Federal Criminal Practice Institute October 17, 18Th and 19Th 2013

NYCLA-CLE I n s t i t u t e Mitchell, Barry Leiwant, Wexler andPollard; Karaahmet, toward certification inciviltriallaw, criminaltriallaw, workerscompensation lawand/ormatrimonial law. hours oftotalCLE credit.Ofthese,3qualify ashoursofcreditforEthics/Professionalism, and0qualify ashoursofcredit This programhas beenapprovedbytheBoard ofContinuingLegalEducation oftheSupremeCourt NewJerseyfor17 Board foramaximumof17 Transitional &Non-Transitional credithours:3Ethics;6Skills;8PP/LPM This coursehasbeenapproved inaccordancewiththerequirementsofNew Cyberology Consultants; Anthony S.Ricco,Esq.;MarkRosen, USDC, EDNY; Marc Agnifilo, Ret. Thomas E.Moseley, Esq.;MarjoriePeerce, Anello, P Brune, & Associates, PC; & Associates, Morvillo, Abramowitz, Grand,Iason& Anello, P.C.; Bergen CountySheriff’s Office; F Ballard SpahrStillman &FriedmanLLP; Morvillo, Abramowitz, Grand,Iason& Anello, P.C. Brune &Richard, LLP; ra Fragomen Worldwide; Prepared inconnectionwithaContinuingLegalEducationcoursepresented ederal at New York CountyLawyers’ Association, 14 Vesey Street, New York, NY Hon.StevenGold, presented on Thursday, FridayandSaturday, October 17,18&192013. 17 TRANSITIONAL &NON-TRANSITIONAL Federal Defenders; Brafman and Associates, P.C Carolyn Pokorny, Prof. Anita Bernstein, StevenJ.Hyman, c Richard Albert,

Mark B.Rosen,Esq., ti Prof. I.BennettCapers, USDC, EDNY; Jonathan Kolodner, Glen McGorty, BenjaminBrafman, US Attorney’s Office,EDNY; John JayCollegeofCriminalJustice; Alan Vinegrad, McLaughlin &Stern,LLP; P c . Brooklyn LawSchool; ; P Richard Albert, r g o r Morvillo Abramowitz, Grand,Iason& Anello, P.C P Ballard SpahrStillman &Friedman,LLP; r g o r r g o r BruceGreen, BrianMorris, Crowell andMoring, LLP;

e Federal Bar Council John JayCollegeofCriminalJustice, a a Cleary GottliebSteen&Hamilton,LLP; JocelynStrauber, m a C m Covington &BurlingLLP Brafman and Associates, P.C.;

C Brooklyn LawSchool; m C ; Marcus Asner,; F I o o Morvillo, Abramowitz, Grand,Iason& Anello, P.C.; Fordham LawSchool; - C A Assistant US Attorney, DeputyChief, Asset Forfeiture, EDNY; - s Hon. Frederick Block, Henry PutzelIII,Esq.;Peter Quijano, c nstitute p u h o JamesGlasser, riminal l I A n t r o s s r y US Attorney’s Office,SDNY; Hon.RichardSullivan, : Arnold &Porter; Marshall Miller, : : JoelCohen, York State ContinuingLegalEducation Hon.RobertM.Levy, MCLE CREDITS: Wiggin andDana; Hon.MargoBrodie, WilliamPollard,

USDC, EDNY; and

Stroock; MichaelBachner, SethLevine, US Attorney,EDNY; SDNY; Peter Valentin; Andrew Donofrio, Hon.JohnGleeson, SteveBojekian, Kornstein, Veisz, Jeremy Temkin, Quijano &Ennis; Levine andLee; EDNY; EDNY;

Bachner James A. Robert Parisa Susan

Information Regarding CLE Credits and Certification Federal Criminal Trial Practice Institute October 17, 2013; 6:00 PM to 7:30 PM

The New York State CLE Board Regulations require all accredited CLE providers to provide documentation that CLE course attendees are, in fact, present during the course. Please review the following NYCLA rules for MCLE credit allocation and certificate distribution.

i. You must sign-in and note the time of arrival to receive your course materials and receive MCLE credit. The time will be verified by the Program Assistant.

ii. You will receive your MCLE certificate as you exit the room at the end of the course. The certificates will bear your name and will be arranged in alphabetical order on the tables directly outside the auditorium.

iii. If you arrive after the course has begun, you must sign-in and note the time of your arrival. The time will be verified by the Program Assistant. If it has been determined that you will still receive educational value by attending a portion of the program, you will receive a pro-rated CLE certificate.

iv. Please note: We can only certify MCLE credit for the actual time you are in attendance. If you leave before the end of the course, you must sign-out and enter the time you are leaving. The time will be verified by the Program Assistant. Again, if it has been determined that you received educational value from attending a portion of the program, your CLE credits will be pro-rated and the certificate will be mailed to you within one week.

v. If you leave early and do not sign out, we will assume that you left at the midpoint of the course. If it has been determined that you received educational value from the portion of the program you attended, we will pro-rate the credits accordingly, unless you can provide verification of course completion. Your certificate will be mailed to you within one week.

Thank you for choosing NYCLA as your CLE provider!

New York County Lawyers’ Association Continuing Legal Education Institute 14 Vesey Street, New York, N.Y. 10007 • (212) 267-6646

2013 Federal Criminal Practice Institute October 17, 18th and 19th 2013

AGENDA

Thursday, October 17, 2013

5:30 PM – 6:00PM Registration

6:00 PM – 6:45PM Reception and Social Hour

6:45 PM - 6:55PM Welcome and Introduction Program Co-Chairs: Mark Rosen, Esq., John Jay College of Criminal Justice; Richard F. Albert, Esq., Morvillo Abramowitz Grand Iason & Anello, P.C.

6:55 PM – 7:45PM Representing the Immigration Defendant Post Padilla Parisa Karaahmet, Fragomen Worldwide Thomas E. Moseley, Esq.

7:45 PM- 8:00 PM Questions and Answers

Federal Bar Council October 17, 2013

IMMIGRATION RED FLAGS FOR CRIMINAL LAWYERS

Parisa Karaahmet, Esq. Thomas E. Moseley, Esq. Fragomen, Del Rey, The law firm of Bernsen & Loewy, LLP Thomas E. Moseley

Your Noncitizen Client Has an Arrest: What should you do?

 Supreme Court Decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010), imposes an affirmative duty on criminal counsel  The Supreme Court ruled that criminal defense lawyers must warn their clients of immigration consequences of a guilty plea  Criminal defense counsel should make it a practice to consult with immigration counsel to obtain a complete analysis of the immigration consequences of the charges

Questions to Ask Your Client

 Are you a U.S. Citizen?

 If no, request information and documentation regarding client’s status (if any) in the U.S.

 Criminal Attorney must be aware of the potential for immigration consequences

1 Questions to Ask Your Client

 Are you a U.S. Citizen?

 If Yes, further analysis may still be required

 Ask: Were you born in the U.S.?  If no, confirm that client is, in fact, a citizen (ask to see U.S. passport or certificate of naturalization)  If yes, client is a U.S. Citizen;

 TIP: Could your client be a citizen and not know it?

• Automatic Acquisition of Citizenship after Birth when (1) Under 18; (2) LPR; (3) one parent naturalized

Overview of Involved Immigration Agencies

 Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE): ICE is the arm of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) responsible for the investigation and enforcement of federal immigration laws. ICE’s Office of Detention and Removal is responsible for ensuring that deportable aliens are removed from the country.  Customs and Border Protection (CBP) oversees border control.  U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), oversees lawful immigration to the United States.

Coming to the Attention of ICE

 Arrest  Imprisonment  Airport Entry  Application for Immigration Benefits Filed with USCIS

2 ICE Detention

 ICE can arrest an individual for an immigration violation. ICE may detain the individual for up to 48 hours, or longer if “extraordinary circumstances” or an “emergency” permits. See 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(a)-(d).  If an individual is arrested by another law enforcement agency, ICE may file an immigration detainer (Form I-247) indicating the intent to assume custody of the individual for removal. See 8 C.F.R. § 287.7. 7

ICE Detention

 ICE interviews the individual and determines whether to bring removal proceedings. 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(d)  Individual may be released on bond or own recognizance provided not subject to mandatory detention for criminal and terrorist related grounds (i.e. crimes of moral turpitude, federal drug offenses, etc.) See 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c). Immigration bonds are set by DHS.  Initial custody and bond determinations (eligibility/lowering) can be challenged. See 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d).

Definition of “Conviction” for Immigration Purposes

 Consider the potential immigration consequences and determine whether the outcome will constitute a conviction for immigration purposes under INA §101(a)(48)(A)

 Pursuant to INA § 101(a)(48)(A), the term “conviction” means, with respect to an alien (noncitizen), a formal judgment of guilt of the alien, or:

3 Definition of “Conviction” for Immigration Purposes

 If adjudication has been withheld, where  (i) a judge or jury has found the noncitizen guilty or the noncitizen has entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendre (no contest) or has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilt; and  (ii) the judge has ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on the noncitizen’s liberty to be imposed.

Definition of “Conviction” for Immigration Purposes

 Some pre-plea or diversionary programs do not amount to a conviction  New York’s Adjournment in Contemplation of Dismissal (“ACD”) statute, NYCPL § 170.55, does not meet the definition of “conviction”:

 No plea is taken on the issue of guilt;

 No finding or judgment of guilt; and

 Failure to meet conditions of ACD only means

case will proceed as usual. 11

Definition of “Conviction” for Immigration Purposes

 However, deferred adjudications are “convictions” where statutory definition is met:

 For example, Defendant pleads guilty and the court orders an imposition upon liberty, such as probation, with dismissal predicated upon satisfactory completion.

4 Definition of “Conviction” for Immigration Purposes

 Must be for a “crime” in jurisdiction where committed

 Person regarded under local law as a juvenile offender or delinquent generally cannot be considered convicted for immigration purposes.

 Juvenile Delinquency proceedings are not criminal convictions, a juvenile can, however, be tried as an adult, which would constitute a conviction

Definition of “Conviction” for Immigration Purposes

 In order to trigger penalties under the INA, the “conviction” must:

 Be final  During its pendency, a direct appeal of right, as opposed to a collateral attack, prevents a conviction from being final for immigration purposes. Marino v. INS, 537 F.2d 686, 691-692 (2d Cir. 1976).

Impact of Conviction on Ability to Stay in U.S.

 Is the individual “inadmissible” or “removable”?  Do any exceptions apply?  Any post-conviction relief available that will eliminate the immigration consequences?

5 “Inadmissible” vs. “Removable”

 INA §212 governs “inadmissibility”

 Eligibility to enter the U.S.

 Eligibility to adjust status (get a green card)  INA §237 governs “removability”

 Now that your client is here, what are the grounds of potential deportation?

Potential Impact for Noncitizen Client

 Inadmissibility Provisions  Criminal grounds of inadmissibility are enumerated under INA § 212(a)(2).  Most Often Used: 1. CIMT - INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) 2. Controlled Substance Violations - INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) 3. Multiple Criminal Convictions - INA § 212(a)(2)(B)

Definition of Crime of Moral Turpitude (“CIMT”)

 A CIMT generally refers to conduct which is inherently base, vile, or depraved and contrary to the accepted rules of morality or involves evil or malicious intent.  However, the BIA has stated that a specific intent is not a prerequisite for such a crime. Matter of Torres-Varela, 23 I. & N. Dec. 78, 83-84 (BIA 2001). Thus, the BIA interprets moral turpitude to include criminally reckless conduct. See Matter of Franklin, 20 I. & N. Dec. 867, 869 (BIA 1994).

6 Definition of Crime of Moral Turpitude (“CIMT”)

 Inherent nature of crime – In the past, the rule for determining whether a crime is a CIMT is based on the “inherent nature of the crime” and not the facts and circumstances of the particular alien’s case that determines whether it is a CIMT. Thus, the statute under which the conviction occurred controls. Matter of Short, 20 I. & N. Dec. 136, 137 (BIA 1989).

 Frequently called the “categorical approach.” In Matter of Silva- Trevino, 24 I & N Dec. 687 (AG 2008), AG Mukasey signaled a departure from this approach. However, the Third, Fourth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh circuits have upheld the categorical approach in light of Matter of Silva-Trevino. 19

Exception to Inadmissibility if FN has Committed a CIMT

 “Petty Offense Exception”

 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II)  INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II)

 FN has committed only one crime;

 The maximum penalty that could be imposed for the crime does not exceed imprisonment for one year; and

 The FN was not sentenced to more than 6 months in prison.

Exception to Inadmissibility if FN has Committed a CIMT

 “Youthful Offender Exception”

 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(I)  INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(I)

 FN had only committed one crime;

 FN was under 18 when the crime was committed; and

 The crime was committed and the FN was released more than 5 years before the date of application for visa or admission (included adjusting status to LPR).

7 Inadmissibility – Controlled Substance Violations

 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II)

 INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II)  Persons who have been convicted, or who admit having committed, or who admit committing the acts that constitute the essential elements of a violation of or conspiracy to violate any law or regulation of a state, the U.S., or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance as defined in 21 U.S.C. §802

Removability (Deportation) Provisions

 Criminal grounds of removability (deportation) are enumerated under INA § 237 (a) (2) (A)

 Many closely parallel exclusion grounds in INA § 212

Removability Provisions – Aggravated Felonies

 Aggravated Felonies (INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii)), as defined in INA § 101(a)(43)  Originally defined to include murder, drug trafficking crime as enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 924 or illicit trafficking in firearms or destructive devices  Revisions enacted in 1990, 1994 and 1996 significantly expanded scope

8 Post-conviction Relief: Will it Help?

 A conviction vacated in criminal court as legally invalid eliminates immigration consequences of the conviction.  May be vacated on merits on direct appeal (cannot be purely ameliorative); or  Relating to violation of a fundamental statutory or constitutional right  Padilla is a game changer. th  The 6 Amendment requires an attorney to inform a client when a guilty plea carries the risk of deportation. Failure to do so may result in post-conviction relief.  However, Padilla does not apply retroactively. See Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103 (2013). 25

Post-conviction and Other Relief

 Determine whether a post-conviction motion is available (e.g., writ of coram nobis or NYCPL §440 Motion)  During Criminal Proceedings: identify resolution that does not meet the immigration definition of conviction (e.g., certain pretrial diversion programs, acquittal, refusal to prosecute, etc.), or review possibility of plea to alternate charge that avoids or minimizes immigration impact  Modifying/Reducing Sentence: e.g., sentences of less than one year may not trigger immigration consequences  Editing the Record of Conviction: negotiate to keep certain terms out that may trigger immigration consequences (e.g. the term “firearm” in an assault)  Full and Unconditional State or Federal Pardons (in limited circumstances) 26

Thank you

Questions?

Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 176 L. Ed. 2d 284 (2010), Court Opinion

Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 176 L. Ed. 2d 284 (2010) [2010 BL 70791]

Pagination * U.S. ** S. Ct. *** L. Ed. 2d **** BL

Supreme Court of the United States

PADILLA v. KENTUCKY.

No. 08-651. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF KENTUCKY. Argued October 13, 2009. Decided March 31, 2010. [***288] [**1475] Petitioner Padilla, a lawful permanent resident of the United States for over 40 years, faces deportation after pleading guilty to drug-distribution charges in Kentucky. In postconviction proceedings, he claims that his counsel not only failed to advise him of this consequence before he entered the plea, but also told him not to worry about deportation since he had lived [**1476] in this country so long. He alleges that he would have gone to trial had he not received this incorrect advice. The Kentucky Supreme Court denied Padilla postconviction relief on the ground that the Sixth Amendment's effective-assistance-of-counsel guarantee does not protect defendants from erroneous deportation advice because deportation is merely a "collateral" consequence of a conviction.

Held: Because counsel must inform a client whether his plea carries a risk of deportation, Padilla has sufficiently alleged that his counsel was constitutionally deficient. Whether he is entitled to relief depends on whether he has been prejudiced, a matter not addressed here. Pp. 2-18.

(a) Changes to immigration law have dramatically raised the stakes of a noncitizen's criminal conviction. While once there was only a narrow class of deportable offenses and judges wielded broad discretionary authority to prevent deportation, immigration reforms have expanded the class of deportable offenses and limited judges' authority to alleviate deportation's harsh consequences. Because the drastic measure of deportation or removal is now virtually inevitable for a vast number of noncitizens convicted of crimes, the importance of accurate legal advice for noncitizens accused of crimes has never been more important. Thus, as a matter of federal law, deportation is an integral part of the penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes. Pp. 2-6.

(b) Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, applies to Padilla's claim. Before deciding whether to plead guilty, a defendant is entitled to "the effective assistance of competent counsel." McMann v. Richardson, 397 U. S. 759, 771. The Supreme Court of Kentucky rejected Padilla's ineffectiveness claim on the ground that the advice he sought about deportation concerned only collateral matters. However, this Court has never distinguished between direct and collateral consequences in defining the scope of constitutionally "reasonable professional assistance" [*357] required under Strickland, 466 U. S., at 689. The question whether that distinction is appropriate need not be considered in this case because of the unique nature of deportation. Although removal proceedings are civil, deportation is intimately related to the criminal process, which makes it uniquely difficult to classify as either a direct or a collateral consequence. Because that distinction is thus ill-suited to evaluating a Strickland claim concerning the specific risk of deportation, [****2] advice regarding deportation is not categorically removed from the ambit of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Pp. 7-9.

(c) To satisfy Strickland's two-prong inquiry, counsel's representation [***289] must fall "below an objective standard of

© 2013 Bloomberg Finance L.P. All rights reserved. Terms of Service View at Bloomberg Law // PAGE 1 Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 176 L. Ed. 2d 284 (2010), Court Opinion reasonableness," 466 U. S., at 688, and there must be "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different," id., at 694. The first, constitutional deficiency, is necessarily linked to the legal community's practice and expectations. Id., at 688. The weight of prevailing professional norms supports the view that counsel must advise her client regarding the deportation risk. And this Court has recognized the importance to the client of "`[p]reserving the . . . right to remain in the United States'" and "preserving the possibility of" discretionary relief from deportation. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U. S. 289, 323. Thus, this is not a hard case in which to find deficiency: The consequences of Padilla's plea could easily be determined [**1477] from reading the removal statute, his deportation was presumptively mandatory, and his counsel's advice was incorrect. There will, however, undoubtedly be numerous situations in which the deportation consequences of a plea are unclear. In those cases, a criminal defense attorney need do no more than advise a noncitizen client that pending criminal charges may carry adverse immigration consequences. But when the deportation consequence is truly clear, as it was here, the duty to give correct advice is equally clear. Accepting Padilla's allegations as true, he has sufficiently alleged constitutional deficiency to satisfy Strickland's first prong. Whether he can satisfy the second prong, prejudice, is left for the Kentucky courts to consider in the first instance. Pp. 9-12.

(d) The Solicitor General's proposed rule — that Strickland should be applied to Padilla's claim only to the extent that he has alleged affirmative misadvice — is unpersuasive. And though this Court must be careful about recognizing new grounds for attacking the validity of guilty pleas, the 25 years since Strickland was first applied to ineffective- assistance claims at the plea stage have shown that pleas are less frequently the subject of collateral challenges than convictions after a trial. Also, informed consideration of possible deportation can benefit both the State and noncitizen defendants, who may be able to reach agreements that better satisfy the interests of both parties. This decision will not [*358] open the floodgates to challenges of convictions obtained through plea bargains. Cf. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U. S. 52, 58. Pp. 12-16.

253 S. W. 3d 482, reversed and remanded.

STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which KENNEDY, GINSBURG, BREYER, and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined. ALITO, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which ROBERTS, C. J., joined. SCALIA, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which THOMAS, J., joined. [*359]

JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioner Jose Padilla, a native of Honduras, has been a lawful permanent resident of the United States for more than 40 years. Padilla served [****3] [***290] this Nation with honor as a member of the U. S. Armed Forces during the Vietnam War. He now faces deportation after pleading guilty to the transportation of a large amount of marijuana in his tractor-trailer in the Commonwealth of Kentucky.[**1478] [fn1]

In this postconviction proceeding, Padilla claims that his counsel not only failed to advise him of this consequence prior to his entering the plea, but also told him that he "`did not have to worry about immigration status since he had been in the country so long.'" 253 S. W. 3d 482, 483 (Ky. 2008). Padilla relied on his counsel's erroneous advice when he pleaded guilty to the drug charges that made his deportation virtually mandatory. He alleges that he would have insisted on going to trial if he had not received incorrect advice from his attorney.

Assuming the truth of his allegations, the Supreme Court of Kentucky denied Padilla postconviction relief without the benefit of an evidentiary hearing. The court held that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of effective assistance of counsel does not protect a criminal defendant from erroneous advice about deportation because it is merely a "collateral" consequence [*360] of his conviction. Id., at 485. In its view, neither counsel's failure to advise petitioner about the possibility of removal, nor counsel's incorrect advice, could provide a basis for relief.

We granted certiorari, 555 U. S. ___ (2009), to decide whether, as a matter of federal law, Padilla's counsel had an obligation to advise him that the offense to which he was pleading guilty would result in his removal from this country. We agree with Padilla that constitutionally competent counsel would have advised him that his conviction for drug

© 2013 Bloomberg Finance L.P. All rights reserved. Terms of Service View at Bloomberg Law // PAGE 2 Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 176 L. Ed. 2d 284 (2010), Court Opinion distribution made him subject to automatic deportation. Whether he is entitled to relief depends on whether he has been prejudiced, a matter that we do not address.

The landscape of federal immigration law has changed dramatically over the last 90 years. While once there was only a narrow class of deportable offenses and judges wielded broad discretionary authority to prevent deportation, immigration reforms over time have expanded the class of deportable offenses and limited the authority of judges to alleviate the harsh consequences of deportation. The "drastic measure" of deportation or removal, Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U. S. 6, 10 (1948), is now virtually inevitable for a vast number of noncitizens convicted of crimes.

The Nation's first 100 years was "a period of unimpeded immigration." C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield, Immigration Law and Procedure § 1.(2)(a), p. 5 (1959). An early effort to empower the President to order the deportation of those immigrants he "judge[d] dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States," Act of June 25, 1798, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 571, was short lived and unpopular. Gordon § 1.2, at 5. It was not until 1875 that Congress first passed a statute barring convicts and prostitutes from entering the country, Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477. Gordon § 1.2b, at 6. In 1891, Congress added to the list of excludable persons those "who have been [***291] convicted of a felony or other infamous [*361] crime or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude." Act of Mar. [****4] 3, 1891, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084. [fn2]

The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1917 (1917 Act) brought "radical changes" [**1479] to our law. S. Rep. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 54-55 (1950). For the first time in our history, Congress made classes of noncitizens de-portable based on conduct committed on American soil. Id., at 55. Section 19 of the 1917 Act authorized the deportation of "any alien who is hereafter sentenced to imprisonment for a term of one year or more because of conviction in this country of a crime involving moral turpitude, committed within five years after the entry of the alien to the United States. . . ." 39 Stat. 889. And § 19 also rendered deportable noncitizen recidivists who commit two or more crimes of moral turpitude at any time after entry. Ibid. Congress did not, however, define the term "moral turpitude."

While the 1917 Act was "radical" because it authorized deportation as a consequence of certain convictions, the Act also included a critically important procedural protection to minimize the risk of unjust deportation: At the time of sentencing or within 30 days thereafter, the sentencing judge in both state and federal prosecutions had the power to make a recommendation "that such alien shall not be deported." Id., at 890.[fn3] This procedure, known as a judicial recommendation [*362] against deportation, or JRAD, had the effect of binding the Executive to prevent deportation; the statute was "consistently . . . interpreted as giving the sentencing judge conclusive authority to decide whether a particular conviction should be disregarded as a basis for deportation," Janvier v. United States, 793 F. 2d 449, 452 (CA2 1986). Thus, from 1917 forward, there was no such creature as an automatically deportable offense. Even as the class of deportable offenses expanded, judges retained discretion to ameliorate unjust results on a case-by-case basis.

Although narcotics offenses — such as the offense at issue in this case — provided a distinct basis for deportation as early as 1922, [fn4] the JRAD procedure was generally available [***292] to avoid deportation in narcotics convictions. See United States v. O'Rourke, 213 F. 2d 759, 762 (CA8 1954). Except for "technical, inadvertent and insignificant violations of the laws relating to narcotics," ibid., it appears that courts treated narcotics offenses as crimes involving [**1480] moral turpitude for purposes of the 1917 Act's broad JRAD provision. See ibid. (recognizing that until 1952 a JRAD in a narcotics [*363] case "was effective to prevent deportation" (citing Dang Nam v. Bryan, 74 F. 2d 379, 380-381 (CA9 1934))).

In light of both the steady expansion of deportable offenses and the significant ameliorative effect of a JRAD, it is unsurprising that, in the wake of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (1984), the Second Circuit held that the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel applies to a JRAD request or lack thereof, see Janvier, 793 F. 2d 449. See also United States v. Castro, 26 F. 3d 557 (CA5 1994). In its view, seeking a JRAD was "part of the sentencing" process, Janvier, 793 F. 2d, at 452, even if deportation itself is a civil action. Under the Second Circuit's

© 2013 Bloomberg Finance L.P. All rights reserved. Terms of Service View at Bloomberg Law // PAGE 3 Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 176 L. Ed. 2d 284 (2010), Court Opinion reasoning, the impact of a conviction on a noncitizen's ability to remain in the country was a central issue to be resolved during the sentencing [****5] process — not merely a collateral matter outside the scope of counsel's duty to provide effective representation.

However, the JRAD procedure is no longer part of our law. Congress first circumscribed the JRAD provision in the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), [fn5] and in 1990 Congress entirely eliminated it, 104 Stat. 5050. In 1996, Congress also eliminated the Attorney General's authority to grant discretionary relief from deportation, 110 Stat. 3009-596, an authority that had been exercised to prevent the deportation of over 10,000 noncitizens during the 5- year period prior to 1996, INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U. S. 289, 296 (2001). Under contemporary law, if a non-citizen has committed a removable offense after the 1996 effective date of these amendments, [*364] his removal is practically inevitable but for the possible exercise of limited remnants of equitable discretion vested in the Attorney General to cancel removal for noncitizens convicted of particular classes of offenses.[fn6] See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b. Subject to limited exceptions, this discretionary relief is not available for an offense related to trafficking in a controlled substance. See § 1101(a)(43)(B); § 1228.

These changes to our immigration law have dramatically raised the stakes of a noncitizen's criminal conviction. The importance of accurate legal advice for noncitizens accused of [***293] crimes has never been more important. These changes confirm our view that, as a matter of federal law, deportation is an integral part — indeed, sometimes the most important part[fn7] — of the penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes.

Before deciding whether to plead guilty, a defendant is entitled to "the effective [**1481] assistance of competent counsel." McMann v. Richardson, 397 U. S. 759, 771 (1970); Strickland, 466 U. S., at 686. The Supreme Court of Kentucky rejected Padilla's ineffectiveness claim on the ground that the advice he sought about the risk of deportation concerned only collateral matters, i.e., those matters not within the sentencing authority of the state trial court.[fn8] 253 S. W. 3d, at 483-484 ([*365] citing Commonwealth v. Fuartado, 170 S. W. 3d 384 (2005)). In its view, "collateral consequences are outside the scope of representation required by the Sixth Amendment," and, therefore, the "failure of defense counsel to advise the defendant of possible deportation consequences is not cognizable as a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel." 253 S. W. 3d, at 483. The Kentucky high court is far from alone in this view.[fn9]

We, however, have never applied a distinction between direct and collateral consequences to define the scope of constitutionally "reasonable professional assistance" required under Strickland, 466 U. S., at 689. Whether that distinction is appropriate is a question we need not consider in this case because of the unique nature of deportation.

We have long recognized that deportation is a particularly severe "penalty," Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698, 740 (1893); but it is not, in a strict sense, a criminal sanction. Although removal proceedings are civil in nature, see INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U. S. 1032, 1038 (1984), deportation is nevertheless intimately related to the criminal process. Our law has enmeshed criminal convictions and [*366] the penalty of [****6] deportation [***294] for nearly a century, see Part I, supra , at 2-7. And, importantly, recent changes in our immigration law have made removal nearly an automatic result for a broad class of noncitizen offenders. Thus, we find it "most difficult" to divorce the penalty from the conviction in the deportation context. United States v. Russell, 686 F. 2d 35, 38 (CADC 1982). Moreover, we are quite confident that noncitizen defendants facing a risk of deportation for a particular offense find it even more difficult. See St. Cyr, 533 U. S., at 322 ("There can be little doubt that, as a general matter, alien defendants considering whether to enter into a plea agreement are acutely aware of the [**1482] immigration consequences of their convictions").

Deportation as a consequence of a criminal conviction is, because of its close connection to the criminal process, uniquely difficult to classify as either a direct or a collateral consequence. The collateral versus direct distinction is thus ill-suited to evaluating a Strickland claim concerning the specific risk of deportation. We conclude that advice regarding deportation is not categorically removed from the ambit of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Strickland applies to Padilla's claim.

III

Under Strickland, we first determine whether counsel's representation "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." 466 U. S., at 688. Then we ask whether "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id., at 694. The first prong — constitutional deficiency — is necessarily linked to the practice and expectations of the legal community: "The proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." Id., at 688. We long have recognized that "[p]revailing norms of practice as reflected in American Bar Association standards and the like . . . are guides to determining what is reasonable. . . ." Ibid.; [*367] Bobby v. Van Hook, 558 U. S. ___, ___ (2009) (per curiam) (slip op., at 3); Florida v. Nixon, 543 U. S. 175, 191, and n. 6 (2004); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U. S. 510, 524 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 362, 396 (2000). Although they are "only guides," Strickland, 466 U. S., at 688, and not "inexorable commands," Bobby, 558 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 5), these standards may be valuable measures of the prevailing professional norms of effective representation, especially as these standards have been adapted to deal with the intersection of modern criminal prosecutions and immigration law.

The weight of prevailing professional norms supports the view that counsel must advise her client regarding the risk of deportation. National Legal Aid and Defender Assn., Performance Guidelines for Criminal Representation § 6.2 (1995); G. Herman, Plea Bargaining § 3.03, pp. 20-21 (1997); Chin & Holmes, Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 697, 713-718 (2002); A. Campbell, Law of Sentencing § 13:23, pp. 555, 560 (3d ed. 2004); [***295] Dept. of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, 2 Compendium of Standards for Indigent Defense Systems, Standards for Attorney Performance, pp. D10, H8-H9, J8 (2000) (providing survey of guidelines across multiple jurisdictions); ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, [****7] Prosecution Function and Defense Function 4-5.1(a), p. 197 (3d ed. 1993); ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Pleas of Guilty 14-3.2(f), p. 116 (3d ed. 1999). "[A]uthorities of every stripe — including the American Bar Association, criminal defense and public defender organizations, authoritative treatises, and state and city bar publications — universally require defense attorneys to advise as to the risk of deportation consequences for non-citizen clients. . . ." Brief for Legal Ethics, Criminal Procedure, and Criminal Law Professors as Amici Curiae 12-14 (footnotes omitted) (citing, inter alia, National Legal Aid and Defender Assn., Guidelines, supra , §§ 6.2-6.4 (1997); S. Bratton & E. Kelley, Practice Points: Representing a Noncitizen [*368] in a Criminal Case, 31 The Champion 61 (Jan./Feb. 2007); N. Tooby, Criminal Defense of Immigrants [**1483] § 1.3 (3d ed. 2003); 2 Criminal Practice Manual §§ 45:3, 45:15 (2009)).

We too have previously recognized that "`[p]reserving the client's right to remain in the United States may be more important to the client than any potential jail sentence.'" St. Cyr, 533 U. S., at 323 (quoting 3 Criminal Defense Techniques §§ 60A.01, 60A.02[2] (1999)). Likewise, we have recognized that "preserving the possibility of" discretionary relief from deportation under § 212(c) of the 1952 INA, 66 Stat. 187, repealed by Congress in 1996, "would have been one of the principal benefits sought by defendants deciding whether to accept a plea offer or instead to proceed to trial." St. Cyr, 533 U. S., at 323. We expected that counsel who were unaware of the discretionary relief measures would "follo[w] the advice of numerous practice guides" to advise themselves of the importance of this particular form of discretionary relief. Ibid., n. 50.

In the instant case, the terms of the relevant immigration statute are succinct, clear, and explicit in defining the removal consequence for Padilla's conviction. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) ("Any alien who at any time after admission has been convicted of a violation of (or a conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or regulation of a State, the United States or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance . . ., other than a single offense involving possession for one's own use of 30 grams or less of marijuana, is deportable"). Padilla's counsel could have easily determined that his plea would make him eligible for deportation simply from reading the text of the statute, which addresses not some broad classification of crimes but specifically commands removal for all controlled substances convictions except for the most trivial of marijuana possession offenses. Instead, Padilla's counsel provided him false assurance that his conviction would not result in his removal from this country. This is not a hard case in which to find deficiency: [*369] The consequences of Padilla's plea could easily be determined from reading the removal statute, his deportation was presumptively mandatory, and his counsel's advice was incorrect.

Immigration law can be complex, [***296] and it is a legal specialty of its own. Some members of the bar who represent clients facing criminal charges, in either state or federal court or both, may not be well versed in it. There will, therefore, undoubtedly [****8] be numerous situations in which the deportation consequences of a particular plea are unclear or uncertain. The duty of the private practitioner in such cases is more limited. When the law is not succinct and straightforward (as it is in many of the scenarios posited by JUSTICE ALITO), a criminal defense attorney need do no more than advise a noncitizen client that pending criminal charges may carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences.[fn10] But when the deportation consequence is truly clear, as it was in this case, the duty to give correct advice is equally clear.

Accepting his allegations as true, Padilla has sufficiently alleged constitutional deficiency to satisfy the first prong of Strickland. Whether Padilla is entitled to relief on his claim will depend on whether he can satisfy Strickland's second prong, prejudice, [**1484] a matter we leave to the Kentucky courts to consider in the first instance.

The Solicitor General has urged us to conclude that Strickland applies to Padilla's claim only to the extent that he has alleged affirmative misadvice. In the United States' view, "counsel is not constitutionally required to provide advice on matters that will not be decided in the criminal case . . .," though counsel is required to provide accurate advice if she [*370] chooses to discusses these matters. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 10.

Respondent and Padilla both find the Solicitor General's proposed rule unpersuasive, although it has support among the lower courts. See, e.g., United States v. Couto, 311 F. 3d 179, 188 (CA2 2002); United States v. Kwan, 407 F. 3d 1005 (CA9 2005); Sparks v. Sowders, 852 F. 2d 882 (CA6 1988); United States v. Russell, 686 F. 2d 35 (CADC 1982); State v. Rojas-Martinez, 2005 UT 86, 125 P. 3d 930, 935; In re Resendiz, 25 Cal. 4th 230, 19 P. 3d 1171 (2001). Kentucky describes these decisions isolating an affirmative misadvice claim as "result-driven, incestuous . . . [, and] completely lacking in legal or rational bases." Brief for Respondent 31. We do not share that view, but we agree that there is no relevant difference "between an act of commission and an act of omission" in this context. Id., at 30; Strickland, 466 U. S., at 690 ("The court must then determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance"); see also State v. Paredez, 2004-NMSC-036, 136 N. M. 533, 538-539.

A holding limited to affirmative misadvice would invite two absurd results. First, it would give counsel an incentive to remain silent on matters of great importance, even when answers are readily available. Silence under these circumstances would be fundamentally at odds with the critical obligation of counsel to advise the client of "the advantages and disadvantages of a plea agreement." Libretti v. United States, 516 U. S. 29, 50-51 (1995). [***297] When attorneys know that their clients face possible exile from this country and separation from their families, they should not be encouraged to say nothing at all.[fn11] Second, it would deny a [*371] class of clients least able to represent themselves the most rudimentary advice on deportation even when it is readily available. It is quintessentially the duty of counsel to provide her client with available advice about [****9] an issue like deportation and the failure to do so "clearly satisfies the first prong of the Strickland analysis." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U. S. 52, 62 (1985) (White, J., concurring in judgment).

We have given serious consideration to the concerns that the Solicitor General, respondent, and amici have stressed regarding the importance of protecting the finality of convictions obtained through guilty pleas. We confronted a similar "floodgates" concern in Hill, see id., at 58, but nevertheless applied [**1485] Strickland to a claim that counsel had failed to advise the client regarding his parole eligibility before he pleaded guilty.[fn12]

A flood did not follow in that decision's wake. Surmounting Strickland's high bar is never an easy task. See, e.g., 466 U. S., at 689 ("Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential"); id., at 693 (observing that "[a]ttorney errors . . . are as likely to be utterly harmless in a [*372] particular case as they are to be prejudicial"). Moreover, to obtain relief on this type of claim, a petitioner must convince the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances. See Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U. S. 470, 480, 486

(2000). There is no reason to doubt that lower courts — now quite experienced with applying Strickland — can effectively and efficiently use its framework to separate specious claims from those with substantial merit.

It seems unlikely that our decision today will have a significant effect on those convictions already obtained as the result of plea bargains. For at [***298] least the past 15 years, professional norms have generally imposed an obligation on counsel to provide advice on the deportation consequences of a client's plea. See, supra , at 11-13. We should, therefore, presume that counsel satisfied their obligation to render competent advice at the time their clients considered pleading guilty. Strickland, 466 U. S., at 689.

Likewise, although we must be especially careful about recognizing new grounds for attacking the validity of guilty pleas, in the 25 years since we first applied Strickland to claims of ineffective assistance at the plea stage, practice has shown that pleas are less frequently the subject of collateral challenges than convictions obtained after a trial. Pleas account for nearly 95% of all criminal convictions.[fn13] But they account for only approximately 30% of the habeas petitions filed.[fn14] The nature of relief secured by a successful collateral [*373] challenge to a guilty plea — an opportunity to withdraw the plea and proceed to trial — imposes its own significant limiting principle: Those who collaterally attack their guilty pleas lose the benefit of the bargain obtained as a result of the plea. Thus, a different calculus informs [**1486] whether it is wise to challenge a guilty plea in a habeas proceeding because, ultimately, the challenge may result in a less favorable outcome for the defendant, whereas a collateral challenge to a conviction obtained after a jury trial has no similar downside potential.

Finally, informed consideration of possible deportation can only benefit both the State and noncitizen defendants [****10] during the plea-bargaining process. By bringing deportation consequences into this process, the defense and prosecution may well be able to reach agreements that better satisfy the interests of both parties. As in this case, a criminal episode may provide the basis for multiple charges, of which only a subset mandate deportation following conviction. Counsel who possess the most rudimentary understanding of the deportation consequences of a particular criminal offense may be able to plea bargain creatively with the prosecutor in order to craft a conviction and sentence that reduce the likelihood of deportation, as by avoiding a conviction for an offense that automatically triggers the removal consequence. At the same time, the threat of deportation may provide the defendant with a powerful incentive to plead guilty to an offense that does not mandate that penalty in exchange for a dismissal of a charge that does.

In sum, we have long recognized that the negotiation of a plea bargain is a critical phase of litigation for purposes of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. Hill, 474 U. S., at 57; see also Richardson, 397 U. S., at 770-771. The severity of deportation — "the equivalent of [***299] banishment or exile," Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U. S. 388, 390-391 (1947) — only underscores how critical it is for counsel [*374] to inform her noncitizen client that he faces a risk of deportation.[fn15]

It is our responsibility under the Constitution to ensure that no criminal defendant — whether a citizen or not — is left to the "mercies of incompetent counsel." Richardson, 397 U. S., at 771. To satisfy this responsibility, we now hold that counsel must inform her client whether his plea carries a risk of deportation. Our longstanding Sixth Amendment precedents, the seriousness of deportation as a consequence of a criminal plea, and the concomitant impact of deportation on families living lawfully in this country demand no less.

Taking as true the basis for his motion for postconviction relief, we have little difficulty [**1487] concluding that Padilla has sufficiently alleged that his counsel was constitutionally deficient. Whether Padilla is entitled to relief will depend on whether he can demonstrate prejudice as a result thereof, a question we do not reach because it was not passed on below. [*375] See Verizon Communications Inc. v. FCC, 535 U. S. 467, 530 (2002).

The judgment of the Supreme Court of Kentucky is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

[fn1] Padilla's crime, like virtually every drug offense except for only the most insignificant marijuana offenses, is a deportable offense under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).

[fn2] In 1907, Congress expanded the class of excluded persons to include individuals who "admit" to having committed a crime of moral turpitude. Act of Feb. 20, 1907, ch. 1134, 34 Stat. 899.

[fn3] As enacted, the statute provided: "That the provision of this section respecting the deportation of aliens convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude shall not apply to one who has been pardoned, nor shall such deportation be made or directed if the court, or judge thereof, sentencing such alien for such crime shall, at the time of imposing judgment or passing sentence or within thirty days thereafter, . . . make a recommendation to the Secretary of Labor that such alien shall not be deported in pursuance of this Act." 1917 Act, 39 Stat. 889-890.

This provision was codified in 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1994 ed.) (transferred to § 1227 (2006 ed.)). The judge's nondeportation recommendation was binding on the Secretary of Labor and, later, the Attorney General after control of immigration removal matters was transferred from the former to the latter. See Janvier v. United States, 793 F. 2d 449, 452 (CA2 1986).

[fn4] Congress first identified narcotics offenses as a special category of crimes triggering deportation in the 1922 Narcotic Drug Act. Act of May 26, 1922, ch. 202, 42 Stat. 596. After the 1922 Act took effect, there was some initial confusion over whether a narcotics offense also had to be a crime of moral turpitude for an individual to be deportable. See Weedin v. Moy Fat, 8 F. 2d 488, 489 (CA9 1925) (holding that an individual who committed narcotics offense was not deportable because offense did not involve moral turpitude). However, lower courts eventually agreed that the narcotics offense provision was "special," Chung Que Fong v. Nagle, 15 F. 2d 789, 790 (CA9 1926); thus, a narcotics offense did not need also to be a crime of moral turpitude (or to satisfy other requirements of the 1917 Act) to trigger deportation. See United States ex rel. Grimaldi v. Ebey, 12 F. 2d 922, 923 (CA7 1926); Todaro v. Munster, 62 F. 2d 963, 964 (CA10 1933).

[fn5] The Act separately codified the moral turpitude offense provision and the narcotics offense provision within 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1994 ed.) under subsections (a)(4) and (a)(11), respectively. See 66 Stat. 201, 204, 206. The JRAD procedure, codified in 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1994 ed.), applied only to the "provisions of subsection (a)(4)," the crimes- of-moral-turpitude provision. 66 Stat. 208; see United States v. O'Rourke, 213 F. 2d 759, 762 (CA8 1954) (recognizing that, under the 1952 Act, narcotics offenses were no longer eligible for JRADs).

[fn6] The changes to our immigration law have also involved a change in nomenclature; the statutory text now uses the term "removal" rather than "deportation." See Calcano-Martinez v. INS, 533 U. S. 348, 350, n. 1 (2001).

[fn7] See Brief for Asian American Justice Center et al. as Amici Curiae 12-27 (providing real-world examples).

[fn8] There is some disagreement among the courts over how to distinguish between direct and collateral consequences. See Roberts, Ignorance is Effectively Bliss: Collateral Consequences, Silence, and Misinformation in the Guilty-Plea Process, 95 Iowa L. Rev. 119, 124, n. 15 (2009). The disagreement over how to apply the direct/collateral distinction has no bearing on the disposition of this case because, as even JUSTICE ALITO agrees, counsel must, at the very least, advise a noncitizen "defendant that a criminal conviction may have adverse immigration consequences," post, at 1 (opinion concurring in judgment). See also post, at 14 ("I do not mean to suggest that the Sixth Amendment does no more than require defense counsel to avoid misinformation"). In his concurring opinion, JUSTICE ALITO has thus departed from the strict rule applied by the Supreme Court of Kentucky and in the two federal cases that he cites, post, at 2.

[fn9] See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 202 F. 3d 20 (CA1 2000); United States v. Del Rosario, 902 F. 2d 55 (CADC 1990); United States v. Yearwood, 863 F. 2d 6 (CA4 1988); Santos-Sanchez v. United States, 548 F. 3d 327

(CA5 2008); Broomes v. Ashcroft, 358 F. 3d 1251 (CA10 2004); United States v. Campbell, 778 F. 2d 764 (CA11 1985); Oyekoya v. State, 558 So. 2d 990 (Ala. Ct. Crim. App. 1989); State v. Rosas, 183Ariz. 421, 904 P. 2d 1245 (App. 1995); State v. Montalban, 2000-2739 (La. 2/26/02), 810 So. 2d 1106 Commonwealth v. Frometa, 520 Pa. 552, 555 A. 2d 92 (1989).

[fn10] As JUSTICE ALITO explains at length, deportation consequences are often unclear. Lack of clarity in the law, however, does not obviate the need for counsel to say something about the possibility of deportation, even though it will affect the scope and nature of counsel's advice.

[fn11] As the Commonwealth conceded at oral argument, were a defendant's lawyer to know that a particular offense would result in the client's deportation and that, upon deportation, the client and his family might well be killed due to circumstances in the client's home country, any decent attorney would inform the client of the consequences of his plea. Tr. of Oral Arg. 37-38. We think the same result should follow when the stakes are not life and death but merely "banishment or exile," Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U. S. 388, 390-391 (1947).

[fn12] However, we concluded that, even though Strickland applied to petitioner's claim, he had not sufficiently alleged prejudice to satisfy Strickland's second prong. Hill, 474 U. S., at 59-60. This disposition further underscores the fact that it is often quite difficult for petitioners who have acknowledged their guilt to satisfy Strickland's prejudice prong.

JUSTICE ALITO believes that the Court misreads Hill, post, at 10-11. In Hill, the Court recognized — for the first time — that Strickland applies to advice respecting a guilty plea. 474 U. S., at 58 ("We hold, therefore, that the two-part Strickland v. Washington test applies to challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel"). It is true that Hill does not control the question before us. But its import is nevertheless clear. Whether Strickland applies to Padilla's claim follows from Hill, regardless of the fact that the Hill Court did not resolve the particular question respecting misadvice that was before it.

[fn13] See Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 2003, p. 418 (31st ed. 2005) (Table 5.17) (only approximately 5%, or 8,612 out of 68,533, of federal criminal prosecutions go to trial); id., at 450 (Table 5.46) (only approximately 5% of all state felony criminal prosecutions go to trial).

[fn14] See V. Flango, National Center for State Courts, Habeas Corpus in State and Federal Courts 36-38 (1994) (demonstrating that 5% of defendants whose conviction was the result of a trial account for approximately 70% of the habeas petitions filed).

[fn15] To this end, we find it significant that the plea form currently used in Kentucky courts provides notice of possible immigration consequences. Ky. Admin. Office of Courts, Motion to Enter Guilty Plea, Form AOC-491 (Rev. 2/2003), http://courts.ky.gov/NR/rdonlyres/ 55E1F54E-ED5C-4A30-B1D5-4C43C7ADD63C/0/491.pdf (as visited Mar. 29, 2010, and available in Clerk of Court's case file). Further, many States require trial courts to advise defendants of possible immigration consequences. See, e.g., Alaska Rule Crim. Proc. 11(c)(3)(C) (2009-2010); Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 1016.5 (West 2008); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-1j (2009); D. C. Code § 16-713 (2001); Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.172(c)(8) (Supp. 2010); Ga. Code Ann. § 17-7-93(c) (1997); Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 802E-2 (2007); Iowa Rule Crim. Proc. 2.8(2)(b)(3) (Supp. 2009); Md. Rule 4-242 (Lexis 2009); Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 278, § 29D (2009); Minn. Rule Crim. Proc. 15.01 (2009); Mont. Code Ann. § 46-12-210 (2009); N. M. Rule Crim. Form 9-406 (2009); N. Y. Crim. Proc. Law Ann. § 220.50(7) (West Supp. 2009); N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 15A-1022 (Lexis 2007); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2943.031 (West 2006); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 135.385 (2007); R. I. Gen. Laws § 12-12-22 (Lexis Supp. 2008); Tex. Code. Ann. Crim. Proc., Art. 26.13(a)(4) (Vernon Supp. 2009); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 13, § 6565(c)(1) (Supp. 2009); Wash. Rev. Code § 10.40.200 (2008); Wis. Stat. § 971.08 (2005-2006).

JUSTICE ALITO, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins, concurring in the judgment.

I concur in the judgment because a criminal defense attorney fails to provide effective assistance within the meaning of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (1984), if the attorney misleads a noncitizen client regarding the removal

© 2013 Bloomberg Finance L.P. All rights reserved. Terms of Service View at Bloomberg Law // PAGE 9 Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 176 L. Ed. 2d 284 (2010), Court Opinion consequences of a conviction. In my view, such an attorney must (1) refrain from unreasonably providing incorrect advice and (2) advise the defendant that a criminal conviction may have adverse immigration consequences and that, if the alien wants advice on this issue, the alien should consult an immigration attorney. I do not agree with the Court that the attorney must attempt [****11] [***300] to explain what those consequences may be. As the Court concedes, "[immigration law can be complex"; "it is a legal specialty of its own"; and "[s]ome members of the bar who represent clients facing criminal charges, in either state or federal court or both, may not be well versed in it." Ante, at 11. The Court nevertheless holds that a criminal defense attorney must provide advice in this specialized area in those cases in which the law is "succinct and straightforward" — but not, perhaps, in other situations. Ante, at 11-12. This vague, halfway test will lead to much confusion and needless litigation.

Under Strickland, an attorney provides ineffective assistance if the attorney's representation does not meet reasonable professional standards. 466 U. S., at 688. Until today, the longstanding and unanimous position of the federal [*376] courts was that reasonable defense counsel generally need only advise a client about the direct consequences of a criminal conviction. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 202 F. 3d 20, 28 (CA1 2000) (ineffective-assistance-of- counsel claim fails if "based on an attorney's failure to advise a client of his plea's immigration consequences"); United States v. Banda, 1 F. 3d 354, 355 (CA5 1993) (holding that "an attorney's failure to advise a client that deportation is a possible consequence of a guilty plea does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel"); see generally Chin & Holmes, Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 697, 699 (2002) (hereinafter Chin & Holmes) (noting that "virtually all jurisdictions" — including "eleven federal circuits, more than thirty states, and the District of Columbia" — "hold that defense counsel need not discuss with their clients the collateral consequences of a conviction," including deportation). While the line between "direct" and "collateral" consequences is not always clear, see ante, at 7, n. 8, the collateral-consequences rule expresses an important truth: Criminal defense attorneys have expertise regarding the conduct of criminal proceedings. They are not expected to possess — and very often do not possess — expertise in other areas of the law, and it is unrealistic to expect them to provide expert advice on [**1488] matters that lie outside their area of training and experience.

This case happens to involve removal, but criminal convictions can carry a wide variety of consequences other than conviction and sentencing, including civil commitment, civil forfeiture, the loss of the right to vote, disqualification from public benefits, ineligibility to possess fire-arms, dishonorable discharge from the Armed Forces, and loss of business or professional licenses. Chin & Holmes 705-706. A criminal conviction may also severely damage a defendant's reputation and thus impair the defendant's ability to obtain future employment or business opportunities. All of those consequences are "seriou[s]," see ante, at 17, but this Court has [*377] never held that a criminal defense attorney's Sixth Amendment duties extend to providing advice about such matters.

The Court tries to justify its dramatic departure [****12] from precedent by pointing to the views of various professional organizations. See ante, at 9 (" The weight of prevailing professional [***301] norms supports the view that counsel must advise her client regarding the risk of deportation"). However, ascertaining the level of professional competence required by the Sixth Amendment is ultimately a task for the courts. E.g., Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U. S. 470, 477 (2000). Although we may appropriately consult standards promulgated by private bar groups, we cannot delegate to these groups our task of determining what the Constitution commands. See Strickland, supra , at 688 (explaining that "[p]revailing norms of practice as reflected in American Bar Association standards . . . are guides to determining what is reasonable, but they are only guides"). And we must recognize that such standards may represent only the aspirations of a bar group rather than an empirical assessment of actual practice.

Even if the only relevant consideration were "prevailing professional norms," it is hard to see how those norms can support the duty the Court today imposes on defense counsel. Because many criminal defense attorneys have little understanding of immigration law, see ante, at 11, it should follow that a criminal defense attorney who refrains from providing immigration advice does not violate prevailing professional norms. But the Court's opinion would not just require defense counsel to warn the client of a general risk of removal; it would also require counsel in at least some cases, to specify what the removal consequences of a conviction would be. See ante, at 11-12.

The Court's new approach is particularly problematic because providing advice on whether a conviction for a particular offense will make an alien removable is often quite complex. "Most crimes affecting immigration status are not [*378] specifically mentioned by the [Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)], but instead fall under a broad category of crimes, such as crimes involving moral turpitude or aggravated felonies." M. Garcia & L. Eig, CRS Report for Congress, Immigration Consequences of Criminal Activity (Sept. 20, 2006) (summary) (emphasis in original). As has been widely acknowledged, determining whether a particular crime is an "aggravated felony" or a "crime involving moral turpitude [(CIMT)]" is not an easy task. See R. McWhirter, ABA, The Criminal Lawyer's Guide to Immigration Law: Questions and Answers 128 (2d ed. 2006) (hereinafter ABA Guidebook) ("Because of the increased complexity of aggravated felony law, this edition devotes a new [30-page] chapter to the subject"); id., § 5.2, at 146 (stating that the aggravated felony list at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) is not clear [**1489] with respect to several of the listed categories, that "the term `aggravated felonies' can include misdemeanors," and that the determination of whether a crime is an "aggravated felony" is made "even more difficult" because "several agencies and courts interpret the statute," including Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), and Federal Circuit and district courts considering immigration-law and criminal-[****13] law issues); ABA Guidebook § 4.65, at 130 ("Because nothing is ever simple with immigration law, the terms `conviction,' `moral turpitude,' and `single scheme of criminal misconduct' are terms of art"); id., § 4.67, at 130 ("[T]he term `moral turpitude' evades precise definition"). [***302]

Defense counsel who consults a guidebook on whether a particular crime is an "aggravated felony" will often find that the answer is not "easily ascertained." For example, the ABA Guidebook answers the question "Does simple possession count as an aggravated felony?" as follows: "Yes, at least in the Ninth Circuit." § 5.35, at 160 (emphasis added). After a dizzying paragraph that attempts to explain the evolution of the Ninth Circuit's view, the ABA Guidebook continues: "Adding to the confusion, however, is that the Ninth [*379] Circuit has conflicting opinions depending on the context on whether simple drug possession constitutes an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)." Id., § 5.35, at 161 (citing cases distinguishing between whether a simple possession offense is an aggravated felony "for immigration purposes" or for "sentencing purposes"). The ABA Guidebook then proceeds to explain that "attempted possession," id., § 5.36, at 161 (emphasis added), of a controlled substance is an aggravated felony, while "[c]onviction under the federal accessory after the fact statute is probably not an aggravated felony, but a conviction for accessory after the fact to the manufacture of methamphetamine is an aggravated felony," id., § 537, at 161 (emphasis added). Conspiracy or attempt to commit drug trafficking are aggravated felonies, but "[s]olicitation is not a drug-trafficking offense because a generic solicitation offense is not an offense related to a controlled substance and therefore not an aggravated felony." Id., § 5.41, at 162.

Determining whether a particular crime is one involving moral turpitude is no easier. See id., at 134 ("Writing bad checks may or may not be a CIMT" (emphasis added)); ibid. ("[R]eckless assault coupled with an element of injury, but not serious injury, is probably not a CIMT" (emphasis added)); id., at 135 (misdemeanor driving under the influence is generally not a CIMT, but may be a CIMT if the DUI results in injury or if the driver knew that his license had been suspended or revoked); id., at 136 ("If there is no element of actual injury, the endangerment offense may not be a CIMT" (emphasis added)); ibid. ("Whether [a child abuse] conviction involves moral turpitude may depend on the subsection under which the individual is convicted. Child abuse done with criminal negligence probably is not a CIMT" (emphasis added)).

Many other terms of the INA are similarly ambiguous or may be confusing to practitioners not versed in the intricacies of immigration law. To take just a few examples, it may [*380] be hard, in some cases, for defense counsel even to determine whether a client is an alien, [fn1] or whether a [**1490] particular state disposition will result in a "conviction" for purposes of federal immigration law.[fn2] The task of offering advice about the immigration [***303] consequences of a criminal conviction is further complicated by other problems, including significant variations among Circuit interpretations [****14] of federal immigration statutes; the frequency with which immigration law changes; different rules governing the immigration consequences of juvenile, first-offender, and foreign convictions; and the relationship between the "length and type of sentence" and the determination "whether [an alien] is subject to removal, eligible for relief from removal, or qualified to become a naturalized citizen," Immigration Law and Crimes § 2:1, at 2-2 to 2-3.

In short, the professional organizations and guidebooks on which the Court so heavily relies are right to say that "nothing [*381] is ever simple with immigration law" — including the determination whether immigration law clearly makes a particular offense removable. ABA Guidebook § 4.65, at 130; Immigration Law and Crimes § 2:1. I therefore cannot agree with the Court's apparent view that the Sixth Amendment requires criminal defense attorneys to provide immigration advice.

The Court tries to downplay the severity of the burden it imposes on defense counsel by suggesting that the scope of counsel's duty to offer advice concerning deportation consequences may turn on how hard it is to determine those consequences. Where "the terms of the relevant immigration statute are succinct, clear, and explicit in defining the removal consequence[s]" of a conviction, the Court says, counsel has an affirmative duty to advise the client that he will be subject to deportation as a result of the plea. Ante, at 11. But "[w]hen the law is not succinct and straightforward . . ., a criminal defense attorney need do no more than advise a noncitizen client that pending criminal charges may carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences." Ante, at 11-12. This approach is problematic for at least four reasons.

First, it will not always be easy to tell whether a particular statutory provision is "succinct, clear, and explicit." How can an attorney who lacks general immigration law expertise be sure that a seemingly clear statutory provision actually means what it seems to say when read in isolation? What if the application of the provision to a particular case is not clear but a cursory examination of case law or administrative decisions would provide a definitive answer? See Immigration Law and Crimes § 2:1, at 2-2 ("Unfortunately, a practitioner or respondent cannot tell easily whether a conviction is for a removable offense. . . . [T]he cautious practitioner or apprehensive respondent will not know [**1491] conclusively the future immigration consequences of a guilty plea").

Second, if defense counsel must provide advice regarding only one of the many collateral consequences of a criminal [*382] conviction, many defendants are likely to be misled. To take just one example, a conviction for a particular offense may render an alien excludable but not removable. If an [***304] alien charged with such an offense is advised only that pleading guilty to such an offense will not result in removal, the alien may be induced to enter a guilty plea without realizing that a consequence of the plea is that the alien will be unable to reenter the United States if the alien [****15] returns to his or her home country for any reason, such as to visit an elderly parent or to attend a funeral. See ABA Guidebook § 4.14, at 111 ("Often the alien is both excludable and removable. At times, however, the lists are different. Thus, the oddity of an alien that is inadmissible but not deportable. This alien should not leave the United States because the government will not let him back in" (emphasis in original)). Incomplete legal advice may be worse than no advice at all because it may mislead and may dissuade the client from seeking advice from a more knowledgeable source.

Third, the Court's rigid constitutional rule could inadvertently head off more promising ways of addressing the underlying problem — such as statutory or administrative reforms requiring trial judges to inform a defendant on the record that a guilty plea may carry adverse immigration consequences. As amici point out, "28 states and the District of Columbia have already adopted rules, plea forms, or statutes requiring courts to advise criminal defendants of the possible immigration consequences of their pleas." Brief for State of Louisiana et al. 25; accord, Chin & Holmes 708 ("A growing number of states require advice about deportation by statute or court rule"). A nonconstitutional rule requiring trial judges to inform defendants on the record of the risk of adverse immigration consequences can ensure that a defendant receives needed information without putting a large number of criminal convictions at risk; and because such a warning would be given on the record, courts would not later have to determine whether the defendant was misrepresenting the [*383] advice of counsel. Likewise, flexible statutory procedures for withdrawing guilty pleas might give courts appropriate discretion to determine whether the interests of justice would be served by allowing a particular defendant to withdraw a plea entered into on the basis of incomplete information. Cf. United States v. Russell, 686 F. 2d 35, 39-40 (CADC 1982) (explaining that a district court's discretion to set aside a guilty plea under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure should be guided by, among other considerations, "the possible existence of prejudice to the government's case as a result of the defendant's untimely request to stand trial" and "the strength of the defendant's reason for withdrawing the plea, including whether the defendant asserts his innocence of the charge").

Fourth, the Court's decision marks a major upheaval in Sixth Amendment law. This Court decided Strickland in 1984, but the majority does not cite a single case, from this or any other federal court, holding that criminal defense counsel's failure to provide advice concerning the removal consequences of a criminal conviction violates a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. As noted above, the Court's view has been rejected by every Federal Court of Appeals to have considered the issue thus far. See, e.g., Gonzalez, 202 F. 3d, at 28; Banda, 1 F. 3d, at 355; Chin & Holmes 697, 699. The majority appropriately acknowledges that the lower courts [**1492] are "now quite experienced with [****16] applying Strickland," ante, at 14, [***305] but it casually dismisses the longstanding and unanimous position of the lower federal courts with respect to the scope of criminal defense counsel's duty to advise on collateral consequences.

The majority seeks to downplay its dramatic expansion of the scope of criminal defense counsel's duties under the Sixth Amendment by claiming that this Court in Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U. S. 52 (1985), similarly "applied Strickland to a claim that counsel had failed to advise the client regarding his parole eligibility before he pleaded guilty." Ante, at 14. That [*384] characterization of Hill obscures much more than it reveals. The issue in Hill was whether a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated where counsel misinformed the client about his eligibility for parole. The Court found it "unnecessary to determine whether there may be circumstances under which erroneous advice by counsel as to parole eligibility may be deemed constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel, because in the present case we conclude that petitioner's allegations are insufficient to satisfy the Strickland v. Washington requirement of `prejudice.'" 474 U. S., at 60. Given that Hill expressly and unambiguously refused to decide whether criminal defense counsel must avoid misinforming his or her client as to one consequence of a criminal conviction (parole eligibility), that case plainly provides no support whatsoever for the proposition that counsel must affirmatively advise his or her client as to another collateral consequence (removal). By the Court's strange logic, Hill would support its decision here even if the Court had held that misadvice concerning parole eligibility does not make counsel's performance objectively unreasonable. After all, the Court still would have "applied Strickland" to the facts of the case at hand.

While mastery of immigration law is not required by Strickland, several considerations support the conclusion that affirmative misadvice regarding the removal consequences of a conviction may constitute ineffective assistance.

First, a rule prohibiting affirmative misadvice regarding a matter as crucial to the defendant's plea decision as deportation appears faithful to the scope and nature of the Sixth Amendment duty this Court has recognized in its past cases. In particular, we have explained that "a guilty plea cannot be attacked as based on inadequate legal advice unless counsel was not `a reasonably competent attorney' and the advice was not `within the range of competence demanded of attorneys [*385] in criminal cases.'" Strickland, 466 U. S., at 687 (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U. S. 759, 770, 771 (1970); emphasis added). As the Court appears to acknowledge, thorough understanding of the intricacies of immigration law is not "within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." See ante, at 11 ("Immigration law can be complex, and it is a legal specialty of its own. Some members of the bar who represent clients facing criminal charges, in either state or federal court or both, may not be well versed in it"). By [****17] contrast, reasonably competent attorneys [***306] should know that it is not appropriate or responsible to hold themselves out as authorities on a difficult and complicated subject matter with which they are not familiar. Candor concerning the limits of one's professional expertise, in other words, is within the range of duties reasonably expected of defense attorneys in criminal cases. As the dissenting judge on [**1493] the Kentucky Supreme Court put it, "I do not believe it is too much of a burden to place on our defense bar the duty to say, `I do not know.'" 253 S. W. 3d 482, 485 (2008).

Second, incompetent advice distorts the defendant's decisionmaking process and seems to call the fairness and integrity of the criminal proceeding itself into question. See Strickland, 466 U. S., at 686 ("In giving meaning to the requirement [of effective assistance of counsel], we must take its purpose — to ensure a fair trial — as the guide"). When a defendant opts to plead guilty without definitive information concerning the likely effects of the plea, the defendant can fairly be said to assume the risk that the conviction may carry indirect consequences of which he or she

© 2013 Bloomberg Finance L.P. All rights reserved. Terms of Service View at Bloomberg Law // PAGE 13 Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 176 L. Ed. 2d 284 (2010), Court Opinion is not aware. That is not the case when a defendant bases the decision to plead guilty on counsel's express misrepresentation that the defendant will not be removable. In the latter case, it seems hard to say that the plea was entered with the advice of constitutionally competent counsel — or that it embodies a voluntary and intelligent decision to forsake constitutional [*386] rights. See ibid. ("The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result").

Third, a rule prohibiting unreasonable misadvice regarding exceptionally important collateral matters would not deter or interfere with ongoing political and administrative efforts to devise fair and reasonable solutions to the difficult problem posed by defendants who plead guilty without knowing of certain important collateral consequences.

Finally, the conclusion that affirmative misadvice regarding the removal consequences of a conviction can give rise to ineffective assistance would, unlike the Court's approach, not require any upheaval in the law. As the Solicitor General points out, "[t]he vast majority of the lower courts considering claims of ineffective assistance in the plea context have [distinguished] between defense counsel who remain silent and defense counsel who give affirmative misadvice." Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 8 (citing cases). At least three Courts of Appeals have held that affirmative misadvice on immigration matters can give rise to ineffective assistance of counsel, at least in some circumstances.[fn3] And several other Circuits have held that affirmative [***307] misadvice concerning nonimmigration consequences of a conviction can violate the Sixth Amendment even if those consequences [*387] might be deemed "collateral."[fn4] By contrast, it appears that [**1494] no court of appeals [****18] holds that affirmative misadvice concerning collateral consequences in general and removal in particular can never give rise to ineffective assistance. In short, the considered and thus far unanimous view of the lower federal courts charged with administering Strickland clearly supports the conclusion that that Kentucky Supreme Court's position goes too far.

In concluding that affirmative misadvice regarding the removal consequences of a criminal conviction may constitute ineffective assistance, I do not mean to suggest that the Sixth Amendment does no more than require defense counsel to avoid misinformation. When a criminal defense attorney is aware that a client is an alien, the attorney should advise the client that a criminal conviction may have adverse consequences under the immigration laws and that the client should consult an immigration specialist if the client wants advice on that subject. By putting the client on notice of the danger of removal, such advice would significantly reduce the chance that the client would plead guilty under a mistaken premise.

III

In sum, a criminal defense attorney should not be required to provide advice on immigration law, a complex specialty [*388] that generally lies outside the scope of a criminal defense attorney's expertise. On the other hand, any competent criminal defense attorney should appreciate the extraordinary importance that the risk of removal might have in the client's determination whether to enter a guilty plea. Accordingly, unreasonable and incorrect information concerning the risk of removal can give rise to an ineffectiveness claim. In addition, silence alone is not enough to satisfy counsel's duty to assist the client. Instead, an alien defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel is satisfied if defense counsel advises the client that a conviction may have immigration consequences, that immigration law is a specialized field, that the attorney is not an immigration lawyer, and that the client should consult an immigration specialist if the client wants advice on that subject.

[fn1] Citizens are not deportable, but "[q]uestions of citizenship are not always simple." ABA Guidebook § 4.20, at 113 (explaining that U.S. citizenship conferred by blood is "`derivative,'" and that "[d]erivative citizenship depends on a number of confusing factors, including whether the citizen parent was the mother or father, the immigration laws in effect at the time of the parents' and/or defendant's birth, and the parents' marital status").

[fn2] "A disposition that is not a `conviction,' under state law may still be a `conviction' for immigration purposes." Id., § 4.32, at 117 (citing Matter of Salazar, 23 I. & N. Dec. 223, 231 (BIA 2002) (en banc)). For example, state law may define the term "conviction" not to include a deferred adjudication, but such an adjudication would be deemed a

© 2013 Bloomberg Finance L.P. All rights reserved. Terms of Service View at Bloomberg Law // PAGE 14 Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 176 L. Ed. 2d 284 (2010), Court Opinion conviction for purposes of federal immigration law. See ABA Guide book § 4.37; accord, D. Kesselbrenner & L. Rosenberg, Immigration Law and Crimes § 2:1, p. 2-2 (2008) (hereinafter Immigration Law and Crimes) ("A practitioner or respondent will not even know whether the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) or the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) will treat a particular state disposition as a conviction for immigration purposes. In fact, the [BIA] treats certain state criminal dispositions as convictions even though the state treats the same disposition as a dismissal").

[fn3] See United States v. Kwan, 407 F. 3d 1005, 1015-1017 (CA9 2005); United States v. Couto, 311 F. 3d 179, 188 (CA2 2002); Downs-Morgan v. United States, 765 F. 2d 1534, 1540-1541 (CA11 1985) (limiting holding to the facts of the case); see also Santos-Sanchez v. United States, 548 F. 3d 327, 333-334 (CA5 2008) (concluding that counsel's advice was not objectively unreasonable where counsel did not purport to answer questions about immigration law, did not claim any expertise in immigration law, and simply warned of "possible" deportation consequence; use of the word "possible" was not an affirmative misrepresentation, even though it could indicate that deportation was not a certain consequence).

[fn4] See Hill v. Lockhart, 894 F. 2d 1009, 1010 (CA8 1990) (en banc) ("[T]he erroneous parole-eligibility advice given to Mr. Hill was ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington"); Sparks v. Sowders, 852 F. 2d 882, 885 (CA6 1988) ("[G]ross misadvice concerning parole eligibility can amount to ineffective assistance of counsel"); id., at 886 (KENNEDY, J., concurring) ("When the maximum possible expo sure is overstated, the defendant might well be influenced to accept a plea agreement he would otherwise reject"); Strader v. Garrison, 611 F. 2d 61, 65 (CA4 1979) ("[T]hough parole eligibility dates are collateral consequences of the entry of a guilty plea of which a defendant need not be informed if he does not inquire, when he is grossly misinformed about it by his lawyer, and relies upon that misinformation, he is deprived of his constitutional right to counsel").

JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS joins, dissenting.

In the best of all possible worlds, criminal defendants contemplating a guilty plea ought to be advised of all serious collateral consequences of conviction, and surely ought not to be misadvised. The Constitution, however, is not an all- purpose tool for judicial construction of a perfect world; and when we ignore its text in [***308] order to make it that, we often find ourselves swinging a sledge where a tack hammer is needed.

The Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused a lawyer "for his defense" against a "criminal prosecutio[n]" — not for sound advice about the collateral consequences of conviction. For that reason, and for the practical reasons set forth in Part I of JUSTICE ALITO's concurrence, I dissent from the Court's conclusion that the Sixth Amendment requires counsel to provide accurate advice concerning the potential removal consequences of a guilty plea. For the same reasons, but unlike the concurrence, I do not believe that affirmative misadvice about those [****19] consequences renders [**1495] an attorney's [*389] assistance in defending against the prosecution constitutionally inadequate; or that the Sixth Amendment requires counsel to warn immigrant defendants that a conviction may render them removable. Statutory provisions can remedy these concerns in a more targeted fashion, and without producing permanent, and legislatively irreparable, overkill.

* * *

The Sixth Amendment as originally understood and ratified meant only that a defendant had a right to employ counsel, or to use volunteered services of counsel. See, United States v. Van Duzee, 140 U. S. 169, 173 (1891); W. Beaney, Right to Counsel in American Courts 21, 28-29 (1955). We have held, however, that the Sixth Amendment requires the provision of counsel to indigent defendants at government expense, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335, 344-345 (1963), and that the right to "the assistance of counsel" includes the right to effective assistance, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 686 (1984). Even assuming the validity of these holdings, I reject the significant further extension that the Court, and to a lesser extent the concurrence, would create. We have until today at least retained the Sixth Amendment's textual limitation to criminal prosecutions. "[W]e have held that `defence' means defense at trial, not defense in relation to other objectives that may be important to the accused." Rothgery v. Gillespie County,

554 U. S. ___, ___ (2008) (ALITO, J., concurring) (slip op., at 4) (summarizing cases). We have limited the Sixth Amendment to legal advice directly related to defense against prosecution of the charged offense — advice at trial, of course, but also advice at postindictment interrogations and lineups, Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S. 201, 205-206 (1964); United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218, 236-238 (1967), and in general advice at all phases of the prosecution where the defendant would be at a disadvantage when pitted alone against the legally trained agents of the state, see Moran v. Burbine, 475 U. S. 412, 430 ([*390] 1986). Not only have we not required advice of counsel regarding consequences collateral to prosecution, we have not even required counsel appointed to defend against one prosecution to be present when the defendant is interrogated in connection with another possible prosecution arising from the same event. Texas v. Cobb, 532 U. S. 162, 164 (2001).

There is no basis in text or in principle [***309] to extend the constitutionally required advice regarding guilty pleas beyond those matters germane to the criminal prosecution at hand — to wit, the sentence that the plea will produce, the higher sentence that conviction after trial might entail, and the chances of such a conviction. Such matters fall within "the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases," McMann v. Richardson, 397 U. S. 759, 771 (1970). See id., at 769-770 (describing the matters counsel and client must consider in connection with a contemplated guilty plea). We have never held, as the logic of the Court's opinion assumes, that once counsel is appointed all professional responsibilities of counsel — even those extending beyond defense against the prosecution — become constitutional commands. Cf. Cobb, supra , at 171, n. 2; Moran, supra , at 430. Because the subject of the misadvice here was not [****20] the prosecution for which Jose Padilla was entitled to effective assistance of counsel, the Sixth Amendment has no application. [**1496]

Adding to counsel's duties an obligation to advise about a conviction's collateral consequences has no logical stopping-point. As the concurrence observes,

"[A] criminal convictio[n] can carry a wide variety of consequences other than conviction and sentencing, including civil commitment, civil forfeiture, the loss of the right to vote, disqualification from public benefits, ineligibility to possess firearms, dishonorable discharge from the Armed Forces, and loss of business or professional licenses. . . . All of those consequences are `serious,'. . . ." Ante, at 2-3 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment). [*391]

But it seems to me that the concurrence suffers from the same defect. The same indeterminacy, the same inability to know what areas of advice are relevant, attaches to misadvice. And the concurrence's suggestion that counsel must warn defendants of potential removal consequences, see ante, at 14-15 — what would come to be known as the "Padilla warning" — cannot be limited to those consequences except by judicial caprice. It is difficult to believe that the warning requirement would not be extended, for example, to the risk of heightened sentences in later federal prosecutions pursuant to the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). We could expect years of elaboration upon these new issues in the lower courts, prompted by the defense bar's devising of ever-expanding categories of plea-invalidating misadvice and failures to warn — not to mention innumerable evidentiary hearings to determine whether misadvice really occurred or whether the warning was really given.

The concurrence's treatment of misadvice seems driven by concern about the voluntariness of Padilla's guilty plea. See ante, at 12. But that concern properly relates to the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, not to the Sixth Amendment. See McCarthy v. United States, 394 U. S. 459, 466 (1969); Brady v. United States, 397 U. S. 742, 748 (1970). Padilla has not argued before us that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary. If that is, however, the true substance of [***310] his claim (and if he has properly preserved it) the state court can address it on remand.[*392] [fn1] But we should not smuggle the claim into the Sixth Amendment.

The Court's holding prevents legislation that could solve the problems addressed by today's opinions in a more precise and targeted fashion. If the subject had not been constitutionalized, legislation could specify which categories of misadvice about matters ancillary to the prosecution invalidate plea agreements, what collateral consequences counsel must bring to a defendant's attention, and what warnings must be given.[fn2] Moreover, legislation could provide consequences for the misadvice, [**1497] nonadvice, or failure to warn, other than nullification of a criminal conviction after the witnesses and evidence needed for retrial have disappeared. Federal

© 2013 Bloomberg Finance L.P. All rights reserved. Terms of Service View at Bloomberg Law // PAGE 16 Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 176 L. Ed. 2d 284 (2010), Court Opinion immigration law might provide, for example, that the near-automatic removal which follows from certain criminal convictions will not apply where the conviction [****21] rested upon a guilty plea induced by counsel's misadvice regarding removal consequences. Or legislation might put the government to a choice in such circumstances: Either retry the defendant or forgo the removal. But all that has been precluded in favor of today's sledge hammer.

In sum, the Sixth Amendment guarantees adequate assistance of counsel in defending against a pending criminal prosecution. We should limit both the constitutional obligation to provide advice and the consequences of bad advice to that well defined area.

[fn1] I do not mean to suggest that the Due Process Clause would surely provide relief. We have indicated that awareness of "direct consequences" suffices for the validity of a guilty plea. See Brady, 397 U. S., at 755 (internal quotation marks omitted). And the required colloquy between a federal district court and a defendant required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b) (formerly Rule 11(c)), which we have said approximates the due process requirements for a valid plea, see Libretti v. United States, 516 U. S. 29, 49-50 (1995), does not mention collateral consequences. Whatever the outcome, however, the effect of misadvice regarding such consequences upon the validity of a guilty plea should be analyzed under the Due Process Clause.

[fn2] As the Court's opinion notes, ante, at 16-17, n. 15, many States — including Kentucky — already require that criminal defendants be warned of potential removal consequences.

General Information

Result(s) Judgment Reversed, Case Remanded

Judge ANTONIN SCALIA; CLARENCE THOMAS; JOHN PAUL STEVENS; SAMUEL A. ALITO, JR; Clarence Thomas; Antonin Scalia; John Paul Stevens; Samuel Anthony Alito

Related Docket(s) 08-00651 (U.S.)

Topic Criminal Law; Immigration & Naturalization

Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 176 L. Ed. 2d 284 (2010), Court Opinion

Direct History Direct History Summary 1 Padilla v. Commonwealth, 381 S.W.3d 322 (Ky. Caution 0 Ct. App. 2012) Negative 0 vacating the conviction and remanding the case and vacating the judgment in Total 0 Unpublished Opinion or Order 2 Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S. Ct. Citation Analysis Summary 1473, 176 L. Ed. 2d 284 (2010) reversing the judgment and remanding the case in Positive 1805 Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482 (Ky. 2008) Distinguished 166 3 Padilla v. Kentucky, 555 U.S. 1169, 129 S. Ct. Caution 0 1317, 173 L. Ed. 2d 582 (2009) Superseded 0 certiorari granted Negative 5 4 Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482 (Ky. 2008) Total 1976 reversing the judgment and denying the rehearing in

Padilla v. Commonwealth, No. 2004-CA-001981-MR, 2006 BL 43559 (Ky. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2006) reinstating the judgment in Unpublished Opinion or Order 5 Padilla v. Commonwealth, No. 2004- CA-001981-MR, 2006 BL 43559 (Ky. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2006) vacating the order and remanding the case in Unpublished Opinion or Order

Citation Analysis ( 1000 cases ) 1 DISCUSSED , Alcena v. Comm'r of Corr., 146 Conn. Quoted App. 370 (App. Ct. 2013) 2 DISTINGUISHED State v. Anderson, 2013-Ohio-4426 (App. 11th Dist. 2013) 3 CITED Carrillo v. Holder, 12-71179., Agency No. A070-915-954, 2013 BL 277825 (9th Cir. Oct. 07, 2013) 4 CITED People v. Avila, No. F065507, 2013 BL 274044 (Cal. App. 5th Dist. Oct. 03, 2013)

Citation Analysis ( 1000 cases ) 5 DISTINGUISHED Tena-Corral v. State, No. 3-649 / 12-2237, 2013 BL 270500 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 02, 2013) 6 DISCUSSED , State v. Blanco, No. A-1725-11T3, Quoted 2013 BL 270730 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Oct. 02, 2013) 7 DISCUSSED De Jesus Bermudez v. Holder, 12-72042., Agency No. A039-729-898, 2013 BL 271664 (9th Cir. Sept. 30, 2013) 8 CITED , Quoted Stroud v. Lester, No. 10-2624-STA- cgc, 2013 BL 266945 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 30, 2013) 9 CITED , Quoted Ainooson v. Gelb, CIVIL ACTION NO. 11-11002-WGY, 2013 BL 267125 (D. Mass. Sept. 30, 2013) 10 CITED People v. Bonilla, 2013 NY Slip Op 51597[U], 2013 BL 274469 (Sup. Ct. Sept. 30, 2013) 11 DISTINGUISHED State v. Trachman, 2013-Ohio-4409 (App. 7th Dist. 2013) 12 CITED , Quoted Nichols v. Bell, NO. 1:10-cv-146, 2013 BL 264361 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 27, 2013)

13 CITED Santana v. Holder, No. 12-2270, 2013 BL 264550 (1st Cir. Sept. 27, 2013) 14 CITED , Quoted State v. Silvera, No. Court of Appeals Nos. A-11174, A-11193, A-11195, 2013 BL 263749 (Alaska Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2013) 15 CITED , Quoted Ray v. Thomas, No. CIVIL ACTION 11-0543-WS-N., 2013 BL 264142 (S.D. Ala. Sept. 27, 2013) 16 CITED , Quoted Williams v. Branker, NO. 5:99-HC-123- F., 2013 BL 263989 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 27, 2013) 17 CITED , Quoted United States v. Sidhana, No. 04-430 (FSH), 2013 BL 263452 (D.N.J. Sept. 26, 2013)

Citation Analysis ( 1000 cases ) 18 CITED , Quoted Bowman v. Lee, No. 10-CV-951 (ERK), 2013 BL 262390 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2013) 19 CITED People v. Soodoo, 2013 NY Slip Op 06034, 2013 BL 257446 (App Div, 2d Dept Sept. 25, 2013) 20 CITED , Quoted Bennett v. United States, Case No. CV613-083, CR604-016, 2013 BL 258666 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 25, 2013) 21 DISTINGUISHED , Ex parte Tavakkoli, No. 09-13-00082- Quoted CR, 2013 BL 257135 (Tex. App.- Beaumont Sept. 25, 2013) 22 CITED , Quoted Miller v. State, No. 94, September Term, 2012, 2013 BL 259253 (Md. Sept. 25, 2013) 23 CITED , Quoted Atkinson v. United States, File No. 1:12-cv-831, 2013 BL 258482 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 25, 2013) 24 CITED People v. Sibbu, No. A136486, 2013 BL 261538 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. Sept. 25, 2013) 25 DISCUSSED , Miller v. State, No. 94, September Quoted Term, 2012, 2013 BL 259253 (Md. Sept. 25, 2013) 26 CITED People v. Contreras, No. E057231, 2013 BL 256786 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. Sept. 24, 2013) 27 DISCUSSED , Chacon v. State, No. WD 75646, 2013 Quoted BL 257065 (Mo. App. W.D. Sept. 24, 2013) 28 CITED , Quoted State v. Osorio-Nicolas, No. 68542-2- I, 2013 BL 255257 (Wash. App. Div. 1 Sept. 23, 2013) 29 CITED Gregory v. United States, No. Nos.: 2:10-cv-124;, 2:05-cr-64(1), 2013 BL 254423 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 23, 2013) 30 CITED , Quoted People v. Carranco, No. H032412, 2013 BL 255039 (Cal. App. 6th Dist. Sept. 23, 2013)

Citation Analysis ( 1000 cases ) 31 DISCUSSED People v. Williamson, No. F064010, 2013 BL 255041 (Cal. App. 5th Dist. Sept. 23, 2013) 32 CITED , Quoted United States v. Clark, CRIMINAL ACTION No. 10-20076-12-KHV, CIVIL ACTION No. 12-2551-KHV, 2013 BL 254721 (D. Kan. Sept. 23, 2013) 33 DISCUSSED Ross v. United States, No. 5:12- cv-124-RLV, (5:94-cr-5-RLV-1), 2013 BL 252713 (W.D.N.C Sept. 20, 2013) 34 CITED , Quoted Ex parte Alvarado, No. 10-12-00343- CR, 2013 BL 252350 (Tex. App.-Waco Sept. 19, 2013) 35 CITED , Quoted Czerkies v. Rapelje, No. 12-CV-11204, 2013 BL 251839 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 19, 2013) 36 DISCUSSED , Loden v. Epps, No. CIVIL ACTION Quoted NO.: 1:10CV311-NBB, 2013 BL 250685 (N.D. Miss. Sept. 18, 2013) 37 DISTINGUISHED , People v. De Lama, No. E055370, Quoted 2013 BL 250889 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. Sept. 18, 2013) 38 CITED People v. Reyes, No. F064435, 2013 BL 250815 (Cal. App. 5th Dist. Sept. 17, 2013) 39 CITED , Quoted United States v. Dyess, No. 11-7335, 2013 BL 245325 (4th Cir. Sept. 16, 2013) 40 CITED , (See) United States v. Dyess, No. 11-7335, 2013 BL 245325 (4th Cir. Sept. 16, 2013) 41 DISTINGUISHED , State v. Luna, No. A-5480-10T3, 2013 Quoted BL 248245 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 13, 2013) 42 DISCUSSED , Commonwealth v. Sylvain, 466 Mass. Quoted 422 (2013) 43 DISTINGUISHED , Vazquez-Villanueva v. United States, Quoted CASE NO. C12-2270-MJP, 2013 BL 243656 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 12, 2013)

Citation Analysis ( 1000 cases ) 44 CITED , Quoted Hardy v. Birkett, No. 2:10-CV-14310, 2013 BL 241935 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 11, 2013) 45 CITED Maness v. United States, No. NOS. 2:10-cv-84, 2:08-cr-58(7), 2013 BL 242243 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 11, 2013) 46 DISCUSSED State v. Rodriguez, No. A-5919-11T1, 2013 BL 245455 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 10, 2013) 47 CITED State v. Datus, No. A-1480-10T2, 2013 BL 245457 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 10, 2013) 48 DISCUSSED , People v. Navas, 2013 NY Slip Op Quoted 51517[U], 2013 BL 244905 (Sup. Ct. Sept. 09, 2013) 49 DISTINGUISHED People v. Marcoll, 2013 NY Slip Op 51486[U], 2013 BL 241162 (App Term, 1st Dept Sept. 09, 2013) 50 CITED , Quoted People v. Hartway, No. C066249, 2013 BL 238170 (Cal. App. 3d Dist. Sept. 06, 2013) 51 DISCUSSED , United States v. Carracelas-Mendez, Quoted No. CV 13-0699 MV/WPL, CR 98-0915 MV, 2013 BL 237959 (D.N.M. Sept. 06, 2013) 52 CITED Pinero v. Warden, 2013 Ct. Sup. 2152 53 DISCUSSED , State v. Carter, No. 3-675 / 12-1938, Quoted 2013 BL 236551 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 05, 2013) 54 CITED State v. Rodriguez, No. A-0503-11T4, 2013 BL 245486 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 05, 2013) 55 CITED United States v. Gkanios, 12-16279 Non-Argument Calendar., D.C. Docket No. 0:12-cv-60423-JIC, 2013 BL 233964 (11th Cir. Sept. 04, 2013) 56 DISCUSSED , Heard v. Addison, No. 12-5060, 2013 Quoted BL 235049 (10th Cir. Sept. 04, 2013)

Citation Analysis ( 1000 cases ) 57 CITED , Quoted Ex parte Rodriguez, No. 09-13-00148- CR, 2013 BL 234211 (Tex. App.- Beaumont Sept. 04, 2013) 58 DISCUSSED , Pugh v. Klee, No. 2:11-CV-10904, Quoted 2013 BL 233398 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 03, 2013) 59 CITED , Quoted United States v. Harris, Criminal Action No. 3:08-CR-491., Civil Action No. 3:12-CV-127., 2013 BL 233805 (E.D. Va. Sept. 03, 2013) 60 CITED United States v. Norvell, No. 12-3415, 2013 BL 233485 (8th Cir. Sept. 03, 2013) 61 DISCUSSED , Kurdi v. United States, No. 3:10- Quoted cv-408-RJC, 3:07-cr-56-RJC-1, 2013 BL 235316 (W.D.N.C Sept. 03, 2013) 62 CITED , Quoted United States v. Abou-Khodr, No. 99- CV-81073, 2013 BL 232903 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 30, 2013) 63 CITED , Quoted Mata-Guevara v. State, No. 04-12-00436-CR, 2013 BL 232006 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Aug. 30, 2013)

64 DISCUSSED Young v. United States, No. Case Nos. 4:06-cr-14, 4:10-cv-72., 2013 BL 232755 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 30, 2013) 65 CITED Banjoko v. United States, 13-11139 Non-Argument Calendar., D.C. Docket No. 8:13-cv-00210-SDM-EAJ, 2013 BL 232342 (11th Cir. Aug. 30, 2013) 66 CITED , Quoted Swanigan v. Rivard, No. 4:12- CV-11858, 2013 BL 230718 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2013) 67 CITED , Quoted Hall v. Capello, No. 10-14165, 2013 BL 231193 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2013) 68 DISCUSSED People v. Baboocall, 2013 NY Slip Op 51424[U], 2013 BL 233482 (Sup. Ct. Aug. 29, 2013) 69 CITED , Quoted Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 2013 PA Super 243

Citation Analysis ( 1000 cases ) 70 CITED , (See) Docherty v. United States, Case No. 11-2230., 2013 BL 230759 (6th Cir. Aug. 28, 2013) 71 DISCUSSED Onate v. State, No. M2013-00531- CCA-R3-PC, 2013 BL 229817 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 28, 2013) 72 CITED , Quoted Oshodi v. Holder, No. 08-71478, 2013 BL 228051 (9th Cir. Aug. 27, 2013) 73 DISCUSSED , Ex parte Tanklevskaya, No. Quoted 01-10-00627-CR, 2013 BL 227612 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 27, 2013) 74 DISCUSSED , Ex parte Obi, No. 01-12-01003-CR, Quoted 2013 BL 227603 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 27, 2013) 75 DISCUSSED Sayles v. United States, Civil No. 12-1644., Criminal No. 09-273., 2013 BL 228639 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 27, 2013) 76 CITED United States v. Graham, Case No. 99-10023-JTM, 2013 BL 228743 (D. Kan. Aug. 27, 2013) 77 DISTINGUISHED , People v. Figari, 2013 NY Slip Op Quoted 51369[U], 2013 BL 225922 (Sup. Ct. Aug. 23, 2013) 78 CITED , Quoted United States v. Young, CRIMINAL ACTION No. 10-20076-07-KHV, CIVIL ACTION No. 12-2487-KHV, 2013 BL 225585 (D. Kan. Aug. 23, 2013) 79 CITED Wilson v. United States, 11-15294 Non-Argument Calendar., D.C. Docket No. 0:11-cv-60614-KAM;, 0:96- cr-06208-WJZ-3, 2013 BL 226543 (11th Cir. Aug. 23, 2013) 80 DISCUSSED Jones v. State, No. 3-465 / 12-0706, 2013 BL 223255 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 21, 2013) 81 DISTINGUISHED , Saksena v. Comm'r of Corr., 145 Conn. Quoted App. 152 (App. Ct. 2013)

Citation Analysis ( 1000 cases ) 82 CITED , (See) Orozco v. United States, Civ. Act. No. 2:12-CV-07405(DMC)., 2013 BL 220817 (D.N.J. Aug. 20, 2013) 83 CITED United States v. Beltran-Jimenez, 12-10205., D.C. No. 4:10-cr-00948- CKJ, 2013 BL 220377 (9th Cir. Aug. 19, 2013) 84 DISCUSSED , Ex parte Ruiz, No. 05-13-00534-CR, Quoted 2013 BL 221613 (Tex. App.-Dallas Aug. 16, 2013) 85 DISCUSSED Coombs v. Holder, 10-72922., Agency No. A037-333-016, 2013 BL 217947 (9th Cir. Aug. 16, 2013) 86 DISTINGUISHED , Grider v. Commonwealth, No. 2010- Quoted CA-002171-MR, 2013 BL 218401 (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 16, 2013) 87 CITED Escobar v. Chrisman, 13-6113., (D.C. No. 5:12-CV-00723-C) (W.D. Okla.), 2013 BL 212350 (10th Cir. Aug. 14, 2013) 88 DISTINGUISHED , Ex parte Trungly, No. 09-12-00311-CR, Quoted 2013 BL 214140 (Tex. App.-Beaumont Aug. 14, 2013) 89 CITED , (See, Hodges v. Colson, No. 09-5021, 2013 e.g.) , Quoted BL 212699 (6th Cir. Aug. 14, 2013) 90 CITED , Quoted Hodges v. Colson, No. 09-5021, 2013 BL 212699 (6th Cir. Aug. 14, 2013) 91 DISTINGUISHED , Gonzalez v. Comm'r of Corr., 145 Quoted Conn. App. 28 (App. Ct. 2013) 92 DISCUSSED , State v. Williams, No. A-1074-11T1, Quoted 2013 BL 245655 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 12, 2013) 93 CITED Ex parte Olvera, No. 05-11-01349-CR, 2013 BL 209079 (Tex. App.-Dallas Aug. 12, 2013) 94 CITED Cress v. State, No. A12-2261, 2013 BL 211198 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 12, 2013)

Citation Analysis ( 1000 cases ) 95 DISTINGUISHED People v. Patterson, 2013 NY Slip Op 31901[U], 2013 BL 218000 (Sup. Ct. Aug. 09, 2013) 96 CITED , Quoted Garcia v. Palmer, No. 10-2685, 2013 BL 217499 (6th Cir. Aug. 09, 2013) 97 CITED Govereh v. United States, CRIMINAL NO. 1:07-cr-0131-JEC-RGV-1., CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:12-cv-0403-JEC-RGV., 2013 BL 208189 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 09, 2013) 98 DISCUSSED , Cabantac v. Holder, No. Nos. Quoted 09-71336, 12-71459[fn*], 2013 BL 209741 (9th Cir. Aug. 09, 2013) 99 CITED State v. Mercado, No. A-6354-11T3, 2013 BL 245678 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 09, 2013) 100 CITED United States v. Seaman, No. CV 12-572 TUC DCB(BPV)., 2013 BL 211341 (D. Ariz. Aug. 08, 2013) 101 CITED Khodr v. Holder, No. 12-3769, 2013 BL 217356 (6th Cir. Aug. 08, 2013) 102 DISCUSSED , People v. Martinez, 57 Cal.4th 555, Quoted 160 Cal.Rptr.3d 37, 304 P.3d 529 (2013) 103 CITED , Quoted State v. Walker, 2013 UT App 198 104 CITED , Quoted Casner v. Valenzuela, Case No. 1:10- cv-01081-SKO-HC, 2013 BL 216683 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 07, 2013) 105 CITED , Quoted Santos v. Frederick Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs, No. 12-1980, 2013 BL 216742 (4th Cir. Aug. 07, 2013) 106 DISCUSSED Dillon v. State, No. 3-609 / 12-1200, 2013 BL 216385 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 07, 2013) 107 CITED Brizard v. United States, No. 11 Civ. 6033 (JGK), 2013 BL 216573 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 07, 2013) 108 DISCUSSED , Crawford v. McCall, No. 2:12-cv-2795- Quoted RMG, 2013 BL 208826 (D.S.C. Aug. 06, 2013)

Citation Analysis ( 1000 cases ) 109 CITED , (See) Odelugo v. State, No. 01-12-00521- CR, 2013 BL 215627 (Tex. App.- Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 06, 2013) 110 DISCUSSED Ex parte Mandujano, No. 01-12-00922- CR, 2013 BL 215637 (Tex. App.- Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 06, 2013) 111 CITED , (See) McHenry v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., No. CASE NO: 8:13-CV-517-T-30TGW., 2013 BL 215831 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 06, 2013) 112 DISTINGUISHED , People v. Finch, 2013 NY Slip Op Quoted 32205[U], 2013 BL 254643 (Sup. Ct. Aug. 06, 2013) 113 CITED Cossio v. United States, Case No. 2:11-cv-471-FtM-29UAM., 2:09-cr-90- FtM-29SPC., 2013 BL 205981 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 02, 2013) 114 DISCUSSED , Cole v. United States, Civ. Action No. (See, e.g.) 12-1479, Crim. Action No. 07-284, Crim. Action No. 08-343, 2013 BL 206100 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 02, 2013) 115 CITED State v. Isa, 2013-Ohio-3382 (App. 2d Dist. 2013) 116 DISCUSSED Ex parte Bright, No. 05-13-00349-CR, 2013 BL 206850 (Tex. App.-Dallas Aug. 02, 2013) 117 DISCUSSED State v. Osorio, 286 Neb. 384 (2013) 118 CITED United States v. Caramadre, CR. No. 11-186 S, 2013 BL 205378 (D.R.I. Aug. 01, 2013) 119 CITED Jiminez v. Holder, 11-56605., D.C. No. 3:10-cv-01528-JAH, 2013 BL 205726 (9th Cir. Aug. 01, 2013) 120 DISCUSSED , Ex parte Becerra, No. 14-12-00042- Quoted CR, 2013 BL 206506 (Tex. App.- Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 01, 2013) 121 CITED People v. Lyons, No. H038698, 2013 BL 203627 (Cal. App. 6th Dist. July 31, 2013)

Citation Analysis ( 1000 cases ) 122 CITED , Quoted King v. Romanowski, No. 2:11- CV-14037, 2013 BL 203527 (E.D. Mich. July 31, 2013) 123 DISTINGUISHED State v. Spivakov, 2013-Ohio-3343 (App. 10th Dist. 2013) 124 CITED , Quoted Wagner v. Klee, No. 2:06-CV-10514, 2013 BL 201676 (E.D. Mich. July 30, 2013) 125 CITED , Quoted People v. Carranco, No. H032412, 2013 BL 200697 (Cal. App. 6th Dist. July 29, 2013) 126 DISTINGUISHED , United States v. London, 13-6079., (See) (D.C. No. 5:00-CR-00004-L-2) (W.D. of Okla.), 2013 BL 201032 (10th Cir. July 29, 2013) 127 CITED State v. McDonald, No. A-4568-10T2, 2013 BL 245740 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 29, 2013) 128 DISCUSSED United States v. Lazala, CR. No. 08-141-S., 2013 BL 200545 (D.R.I. July 29, 2013) 129 CITED , Quoted People v. Hernandez, No. H031992, 2013 BL 200881 (Cal. App. 6th Dist. July 29, 2013) 130 DISCUSSED , Abbey v. United States, No. 09- Quoted CR-203S., 12-CV-595S., 2013 BL 200215 (W.D.N.Y. July 29, 2013) 131 DISCUSSED , State v. Figueroa, No. Nos. Quoted A-5732-10T4, A-0087-11T4, 2013 BL 245767 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 26, 2013) 132 DISCUSSED People v. Diaz, 970 N.Y.S.2d 444 (Sup. Ct. 2013) 133 CITED State v. Mades, No. A-5482-10T4, 2013 BL 245781 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 25, 2013) 134 CITED Rollie v. Falk, 13-1248., (D.C. No. 1:12-CV-02120-LTB) D. Colorado, 2013 BL 198424 (10th Cir. July 25, 2013)

Citation Analysis ( 1000 cases ) 135 CITED State v. Dominguez, No. A-5756-10T1, 2013 BL 245780 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 25, 2013) 136 DISCUSSED , Commonwealth v. Barndt, 2013 PA Quoted Super 206 137 CITED , Quoted Dar v. Olivares, Case No. 11-CV-213- JED-FHM., 2013 BL 197774 (N.D. Okla. July 25, 2013) 138 DISTINGUISHED , Ex parte Nieves, No. 08-11-00189-CR, Quoted 2013 BL 196316 (Tex. App.-El Paso July 24, 2013) 139 CITED Wong v. State, No. 3-433 / 12-0471, 2013 BL 195521 (Iowa Ct. App. July 24, 2013) 140 CITED Ex parte Marquez, No. WR-78,309-01, 2013 BL 196084 (Tex. Crim. App. July 24, 2013) 141 CITED People v. Andrews, 108 A.D.3d 727, 970 N.Y.S.2d 226 (App Div, 2d Dept 2013) 142 CITED Perez v. State, No. 4D12-1770, 2013 BL 195426 (Fla. 4th DCA July 24, 2013) 143 CITED Perez v. State, No. 4D12-1770, 2013 BL 195426 (Fla. 4th DCA July 24, 2013) 144 CITED , Quoted State v. Tykot, No. A-0487-10T4, 2013 BL 245791 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 24, 2013) 145 CITED Wajda v. Holder, No. 12-3978, 2013 BL 211809 (6th Cir. July 23, 2013) 146 DISCUSSED United States v. Chaidez, No. 03 CR 636-6, 2013 BL 194189 (N.D. Ill. July 22, 2013) 147 CITED People v. Lezama, 2013 NY Slip Op 31643[U], 2013 BL 198832 (Sup. Ct. July 22, 2013) 148 DISTINGUISHED Ikharo v. Dewine, Case No. 2:12- cv-00489., 2013 BL 193291 (S.D. Ohio July 22, 2013)

Citation Analysis ( 1000 cases ) 149 CITED , Quoted Thompson v. Parker, CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:11CV-31-R., 2013 BL 193232 (W.D. Ky. July 22, 2013) 150 DISCUSSED Lunan v. State, No. A12-2161, 2013 BL 193057 (Minn. Ct. App. July 22, 2013) 151 CITED , Quoted Rickenbacker v. United States, No. Criminal Case No.: RWT-08-0536., Civil Action No.: RWT-11-0502., 2013 BL 190173 (D. Md. July 18, 2013) 152 DISCUSSED Collins v. State, 2013 UT App 182 153 DISCUSSED , Odelugo v. State, No. 01-12-00272- Quoted CR, 2013 BL 190099 (Tex. App.- Houston [1st Dist.] July 18, 2013) 154 CITED , Quoted Garcia v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., Case No. 8:10-CV-2116-T-27MAP, 2013 BL 189121 (M.D. Fla. July 17, 2013) 155 DISTINGUISHED People v. Abreu, 2013 NY Slip Op 31735[U], 2013 BL 206977 (Sup. Ct. July 17, 2013) 156 DISCUSSED , People v. Burrell, 2013 NY Slip Op Quoted 51242[U], 2013 BL 202673 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. July 15, 2013) 157 CITED , Quoted People v. Caceras, 2013 NY Slip Op 51216[U], 2013 BL 198657 (Sup. Ct. July 12, 2013) 158 DISCUSSED , State v. Yuma, 286 Neb. 244, 835 Quoted N.W.2d 679 (2013) 159 CITED Kang v. Holder, 12-70676., Agency No. A035-375-789, 2013 BL 184801 (9th Cir. July 11, 2013) 160 CITED , Quoted Wash. v. McQuiggin, No. 11-1856, 2013 BL 183068 (6th Cir. July 11, 2013) 161 DISTINGUISHED People v. Bent, 108 A.D.3d 882, 968 N.Y.S.2d 734 (App Div, 3d Dept 2013)

162 CITED , Quoted Holiday v. Stephens, CIVIL ACTION NO. H-11-1696, 2013 BL 184366 (S.D. Tex. July 10, 2013)

Citation Analysis ( 1000 cases ) 163 DISCUSSED Gonzalez v. United States, 722 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2013) 164 CITED , Quoted Porter v. United States, Cv. No. 10-2477-JPM-dkv., Cr. No. 08-20111- JPM., 2013 BL 183783 (W.D. Tenn. July 10, 2013) 165 CITED Johnson v. State, 118 So. 3d 239 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) 166 DISCUSSED Spencer v. United States, No. 12- CV-6181(DMC), 2013 BL 182325 (D.N.J. July 09, 2013) 167 DISCUSSED , Commonwealth v. Escobar, 2013 PA Quoted Super 175, 70 A.3d 838 168 DISCUSSED Solano v. United States, No. 3:08- cr-154(1), 2013 BL 181472 (S.D. Ohio July 09, 2013) 169 CITED , Quoted Boyle v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., Case No. 3:10-cv-702-J-34TEM, 2013 BL 180369 (M.D. Fla. July 08, 2013) 170 CITED , Quoted Randle v. United States, No. 07-667, 2013 BL 181361 (E.D. Pa. July 08, 2013) 171 CITED , Quoted Dorsey v. United States, Civil No. PJM 11-0988., Criminal No. PJM 07-0404., 2013 BL 180523 (D. Md. July 08, 2013)

172 CITED , (See) Rodriguez-Rodriguez v. United States, CIVIL NO. 13-1235 (JA)., (CRIM. NO. 94-274 (DRD))., 2013 BL 180570 (D.P.R. July 08, 2013) 173 CITED United States v. Manjang, Case No. 1:07-cr-07., 2013 BL 180444 (S.D. Ohio July 08, 2013) 174 CITED Tomlinson v. Att'y Gen., No. 13-1348, 2013 BL 179708 (3d Cir. July 03, 2013)

175 CITED , Quoted Davis v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., Case No. 8:10-CV-1555-T-27TBM., 2013 BL 178275 (M.D. Fla. July 03, 2013)

Citation Analysis ( 1000 cases ) 176 CITED , Quoted Betts v. McKune, No. 11-3097-SAC, 2013 BL 176925 (D. Kan. July 02, 2013) 177 DISCUSSED , Candelas v. State, No. 01-13-00007- Quoted CR, 2013 BL 176295 (Tex. App.- Houston [1st Dist.] July 02, 2013) 178 CITED Gonzalez v. United States, No. 12 Civ. 8261 (JFK), 2013 BL 175307 (S.D.N.Y. July 01, 2013) 179 CITED , Quoted Commonwealth v. Feliciano, 69 A.3d 1270 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013) 180 DISCUSSED United States v. Chaidez, No. 03 CR 636-6, 2013 BL 202511 (N.D. Ill. July 01, 2013) 181 CITED , Quoted United States v. Dolmuz-Carcamo, Cr. No. C-11-169., (Ca. No. C-12-333)., 2013 BL 175283 (S.D. Tex. July 01, 2013) 182 DISCUSSED , Al-Aridi v. Commonwealth, 404 S.W.3d Quoted 210 (Ky. Ct. App. 2013) 183 DISCUSSED , People v. King, 2013 NY Slip Op Quoted 31577[U], 2013 BL 192916 (Sup. Ct. June 28, 2013) 184 DISCUSSED People v. Verdejo, 109 A.D.3d 138, 967 N.Y.S.2d 729 (App Div, 1st Dept 2013) 185 CITED , (See) Bozelko v. Warden, 2013 Ct. Sup. 1659 186 DISCUSSED , United States v. Ifenatuora, No. CR Quoted S-96-00088 GEB DAD P, 2013 BL 171727 (E.D. Cal. June 26, 2013) 187 DISCUSSED , State v. Garcia, 2013 SD 46, 834 Quoted N.W.2d 821 188 CITED State v. Cantarero-Diaz, No. 3-445 / 12-1694, 2013 BL 168748 (Iowa Ct. App. June 26, 2013) 189 CITED , Quoted Al-Shimary v. Curtin, No. 2:12- CV-11126, 2013 BL 169669 (E.D. Mich. June 26, 2013)

Citation Analysis ( 1000 cases ) 190 DISCUSSED , Ex parte Morales, No. 01-12-00897- Quoted CR, 2013 BL 167040 (Tex. App.- Houston [1st Dist.] June 25, 2013) 191 DISTINGUISHED Garcia-Henriquez v. Holder, No. 11-4187-ag, 2013 BL 169148 (2d Cir. June 25, 2013) 192 CITED Ex parte Ramos, No. 14-12-00739-CR, 2013 BL 167054 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] June 25, 2013) 193 CITED , Quoted People v. Johnson, No. H037644, 2013 BL 169653 (Cal. App. 6th Dist. June 25, 2013) 194 CITED , Quoted Hailey v. Woods, CASE NO. 2:12- CV-11896., 2013 BL 223595 (E.D. Mich. June 25, 2013) 195 CITED , (See Chrishon v. United States, No. 4:10- also) , Quoted CV-1489 (CEJ), 2013 BL 166203 (E.D. Mo. June 24, 2013) 196 CITED Balcazar v. State, 116 So. 3d 575 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) 197 DISCUSSED Chhabra v. United States, 720 F.3d 395 (2d Cir. 2013) 198 CITED Lipscomb v. State, C.A. No. PM 2010-3377, 2013 BL 164085 (R.I. Super. June 20, 2013) 199 CITED , (See Rabess v. State, 115 So. 3d 1079 (Fla. generally) 4th DCA 2013) 200 DISTINGUISHED , Taylor v. State, 745 S.E.2d 97 (S.C. Quoted 2013) 201 DISCUSSED People v. Galarza, No. B242992, 2013 BL 163160 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. June 19, 2013) 202 DISTINGUISHED , Ex parte Luna, No. 01-13-00054-CR, Quoted 2013 BL 159484 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] June 18, 2013) 203 CITED , Quoted Ford v. McKinney, No. 11-CV-3009- DEO, 2013 BL 160383 (N.D. Iowa June 18, 2013)

Citation Analysis ( 1000 cases ) 204 CITED , Quoted James v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., Case No. 3:10-cv-731-J-34JRK, 2013 BL 158783 (M.D. Fla. June 17, 2013) 205 DISCUSSED , United States v. Villa-Gutierrez, No. Quoted 8:07CR112, 2013 BL 157635 (D. Neb. June 14, 2013) 206 CITED Perdomo v. Att'y Gen., No. 12-2953, 2013 BL 158352 (3d Cir. June 14, 2013) 207 CITED In re Ifenatuora, No. 10-1492, 2013 BL 157285 (4th Cir. June 14, 2013) 208 DISCUSSED , Alcorn v. State, No. SC11-1322, 2013 (See) BL 155851 (Fla. June 13, 2013) 209 CITED Ex parte Sudhakar, No. 14-11-00701- CR, 2013 BL 155547 (Tex. App.- Houston [14th Dist.] June 13, 2013) 210 CITED Jian Tian Lin v. United States, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:12-CV-813-H., 2013 BL 156402 (W.D. Ky. June 13, 2013) 211 DISCUSSED Ex parte Martinez, No. 13-10-00390- CR, 2013 BL 156507 (Tex. App.- Corpus Christi June 13, 2013) 212 DISTINGUISHED , United States v. Moran, No. 2:10- Quoted CR-575 JCM (VCF), 2013 BL 156535 (D. Nev. June 13, 2013) 213 CITED , Quoted McKoy v. Gray, No. 5:12-HC-2076-D, 2013 BL 154700 (E.D.N.C. June 12, 2013) 214 CITED Ex parte Gomez, No. 01-12-00972-CR, 2013 BL 155118 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] June 11, 2013) 215 CITED , (See also) United States v. Rivera, No. 09- CR-619 (SJF)., 2013 BL 153338 (E.D.N.Y. June 11, 2013) 216 CITED , Quoted Johnson v. Heath, No. 11 CV 6270 (ERK), 2013 BL 153361 (E.D.N.Y. June 11, 2013) 217 DISCUSSED Ikharo v. Dewine, CASE NO. 2:12- CV-489., 2013 BL 153293 (S.D. Ohio June 11, 2013)

Citation Analysis ( 1000 cases ) 218 CITED , Quoted Patterson v. United States, Civil Action No. DKC 10-3093, Criminal Case No. DKC 08-0393, 2013 BL 152038 (D. Md. June 10, 2013) 219 DISCUSSED People v. Cabrera, No. G045917, 2013 BL 152456 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. June 10, 2013) 220 CITED , (See also) Valle-Iglesias v. United States, No. CV-10-3223., 2013 BL 150244 (E.D.N.Y. June 07, 2013) 221 CITED , Quoted United States v. Reed, 719 F.3d 369 (5th Cir. 2013) 222 CITED Changar v. United States, No. CV-10-3123., 2013 BL 147342 (E.D.N.Y. June 05, 2013) 223 DISTINGUISHED , Ex parte Rodriguez-Grimaldo, No. (See) 03-12-00019-CR, 2013 BL 150950 (Tex. App.-Austin June 05, 2013) 224 CITED Ex parte Bazaldua, No. WR-78,452-01, 2013 BL 148856 (Tex. Crim. App. June 05, 2013) 225 CITED Ex parte Muniz, No. WR-76,766-01, 2013 BL 148841 (Tex. Crim. App. June 05, 2013) 226 DISTINGUISHED State v. Guerrero, 400 S.W.3d 576 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) 227 CITED , Quoted Facyson v. Pennsylvania, No. 1:12- cv-1549, 2013 BL 147287 (M.D. Pa. June 05, 2013) 228 CITED , Quoted Whipple v. State, No. A12-1713, 2013 BL 145987 (Minn. Ct. App. June 03, 2013) 229 CITED Chambers v. State, 831 N.W.2d 311 (Minn. 2013) 230 CITED Chambers v. State, 831 N.W.2d 311 (Minn. 2013) 231 CITED , Quoted Robinson v. Secretary, Florida Dept. of Corrections, Case No. 3:10-cv-791- J-34MCR., 2013 BL 143670 (M.D. Fla. May 31, 2013)

Citation Analysis ( 1000 cases ) 232 DISCUSSED People v. Vatic, 2013 NY Slip Op 50909[U], 2013 BL 148641 (Sup. Ct. May 31, 2013) 233 DISCUSSED , United States v. Curran, No. 12-2049, Quoted 2013 BL 143150 (3d Cir. May 31, 2013) 234 DISCUSSED Lopez v. Holder, No. 12-60610 Summary Calendar, 2013 BL 143015 (5th Cir. May 31, 2013) 235 DISTINGUISHED People v. Singh, No. F063231, 2013 BL 141274 (Cal. App. 5th Dist. May 30, 2013) 236 CITED , (See) Collier v. Hartey, No. C 12-1764 JSW (PR), 2013 BL 142728 (N.D. Cal. May 30, 2013) 237 CITED , Quoted Baldwin v. Jackson, No. 1:11CV1035, 2013 BL 141114 (M.D.N.C. May 30, 2013) 238 CITED , (See) Ex parte Weldezion, No. 05-13-00177- CR, 2013 BL 144078 (Tex. App.-Dallas May 29, 2013) 239 DISCUSSED , United States v. Martinez, Case No. Quoted 2:99-cr-038-KJD-RJJ, 2013 BL 140271 (D. Nev. May 28, 2013) 240 DISTINGUISHED Ramos v. State, No. A12-2145, 2013 BL 141006 (Minn. Ct. App. May 28, 2013) 241 DISCUSSED Pantoja-Coronado v. State, No. A12-0952, 2013 BL 140978 (Minn. Ct. App. May 28, 2013) 242 CITED United States v. Brown, Criminal Action No. 3:01-CR-304-12., Civil Action No. 3:12-CV-553., 2013 BL 139149 (E.D. Va. May 28, 2013) 243 DISCUSSED , Cheatham v. Warren, No. 11-14855, Quoted 2013 BL 138470 (E.D. Mich. May 28, 2013) 244 DISCUSSED State v. Gonnzalez, 285 Neb. 940, 830 N.W.2d 504 (2013) 245 DISCUSSED State v. Tejeda-Acosta, 2013 Ark. 217

Citation Analysis ( 1000 cases ) 246 CITED People v. Van Coutren, No. B240800, 2013 BL 136203 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. May 23, 2013) 247 DISCUSSED , State v. Tejeda-Acosta, 2013 Ark. 217 Quoted 248 CITED , Quoted Jones v. Trammell, Case No. CIV-07-1290-D, 2013 BL 136428 (W.D. Okla. May 22, 2013) 249 CITED Wills v. Barkowski, Civil Action No. 11-2110 (FLW), 2013 BL 134774 (D.N.J. May 22, 2013) 250 DISCUSSED Foster v. United States, NO. 5:08- CR-87-FL., NO. 5:11-CV-439-FL., 2013 BL 135895 (E.D.N.C. May 22, 2013) 251 CITED Moore v. Singh, No. 2:11-cv-2718 CKD P, 2013 BL 135126 (E.D. Cal. May 21, 2013) 252 DISTINGUISHED , People v. Litonjua, No. E056854, 2013 Quoted BL 133805 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. May 21, 2013) 253 CITED Ex parte Aguilar, No. 14-11-00227-CR, 2013 BL 135335 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] May 21, 2013) 254 CITED , Quoted Smith v. Thaler, No. 12-10435, 2013 BL 133827 (5th Cir. May 21, 2013) 255 CITED Phillips v. United States, No. 3:13- cv-287-FDW, (3:06-cr-118-FDW-2), 2013 BL 132774 (W.D.N.C May 20, 2013) 256 DISCUSSED United States v. Pinet, Criminal Action No. 00-10402-JLT-19, 2013 BL 133898 (D. Mass. May 20, 2013) 257 CITED Esparza-Recendez v. Holder, No. 12-9564, 2013 BL 132800 (10th Cir. May 20, 2013) 258 CITED , Quoted Tetreau v. Klee, No. 2:10-CV-14475, 2013 BL 129174 (E.D. Mich. May 16, 2013)

Citation Analysis ( 1000 cases ) 259 DISCUSSED , City of Parma v. Benedict, 2013- Quoted Ohio-1990 (App. 8th Dist. 2013) 260 DISCUSSED , Ex parte Arjona, 402 S.W.3d 312 (Tex. Quoted App.-Beaumont 2013) 261 DISCUSSED , United States v. Gomez, Case No. Quoted 12-20802-Civ-COOKE/TURNOFF., 2013 BL 129002 (S.D. Fla. May 15, 2013) 262 CITED , (See) , United States v. Ramirez-Jimenez, Quoted No. 2:08-cr-0509 MCE KJN, 2013 BL 129658 (E.D. Cal. May 15, 2013) 263 CITED In re J.C., No. 04-12-00386-CV, 2013 BL 130474 (Tex. App.-San Antonio May 15, 2013) 264 DISCUSSED Berroa v. Attorney General, No. 12-4324, 2013 BL 127827 (3d Cir. May 14, 2013) 265 DISTINGUISHED Pacheco v. State, No. Nos. 07-11-00217-CR, 07-11-00218-CR, 2013 BL 130463 (Tex. App.-Amarillo May 14, 2013) 266 CITED , Quoted Gonzalez v. Commissioner of Correction, 308 Conn. 463, 68 A.3d 624 (2013) 267 CITED , Quoted Meek v. Bergh, No. 12-176, 2013 BL 128146 (6th Cir. May 14, 2013) 268 DISTINGUISHED , Commonwealth v. McDermitt, 2013 PA Quoted Super 113, 66 A.3d 810 269 CITED Akande v. Warden, 2013 Ct. Sup. 1307

270 DISCUSSED Puentes-Garcia v. United States, Civil No. 12-cv-1184-JPG, Criminal No 03- cr-30181-JPG, 2013 BL 125366 (S.D. Ill. May 13, 2013) 271 DISCUSSED Bezuidenhout v. State, No. M2012-01114-CCA-R3-PC, 2013 BL 127829 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 13, 2013) 272 DISCUSSED State v. Sarabia-Flores, 48 Kan. App. 2d 932, 300 P.3d 644 (Ct. App. 2013)

Citation Analysis ( 1000 cases ) 273 DISCUSSED , Barajas v. State, 987 N.E.2d 176 (Ind. Quoted Ct. App. 2013) 274 CITED , Quoted Smith v. United States, 7:07-CR-101- BR-1., No. 7:11-CV-229-BR, 2013 BL 125742 (E.D.N.C. May 10, 2013) 275 CITED , (See) , State v. Hicks, 2013-Ohio-1904 (App. Quoted 8th Dist. 2013) 276 DISTINGUISHED Eley v. United States, Case No. 4:10- CV-1529 (CEJ)., 2013 BL 123808 (E.D. Mo. May 09, 2013) 277 DISCUSSED , Ex parte Gonzalez, 402 S.W.3d 843 (See) (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2013) 278 DISCUSSED , Hamm v. State, 403 S.C. 461, 744 Quoted S.E.2d 503 (2013) 279 DISTINGUISHED , Larbi v. United States, Civil No. Quoted RDB-12-1312., Criminal No. RDB-05-0088., 2013 BL 123550 (D. Md. May 08, 2013) 280 DISCUSSED Persaud v. Warden, 2013 Ct. Sup. 1396 281 CITED , Quoted United States v. Brinson-Scott, 714 F.3d 616 (D.C. Cir. 2013) 282 CITED United States v. Fazio, No. 2:09- cr-325, 2013 BL 120768 (W.D. Pa. May 07, 2013) 283 CITED , (See) Green v. Warden, 2013 Ct. Sup. 1276 284 CITED , (See) Cintron-Boglio v. United States, No. CIVIL 13-1225 (DRD)., CRIMINAL 08-0204(DRD)., 2013 BL 120242 (D.P.R. May 06, 2013) 285 DISCUSSED Haggerty v. Burns, No. 2:13-cv-100., 2013 BL 119551 (W.D. Pa. May 06, 2013) 286 CITED , Quoted United States v. Fisher, Criminal Action No. 5:10CR00037, Civil Action No. 5:12CV80545, 2013 BL 119630 (W.D. Va. May 03, 2013) 287 CITED Brown v. United States, No. 4:13cv41, 2013 BL 116323 (E.D. Va. May 02, 2013)

Citation Analysis ( 1000 cases ) 288 DISCUSSED , People v. Wright, 2013 NY Slip Op Quoted 31365[U], 2013 BL 179621 (Sup. Ct. May 02, 2013) 289 CITED United States v. Montes-Flores, No. 2:10-cr-21-JMS-CMM-02., 2013 BL 118364 (S.D. Ind. May 02, 2013) 290 DISCUSSED People v. Bedier, No. B241606, 2013 BL 117339 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. May 02, 2013) 291 CITED United States v. Montes-Florse, No. 2:11-cr-32-JMS-CMM-01., 2013 BL 118370 (S.D. Ind. May 02, 2013) 292 DISCUSSED Garcia v. United States, No. 4:12- CV-519 CAS, 2013 BL 117091 (E.D. Mo. May 02, 2013) 293 CITED , Quoted Ross v. Wolfe, CIVIL NO. JKB-11-1672., 2013 BL 116332 (D. Md. May 01, 2013) 294 DISCUSSED , Garba v. United States, CIVIL ACTION Quoted NO. 10-4445 (MLC)., 2013 BL 114844 (D.N.J. Apr. 30, 2013) 295 CITED Brizard v. United States, No. 11 Civ. 6033 (JGK), 2013 BL 114905 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2013) 296 DISCUSSED State v. Martinez-Leon, 174 Wn. App. 753, 300 P.3d 481 (App. Div. 2 2013) 297 DISCUSSED United States v. Garcia, 517 Fed. Appx. 920 (11th Cir. 2013) 298 CITED , Quoted Guyton v. United States, No. CV412-241, 2013 BL 113195 (S.D. Ga. Apr. 29, 2013) 299 CITED Llanes v. United States, 517 Fed. Appx. 889 (11th Cir. 2013) 300 DISCUSSED , People v. Santos, 40 Misc. 3d 400, 969 Quoted N.Y.S.2d 390 (Sup. Ct. 2013) 301 CITED , (See also) Washington v. Hall, No. 1:11-CV-764, 2013 BL 111867 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 26, 2013) 302 CITED Cano v. State, 112 So. 3d 646 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)

Citation Analysis ( 1000 cases ) 303 CITED Ex parte Enyong, 397 S.W.3d 208 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) 304 CITED Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 185 L. Ed. 2d 727 (2013) 305 CITED , Quoted Comer v. Warden, CASE NO. 2:13- CV-0003., 2013 BL 108683 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 22, 2013) 306 CITED United States v. Morales, 516 Fed. Appx. 654 (9th Cir. 2013) 307 CITED Saintaude v. United States, No. Civil Action No: SA-13-CA-144-XR., 2013 BL 108672 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 22, 2013) 308 DISTINGUISHED Amador-Flores v. Holder, No. 12-60493 Summary Calendar, 2013 BL 107497 (5th Cir. Apr. 22, 2013) 309 CITED , (See, e.g.) Whyte v. United States, No. Criminal No.: RDB-10-0212., Civil Action No.: RDB-12-1141., 2013 BL 104535 (D. Md. Apr. 19, 2013) 310 DISCUSSED Krynski v. Connecticut Adult Probation Servs., 2013 Ct. Sup. 1099, 56 Conn. L. Rptr. 5 311 DISTINGUISHED People v. Marshall, 2013 NY Slip Op 50614[U], 2013 BL 106949 (Sup. Ct. Apr. 19, 2013) 312 DISCUSSED , United States v. Ponce-Zuniga, 515 Quoted Fed. Appx. 693 (9th Cir. 2013) 313 DISCUSSED State v. Arrunategui, 2013-Ohio-1525 (App. 9th Dist. 2013) 314 CITED , (See) Harvey v. Attorney General, No. 12-3681, 2013 BL 103284 (3d Cir. Apr. 17, 2013) 315 CITED In re Barera, No. F064000, 2013 BL 103329 (Cal. App. 5th Dist. Apr. 17, 2013) 316 CITED Ex parte Sudhakar, No. PD-0220-13, 2013 BL 104811 (Tex. Crim. App. Apr. 17, 2013) 317 CITED Jackson v. State, 112 So. 3d 591 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)

Citation Analysis ( 1000 cases ) 318 DISTINGUISHED State v. Arrunategui, 2013-Ohio-1525 (App. 9th Dist. 2013) 319 CITED , Quoted Shah v. United States, No. 12 Civ. 6366 (WHP)., 10 Cr. 1169 (WHP)., 2013 BL 101524 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2013) 320 CITED Pick v. Florida 17th Judicial Circuit Court, Case No. 12-62500-CIV- ROSENBAUM/SELTZER, 2013 BL 99274 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 12, 2013) 321 CITED , Quoted Sanders v. Green, Civil Action No. DKC 10-2079., 2013 BL 100120 (D. Md. Apr. 12, 2013) 322 CITED , (See) People v. Bryant, 2013 NY Slip Op 23285, 2013 BL 272865 (Sup. Ct. Apr. 11, 2013) 323 DISCUSSED Chacko v. Attorney General, No. 12-1871, 2013 BL 98519 (3d Cir. Apr. 11, 2013) 324 PRIOR People v. Ahmadzai, No. G046631, OVERRULING , 2013 BL 98016 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. Quoted Apr. 11, 2013) 325 CITED , Quoted United States v. Freeman, Criminal Action No. 7:10CR00058., Civil Action No. 7:12CV80462., 2013 BL 98832 (W.D. Va. Apr. 11, 2013) 326 DISCUSSED Avina v. State, 832 N.W.2d 384 (Iowa Ct. App. 2013) 327 DISCUSSED Velazquez v. United States, No. CV-11-820-PHX-RCB(LOA), CR-97-361-PHX-RCB, 2013 BL 97739 (D. Ariz. Apr. 10, 2013) 328 CITED United States v. Vy Thi Thach, 515 Fed. Appx. 668 (9th Cir. 2013) 329 CITED , Quoted Burgess v. Booker, No. 10-2633, 2013 BL 95903 (6th Cir. Apr. 09, 2013) 330 DISTINGUISHED People v. Richey, No. G046919, 2013 BL 94321 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. Apr. 08, 2013)

Citation Analysis ( 1000 cases ) 331 CITED Deleon-Gallegos v. Holder, No. 12-60297 Summary Calendar, 2013 BL 94728 (5th Cir. Apr. 08, 2013) 332 DISCUSSED , Tengben v. State, No. A12-1539, 2013 Quoted BL 94801 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 08, 2013) 333 DISTINGUISHED , Jacobson v. United States, Civil Action Quoted No. 12-1258 (ES)., 2013 BL 119274 (D.N.J. Apr. 05, 2013) 334 CITED Rodriguez v. Attorney General, 517 Fed. Appx. 82 (3d Cir. 2013) 335 DISCUSSED United States v. De La Cruz-Trejo, 518 Fed. Appx. 286 (5th Cir. 2013) 336 DISCUSSED , United States v. Ruiz-Romero, No. Quoted 12-2074., (D. New Mexico) (D.C. Nos. 1:11-CV-00308-MV-ACT and, 2:95- CR-00650-MV-ACT-1), 2013 BL 93332 (10th Cir. Apr. 05, 2013) 337 PRIOR Marquez v. State, No. 11-12-00316- OVERRULING CR, 2013 BL 91896 (Tex. App.- Eastland Apr. 04, 2013) 338 CITED Waslaski v. State, 2013 ND 56, 828 N.W.2d 787 339 CITED Aguila v. United States, 515 Fed. Appx. 803 (11th Cir. 2013) 340 DISCUSSED Ex parte Garcia, No. 14-12-01082-CR, 2013 BL 90194 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 02, 2013) 341 CITED Ex parte Juarez, No. Nos. 14-12-00564-CR, 14-12-00565-CR, 14-12-00566-CR, 2013 BL 90195 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 02, 2013) 342 DISCUSSED United States v. Cabezas, Criminal Action No. 85-00276-JLT., 2013 BL 89832 (D. Mass. Apr. 02, 2013) 343 DISTINGUISHED Millan-Portela v. Holder, 514 Fed. Appx. 687 (9th Cir. 2013)

Citation Analysis ( 1000 cases ) 344 CITED , Quoted People v. Butler, No. C068341, 2013 BL 87725 (Cal. App. 3d Dist. Mar. 29, 2013) 345 CITED , Quoted Bilauski v. Steele, Case No. 4:09 CV 1983 RWS., 2013 BL 84516 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 29, 2013) 346 CITED , Quoted People v. White, No. C069249, 2013 BL 87327 (Cal. App. 3d Dist. Mar. 29, 2013) 347 DISCUSSED , United States v. Seriki, Case No. 12- Quoted CV-7691, 2013 BL 102016 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 2013) 348 CITED Ottenwarde v. United States, No. 12 Civ. 6537 (JGK)., 2013 BL 83077 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2013) 349 CITED , Quoted Blackwell v. Hastings, Civil Action No. 11-5131 (JAP)., 2013 BL 83090 (D.N.J. Mar. 28, 2013) 350 CITED People v. Carabai, 39 Misc. 3d 1206, 969 N.Y.S.2d 805 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. 2013) 351 DISCUSSED , Ex parte Cisneros, No. 08-11-00180- Quoted CR, 2013 BL 84888 (Tex. App.-El Paso Mar. 28, 2013) 352 DISCUSSED United States v. Carmen-Iglesias, 514 Fed. Appx. 922 (11th Cir. 2013) 353 CITED United States v. Rodriguez-Trujillo, Case No. 4:11-cv-00593-BLW., 4:08- cr-00240-BLW., 2013 BL 83073 (D. Idaho Mar. 28, 2013) 354 CITED Ex parte Calderon, No. AP-77,006, 2013 BL 81761 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 27, 2013) 355 DISTINGUISHED , United States v. Castillo-Magdaleno, Quoted No. NO: CR-11-172-RMP., CV-12-675- RMP., 2013 BL 82634 (E.D. Wash. Mar. 27, 2013) 356 CITED , Quoted Floyd v. Secretary, Florida Dept. of Corrections, Case No. 3:09-cv-1017-

Citation Analysis ( 1000 cases ) J-34TEM, 2013 BL 95198 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 27, 2013) 357 DISTINGUISHED , Mason v. United States, CIVIL ACTION (See) NO. 3:11-CV-60, CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 3:08-CR-30-02, 2013 BL 83501 (N.D. W. Va. Mar. 27, 2013) 358 DISCUSSED , State v. Howard, 2013-Ohio-1437 (See) (App. 7th Dist. 2013) 359 CITED Gutierrez v. State, 110 So. 3d 502 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) 360 CITED United States v. Dwumaah, CRIMINAL NO. 1:05-CR-0157, 2013 BL 83477 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 27, 2013) 361 PRIOR Heredia v. Holder, 516 Fed. Appx. 63 OVERRULING (2d Cir. 2013) 362 CITED , Quoted Ex parte Hernandez, 398 S.W.3d 369 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2013) 363 CITED , Quoted Ex parte Hernandez, 398 S.W.3d 369 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2013) 364 CITED Fernandez-Balart v. State, 109 So. 3d 890 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) 365 CITED , Quoted Lopez-Iriarte v. United States, No. 4:10-CV-240-JAR, 2013 BL 81121 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 27, 2013) 366 DISCUSSED Rodriguez v. State, 109 So. 3d 1189 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) 367 CITED , Quoted Hamm v. Allen, CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:06-cv-00945-KOB, 2013 BL 83387 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 27, 2013) 368 CITED , (See, Hodges v. Colson, 711 F.3d 589 (6th e.g.) , Quoted Cir. 2013) 369 CITED , Quoted Hodges v. Colson, 711 F.3d 589 (6th Cir. 2013) 370 DISTINGUISHED Leiva v. Trammell, No. CIV-12-342-W, 2013 BL 81897 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 26, 2013) 371 DISTINGUISHED Ex parte Luna, 401 S.W.3d 329 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2013) 372 CITED Zia v. United States, Criminal Case No. 08-20532-01., Civil Case No.

Citation Analysis ( 1000 cases ) 11-14798., 2013 BL 81388 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 26, 2013) 373 CITED Bejarano v. United States, CRIMINAL NO. 1:05-CR-0477-CC-GGB-5, CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:10-CV-1919-CC-GGB, 28 U.S.C. § 2255, 2013 BL 108484 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 25, 2013) 374 PRIOR Chapa v. United States, 514 Fed. OVERRULING Appx. 837 (11th Cir. 2013) 375 CITED Duncan v. Warden, 2013 Ct. Sup. 845 376 CITED , (See, Commonwealth v. Lewis, 2013 PA e.g.) , Quoted Super 62, 63 A.3d 1274 377 DISCUSSED De Los Santos v. Ercole, Case No. 07- CV-7569 (KMK)(PED)., 2013 BL 77980 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2013) 378 DISCUSSED , Nguyen v. State, 828 N.W.2d 324 (See) (Iowa 2013) 379 CITED , Quoted Harris v. United States, CASE NO. 2:12-CV-107., CRIM. NO. 2:09- CR-216., 2013 BL 77938 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 22, 2013) 380 CITED Commonwealth v. Ghisoiu, 2013 PA Super 63, 63 A.3d 1272 381 CITED , Quoted People v. Osario, 2013 NY Slip Op 30822[U], 2013 BL 112046 (Sup. Ct. Mar. 21, 2013) 382 DISCUSSED Ibarra v. State, No. 01-12-00292-CR, 2013 BL 75448 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 21, 2013) 383 CITED Aguilar v. State, 393 S.W.3d 787 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) 384 CITED Ex parte Romero, 393 S.W.3d 788 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) 385 CITED Ex parte Carpio-Cruz, No. PD-1872-11, 2013 BL 73880 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 20, 2013) 386 CITED , Quoted United States v. Sykes, Criminal Action No. 3:11-CR-43., 2013 BL 73756 (E.D. Va. Mar. 20, 2013)

Citation Analysis ( 1000 cases ) 387 CITED Ex parte Tanklevskaya, 393 S.W.3d 787 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) 388 CITED Ibarra v. State, No. 4D11-1459, 2013 BL 75523 (Fla. 4th DCA Mar. 20, 2013)

389 DISCUSSED Govereh v. Pugh, No. 2:12-cv-10913, 2013 BL 73058 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 20, 2013) 390 CITED Sipsis v. State, No. 4D11-2673, 2013 BL 75562 (Fla. 4th DCA Mar. 20, 2013)

391 CITED Hurtado v. State, 109 So. 3d 883 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) 392 DISCUSSED , Ex parte Garcia, No. 08-11-00232-CR, Quoted 2013 BL 76020 (Tex. App.-El Paso Mar. 20, 2013) 393 CITED , Quoted Mooney v. United States, CRIMINAL NO. 1:07-CR-0060-TWT-JSA-1, CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:10-CV-3195-TWT-JSA, 2013 BL 108744 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 20, 2013) 394 DISCUSSED , State v. Parker, 112 So. 3d 366 (La. Quoted App. 4th Cir. 2013) 395 DISTINGUISHED , Ex parte Reyes, 392 S.W.3d 675 (Tex. Quoted Crim. App. 2013) 396 DISCUSSED , Patel v. Warden, 2013 Ct. Sup. 847 Quoted 397 DISCUSSED , Knott v. Warden, 2013 Ct. Sup. 824 Quoted 398 CITED Ex parte Olvera, No. PD-1215-12, 2013 BL 73884 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 20, 2013) 399 CITED Rivers v. State, 109 So. 3d 882 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) 400 CITED People v. McClure, No. F064207, 2013 BL 73970 (Cal. App. 5th Dist. Mar. 20, 2013) 401 CITED People v. Payamps, 104 A.D.3d 539, 960 N.Y.S.2d 430 (App Div, 1st Dept 2013)

Citation Analysis ( 1000 cases ) 402 DISTINGUISHED , King v. Secretary, Dept. of Corrections, Quoted No. Case No: 6:12-cv-1037- Orl-36KRS., 2013 BL 71747 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 19, 2013) 403 CITED , Quoted Claxton v. United States, Civ. No. 12-00433 JMS-KSC, Civ. No. 12-00433 JMS-KSC Cr. No. 10-00108 JMS, 2013 BL 71839 (D. Haw. Mar. 18, 2013) 404 CITED Martino v. McCabe, C/A No. 6:11-3472-JFA-KFM, 2013 BL 72896 (D.S.C. Mar. 18, 2013) 405 DISCUSSED , Blay v. United States, No. 12-1381 Quoted (FLW), 2013 BL 71655 (D.N.J. Mar. 18, 2013) 406 CITED , (See) People v. Greenberg, 2013 NY Slip Op 50409[U], 2013 BL 81268 (App Term, 2d Dept Mar. 15, 2013) 407 DISCUSSED , People v. Campbell, 2013 NY Slip Op Quoted 30821[U], 2013 BL 111340 (Sup. Ct. Mar. 15, 2013) 408 CITED Bonilla v. United States, Civil Action No. DKC 09-2836, Criminal Case No. DKC 07-135, 2013 BL 71461 (D. Md. Mar. 15, 2013) 409 CITED , (See) Longsworth v. United States, CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:09-cv-1411-JEC., CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 1:09-cr-74- JEC., 2013 BL 68570 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 15, 2013) 410 DISCUSSED Castillo v. State, 829 N.W.2d 589 (Iowa Ct. App. 2013) 411 DISCUSSED , State v. Mendoza, 113 So. 3d 288 (La. Quoted App. 5th Cir. 2013) 412 DISTINGUISHED , Saldana-Ramirez v. State, 255 Or. Quoted App. 602, 298 P.3d 59 (Ct. App. 2013)

413 CITED , Quoted United States v. Hernandez-Munguia, 511 Fed. Appx. 627 (9th Cir. 2013)

Citation Analysis ( 1000 cases ) 414 DISCUSSED Guzman v. Holder, 513 Fed. Appx. 113 (2d Cir. 2013) 415 DISTINGUISHED People v. Hamawi, No. D062045, 2013 BL 85440 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. Mar. 12, 2013) 416 CITED , Quoted Burr v. Lassiter, 513 Fed. Appx. 327 (4th Cir. 2013) 417 CITED , Quoted Walker v. Martel, 709 F.3d 925 (9th Cir. 2013) 418 DISTINGUISHED , Nanan v. United States, CASE NO. Quoted 6:11-cv-405-Orl-35GJK., (6:09-cr-212- Orl-35GJK)., 2013 BL 62262 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 07, 2013) 419 CITED United States v. Solomon, No. 2:05- cr-0385, 2:12-cv-0282, 2013 BL 60601 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 07, 2013) 420 DISCUSSED Gjini v. Warden, 2013 Ct. Sup. 659 421 CITED , Quoted Whittier v. Secretary, Florida Dept. of Corrections, Case No. 3:10-cv-166- J-34JBT, 2013 BL 59725 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 05, 2013) 422 CITED , Quoted Fernandes v. Johnson, No. 12 Civ. 2774 (LBS)., 2013 BL 59483 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 05, 2013) 423 CITED State v. Crump, 826 N.W.2d 838 (Minn. Ct. App. 2013) 424 DISCUSSED , Davis v. New York, No. 10 CV 615 Quoted (RJD)., 2013 BL 55591 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 04, 2013) 425 DISCUSSED , People v. Alegria, 2013 NY Slip Op Quoted 30448[U], 2013 BL 62868 (Sup. Ct. Mar. 01, 2013) 426 CITED , Quoted People v. Campos-Corona, 2013 COA 23 427 DISTINGUISHED , Gunner v. Welch, No. 3:09CV03009, Quoted 2013 BL 53114 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 28, 2013) 428 CITED Moral-Salazar v. Holder, 708 F.3d 957 (7th Cir. 2013)

Citation Analysis ( 1000 cases ) 429 CITED Wright v. United States, No. Case Nos. 3:04cr00003, 3:10cv00174., 2013 BL 54532 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 28, 2013) 430 CITED People v. Martinez, No. B239550, 2013 BL 52942 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. Feb. 27, 2013) 431 DISCUSSED United States v. Fraire, 512 Fed. Appx. 745 (10th Cir. 2013) 432 CITED , Quoted Sands v. Lewis, 511 Fed. Appx. 608 (9th Cir. 2013) 433 DISTINGUISHED Desrosiers v. Lee, No. 11-CV-00804 (CBA), 2013 BL 50303 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2013) 434 DISCUSSED , Grullon v. United States, 12 Civ. 4086 Quoted (JFK)., No. 94 Cr. 466 (JFK), 2013 BL 50823 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2013) 435 DISCUSSED Solano v. United States, No. 3:11- cv-112, 2013 BL 47956 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 25, 2013) 436 DISCUSSED , Francis v. United States, No. 12 Quoted Civ. 01362 (AJN)., 2013 BL 49259 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2013) 437 DISCUSSED Cuevas v. United States, No. 10 Civ. 5959 (PAE) (GWG)., 98 Cr. 1053 (PAE)., 2013 BL 47221 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2013) 438 CITED United States v. Arias-Robles, 510 Fed. Appx. 569 (9th Cir. 2013) 439 CITED Moats v. Plumley, No. 12-0022, 2013 BL 49706 (W. Va. Feb. 22, 2013) 440 CITED United States v. Serrano-Navarro, 510 Fed. Appx. 558 (9th Cir. 2013) 441 DISCUSSED , Dehart v. Commonwealth, No. Quoted Nos. 2011-CA-001592-MR, 2011- CA-001593-MR, 2013 BL 49002 (Ky. Ct. App. Feb. 22, 2013) 442 DISCUSSED , People v. Rodriguez, No. G047426, Quoted 2013 BL 45650 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. Feb. 20, 2013)

Citation Analysis ( 1000 cases ) 443 DISCUSSED , Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. Quoted 1103, 185 L. Ed. 2d 149 (2013) 444 CITED , Quoted Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 185 L. Ed. 2d 149 (2013) 445 DISCUSSED , Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. Quoted 1103, 185 L. Ed. 2d 149 (2013) 446 CITED Ioselli v. State, No. 4D12-1449, 2013 BL 46817 (Fla. 4th DCA Feb. 20, 2013)

447 CITED , Quoted Dinkens v. Secretary, Florida Dept. of Corrections, Case No. 3:09-cv-1174- J-34JRK., 2013 BL 45275 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 20, 2013) 448 DISCUSSED Mendez-Valdez v. United States, No. 5:12-cv-91-RLV., (5:06-cr-009-RLV- DCK-1)., 2013 BL 44484 (W.D.N.C Feb. 19, 2013) 449 DISCUSSED , Carrillo v. State, 982 N.E.2d 461 (Ind. Quoted Ct. App. 2013) 450 DISCUSSED , Carrillo v. State, 982 N.E.2d 468 (Ind. Quoted Ct. App. 2013) 451 CITED , Quoted Thomas v. McKee, No. 2:11- CV-15123, 2013 BL 39888 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 15, 2013) 452 CITED , Quoted Ex parte Karedia, No. Nos. 03-11-00831-CR, 03-11-00832-CR, 2013 BL 42178 (Tex. App.-Austin Feb. 15, 2013) 453 CITED , Quoted Gutierrez v. United States, CRIMINAL NO. 1:07-cr-0051-JEC-RGV-1., CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:10-cv-2748-JEC-RGV., 2013 BL 39819 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 15, 2013) 454 CITED , (See) State v. Khrinyuk, 2013-Ohio-498 (App. 8th Dist. 2013) 455 DISCUSSED , Catalao v. State, No. P.M. 2012-2803 Quoted (Re: P2-06-3767), 2013 BL 45080 (R.I. Super. Feb. 14, 2013)

Citation Analysis ( 1000 cases ) 456 CITED , Quoted Evans v. United States, Case No. CV613-005, CR610-029, 2013 BL 55146 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 14, 2013) 457 CITED People v. Mbaabu, 213 Cal.App.4th 1139, 152 Cal.Rptr.3d 818 (App. 4th Dist. 2013) 458 CITED , Quoted Fielder v. Stevenson, No. Civil Action No.: 2:12-cv-00412-JMC, 2013 BL 40290 (D.S.C. Feb. 14, 2013) 459 DISTINGUISHED Joseph v. State, 107 So. 3d 492 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) 460 CITED Bzeih v. United States, Criminal Case No. 08-20443, Civil Case No. 12-14107, 2013 BL 39415 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 13, 2013) 461 CITED People v. Nicholson, No. D060667, 2013 BL 38142 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. Feb. 13, 2013) 462 CITED Romero v. State, No. 4D12-2667, 2013 BL 38634 (Fla. 4th DCA Feb. 13, 2013)

463 CITED , Quoted Ex parte Chavez, No. 05-12-01234- CR, 2013 BL 39313 (Tex. App.-Dallas Feb. 13, 2013) 464 DISTINGUISHED Donegal v. State, 107 So. 3d 490 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) 465 DISCUSSED , United States v. Boliero, 923 F. Supp. Quoted 2d 319 (D. Mass. 2013) 466 CITED United States v. Denson, No. 2:08- cr-00365, 2:12-cv-0771, 2013 BL 36142 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 11, 2013) 467 CITED Bereano v. United States, 706 F.3d 568 (4th Cir. 2013) 468 DISCUSSED , United States v. Gouin, No. 2:05-cr-59- Quoted FtM-29DNF, 2013 BL 34349 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 08, 2013) 469 CITED , Quoted Cadet v. United States, CRIMINAL ACTION 1:11-CR-113-WBH, CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:12-CV-1632-WBH,

Citation Analysis ( 1000 cases ) 2013 BL 34869 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 08, 2013) 470 CITED Lawther v. United States, Case No. 2:11-cv-190-FtM-29DNF, Case No. 2:08-cr-107-FtM-29DNF, 2013 BL 33460 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 08, 2013) 471 DISCUSSED , State v. Brewster, 429 N.J. Super. 387, Quoted 58 A.3d 1234 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013) 472 CITED , Quoted McSwain v. Warren, Civil Action No. 11-5658 (JAP)., 2013 BL 32542 (D.N.J. Feb. 07, 2013) 473 CITED Cuevas v. United States, No. 12 Civ. 9004 (JSR) (JCF)., 13 Civ. 0306 (JSR) (JCF)., 98 Cr. 1053 (JSR)., 2013 BL 33976 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 07, 2013) 474 CITED , Quoted People v. Tyler, No. C062508, 2013 BL 72576 (Cal. App. 3d Dist. Feb. 06, 2013) 475 CITED , Quoted Johnson v. State, 398 S.W.3d 513 (Mo. App. S.D. 2013) 476 CITED , Quoted Scott v. Palmer, No. 2:12-CV-10172, 2013 BL 30669 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 06, 2013) 477 DISCUSSED , People v. Smith, No. B240125, 2013 Quoted BL 31614 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. Feb. 06, 2013) 478 CITED , Quoted Curry v. Stovall, No. 2:11-15414, 2013 BL 30659 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 06, 2013) 479 DISCUSSED , United States v. Dwumaah, CRIMINAL Quoted NO. 1:05-CR-0157., 2013 BL 28907 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 01, 2013) 480 CITED , Quoted Bing Yi Chen v. United States, No. 12 CV 3904 (DAB)., 03 CR 724-4 (DAB)., 2013 BL 27480 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 01, 2013) 481 DISCUSSED , Ex parte Fuertes, No. 02-11-00536- (See) CR, 2013 BL 29474 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Jan. 31, 2013)

Citation Analysis ( 1000 cases ) 482 CITED , (See) Palkimas v. Warden, 2013 Ct. Sup. 429 483 DISCUSSED Blair v. State, No. M2012-00066-CCA- R3-PC, 2013 BL 29105 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 31, 2013) 484 CITED , Quoted Snead v. Shearin, Civil Action No. WMN-09-2080, 2013 BL 25983 (D. Md. Jan. 31, 2013) 485 CITED , Quoted Ex parte Hernandez, No. 05-12-00737- CR, 2013 BL 31950 (Tex. App.-Dallas Jan. 31, 2013) 486 DISCUSSED Mondragón v. Holder, 706 F.3d 535 (4th Cir. 2013) 487 CITED German v. Attorney General, 512 Fed. Appx. 205 (3d Cir. 2013) 488 CITED , Quoted Gomez v. United States, Case No. CV413-001, CR410-100, 2013 BL 24455 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 30, 2013) 489 CITED Dziwak v. Attorney General, 512 Fed. Appx. 190 (3d Cir. 2013) 490 DISCUSSED , People v. Hughes, 2012 IL 112817, Quoted 368 Ill. Dec. 26, 983 N.E.2d 439 491 CITED Castano v. State, 106 So. 3d 28 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013) 492 DISCUSSED , United States v. Banjoko, Case No. Quoted 8:13-cv-210-T-23EAJ., 2013 BL 21262 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 25, 2013) 493 DISCUSSED Smith v. Warden, Civ. No. 12-2932 (DRD)., 2013 BL 19292 (D.N.J. Jan. 24, 2013) 494 DISCUSSED , State v. Dzopa, 828 N.W.2d 632 (Iowa Quoted Ct. App. 2013) 495 CITED , Quoted State v. Vrzivoli, 2013 Ct. Sup. 383, 55 Conn. L. Rptr. 351 496 DISCUSSED , Carbajal-Martinez v. United States, Quoted Case No. 4:12 CV 2333., 2013 BL 16563 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 22, 2013) 497 CITED State v. Montero, No. A-2551-10T1, 2013 BL 153059 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 22, 2013)

Citation Analysis ( 1000 cases ) 498 CITED , Quoted Martinez v. Secretary, Dept. of Corrections, Case No. 8:10-CV-8- T-27EAJ, 2013 BL 16824 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 18, 2013) 499 DISCUSSED Valdes v. United States, 503 Fed. Appx. 941 (11th Cir. 2013) 500 CITED Hunter v. United States, Civil Case No. 1:09-cv-00436-MR., [Criminal Case No. 1:06-cr-00251-MR-2]., 2013 BL 12738 (W.D.N.C Jan. 17, 2013) 501 DISCUSSED State v. Brathwaite, No. A-6271-10T2, 2013 BL 153046 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 17, 2013) 502 DISCUSSED , Haskell v. Berghuis, 511 Fed. Appx. Quoted 538 (6th Cir. 2013) 503 CITED , Quoted United States v. Munoz, CRIMINAL NO. 10-126., CIVIL NO. 12-4917., 2013 BL 11507 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 16, 2013) 504 CITED , Quoted Johnson v. Woods, No. 5:12-11632, 2013 BL 9929 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 15, 2013) 505 DISCUSSED , Xique v. State, No. A10-2148, 2013 BL Quoted 13049 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2013) 506 DISCUSSED , El Eid v. State, No. A11-0898, 2013 BL Quoted 13050 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2013) 507 DISCUSSED , Commonwealth v. Marinho, 464 Mass. Quoted 115, 981 N.E.2d 648 (2013) 508 DISCUSSED , Commonwealth v. Marinho, 464 Mass. Quoted 115, 981 N.E.2d 648 (2013) 509 DISCUSSED , United States v. Hassun, 503 Fed. Quoted Appx. 826 (11th Cir. 2013) 510 CITED , Quoted Gray v. Secretary, Florida Dept. of Corrections, Case No. 3:10-cv-98- J-34MCR., 2013 BL 11129 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 10, 2013) 511 CITED , Quoted Davis v. State, 104 So. 3d 1279 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) 512 DISTINGUISHED Clarke v. United States, 703 F.3d 1098 (7th Cir. 2013)

Citation Analysis ( 1000 cases ) 513 CITED , Quoted Parker v. Secretary, Florida Dept. of Corrections, Case No. 3:09-cv-1203- J-34JRK., 2013 BL 7947 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 09, 2013) 514 CITED Fisenko v. State, 104 So. 3d 1280 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) 515 CITED State v. Luna, No. 2 CA-CR 2012-0293-PR, 2013 BL 172753 (Ariz. App. Div. 2 Jan. 09, 2013) 516 DISCUSSED , People v. James, 38 Misc. 3d 1209, Quoted 966 N.Y.S.2d 348 (City Ct. 2013) 517 CITED , Quoted Ex Parte Murillo, 389 S.W.3d 922 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2013) 518 CITED , Quoted Council v. United States, No. 3:09- CR-378, 2013 BL 4927 (E.D. Va. Jan. 08, 2013) 519 DISCUSSED Medrano v. Thaler, No. CIVIL ACTION H-12-1948, 2013 BL 4787 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 07, 2013) 520 DISCUSSED Rodriguez v. State, No. M2011-01485- CCA-R3-PC, 2013 BL 4198 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 07, 2013) 521 CITED Rodriguez v. State, No. M2011-01485- CCA-R3-PC, 2013 BL 4198 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 07, 2013) 522 DISCUSSED , Inzunza v. State, No. M2011-02641- Quoted CCA-R3-PC, 2013 BL 4197 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 07, 2013) 523 DISCUSSED , Ex parte Meman, No. 02-12-00097-CR, Quoted 2013 BL 26256 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Jan. 04, 2013) 524 CITED Moreau v. State, 109 So. 3d 231 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) 525 CITED , Quoted Gulliver v. Secretary, Florida Dep't. of Corr., Case No. 3:10-cv-251-J-34JRK, 2013 BL 2435 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 04, 2013) 526 DISCUSSED , Gomez v. United States, No. 10- Quoted CV-01886(CBA), 2013 BL 2066 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 04, 2013)

Citation Analysis ( 1000 cases ) 527 CITED United States v. Abuhouran, 508 Fed. Appx. 95 (3d Cir. 2013) 528 CITED United States v. Johal, No. CR-02-214- FVS, 2013 BL 2933 (E.D. Wash. Jan. 03, 2013) 529 CITED , (See) Andrews v. Warden, 2013 Ct. Sup. 205

530 CITED , Quoted United States v. Fugit, 703 F.3d 248 (4th Cir. 2012) 531 DISCUSSED People v. Mensah, No. B240803, 2012 BL 341077 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. Dec. 31, 2012) 532 DISCUSSED , Hernandez-Munoz v. State, No. Nos. Quoted 14-11-00730-CR, 14-11-00828-CR, 2012 BL 341491 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 28, 2012) 533 CITED United States v. Martinez, 504 Fed. Appx. 348 (5th Cir. 2012) 534 DISCUSSED Salmon v. Attorney General, 509 Fed. Appx. 126 (3d Cir. 2012) 535 DISCUSSED , People v. Cao, No. G045980, 2012 BL Quoted 340899 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. Dec. 28, 2012) 536 CITED State v. Tovar, 2012-Ohio-6156 (App. 10th Dist. 2012) 537 DISCUSSED Tejeda-Acosta v. Holder, 506 Fed. Appx. 785 (10th Cir. 2012) 538 DISCUSSED , People v. Lawrence, 38 Misc. 3d 1204, Quoted 969 N.Y.S.2d 805 (Sup. Ct. 2012) 539 CITED , Quoted United States v. Rush, 910 F. Supp. 2d 286 (D.D.C. 2012) 540 DISCUSSED People v. Curillo, 2012 NY Slip Op 52469[U], 2012 BL 344073 (App Term, 2d Dept Dec. 24, 2012) 541 CITED Garafola v. United States, 909 F. Supp. 2d 313 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) 542 DISTINGUISHED People v. Hinds, 2012 NY Slip Op 33070[U], 2012 BL 342119 (Sup. Ct. Dec. 21, 2012)

Citation Analysis ( 1000 cases ) 543 DISCUSSED , Bolin v. Chappell, Case No. 1:99- (See) cv-05279 LJO, 2012 BL 337816 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2012) 544 DISCUSSED , Jian Tian Lin v. United States, CIVIL Quoted ACTION NO. 3:12-CV-813-H., CRIMINAL: 3:06CR-90-H., 2012 BL 337910 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 21, 2012) 545 CITED , Quoted Robinson v. McKee, No. 5:12- CV-11059, 2012 BL 332744 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 20, 2012) 546 CITED , Quoted Kazadi v. People, 2012 CO 73, 291 P.3d 16 547 DISCUSSED , Pacheco v. State, No. 08-11-00237- Quoted CR, 2012 BL 335719 (Tex. App.-El Paso Dec. 19, 2012) 548 CITED United States v. Hill, 500 Fed. Appx. 258 (4th Cir. 2012) 549 DISCUSSED , People v. Maramolejos, 2012 NY Slip Quoted Op 33149[U], 2012 BL 343616 (Sup. Ct. Dec. 19, 2012) 550 DISTINGUISHED , State v. Bieksza, 2012-Ohio-5976 Quoted (App. 10th Dist. 2012) 551 DISTINGUISHED , People v. Pena-Romero, 2012 IL App Quoted (4th) 110780, 366 Ill. Dec. 910, 980 N.E.2d 1269 552 CITED , (Accord) Williams v. Ricci, No. 09-1822 (DRD), 2012 BL 327400 (D.N.J. Dec. 14, 2012) 553 DISCUSSED , State v. Garcia, No. 13-11-00689-CR, Quoted 2012 BL 329049 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi Dec. 13, 2012) 554 DISCUSSED , Ex parte Tuan Dinh Phan, No. Quoted 14-11-00766-CR, 2012 BL 328043 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 13, 2012) 555 DISCUSSED State v. Rodriguez, No. 1 CA-CR 11-0205 PRPC, 2012 BL 345647 (Ariz. App. Div. 1 Dec. 13, 2012)

Citation Analysis ( 1000 cases ) 556 DISCUSSED , Ebrahim v. LeConey, No. 10- Quoted CV-6397(MAT), 2012 BL 322449 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2012) 557 CITED , Quoted People v. Herrera, No. F062641, 2012 BL 323493 (Cal. App. 5th Dist. Dec. 11, 2012) 558 CITED Sanhaji v. North Carolina, No. NO, 5:11-HC-2236-BO, 2012 BL 323631 (E.D.N.C. Dec. 10, 2012) 559 DISTINGUISHED , Rigoberto v. State, No. M2011-02690- Quoted CCA-R3-PC, 2012 BL 324058 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 10, 2012) 560 CITED , Quoted Bennett v. North Carolina, No. 1:09CV647, 2012 BL 322204 (M.D.N.C. Dec. 10, 2012) 561 CITED , Quoted Thompson v. Parker, No. 5:11CV-31- R, 2012 BL 321188 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 10, 2012) 562 DISTINGUISHED , Commonwealth v. Abraham, 62 A.3d Quoted 343 (Pa. 2012) 563 PRIOR Commonwealth v. Abraham, 62 A.3d OVERRULING , 343 (Pa. 2012) Quoted 564 DISCUSSED , Commonwealth v. Abraham, 62 A.3d Quoted 343 (Pa. 2012) 565 DISCUSSED , Commonwealth v. Abraham, 58 A.3d Quoted 42 (Pa. 2012) 566 DISCUSSED , Thiersaint v. Warden, 2013 Ct. Sup. 77 Quoted 567 DISCUSSED , Commonwealth v. Abraham, 58 A.3d Quoted 42 (Pa. 2012) 568 CITED Garcia v. State, No. M2012-01058- CCA-R3-PC, 2012 BL 322113 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 07, 2012) 569 CITED Rathy v. Thompson, Civil Action No. 09-1370., 2012 BL 319415 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 07, 2012) 570 DISCUSSED , Commonwealth v. Abraham, 58 A.3d Quoted 42 (Pa. 2012)

Citation Analysis ( 1000 cases ) 571 DISCUSSED , Esparza-Recendez v. State, 2012 UT (See) App 344, 293 P.3d 377 572 CITED , Quoted Underwood v. United States, Criminal Action No. 3:08-CR-524, Civil Action No. 3:10-CV-784, 2012 BL 320442 (E.D. Va. Dec. 06, 2012) 573 DISCUSSED , Ex parte Sudhakar, No. 14-11-00701- Quoted CR, 2012 BL 320951 (Tex. App.- Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 06, 2012) 574 DISCUSSED , Oropesa v. State, 104 So. 3d 1183 Quoted (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) 575 DISTINGUISHED Forrest v. State, 101 So. 3d 1268 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) 576 CITED , Quoted Pimentel-Herrera v. United States, CASE NO. 3:12-cv-2627-AJB, CRIM. NO. 3:11-cr-1391-AJB, [Doc. No. 45 in 3:11-cr-1391], 2012 BL 320068 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 05, 2012) 577 DISCUSSED , Ex parte Fassi, 388 S.W.3d 881 (Tex. Quoted App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2012) 578 DISCUSSED Aguilar-Perez v. State, No. A12-0652, 2012 BL 317709 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 03, 2012) 579 DISCUSSED , Candelario v. State, C.A. No. Quoted PM-2010-6205, 2012 BL 319606 (R.I. Super. Dec. 03, 2012) 580 CITED , Quoted Guerrero v. United States, 914 F. Supp. 2d 105 (D. Mass. 2012) 581 CITED People v. Lee, No. G046173, 2012 BL 313915 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. Nov. 29, 2012) 582 CITED Allen v. United States, No. 1:11-cv-67- CL, 2012 BL 314841 (D. Or. Nov. 29, 2012) 583 CITED , (See Knight v. Phillips, No. 05-CV-2758 generally) (NG), 2012 BL 310374 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2012) 584 CITED Morrow v. Curtin, No. 10-13572, 2012 BL 311047 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 28, 2012)

Citation Analysis ( 1000 cases ) 585 CITED Campbell v. State, 101 So. 3d 913 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) 586 CITED People v. Serrano, 211 Cal.App.4th 496, 149 Cal.Rptr.3d 706 (App. 6th Dist. 2012) 587 DISCUSSED Commonwealth v. Rachak, 2012 PA Super 260, 62 A.3d 389 588 CITED , Quoted Morris v. Curtin, No. 2:10-10071, 2012 BL 306570 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 26, 2012) 589 DISCUSSED United States v. Rodriguez, No. 06-40015-FDS, 2012 BL 308485 (D. Mass. Nov. 26, 2012) 590 CITED McDowell v. United States, Case No. 2:10-cv-43-FTM-29SPC., Case No. 2:05-cr-65-FTM-29SPC., 2012 BL 306551 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 26, 2012) 591 CITED Johnston v. United States, Case No. 2:10-cv-180-FtM-29DNF., Case No. 2:07-cr-105-FTM-29DNF., 2012 BL 306518 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 26, 2012) 592 CITED , Quoted Merrill v. United States, Civil No. 12- cv-397-JD, 2012 BL 309981 (D.N.H. Nov. 26, 2012) 593 CITED , (See) Perez v. Commissioner of Corrections, 2012 Ct. Sup. 3139 594 CITED Beaulieu v. State, No. A12-0289, 2012 BL 309259 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 26, 2012) 595 DISCUSSED , Seaman v. Washington, 506 Fed. Quoted Appx. 349 (6th Cir. 2012) 596 DISCUSSED Castano v. State, No. SC11-1571, 2012 BL 307656 (Fla. Nov. 21, 2012) 597 CITED , Quoted Davis v. Secretary, Florida Dept. of Corrections, Case No. 3:10-cv-273- J-34TEM., 2012 BL 306854 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 21, 2012) 598 DISTINGUISHED Castano v. State, No. SC11-1571, 2012 BL 307656 (Fla. Nov. 21, 2012)

Citation Analysis ( 1000 cases ) 599 CITED , (See) People v. Rajpaul, 100 A.D.3d 1183, 954 N.Y.S.2d 249 (App Div, 3d Dept 2012) 600 DISTINGUISHED Hernandez v. State, No. Nos. SC11-941, SC11-1357, 2012 BL 307657 (Fla. Nov. 21, 2012) 601 DISTINGUISHED , Hernandez v. State, No. Nos. Quoted SC11-941, SC11-1357, 2012 BL 307657 (Fla. Nov. 21, 2012) 602 CITED Maxwell v. Attorney General, 505 Fed. Appx. 132 (3d Cir. 2012) 603 CITED , Quoted Williams v. Bergh, No. 10-12861, 2012 BL 304369 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 20, 2012) 604 DISTINGUISHED State v. Velasquez, No. 2 CA-CR 2012-0326-PR, 2012 BL 345611 (Ariz. App. Div. 2 Nov. 20, 2012) 605 DISCUSSED Greenwood v. United States, 5:10- CR-00238-6-F, No. 5:12-CV-00509- F, 2012 BL 304721 (E.D.N.C. Nov. 19, 2012) 606 CITED Anderson v. Holder, 503 Fed. Appx. 23 (2d Cir. 2012) 607 CITED United States v. Oseguera-Madrigal, 700 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2012) 608 CITED , Quoted Franklin v. Woods, No. 09-13466, 2012 BL 303241 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 19, 2012) 609 DISCUSSED , United States v. Salinas-Martinez, No. Quoted 8:09CR456., 2012 BL 300346 (D. Neb. Nov. 16, 2012) 610 CITED , (Cf.) , Rhinehart v. State, 2012 UT App 322, Quoted 290 P.3d 921 611 DISCUSSED , Abraham v. United States, 699 F.3d Quoted 1050 (8th Cir. 2012) 612 CITED , (See) People v. Ramos, 100 A.D.3d 487, 953 N.Y.S.2d 594 (App Div, 1st Dept 2012)

613 CITED , Quoted Jennings v. Secretary, Florida Dept. of Corrections, Case No. 3:10-cv-199- J-34MCR, 2012 BL 299577 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 14, 2012)

Citation Analysis ( 1000 cases ) 614 DISCUSSED United States v. Cano, Case No. 05-40116-JAR, 12-4142-JAR, 2012 BL 297958 (D. Kan. Nov. 14, 2012) 615 CITED , Quoted Robles v. Lempke, No. 09-CV-2636 (SLT)., 2012 BL 300126 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2012) 616 DISCUSSED , Asan v. United States, 907 F. Supp. 2d Quoted 426 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) 617 DISCUSSED Hatton v. State, No. A12-0298, 2012 BL 298920 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2012) 618 DISTINGUISHED , Commonwealth v. Chleikh, 82 Mass. Quoted App. Ct. 718, 978 N.E.2d 96 (App. Ct. 2012) 619 DISCUSSED Aguas v. State, 100 So. 3d 1212 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) 620 CITED Solana v. New York City Dept. of Corrections, No. 12-CV-3519 (ARR), 2012 BL 294363 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 08, 2012) 621 DISCUSSED , Restrepo v. United States, No. 12-3517 Quoted (JBS), 2012 BL 294382 (D.N.J. Nov. 08, 2012) 622 DISTINGUISHED Gamboa-Victoria v. United States, No. Civil Case No.: 8:12-cv-2517-T-24- EAJ., Criminal Case No.: 8:06-cr-465- T-24-EAJ., Related Civil Case No.: 8:09-cv-1536-T-24-EAJ., 2012 BL 292798 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 07, 2012) 623 CITED , Quoted Estep v. Ballard, 502 Fed. Appx. 234 (4th Cir. 2012) 624 CITED , Quoted Fenton v. United States, 914 F. Supp. 2d 79 (D. Mass. 2012) 625 CITED , Quoted Carrodine v. Romanowski, No. 2:11- CV-15587, 2012 BL 291420 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 07, 2012) 626 DISCUSSED , People v. Alonso, 37 Misc. 3d 1218, Quoted 964 N.Y.S.2d 61 (Sup. Ct. 2012)

Citation Analysis ( 1000 cases ) 627 DISCUSSED Nicolaison v. State, No. A12-0187, 2012 BL 290443 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 05, 2012) 628 DISCUSSED , Garcia v. United States, No. CR Quoted 97-022 MEJ, 2012 BL 290627 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 05, 2012) 629 DISCUSSED Smith v. Warden, 902 F. Supp. 2d 524 (D.N.J. 2012) 630 CITED , (See also) State v. Lopez, No. A-3602-11T2, 2012 BL 345162 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Nov. 02, 2012) 631 DISCUSSED , United States v. Sander, Case No. Quoted 8:08-cr-288-T-23MAP., 8:12-cv-2413- T-23MAP., 2012 BL 286681 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 31, 2012) 632 DISCUSSED , United States v. Borden, Case No. Quoted 8:04-cr-563-T-23MAP., 8:12-cv-2343- T-23MAP., 2012 BL 286680 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 31, 2012) 633 CITED , Quoted Carr v. Palmer, No. 2:11-CV-10539, 2012 BL 285391 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2012) 634 DISCUSSED Alencastro-Mejia v. United States, No. C 11-4016-MWB, 2012 BL 284447 (N.D. Iowa Oct. 31, 2012) 635 CITED Richards v. State, 103 So. 3d 912 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) 636 CITED Johnson v. State, No. M2011-00881- CCA-R3-PC, 2012 BL 286264 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 29, 2012) 637 DISCUSSED , State v. Mendez, No. A-3077-10T2, Quoted 2012 BL 345133 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Oct. 29, 2012) 638 DISCUSSED Hernandez-Olivas v. United States, Case No. 4:10-cv-00512-BLW, 4:08- cr-00240-BLW, 2012 BL 279631 (D. Idaho Oct. 25, 2012) 639 CITED , (See) Steele v. State, 291 P.3d 466 (Idaho Ct. App. 2012)

Citation Analysis ( 1000 cases ) 640 DISCUSSED , Commonwealth v. Pridham, 394 Quoted S.W.3d 867 (Ky. 2012) 641 DISCUSSED , Stiger v. Commonwealth, 381 S.W.3d Quoted 230 (Ky. 2012) 642 CITED Diez v. State, 102 So. 3d 19 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) 643 CITED Lifete v. State, 100 So. 3d 179 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) 644 CITED Draven v. United States, CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:12cv117., [ORIGINAL CRIMINAL NO. 4:08cr16]., 2012 BL 278849 (E.D. Va. Oct. 23, 2012) 645 DISTINGUISHED , People v. Mercedes, 37 Misc. 3d 1213, Quoted 964 N.Y.S.2d 61 (Sup. Ct. 2012) 646 CITED , (See) , United States v. Basu, 881 F. Supp. 2d Quoted 1 (D.D.C. 2012) 647 CITED Vazquez v. United States, Case No. 2:09-cv-673-FtM-29SPC, Case No. 2:08-cr-34-FTM-29SPC, 2012 BL 274261 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 19, 2012) 648 CITED Hyde v. State, 97 So. 3d 944 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) 649 CITED Sanchez-Garcia v. Outlaw, No. 2:12- cv-25-DPM-JTR, 2012 BL 274542 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 18, 2012) 650 CITED , Quoted People v. Cimientos, No. H036787, 2012 BL 273818 (Cal. App. 6th Dist. Oct. 18, 2012) 651 DISCUSSED People v. Wilson, 37 Misc. 3d 1211, 961 N.Y.S.2d 360 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. 2012) 652 DISCUSSED Turner v. Hudson, No. 2:07-cv-595, 2012 BL 272757 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 18, 2012) 653 DISCUSSED Ruiz v. Recktenwald, No. 12 Civ. 3955 (BMC)., 2012 BL 272663 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2012) 654 CITED People v. Alvarez-Tinoco, No. A134872, 2012 BL 273800 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. Oct. 18, 2012)

Citation Analysis ( 1000 cases ) 655 CITED Gallegos-Gonzalez v. United States, NO. 5:10-CR-114-2BO., NO. 5:11- CV-589-BO., 2012 BL 274867 (E.D.N.C. Oct. 18, 2012) 656 DISCUSSED , Rahim v. State, 103 So. 3d 895 (Fla. (See) 2d DCA 2012) 657 DISTINGUISHED United States v. Kelly, Criminal Action No. 2:09-36-DCR., and Civil Action No. 2:12-7226-DCR., 2012 BL 273354 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 17, 2012) 658 CITED Prado v. State, 823 N.W.2d 418 (Iowa Ct. App. 2012) 659 CITED , Quoted Robins v. Fortner, 698 F.3d 317 (6th Cir. 2012) 660 CITED Medina v. United States, Case No. 6:12-cv-494-Orl-28GJK, (Criminal Case No.: 6:09-cr-251-Orl-28GJK), 2012 BL 271723 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 16, 2012) 661 DISCUSSED , Betancur v. United States, No. 11 Civ. Quoted 5866 (WHP)., 01 Cr. 628 (WHP)., 2012 BL 271940 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2012) 662 DISCUSSED , People v. Watson, 2012 NY Slip Op Quoted 32619[U], 2012 BL 274355 (Sup. Ct. Oct. 16, 2012) 663 CITED Santos-Sanchez v. United States, 482 Fed. Appx. 953 (5th Cir. 2012) 664 CITED People v. Andreas, No. E054349, 2012 BL 271018 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. Oct. 16, 2012) 665 CITED Santos-Sanchez v. United States, 482 Fed. Appx. 953 (5th Cir. 2012) 666 DISCUSSED , People v. Marshall, 37 Misc. 3d 1210, Quoted 961 N.Y.S.2d 360 (Sup. Ct. 2012) 667 CITED , Quoted United States v. Elliott, Criminal Action No. 2:11-021-DCR, and Civil Action No. 2:12-7215-DCR., 2012 BL 269409 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 15, 2012) 668 DISCUSSED , Sasic v. State, No. A11-1221, 2012 BL Quoted 270145 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2012)

Citation Analysis ( 1000 cases ) 669 CITED Hardison v. Warden, 2012 Ct. Sup. 2907 670 CITED People v. Chacko, 99 A.D.3d 527, 952 N.Y.S.2d 160 (App Div, 1st Dept 2012)

671 CITED State v. Gell-Espinoza, No. A-0213-10T2, 2012 BL 345470 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Oct. 10, 2012) 672 DISCUSSED State v. Alvarez, No. 31,987, 2012 BL 387056 (N.M. Ct. App. Oct. 10, 2012) 673 DISCUSSED Solano v. United States, No. 3:11- cv-112, 2012 BL 264469 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 10, 2012) 674 CITED Moraille v. State, 98 So. 3d 725 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) 675 CITED Evans v. United States, Case No. 2:10- cv-45-FTM-29DNF., Case No. 2:04- cr-03-FTM-29DNF., 2012 BL 259267 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 04, 2012) 676 CITED , Quoted Valencia-Avendano v. United States, CASE NO. 3:12-cv-01469-AJB., CRIM. NO. 3:11-cr-01401-AJB-1., [Doc. No. 84 in 3:11-cr-01401]., 2012 BL 263165 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 04, 2012) 677 DISCUSSED , Nangia v. United States, No. 11 Quoted Civ. 6056 (RMB), 2012 BL 257159 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 02, 2012) 678 DISCUSSED , Sylvain v. Commonwealth, 85 Va. Cir. Quoted 400 (Cir. Ct. 2012) 679 CITED State v. Rubio, 732 S.E.2d 393 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012) 680 DISCUSSED People v. Baret, 99 A.D.3d 408, 952 N.Y.S.2d 108 (App Div, 1st Dept 2012)

681 DISCUSSED Conard v. State, No. A12-0122, 2012 BL 257935 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 01, 2012) 682 DISCUSSED Jose v. State, No. M2011-00295-CCA- R3-PC, 2012 BL 253947 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 28, 2012)

Citation Analysis ( 1000 cases ) 683 CITED Padilla v. Commonwealth, 381 S.W.3d 322 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012) 684 CITED King v. Commonwealth, 384 S.W.3d 193 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012) 685 DISTINGUISHED , People v. Rodriguez, 2012 NY Slip Op Quoted 32584[U], 2012 BL 270151 (Sup. Ct. Sept. 27, 2012) 686 CITED Geter v. State, 115 So. 3d 375 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) 687 CITED , Quoted Deonarinesingh v. State, 98 So. 3d 665 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) 688 CITED , (See) Bekurti v. Warden, 2012 Ct. Sup. 2698

689 DISCUSSED Beckford v. State, 98 So. 3d 666 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) 690 DISCUSSED , Ex parte Meman, No. 02-12-00098-CR, Quoted 2012 BL 257463 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Sept. 27, 2012) 691 CITED , Quoted Harper v. Jones, NO. 5:11-HC-2074- F, 2012 BL 254224 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 27, 2012) 692 DISCUSSED , Rodriguez v. State, No. M2011-02068- Quoted CCA-R3-PC, 2012 BL 252627 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 27, 2012) 693 DISTINGUISHED , Miller v. State, 207 Md. App. 453, 53 Quoted A.3d 385 (Ct. Spec. App. 2012) 694 CITED , Quoted Murray v. Secretary, Dept. of Corrections, Case No. 8:09-CV-1822- T-27TBM., 2012 BL 250844 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 26, 2012) 695 DISTINGUISHED Ortiz v. United States, Crim. No. 11-475 (WHW)., 2012 BL 250781 (D.N.J. Sept. 26, 2012) 696 CITED State v. Ojeda, 2012 Ct. Sup. 2659 697 CITED Spencer v. United States, 894 F. Supp. 2d 721 (E.D. Va. 2012) 698 DISCUSSED , Glushko v. State, No. A12-0102, 2012 Quoted BL 244577 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 24, 2012)

Citation Analysis ( 1000 cases ) 699 DISTINGUISHED , State v. Nol, No. A12-0938, 2012 BL Quoted 244589 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 24, 2012)

700 CITED People v. Rivera, No. C068274, 2012 BL 241788 (Cal. App. 3d Dist. Sept. 20, 2012) 701 DISTINGUISHED , United States v. Chan Ho Shin, 891 F. Quoted Supp. 2d 849 (N.D. Ohio 2012) 702 DISCUSSED , Torres v. State, C.A. No. PM-08-6570, Quoted 2012 BL 243600 (R.I. Super. Sept. 20, 2012) 703 CITED , Quoted Colón-Díaz v. United States, 899 F. Supp. 2d 119 (D.P.R. 2012) 704 CITED Oriakhi v. United States, No. 11-5648 (JBS), 2012 BL 239708 (D.N.J. Sept. 18, 2012) 705 CITED , (See) Quijano v. Warden, 2012 Ct. Sup. 2628

706 CITED Ikharo v. Dewine, CASE NO. 2:12- CV-489, 2012 BL 245773 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 18, 2012) 707 DISCUSSED Antigua-Diaz v. United States, No. 11-6082 (SDW), 2012 BL 239137 (D.N.J. Sept. 17, 2012) 708 CITED , Quoted Wade v. Sheets, CASE NO. 2:09- CV-632., 2012 BL 240462 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 17, 2012) 709 CITED State v. Stephenson, No. A-0911-11T1, 2012 BL 345314 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 14, 2012) 710 DISCUSSED Litchmore v. State, 96 So. 3d 1157 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) 711 CITED Jones v. Lopez, No. 2:10-cv-3154 KJM JFM (HC), 2012 BL 238788 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2012) 712 DISCUSSED People v. Hassan, 36 Misc. 3d 160, 960 N.Y.S.2d 51 (App Term, 2d Dept 2012)

Citation Analysis ( 1000 cases ) 713 CITED United States v. Khera, No. 2:03- cr-0103 JAM EFB P, 2012 BL 237055 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2012) 714 CITED Alvarez v. State, No. 4D 11-1468, 2012 BL 234285 (Fla. 4th DCA Sept. 12, 2012) 715 DISCUSSED , (See United States v. Williams, 698 F.3d also) , Quoted 374 (7th Cir. 2012) 716 CITED Owuor v. Viator, No. 12-CV-4338 (KAM), 2012 BL 233520 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2012) 717 DISTINGUISHED Suber v. Kerestes, Civil Action No. 09-1049, 2012 BL 233585 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 2012) 718 CITED , (See) Mares v. United States, No. Case No.: 09-CR-00885-LHK., 2012 BL 233234 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 07, 2012) 719 CITED , Quoted People v. Roberts, 36 Misc. 3d 1239, 964 N.Y.S.2d 62 (Sup. Ct. 2012) 720 DISTINGUISHED , Commonwealth v. Gordon, 82 Mass. Quoted App. Ct. 389, 974 N.E.2d 645 (App. Ct. 2012) 721 DISCUSSED Hall v. Attorney General, 495 Fed. Appx. 283 (3d Cir. 2012) 722 DISCUSSED , People v. Williams, 2012 NY Slip Op Quoted 32281[U], 2012 BL 229278 (Sup. Ct. Sept. 06, 2012) 723 DISCUSSED People v. Valerio, 36 Misc. 3d 1237, 960 N.Y.S.2d 52 (Sup. Ct. 2012) 724 CITED , Quoted Ex parte Alfaro, 378 S.W.3d 677 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2012) 725 CITED Hirdhani v. State, 96 So. 3d 1057 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) 726 CITED Mack v. State, 96 So. 3d 1095 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) 727 CITED Cifuentes v. State, 96 So. 3d 1097 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) 728 DISCUSSED , Mortimer v. State, 96 So. 3d 1060 (Fla. Quoted 4th DCA 2012)

Citation Analysis ( 1000 cases ) 729 DISCUSSED , (Cf.) Arias-Gonzales v. United States, 486 Fed. Appx. 617 (8th Cir. 2012) 730 DISCUSSED State v. Helm, No. A11-0144, A11-1859, 2012 BL 227330 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 04, 2012) 731 CITED Yuma v. Holder, No. 8:12-CV-102., 2012 BL 236802 (D. Neb. Aug. 31, 2012) 732 DISCUSSED , In re Moreno, 382 S.W.3d 523 (Tex. Quoted App.-Fort Worth 2012) 733 DISCUSSED , Espino v. State, No. 03-11-00120-CR, Quoted 2012 BL 224768 (Tex. App.-Austin Aug. 30, 2012) 734 DISTINGUISHED People v. Marsh, 2012 NY Slip Op 32321[U], 2012 BL 232523 (Sup. Ct. Aug. 30, 2012) 735 CITED Lestrade v. State, 96 So. 3d 1051 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) 736 CITED People v. Lopez, No. B233591, 2012 BL 224232 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. Aug. 29, 2012) 737 CITED Morales v. State, 96 So. 3d 1049 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) 738 DISCUSSED , Alshalabi v. United States, No. Quoted 11CV1421(RJD), 2012 BL 225297 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2012) 739 CITED Charles v. State, 96 So. 3d 1050 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) 740 CITED Jacob v. United States, No. 11- CV-482S., 10-CR-167S., 2012 BL 221026 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2012) 741 CITED , Quoted Ex parte Rabago, No. 14-12-00027- CR, 2012 BL 220542 (Tex. App.- Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 28, 2012) 742 CITED United States v. Creamer, CRIMINAL NO. 10-478., CIVIL NO. 12-975., 2012 BL 215654 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 24, 2012) 743 CITED , Quoted Burch v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., Case No. 8:09-CV-745-T-27TGW, 2012 BL 216428 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 23, 2012)

Citation Analysis ( 1000 cases ) 744 CITED , (See also) Gouvatsos v. Ercole, No. 09-CV-1449 (SJF), 2012 BL 215547 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2012) 745 DISCUSSED , Ex parte Gonzales, No. Nos. Quoted 10-10-00441-CR, 10-10-00442-CR, 2012 BL 218012 (Tex. App.-Waco Aug. 23, 2012) 746 DISCUSSED Ewan v. United States, Case No. 11- CV-06254 (FB), 2012 BL 214043 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2012) 747 DISCUSSED United States v. Banuelos, Case No. 08-CR-55-TCK, Civil No. 10-CV-47- TCK-TLW, 2012 BL 215286 (N.D. Okla. Aug. 23, 2012) 748 CITED , Quoted Leonard v. Warden, CASE NO. 2:10- CV-769, 2012 BL 216460 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 23, 2012) 749 CITED , Quoted Brooks v. McCoy, No. 5:11-HC-2222- F, 2012 BL 216030 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 22, 2012) 750 CITED Kissoon v. State, 95 So. 3d 1001 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) 751 CITED People v. Hamawi, No. D060996, 2012 BL 215370 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. Aug. 22, 2012) 752 CITED Louis v. State, 95 So. 3d 1001 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) 753 CITED People v. Hernandez, 98 A.D.3d 449, 950 N.Y.S.2d 268 (App Div, 1st Dept 2012) 754 CITED , Quoted Najimias-Nacach v. United States, CASE NO. 11-cr-225-IEG., Related Case: 12-cv-2012-IEG., [Doc. No. 43]., 2012 BL 215031 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2012) 755 CITED , Quoted Mateo-Castellanos v. Rapelje, No. 2:11-CV-13761, 2012 BL 211596 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 21, 2012) 756 CITED , Quoted Castro v. United States, CASE NO. 11-cr-323-IEG., Related Case: 12-

Citation Analysis ( 1000 cases ) cv-1036-IEG., [Doc. No. 26 in 11- cr-323]., 2012 BL 214876 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2012) 757 CITED , (See) People v. Hernandez, 98 A.D.3d 449, 950 N.Y.S.2d 268 (App Div, 1st Dept 2012) 758 CITED People v. Washington, No. H036756, 2012 BL 213433 (Cal. App. 6th Dist. Aug. 20, 2012) 759 DISCUSSED , United States v. Dwumaah, CRIMINAL Quoted NO. 1:05-CR-0157., 2012 BL 294022 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 20, 2012) 760 CITED Perocier-Morales v. United States, 887 F. Supp. 2d 399 (D.P.R. 2012) 761 CITED , Quoted Fondren v. Allen, No. 1:08-CV-2089- SLB-RRA, 2012 BL 210145 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 20, 2012) 762 DISTINGUISHED , United States v. Reeves, 695 F.3d 637 Quoted (7th Cir. 2012) 763 DISCUSSED State v. Hall, No. A-4356-10T3, 2012 BL 333492 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 17, 2012) 764 CITED , Quoted Cuevas v. United States, No. 10 Civ. 5959 (PAE) (GWG)., 98 Cr. 1053 (PAE)., 2012 BL 208564 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2012) 765 DISCUSSED Algee v. United States, No. 11-959- GPM, 2012 BL 206461 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 15, 2012) 766 CITED Jean v. State, 100 So. 3d 94 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) 767 CITED , (See) , Aladino v. United States, No. 09- Quoted cv-926 (CBA)., 2012 BL 206429 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2012) 768 CITED United States v. Sanchez-Cardenas, No. NOS. CR-07-2020-LRS-3, 2012 BL 209296 (E.D. Wash. Aug. 15, 2012) 769 CITED , Quoted Bogins v. Secretary, Florida Dept. of Corrections, Case No. 3:09-cv-572-

Citation Analysis ( 1000 cases ) J-34MCR., 2012 BL 207047 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 14, 2012) 770 DISCUSSED , In re Jagana, 170 Wn. App. 32, 282 Quoted P.3d 1153 (App. Div. 1 2012) 771 DISCUSSED People v. Anderson, 2012 NY Slip Op 32322[U], 2012 BL 232526 (Sup. Ct. Aug. 13, 2012) 772 CITED United States v. Mercer, CASE NO. 07-20167, 09-13350., 2012 BL 205806 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 13, 2012) 773 CITED , Quoted People v. Ostatishvili, 2012 NY Slip Op 32280[U], 2012 BL 229279 (Sup. Ct. Aug. 10, 2012) 774 CITED , (See also) United States v. Keller, No. 3:03- CR-00048-BR, (3:11-CV-70021-BR), 2012 BL 203245 (D. Or. Aug. 10, 2012)

775 DISTINGUISHED , Jelashovic v. State, 2012 UT App 220, Quoted 285 P.3d 14 776 CITED , Quoted Hampton v. Secretary, Florida Dept. of Corrections, Case No. 3:09-cv-471- J-34JBT, 2012 BL 203483 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 09, 2012) 777 CITED Camara v. New York, Case No. 11- CV-8235 (KMK)., 2012 BL 203201 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 09, 2012) 778 CITED Gamarra v. State, 93 So. 3d 1194 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) 779 CITED Moore v. United States, 881 F. Supp. 2d 125 (D.D.C. 2012) 780 CITED Spence v. Attorney General, 481 Fed. Appx. 43 (3d Cir. 2012) 781 CITED Zamora v. State, 112 So. 3d 112 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) 782 CITED Butte County Dept. of Employment & Social Servs. v. C.E., No. C064723, 2012 BL 201897 (Cal. App. 3d Dist. Aug. 08, 2012)

Citation Analysis ( 1000 cases ) 783 DISCUSSED People v. Montano, No. A132246, 2012 BL 201742 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. Aug. 07, 2012) 784 CITED , Quoted Davis v. Cavazos, CASE NO. 11- CV-1193-H (MDD), 2012 BL 200448 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 07, 2012) 785 DISCUSSED Gulzar v. State, 971 N.E.2d 1258 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) 786 CITED , Quoted United States v. Bradley, Cv. No. 09-2685-STA/cgc., Cr. No. 06-20416(JDB)-STA., 2012 BL 199366 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 06, 2012) 787 CITED Beck v. Rudek, Case No. CIV-11-1469- R., 2012 BL 199381 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 06, 2012) 788 CITED , Quoted Hooks v. Workman, 689 F.3d 1148 (10th Cir. 2012) 789 DISTINGUISHED , People v. Abdullah, 36 Misc. 3d 1233, Quoted 960 N.Y.S.2d 51 (Dist. Ct. 2012) 790 CITED , Quoted United States v. Calvillo, No. 3:07- cr-00094-RCJ-WGC-1, 2012 BL 200083 (D. Nev. Aug. 03, 2012) 791 CITED Marquez v. Attorney General, 490 Fed. Appx. 481 (3d Cir. 2012) 792 DISCUSSED , Quiroz v. Holder, 493 Fed. Appx. 116 (See) (1st Cir. 2012) 793 CITED O'Ferral v. Knipp, No. Case No.: 1:12- cv-00200-LJO-JLT., 2012 BL 196533 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 02, 2012) 794 DISCUSSED , Rahming v. State, No. M2011-01574- (See) CCA-R3-PC, 2012 BL 196958 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 01, 2012) 795 CITED Ex parte Ramirez, No. 08-11-00073- CR, 2012 BL 196262 (Tex. App.-El Paso Aug. 01, 2012) 796 DISCUSSED , United States v. Jabero, No. Quoted 03-81060-2, 2012 BL 191670 (E.D. Mich. July 31, 2012)

Citation Analysis ( 1000 cases ) 797 DISCUSSED , United States v. Miranda, Case No. Quoted 1:03-CR-054-02, 2012 BL 194633 (S.D. Ohio July 31, 2012) 798 CITED Binienda v. Scutt, No. 09-13233, 2012 BL 191107 (E.D. Mich. July 31, 2012) 799 DISTINGUISHED People v. Pedroza, No. B232825, 2012 BL 193394 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. July 31, 2012) 800 DISTINGUISHED Espinoza v. United States, CRIMINAL ACTION NO. L-8-2031-1, CIVIL ACTION NO. L-11-61, 2012 BL 192409 (S.D. Tex. July 30, 2012) 801 CITED Stevenson v. Curtin, No. 09-13358, 2012 BL 189954 (E.D. Mich. July 30, 2012) 802 CITED Byrd v. Lopez, No. 2:10-cv-2741 KJM JFM (HC), 2012 BL 191352 (E.D. Cal. July 30, 2012) 803 CITED Berry v. United States, 884 F. Supp. 2d 453 (E.D. Va. 2012) 804 CITED , (See) Chaparro v. Bartos, 481 Fed. Appx. 313 (9th Cir. 2012) 805 DISCUSSED , United States v. Brasier, No. CR Quoted S-08-0453 LKK KJN P, 2012 BL 190331 (E.D. Cal. July 27, 2012) 806 CITED United States v. Toolasprashad, 474 Fed. Appx. 408 (4th Cir. 2012) 807 CITED Uzoka v. Attorney General, 489 Fed. Appx. 595 (3d Cir. 2012) 808 DISTINGUISHED , Vazquez v. Dept. of Homeland Quoted Security, Case No. 8:11-cv-1274- T-23AEP., 2012 BL 189216 (M.D. Fla. July 26, 2012) 809 DISCUSSED Mendoza v. State, 821 N.W.2d 287 (Iowa Ct. App. 2012) 810 CITED Shah v. State, 821 N.W.2d 287 (Iowa Ct. App. 2012) 811 CITED Guerrero v. State, 821 N.W.2d 287 (Iowa Ct. App. 2012)

Citation Analysis ( 1000 cases ) 812 DISCUSSED Jones v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation & Parole, 492 Fed. Appx. 242 (3d Cir. 2012) 813 CITED , Quoted United States v. Akinsade, 686 F.3d 248 (4th Cir. 2012) 814 DISCUSSED United States v. Akinsade, 686 F.3d 248 (4th Cir. 2012) 815 CITED Yuma v. Holder, No. 8:12-CV-102., 2012 BL 184881 (D. Neb. July 24, 2012) 816 CITED Tayo v. United States, 5:95-CR-28- BR., No. 5:11-CV-638-BR, 2012 BL 188915 (E.D.N.C. July 24, 2012) 817 CITED , Quoted Dougherty v. United States, No. 12-0143-CV-W-ODS, 2012 BL 184338 (W.D. Mo. July 24, 2012) 818 CITED Gonzalez v. Holder, 476 Fed. Appx. 796 (5th Cir. 2012) 819 CITED , (See) United States v. Garcia, 689 F.3d 362 (5th Cir. 2012) 820 CITED , Quoted Jones v. Michigan, No. 2:12-CV-13007, 2012 BL 184235 (E.D. Mich. July 24, 2012) 821 CITED Johnson v. United States, Case No. 2:09-cv-647-FtM-29SPC., Case No. 2:06-cr-4-FtM-29SPC., 2012 BL 183041 (M.D. Fla. July 23, 2012) 822 DISCUSSED , United States v. Youngs, 687 F.3d 56 Quoted (2d Cir. 2012) 823 CITED , Quoted Baez v. Warren, No. 2:11-13552, 2012 BL 182538 (E.D. Mich. July 20, 2012) 824 CITED Robles v. Warden, 2012 Ct. Sup. 2115

825 CITED Beato v. United States, 472 Fed. Appx. 904 (11th Cir. 2012) 826 CITED Phillips v. Yates, No. 2:10-cv-1368 KJM JFM (HC), 2012 BL 183098 (E.D. Cal. July 19, 2012)

Citation Analysis ( 1000 cases ) 827 DISCUSSED , Ex parte Nguyen, No. 03-11-00710- Quoted CR, 2012 BL 185100 (Tex. App.-Austin July 18, 2012) 828 CITED , Quoted Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2012) 829 CITED , Quoted Tapanes v. United States, Case No. 2:10-cv-13-FtM-29SPC, Case No. 2:07-cr-43-FTM-29SPC, 2012 BL 178612 (M.D. Fla. July 18, 2012) 830 CITED , Quoted United States v. Schroyer, No. 3:09- cr-127(1), 2012 BL 177220 (S.D. Ohio July 17, 2012) 831 DISCUSSED , State v. Taylor, 344 Wis. 2d 124, 820 Quoted N.W.2d 156 (Ct. App. 2012) 832 CITED , Quoted Hernandez v. Bartkowski, Civil Action No. 11-1049 (FLW), 2012 BL 177308 (D.N.J. July 17, 2012) 833 CITED State v. Lee, No. W2011-02160-CCA- R3-CD, 2012 BL 181881 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 17, 2012) 834 DISCUSSED , Seales v. State, No. M2011-01151- Quoted CCA-R3-PC, 2012 BL 175929 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 13, 2012) 835 DISCUSSED United States v. Castillo, No. 2:00 CR 168, 2012 BL 174202 (N.D. Ind. July 13, 2012) 836 CITED Caraballo-Torres v. United States, 887 F. Supp. 2d 387 (D.P.R. 2012) 837 DISCUSSED United States v. Masoud, Case No. 03- CR-46., 2012 BL 176191 (E.D. Wis. July 13, 2012) 838 DISTINGUISHED People v. Flores, 2012 NY Slip Op 32244[U], 2012 BL 224187 (Sup. Ct. July 13, 2012) 839 DISCUSSED , People v. Melgar, No. F063206, 2012 Quoted BL 175143 (Cal. App. 5th Dist. July 13, 2012) 840 CITED , (See) People v. Oouch, 97 A.D.3d 904, 948 N.Y.S.2d 453 (App Div, 3d Dept 2012)

Citation Analysis ( 1000 cases ) 841 CITED , Quoted State v. Negrete, 2012 WI 92, 343 Wis. 2d 1, 819 N.W.2d 749 842 DISCUSSED State v. Cervantes, 169 Wn. App. 428, 282 P.3d 98 (App. Div. 3 2012) 843 CITED , Quoted State v. Thompson, 2012 WI 90, 342 Wis. 2d 674, 818 N.W.2d 904 844 DISCUSSED State v. Negrete, 2012 WI 92, 343 Wis. 2d 1, 819 N.W.2d 749 845 DISCUSSED , Guerrero v. State, 47 A.3d 289 (R.I. Quoted 2012) 846 CITED Quarterman v. United States, Case No. 2:11-cv-299-FtM-29DNF, Case No. 2:08-cr-66-FtM-29DNF, 2012 BL 171015 (M.D. Fla. July 11, 2012) 847 CITED Angel-Bello v. State, 91 So. 3d 276 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) 848 DISCUSSED , United States v. Mathur, 685 F.3d 396 Quoted (4th Cir. 2012) 849 CITED Howard v. United States, Case No. 2:11-cv-298-FtM-29DNF, Case No. 2:08-cr-66-FtM-29DNF, 2012 BL 171057 (M.D. Fla. July 11, 2012) 850 DISCUSSED People v. Banderas, No. E051589, 2012 BL 172091 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. July 10, 2012) 851 CITED , Quoted Schneider v. Booker, No. 2:10- CV-15017, 2012 BL 169734 (E.D. Mich. July 10, 2012) 852 CITED People v. Busgith, 954 N.Y.S.2d 760 (Sup. Ct. 2012) 853 DISCUSSED , Aguilar v. State, 375 S.W.3d 518 (Tex. Quoted App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2012) 854 CITED Horsley v. Haviland, No. 2:10-cv-1694 JAM JFM (HC), 2012 BL 171268 (E.D. Cal. July 10, 2012) 855 DISCUSSED , Aguilar v. State, 375 S.W.3d 518 (Tex. Quoted App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2012) 856 DISCUSSED United States v. Guerrero-Castro, 488 Fed. Appx. 300 (10th Cir. 2012)

Citation Analysis ( 1000 cases ) 857 CITED , Quoted State v. Harbour, No. A-1025-09T2, 2012 BL 333817 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 09, 2012) 858 CITED , Quoted People v. Rodriguez, 36 Misc. 3d 1239 (Sup. Ct. 2012) 859 CITED , Quoted People v. Rodriguez, 2012 NY Slip Op 32267[U], 2012 BL 227449 (Sup. Ct. July 09, 2012) 860 DISCUSSED People v. Cortes, No. A129974, 2012 BL 168118 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. July 06, 2012) 861 CITED Cabrera v. Trammell, 488 Fed. Appx. 294 (10th Cir. 2012) 862 CITED , Quoted Madison v. Secretary, Florida Dept. of Corrections, Case No. 3:09-cv-444- J-34JRK, 2012 BL 168870 (M.D. Fla. July 06, 2012) 863 CITED , Quoted Hogarth v. Secretary of Florida Dept. of Corrections, Case No. 3:09-cv-496- J-34JBT, 2012 BL 169055 (M.D. Fla. July 06, 2012) 864 CITED Cabrera v. State, 92 So. 3d 273 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) 865 CITED Valdivieso v. State, 90 So. 3d 376 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) 866 DISCUSSED People v. Valerio, 2012 NY Slip Op 32250[U], 2012 BL 226068 (Sup. Ct. July 05, 2012) 867 DISCUSSED , People v. Hendy, 2012 NY Slip Op Quoted 32255[U], 2012 BL 226081 (Sup. Ct. July 05, 2012) 868 CITED Dade v. Schneiderman, No. 12 Civ. 2092 (BMC)., 2012 BL 168327 (E.D.N.Y. July 05, 2012) 869 DISTINGUISHED Cisneros v. State, 92 So. 3d 278 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) 870 CITED Daria v. State, 92 So. 3d 875 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) 871 DISTINGUISHED State v. Ahmed, 727 S.E.2d 405 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012)

Citation Analysis ( 1000 cases ) 872 CITED Ayton v. Holder, 686 F.3d 331 (5th Cir. 2012) 873 CITED , Quoted People v. Burgos, 37 Misc. 3d 394, 950 N.Y.S.2d 428 (Sup. Ct. 2012) 874 DISCUSSED , People v. Gonzalez, 957 N.Y.S.2d 265 Quoted (Sup. Ct. 2012) 875 DISCUSSED , People v. Williams, 2012 NY Slip Op Quoted 32249[U], 2012 BL 226072 (Sup. Ct. June 29, 2012) 876 DISTINGUISHED , Ramirez v. State, No. 12-11-00322- Quoted CR, 2012 BL 164898 (Tex. App.-Tyler June 29, 2012) 877 DISCUSSED , Haddad v. United States, 486 Fed. Quoted Appx. 517 (6th Cir. 2012) 878 DISCUSSED Allong v. Govt. of Virgin Islands, No. 1:10-cv-00045-JEJ, 2012 BL 160936 (D.V.I. June 28, 2012) 879 CITED , (See) Mendoza v. United States, 690 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2012) 880 DISCUSSED , People v. Salazar, No. G045574, 2012 Quoted BL 161494 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. June 27, 2012) 881 CITED Sheridan v. State, 820 N.W.2d 159 (Iowa Ct. App. 2012) 882 CITED Baroudi v. Marshall, No. CIV S-09-1450 MCE JFM (HC), 2012 BL 159457 (E.D. Cal. June 26, 2012) 883 DISCUSSED , Marroquin v. United States, 480 Fed. Quoted Appx. 294 (5th Cir. 2012) 884 DISCUSSED Lopez v. State, No. M2011-02349- CCA-R3-PC, 2012 BL 160957 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 26, 2012) 885 DISCUSSED , Mainali v. Virginia, 873 F. Supp. 2d 748 (See) , Quoted (E.D. Va. 2012) 886 CITED , (See) Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 183 L. Ed. 2d 351, 115 FEP Cases 353 (2012) 887 CITED , (See) Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 183 L. Ed. 2d 351, 115 FEP Cases 353 (2012)

Citation Analysis ( 1000 cases ) 888 CITED Coley v. Attorney General, 485 Fed. Appx. 603 (3d Cir. 2012) 889 DISCUSSED , State v. Yekeh, No. A10-1374, 2012 Quoted BL 158013 (Minn. Ct. App. June 25, 2012) 890 CITED People v. Gomez-Hernandez, No. C064787, 2012 BL 158725 (Cal. App. 3d Dist. June 25, 2012) 891 DISCUSSED , Johnson v. Uribe, 682 F.3d 1238 (9th (See) , Quoted Cir. 2012) 892 CITED , Quoted Brown v. Berghuis, No. 2:10- CV-14833, 2012 BL 154669 (E.D. Mich. June 22, 2012) 893 DISCUSSED Francisco v. Yelich, No. 12-CV-2243 (SLT), 2012 BL 157218 (E.D.N.Y. June 21, 2012) 894 DISCUSSED State v. Henriot, No. A-3959-10T3, 2012 BL 333615 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 21, 2012) 895 CITED Arellano v. State, 90 So. 3d 923 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) 896 DISCUSSED , Bolarinho v. State, No. C.A. Quoted PM-2011-3700, 2012 BL 156793 (R.I. Super. June 20, 2012) 897 CITED Diaz-Luengas v. State, 90 So. 3d 923 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) 898 CITED , Quoted People v. Vallejo, 35 Misc. 3d 1243, 953 N.Y.S.2d 553 (Sup. Ct. 2012) 899 DISCUSSED , Campos v. State, 816 N.W.2d 480 Quoted (Minn. 2012) 900 DISCUSSED , Campos v. State, 816 N.W.2d 480 Quoted (Minn. 2012) 901 DISCUSSED , Ex parte Olvera, 394 S.W.3d 572 (Tex. Quoted App.-Dallas 2012) 902 DISTINGUISHED , People v. Santana, 36 Misc. 3d 1201, Quoted 957 N.Y.S.2d 266 (Sup. Ct. 2012) 903 DISCUSSED State v. Sansone, 2012-Ohio-2736 (App. 10th Dist. 2012)

Citation Analysis ( 1000 cases ) 904 CITED , Quoted Gates v. Thaler, 476 Fed. Appx. 336 (5th Cir. 2012) 905 DISCUSSED , United States v. Rodriguez-Rivera, Quoted Case No. 07-CR-0026 (PJS/AJB)., 2012 BL 150748 (D. Minn. June 18, 2012) 906 DISCUSSED Cantu v. State, No. M2011-02506- CCA-R3-PC, 2012 BL 151984 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 18, 2012) 907 DISCUSSED Bush v. State, No. M2011-02133-CCA- R3-PC, 2012 BL 148489 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 15, 2012) 908 CITED , Quoted Parker v. Bauman, No. 5:10-CV-14304, 2012 BL 146992 (E.D. Mich. June 15, 2012) 909 DISCUSSED Meraz v. United States, No. 7:09- cr-00064-KOB-JEO., 7:10-cv-08041- KOB-JEO., 2012 BL 146282 (N.D. Ala. June 14, 2012) 910 DISCUSSED , People v. Zaia, No. D059312, 2012 BL Quoted 150993 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. June 14, 2012) 911 CITED People v. Haley, 96 A.D.3d 1168, 946 N.Y.S.2d 678 (App Div, 3d Dept 2012)

912 CITED Oriakhi v. United States, 469 Fed. Appx. 78 (3d Cir. 2012) 913 CITED , Quoted People v. Castro, No. B233013, 2012 BL 150976 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. June 13, 2012) 914 FOLLOWED Smith v. State, 89 So. 3d 1107 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) 915 CITED Gabe v. United States, Case No. CV412-145., [underlying CR405-281]., 2012 BL 145608 (S.D. Ga. June 13, 2012) 916 DISCUSSED Sanchez v. State, 89 So. 3d 1118 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012)

Citation Analysis ( 1000 cases ) 917 DISCUSSED People v. Roselien, 35 Misc. 3d 150, 953 N.Y.S.2d 552 (App Term, 2d Dept 2012) 918 DISCUSSED , People v. Cruz, No. F062037, 2012 BL Quoted 145943 (Cal. App. 5th Dist. June 12, 2012) 919 DISCUSSED Williams v. State, 367 S.W.3d 652 (Mo. App. E.D. 2012) 920 DISCUSSED , Perez v. State, 816 N.W.2d 354 (Iowa Quoted 2012) 921 DISCUSSED , People v. Haffiz, 19 N.Y.3d 883, 951 Quoted N.Y.S.2d 690, 976 N.E.2d 216 (2012) 922 DISCUSSED , Ekechuckwu v. United States, No. Quoted 3:12CV109-GCM, 95CR154-GCM-1, 2012 BL 141721 (W.D.N.C June 07, 2012) 923 DISTINGUISHED , People v. Carty, 96 A.D.3d 1093, 947 Quoted N.Y.S.2d 617 (App Div, 3d Dept 2012)

924 CITED United States v. Adewuyi, No. 11-10069-EFM., 2012 BL 139174 (D. Kan. June 06, 2012) 925 DISCUSSED , People v. Picca, 97 A.D.3d 170, 947 Quoted N.Y.S.2d 120 (App Div, 2d Dept 2012)

926 CITED Liggins v. McDonald, No. 2:09-cv-1777 GEB EFB P, 2012 BL 139272 (E.D. Cal. June 06, 2012) 927 DISCUSSED State v. Batista-Izaias, No. A-0824-10T2, 2012 BL 328550 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 05, 2012) 928 DISCUSSED , People v. Lezama, 35 Misc. 3d 1235, Quoted 953 N.Y.S.2d 552 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. 2012) 929 DISCUSSED , State v. Ramirez, 2012-NMCA-057, Quoted 278 P.3d 569 930 DISCUSSED , Ross v. Wolfe, CIVIL ACTION NO. (See) JKB-11-1672., 2012 BL 135339 (D. Md. June 04, 2012)

Citation Analysis ( 1000 cases ) 931 CITED State v. Ninefeldt, No. A11-1061, 2012 BL 137175 (Minn. Ct. App. June 04, 2012) 932 DISCUSSED State v. Nunez-Delprado, No. A-0065-10T2, 2012 BL 333199 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 04, 2012) 933 CITED Ross v. Wolfe, CIVIL ACTION NO. JKB-11-1672., 2012 BL 140555 (D. Md. June 01, 2012) 934 CITED Herrera v. State, 90 So. 3d 864 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) 935 DISCUSSED , O'Neill v. State, 107 So. 3d 1133 (Fla. Quoted 2d DCA 2012) 936 CITED , Quoted Anderson v. Birkett, No. 2:11- CV-10346, 2012 BL 132799 (E.D. Mich. May 31, 2012) 937 CITED , Quoted United States v. Gomez-Alvarez, 482 Fed. Appx. 330 (10th Cir. 2012) 938 CITED , Quoted Lee v. Thomas, No. CIVIL ACTION 10-0587-WS-M, 2012 BL 133108 (S.D. Ala. May 30, 2012) 939 DISCUSSED United States v. Castro-Inzunza, Case No. 3:11-cr-00418-MA., 2012 BL 134177 (D. Or. May 30, 2012) 940 CITED , Quoted Kirschke v. Prelesnik, No. 2:10- CV-10229, 2012 BL 131631 (E.D. Mich. May 30, 2012) 941 CITED , Quoted Murray v. Romanowski, No. 2:11- CV-14007, 2012 BL 131619 (E.D. Mich. May 30, 2012) 942 CITED State v. Adim, No. A-0329-10T1, 2012 BL 333389 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 29, 2012) 943 CITED , (See) Bobadilla v. Holder, 679 F.3d 1052 (8th Cir. 2012) 944 CITED Morel v. United States, No. 02 Cr. 1542 (SHS), 2012 BL 129994 (S.D.N.Y. May 29, 2012) 945 CITED McCullers v. United States, CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:12cv37, [ORIGINAL

Citation Analysis ( 1000 cases ) CRIMINAL NO. 4:07cr49], 2012 BL 130095 (E.D. Va. May 29, 2012) 946 CITED United States v. Onyango, CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 09-128-KSF., (Civil Action No. 12-7195-KSF-JGW)., 2012 BL 130954 (E.D. Ky. May 29, 2012) 947 CITED , Quoted Pride v. Secretary, Florida Dept. of Corrections, Case No. 3:09-cv-323- J-34MCR., 2012 BL 131362 (M.D. Fla. May 29, 2012) 948 CITED , Quoted Carter v. Secretary, Florida Dept. of Corrections, Case No. 3:09-cv-628- J-34JBT., 2012 BL 131372 (M.D. Fla. May 29, 2012) 949 CITED , (See) People v. Cole, 491 Mich. 325, 817 N.W.2d 497 (2012) 950 CITED , Quoted People v. Tabios, No. F061371, 2012 BL 129516 (Cal. App. 5th Dist. May 25, 2012) 951 DISCUSSED State v. Lipa, No. A-5565-09T2, 2012 BL 333963 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 25, 2012) 952 DISCUSSED , Solano v. United States, No. Case Quoted Nos. 3:11cv00112, Case Nos. 3:08cr00154-1, 2012 BL 128746 (S.D. Ohio May 25, 2012) 953 CITED State v. Balcacer, No. A-2825-10T4, 2012 BL 333931 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 24, 2012) 954 CITED , Quoted Rote v. Secretary, Florida Dept. of Corrections, Case No. 3:09-cv-1218- J-20MCR., 2012 BL 128341 (M.D. Fla. May 23, 2012) 955 CITED Volcimus v. State, 87 So. 3d 1263 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) 956 DISCUSSED Pawlowski v. Holder, 482 Fed. Appx. 162 (7th Cir. 2012) 957 DISCUSSED , People v. Wagner, No. G044721, 2012 Quoted BL 127853 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. May 23, 2012)

Citation Analysis ( 1000 cases ) 958 CITED , Quoted Perry v. Scutt, No. 5:11-CV-13960, 2012 BL 126070 (E.D. Mich. May 23, 2012) 959 DISCUSSED State v. Camilo, No. A-0236-10T1, 2012 BL 328482 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 21, 2012) 960 DISCUSSED People v. Delcastillo, 35 Misc. 3d 1227, 953 N.Y.S.2d 552 (Sup. Ct. 2012) 961 DISCUSSED State v. Brown, No. A-5283-08T3, 2012 BL 333129 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 21, 2012) 962 CITED People v. Presley, 2012 IL App (2d) 100617, 360 Ill. Dec. 907, 969 N.E.2d 952 963 CITED , Quoted United States v. Watson, Case No. 11- CR-0166-002-CVE., 2012 BL 123186 (N.D. Okla. May 18, 2012) 964 CITED United States v. Titus, CRIMINAL NO. 3:10-585-CMC., 2012 BL 123132 (D.S.C. May 18, 2012) 965 CITED , Quoted United States v. Wilson, 872 F. Supp. 2d 493 (E.D. La. 2012) 966 CITED , Quoted United States v. Davis, CRIMINAL DOCKET NO. 08-231 SECTION "L"., 2012 BL 342716 (E.D. La. May 17, 2012) 967 CITED , (See) Caraballo-Torres v. United States, 887 F. Supp. 2d 387 (D.P.R. 2012) 968 DISCUSSED , Ex parte Ali, 368 S.W.3d 827 (Tex. Quoted App.-Austin 2012) 969 DISCUSSED , (Cf.) Smith v. Bank of America Corp., 865 F. Supp. 2d 298 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) 970 CITED , Quoted Suarez v. State, 967 N.E.2d 552 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) 971 DISCUSSED , Martinez v. State, No. PD-1338-11, Quoted 2012 BL 121104 (Tex. Crim. App. May 16, 2012) 972 CITED , Quoted Meek v. Bergh, No. 09-11674, 2012 BL 119836 (E.D. Mich. May 16, 2012)

Citation Analysis ( 1000 cases ) 973 CITED People v. Breslin, 205 Cal.App.4th 1409, 140 Cal.Rptr.3d 906 (App. 1st Dist. 2012) 974 DISCUSSED Ramos v. State, 88 So. 3d 997 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) 975 CITED People v. Shokur, 205 Cal.App.4th 1398, 141 Cal.Rptr.3d 283 (App. 4th Dist. 2012) 976 CITED United States v. Nunez, Case No. 09-40039-01., 11-4118-RDR., 2012 BL 119513 (D. Kan. May 15, 2012) 977 DISCUSSED , Ex parte Haddad, No. 05-12-00028- Quoted CR, 2012 BL 119663 (Tex. App.-Dallas May 14, 2012) 978 DISCUSSED , Salim v. Napolitano, Civil Action No. Quoted CV-11-S-3402-NE, 2012 BL 126992 (N.D. Ala. May 14, 2012) 979 DISCUSSED Torres v. State, 93 So. 3d 350 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) 980 CITED , Quoted Akinsade v. Holder, 678 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 2012) 981 CITED , Quoted Green v. Secretary, Dept. of Corrections, Case No. 8:12-cv-1011- T-17AEP, 2012 BL 116711 (M.D. Fla. May 10, 2012) 982 CITED Obomighie v. United States, 480 Fed. Appx. 227 (4th Cir. 2012) 983 CITED , Quoted Matthews v. Berghuis, No. 2:10- CV-11974, 2012 BL 114723 (E.D. Mich. May 10, 2012) 984 DISCUSSED , United States v. Amer, 681 F.3d 211 Quoted (5th Cir. 2012) 985 DISCUSSED , Thomas v. State, 365 S.W.3d 537 Quoted (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2012) 986 CITED Espinal-Gutierrez v. United States, 887 F. Supp. 2d 361 (D.P.R. 2012) 987 CITED State v. Santos, 210 N.J. 129, 42 A.3d 141 (2012)

Citation Analysis ( 1000 cases ) 988 CITED People v. Latalski, 35 Misc. 3d 1222, 953 N.Y.S.2d 552 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. 2012) 989 CITED Vassell v. United States, Civil Action No. 3:12-CV-23, Criminal Action No. 3:89-CR-190 (GROH), 2012 BL 112837 (N.D. W. Va. May 07, 2012) 990 CITED People v. Castillo, 35 Misc. 3d 1220, 953 N.Y.S.2d 552 (Sup. Ct. 2012) 991 CITED , Quoted Villalpando v. United States, No. C 10-4051-MWB, 2012 BL 111266 (N.D. Iowa May 04, 2012) 992 DISTINGUISHED State v. Ruiz, 2012 UT 29, 282 P.3d 998 993 CITED Hamilton v. Holder, 480 Fed. Appx. 35 (2d Cir. 2012) 994 CITED , Quoted Elham v. Kane, No. CV-11-02372- PHX-NVW (LOA), 2012 BL 111970 (D. Ariz. May 04, 2012) 995 CITED , Quoted Bennett v. Curley, No. 09-12054, 2012 BL 108431 (E.D. Mich. May 03, 2012) 996 CITED , Quoted Mosley v. United States, No. 08-20026, 2012 BL 108413 (E.D. Mich. May 03, 2012) 997 CITED , (See also) Matter of Aaron H. v. James G., 35 Misc. 3d 1219, 951 N.Y.S.2d 84 (Fam. Ct. 2012) 998 DISCUSSED People v. Glasgow, 95 A.D.3d 1367, 943 N.Y.S.2d 674 (App Div, 3d Dept 2012) 999 CITED Henriquez v. United States, NO. 5:06- CR-232-FL, NO. 5:11-CV-142-FL, 2012 BL 109275 (E.D.N.C. May 02, 2012) 1000 CITED , Quoted United States v. Ramos, 470 Fed. Appx. 836 (11th Cir. 2012)

Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 185 L. Ed. 2d 149 (2013) [2013 BL 44424]

Pagination * S. Ct. ** L. Ed. 2d *** BL

Supreme Court of the United States

ROSELVA CHAIDEZ, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES.

No. 11-820 On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Argued November 1, 2012, Decided February 20, 2013 October TERM, 2012 [**152] [*1104] Syllabus

Immigration officials initiated removal proceedings against petitioner Chaidez in 2009 upon learning that she had pleaded guilty to mail fraud in 2004. To avoid removal, she sought to overturn that conviction by filing a petition for a writ of coram nobis, contending that her former attorney's failure to advise her of the guilty plea's immigration consequences constituted ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. While her petition was pending, this Court held in Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. ___, that the Sixth Amendment requires defense attorneys to inform non-citizen clients of the deportation risks of guilty pleas. The District Court vacated Chaidez's conviction, determining that Padilla did not announce a "new rule" under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, and thus applied to Chaidez's case. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that Padilla had [**153] declared a new rule and should not apply in a challenge to a final conviction.

Held: Padilla does not apply retroactively to cases already final on direct review. Pp. 3-15.

(a) Under Teague, a person whose conviction is already final may not benefit from a new rule of criminal procedure on collateral review. A "case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final." Teague, 489 U.S., at 301. And a holding is not so dictated unless it would have been "apparent to all reasonable jurists." Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 527-528. At the same time, a case does not "announce a new rule, [when] it [is] merely an application of the principle that governed" a prior decision to a different set of facts. Teague, 489 U.S., at 307. Thus, garden-variety applications of the test in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, for assessing ineffective assistance claims do not produce new rules, id., at 687-688.

But Padilla did more than just apply Strickland's general standard to yet another factual situation. Before deciding if failing to inform a client about the risk of deportation "fell below [Strickland's] objective standard of reasonableness," 466 U.S., at 688, Padilla first considered the threshold question whether advice about deportation was "categorically removed" from the scope of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel because it involved only a "collateral consequence" of a conviction, rather than a component of a criminal sentence, 559 U.S., at ___. That is, prior to asking how the Strickland test applied, Padilla asked whether that test applied at all.

That preliminary question came to the Court unsettled. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, had explicitly left open whether the Sixth Amendment right extends to collateral consequences. That left the issue to the state and lower federal courts, and they [*1105] almost unanimously concluded that the Sixth Amendment does not require attorneys to inform their clients of a conviction's collateral consequences, including deportation. Padilla's contrary ruling [***2] thus answered an open question about the Sixth Amendment's reach, in a way that altered the law of most jurisdictions. In

© 2013 Bloomberg Finance L.P. All rights reserved. Terms of Service View at Bloomberg Law // PAGE 1 Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 185 L. Ed. 2d 149 (2013), Court Opinion so doing, Padilla broke new ground and imposed a new obligation. Pp. 3-11.

(b) Chaidez argues that Padilla did no more than apply Strickland to a new set of facts. But she ignores that Padilla had to develop new law to determine that Strickland applied at all. The few lower court decisions she cites held only that a lawyer may not affirmatively misrepresent his expertise or otherwise actively mislead his client as to any important matter. Those rulings do not apply to her case, and they do not show that all reasonable judges thought that lawyers had to advise their clients about deportation risks. Neither does INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, have any relevance here. In saying that a reasonably competent lawyer would tell a non-citizen client about a guilty plea's deportation [**154] consequences, St. Cyr did not determine that the Sixth Amendment requires a lawyer to provide such information. It took Padilla to decide that question. Pp. 11-15.

655 F. 3d 684, affirmed.

KAGAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and SCALIA, KENNEDY, BREYER, and ALITO, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which GINSBURG, J., joined.

JUSTICE KAGAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

In Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. ___ (2010), this Court held that the Sixth Amendment requires an attorney for a criminal defendant to provide advice about the risk of deportation arising from a guilty plea. We consider here whether that ruling applies retroactively, so that a person whose conviction became final before we decided Padilla can benefit from it. We conclude that, under the principles set out in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), Padilla does not have retroactive effect.

Petitioner Roselva Chaidez hails from Mexico, but became a lawful permanent resident of the United States in 1977. About 20 years later, she helped to defraud an automobile insurance company out of $26,000. After federal agents uncovered [*1106] the scheme, Chaidez pleaded guilty to two counts of mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S. C. § 1341. The District Court sentenced her to four years of probation and ordered her to pay restitution. Chaidez's conviction became final in 2004.

Under federal immigration law, the offenses to which Chaidez pleaded guilty are "aggravated felonies," subjecting her to mandatory removal from this country. See 8 U.S. C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(M)(i), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). But according to Chaidez, her attorney never advised her of that fact, and at the time of her plea she remained ignorant of it.

Immigration officials initiated removal proceedings against Chaidez in 2009, after an application she made for citizenship alerted them to her prior conviction. To avoid removal, Chaidez sought to overturn that conviction by filing a petition for a writ of coram nobis in Federal District Court.[fn1] She argued that her former attorney's failure to advise her of the immigration consequences of pleading guilty constituted ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment.

While Chaidez's petition [***3] was pending, this Court decided Padilla. Our ruling vindicated Chaidez's view of the Sixth Amendment: We held that [**155] criminal defense attorneys must inform non-citizen clients of the risks of deportation arising from guilty pleas. See 559 U.S., at ___ (slip op., at 9). But the Government argued that Chaidez could not benefit from Padilla because it announced a "new rule" and, under Teague, such rules do not apply in collateral challenges to already-final convictions.

The District Court determined that Padilla "did not announce a new rule for Teague purposes," and therefore should apply to Chaidez's case. 730 F. Supp. 2d 896, 904 (ND Ill. 2010). It then found that Chaidez's counsel had performed

© 2013 Bloomberg Finance L.P. All rights reserved. Terms of Service View at Bloomberg Law // PAGE 2 Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 185 L. Ed. 2d 149 (2013), Court Opinion deficiently under Padilla and that Chaidez suffered prejudice as a result. Accordingly, the court vacated Chaidez's conviction. See No. 03 CR 636-6, [2010 BL 252301], 2010 WL 3979664 (ND Ill., Oct. 6, 2010).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that Padilla had declared a new rule and so should not apply in a challenge to a final conviction. "Before Padilla," the Seventh Circuit reasoned, "the [Supreme] Court had never held that the Sixth Amendment requires a criminal defense attorney to provide advice about matters not directly related to [a] client's criminal prosecution," including the risks of deportation. 655 F. 3d 684, 693 (2011). And state and lower federal courts had uniformly concluded that an attorney need not give "advice concerning [such a] collateral (as opposed to direct) consequenc[e] of a guilty plea." Id., at 690. According to the Seventh Circuit, Padilla's holding was new because it ran counter to that widely accepted "distinction between direct and collateral consequences." 655 F. 3d, at 691. Judge Williams dissented. Agreeing with the Third Circuit's view, she argued that Padilla "broke no new ground" because it merely applied established law about a lawyer's "duty to consult" with a client. 655 F. 3d, at 695 (quoting United States v. Orocio, 645 F. 3d 630, 638-639 (CA3 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted)). [*1107]

We granted certiorari, 566 U.S. ___ (2012), to resolve a split among federal and state courts on whether Padilla applies retroactively.[fn2] Holding that it does not, we affirm the Seventh Circuit.

Teague makes the retroactivity of our criminal procedure decisions turn on whether they are novel. When we announce a "new rule," a person whose conviction is already final may not benefit from the decision in a habeas or similar proceeding.[fn3] Only when we apply a settled rule may a person avail herself of the decision on collateral review. Here, Chaidez filed her coram nobis petition five years after her guilty plea became final. Her challenge therefore fails if Padilla declared a new rule. [**156]

"[A] case announces a new rule," Teague explained, "when it breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation" on the government. 489 U.S., at 301. "To put it differently," we continued, "a case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final." Ibid. And a holding is not so dictated, we later stated, unless it would have been "apparent to all reasonable jurists." Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 527-528 (1997).

But that account has a flipside. Teague also made [***4] clear that a case does not "announce a new rule, [when] it `[is] merely an application of the principle that governed'" a prior decision to a different set of facts. 489 U.S., at 307 (quoting Yates v. Aiken, 484 U.S. 211, 217 (1988)). As JUSTICE KENNEDY has explained, "[w]here the beginning point" of our analysis is a rule of "general application, a rule designed for the specific purpose of evaluating a myriad of factual contexts, it will be the infrequent case that yields a result so novel that it forges a new rule, one not dictated by precedent." Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 309 (1992) (concurring in judgment); see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391 (2000). Otherwise said, when all we do is apply a general standard to the kind of factual circumstances it was meant to address, we will rarely state a new rule for Teague purposes.

Because that is so, garden-variety applications of the test in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), for assessing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel do not produce new rules. In Strickland, we held that legal representation violates the Sixth Amendment if it falls "below an objective standard of reasonableness," as indicated by "prevailing professional norms," and the defendant suffers prejudice as a result. Id., at 687-688. That standard, we later concluded, "provides sufficient guidance for resolving virtually all" claims of ineffective assistance, even [*1108] though their particular circumstances will differ. Williams, 529 U.S., at 391. And so we have granted relief under Strickland in diverse contexts without ever suggesting that doing so required a new rule. See, e.g., ibid.; Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003).[fn4] In like manner, Padilla would not have created a new rule had it only applied Strickland's general standard to yet another factual situation — that is, had Padilla merely made clear that a lawyer who neglects to inform a client about the risk of deportation is professionally incompetent.

But Padilla did something more. Before deciding if failing to provide such advice "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness," Padilla[**157] considered a threshold question: Was advice about deportation "categorically removed" from the scope of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel because it involved only a "collateral consequence" of a conviction, rather than a component of the criminal sentence? 559 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 7-9).[fn5] In other words, prior to asking how the Strickland test applied ("Did this attorney act unreasonably?"), Padilla asked whether the Strickland test applied ("Should we even evaluate if this attorney acted unreasonably?"). And as we will describe, that preliminary question about Strickland's ambit came to the Padilla Court unsettled — so that the Court's answer ("Yes, Strickland governs here") required a new rule.

The relevant background begins with our decision in Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985), which explicitly left open whether advice concerning a collateral consequence must satisfy Sixth Amendment requirements. Hill pleaded guilty to first-degree murder after his attorney misinformed him about his parole eligibility. In addressing his claim of ineffective assistance, we first held that the Strickland[***5] standard extends generally to the plea process. See Hill, 474 U. S., at 57. We then determined, however, that Hill had failed to allege prejudice from the lawyer's error and so could not prevail under that standard. See id., at 60. That conclusion allowed us to avoid another, more categorical question: whether advice about parole (however inadequate and prejudicial) could possibly violate the Sixth Amendment. The Court of Appeals, we noted, had held "that parole eligibility is a collateral rather than a direct consequence of a guilty plea, of which a defendant need not be informed." Id., at 55. But our ruling on prejudice made "it unnecessary to determine whether there may be circumstances under which" advice about a matter deemed collateral violates the Sixth Amendment. Id., at 60.[*1109] [fn6]

That non-decision left the state and lower federal courts to deal with the issue; and they almost unanimously concluded that the Sixth Amendment does not require attorneys to inform their clients of a conviction's collateral consequences, including deportation. All 10 federal appellate courts to consider the question decided, in the words of one, that "counsel's failure to inform a defendant of the collateral consequences of a guilty plea is never" a violation of the Sixth Amendment. Santos-Sanchez v. United States, 548 F. 3d 327, 334 (CA5 2008).[fn7] That constitutional guarantee, another typical decision expounded, "assures an accused [**158] of effective assistance of counsel in `criminal prosecutions'"; accordingly, advice about matters like deportation, which are "not a part of or enmeshed in the criminal proceeding," does not fall within the Amendment's scope. United States v. George, 869 F. 2d 333, 337 (CA7 1989). Appellate courts in almost 30 States agreed.[fn8]

By contrast, only two state courts held that an attorney could violate the Sixth Amendment by failing to inform a client about deportation risks or other collateral consequences of a guilty plea.[fn9] That imbalance led the authors of the principal scholarly article on the subject to call the exclusion of advice about collateral consequences from the Sixth Amendment's scope one of "the most widely recognized rules of American law." Chin & Holmes, Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 697, 706 (2002).[*1110] [fn10]

So when we decided Padilla, we answered a question about the Sixth Amendment's reach that we had left open, in a way that altered the law of most jurisdictions — and our reasoning reflected that we were doing as much. In the normal Strickland case, a court begins by evaluating the reasonableness of an attorney's conduct in light of professional norms, and then assesses prejudice. But as earlier indicated, see supra , at 5-6, Padilla had a different starting point. Before asking whether the performance of Padilla's attorney was deficient under Strickland, we considered (in a separately numbered part of the [**159] opinion) whether Strickland applied at all. See 559 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 7-9). Many courts, we acknowledged, had excluded advice about collateral matters from the Sixth Amendment's ambit; and deportation, because the consequence of a distinct [***6] civil proceeding, could well be viewed as such a matter. See id., at ___ (slip op., at 7). But, we continued, no decision of our own committed us to "appl[y] a distinction between direct and collateral consequences to define the scope" of the right to counsel. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 8). And however apt that distinction might be in other contexts, it should not exempt from Sixth Amendment scrutiny a lawyer's advice (or non-advice) about a plea's deportation risk. Deportation, we stated, is "unique." Ibid. It is a "particularly severe" penalty, and one "intimately related to the criminal process"; indeed, immigration statutes make it "nearly an automatic result" of some convictions. Ibid. We thus resolved the threshold question before us by breaching the previously chink-free wall between direct and collateral

© 2013 Bloomberg Finance L.P. All rights reserved. Terms of Service View at Bloomberg Law // PAGE 4 Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 185 L. Ed. 2d 149 (2013), Court Opinion consequences: Notwithstanding the then-dominant view, "Strickland applies to Padilla's claim." Id., at ___ (slip op., at 9).

If that does not count as "break[ing] new ground" or "impos[ing] a new obligation," we are hard pressed to know what would. Teague, 489 U. S., at 301. Before Padilla, we had declined to decide whether the Sixth Amendment had any relevance to a lawyer's advice about matters not part of a criminal proceeding. Perhaps some advice of that kind would have to meet Strickland's reasonableness standard — but then again, perhaps not: No precedent of our own "dictated" the answer. Teague, 489 U. S., at 301. And as the lower courts filled the vacuum, they almost uniformly insisted on what Padilla called the "categorica[l] remov[al]" of advice about a conviction's non-criminal consequences — including deportation — from the Sixth Amendment's scope. 559 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 9). It was Padilla that first rejected that categorical approach — and so made the Strickland test operative — when a criminal lawyer gives (or fails to give) advice about immigration consequences.[fn11] In acknowledging that [*1111] fact, we do not cast doubt on, or at all denigrate, Padilla. Courts often need to, and do, break new ground; it is the very premise of Teague that a decision can be right and also be novel. All we say here is that Padilla's holding that the failure [**160] to advise about a non-criminal consequence could violate the Sixth Amendment would not have been — in fact, was not — "apparent to all reasonable jurists" prior to our decision. Lambrix, 520 U. S., at 527-528. Padilla thus announced a "new rule."

III

Chaidez offers, and the dissent largely adopts, a different account of Padilla, in which we did no more than apply Strickland to a new set of facts. On Chaidez's view, Strickland insisted "[f]rom its inception" that all aspects of a criminal lawyer's performance pass a test of "`reasonableness under prevailing professional norms'": The decision thus foreclosed any "categorical distinction between direct and collateral consequences." Brief for Petitioner 21-22 (emphasis deleted) (quoting Strickland, 466 U. S., at 688). Indeed, Chaidez contends, courts prior to Padilla recognized Strickland's all-encompassing scope and so applied its reasonableness standard to advice concerning deportation. See Brief for Petitioner 25-26; Reply Brief 10-12. She here points to caselaw in three federal appeals courts allowing [***7] ineffective assistance claims when attorneys affirmatively misled their clients about the deportation consequences of guilty pleas.[fn12] The only question left for Padilla to resolve, Chaidez claims, was whether professional norms also require criminal lawyers to volunteer advice about the risk of deportation. In addressing that issue, she continues, Padilla did a run-of-the-mill Strickland analysis. And more: It did an especially easy Strickland analysis. We had earlier noted in INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001) — a case raising an issue of immigration law unrelated to the Sixth Amendment — that a "competent defense counsel" would inform his client about a guilty plea's deportation consequences. Id., at 323, n. 50.

All Padilla had to do, Chaidez concludes, was recite that prior finding.

But Chaidez's (and the dissent's) story line is wrong, for reasons we have mostly already noted: Padilla had to develop new law, establishing that the Sixth Amendment applied at all, before it could assess the performance of Padilla's lawyer under Strickland. See supra , at 5-6, 9. Our first order of business was thus to consider whether the widely accepted distinction between direct and collateral consequences categorically foreclosed Padilla's claim, whatever the level of his attorney's performance. We did not think, as Chaidez argues, that Strickland barred resort to that distinction. Far from it: [*1112] Even in Padilla we did not eschew the direct-collateral divide across the board. See 559 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 8) ("Whether that distinction is [generally] appropriate is a question we need not consider in this case"). Rather, we relied on the special "nature of deportation" — the severity of the penalty and the "automatic" way it follows from conviction — to show that "[t]he collateral versus direct distinction [was] ill-suited" to dispose of Padilla's claim. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 8-9). All that reasoning came before we conducted a Strickland analysis (by examining professional [**161] norms and so forth), and none of it followed ineluctably from prior law.[fn13]

Predictably, then, the caselaw Chaidez and the dissent cite fails to support their claim that lower courts "accepted that Strickland applied to deportation advice." Brief for Petitioner 25; see post, at 8-11. True enough, three federal circuits

(and a handful of state courts) held before Padilla that misstatements about deportation could support an ineffective assistance claim. But those decisions reasoned only that a lawyer may not affirmatively misrepresent his expertise or otherwise actively mislead his client on any important matter, however related to a criminal prosecution. See, e.g., United States v. Kwan, 407 F. 3d 1005, 1015-1017 (CA9 2005). They co-existed happily with precedent, from the same jurisdictions (and almost all others), holding that deportation is not "so unique as to warrant an exception to the general rule that a defendant need not be advised of the [collateral] consequences of a guilty plea." United States v. Campbell, 778 F. 2d 764, 769 (CA11 1985).[fn14] So at most, Chaidez has shown that a minority of courts recognized a separate rule for material misrepresentations, regardless whether [***8] they concerned deportation or another collateral matter. That limited rule does not apply to Chaidez's case. And because it lived in harmony with the exclusion of claims like hers from the Sixth Amendment, it does not establish what she needs to — that all reasonable judges, prior to Padilla, thought they were living in a Padilla-like world.

Nor, finally, does St. Cyr have any relevance here. That decision stated what is common sense (and what we again recognized in Padilla): A reasonably competent lawyer will tell a non-citizen client about a guilty plea's deportation consequences because "`[p]reserving the client's right to remain in the United States may be more important to the client than any potential jail sentence.'" Padilla, 559 U. S., at ___ ([*1113] slip op., at 10) (quoting St. Cyr, 533 U. S., at 322). But in saying that much, St. Cyr did not determine that the Sixth Amendment requires a lawyer to provide such information. Courts had held to the contrary not because advice about deportation was insignificant to a client — really, who could [**162] think that, whether before or after St. Cyr? — but because it concerned a matter collateral to the criminal prosecution.[fn15] On those courts' view, the Sixth Amendment no more demanded competent advice about a plea's deportation consequences than it demanded competent representation in the deportation process itself. Padilla decided that view was wrong. But to repeat: It was Padilla that did so. In the years following St. Cyr, not a single state or lower federal court considering a lawyer's failure to provide deportation advice abandoned the distinction between direct and collateral consequences, and several courts reaffirmed that divide. See, e.g., Santos-Sanchez, 548 F. 3d, at 335-336; Broomes v. Ashcroft, 358 F. 3d 1251, 1256-1257 (CA10 2004); United States v. Fry, 322 F. 3d 1198, 1200-1201 (CA9 2003). It took Padilla to decide that in assessing such a lawyer's performance, the Sixth Amendment sets the standard.[fn16]

This Court announced a new rule in Padilla. Under Teague, defendants whose convictions became final prior to Padilla therefore cannot benefit from its holding. We accordingly affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.

It is so ordered.

[fn1] A petition for a writ of coram nobis provides a way to collaterally attack a criminal conviction for a person, like Chaidez, who is no longer "in custody" and therefore cannot seek habeas relief under 28 U.S. C. § 2255 or § 2241. See United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 507, 510-511 (1954). Chaidez and the Government agree that nothing in this case turns on the difference between a coram nobis petition and a habeas petition, and we assume without deciding that they are correct.

[fn2] Compare 655 F. 3d 684 (CA7 2011) (case below) (not retroactive); United States v. Amer, 681 F. 3d 211 (CA5 2012) (same); United States v. Chang Hong, 671 F. 3d 1147 (CA10 2011) (same); State v. Gaitan, 209 N. J. 339, 37 A. 3d 1089 (2012) (same), with United States v. Orocio, 645 F. 3d 630 (CA3 2011) (retroactive); Commonwealth v. Clarke, 460 Mass. 30, 949 N. E. 2d 892 (2011) (same).

[fn3] Teague stated two exceptions: "[W]atershed rules of criminal procedure" and rules placing "conduct beyond the power of the [government] to proscribe" apply on collateral review, even if novel. 489 U.S., at 311 (internal quotation marks omitted). Chaidez does not argue that either of those exceptions is relevant here.

[fn4] We did not consider Teague in Williams, Rompilla, and Wiggins, but we granted habeas relief pursuant to

28 U.S. C. § 2254(d)(1) because state courts had unreasonably applied "clearly established" law. And, as we have explained, "clearly established" law is not "new" within the meaning of Teague. See Williams, 529 U. S., at 412.

[fn5] We have never attempted to delineate the world of "collateral consequences," see Padilla, 559 U. S., at ___, n. 8 (slip op., at 7, n. 8), nor do we do so here. But other effects of a conviction commonly viewed as collateral include civil commitment, civil forfeiture, sex offender registration, disqualification from public benefits, and disfranchisement. See id., at ___ (ALITO, J., concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 2-3) (listing other examples).

[fn6] In saying that much, we declined to rule not only on whether advice about a conviction's collateral consequences falls outside the Sixth Amendment's scope, but also on whether parole eligibility should be considered such a consequence, as the court of appeals held.

[fn7] See Broomes v. Ashcroft, 358 F. 3d 1251, 1256 (CA10 2004); United States v. Fry, 322 F. 3d 1198, 1200-1201 (CA9 2003); United States v. Gonzalez, 202 F. 3d 20, 25 (CA1 2000); Russo v. United States, 1999 WL 164951, *2 (CA2, Mar. 22, 1999); Ogunbase v. United States, 1991 WL 11619, *1 (CA6, Feb. 5, 1991); United States v. Del Rosario, 902 F. 2d 55, 58-59 (CADC 1990); United States v. George, 869 F. 2d 333, 337 (CA7 1989); United States v. Yearwood, 863 F. 2d 6, 7-8 (CA4 1988); United States v. Campbell, 778 F. 2d 764, 768-769 (CA11 1985).

[fn8] Rumpel v. State, 847 So. 2d 399, 402-405 (Ala. Crim. App. 2002); Tafoya v. State, 500 P. 2d 247, 252 (Alaska 1972); State v. Rosas, 183 Ariz. 421, 423, 904 P. 2d 1245, 1247 (App. 1995); Niver v. Commissioner of Correction, 101 Conn. App. 1, 3-5, 919 A. 2d 1073, 1075-1076 (2007) (per curiam); State v. Christie, 655 A. 2d 836, 841 (Del. Super. 1994); Matos v. United States, 631 A. 2d 28, 31-32 (D. C. 1993); Major v. State, 814 So. 2d 424, 431 (Fla. 2002); People v. Huante, 143 Ill. 2d 61, 68-71, 571 N. E. 2d 736, 740-741 (1991); State v. Ramirez, 636 N. W. 2d 740, 743-746 (Iowa 2001); State v. Muriithi, 273 Kan. 952, 961, 46 P. 3d 1145, 1152 (2002); Commonwealth v. Fuartado, 170 S. W. 3d 384, 385-386 (Ky. 2005); State v. Montalban, 2000-2739, p. 4 (La. 2/26/02), 810 So. 2d 1106, 1110; Commonwealth v. Fraire, 55 Mass. App. 916, 917, 774 N. E. 2d 677, 678-679 (2002); People v. Davidovich, 463 Mich. 446, 452, 618 N. W. 2d 579, 582 (2000) (per curiam); State ex rel. Nixon v. Clark, 926 S. W. 2d 22, 25 (Mo. App. 1996); State v. Zarate, 264 Neb. 690, 693-696, 651 N. W. 2d 215, 221-223 (2002); Barajas v. State, 115 Nev. 440, 441-442, 991 P. 2d 474, 475-476 (1999) (per curiam); State v. Chung, 210 N. J. Super. 427, 434, 510 A. 2d 72, 76 (App. Div. 1986); People v. Ford, 86 N. Y. 2d 397, 403-404, 657 N. E. 2d 265, 268-269 (1995); State v. Dalman, 520 N. W. 2d 860, 863-864 (N. D. 1994); Commonwealth v. Frometa, 520 Pa. 552, 555-557, 555 A. 2d 92, 93-94 (1989); State v. Alejo, 655 A. 2d 692, 692-693 (R. I. 1995); Nikolaev v. Weber, 2005 S. D. 100, ¶¶ 11-12, 705 N. W. 2d 72, 75-77 (per curiam); Bautista v. State, 160 S. W. 3d 917, 922 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2004); Perez v. State, 31 S. W. 3d 365, 367-368 (Tex. App. 2000); State v. Rojas-Martinez, 2005 UT 86, ¶¶ 15-20, 125 P. 3d 930, 934-935; State v. Martinez- Lazo, 100 Wash. App. 869, 876-878, 999 P. 2d 1275, 1279-1280 (2000); State v. Santos, 136 Wis. 2d 528, 531, 401 N. W. 2d 856, 858 (App. 1987).

[fn9] People v. Pozo, 746 P. 2d 523, 527-529 (Colo. 1987); State v. Paredez, 2004-NMSC-036, ¶¶ 17-19, 136 N. M. 533, 539, 101 P. 3d 799, 805.

[fn10] The dissent is therefore wrong to claim that we emphasize "the absence of lower court authority" holding that an attorney's failure to advise about deportation violated the Sixth Amendment. Post, at 10 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.). We instead point to the presence of lower court authority — in case after case and jurisdiction after jurisdiction — holding that such a failure, because relating to a collateral matter, could not do so.

[fn11] The separate opinions in Padilla objected to just this aspect of the Court's ruling. Dissents have been known to exaggerate the novelty of majority opinions; and "the mere existence of a dissent," like the existence of conflicting authority in state or lower federal courts, does not establish that a rule is new. Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 416, n. 5 (2004); see Williams, 529 U. S., at 410. But the concurring and dissenting opinions in Padilla were on to something when they described the line the Court was crossing. "Until today," JUSTICE ALITO wrote, "the longstanding and unanimous position of the federal courts was that reasonable defense counsel generally need only advise a client about the direct consequences of a criminal conviction." See 559 U. S., at ___ (concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 2).

Or again, this time from JUSTICE SCALIA: "[U]ntil today," the Sixth Amendment guaranteed only "legal advice directly related to defense against prosecution" of a criminal charge. Id., at ___ (dissenting) (slip op., at 2). One need not agree with any of the separate opinions' criticisms of Padilla to concur with their view that it modified governing law.

[fn12] See United States v. Kwan, 407 F. 3d 1005, 1015-1017 (CA9 2005); United States v. Couto, 311 F. 3d 179, 188 (CA2 2002); Downs-Morgan v. United States, 765 F. 2d 1534, 1540-1541 (CA11 1985).

[fn13] The dissent's entire analysis founders on this most basic point. In its lengthy description of Padilla, the dissent picks up in the middle — after the Court concluded that the direct-collateral distinction did not preclude finding that Padilla's lawyer provided ineffective assistance under the Sixth Amendment. See post, at 3-5. The dissent justifies ignoring that threshold conclusion on the ground that "Padilla declined to embrace the . . . distinction between collateral and direct consequences" and "stated very clearly that it found the distinction irrelevant" to the case. Post, at 6. But it is exactly in refusing to apply the direct-collateral distinction that the Padilla Court did something novel. Before then, as the Court forthrightly acknowledged, that distinction would have doomed Padilla's claim in well-nigh every court in the United States. See 559 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 7); supra , at 9.

[fn14] See also Resendiz v. Kovensky, 416 F. 3d 952, 957 (CA9 2005) ("[B]ecause immigration consequences remain collateral, the failure of counsel to advise his client of the potential immigration consequences of a conviction does not violate the Sixth Amendment"); Russo v. United States, 1999 WL 164951, *2 ("[C]ounsel cannot be found ineffective for the mere failure to inform a defendant of the collateral consequences of a plea, such as deportation") (relying on United States v. Santelises, 509 F. 2d 703, 704 (CA2 1975) (per curiam)).

[fn15] The dissent claims the opposite, averring that lower court "decisions show nothing more than that the underlying professional norms had not yet evolved to require attorneys to provide advice about deportation consequences." Post, at 8. But the dissent cannot point to a single decision stating that a lawyer's failure to offer advice about deportation met professional norms; all the decisions instead held that a lawyer's breach of those norms was constitutionally irrelevant because deportation was a collateral consequence. See supra , at 7. Had courts in fact considered professional standards in the slew of cases before Padilla that presented Padilla-like claims, they would have discovered as early as 1968 that the American Bar Association instructed criminal lawyers to advise their non-citizen clients about the risks of deportation. See 3 ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty § 3.2(b), Commentary, p. 71 (App. Draft 1968). The difficulty in upholding such claims prior to Padilla had nothing to do with courts' view of professional norms and everything to do with their use of the direct-collateral divide.

[fn16] Chaidez makes two back-up arguments in her merits briefs — that Teague's bar on retroactivity does not apply when a petitioner challenges a federal conviction, or at least does not do so when she makes a claim of ineffective assistance. Brief for Petitioner 27-39. But Chaidez did not include those issues in her petition for certiorari. Nor, still more critically, did she adequately raise them in the lower courts. Only her petition for rehearing en banc in the Seventh Circuit at all questioned Teague's applicability, and her argument there — that a "Teague light" standard should apply to challenges to federal convictions — differs from the ones she has made in this Court. See Petition for Rehearing and for Rehearing En Banc in No. 10-3623 (CA7), p. 13. Moreover, we cannot find any case in which a federal court has considered Chaidez's contention that Teague should not apply to ineffective assistance claims. "[M]indful that we are a court of review, not of first view," we decline to rule on Chaidez's new arguments. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 718, n. 7 (2005).

JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring in the judgment.

In Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010), this Court held that the Sixth Amendment requires an attorney for a criminal defendant [*1114] to apprise his client of the risk of deportation created by a guilty plea. I dissented. The Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions," an accused enjoys the right "to have the Assistance [**163] of Counsel for his defence." By its terms, this right ex-tends "to legal advice directly related to defense against

© 2013 Bloomberg Finance L.P. All rights reserved. Terms of Service View at Bloomberg Law // PAGE 8 Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 185 L. Ed. 2d 149 (2013), Court Opinion prosecution of the charged offense," and "[t]here is no basis in text or in principle" to expand the reach of this guarantee to guidance concerning the collateral consequences of a guilty plea. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 2-3) (SCALIA, J., dissenting). Today, the Court finds that Padilla announced a new rule of constitutional law and that, under our decision in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), "defendants whose convictions became final prior to Padilla therefore cannot benefit from its holding." Ante, at 15. I continue to believe that Padilla was wrongly decided [***9] and that the Sixth Amendment does not extend-either prospectively or retrospectively-to advice concerning the collateral consequences arising from a guilty plea. I, therefore, believe that the Teague analysis is unnecessary and thus concur only in the judgment.

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, with whom JUSTICE GINSBURG joins, dissenting.

The Court holds today that Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. ___ (2010), announced a "new" rule within the meaning of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989), and so does not apply to convictions that became final before its announcement. That is wrong, because Padilla did nothing more than apply the existing rule of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), in a new setting, the same way the Court has done repeatedly in the past: by surveying the relevant professional norms and concluding that they unequivocally required attorneys to provide advice about the immigration consequences of a guilty plea. Because Padilla fell squarely within the metes and bounds established by Strickland, I respectfully dissent.

The majority correctly sets forth the governing legal principles under Teague and Strickland. Ante, at 4-5. The Teague inquiry turns centrally on the "nature of the rule" in question, and for that reason, "[w]here the beginning point is a rule of . . . general application, . . . it will be the infrequent case that yields a result so novel that it forges a new rule." Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 308-309 (1992) (KENNEDY, J., concurring in judgment); see ante, at 4-5. The majority makes the important observation that "when all we do is apply a general standard to the kind of factual circumstances it was meant to address, we will rarely state a new rule." Ibid. It makes sense, then, that "garden-variety applications of . . . Strickland . . . do not produce new rules." Ante, at 5.

In Strickland, we did not provide a comprehensive definition of deficient performance, and instead held that "[t]he proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." 466 U. S., at 688. Strickland's reasonableness prong therefore takes its content from the standards by which lawyers judge their professional [**164] obligations, ibid., and those standards are subject to change. That is why, despite the many different settings in which it has been applied, we have never [*1115] found that an application of Strickland resulted in a new rule.[fn1]

Significantly, we have previously found that applications of Strickland to new factual scenarios are not barred under 28 U.S. C. § 2254(d)(1) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). Section 2254(d)(1) precludes habeas relief unless a state court decision violates "clearly established Federal law," which, as relevant here, largely overlaps with the inquiry under Teague of whether a decision was "dictated by precedent." 489 U. S., at 301 (plurality opinion).[fn2] In Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 522 (2003), for example, we found that Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000), "made no new law" when it held that Strickland extended to an attorney's responsibility to conduct a background investigation in a capital case. Rather, we explained that "in referring to the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice as guides, [Williams] applied [***10] the same `clearly established' precedent of Strickland we apply today." 539 U. S., at 522. Similarly, in Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. ___, ___, ___-___ (2012) (slip op., at 6, 14-16), we rejected the argument advanced by the Solicitor General that the Sixth Amendment did not extend to advice about a plea offer because it did not impact the fairness of the trial. Instead, we simply held that Strickland applied to this form of attorney misconduct.

In short, where we merely apply Strickland in a way that corresponds to an evolution in professional norms, we make no new law.

Contrary to the majority's reconstruction, Padilla is built squarely on the foundation laid out by Strickland. Padilla relied upon controlling precedent. It began by reciting the basic rule that "[u]nder Strickland, we first determine whether counsel's representation `fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.'" Padilla, 559 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 9) (quoting Strickland, 466 U. S., at 688). We recognized that "[t]he first prong — constitutional deficiency — is necessarily linked to the practice and expectations of the legal [**165] community: `[t]he proper measure of attorney performance remains reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.'" Padilla, 559 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 9) (quoting Strickland, 466 U. S., at 688).

[*1116] We therefore examined the substantial changes in federal immigration law that provided the backdrop to the relevant professional standards. Padilla, 559 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 2-6). Pursuant to the Immigration Act of 1917, 39 Stat. 889-890, a judge could recommend that a defendant who had committed a deportable offense not be removed from the country. Congress entirely eliminated this procedure in 1990. 104 Stat. 5050. Then the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), 110 Stat. 3009-596, abolished the Attorney General's authority to grant discretionary relief from removal for all but a small number of offenses. Padilla, 559 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 6). These changes in immigration law meant that for a noncitizen who committed a removable offense, "removal [had become] practically inevitable." Ibid.

In parallel with these developments, the standards of professional responsibility relating to immigration had become more demanding. "For at least the past 15 years," we observed in Padilla, "professional norms have generally imposed an obligation on counsel to provide advice on the deportation consequences of a client's plea." Id., at ___ (slip op., at 15). Citing an array of practice guides and professional responsibility manuals, we noted that "[t]he weight of prevailing professional norms supports the view that counsel must advise her client regarding the risk of deportation." Id., at ___ (slip op., at 9). Indeed, "authorities of every stripe — including the American Bar Association, criminal defense and public defender organizations, authoritative treatises, and state and city bar publications — universally require defense attorneys to advise as to the risk of deportation consequences for non-citizen clients." Id., at ___ (slip op., at 10) (internal quotation marks omitted).

We drew further support for our conclusion that professional standards required advice about deportation consequences from our [***11] decision in INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001). See Padilla, 559 U. S., at ___ [**166] (slip op., at 10-11) (citing St. Cyr, 533 U. S., at 323). In St. Cyr, we had explained that the availability of discretionary relief from removal was critical to a noncitizen's decision to accept a plea offer, and expected counsel to follow the instructions of "numerous practice guides," such as the ABA's Standards for Criminal Justice, to inform themselves of the possible immigration consequences of a plea. Padilla, 559 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 11) (citing St. Cyr, 533 U. S., at 323, n. 50); see id., at 322, n. 48. And we there found that many States already required that a trial judge advise defendants of the same. Ibid. St. Cyr thus "recognized that `preserving the client's right to remain in the United States may be more important to the client than any potential jail sentence.'" Padilla, 559 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 10) (quoting St. Cyr, 533 U. S., at 322).

Our application of Strickland in Padilla followed naturally from these earlier observations about changes in immigration law and the accompanying evolution of professional norms. When we decided St. Cyr and Padilla, nothing about Strickland's substance or applicability had changed. The only difference from prior law was that the underlying professional norms had changed such that counsel's failure to give this advice now amounted to constitutionally deficient performance.[*1117] [fn3] Both before Padilla and after, counsel was obligated to follow the relevant professional norms. It was only because those norms reflected changes in immigration law that Padilla reached the result it did, not because the Sixth Amendment right had changed at all.

Accepting that routine applications of Strickland do not result in new rules, the majority nevertheless holds that Padilla went a step further. In its view, Padilla "`br[oke] new ground'" by addressing the threshold question of whether advice about deportation is a collateral consequence of a criminal conviction that falls within the scope of the Sixth Amendment. Ante, at 9-10. But that is wrong, because Padilla declined to embrace the very distinction between collateral and direct consequences of a criminal conviction that the majority says it did. In fact, the Court stated very clearly that it found the distinction irrelevant for the purposes of determining a defense lawyer's obligation to provide advice about the immigration consequences of a plea. 559 U. S., at ___, n. 8 (slip op., at 7, n. 8). We asserted that we had "never applied a distinction between direct and collateral consequences to define the scope of constitutionally reasonable professional assistance' required under Strickland," and concluded that "[w]hether that distinction is appropriate is a question we need not consider in this case." Id., at ___ (slip op., at 8) (emphasis added). The distinction was "ill suited" to the task at hand, we explained, because deportation has a "close connection to the criminal process," and is "uniquely difficult to classify as either a direct or a collateral consequence." Id., at ___ (slip op., at 8-9). Indeed, "[o]ur law ha[d] enmeshed criminal convictions and the penalty of deportation for nearly a century, " and we had "long recognized" that deportation [***12] is "particularly severe." Id., at ___ (slip op., at 8).[**167] [fn4]

At bottom, then, the majority's argument hinges upon a distinction the Court has never embraced and that Padilla found irrelevant to the issue it ultimately decided. Without this revision to our recent [*1118] decisional history, the majority's analysis unravels.

The majority finds that the "legal landscape," Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 468 (1993), before Padilla was nearly uniform in its rejection of Strickland's application to the deportation consequences of a plea. Ante, at 7-10. It concludes that the lower courts were generally in agreement that the Sixth Amendment did not require attorneys to inform clients of the collateral consequences of a plea, and that this weighs heavily in favor of finding that Padilla announced a new rule. Ante, at 7-8, nn. 7, 8. But the majority's discussion of these precedents operates at too high a level of generality and fails to account for the development of professional standards over time. St. Cyr noted the importance of advising clients about immigration consequences was of recent vintage, indeed more recent than some of the cases the majority cites. See 533 U. S., at 322-323. The Court relies upon decisions issued over a period that spans more than 30 years. See ante, at 7-8, nn. 7, 8. Nearly half of them (17) were decided before the enactment of IIRIRA. See ibid. And all but two of the Federal Court of Appeals cases were decided before St. Cyr. See ante, at 7-8, nn. 7, 8. These earlier decisions show nothing more than that the underlying professional norms had not yet evolved to require attorneys to provide advice about deportation consequences.

Cases from the period following IIRIRA and St. Cyr undermine the majority's generalizations about the state of the law before Padilla. Deportation had long been understood by lower courts to present "the most difficult" penalty to classify as either a collateral or direct consequence. United States v. Russell, 686 F. 2d 35, 38 (CADC 1982); cf. Janvier v. United States, 793 F. 2d 449, 455 (CA2 1986) (holding that Strickland applied to advice about a judicial recommendation against deportation). Eventually, and in parallel with changes in federal immigration law and the corresponding professional norms, the lower courts had acknowledged an important qualification to the collateral consequences rule. After the passage of IIRIRA and this Court's decision in St. Cyr, many courts concluded that a lawyer's affirmative misstatements about the immigration consequences of a guilty plea can constitute [**168] deficient performance under Strickland. Indeed, each Federal Court of Appeals to address the question after St. Cyr so held. See United States v. Couto, 311 F. 3d 179, 188 (CA2 2002); United States v. Kwan, 407 F. 3d 1005, 1015 (CA9 2005); cf. Downs-Morgan v. United States, 765 F. 2d 1534, 1540-1541 (CA11 1985).[fn5] State-court decisions from this period were in accord and relied upon similar reasoning.[*1119] [fn6]

These decisions created an important exception to the collateral/direct consequences distinction. They also foreshadowed the Court's reasoning in Padilla by basing their analysis of the relevant professional norms on the special nature of deportation, the ABA standards [***13] governing immigration practice, and the Court's assessment

© 2013 Bloomberg Finance L.P. All rights reserved. Terms of Service View at Bloomberg Law // PAGE 11 Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 185 L. Ed. 2d 149 (2013), Court Opinion of those standards in St Cyr. See Kwan, 407 F. 3d, at 1016 ("That counsel may have misled [the defendant] out of ignorance is no excuse. It is a basic rule of professional conduct that a lawyer must . . . [remain] abreast of changes in the law and its practice. . . . Counsel's performance . . . fell below the [ABA]'s ethical standard for criminal defense attorneys with respect to immigration consequences. The Supreme Court noted this standard in [St. Cyr]"); Couto, 311 F. 3d, at 187-191 (citing St. Cyr and the relevant ABA standards, and concluding that "recent Supreme Court authority supports [a] broader view of attorney responsibility" that encompasses affirmative misrepresentations about deportation consequences); see also Downs-Morgan, 765 F. 2d, at 1541 ("[D]eportation and exclusion [are] harsh consequences").

The majority believes that these decisions did not meaningfully alter the state of the law in the lower courts before Padilla, because they merely applied the age-old principle that a lawyer may not affirmatively mislead a client. Ante, at 12-13. But, as explained, the reasoning of these cases renders that characterization at best incomplete. See, e.g., Kwan, 407 F. 3d, at 1016. While these lower court precedents are consistent with the general principle that attorneys should not mislead clients by providing incorrect advice, they did not rest primarily on that rule. Rather, they recognized the significant changes in professional norms that predated Padilla and that we had noted in St. Cyr. As a consequence, the "wall between direct and collateral consequences" that the lower courts had erected, ante, at 9, had already been dealt a serious blow by the time the Court decided Padilla.

As the majority points out, these misrepresentation cases stopped short of imposing an affirmative obligation [**169] on lawyers to consult with clients about the consequences of deportation. Ante, at 12-13. But the majority places too much emphasis on the absence of lower court authority finding that an attorney's omissions with respect to deportation resulted in ineffective assistance. The distinction between omissions and affirmative misrepresentations on which these lower court cases depended cannot be reconciled with Strickland. In Padilla itself, we rejected the Solicitor General's suggestion that Strickland should apply to advice about the immigration consequences of a plea only in cases where defense counsel makes an affirmative misstatement. Padilla, 559 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 12). We did so because we found that Strickland was incompatible with the distinction between an obligation to give advice and a prohibition on affirmative misstatements. 559 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 12-13) (citing Strickland, 466 U. S., at 690). Strickland made clear that its standard of attorney performance applied to both "acts" and "omissions," and that a rule limiting the performance inquiry to one or the other was too narrow. 466 U. S., at 690. Thus, the distinction between misrepresentations and omissions, on which the majority relies in classifying lower court precedent, implies a categorical rule that is inconsistent with Strickland's requirement [***14] of a case-by-case [*1120] assessment of an attorney's performance.[fn7] Id., at 688-689; see, e.g., Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 479 (2000). In short, that some courts have differentiated between misleading by silence and affirmative misrepresentation hardly establishes the rationality of the distinction. Notably, the Court offers no reasoned basis for believing that such a distinction can be extracted from Strickland.

To be sure, lower courts did continue to apply the distinction between collateral and direct consequences after St. Cyr. See ante, at 13-14; see, e.g., Broomes v. Ashcroft, 358 F. 3d 1251, 1256-1257 (CA10 2004). Even so, and even assuming the misrepresentation cases did not call the distinction into question, the existence of these lower court decisions is not dispositive. "[T]he standard for determining when a case establishes a new rule is `objective,' and the mere existence of conflicting authority does not necessarily mean a rule is new." Wright, 505 U. S., at 304 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (citing Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 237 (1992)); see Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 506 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting).

Where the application of Strickland was straightforward, rooted in 15 years of professional standards and [**170] the Court's prior St. Cyr decision, there is no reason to put these lower court cases, many from more than a decade earlier, ahead of this Court's simple and clear reasoning in Padilla. Nevertheless, the majority reaches the paradoxical conclusion that by declining to apply a collateral-consequence doctrine the Court had never adopted, Padilla announced a new rule.

III

What truly appears to drive the majority's analysis is its sense that Padilla occasioned a serious disruption in lower court decisional reasoning. See, e.g., ante, at 9-10 ("If that does not count as `break[ing] new ground' . . . we are hard pressed to know what would" (quoting Teague, 489 U. S., at 301)). The concurring and dissenting opinions in Padilla similarly reflected the impression that it was a significant and destabilizing decision. See 559 U. S., at ___ (ALITO, J., concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 3); id., at ___ (SCALIA, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 5) (describing the majority opinion as a "sledge hammer"); ante, at 8-9, n. 10. But the fact that a decision was perceived as momentous or consequential, particularly by those who disagreed with it, does not control in the Teague analysis. Faithfully applying the Teague rule depends instead on an examination of this Court's reasoning and an objective assessment of the precedent at issue. Stringer, 503 U. S., at 237. In Padilla, we did nothing more than apply Strickland. By holding to the contrary, today's decision deprives defendants of the fundamental protection of Strickland, which requires that lawyers comply with professional [*1121] norms with respect to any advice they provide to clients.

* * *

Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the Seventh Circuit and hold that Padilla applies retroactively on collateral review to convictions that became final before its announcement. With respect, I dissent.

[fn1] See, e.g., Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. ___, ___-___ (2012) (incorrect advice leading to a plea offer's rejection); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005) (failure to investigate evidence the prosecution intended to use to prove an aggravating circumstance in a capital case); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) (failure to investigate a defendant's social history in a capital case); Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000) (failure to consult with a defendant regarding whether to pursue an appeal); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391 (2000) (failure to investigate a defendant's background for the purposes of mitigation evidence in a capital case); Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985) (failure to provide effective assistance during plea negotiations).

[fn2] AEDPA of course differs from the Teague rule in other important respects. See, e.g., Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 5). But these differences aside, the fact that we have repeatedly found AEDPA cases involving Strickland to be controlled by established precedent underscores that the application of Strickland in a new context should almost never result in a new rule.

[fn3] Even before IIRIRA and St. Cyr, lawyers of course understood that it was good practice to inform clients of the deportation consequences of a plea. See ante, at 14, n. 15 (citing 3 ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty § 3.2(b), Commentary, p. 71 (App. Draft 1968)). Following the sea change in immigration law, however, the professional norms had become so established and universally recognized that the measure of constitutionally adequate performance now included giving such advice in the form Padilla recognized. See 559 U. S, at ___ (slip op., at 10).

[fn4] See, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 322 (2001) (noting that "[p]reserving the client's right to remain in the United States may be more important . . . than any potential jail sentence" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 243 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (deportation proceedings "practically . . . are [criminal] for they extend the criminal process of sentencing to include on the same convictions an additional punishment"); Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948) ("[D]eportation is a drastic measure and at times the equivalent of banishment or exile"); Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922) (deportation may result in "loss of both property and life; or of all that makes life worth living"); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 740 (1893) (Brewer, J., dissenting) ("Every one knows that to be forcibly taken away from home, and family, and friends, and business, and property, and sent across the ocean to a distant land, is punishment; and that oftentimes most severe and cruel").

[fn5] See United States v. Mora-Gomez, 875 F. Supp. 1208, 1212 (ED Va. 1995) ("[T]he clear consensus is that an affirmative misstatement regarding deportation may constitute ineffective assistance").

[fn6] See Rubio v. State, 124 Nev. 1032, 1041, 194 P. 3d 1224, 1230 (2008) (per curiam) ("Like other jurisdictions, we

© 2013 Bloomberg Finance L.P. All rights reserved. Terms of Service View at Bloomberg Law // PAGE 13 Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 185 L. Ed. 2d 149 (2013), Court Opinion recognize the particularly harsh and penal nature of deportation. The Supreme Court of the United States has described deportation as `a drastic measure and at times the equivalent of banishment or exile' and further depicted it as `a penalty.' . . . Perhaps understanding the harshness of deportation, a growing number of jurisdictions have adopted the affirmative misrepresentation exception to the collateral consequence rule"); People v. Correa, 108 Ill. 2d 541, 550-552, 485 N. E. 2d 307, 311 (1985); People v. McDonald, 1 N. Y. 3d 109, 113-115, 802 N. E. 2d 131, 134-135 (2003); see also Alguno v. State, 892 So. 2d 1200, 1201 (Fla. App. 2005) (per curiam); State v. Rojas-Martinez, 2005 UT 86 ¶¶ 15-20, 125 P. 3d 930, 933-935; In re Yim, 139 Wash. 2d 581, 588, 989 P. 2d 512, 516 (1999).

[fn7] The majority cites a law review article for the proposition that the categorical consequences rule is "one of `the most widely recognized rules of American law.'" Ante, at 8 (quoting Chin & Holmes, Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 697, 706 (2002)). But the article was, in fact, quite critical of the rule. The authors explained that "[t]he real work of the conviction is performed by the collateral consequences," and that the direct/collateral distinction in the context of ineffective-assistance claims was "surprising because it seems inconsistent with the framework that the Supreme Court . . . laid out" in Strickland. Chin & Holmes, at 700-701.

General Information

Result(s) Judgment Affirmed

Judge CLARENCE THOMAS; ELENA KAGAN; RUTH BADER GINSBURG; SONIA M. SOTOMAYOR; Ruth Bader Ginsburg; Clarence Thomas; Elena Kagan; Sonia M Sotomayor

Related Docket(s) 11-00820 (U.S.)

Topic Criminal Law

Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 185 L. Ed. 2d 149 (2013), Court Opinion

Direct History Direct History Summary 1 United States v. Chaidez, No. 03 CR 636-6, Caution 0 2013 BL 202515 (N.D. Ill. July 23, 2013) Negative 0 writ denied, motion denied 2 United States v. Chaidez, No. 03 CR 636-6, Total 0 2013 BL 194189 (N.D. Ill. July 22, 2013) writ denied Citation Analysis Summary 3 United States v. Chaidez, No. 03 CR 636-6, 2013 BL 202511 (N.D. Ill. July 01, 2013) Positive 210 writ denied Distinguished 1 4 Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 185 Caution 0 L. Ed. 2d 149 (2013) Superseded 0 affirming the judgment in Chaidez v. United States, 655 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011) Negative 0 5 Chaidez v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2101, 182 Total 211 L. Ed. 2d 867 (2012) certiorari granted Authorities Summary 6 Chaidez v. United States, 655 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011) Positive 61 reversing the judgment and remanding the case in Distinguished 0 United States v. Chaidez, No. 03 CR 636-6, 2010 BL Caution 0 252301 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 06, 2010) Superseded 0 7 United States v. Chaidez, No. 03 CR 636-6, 2010 BL 252301 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 06, 2010) Negative 36 vacating the conviction and granting the writ in Total 97 Unpublished Opinion or Order

8 United States v. Chaidez, 730 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Ill. 2010) order entered

Citation Analysis ( 211 cases ) 1 DISCUSSED , Alcena v. Comm'r of Corr., 146 Conn. Quoted App. 370 (App. Ct. 2013) 2 CITED Carrillo v. Holder, 12-71179., Agency No. A070-915-954, 2013 BL 277825 (9th Cir. Oct. 07, 2013)

Citation Analysis ( 211 cases ) 3 DISCUSSED Tena-Corral v. State, No. 3-649 / 12-2237, 2013 BL 270500 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 02, 2013) 4 DISCUSSED , State v. Blanco, No. A-1725-11T3, Quoted 2013 BL 270730 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Oct. 02, 2013) 5 CITED United States v. Sidhana, No. 04-430 (FSH), 2013 BL 263452 (D.N.J. Sept. 26, 2013) 6 DISCUSSED , Ex parte Tavakkoli, No. 09-13-00082- Quoted CR, 2013 BL 257135 (Tex. App.- Beaumont Sept. 25, 2013) 7 DISCUSSED , Miller v. State, No. 94, September Quoted Term, 2012, 2013 BL 259253 (Md. Sept. 25, 2013) 8 DISCUSSED , People v. Soodoo, 2013 NY Slip Op Quoted 06034, 2013 BL 257446 (App Div, 2d Dept Sept. 25, 2013) 9 DISCUSSED , Miller v. State, No. 94, September Quoted Term, 2012, 2013 BL 259253 (Md. Sept. 25, 2013) 10 CITED , Quoted Chacon v. State, No. WD 75646, 2013 BL 257065 (Mo. App. W.D. Sept. 24, 2013) 11 DISCUSSED , Ross v. United States, No. 5:12- Quoted cv-124-RLV, (5:94-cr-5-RLV-1), 2013 BL 252713 (W.D.N.C Sept. 20, 2013) 12 DISTINGUISHED , State v. Luna, No. A-5480-10T3, 2013 Quoted BL 248245 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 13, 2013) 13 DISCUSSED , Commonwealth v. Sylvain, 466 Mass. Quoted 422 (2013) 14 DISCUSSED , Vazquez-Villanueva v. United States, Quoted CASE NO. C12-2270-MJP, 2013 BL 243656 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 12, 2013) 15 DISCUSSED State v. Datus, No. A-1480-10T2, 2013 BL 245457 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 10, 2013)

Citation Analysis ( 211 cases ) 16 CITED , (See) People v. Marcoll, 2013 NY Slip Op 51486[U], 2013 BL 241162 (App Term, 1st Dept Sept. 09, 2013) 17 DISCUSSED State v. Rodriguez, No. A-0503-11T4, 2013 BL 245486 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 05, 2013) 18 CITED , (See) United States v. Gkanios, 12-16279 Non-Argument Calendar., D.C. Docket No. 0:12-cv-60423-JIC, 2013 BL 233964 (11th Cir. Sept. 04, 2013) 19 CITED , (See) Valsien v. State, No. 4D13-1718, 2013 BL 234141 (Fla. 4th DCA Sept. 04, 2013) 20 DISCUSSED Kurdi v. United States, No. 3:10- cv-408-RJC, 3:07-cr-56-RJC-1, 2013 BL 235316 (W.D.N.C Sept. 03, 2013) 21 DISCUSSED United States v. Abou-Khodr, No. 99- CV-81073, 2013 BL 232903 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 30, 2013) 22 DISCUSSED , Banjoko v. United States, 13-11139 Quoted Non-Argument Calendar., D.C. Docket No. 8:13-cv-00210-SDM-EAJ, 2013 BL 232342 (11th Cir. Aug. 30, 2013) 23 CITED , Quoted Velez v. Atchison, No. 12 C 07518, 2013 BL 232840 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 30, 2013) 24 CITED People v. Baboocall, 2013 NY Slip Op 51424[U], 2013 BL 233482 (Sup. Ct. Aug. 29, 2013) 25 CITED Onate v. State, No. M2013-00531- CCA-R3-PC, 2013 BL 229817 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 28, 2013) 26 CITED Ex parte Obi, No. 01-12-01003-CR, 2013 BL 227603 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 27, 2013) 27 DISCUSSED , Ex parte Tanklevskaya, No. Quoted 01-10-00627-CR, 2013 BL 227612 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 27, 2013)

Citation Analysis ( 211 cases ) 28 CITED , Quoted Sayles v. United States, Civil No. 12-1644., Criminal No. 09-273., 2013 BL 228639 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 27, 2013) 29 CITED United States v. Graham, Case No. 99-10023-JTM, 2013 BL 228743 (D. Kan. Aug. 27, 2013) 30 DISCUSSED , Wilson v. United States, 11-15294 Quoted Non-Argument Calendar., D.C. Docket No. 0:11-cv-60614-KAM;, 0:96- cr-06208-WJZ-3, 2013 BL 226543 (11th Cir. Aug. 23, 2013) 31 CITED , (See) Andre v. State, No. 4D13-557, 2013 BL 221705 (Fla. 4th DCA Aug. 21, 2013) 32 DISCUSSED Saksena v. Comm'r of Corr., 145 Conn. App. 152 (App. Ct. 2013) 33 CITED , (See) United States v. Beltran-Jimenez, 12-10205., D.C. No. 4:10-cr-00948- CKJ, 2013 BL 220377 (9th Cir. Aug. 19, 2013) 34 DISCUSSED Coombs v. Holder, 10-72922., Agency No. A037-333-016, 2013 BL 217947 (9th Cir. Aug. 16, 2013) 35 DISCUSSED Grider v. Commonwealth, No. 2010- CA-002171-MR, 2013 BL 218401 (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 16, 2013) 36 CITED Escobar v. Chrisman, 13-6113., (D.C. No. 5:12-CV-00723-C) (W.D. Okla.), 2013 BL 212350 (10th Cir. Aug. 14, 2013) 37 DISCUSSED , Ex parte Trungly, No. 09-12-00311-CR, Quoted 2013 BL 214140 (Tex. App.-Beaumont Aug. 14, 2013) 38 DISCUSSED , Gonzalez v. Comm'r of Corr., 145 Quoted Conn. App. 28 (App. Ct. 2013) 39 DISCUSSED Ex parte Olvera, No. 05-11-01349-CR, 2013 BL 209079 (Tex. App.-Dallas Aug. 12, 2013) 40 CITED People v. Patterson, 2013 NY Slip Op 31901[U], 2013 BL 218000 (Sup. Ct. Aug. 09, 2013)

Citation Analysis ( 211 cases ) 41 CITED , (See) State v. Mercado, No. A-6354-11T3, 2013 BL 245678 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 09, 2013) 42 DISCUSSED , Govereh v. United States, CRIMINAL (See) NO. 1:07-cr-0131-JEC-RGV-1., CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:12-cv-0403-JEC-RGV., 2013 BL 208189 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 09, 2013) 43 CITED Khodr v. Holder, No. 12-3769, 2013 BL 217356 (6th Cir. Aug. 08, 2013) 44 CITED , (See) Simeus v. State, No. 4D13-1026, 2013 BL 216348 (Fla. 4th DCA Aug. 07, 2013) 45 CITED , (See) Ex parte Mandujano, No. 01-12-00922- CR, 2013 BL 215637 (Tex. App.- Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 06, 2013) 46 CITED , Quoted People v. Finch, 2013 NY Slip Op 32205[U], 2013 BL 254643 (Sup. Ct. Aug. 06, 2013) 47 DISCUSSED Ex parte Bright, No. 05-13-00349-CR, 2013 BL 206850 (Tex. App.-Dallas Aug. 02, 2013) 48 DISCUSSED State v. Osorio, 286 Neb. 384 (2013) 49 DISCUSSED Cossio v. United States, Case No. 2:11-cv-471-FtM-29UAM., 2:09-cr-90- FtM-29SPC., 2013 BL 205981 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 02, 2013) 50 DISCUSSED , Jiminez v. Holder, 11-56605., D.C. No. (See) 3:10-cv-01528-JAH, 2013 BL 205726 (9th Cir. Aug. 01, 2013) 51 CITED Ex parte Becerra, No. 14-12-00042- CR, 2013 BL 206506 (Tex. App.- Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 01, 2013) 52 CITED Canastuj-Tzul v. State, No. 4D13-260, 2013 BL 202422 (Fla. 4th DCA July 31, 2013) 53 CITED , (See) Mederos v. State, No. 4D13-662, 2013 BL 202423 (Fla. 4th DCA July 31, 2013)

Citation Analysis ( 211 cases ) 54 CITED , (See) Francois v. State, No. 4D4D13-1032, 2013 BL 202421 (Fla. 4th DCA July 31, 2013) 55 DISCUSSED State v. Spivakov, 2013-Ohio-3343 (App. 10th Dist. 2013) 56 CITED , Quoted United States v. Lazala, CR. No. 08-141-S., 2013 BL 200545 (D.R.I. July 29, 2013) 57 DISCUSSED , United States v. London, 13-6079., (See) (D.C. No. 5:00-CR-00004-L-2) (W.D. of Okla.), 2013 BL 201032 (10th Cir. July 29, 2013) 58 CITED State v. Salem, No. A-5752-10T3, 2013 BL 245744 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 29, 2013) 59 CITED , (See) Henderson v. United States, Civil No. WDQ-13-1733., 2013 BL 199628 (D. Md. July 29, 2013) 60 CITED People v. Diaz, 970 N.Y.S.2d 444 (Sup. Ct. 2013) 61 CITED , (Accord) Sampson v. United States, 724 F.3d 150 (1st Cir. 2013) 62 DISCUSSED State v. Mades, No. A-5482-10T4, 2013 BL 245781 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 25, 2013) 63 DISCUSSED State v. Dominguez, No. A-5756-10T1, 2013 BL 245780 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 25, 2013) 64 CITED , Quoted Perez v. State, No. 4D12-1770, 2013 BL 195426 (Fla. 4th DCA July 24, 2013) 65 DISCUSSED , Wong v. State, No. 3-433 / 12-0471, Quoted 2013 BL 195521 (Iowa Ct. App. July 24, 2013) 66 DISCUSSED People v. Andrews, 108 A.D.3d 727, 970 N.Y.S.2d 226 (App Div, 2d Dept 2013) 67 CITED , (See) Perez v. State, No. 4D12-1770, 2013 BL 195426 (Fla. 4th DCA July 24, 2013)

Citation Analysis ( 211 cases ) 68 CITED Ex parte Nieves, No. 08-11-00189-CR, 2013 BL 196316 (Tex. App.-El Paso July 24, 2013) 69 CITED Wajda v. Holder, No. 12-3978, 2013 BL 211809 (6th Cir. July 23, 2013) 70 DISCUSSED Ikharo v. Dewine, Case No. 2:12- cv-00489., 2013 BL 193291 (S.D. Ohio July 22, 2013) 71 CITED People v. Lezama, 2013 NY Slip Op 31643[U], 2013 BL 198832 (Sup. Ct. July 22, 2013) 72 DISCUSSED Collins v. State, 2013 UT App 182 73 CITED , (See) , Odelugo v. State, No. 01-12-00272- Quoted CR, 2013 BL 190099 (Tex. App.- Houston [1st Dist.] July 18, 2013) 74 CITED People v. Abreu, 2013 NY Slip Op 31735[U], 2013 BL 206977 (Sup. Ct. July 17, 2013) 75 DISCUSSED , People v. Burrell, 2013 NY Slip Op Quoted 51242[U], 2013 BL 202673 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. July 15, 2013) 76 DISCUSSED , People v. Caceras, 2013 NY Slip Op Quoted 51216[U], 2013 BL 198657 (Sup. Ct. July 12, 2013) 77 DISCUSSED State v. Yuma, 286 Neb. 244, 835 N.W.2d 679 (2013) 78 DISCUSSED Gonzalez v. United States, 722 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2013) 79 DISCUSSED , Johnson v. State, 118 So. 3d 239 (Fla. (See) 3d DCA 2013) 80 DISCUSSED Solano v. United States, No. 3:08- cr-154(1), 2013 BL 181472 (S.D. Ohio July 09, 2013) 81 CITED , Quoted United States v. Manjang, Case No. 1:07-cr-07., 2013 BL 180444 (S.D. Ohio July 08, 2013) 82 CITED Gonzalez v. State, 117 So. 3d 847 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)

Citation Analysis ( 211 cases ) 83 DISCUSSED , (Cf.) Tomlinson v. Att'y Gen., No. 13-1348, 2013 BL 179708 (3d Cir. July 03, 2013)

84 DISCUSSED , Candelas v. State, No. 01-13-00007- Quoted CR, 2013 BL 176295 (Tex. App.- Houston [1st Dist.] July 02, 2013) 85 DISCUSSED , Al-Aridi v. Commonwealth, 404 S.W.3d Quoted 210 (Ky. Ct. App. 2013) 86 DISCUSSED , People v. King, 2013 NY Slip Op Quoted 31577[U], 2013 BL 192916 (Sup. Ct. June 28, 2013) 87 DISCUSSED , People v. Verdejo, 109 A.D.3d 138, Quoted 967 N.Y.S.2d 729 (App Div, 1st Dept 2013) 88 DISCUSSED , United States v. Ifenatuora, No. CR Quoted S-96-00088 GEB DAD P, 2013 BL 171727 (E.D. Cal. June 26, 2013) 89 CITED , Quoted State v. Garcia, 2013 SD 46, 834 N.W.2d 821 90 CITED Ex parte Morales, No. 01-12-00897- CR, 2013 BL 167040 (Tex. App.- Houston [1st Dist.] June 25, 2013) 91 DISCUSSED Chhabra v. United States, 720 F.3d 395 (2d Cir. 2013) 92 CITED People v. Gomez, 494 Mich. 865, 831 N.W.2d 457 (2013) 93 CITED People v. Aleksanyan, 494 Mich. 865, 831 N.W.2d 456 (2013) 94 CITED People v. Galarza, No. B242992, 2013 BL 163160 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. June 19, 2013) 95 CITED People v. Acosta, 494 Mich. 865, 831 N.W.2d 456 (2013) 96 CITED Taylor v. State, 745 S.E.2d 97 (S.C. 2013) 97 CITED Ex parte Luna, No. 01-13-00054-CR, 2013 BL 159484 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] June 18, 2013)

Citation Analysis ( 211 cases ) 98 CITED , Quoted United States v. Villa-Gutierrez, No. 8:07CR112, 2013 BL 157635 (D. Neb. June 14, 2013) 99 DISCUSSED , (Cf.) Perdomo v. Att'y Gen., No. 12-2953, 2013 BL 158352 (3d Cir. June 14, 2013) 100 DISCUSSED , In re Ifenatuora, No. 10-1492, 2013 BL Quoted 157285 (4th Cir. June 14, 2013) 101 DISCUSSED Ex parte Martinez, No. 13-10-00390- CR, 2013 BL 156507 (Tex. App.- Corpus Christi June 13, 2013) 102 CITED Jian Tian Lin v. United States, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:12-CV-813-H., 2013 BL 156402 (W.D. Ky. June 13, 2013) 103 DISCUSSED , Ex parte Sudhakar, No. 14-11-00701- Quoted CR, 2013 BL 155547 (Tex. App.- Houston [14th Dist.] June 13, 2013) 104 CITED Ikharo v. Dewine, CASE NO. 2:12- CV-489., 2013 BL 153293 (S.D. Ohio June 11, 2013) 105 DISCUSSED , Ex parte Gomez, No. 01-12-00972-CR, Quoted 2013 BL 155118 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] June 11, 2013) 106 CITED , (See) , Yalincak v. United States, Civil No. Quoted 3:08cv1453 (JBA)., 2013 BL 150284 (D. Conn. June 07, 2013) 107 DISCUSSED Changar v. United States, No. CV-10-3123., 2013 BL 147342 (E.D.N.Y. June 05, 2013) 108 DISCUSSED Ex parte Rodriguez-Grimaldo, No. 03-12-00019-CR, 2013 BL 150950 (Tex. App.-Austin June 05, 2013) 109 CITED State v. Guerrero, 400 S.W.3d 576 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) 110 DISCUSSED , Whipple v. State, No. A12-1713, 2013 Quoted BL 145987 (Minn. Ct. App. June 03, 2013) 111 DISCUSSED , People v. Vatic, 2013 NY Slip Op Quoted 50909[U], 2013 BL 148641 (Sup. Ct. May 31, 2013)

Citation Analysis ( 211 cases ) 112 CITED Lopez v. Holder, No. 12-60610 Summary Calendar, 2013 BL 143015 (5th Cir. May 31, 2013) 113 CITED , Quoted People v. Singh, No. F063231, 2013 BL 141274 (Cal. App. 5th Dist. May 30, 2013) 114 CITED , (See Keller v. United States, No. also) , Quoted CCB-13-857, 2013 BL 142311 (D. Md. May 30, 2013) 115 CITED , (See) Ex parte Weldezion, No. 05-13-00177- CR, 2013 BL 144078 (Tex. App.-Dallas May 29, 2013) 116 CITED Pantoja-Coronado v. State, No. A12-0952, 2013 BL 140978 (Minn. Ct. App. May 28, 2013) 117 CITED Ramos v. State, No. A12-2145, 2013 BL 141006 (Minn. Ct. App. May 28, 2013) 118 DISCUSSED , United States v. Martinez, Case No. Quoted 2:99-cr-038-KJD-RJJ, 2013 BL 140271 (D. Nev. May 28, 2013) 119 DISCUSSED State v. Gonnzalez, 285 Neb. 940, 830 N.W.2d 504 (2013) 120 DISCUSSED , Wills v. Barkowski, Civil Action No. Quoted 11-2110 (FLW), 2013 BL 134774 (D.N.J. May 22, 2013) 121 CITED Avila v. State, 114 So. 3d 388 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) 122 DISCUSSED , Ex parte Aguilar, No. 14-11-00227-CR, Quoted 2013 BL 135335 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] May 21, 2013) 123 CITED United States v. Pinet, Criminal Action No. 00-10402-JLT-19, 2013 BL 133898 (D. Mass. May 20, 2013) 124 DISCUSSED , Phillips v. United States, No. 3:13- Quoted cv-287-FDW, (3:06-cr-118-FDW-2), 2013 BL 132774 (W.D.N.C May 20, 2013)

Citation Analysis ( 211 cases ) 125 CITED Nelson v. United States, Civil Action No. 12-5265 (FLW), 2013 BL 132556 (D.N.J. May 20, 2013) 126 CITED , Quoted United States v. Hopkins, CRIMINAL NO. 1:06-CR-0064, 2013 BL 131016 (M.D. Pa. May 16, 2013) 127 DISCUSSED United States v. Gomez, Case No. 12-20802-Civ-COOKE/TURNOFF., 2013 BL 129002 (S.D. Fla. May 15, 2013) 128 CITED , Quoted Ex parte Arjona, 402 S.W.3d 312 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2013) 129 CITED Berroa v. Attorney General, No. 12-4324, 2013 BL 127827 (3d Cir. May 14, 2013) 130 CITED Puentes-Garcia v. United States, Civil No. 12-cv-1184-JPG, Criminal No 03- cr-30181-JPG, 2013 BL 125366 (S.D. Ill. May 13, 2013) 131 CITED Bezuidenhout v. State, No. M2012-01114-CCA-R3-PC, 2013 BL 127829 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 13, 2013) 132 DISCUSSED , State v. Sarabia-Flores, 48 Kan. App. Quoted 2d 932, 300 P.3d 644 (Ct. App. 2013) 133 CITED Ex parte Gonzalez, 402 S.W.3d 843 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2013) 134 DISCUSSED , Hamm v. State, 403 S.C. 461, 744 Quoted S.E.2d 503 (2013) 135 DISCUSSED , Garcia v. United States, No. 4:12- Quoted CV-519 CAS, 2013 BL 117091 (E.D. Mo. May 02, 2013) 136 CITED , Quoted People v. Wright, 2013 NY Slip Op 31365[U], 2013 BL 179621 (Sup. Ct. May 02, 2013) 137 CITED People v. Bedier, No. B241606, 2013 BL 117339 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. May 02, 2013) 138 DISCUSSED , United States v. Garcia, 517 Fed. Quoted Appx. 920 (11th Cir. 2013)

Citation Analysis ( 211 cases ) 139 DISCUSSED , Garba v. United States, CIVIL ACTION Quoted NO. 10-4445 (MLC)., 2013 BL 114844 (D.N.J. Apr. 30, 2013) 140 DISCUSSED , State v. Martinez-Leon, 174 Wn. App. Quoted 753, 300 P.3d 481 (App. Div. 2 2013) 141 DISCUSSED , People v. Santos, 40 Misc. 3d 400, 969 Quoted N.Y.S.2d 390 (Sup. Ct. 2013) 142 CITED , Quoted United States v. Diaz-Pabon, CRIM. NO. 96-022(PG)., 2013 BL 114503 (D.P.R. Apr. 29, 2013) 143 DISCUSSED , Llanes v. United States, 517 Fed. Quoted Appx. 889 (11th Cir. 2013) 144 CITED Ex parte Enyong, 397 S.W.3d 208 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) 145 CITED , (See) United States v. Morales, 516 Fed. Appx. 654 (9th Cir. 2013) 146 CITED Saintaude v. United States, No. Civil Action No: SA-13-CA-144-XR., 2013 BL 108672 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 22, 2013) 147 CITED United States v. Ponce-Zuniga, 515 Fed. Appx. 693 (9th Cir. 2013) 148 DISCUSSED People v. Marshall, 2013 NY Slip Op 50614[U], 2013 BL 106949 (Sup. Ct. Apr. 19, 2013) 149 DISCUSSED In re Barera, No. F064000, 2013 BL 103329 (Cal. App. 5th Dist. Apr. 17, 2013) 150 CITED Ex parte Sudhakar, No. PD-0220-13, 2013 BL 104811 (Tex. Crim. App. Apr. 17, 2013) 151 CITED United States v. Pope, No. 03CR492(RJD), 13CV598(RJD), 2013 BL 98380 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2013) 152 DISCUSSED People v. Ahmadzai, No. G046631, 2013 BL 98016 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. Apr. 11, 2013) 153 CITED Gazquez v. State, 112 So. 3d 568 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) 154 CITED Gomez v. State, 112 So. 3d 569 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)

Citation Analysis ( 211 cases ) 155 CITED , Quoted Velazquez v. United States, No. CV-11-820-PHX-RCB(LOA), CR-97-361-PHX-RCB, 2013 BL 97739 (D. Ariz. Apr. 10, 2013) 156 CITED Powell v. State, 112 So. 3d 570 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) 157 CITED Pinillos v. State, 112 So. 3d 569 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) 158 CITED Richards v. State, 112 So. 3d 571 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) 159 DISCUSSED United States v. Vy Thi Thach, 515 Fed. Appx. 668 (9th Cir. 2013) 160 CITED , (See) Paul v. United States, CASE NO. 1:12 CV 1227., 2013 BL 93141 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 08, 2013) 161 CITED Tengben v. State, No. A12-1539, 2013 BL 94801 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 08, 2013) 162 CITED , (See) , Jacobson v. United States, Civil Action Quoted No. 12-1258 (ES)., 2013 BL 119274 (D.N.J. Apr. 05, 2013) 163 CITED , (See) United States v. Ruiz-Romero, No. 12-2074., (D. New Mexico) (D.C. Nos. 1:11-CV-00308-MV-ACT and, 2:95- CR-00650-MV-ACT-1), 2013 BL 93332 (10th Cir. Apr. 05, 2013) 164 DISCUSSED Marquez v. State, No. 11-12-00316- CR, 2013 BL 91896 (Tex. App.- Eastland Apr. 04, 2013) 165 DISCUSSED , Waslaski v. State, 2013 ND 56, 828 (See) N.W.2d 787 166 DISCUSSED Aguila v. United States, 515 Fed. Appx. 803 (11th Cir. 2013) 167 CITED , (See) Millan-Portela v. Holder, 514 Fed. Appx. 687 (9th Cir. 2013) 168 DISCUSSED , Ex parte Garcia, No. 14-12-01082-CR, Quoted 2013 BL 90194 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 02, 2013)

Citation Analysis ( 211 cases ) 169 DISCUSSED , United States v. Cabezas, Criminal Quoted Action No. 85-00276-JLT., 2013 BL 89832 (D. Mass. Apr. 02, 2013) 170 DISCUSSED , Ex parte Juarez, No. Nos. Quoted 14-12-00564-CR, 14-12-00565-CR, 14-12-00566-CR, 2013 BL 90195 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 02, 2013) 171 CITED , (See) , United States v. Rodriguez-Trujillo, Quoted Case No. 4:11-cv-00593-BLW., 4:08- cr-00240-BLW., 2013 BL 83073 (D. Idaho Mar. 28, 2013) 172 DISCUSSED , United States v. Carmen-Iglesias, 514 (Cf.) , Quoted Fed. Appx. 922 (11th Cir. 2013) 173 DISCUSSED People v. Carabai, 39 Misc. 3d 1206, 969 N.Y.S.2d 805 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. 2013) 174 DISCUSSED Ex parte Cisneros, No. 08-11-00180- CR, 2013 BL 84888 (Tex. App.-El Paso Mar. 28, 2013) 175 FOLLOWED , United States v. Dwumaah, CRIMINAL Quoted NO. 1:05-CR-0157, 2013 BL 83477 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 27, 2013) 176 DISCUSSED , Heredia v. Holder, 516 Fed. Appx. 63 (See) (2d Cir. 2013) 177 CITED , (See) Lopez-Iriarte v. United States, No. 4:10-CV-240-JAR, 2013 BL 81121 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 27, 2013) 178 DISCUSSED Ex parte Luna, 401 S.W.3d 329 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2013) 179 DISCUSSED , Chapa v. United States, 514 Fed. Quoted Appx. 837 (11th Cir. 2013) 180 CITED Bejarano v. United States, CRIMINAL NO. 1:05-CR-0477-CC-GGB-5, CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:10-CV-1919-CC-GGB, 28 U.S.C. § 2255, 2013 BL 108484 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 25, 2013) 181 CITED , Quoted De Los Santos v. Ercole, Case No. 07- CV-7569 (KMK)(PED)., 2013 BL 77980 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2013)

Citation Analysis ( 211 cases ) 182 DISCUSSED , Nguyen v. State, 828 N.W.2d 324 Quoted (Iowa 2013) 183 DISCUSSED , Ibarra v. State, No. 01-12-00292-CR, Quoted 2013 BL 75448 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 21, 2013) 184 CITED , Quoted People v. Osario, 2013 NY Slip Op 30822[U], 2013 BL 112046 (Sup. Ct. Mar. 21, 2013) 185 CITED Ibarra v. State, No. 4D11-1459, 2013 BL 75523 (Fla. 4th DCA Mar. 20, 2013)

186 CITED , Quoted Ex parte Reyes, 392 S.W.3d 675 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) 187 DISCUSSED Sipsis v. State, No. 4D11-2673, 2013 BL 75562 (Fla. 4th DCA Mar. 20, 2013)

188 CITED Ex parte Olvera, No. PD-1215-12, 2013 BL 73884 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 20, 2013) 189 CITED Ex parte Tanklevskaya, 393 S.W.3d 787 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) 190 DISCUSSED , Govereh v. Pugh, No. 2:12-cv-10913, Quoted 2013 BL 73058 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 20, 2013) 191 CITED Ex parte Carpio-Cruz, No. PD-1872-11, 2013 BL 73880 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 20, 2013) 192 CITED Michel v. State, 110 So. 3d 493 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) 193 CITED , Quoted King v. Secretary, Dept. of Corrections, No. Case No: 6:12-cv-1037- Orl-36KRS., 2013 BL 71747 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 19, 2013) 194 CITED , Quoted Gomez-Rodriguez v. Tennessee, No. : 3:12-cv-106, 2013 BL 71062 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 18, 2013) 195 CITED , Quoted Blay v. United States, No. 12-1381 (FLW), 2013 BL 71655 (D.N.J. Mar. 18, 2013)

Citation Analysis ( 211 cases ) 196 CITED Martino v. McCabe, C/A No. 6:11-3472-JFA-KFM, 2013 BL 72896 (D.S.C. Mar. 18, 2013) 197 CITED , (See) Longsworth v. United States, CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:09-cv-1411-JEC., CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 1:09-cr-74- JEC., 2013 BL 68570 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 15, 2013) 198 CITED Johnson v. State, 110 So. 3d 478 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) 199 DISCUSSED , Saldana-Ramirez v. State, 255 Or. Quoted App. 602, 298 P.3d 59 (Ct. App. 2013)

200 FOLLOWED , Huynh v. State, 829 N.W.2d 589 (Iowa Quoted Ct. App. 2013) 201 DISCUSSED , Castillo v. State, 829 N.W.2d 589 (Iowa Quoted Ct. App. 2013) 202 CITED , Quoted Guzman v. Holder, 513 Fed. Appx. 113 (2d Cir. 2013) 203 CITED , (See) Nanan v. United States, CASE NO. 6:11-cv-405-Orl-35GJK., (6:09-cr-212- Orl-35GJK)., 2013 BL 62262 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 07, 2013) 204 DISCUSSED , Fernandes v. Johnson, No. 12 Civ. Quoted 2774 (LBS)., 2013 BL 59483 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 05, 2013) 205 CITED Davis v. New York, No. 10 CV 615 (RJD)., 2013 BL 55591 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 04, 2013) 206 DISCUSSED People v. Alegria, 2013 NY Slip Op 30448[U], 2013 BL 62868 (Sup. Ct. Mar. 01, 2013) 207 DISCUSSED Desrosiers v. Lee, No. 11-CV-00804 (CBA), 2013 BL 50303 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2013) 208 CITED , Quoted Grullon v. United States, 12 Civ. 4086 (JFK)., No. 94 Cr. 466 (JFK), 2013 BL 50823 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2013)

Citation Analysis ( 211 cases ) 209 DISCUSSED , Solano v. United States, No. 3:11- Quoted cv-112, 2013 BL 47956 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 25, 2013) 210 DISCUSSED , Francis v. United States, No. 12 Quoted Civ. 01362 (AJN)., 2013 BL 49259 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2013) 211 CITED Cuevas v. United States, No. 10 Civ. 5959 (PAE) (GWG)., 98 Cr. 1053 (PAE)., 2013 BL 47221 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2013)

Table Of Authorities ( 97 cases ) 1 CITED , (Compare) United States v. Amer, 681 F.3d 211 (5th Cir. 2012) 2 DISCUSSED Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 182 L. Ed. 2d 398 (2012) 3 CITED , (Compare) State v. Gaitan, 209 N.J. 339, 37 A.3d 1089 (2012) 4 CITED , (Compare) Chaidez v. United States, 655 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011) 5 DISCUSSED , Greene v. Fisher, 132 S. Ct. 38, 181 L. (See, e.g.) Ed. 2d 336 (2011) 6 CITED , (Compare) United States v. Chang Hong, 671 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2011) 7 CITED , Quoted United States v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630 (3d Cir. 2011) 8 CITED , (Compare) Commonwealth v. Clarke, 460 Mass. 30, 949 N.E.2d 892 (2011) 9 DISCUSSED , Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 Quoted S. Ct. 1473, 176 L. Ed. 2d 284 (2010) 10 CITED , Quoted Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 176 L. Ed. 2d 284 (2010) 11 DISCUSSED , Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 Quoted S. Ct. 1473, 176 L. Ed. 2d 284 (2010) 12 PRIOR Santos-Sanchez v. United States, 548 OVERRULING , F.3d 327 (5th Cir. 2008) Quoted 13 CITED , (See) , Rubio v. State, 124 Nev. 1032, 194 Quoted P.3d 1224

Table Of Authorities ( 97 cases ) 14 PRIOR Niver v. Commissioner of Correction, OVERRULING 101 Conn. App. 1, 919 A.2d 1073 (App. Ct. 2007) 15 CITED , (See also) State v. Rojas-Martinez, 2005 UT 86, 125 P.3d 930 16 PRIOR State v. Rojas-Martinez, 2005 UT 86, OVERRULING 125 P.3d 930 17 PRIOR Nikolaev v. Weber, 2005 SD 100, 705 OVERRULING N.W.2d 72 18 PRIOR Commonwealth v. Fuartado, 170 OVERRULING S.W.3d 384 (Ky. 2005) 19 CITED , (See Resendiz v. Kovensky, 416 F.3d 952 also) , Quoted (9th Cir. 2005) 20 CITED , (See, e.g.) Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 125 S. Ct. 2456, 162 L. Ed. 2d 360 (2005) 21 DISCUSSED , Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 125 (See, e.g.) S. Ct. 2456, 162 L. Ed. 2d 360 (2005) 22 CITED , Quoted Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 125 S. Ct. 2113, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1020 (2005)

23 CITED , (See, United States v. Kwok Chee Kwan, 407 e.g.) , Quoted F.3d 1005 (9th Cir. 2005) 24 CITED , (See, e.g.) United States v. Kwok Chee Kwan, 407 F.3d 1005 (9th Cir. 2005) 25 CITED , (See also) Alguno v. State, 892 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) 26 PRIOR Bautista v. State, 160 S.W.3d 917 OVERRULING (Tenn. Crim. App. 2005) 27 CITED State v. Paredez, 2004-NMSC-036, 136 N.M. 533, 101 P.3d 799 28 CITED , Quoted Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 124 S. Ct. 2504, 159 L. Ed. 2d 494 (2004) 29 PRIOR Broomes v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 1251 OVERRULING , (10th Cir. 2004) (See, e.g.) 30 CITED , (See, e.g.) Broomes v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 1251 (10th Cir. 2004)

Table Of Authorities ( 97 cases ) 31 CITED , (See) People v. McDonald, 1 N.Y.3d 109, 769 N.Y.S.2d 781, 802 N.E.2d 131 (2003) 32 CITED , (See, e.g.) Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 123 S. Ct. 2527, 156 L. Ed. 2d 471 (2003) 33 DISCUSSED , Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 123 S. Quoted Ct. 2527, 156 L. Ed. 2d 471 (2003) 34 PRIOR United States v. Fry, 322 F.3d 1198 OVERRULING , (9th Cir. 2003) (See, e.g.) 35 CITED , (See) United States v. Couto, 311 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2002) 36 DISCUSSED , United States v. Couto, 311 F.3d 179 (See) , Quoted (2d Cir. 2002) 37 PRIOR Rumpel v. State, 847 So. 2d 399 (Ala. OVERRULING Crim. App. 2002) 38 PRIOR State v. Zarate, 264 Neb. 690, 651 OVERRULING N.W.2d 215 (2002) 39 PRIOR Commonwealth v. Fraire, 55 Mass. OVERRULING App. Ct. 916, 774 N.E.2d 677 (App. Ct. 2002) 40 PRIOR State v. Muriithi, 273 Kan. 952, 46 P.3d OVERRULING 1145 (2002) 41 PRIOR Major v. State, 814 So. 2d 424 (Fla. OVERRULING 2002) 42 PRIOR State v. Montalban, 810 So. 2d 1106 OVERRULING (La. 2002) 43 PRIOR State v. Ramirez, 636 N.W.2d 740 OVERRULING (Iowa 2001) 44 DISCUSSED , Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Quoted St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 121 S. Ct. 2271, 150 L. Ed. 2d 347 (2001) 45 DISCUSSED , Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Quoted St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 121 S. Ct. 2271, 150 L. Ed. 2d 347 (2001) 46 PRIOR People v. Davidovich, 463 Mich. 446, OVERRULING 618 N.W.2d 579 (2000) 47 PRIOR Perez v. State, 31 S.W.3d 365 (Tex. OVERRULING App.-San Antonio 2000)

Table Of Authorities ( 97 cases ) 48 PRIOR State v. Martinez-Lazo, 100 Wn. App. OVERRULING 869, 999 P.2d 1275 (App. Div. 3 2000)

49 DISCUSSED , Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 Quoted S. Ct. 1495, 146 L. Ed. 2d 389 (2000) 50 CITED , Quoted Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 146 L. Ed. 2d 389 (2000) 51 DISCUSSED , Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, (See, e.g.) 120 S. Ct. 1029, 145 L. Ed. 2d 985 (2000) 52 PRIOR United States v. Gonzalez, 202 F.3d 20 OVERRULING , (1st Cir. 2000) (See) 53 PRIOR Barajas v. State, 115 Nev. 440, 991 OVERRULING P.2d 474 (1999) 54 CITED , (See also) State v. Yokley, 139 Wn.2d 581, 989 P.2d 512 (1999) 55 CITED , Quoted Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 117 S. Ct. 1517, 137 L. Ed. 2d 771 (1997) 56 PRIOR State ex rel. Nixon v. Clark, 926 OVERRULING S.W.2d 22 (Mo. App. W.D. 1996) 57 PRIOR People v. Ford, 86 N.Y.2d 397, 633 OVERRULING N.Y.S.2d 270, 657 N.E.2d 265 (1995) 58 PRIOR State v. Alejo, 655 A.2d 692 (R.I. 1995) OVERRULING 59 PRIOR State v. Rosas, 183 Ariz. 421, 904 OVERRULING P.2d 1245 (App. Div. 1 1995) 60 CITED , (See) , United States v. Mora-Gomez, 875 F. Quoted Supp. 1208 (E.D. Va. 1995) 61 PRIOR State v. Dalman, 520 N.W.2d 860 OVERRULING (N.D. 1994) 62 PRIOR State v. Christie, 655 A.2d 836 (Del. OVERRULING Super. Ct. 1994) 63 PRIOR Matos v. United States, 631 A.2d 28 OVERRULING (D.C. 1993) 64 CITED Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 113 S. Ct. 892, 122 L. Ed. 2d 260 (1993)

Table Of Authorities ( 97 cases ) 65 CITED , Quoted Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 112 S. Ct. 2482, 120 L. Ed. 2d 225 (1992) 66 CITED , Quoted Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 112 S. Ct. 2482, 120 L. Ed. 2d 225 (1992) 67 CITED Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 112 S. Ct. 1130, 117 L. Ed. 2d 367 (1992) 68 PRIOR People v. Huante, 143 Ill. 2d 61, 156 Ill. OVERRULING Dec. 756, 571 N.E.2d 736 (1991) 69 PRIOR United States v. Del Rosario, 902 F.2d OVERRULING , 55, 284 U.S. App. D.C. 90 (D.C. Cir. (See) 1990) 70 PRIOR Commonwealth v. Frometa, 520 Pa. OVERRULING 552, 555 A.2d 92 (1989) 71 CITED , Quoted Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 103 L. Ed. 2d 334 (1989) 72 CITED Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 103 L. Ed. 2d 334 (1989) 73 DISCUSSED , Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S. Quoted Ct. 1060, 103 L. Ed. 2d 334 (1989) 74 PRIOR United States v. George, 869 F.2d 333 OVERRULING , (7th Cir. 1989) Quoted 75 PRIOR United States v. Yearwood, 863 F.2d 6 OVERRULING , (4th Cir. 1988) (See) 76 CITED , Quoted Yates v. Aiken, 484 U.S. 211, 108 S. Ct. 534, 98 L. Ed. 2d 546 (1988) 77 CITED People v. Pozo, 746 P.2d 523 (Colo. 1987) 78 PRIOR State v. Santos, 136 Wis. 2d 528, 401 OVERRULING N.W.2d 856 (Ct. App. 1987) 79 DISCUSSED , (Cf.) Janvier v. United States, 793 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1986) 80 PRIOR State v. Chung, 210 N.J. Super. 427, OVERRULING 510 A.2d 72 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986) 81 PRIOR United States v. Campbell, 778 F.2d OVERRULING , 764 (11th Cir. 1985) Quoted

Table Of Authorities ( 97 cases ) 82 DISCUSSED , Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S. Ct. (See, e.g.) 366, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1985) 83 DISCUSSED , Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S. Ct. Quoted 366, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1985) 84 CITED , (See) People v. Correa, 108 Ill. 2d 541, 92 Ill. Dec. 496, 485 N.E.2d 307 (1985) 85 CITED , (See) United States v. Byrd, 765 F.2d 1524 (11th Cir. 1985) 86 CITED , (See Downs-Morgan v. United States, 765 also) , Quoted F.2d 1534 (11th Cir. 1985) 87 CITED , (See) United States v. Byrd, 765 F.2d 1524 (11th Cir. 1985) 88 DISCUSSED , Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. Quoted 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984) 89 DISCUSSED , Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. Quoted 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984) 90 CITED , Quoted United States v. Russell, 686 F.2d 35, 222 U.S. App. D.C. 313 (D.C. Cir. 1982) 91 CITED United States v. Santelises, 509 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1975) 92 PRIOR Tafoya v. State, 500 P.2d 247 (Alaska OVERRULING 1972) 93 CITED , (See) , United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, Quoted 74 S. Ct. 247, 98 L. Ed. 248 (1954) 94 DISCUSSED , Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 71 (See, e.g.) , Quoted S. Ct. 703, 95 L. Ed. 886 (1951)

95 CITED , (See, Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, e.g.) , Quoted 68 S. Ct. 374, 92 L. Ed. 433 (1948) 96 DISCUSSED , Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 42 (See, e.g.) , Quoted S. Ct. 492, 66 L. Ed. 938 (1922)

97 CITED , (See, Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 e.g.) , Quoted U.S. 698, 13 S. Ct. 1016, 37 L. Ed. 905 (1893)

FEDERAL STATUTES IMPOSING COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES UPON CONVICTION

DISCLAIMER

This monograph highlights significant collateral consequences that are imposed by federal law upon conviction of a felony offense. It is provided for informational purposes only, as an aid to further inquiry. The views expressed in the monograph on questions of federal or state law do not necessarily represent the official position of the Department of Justice. The Office of the Pardon Attorney does not have operational responsibility for the interpretation or enforcement of the statutes cited in the monograph. Readers should therefore consult with the appropriate agency with operational responsibility for administering the statutory provision of interest for authoritative and more complete information. In addition, the research for the preparation of the monograph was completed by the early fall of 2000. Because laws are revised frequently, readers are cautioned that the information in this monograph may be out of date and that they should consult with the appropriate agency for more current information.

We have not attempted to describe all the adverse legal consequences of a felony conviction, and do not cover in depth the adverse consequences of conviction of a crime other than a felony. In addition, although disabilities may attend being charged with or agreeing to pretrial diversion for a crime, we have not attempted to explore those issues or to define what is meant by Aconviction@ of a crime, which may vary from context to context. For example, a person may not be considered Aconvicted@ for some purposes until sentence is imposed. Further, the treatment of military convictions, juvenile adjudications, and convictions in foreign countries or tribal courts is not covered to any significant degree in this monograph. Finally, the issue of the effective dates of particular disabilities and restoration procedures is not addressed in any detail, but should be considered before concluding that a particular disability or restoration procedure applies as a result of a particular conviction. FEDERAL LAW

I. FEDERAL LAW REGARDING EFFECT OF CONVICTION ON VOTING, OFFICE HOLDING, JURY SERVICE, LICENSING, EMPLOYMENT, FEDERAL BENEFITS, AND IMMIGRATION

A. Right to vote

The United States Constitution, aside from prohibiting disenfranchisement on grounds such as age, gender, and race, U.S. Const. amend. XV, XIX, XXVI, provides that qualifications for voting in federal elections are determined by state law. U.S. Const. art. I, ' 2, cl. 1; art. I, ' 4; art. II, ' 1, cl. 2; amend. XVII. (For the District of Columbia, see U.S. Const. amend. XXIII; D.C. Code Ann. ' 1-1301.) See also the Voting Rights Act and related statutes, 42 U.S.C. '' 1971 - 1973gg-10.

The power of the states to deny the right to vote because of participation in a crime is expressly recognized in the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, ' 2. See generally Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974). Therefore, the effect of a federal felony conviction upon the right to vote is determined by the law of the state in which the felon seeks to vote, and thus varies from state to state.1

The great majority of states impose some type of restriction on the ability of convicted felons to vote, at least during a period of incarceration following conviction. Many states impose or continue the disability during periods of supervision, such as probation or parole. Restoration of the right to vote may be automatic after a defined event (such as release from incarceration or expiration of sentence) or after the passage of a defined period of time, or may require the defendant to employ an administrative or judicial procedure in order to have the right to vote reinstated. In some states, only a pardon will restore the right to vote.

B. Right to serve on a federal jury

Conviction in federal or state court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year disqualifies an individual from serving on a federal grand or petit jury if Ahis civil rights have not been restored.@ 28 U.S.C. ' 1865(b)(5). The only method currently provided by federal law to restore civil rights is a pardon; however, the court in United States v. Hefner, 842 F.2d 731, 732 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 868 (1988), noted that ' 1865 reflects a congressional concern that requiring a pardon would unduly limit the potential means by which an individual=s civil rights may be restored. The court nonetheless held that Asome affirmative act recognized in

1 The claim that felon disenfranchisement provisions are racially discriminatory and therefore violate either the Constitution or the Voting Rights Act has been litigated in several cases. See, e.g., Baker v. Pataki, 85 F.3d 919 (2d Cir. 1996); Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255 (6th Cir. 1986); Farrakhan v. Locke, 987 F. Supp. 1304 (E.D. Wash. 1997); Texas Supporters of Workers World Party Presidential Candidates v. Strake, 511 F. Supp. 149 (S.D. Tex. 1981). The claim that disenfranchisement of persons under a felony charge is irrational and, therefore, violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment has also been litigated and rejected. United States v. Green, 995 F.2d 793 (8th Cir. 1993). law must first take place to restore one=s civil rights to meet the eligibility requirements of section 1865(b)(5).@ Id. This provision is discussed in greater detail at p. 13, infra.

C. Employment and licensing

1. Right to hold federal office or employment

In setting qualifications for federal office, the United States Constitution does not prohibit felons from holding elected federal office. See U.S. Const. art. I, '' 2, 3; art. II, ' 1; art. VI.2 Various federal statutes, however, provide that a conviction may result in the loss of or ineligibility for office. For example, conviction of treason renders the defendant Aincapable of holding any office under the United States.@ 18 U.S.C. ' 2381. Likewise, when an individual is convicted of bribing a public official or accepting a bribe, disqualification from federal office may be ordered by the sentencing court. 18 U.S.C. ' 201(b).

Other examples of loss of or disqualification for federal office or employment as a result of conviction or commission of a crime include:

$ removal from federal or District of Columbia office and ineligibility for employment by the United States or the District of Columbia for five years upon conviction under federal or state law of a felony for inciting, organizing, encouraging, or participating in, a riot or civil disorder or any offense committed in furtherance of, or while participating in, a riot or civil disorder (5 U.S.C. ' 7313);

$ removal from office, and ineligibility for any federal office, of a collecting or disbursing officer upon conviction of trading in public funds or property (18 U.S.C. ' 1901);

$ removal from office or employment of designated federal officers and employees upon conviction of unauthorized disclosure of certain confidential information relating to trade secrets or the financial profile of any person or business (18 U.S.C. ' 1905);

$ removal from office or employment of a federal officer or employee convicted of using federal money to finance lobbying a Member of Congress (18 U.S.C. ' 1913);

2The Constitution, however, provides that the APresident, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors,@ U.S. Const. art. II, ' 4, and further provides that a judgment in a case of impeachment may include removal from office and Adisqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States.@ U.S. Const. art. I, ' 3.

-2- $ forfeiture of office, and disqualification from any federal office, of a records custodian convicted of unlawfully concealing, removing, falsifying, or mutilating public documents (18 U.S.C. ' 2071);

$ ineligibility for federal employment for five years after conviction of an offense arising from advocating the overthrow by force or violence of the federal government or the government of a state or territory or conspiring to do so, or interfering with the morale or discipline of the United States armed forces (18 U.S.C. '' 2385, 2387);

$ removal from the Board of Directors of the United States Institute of Peace upon conviction of a felony (22 U.S.C. ' 4605(f)(1));

$ ineligibility for appointment to or continued service on the National Indian Gaming Commission upon conviction of a felony or gaming offense (25 U.S.C. ' 2704(b)(5)(A));

$ dismissal from office or discharge from employment of an officer or employee of the United States upon conviction of unlawfully disclosing to any unauthorized person taxpayer return or return information (or disclosing the operations of a manufacturer or producer visited during the course of official duties) (26 U.S.C. '' 7213(a)(1), (b));

$ dismissal from office or discharge from employment of a federal officer or employee convicted of unauthorized inspection of a tax return (26 U.S.C. ' 7213A);

$ dismissal from office or discharge from employment of any officer or employee of the United States acting in connection with any federal revenue law who is guilty of extortion, bribery, conspiracy to defraud the United States, making false entries, or another enumerated offense (26 U.S.C. ' 7214(a)).

Aside from such specific statutory disqualifications, a felony conviction does not dis- qualify a person from federal employment, but is a factor in determining suitability for it, according to the Office of Personnel Management.

2. Armed forces B qualifications for service; payment of benefits

Unless an exception is made (see p. 13, infra), an individual convicted of a felony is ineligible to enlist in any service of the armed forces. 10 U.S.C. ' 504. See also 50 U.S.C. App. ' 456(m). Any person guilty of mutiny, treason, sabotage, or rendering assistance to an enemy of the United States or of its allies forfeits all accrued and future Agratuitous@ veterans benefits.3

3According to the Veterans= Administration, all veterans benefits are considered gratuitous; therefore, the

-3- 38 U.S.C. ' 6104(a). Anyone convicted of certain offenses related to espionage, treason, or subversive activities forfeits Agratuitous@ veterans benefits (payable to himself or to his dependents or survivors) based on any of his military service. 38 U.S.C. '' 6105(a), (b).4 After the first 60 days, military pensions may not be paid to an individual who is incarcerated in a federal, state, or local penal institution as a result of conviction of a felony or misdemeanor. 38 U.S.C. ' 1505(a). However, the pension lost as a result of such imprisonment may be paid to the spouse or children of the imprisoned veteran. 38 U.S.C. ' 1505(b). Any person guilty of mutiny, treason, spying, or desertion forfeits all rights to National Service Life Insurance and Servicemembers= Group Life Insurance. 38 U.S.C. '' 1911, 1973. National Service Life Insurance, Servicemembers= Group Life Insurance, and United States Government life insurance are not payable for death inflicted as lawful punishment for a crime or for a military or naval offense, except when inflicted by an enemy of the United States. 38 U.S.C. '' 1911, 1954, 1973.

3. Other federally imposed occupational restrictions and disabilities

(a) General

Under 18 U.S.C. '' 3563(b)(5), 3583(d), and the United States Sentencing Guidelines, the sentencing court may impose certain occupational restrictions5 as a condition of probation or supervised release. Restrictions are authorized when a Areasonably direct relationship@ exists between the defendant=s occupation and the offense conduct, 18 U.S.C. ' 3563(b)(5), U.S.S.G. ' 5F1.5(a)(1); and the conditions are Areasonably necessary to protect the public because there is reason to believe that, absent such restriction, the defendant will continue to engage in unlawful conduct similar to that for which the defendant was convicted.@ U.S.S.G. ' 5F1.5(a)(2). If such an occupational restriction is imposed, it must be imposed Afor the minimum time and to the minimum extent necessary to protect the public.@ U.S.S.G. ' 5F1.5(b).

In addition, specific federal statutes provide that particular convictions may result in the loss of or ineligibility for a federal license.6 See, e.g.: grain inspector=s license (7 U.S.C. ' 85);

benefits forfeited under '' 6104(a) and 6105(a) include pension, disability, hospitalization, loan guarantees, and burial in a national cemetery.

4Certain veterans benefits are also forfeited if false claims for them are submitted. 38 U.S.C. ' 6103.

5Specifically, the court may require the defendant to refrain from engaging in the occupation, or to engage in it only to a stated degree or under stated circumstances.

6The offenses for which conviction may result in revocation of or ineligibility for a license are generally spelled out in the statute imposing the disability, along with any time limit for the disability. See, e.g., under 50 U.S.C. App. ' 2410(h)(1), a license may be revoked, or a 10-year period of non-use of or ineligibility for a license may be imposed, upon conviction of specified offenses, such as espionage and violations of various statutes, including the Export Administration Act, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, the Internal Security Act of 1950, and the Arms Export Control Act. In addition, sanctions may be authorized even if the individual is not convicted but is found to have been indicted for or to have committed a disqualifying violation. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. App. ' 2410b(a) (certain knowing violations of the Arms Export Control Act may lead to a two-year denial of certain export licenses).

-4- license to import, manufacture, or deal in explosives or permit to use explosives (18 U.S.C. ' 843(d)); customs broker=s license (19 U.S.C. ' 1641(d)(1)(B)); license to export defense articles and services (22 U.S.C. ' 2778(g)(4)); merchant mariner=s document, license, or certificate of registry (46 U.S.C. ' 7503); license or certification of locomotive engineer (49 U.S.C. ' 20135(b)(4); 49 C.F.R. '' 240.111, 240.115); commercial motor vehicle operator=s license (49 U.S.C. ' 31310); 49 U.S.C. '' 44709(b)(2), 44710(b), and 14 C.F.R. ' 61.15 (certificate, rating, or authorization of a pilot, flight instructor, or ground instructor) (see also Zukas v. Hinson, 124 F.3d 1407 (11th Cir. 1997) (revocation of commercial pilot=s certificate as result of federal drug conviction)); export license (50 U.S.C. App. ' 2410(h)(1).

A federal license may be lost upon conviction of a drug offense. 21 U.S.C. ' 862(d)(1); U.S.S.G. '5F1.6, discussed in section I.D, infra. A professional license may be forfeited if used to facilitate a federal drug offense. 21 U.S.C. ' 853; United States v. Dicter, 198 F.3d 1284 (11th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 828 (2000) (state medical license).

Depending on the statutory provision, a felony conviction may be an absolute bar to licensure. But even if not an absolute bar, a conviction may nonetheless be a relevant consideration when an agency reviews an application for a license. Agencies closely examine convictions related to the license being sought, and other convictions, as a sign of the prospective licensee=s character. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. ' 823 (Attorney General directed to consider convictions relating to the manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of controlled substances or to distribute certain listed chemicals in deciding whether to register an applicant to manufacture, distribute, or conduct research on controlled substances); 47 C.F.R. ' 73.4280, 55 Fed. Reg. 23,082 (June 6, 1990, setting forth F.C.C. 90-195, the F.C.C.=s policy statement expanding the scope of inquiry to consider all felony convictions in evaluating a broadcast licensee=s character); 49 U.S.C. ' 44709(b)(1)(A) (revocation of airman=s certificate if Asafety in air commerce or air transportation and the public interest require that action@) and 14 C.F.R. '' 61.15(c), (d) (revocation of certificate, rating, or authorization of pilot, flight instructor, or ground instructor permitted if holder convicted of a specified offense).

(b) Banking, commodities, and securities

A person who has been convicted of any criminal offense involving dishonesty or a breach of trust or money laundering may not: become, or continue as, an institution-affiliated party7 with respect to a federally insured depository institution; own or control, directly or indirectly, an insured depository institution; or otherwise participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of the affairs of such an institution. 12 U.S.C. '' 1818(e), (g)(1)(C), 1829(a). Nor may the institution permit a disqualified person to engage in such conduct or to continue such a relationship. 12 U.S.C. '' 1818(e), (g); 1829(a)(1)(B). The prohibition may be waived upon the

7This term includes any director, officer, employee, agent, and controlling stockholder, as well as specified other persons who participate in conducting the affairs of the institution or who participated in the violations. 12 U.S.C. ' 1813(u).

-5- written consent of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, but consent may not be given until 10 years after the date the conviction becomes final in the case of certain offenses, generally relating to the banking and financial industry. 12 U.S.C. ' 1829. An exception to the prohibition may be made by the sentencing court upon motion of the FDIC Aif the exception is in the interest of justice.@ 12 U.S.C. ' 1829.8 In addition, an indictment for a money-laundering offense or a felony offense for which removal or prohibition may be ordered upon conviction may also result in suspension. 12 U.S.C. ' 1818(g)(1)(A).

The Commodity Futures Trading Commission may refuse to register, or may register conditionally, a futures commission merchant, introducing broker, commodity trading advisor, commodity pool operator, floor broker, or floor trader (or an associated person of an introducing broker, a commodity trading advisor, or a commodity pool operator) or may suspend him or her, place restrictions on a registration, or revoke a registration if, within 10 years of applying for registration or thereafter, he (or an associated person) has been convicted a felony relating to commodities futures trading or of an enumerated offense, including such crimes as embezzlement, mail fraud, false statements, theft, bribery, gambling, and federal tax offenses. 7 U.S.C. ' 12a(2)(D). In addition, the Commission may refuse to register, or may register conditionally, a person who has been convicted of: a felony other than an enumerated offense, 7 U.S.C. ' 12a(3)(D); an enumerated offense more than 10 years ago, 7 U.S.C. ' 12a(3)(D); certain misdemeanors relating to commodities trading or misdemeanors involving an enumerated offense, 7 U.S.C. ' 12a(3)(E); or a state, military, or foreign conviction for conduct that would be a felony under federal law, 7 U.S.C. ' 12a(3)(H).

The Securities and Exchange Commission, after finding that such action is in the public interest, may censure, place limitations on the activities, functions, or operations of, suspend for up to one year, or revoke the registration of any investment adviser (or any person associated, or seeking to become associated, with an investment advisor) if he or she (or an associated person), within the 10 years before an application for registration is filed or thereafter, has been convicted of any felony or of certain enumerated offenses (whether felonies or misdemeanors), including such offenses as securities violations, theft, forgery, counterfeiting, embezzlement, perjury, bribery, and mail fraud. 15 U.S.C. '' 80b-3(e)(2), (e)(3), (f). The Commission may take similar action against any broker or dealer (or any person associated, or seeking to become associated, with a broker or dealer) if he or she (or an associated person), within the 10 years before filing an application for registration or thereafter, is convicted of an enumerated felony or misdemeanor. 15 U.S.C. '' 78o(b)(4)(B), (b)(6)(A).9

8The appropriate federal banking agency has the discretion to impose the sanctions of removal or prohibition of further participation upon final conviction for the commission of a crime involving dishonesty or breach of trust that is punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, if it is determined that Acontinued service or participation by such party may pose a threat to the interests of the depository institution=s depositors or may threaten to impair public confidence in the depository institution.@ 12 U.S.C. ' 1818(g)(1)(C)(i). Such a sanction is mandatory in the case of final conviction of certain money-laundering offenses. 12 U.S.C. ' 1818(g)(1)(C)(ii).

9Except as otherwise provided by the Securities and Exchange Commission, an issuer of securities

-6- (c) Labor organizations

Conviction of certain offenses (including such offenses as robbery, bribery, extortion, embezzlement, grand larceny, burglary, arson, drug violations, murder, assault with intent to kill, rape, and certain offenses relating to a labor organization or employee benefit plan) disqualifies an individual from serving in any of a wide range of capacities relating to a labor organization or an employee benefits plan, including consultant, adviser, officer, director, trustee, business agent, manager, or member of the labor organization=s governing board. 29 U.S.C. '' 504, 1111. The disability lasts for 13 years after conviction or until Athe end of such imprisonment,@ whichever is later, unless the sentencing court sets a shorter period of no less than three years. 29 U.S.C. '' 504, 1111. The disability may be removed sooner if the individual=s Acitizenship rights, having been revoked as a result of such conviction, have been fully restored.@ Id. For a federal offense committed on or after November 1, 1987, the disability may also be removed by the sentencing court, or, for state or local offenses, by the United States district court where the offense was committed, in accordance with the policy statements of the United States Sentencing Commission, if the court determines that the person=s service in a prohibited capacity would not be contrary to the purposes of the law under which the disqualification is imposed. 29 U.S.C. '' 504, 1111. The disability for offenses committed before November 1, 1987, may be removed by the United States Parole Commission. See U.S.S.G. ' 5J1.1 (policy statement implementing '' 504, 1111). See Viverito v. Levi, 395 F. Supp. 47 (N.D. Ill. 1975).

(d) Participation in federal contracts or programs

With certain exceptions, individuals convicted of fraud or any felony arising out of a contract with the Department of Defense are prohibited, for a period of time set by the Secretary of Defense of not less than five years, from working in a management or supervisory capacity for a defense contractor or first-tier subcontractor, or from serving on the board of directors or acting as a consultant for any company that is a defense contractor or subcontractor awarded a contract directly by the contractor, or being involved in any way proscribed by the Secretary of Defense with a defense contract or a first-tier subcontract. 10 U.S.C. ' 2408(a); 48 C.F.R. ' 252.203-7001. The five-year period may be waived by the Secretary of Defense Ain the interests of national security.@ 10 U.S.C. ' 2408(a)(3).

convicted of such an offense is ineligible for three years for the benefit under the securities laws of provisions establishing safe harbor (immunity from civil liability in private actions under the securities laws) for forward- looking statements. 15 U.S.C. '' 77z-2(b)(1)(i), 78u-5(b)(1)(i).

-7- Mandatory and permissive exclusions from participation in any federal health care program or designated state health care program based on conviction of certain types of crimes are set forth in 42 U.S.C. ' 1320a-7.10 Mandatory and permissive periods of debarment from participation in aspects of the drug industry based on conviction of certain types of crimes are set forth in 21 U.S.C. ' 335a.11 The periods of debarment may be up to five years for an individual (10 years for an entity) depending on the offense, and in some circumstances may be permanent. 21 U.S.C. ' 335a(c)(2).

10The Secretary of Health and Human Services must exclude persons or entities convicted of an offense relating to the delivery of an item or service under the Medicare program or any state health care program or of an offense relating to the neglect or abuse of patients in connection with the delivery of a health care item or service. 42 U.S.C. '' 1320a-7(a)(1), (a)(2). In addition, for offenses occurring after August 21, 1996, the Secretary must exclude persons or entities convicted of a felony offense relating to manufacturing, distributing, prescribing, or dispensing drugs, 42 U.S.C. ' 1320a-7(a)(4), or of a felony offense in connection with the delivery of a health care item or service or with respect to any act or omission in a health care program (other than an offense already covered by mandatory exclusion) that consists of fraud, theft, embezzlement, breach of fiduciary responsibility, or other financial misconduct. 42 U.S.C. ' 1320a-7(a)(3). The Secretary may exclude persons convicted for an offense occurring after August 22, 1996, that is: (a) a misdemeanor Arelating to fraud, theft, embezzlement, breach of fiduciary responsibility, or other financial misconduct@ in connection with the delivery of a health care item or service or with respect to any act or omission in a health care program (other than an offense that results in mandatory exclusion); (b) a criminal offense relating to fraud, theft, embezzlement, breach of fiduciary responsibility, or other financial misconduct for an act or omission in a program financed by the federal or state government other than a health care program; or (c) Ain connection with the interference with or obstruction of any investigation@ into any offense requiring mandatory exclusion or described in (a) or (b), above. 42 U.S.C. '' 1320a- 7(b)(1), (2). The Secretary may also exclude persons convicted of a misdemeanor offense relating to manufacturing, distributing, prescribing, or dispensing drugs. 42 U.S.C. ' 1320a-7(b)(3).

11Mandatory debarment of an individual from providing services in any capacity to a person who has an approved or pending Adrug product@ application is required when the individual is convicted of a federal felony for conduct relating to the development or approval of any Adrug product@ or otherwise relating to the regulation of any Adrug product.@ 21 U.S.C. ' 335a(a)(2). ADrug product@ is defined in 21 U.S.C. ' 321(dd) to be a drug subject to regulation under 21 U.S.C. '' 355 (Anew drug@), 360b (new animal drug), or 382 (export of certain unapproved products), or 42 U.S.C. ' 262 (biological products). Debarment may also be imposed for a conviction of a misdemeanor under federal law or a felony under state law for conduct relating to the development or approval of a Adrug product@ or otherwise relating to the regulation of Adrug products,@ or a conspiracy to commit or aiding and abetting an offense that requires mandatory debarment for an individual, if, in either case, the conduct that formed the basis for the conviction Aundermines the process for the regulation of drugs.@ 21 U.S.C. ' 335a(b)(2)(B)(i). Debarment may also be ordered for any individual convicted of a felony involving bribery, payment of illegal gratuities, fraud, perjury, false statement, racketeering, blackmail, extortion, falsification or destruction of records, or interference with or obstruction of an investigation into, or prosecution of, any criminal offense, or for conspiracy to commit or aiding and abetting such a felony, if the individual Ahas demonstrated a pattern of conduct sufficient to find that there is reason to believe that [he] may violate requirements@ under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act relating to Adrug products.@ 21 U.S.C. ' 335a(b)(2)(B)(ii). Mandatory debarment is also provided for entities convicted after May 13, 1992, of a federal felony for conduct relating to the development or approval of any abbreviated drug application, 21 U.S.C. ' 335a(a)(1), and permissive debarment is authorized for federal felony convictions before that date, state felonies, or federal misdemeanor convictions after that date for conduct that relates to the development or approval of any abbreviated drug application if the Atype of conduct which served as the basis for such conviction undermines the process for the regulation of drugs.@ 21 U.S.C. ' 335a(b)(2)(A). Suspension of the distribution of drugs may also be ordered during the pendency of a criminal investigation under specified circumstances. 21 U.S.C. ' 335a(g).

-8- Conviction may result in debarment from participation in a federal contract or program. For example, a conviction for fraud, an antitrust violation, embezzlement, theft, forgery, bribery, falsification or destruction of records, making false statements or claims, receiving stolen property, obstructing justice, Aa criminal offense in connection with obtaining, attempting to obtain, or performing a public or private agreement or transaction,@ or Aany other offense indicating a lack of business integrity or business honesty that seriously and directly affects the present responsibility of a person@ may result in debarment from participation in contracts with the Department of Housing and Urban Development. See 24 C.F.R. ' 24.305. Conviction of a crime may also form the basis for an order debarring an individual from obtaining other federal contracts. See 48 C.F.R. Part 9, Subpart 9.4.

Conviction of a designated crime, such as fraud, embezzlement, theft, forgery, bribery, falsification or destruction of records, making false statements, receiving stolen property, making false claims, obstruction of justice, and other business-related crimes, is cause for debarment or suspension from participating in procurement and non-procurement programs. Executive Order No. 12,549, 16,689; 5 C.F.R. '' 970.110(c), 970.305, 970.405; 48 C.F.R. ' 9.406-2. Under Executive Order No. 12,549, ADebarment and Suspension,@ 51 Fed. Reg. 6370 (1986), all federal agencies must participate in a system of debarment and suspension for non-procurement programs and A[d]ebarment or suspension of a participant in a program by one agency shall have government-wide effect.@ Under Executive Order No. 12,689, ADebarment and Suspension,@ 54 Fed. Reg. 34,131 (1989), debarment, suspension, or exclusion of a participant in a procurement or non-procurement program has government wide effect. The period of debarment is generally not to exceed three years. 5 C.F.R. ' 970.320. The Office of Personnel Management has issued guidelines to implement the executive orders= provisions concerning non-procurement programs, 5 C.F.R. Part 970, and regulations pertaining to procurement programs are set forth in 48 C.F.R. Subpart 9.4.

D. Federal benefits

Certain federal benefits may be revoked or limited upon conviction of a crime. Under 21 U.S.C. ' 862 and U.S.S.G. ' 5F1.6,12 drug offenders convicted after September 1, 1989, may be made ineligible for grants, licenses, contracts, and other federal benefits, excluding retirement, welfare, Social Security, health, disability, public housing, benefits based on military service, and benefits for which payments or services are required for eligibility. The exclusion of certain

12For individuals residing in federally funded public housing, Acriminal activity that threatens the health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other tenant[s], any criminal activity that threatens the health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of their residences by persons residing in the immediate vicinity of the premises, or any drug-related criminal activity on or near such premises,@ is cause for eviction, whether engaged in by the tenant, any member of the tenant=s household, or any guest or other person under the tenant=s control. 42 U.S.C. ' 1437f(d)(1)(B)(iii). See also 42 U.S.C. '' 13661-13662. Anyone fleeing to avoid prosecution or to avoid custody or confinement after conviction for a felony (or high misdemeanor in New Jersey) may be evicted. 42 U.S.C. ' 1437f(d)(1)(B)(v)(I). Expedited procedures may apply in cases of eviction for criminal or drug-related activity. 42 U.S.C. ' 1437d(k). A person may also be evicted for violating a condition of probation or parole. 42 U.S.C. ' 1437f(d)(1)(B)(v)(II).

-9- benefits from restriction under these provisions, however, has been qualified by the more recent specific disqualifications of drug offenders discussed below. The maximum period of authorized denial of benefits is shorter for drug-possession offenses than for drug-trafficking offenses, compare 21 U.S.C. ' 862(a) with ' 862(b), but denial of benefits is mandatory and permanent upon a third conviction for a drug-trafficking offense. 21 U.S.C. ' 862(a)(1)(C). The disability may be waived or suspended for participation in treatment programs, or for drug addicts who are rehabilitated or who enter into long-term treatment or who are prevented from entering into treatment because of its unavailability. 21 U.S.C. ' 862(c). The disability does not apply to persons who cooperate with the government in connection with the prosecution of other offenders or who are in a government witness protection program. 21 U.S.C. ' 862(e).

Anyone convicted of a federal or state felony for conduct occurring on or after August 22, 1996, that involved the possession, use, or distribution of drugs is not eligible to receive food stamps or temporary assistance to needy families, and the amount payable to any family or household of which such a person is a member is reduced proportionately. 21 U.S.C. '' 862a(a), (b), (d)(2). States may, however, elect not to impose such a disability or may limit the period of the disability. 21 U.S.C. ' 862a(d). Any person convicted of a federal or state offense involving the possession or sale of drugs is ineligible to receive any grant, loan, or work assistance for students in attendance at institutions for higher education (including so-called APell grants@) or benefits under the federal work-study program for the statutorily designated period (two years after conviction in the case of a first offense for the sale of drugs). 20 U.S.C. ' 1091(r). Persons convicted of illegally manufacturing or producing methamphetamine on the premises of federally assisted housing may be evicted and permanently barred from occupying such housing and from receiving federal low-income housing assistance. 42 U.S.C. ' 1437n(f).

Any person who is subject to a lifetime registration requirement under a state sex offender registration program is ineligible for federally assisted housing. 42 U.S.C. ' 13663. Upon conviction of certain offenses related to the national security, an individual, his survivor, and his beneficiary may not receive an annuity or retirement pay from the United States or District of Columbia government and may be subject to additional penalties regarding his collection of old-age, survivors, or disability insurance benefits, or health insurance for the aged and disabled. 5 U.S.C. ' 8312; 42 U.S.C. ' 402(u)(1). A person confined for more than 30 days in a jail or penal institution upon conviction of a criminal offense may not receive old-age, survivors, or disability insurance payments for any month in which he or she was incarcerated. 42 U.S.C. ' 402(x)(1)(A)(i). Persons convicted of fraud in applying for or receiving federal workers compensation benefits forfeit those benefits for any injury occurring on or before the conviction. 5 U.S.C. ' 8148(a). Federal workers compensation benefits may not be paid to the offender (but may be paid to dependents) during a period of incarceration resulting from a felony conviction. 5 U.S.C. '' 8148(b)(1), (3).

A passport may not be issued to a person convicted of a felony federal or state drug offense if he used the passport or otherwise crossed an international boundary in committing the offense. 22 U.S.C. '' 2714(a)(1), (b)(1). An already issued passport may be revoked upon conviction of a disqualifying offense. 22 U.S.C. ' 2714(a)(2). The disqualification lasts during

-10- any period the person is imprisoned as a result of the conviction and during any period of parole or other supervised release after having been imprisoned as a result of conviction for such an offense. 22 U.S.C. ' 2714(c). AImprisoned@ includes confinement in a jail-type facility and halfway house or treatment facility. 22 U.S.C. ' 2714(e)(4). The Secretary of State may also apply the disqualification to a person convicted of a misdemeanor drug offense under federal or state law (except a person=s first conviction for a misdemeanor that involves only possession of a controlled substance) if the Secretary determines that the disqualification should apply to that person on account of that offense. 22 U.S.C. ' 2714(b)(2). Exceptions may be granted in emergency circumstances or for humanitarian reasons. 22 U.S.C. ' 2714(d).

E. Immigration

An alien is ineligible for admission to the United States if he or she has been convicted of (or admits committing13) a crime involving moral turpitude (unless the alien was younger than 18 when the crime was committed, he committed only one crime, the penalty for which was less than one year=s imprisonment and a sentence of six months or less was imposed, and the crime was committed (and the alien released from confinement) more than five years before applying for admission) or multiple offenses for which the aggregate sentences to confinement were five years or more. 8 U.S.C. '' 1182(a)(2)(A), (B). An alien may be removed from the United States if he was inadmissible at the time of entry, 8 U.S.C. ' 1227(a)(1)(A), or upon conviction of: a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years after the date of entry (or 10 years in the case of an offender having certain lawful permanent resident status) and for which a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed; two or more crimes of moral turpitude not arising out of a single scheme; an Aaggravated felony@;14 a drug offense (other than one involving possession for one=s own use of 30 grams or less of marijuana); a specified firearms offense; a specified offense related to national security, such as treason or espionage; a specified immigration offense; or a domestic violence offense. 8 U.S.C. ' 1227(a)(2). An individual is precluded from establishing Agood moral character@ and is therefore disqualified from naturalization and from certain forms of relief from removal if he or she, during the required

13Immigration consequences may flow from the commission of a number of criminal acts, whether or not they result in conviction. For example, an alien who is a known trafficker in drugs or persons is inadmissible and may be removed from the United States. 8 U.S.C. '' 1182(a)(2)(C), (H). The discussion in this section on federal law, however, focuses on the statutory provisions relating to disabilities imposed by reason of conviction.

14AAggravated felony@ is defined to include a long list of enumerated crimes, under federal or state law or foreign violations for which the prison sentence was completed within the past 15 years; the list includes such offenses as murder, rape, illicit trafficking in any controlled substance or in any firearm or destructive device, offenses relating to the laundering of monetary instruments, theft or burglary offenses for which the term of imprisonment was at least one year, fraud or deceit causing a loss of more than $10,000, tax evasion causing a loss of more than $10,000, certain offenses involving aliens, failure to appear to begin serving a sentence for an offense punishable by five or more years in prison, perjury or obstruction of justice for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year, and a crime of violence for which the term of imprisonment imposed is at least one year. 8 U.S.C. '1101(a)(43). In general, an alien convicted of an aggravated felony is ineligible for most forms of relief from removal.

-11- period of good behavior, was confined for 180 days or more as a result of a conviction, has at any time been convicted of an aggravated felony, or has been convicted of any of the following offenses committed during the required period of good behavior: a crime involving moral turpitude (except crimes punishable by less than one year=s imprisonment for which a sentence of six months or less was imposed); two or more offenses for which the aggregate sentence was five years or more; a drug offense (except simple possession of a small amount of marijuana); or two or more gambling offenses. 8 U.S.C. '' 1101(f)(3), (5), (7), (8); 1427(a).

F. Registration and notification statutes

The growing area of sex offender registration is addressed in several federal statutes, including the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act (the AWetterling Act,@ 42 U.S.C. ' 14071, and 64 Fed. Reg. 572, 3590 (implementing guidelines)) and the Pam Lychner Sexual Offender Tracking and Identification Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. ' 14072. Every state has enacted legislation requiring convicted sex offenders to inform designated authorities of their places of residence following conviction (sometimes referred to as AMegan=s laws@).15 These registration laws assist law enforcement by making available for law enforcement purposes information concerning the identity and location of convicted sex offenders. The minimum national standards for state registration programs are set forth in the Wetterling Act, which addresses such issues as the types of offenses for which registration should be required, the duration of the registration requirement, the need for periodic verification of address information and updating of registration information when a sex offender changes address, and the release of information about registrants as necessary to protect the public. Compliance with the standards of the Wetterling Act affects state eligibility for certain federal funding related to law enforcement assistance. See 42 U.S.C. ' 14071(g)(2) (10-percent reduction of assistance grant funds imposed on noncompliant states).

The registration laws of each state provide for some form of disclosure to members of the public of information concerning registered sex offenders (or some subset of such offenders). Examples of common methods of notification include: making available registration lists for public inspection at law enforcement offices; maintaining sex offender websites accessible by the public; and affirmatively notifying neighbors of the presence of particularly dangerous sex offenders.

In addition to the standards set by the Wetterling Act for state registration programs, federal law directly imposes registration requirements on certain offenders. A sex offender registered in any state who moves to another state must notify the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the new state of residence. See 42 U.S.C. ' 14072(g)(3), (i)(1). Federal authorities must notify state law enforcement and registration authorities when a federal prisoner

15While the Wetterling Act focuses on sex offenders, some states have more general felon registration statutes or require registration not only for sexual offenses but also for other serious offenses or for other serious offenses that harm children. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. ' 775.13; N.D. Cent. Code ' 12.1-32-15.

-12- who is a sex offender is released to their areas or when a federal sex offender is sentenced to probation. 18 U.S.C. ' 4042(c). Federal sex offenders (including designated military offenders) are required to register in the states in which they reside, are employed, carry on a vocation, or go to school. See 42 U.S.C. '' 14072 (i)(3), (i)(4), and 18 U.S.C. '' 3563(a)(8), 3583(d), 4209(a) (registration as a condition of federal probation, supervised release, or parole).

II. RESTORATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS AND REMOVAL OF DISABILITIES UNDER FEDERAL LAW

A presidential pardon restores civil rights lost as a result of a federal conviction, including the rights to vote, to serve on a jury, and to hold public office, and generally relieves other disabilities that attach solely by reason of the commission or conviction of the pardoned offense. See Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333 (1866); Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel, United States Department of Justice, June 19, 1995, Effects of a Pardon. See also Carlesi v. New York, 233 U.S. 51 (1914). There is no general federal statutory procedure whereby civil rights may be restored after conviction or judicial records of an adult federal criminal conviction expunged.16 The loss of civil rights generally occurs as a matter of state law and thus those rights may be restored by state action as well as by a presidential pardon.

Certain federal statutes also specifically provide that a presidential pardon will remove a particular disqualification. For example, removal of an alien from the United States may not be based on certain criminal convictions if they have been the subject of a presidential pardon. 8 U.S.C. ' 1227(a)(2)(A)(v). A pardon will remove additional penalties relating to the receipt or calculation of old-age or disability insurance benefits that a court may impose upon conviction of certain offenses. 42 U.S.C. ' 402(u)(3) (see p. 10, supra). Certain veterans= benefits forfeited by virtue of a conviction for subversive activities are restored by a presidential pardon. 38 U.S.C. ' 6105(a); 38 C.F.R. '' 3.903(c), 3.904(c).

The right to serve on a federal jury is reinstated if the individual=s Acivil rights have . . . been restored.@ 28 U.S.C. ' 1865(b)(5). This provision has generally been interpreted by federal courts and the Administrative Office of the United States Courts to require an affirmative act (such as a pardon) by the state (or by the President, for a federal conviction) before the right to serve on a federal jury will be reinstated. Thus, the automatic restoration of civil rights that occurs in many states upon completion of sentence will not operate to restore the right to serve on a federal jury. See, e.g., United States v. Hefner, 842 F.2d 731, 732 (4th Cir. 1988) (relying

16Under 18 U.S.C. ' 3607, a person found guilty of a misdemeanor offense of simple possession of marijuana under 21 U.S.C. ' 844 who has no prior federal or state drug conviction may agree to complete up to a year of probation before a judgment of conviction is entered. If the defendant successfully completes the probationary period, the case is dismissed without the entry of a judgment of conviction and only a non-public record of the disposition is maintained. The defendant in such a case is not considered to have been convicted for any purpose. If the defendant was less than 21 years old at the time the offense was committed, the records of any arrest or initiation of criminal proceedings in the case may be expunged as well. This procedure is available to a defendant only once.

-13- on the legislative history of ' 1865 to hold that Asome affirmative act recognized in law must first take place to restore one=s civil rights to meet the eligibility requirements of section 1865(b)(5)@).

As noted in section I, ineligibility for some federal benefits or licenses because of a conviction may only last a limited time; eligibility for other benefits or licenses may be restored by administrative or judicial action. For example:

$ The prohibitions relating to involvement in labor organizations and employee benefit plans last up to 13 years, but may be removed earlier if civil rights have been Afully restored@ or if a federal court or the Parole Commission so directs. 29 U.S.C. '' 504, 1111. (See section I.C.3(c), supra.) In order to grant relief from the disability, the court must determine that the person=s service in the prohibited capacity would not be contrary to the purposes of the law under which the disability is imposed. 29 U.S.C. '' 504, 1111. Relief from the disability must not be granted to aid rehabilitation, but only following Aa clear demonstration@ that the person Ahas been rehabilitated@ and Acan therefore be trusted not to endanger the organization in the position for which he or she seeks relief from the disability.@ U.S.S.G. ' 5J1.1.

$ Under the immigration laws, the Attorney General may waive the application of certain grounds for inadmissibility resulting from conviction. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. '' 1182(h) (waiver of inadmissibility authorized for certain offenses, other than aggravated felonies, if certain conditions are met), 1227(a)(7) (conviction of a crime of domestic violence may be waived as a ground for removal in certain cases involving an alien who is also a victim of domestic violence). The Attorney General may also cancel removal of certain permanent resident aliens convicted of a criminal offense other than an aggravated felony. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. ' 1229b(a).

$ Exceptions to the prohibition on military enlistment of convicted felons may be authorized by the Secretary of the affected branch of the service in Ameritorious cases.@ 10 U.S.C. ' 504.

$ The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation may waive a conviction-related prohibition to permit individuals to participate in the affairs of a federally insured depository institution, but for certain offenses may not do so for 10 years. 12 U.S.C. '' 1829(a)(1), (a)(2)(A). The sentencing court may make an exception to the prohibition Aif granting the exception is in the interest of justice.@ 12 U.S.C. ' 1829(a)(2)(B).

$ The period of ineligibility for educational grants and work-study benefits imposed upon conviction of a drug offense may be shortened if the student satisfactorily completes a drug rehabilitation program. 20 U.S.C. ' 1091(r)(2).

-14-

$ The Secretary of the Treasury (or his delegate) may grant relief from the conviction-based disabilities concerning licenses and permits for explosives if he finds Athat the applicant will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety and that . . . granting . . . relief will not be contrary to the public interest.@ 18 U.S.C. ' 845(b).

$ The Secretary of Health and Human Services may terminate the debarment (other than a permanent debarment) of an individual or entity prohibited from submitting drug approval applications under 21 U.S.C. ' 335a. 21 U.S.C. ' 335a(d). In certain cases, termination of debarment may be ordered Aif such termination serves the interests of justice and adequately protects the integrity of the drug approval process,@ 21 U.S.C. ' 335a(d)(3)(B)(ii); in other cases, special termination may be ordered by the Secretary under specified circumstances. 21 U.S.C. ' 335a(d)(4).

III. LOSS AND RESTORATION OF FEDERAL FIREARMS PRIVILEGES

Under the Gun Control Act of 1968, as amended, 18 U.S.C. '' 921 - 930, a person convicted in any court of a Acrime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year@ may not ship or transport a firearm or ammunition in interstate or foreign commerce, possess a firearm or ammunition in or affecting commerce, or receive any firearm or ammunition that has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce. 18 U.S.C. ' 922(g)(1).17 The definition of firearm includes both long guns and handguns. 18 U.S.C. ' 921(a)(3). This prohibition is inapplicable to certain federal and state offenses related to business practices,18 to certain state offenses classified as misdemeanors,19 and to:

[a]ny conviction which has been expunged, or set aside or for which a person has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored . . . unless such pardon, expungement, or restoration of civil rights expressly provides that the person may not ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms.

17A parallel prohibition makes it unlawful to sell or otherwise dispose of a firearm or ammunition to such a person. 18 U.S.C. ' 922(d).

18Excluded are Aany Federal or State offenses pertaining to antitrust violations, unfair trade practices, restraints of trade, or other similar offenses relating to the regulation of business practices.@ 18 U.S.C. ' 921(a)(20)(A).

19Excluded is Aany State offense classified by the laws of the State as a misdemeanor and punishable by a term of imprisonment of two years or less.@ 18 U.S.C. ' 921(a)(20)(B).

-15- 18 U.S.C. ' 921(a)(20). The statute further provides that A[w]hat constitutes a conviction of such a crime shall be determined in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction in which the proceedings were held.@ Id.20

In addition, federal law prohibits gun possession by persons convicted in any court of a Amisdemeanor crime of domestic violence.@ 18 U.S.C. ' 922(g)(9).21 A person is not considered to have been convicted of such an offense, however, Aif the conviction has been expunged or set aside, or is an offense for which the person has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored (if the law of the applicable jurisdiction provides for the loss of civil rights under such an offense) unless the pardon, expungement, or restoration of civil rights expressly provides that the person may not ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms.@ 18 U.S.C. ' 921(a)(33)(B)(ii).

Contrary to the implication of these provisions, the meaning of the phrase Ahas had civil rights restored@ is not monolithic but varies in practical effect from state to state depending on the laws regarding loss and restoration of rights. The problem of statutory interpretation has been further complicated in the case of the disability imposed upon conviction of a misdemeanor involving domestic violence because misdemeanor convictions generally do not result in the loss of civil rights under state law.22

20While the statute does not expressly state which jurisdiction=s law governs the determination whether the offender=s civil rights have been restored, the Supreme Court in Beecham v. United States, 511 U.S. 368, 371 (1994) (see discussion in text accompanying note 23, infra), concluded, in considering a federal conviction, that the determination whether a person=s civil rights have been restored Ais governed by the law of the convicting jurisdiction.@ Cases dealing with state convictions have reached the same conclusion, drawing upon the reasoning of Beecham. See, e.g., United States v. Collins, 61 F.3d 1379, 1382 (9th Cir. 1995) (restoration determined by the law of Illinois, the convicting jurisdiction, rather than the law of Montana, the jurisdiction of residence and possession of a firearm); United States v. Eaton, 31 F.3d 789, 791-92 (9th Cir. 1994) (restoration determined by the law of North Dakota, the convicting jurisdiction, rather than the law of Montana, the jurisdiction of residence and possession of a firearm). See also United States v. Capito, 992 F.2d 218, 219-220 & n. 2 (8th Cir. 1993) (law of South Dakota, the jurisdiction of residence and possession of a firearm, restoring rights to felons held not to apply to defendants convicted in other states); Thompson v. United States, 989 F.2d 269, 270 (8th Cir. 1993) (same).

21This prohibition was added by the Lautenberg Amendment, passed in 1996. The term Amisdemeanor crime of domestic violence@ is defined to mean any federal or state misdemeanor that Ahas, as an element, the use or attempted use of physical force, or the threatened use of a deadly weapon, committed by a current or former spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim, by a person with whom the victim shares a child in common, by a person who is cohabiting with or has cohabited with the victim as a spouse, parent, or guardian, or by a person similarly situated to a spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim.@ 18 U.S.C. ' 921(a)(33)(A). Unlike ' 921(a)(20), the definition of Amisdemeanor crime of domestic violence@ does not specify the law that governs the determination of what constitutes a conviction. One court, however, in interpreting the definition in ' 921(a)(33) in the context of applying a provision of the United States Sentencing Guidelines that incorporates it, concluded that federal law, rather than state law, applies. See United States v. Cadden, 98 F. Supp. 2d 193, 196-97 (D.R.I. 2000).

22See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 171 F.3d 617, 623 (8th Cir. 1999); United States v. Wegrzyn, 106 F. Supp. 2d 959, 961 (W.D. Mich. 2000).

-16- Courts have generally held that the phrase Acivil rights restored@ refers to the basic rights of citizenship, such as the rights to vote, serve on a jury, and hold public office. Further, they have held that a felon=s civil rights must have been Asubstantially restored@ under state law in order to meet the statutory exclusion. See, e.g., United States v. Metzger, 3 F.3d 756, 758 (4th Cir. 1993); United States v. Gomez, 911 F.2d 219, 220-21 (9th Cir. 1990). See also Caron v. United States, 524 U.S. 308, 316, 318 (1998) (in discussing restoration of Acivil rights,@ the Court speaks of Athe right to vote, the right to hold office, and the right to sit on a jury@ and notes that Astate law limitations on firearms possession are only relevant once it has been established that an ex-felon=s other civil rights, such as the right to vote, the right to seek and to hold public office, and the right to serve on a jury, have been restored@). With respect to felons, a minority of states automatically restore all these civil rights to a felon upon completion of his sentence. Some states have an administrative procedure for restoring a felon=s civil rights, while others restore rights in piecemeal fashion. In approximately 12 states, a pardon is needed to restore one or more of these rights.

The meaning of the statutory requirement that Acivil rights@ be Arestored@ was settled for federal offenders in Beecham v. United States,23 in which the Supreme Court held that federal felons remain subject to the federal firearms disability until their civil rights are restored through a federal, not a state, procedure. Therefore, federal felons who have had their civil rights restored by a state law or procedure nonetheless are still prohibited by federal law from possessing firearms. As noted above, there is no general federal statutory procedure for restoring civil rights to federal felons. While the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF) is authorized under 18 U.S.C. ' 925(c) to restore federal firearms privileges to an individual convicted of a felony, it has not been permitted to expend funds for this purpose since fiscal year 1992 (although it may restore rights to corporations). Accordingly, at the present time an individual may regain federal firearms privileges forfeited as a result of a federal felony conviction only by obtaining a presidential pardon.24

Offenders whose conviction has been pardoned, expunged, or set aside or whose rights have been restored are still subject to the firearms prohibition if the Apardon, expungement, or restoration of civil rights expressly provides that the person may not ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms.@ 18 U.S.C. '' 921(a)(20), (a)(33). State offenders seeking to rely on a state

23511 U.S. 368 (1994).

24See McHugh v. Rubin, 220 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2000); Owen v. Magaw, 122 F.3d 1350 (10th Cir. 1997); Burtch v. United States Department of Treasury, 120 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. McGill, 74 F.3d 64 (5th Cir. 1996); Moyer v. Secretary of Treasury, 830 F. Supp. 516 (W.D. Mo. 1993). But see Rice v. United States, 68 F.3d 702 (3d Cir. 1995) (concluding that BATF=s inability to process an application under ' 925(c) for relief from federal firearms disabilities constitutes an undue delay that excuses the applicant from exhausting administrative remedies and permits him to seek judicial review, whereby the court may determine in the exercise of its sound discretion whether there is a potential for a miscarriage of justice that would justify the submission of evidence to the court to establish fitness to have federal firearms privileges restored); Rice v. United States, 1997 WL 48945 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (on remand, federal firearms privileges restored).

-17- restoration of civil rights to meet the exception to the federal firearms disability may be caught by the proviso because, despite the restoration of various rights, their state firearms privileges are still restricted. The variation among state laws regarding the loss and restoration of a felon=s state firearms privileges is quite pronounced. Some states, such as Colorado, prohibit a felon from possessing any firearm until and unless he is pardoned, while others, like New Mexico, restrict state firearms privileges for a specific period of time. A number of states, including Alaska and Massachusetts, prohibit felons from possessing certain types of firearms or restrict the places where a felon may possess a firearm. In some states, restrictions upon state firearms privileges are imposed for certain types of offenses, such as violent crimes. Finally, some states have established a mechanism for restoring a felon=s state firearms privileges that involves an affirmative act by the governor of the state, an authorized state agency, or the sentencing court.

The Supreme Court=s 1998 decision in Caron v. United States, 524 U.S. 308 (1998), addressed whether a state offender is still subject to the federal firearm disability if his civic rights have been restored, but state law continues to restrict his firearms privileges to some degree. The defendant in Caron, who resided in Massachusetts and had been previously convicted of felonies in Massachusetts and California, was charged under 18 U.S.C. ' 922(g)(1) with being a felon in possession of a number of rifles and shotguns and his sentence was enhanced under the Armed Career Criminal Act based on his three prior convictions for violent felonies.25 He argued that his prior Massachusetts offenses could not be counted toward the enhancement because under Massachusetts law his civil rights had been restored and state law permitted him to possess either rifles or shotguns. Massachusetts law, however, continued to prohibited him, as a felon, from possessing a handgun outside his home or business. The Supreme Court ruled that, although state law allowed him to possess rifles and shotguns, the federal firearms law nonetheless prohibited his possession of those guns. The Court reasoned that because the defendant was still subject to a state-law limitation regarding handguns, the restoration of his civil rights Aexpressly provides that [he] may not . . . possess . . . firearms,@ within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. ' 921(a)(20); therefore, he could be prosecuted under ' 922(g)(1) regardless of the type of firearm he possessed.

The Caron decision also appears to have answered another problematic issue of interpretation: whether the restoration of rights must be accomplished by an individualized assessment of rehabilitation or whether automatic restoration by operation of state law or by the routine issuance of a certificate of discharge is sufficient. In Caron, 524 U.S. at 313, the Court noted among its Apreliminary points@ the following:

25The interpretation of the definition of Acrime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year@ also arises in the context of determining whether a person prohibited from possessing firearms under ' 922(g) is subject to the enhanced penalty under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. ' 924(e). One way the enhancement is triggered is by having three or more convictions for a Aviolent felony.@ The definition of Aviolent felony@ includes among its components the requirement that the defendant have been convicted of a Acrime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,@ which in turn is defined in 18 U.S.C. ' 921(a)(20), quoted on p. 16, supra. 18 U.S.C. ' 924(e)(2)(B).

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First, Massachusetts restored petitioner=s civil rights by operation of law rather than by pardon or the like. This fact makes no difference. Nothing in the text of ' 921(a)(20) requires a case-by- case decision to restore civil rights to this particular offender. While the term Apardon@ connotes a case-by-case determination, Arestoration of civil rights@ does not. Massachusetts has chosen a broad rule to govern this situation, and federal law gives effect to its rule. All Courts of Appeals to address the point agree.

A number of cases have addressed other issues concerning under what circumstances a state offender=s civil rights have been restored and in what circumstances the state felon=s restoration of rights Aexpressly provides@ that he may not possess firearms, including:

$ whether civil rights are considered to have been Arestored@ when the offender does not lose his rights to vote, sit on a jury, and hold office under state law after conviction;26

$ whether civil rights are considered restored when a state felon retains or regains some but not all his civil rights after conviction;27

$ whether, in determining if a particular right has been restored, one looks to the law in effect at the time of the claimed restoration, or to the law in effect at the time of the claimed violation of the federal firearms statute;28 and

26See, e.g., McGrath v. United States, 60 F.3d 1005, 1007-09 (2d Cir. 1995) (under Vermont law, felon=s rights not considered restored because they were never lost); United States v. Caron, 77 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1996) (fact that felon does not lose rights does not preclude a finding that rights have been restored), aff=d on other grounds, 524 U.S. 308 (1998). See also United States v. Moore, 108 F.3d 878, 881 (11th Cir. 1997) (fact that Tennessee law did not prohibit possession of guns by felons did not constitute restoration of rights).

27See, e.g., United States v. Caron, 77 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1996) (rights could be considered restored under Massachusetts law when the right to vote was never lost but the right to hold public office was restored and the right to serve on a jury was restored subject to a contingency), on remand, 941 F. Supp. 238 (D. Mass. 1996) (concluding rights were substantially restored); United States v. Flower, 29 F.3d 530, 536 (10th Cir. 1994) (rights not restored under Utah law when the right to serve on a jury was not restored); United States v. McKinley, 23 F.3d 181, 183-84 (7th Cir. 1994) (rights not restored under Indiana law when rights to serve on a jury and hold elective office were not restored); United States v. Essig, 10 F.3d 968, 974-76 (3d Cir. 1993) (rights not restored under Pennsylvania law when the right to serve on a jury not restored); United States v. Meeks, 987 F.2d 575, 578 (9th Cir. 1993) (rights not restored under Missouri law when rights to serve on a jury and to hold certain government office not restored).

28See, e.g., United States v. Collins, 61 F.3d 1379, 1381 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Varela, 993 F.2d 686, 689-91 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Bell, 983 F.2d 910, 911 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Cardwell, 967 F.2d 1349, 1350 (9th Cir. 1992). See also United States v. Clark, 993 F.2d 402, 403-05 (4th Cir. 1993).

-19- $ whether, in a case charging a violation of 18 U.S.C. ' 922(g)(1), the government must prove that the defendant did not have his civil rights restored.29

Because of the considerable variation among the states concerning the loss and restoration of civil rights and firearms privileges, the determination whether a person convicted of a state offense is subject to the federal law prohibiting possession of firearms is complex and requires a painstaking consideration of both state and federal law. While the Supreme Court has answered some of the significant questions of interpretation concerning the federal statute, the variation among the lower courts in addressing issues that have not been definitively settled further underscores the intricacy of the interplay between federal and state law in this area.

29See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 57 F.3d 1012, 1016 (11th Cir. 1995) (government not required to disprove possible exceptions to liability when defendant did not proffer evidence of their applicability); United States v. Flower, 29 F.3d 530, 535-36 (10th Cir. 1994) (defendant must raise applicability of exception). But see, e.g., United States v. Essick, 935 F.2d 28, 31 (4th Cir. 1991) (government must prove that defendant possessed firearm within five years of release from supervision for North Carolina felony when North Carolina law restricts felon=s right to possess a firearm for only five years after release); United States v. Clark, 993 F.2d 402, 406 (4th Cir. 1993) (restoration of civil rights is not a distinct element of the offense but is a component of the definition of Acrime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,@ proof of which was obviated by defendant=s stipulation).

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PARISA K. KARAAHMET

Prior to joining Fragomen, Parisa served as an Assistant District Counsel and Acting Deputy District Counsel for the Immigration & Naturalization Service, New York District. At Fragomen, she leads a team that specializes in individual and complex immigration matters and also manages a number of corporate accounts. Her area of specialty includes advising clients with respect to criminal and other inadmissibility grounds, employer sanctions, EB-5, E-verify and I-9 compliance and enforcement.

On the corporate Compliance advisory group side, Parisa represents a variety of large, mid-size and smaller companies in their immigration matters, including those in the financial services, Partner medical, pharmaceutical, and technology sectors. She also regularly advises academic institutions T +1 212 891 7593 and hospitals in their immigration matters. F +1 212 446 0377 [email protected] PROFESSIONAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS

7 Hanover Square MEMBERSHIPS New York, NY 10004-2756 Co-chair, Immigration Litigation Committee of the American Bar Association (ABA) United States of America Member, American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA) Member, Federal Bar Council Member, American Foreign Lawyers Association Member, Iranian American Bar Association IMMIGRATION MINUTE FACULTY POSITIONS Faculty Member and Presenter, the Judicial Institute at Pace University, 2007-2008 MORE ABOUT PARISA PUBLICATIONS AND LECTURES KARAAHMET April 2011 Parisa has been a faculty member/presenter for the Judicial Institute at Pace University and a guest lecturer at Cardozo Law School BAR ADMISSIONS Parisa is a frequent speaker at national conferences on a variety of immigration topics such as employer sanctions, I-9 compliance, EB-5, and criminal immigration issues Maryland Parisa has presented at panel events sponsored by the Practicing Law Institute (PLI), the New York American Bar Association and other prestigious organizations Parisa also chairs PLI’s annual conference “Defending Removal Proceedings” EDUCATION PRO BONO Catholic University, Columbus School of Law, J.D., 1994 Parisa has provided immigration advice and guidance on a pro bono basis to a number of Syracuse University, B.A., 1991 organizations and individuals Parisa is a participant in the Varick Street Clinic, sponsored by The New York City Immigrant Advocacy Initiative (NYCIAI) a collaboration between the NY Chapter of AILA and the New SPOKEN LANGUAGES York City Bar to provide guidance to detained individuals at the Immigration and Customs Farsi Enforcement’s Varick Street Detention Center French

http://www.fragomen.com/ourprofessionals/ProfessionalDetail.aspx?xpST=ProfessionalDetail&professional=196[10/10/2013 12:52:42 PM] Thomas E. Moseley practices immigration law in Newark, New Jersey concentrating in federal court litigation and removal defense. He received his A.B. from Harvard College and his J.D. from Harvard Law School and previously served as Chief of the Immigration Unit in the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York. He is a past chair of the Immigration Section of the Federal Bar Association and has lectured on immigration before the Federal Bar Association, the Practising Law Institute, and American Immigration Lawyers Association.