Slovakia External Relations Briefing: External Relations Development Outlook for 2021 Juraj Ondriaš
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ISSN: 2560-1601 Vol. 36, No. 4 (SK) January 2021 Slovakia external relations briefing: External Relations Development Outlook for 2021 Juraj Ondriaš 1052 Budapest Petőfi Sándor utca 11. +36 1 5858 690 Kiadó: Kína-KKE Intézet Nonprofit Kft. [email protected] Szerkesztésért felelős személy: CHen Xin Kiadásért felelős személy: Huang Ping china-cee.eu 2017/01 External Relations Development Outlook for 2021 As was the case in 2020, it is expected that the main priority of the foreign policy of the Slovak Republic in 2021 will be connected to dealing with the COVID-19 pandemic. While this is primarily a matter of domestic policy, it has a vital foreign policy component, notably obtaining vaccines against COVID-19. This diplomatic effort will mostly take place within the framework of the EU, which should therefore remain the main arena for Slovakia to pursue its national interest. As a small country, Slovakia would have a difficult time obtaining vaccines on its own amid competition with larger and richer countries, whereas as an EU member state, the country can rely on the greater clout of the EU as a whole. For that reason, Slovakia supports the common approach of the EU [9]. Therefore, Slovakia is not in favor of vaccines which have not been cleared by the European Medicines Agency (EMA). Among the vaccines certified by the EMA, Slovakia ordered 208 000 doses of the Pfizer- BioNTech vaccine, 12 000 doses of the Moderna vaccine, and also the AstraZeneca vaccine, developed below, as all three vaccines have been authorized for use in the EU [13]. While the merits of other vaccines (mainly Sputnik V) were also debated in the media, the was no serious debate on using non-Western vaccines in Slovakia – not even after the news that the three aforementioned vaccine producers will not meet their vaccine delivery targets for the EU. For example, in the case of Slovakia, the country was supposed to get 360 000 doses of the AstraZeneca vaccine, but this number was later revised downward to 210 000 doses, which should arrive on February 7th. Slovakia was not among the EU member states that reacted strongly to the delay of vaccine deliveries by AstraZeneca and other providers to the EU, with the Minister of Health, Marek Krajčí, simply declaring that the EU will put pressure on AstraZeneca to fulfill its obligations, and the results will have to be seen [12]. Such a mild response may be due to the fact that, apart from the risk of running out of vaccines, the pace of vaccination in Slovakia, which started on December 26th with the Pfizer-BioNTech vaccine, has been disappointingly slow, similar to the situation in several other EU countries. On a more positive note, it must be said that Slovakia is not only a buyer, but also a provider of of equipment to combat the pandemic – as proven by the example of Slovenia, which used a test by Slovak company MultiplexDX to determine the presence of the British mutation of COVID- 19 [11]. Another important role for the ministry will continue to be the monitoring of the evolution of the pandemic situation in other countries. Related to this, Slovakia supports the 1 earliest possible introduction of COVID-19 certificates, which should include information on any COVID-19 tests and vaccines taken by the holder, to enable free movement within the EU. This should be a more desirable alternative to travel bans and restrictions or the bureaucracy linked to travel permits [2]. Given the high number of Slovak citizens living and working in border areas, notably around the capital city of Bratislava, such a position makes sense for the country. Slovakia’s membership in the EU will have bearing on another important issue facing the country in the new year, which is Brexit. Negotiations on the final deal between the EU and the United Kingdom, meant to take effect after the transition period, i.e. at the end of 2020, were expected to be one of the dominant issues for the EU and its member states in the previous year. However, this took a back seat after the pandemic hit. While a deal was thrashed out on December 24th 2020, 2021 will show what effects the deal will have. Slovakia supported the deal, as it was afraid of a hard Brexit which would have occurred otherwise [3]. The main reason for Slovakia’s support was vulnerability to the economic consequences of a hard Brexit, due to the strong links of the Slovak economy to the British one. These links, are exemplified by the Jaguar Land Rover automobile manufacturing plant, which only started production in 2018. This plant is one of the “big four” carmakers in Slovakia which contribute to making the car industry the driver of the economy of Slovakia (representing 49.5% of industrial output in Slovakia in 2018), with the country being the largest producer of automobiles per capita in the world, with over 1.1 million car produced in 2019 [8], before the pandemic. Due to the pandemic, production felt by 20% [14], so there is a desire to avoid any further economic disruption, such as a hard Brexit or disadvantageous deal. Another reason would be the social consequences relating to Slovak workers and students currently living in the UK. These expatriate Slovaks would have lost benefits pertaining to EU citizens in the country. After losing job and study opportunities in the UK, these workers and students may have had no choice but to return to Slovakia, exacerbating the economical and social situation in the country and putting a strain on Slovak welfare programs. Though these fears have been allayed thanks to the deal, the increased difficulty of maintaining trade relations between the two countries remains a worry. Therefore, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs took on a role of informing entrepreneurs of the conditions and evolving situation of commerce between the EU and the UK after Brexit [4]. Similarly, other ministries are informing on their specialized aspects, of Brexit, such as the Ministry of Health explaining health insurance for Slovaks living in the UK [1]. This approach will continue until all the issues have been smoothed out. But Slovakia has another reason to keep a close watch on the situation in the UK – the rise of nationalism accompanying Brexit in the UK was also felt by the Slovak expatriate community. 2 This was seen most recently in Sheffield, where flyers warning locals about Slovak immigrants have appeared [10]. One other aspect of EU policy, in which Slovakia takes a special interest, is EU enlargement in the Western Balkans. Since Slovakia shares a common communist past and other aspects of culture with these countries, it sees itself as well qualified to contribute to the enlargement process by offering know-how based on its own experiences. After the enlargement process had stalled in 2020 due to the French veto of October 15th 2019 on opening talks with North Macedonia, as well as due to the pandemic redirecting resources and attention elsewhere, there is hope that the new year can put EU enlargement back into greater focus. Following this priority, Slovakia, along with the Czech Republic, vetoed the European Council conclusions of the on enlargement on December 16th, because of a perceived attempt by Bulgaria to disrupt the accession of North Macedonia by injecting bilateral disputes into the conclusions. Slovakia and the Czech Republic saw this Bulgarian initiative as being an obstacle to swift and smooth enlargement. While Slovakia has long declared the Western Balkans to be a priority region for Slovak foreign policy, this is a rare example of Slovak diplomacy going beyond the level of declarations and taking a practical step to enforce its views [7]. The spat with Bulgaria is therefore an issue that Slovak diplomacy will have to navigate in the new year. Already on January 11th, minister Korčok set the tone in a conversation with the European Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement, Olivér Várhelyi. Korčok emphasized that the EU accession process should not be hindered by disputes between EU member states and candidate countries. He also expressed the hope that a compromise will be found in the first months of the new year, as well as an expectation for a more dynamic and trustworthy process of enlargement for 2021, showing that Slovakia expects this issue to remain a priority for the year [5]. This was reiterated by the deputy minister, Martin Klus, in separate videoconferences with the chief negotiators of North Macedonia and Albania on January 20th. Klus emphasized the political and economic reforms that both Balkan countries have made, as well as those that they still have to make. As is usual during such discussions, he pointed out Slovakia’s experiences with its own accession process and offered to share these experiences and the expertise gained from them. He also expressed satisfaction at the North Macedonian decision to open an embassy in Slovakia, which would make cooperation on EU accession simpler [6]. In general, Slovakia’s foreign policy priorities and goals reflect the pro-Western orientation of the country, exemplified by its attempts to be seen as a staunch and reliable EU member state. This shows itself as working within the EU on the COVID-19 vaccination program, as opposed to buying vaccines without EMA certification on its own, or as toeing the EU line on Brexit to ensure the best possible relationship between the EU and the UK. However, 3 Slovakia has shown itself to go even further than the EU on enlargement, in the name of spreading EU or Western values through reforms in the candidate countries.