo, 2008), I, 39-40 (45-7). 120 Anticorruption in History

ROCCANTICA 33. Statuti del/a Provincia Romama, ed. T. Tomassetti, V. Federici and P. Egidi (Rorne- Forzani e C. Tipografi del Senato, 1910), Statuto di Roccantica del MCCOOcvJ' 4 X (61). '

ROME 34. Statuti del/a città di Roma, ed. Camillo Re (Rome: Tipografia della pace, 1880), III, xxxiii-iv (xxxii-iii) (216-17), xxxiv (xxxiii).

SALUZZI 35. Gli statuti di Saluzzi (1480), ed. Giuseppe Gullino (Cuneo: Società per gli studi storici, archeologici ed artistici della Provincia di Cuneo, 2001), 4 (83-4).

SANTA MARIA A MONTE 36. Statuto del Comune di S. Maria a Monte (1391), ed. Bruno Casini (Florence: Leo S. Olschki, 1963), LXXVI (116-18).

SCARPERIA 37. Gli Statuti di Scarperia del XV secolo, ed. Vanna Arrighi (Florence: Edizioni Firenze, 2004), Statuti del vicariato del Mugello del 1415, 9 (44-6), 12 (48-9).

SETTIMO 38. Statuti di Settimo, ed. Alfonso Mirto (Scandicci: CentroLibro, 2001), XI (39).

TREQUANDA 39. Statuti medievali e moderni del Comune di Trequanda (secoli XIV-XVIII), ed. Donatella Ciampoli and Patrizia Turrini (Siena: Cantagalli, 2002), I, 7 (32-3).

TREVISO 40. Gli Statuti del comune di Treviso (sec. XII-XIV), ed. Bianca Berto, 2 vols. (Rome: lstituto Storico Italiano per il Medio Evo, 1984-6), CCCCXLVIIII (CCCCXXXVIIII) (1:305-10).

VALGRANA 41. Gli Statuti del Comune di Valgrana (1431), ed. Pier Paolo Giorsetti (Cuneo: Società per gli studi storici della Pronincia di Cuneo, 2004), I, II (20). Fighting Corruption in the Italian City-State 121 ,z History

VERONA "ICA .massetti, V. Federici and P. Egidi (Rome: 42. Gli statuti veronesi del 1276, ed. Gino Sandri, 2 vols. (Venice: R. Deputazione di Sroria Patria per le Venezie, 1940-59), I, XXVII (35-6). , Staturo di Roccantica del MCCCXXVI, 43. Statuti di Verona del 1327, ed. Silvana Anna Bianchi and Rosalba Granuzzo, 2 vols. (Rome: Jouvence, 1992), I, XXVII-XXVIII (1:144-6).

~ (Rome: Tipografia delta pace, 1880), Ill, VILLANOVA D'ASTI ii). 44. Statuti comunali di Villanova d'Asti, ed. Pietro Savio (Vatican City [Rome]: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 1934), Statutes of 1414, Il, LXXXVII (48).

:ZI ppe Gullino (Cuneo: Società per gli studi VITERBO vincia di Cuneo, 2001), 4 (83-4). 45. Statuti del/a Provincia Romana, ed. Vincenzo Federici (Rome: Istituto Storico Italiano, 1930), Stature di Viterbo del MCCXXXVII-XXXVIII [fragment], CCCCLIIII (87-8). ,A MONTE te (1391), ed. Bruno Casini (Florence: Leo VOLTERRA 46. Statuti di Volterra I (1210-1224), ed. Enrico Fiumi (Florence: Deputazione di Storia Patria per la Toscana, 1951), I (1210-22), CLXVIIII (87-8); Codice II (1224), ERIA CXXVIIII (171-2). . Vanna Arrighi (Florence: Edizioni Firenze, > del 1415, 9 (44-6), 12 (48-9).

IMO ,candicci: CentroLibro, 2001), XI (39). iANDA di Trequanda (secoli XIV-XVIII), ed. Donatella :::anragalli, 2002), I, 7 (32-3).

vISO l (R me· ianca Berto, 2 vo s. 0 · XJJ.- XIV) ' ed . B VIIII Medio Evo, 1984-6), CCCCXL

;RANA . . Società 431), ed. Pier Paolo Giorsem (Cuneo . . Cuneo, 2004), I, Il (20).