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: A CATALYST OF HATE SPEECH IN AND

© Andrej Školkay1

1. INTRODUCTION2

This paper discusses hate speech as a result of xenophobia in the two newly independent small Central European states, Slovakia and Slovenia, since their in 1993 and 1991/1992 respectively. It seems that xenophobia and intolerance in general are the major cause of racism, ethnic hatred, anti-Semitism, Islamophobia and fascism.

Why is it interesting or important to focus on these two states and two nations? First of all, it is instructive to know how these states deal with two relatively new, small nations that always have sensitive and often controversial issues of this kind. Second, we can find more historical and political similarities than differences between Slovakia and Slovenia:

Similarities - common history in the Habsburg Empire and thus part of the multinational empire until the end of 1918 - national evolution started in the middle of the 19th century - identical basic state mythology that is a 1000 year old dream of independence - stress on preservation of national distinctiveness - language as the key element in culture - part of confederal/federal states until early 1990s - crossroad of cultures but before the modernization localized. Originally the culture was largely peasant-based without significant bourgeoisie (or people who live in larger ) - dominant Catholicism and socially conservative societies (the result of unsuccessful or rather successful counter-reformation)

1 University of Sts. Cyril and Methodius, Faculty of Mass Media Communication, Nám. J. Herdu 2, 917 01 , Slovakia. E-mail: [email protected], [email protected] 2 This research was made possible through the grant of the Peace Institute in , Slovenia. My special thanks to Program Director Brankica Petkovič and Saša Lubej. - small nations that gained full independence in 1990s (in Slovakia also in 1939-1945, but this was quasi-indpendence under German tutelage) - national independence of both countries might not have been achieved if political reforms of federations would have been performed on time - strong impact of long-time dominant foreign culture or at least strong impact of a bigger nation(s) (Austro-German in the case of Slovenia, Hungarian and later Czech in the case of Slovakia) - origins of civil society in alternative movements: the punk movement in 1977 in Slovenia and in green as well and the Catholic movement in 1988 in Slovakia - the issue of democracy and came often in conflict throughout the history - recently tendency towards a rule by parties (party-ocracy), formations of clienteles and clans even at the level of larger civil society organizations due to dominance of personal connections in social life.

Differences - the most economically developed (Slovenia) versus the least (or less) developed (Slovakia) part of the federation - clerical versus liberal pattern (or according to some, Catholic versus Socialist pattern) in Slovenia, and nationalist-populist versus conservative-liberal (but with clerical versus liberal value conflict in background) in Slovakia - predominantly an ideology based politics in Slovenia versus more personalized politics (phenomenom Mečiar) in Slovakia - almost homogeneous Slovenian society versus large minorities (10.48 percent and officially 1.42 percent Roma, but scientific estimates are as high as 9.5 percent, which would be highest percentage of Roma population among all East European countries) in Slovakia (85.58 percent ethnic ) - well-managed economic reform in Slovenia versus less successful (but not total failure) of economic reform in Slovakia

It is clear that there are more striking historical and cultural similarities than differences, while at the political and economic level, and in some aspects at the cultural (or ethnic) level there seem to be significant, if not crucial differences. The question then is to what degree, if at all, are these similarities and differences reflected in xenophobia in general and in hate speech cases in particular as well as in the legal regulation of hate speech in both nations since their independence?

2 This study will comparatively analyze hate speech using the empirical-analytical approach. This approach tries to avoid normative evaluations and has the advantage of using both the ideograph (historical) perspectives for some partial research tasks (e.g. for analysis of political culture), as well as the systematic approach, i.e. generalizations about some regularity (e.g. in legal regulation). This is also a case study research in a comparative perspective. The case study research focuses on the investigation of relatively a small number of cases. This allows for more information and a larger number of features to be gathered for each case. The concern is with understanding the cases studied (see Gomm, Hammersley and Foster 2000). The focus here is on the cases and causes of hate speech, with special emphasis on the media (reporting and "" news) and attitudes of politicians and public figures towards these issues. The strength and role of civil society organizations are also in our focus. Björgo (2000, 369) has suggested that there are 14 actors that are involved in responding to racist violence (which usually includes, and certainly often follows hate speech). The main focus is on the following actors: the public at large, the media, the public figures and civil society organizations and politicians and legal system. Various cases of, for example, hate graffiti "speech" will not be dealt with in this work. The main problem was a lack of systematic, if at all television broadcast analysis in Slovenia. This lack of television analysis is typical for social sciences in general. It is difficult (time-consuming and expensive) to monitor and analyze television broadcasts. Yet, it is precisely television that undoubtedly influences most of the public in developed countries. Fortunately, Slovakia is somehow an exception in this . The more general and usual problem with this type of case study is difficulty in comparing various, often strictly speaking incompatible, data.

2. MEDIA AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH

In theory as well as in practice, there are significant differences among political and legal cultures. For example, the US Supreme Court ruled in the early 1990s that it was legal when a man burned a cross in front of a house where Afro-American families lived (a kind of Ku-Klux-Klan activity). The Court preferred freedom of expression before the right to protection against possible hate speech. The explanation given was that it was racist but not illegal. If this act, however, would cause violence than it would be illegal, the

3 Supreme Court argued. Similarly, an earlier decision by the US Supreme Court freed a man, a Ku-Klux-Klan member, who on a television broadcast had said, "Negroes should go back to Africa and back to .” In contrast, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that has the right to ban exhibiting Nazi posters on the streets (Orlin 1994, 12-15). The practice in the US is understood in the following terms: even though inviting a dispute is an acceptable objective of speech, when speech passes beyond dispute and creates the danger of a breach of the peace, it is not longer protected and can be punished. This means that speech is protected unless shown to produce a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that rises above public inconvenience, annoyance or unrest. The principle that speech that creates a danger of disorderly conduct be punished applies even though the audience is only one person. The test of the content is what men of common intelligence would understand would be words likely to cause an average addressee to fight. It is not important what a particular addressee thinks (Leahy 1994). The European Court of Human Rights following ideas expressed in the European Convention of Human Rights argues that the very essence of hate- speech is in opposition to the principles of a democratic society. The Court turned down all rare demands for the protection of hate speech under Article 10 of the Convention. European standards protect only opinions that represent a creative contribution to the public debate and enhance understanding and tolerance among people by presenting various points of views on specific issues (Kovačič 2001). This should not be confused with higher protection given to political speech in . Yet the US legal system protects many statements that in Europe would be seen as extremist and therefore forbidden (Hart 2002). Clearly, there are two different opinions on the limits of freedom of speech and tolerance in general. These legal opinions are formed by a different system of values (see Seiler and Seilerová 1997).

Another difference between US and Europe (or rather between the European Court and the US Supreme Court) was the asymmetrical treatment of the print and broadcast media with respect to the coverage of controversial issues of public importance until 1987 in the US. The broadcast media in the US were required to devote a reasonable amount of time to this coverage and to do so fairly. In addition, the US radio and television stations still must provide free reply time to those attacked in station broadcast. This duty did not and does not apply to the press (Mills 1994, 126-127).

4 Slovakia and Slovenia will soon join the . At that time, or soon afterwards, there will probably be adopted a Charter of Basic Rights of the citizens of the EU. Then further problems will arise. Although this charter clearly states that it can not be used as abridging freedoms and rights stated in European Convention of Human Rights (both Slovakia and Slovenia are members of the ), the European Court of Justice (in ) has already made a different decision (in other matters) than the European Court of Human Rights (in Strasbourg) (Sander 2001). Further, similar to the present situation in the US, the judges will potentially have a highly influential say in forming the limits of public debate. Thus, there will be, at least for some time, legal uncertainty as far as the limits of freedom of speech are concerned (Hart 2002). But these are issues ahead of us (see also Engel 2001).

The history suggests that it is necessary to limit and indeed suppress intolerance as early as possible if it can cause danger in society. For example, probably all liberal-democratic Constitutions of European states ban hate speech in its various forms. Otherwise tolerance towards intolerance can be seen as a weakness towards violence in all its forms (Zajac 1996, 94). Jansen similarly argues (1991, 44): Tolerance is achieved through intolerance of the intolerant. Delgado and Stefanic (1997, 60) suggest that the main inhibitor of prejudice is the certainty that it will be remarked and punished. This so-called confrontation theory is probably the majority view today among social scientists on how to control racism.

Even the US courts, which have been extremely reluctant to impose liability on the basis of words alone, are changing their attitudes, Delgado and Stefanic argue (1997, 13). The old, formalist view of speech in the US as a near perfect instrument for testing ideas and promoting social progress is passing into history, argue Delgado and Stefanic (1997, 42). Replacing this view is a much more nuanced, skeptical and realistic view of what speech can do. For this reason it is important to monitor and analyses hate speech, i.e. intolerant speech, in its early stages.

2.1. THE MEDIA, HATE AND DEFAMATION SPEECH IN SLOVAKIA AND SLOVENIA AFTER INDEPENDENCE

Slovak politician and literary scientist Peter Zajac (1994) defined freedom of the press as necessarily connected with responsibility. In this theory, the limits of freedom of the press end where the press breaks the rights of others.

5 In the early years of post-communism in Slovakia it was exactly nationalism, anti-Semitism, racism, chauvinism, religious and ethnic intolerance on the one hand and publishing rumors of unverified facts, on the other hand, which interfered with the human rights of others. In a survey conducted in May 1994, 61 percent of Slovaks argued that freedom of expression was the best in 1989-1992 (Krivý 1994). In the early 1990s, the freedom of the media was understood as a right to publish anything. As a result, many unsubstantiated issues were published. Many personal opionions were presented as facts. Many politicians deliberately explained current issues to citizens in a way that did not help them understand. This kind of discourse led to an almost pathological polarization of society. Citizens did not perceive the economic and social decline as the inability of political and business elites to solve issues related to transformation (regardless of whether it was for objective of subjective reasons), but perceived it as almost exclusively from internal and external enemies. Thus, a number of real and artificial crises and scandals were present. Both politicians and the media paid attention to scandals and not to decisions and their possible consequences. In the early 1990s, issues of national identity and self-determination dominated the public arena. In the middle 1990s, Slovaks struggled for democracy against their authoritarian leader(s). In the late 1990s until early 2002, politicians and journalists deformed public opinion with the invasion of artificial issues and topics. Public discourse was heavily politicized even in cases where professionals, not politicians had more to say. There was enough political information but not enough facts and discussions about the important issues.

Clearly, the low ability of the media (whether objective or subjective) to present standard political and professional discourse as well as ethical norms led to the cognitive impotence of citizens in crucial periods of Slovak transition. In addition, many pseudo-intellectuals and pseudo-experts were able to enter into public arena.

The overall situation was often described as "moral crisis". Here’s what one informed observer said: In this country -- with some special exceptions -- there is a deep silence about fascism and communism, about nationalism and anti- Semitism. There is no society-wide consensus in interpretation of a single great event of national history. Collective memory is unable to create cohesion without intolerance and xenophobia (Szigeti 2002).

6 Another observer noted that the national and patriotic feelings in Slovakia often turn into a synonym of nationalism, chauvinism and racism (Ondrejková 2002). The first time in recent history there was huge, true patriotism in Slovakia after the victory of the Slovak team at the Ice Championship in May 2002. This was a real national celebration without chauvinistic or nationalistic undertones.

One can find similar critical observations about the political culture in Slovenia. For example, designer Matevž Medja believes that the greatest problem in Slovenia is the lack of minimal consensus about what is Slovenia, and what it wants to become (Slovenia weekly, No. 8, 2002, p.19). Historian Božo Repe (2001, 5) argues that the development of the primary characteristics of democracy influenced by Slovenes themselves were the induction of mutual intolerance and the exclusion of those with different opinions. In psychological terms, argues Repe (2001, 22), self-assertions, a belief in self-sufficiency and prejudices towards anything different, are factors that only strengthened after attaining independence. This can be seen at instructive examples. On June 1992 chief editor of TV Slovenija resigned from his post, citing fears of revived totalitarian, anti-free speech government policies as the reason for his action. In 1993 Janez Janša, who, as a journalist for Mladina, had pilloried the former Yugoslav defense secretaries, became himself the target of media criticism (as defense minister of Slovenia). Janša later in independent Slovenia became the focal point of criticism for a number of reasons. For example, he suggested changing some editors in public television. There was even negative expression "janšizmus". Simply, national hero turned into an example of intolerance.

In this context, it is hardly correct to accept the claim (raised in Racism in…, 2000, p.18) that human rights debates were taken up by the media in many countries of the former communist bloc and that the weight given to these issues was greatest both in countries that previously enjoyed the most freedom and those that had the least. Certainly, Slovakia had different priorities until late 1990s. Even in Slovenia there was much less interest in human rights until a new revival of civil society in 2000/2001. Thus, we can see that although for different reasons, neither Slovakia nor Slovakia paid enough attention to human rights issues in general and to hate speech in particular.

Neither of the media were free to devote their attention to these issues. Between 1989 and 1991, Slovenian politicians had some informal influence

7 on the media even though the freedom of the media was quite wide, similar to Slovak case. In general, it is clear that soon after the independence, new political elites in both countries tried to control or, in some cases, to sue the media seen as a threat to their power or image. Much less attention was paid to xenophobia, hate and defamation speech in the media and in the public at large. For example, still in 2000, the interim government of Slovenia attempted to change the ownership structure of biggest dailies. This attempt failed. Another attempt to change what was seen as an unbalance media scene was the Fund for Media Pluralism. A paragraph related to this idea was included into a draft on media, but the new government did not accept this version of law. Lastly, the tried to fire two members of Broadcasting Council, nominees of now opposition LDS, but domestic and international pressure stopped this attempt. While this behavior towards the media was "standard" in Slovakia in the early and middle 1990s, it was less acceptable at the turn of 1990s and 2000s. For example, two young but well-know journalists from public television protested in early June 2002 against what they called unsubstantiated pressure from their editor to give some space to politicians from the opposition of a newly established party. The point of criticism was that this party never expressed its opinion on the issue to be debated.

3. LEGAL REGULATION OF HATE SPEECH

The legal systems of Slovenia and Slovakia are based on a continental tradition, i.e. Roman-German law, more specifically Austrian legal tradition in the case of Slovenia and Austro-Hungarian legal tradition in the case of Slovakia.

According to an earlier report ( Against…, 1995, 5), there was little legislation specifically designed to combat racism in . The explanation for this is that, because of the existence of many national minorities, the concerned preferred to adopt a different approach, which was on minorities. The fight against racism therefore has a quite different dimension in Central and Eastern Europe. However, the term hate crime is quite recent even in more stable legal systems. and Potter (1998, 4-6) argue that the legal scholars began using the terms "hate crime" and "bias crime" in the early 1990s; before the mid-1980s the term "hate crime" did not exist in the US. Hate crime is not really about hate, but about bias or prejudice. Hate crime statutes extend the drive against prejudice to matters of crime and punishment. The hate crime laws seek to punish

8 bigoted offenders more severely. In addition, the hate crime laws seek to send a symbolic message of output to members of certain groups. Hate crime laws seek to prohibit conduct, rather than pure speech although the line between conduct and pure speech is unclear. Hate crime laws re-criminalize or enhance the punishment of an ordinary crime when the criminal`s motive becomes a legislatively designated prejudice like racism or anti-Semitism.

Jacobs and Potter (1998, 8) believe that the well-intentioned attempt to fight designated prejudices with criminal laws raises a number of problems. First, the attempt to attribute crime to a prejudiced motivation is fraught with difficulties because of the complexity of defining prejudice and establishing motivation. Second, should all prejudices (ageism, anti-gay bias, bias against the physically and mentally disabled, etc) be included in hate crime laws or only a select few (racism, ethnic bias, and religious bias)? Inevitably, if some groups are left out, they will resent the selective depreciation of their victimization. However, if all victims are included, the hate crime category will be coterminous with "generic" criminal law. Third, for reasons of socialization and education, criminals inherently are less amenable than other citizens to societal norms of tolerance and equality. Fourth, processing hate crimes through the criminal justice system posses challenges for the police, prosecutors, jurors and criminal court judges. Fifth, the splintering of criminal law into various offender/victim configurations based upon characteristics like race and gender may backfire and contribute to the balkanization of a society. This opinion is indirectly supported by Rex (2000, 69) who suggests that multicultural policies might be of a kind that "minorises" minority groups and marks them for inferior treatment for special forms of manipulation and control. He suggests that minorities should not be marked for inferior treatment and special control.

Delgado and Stefanic (1997, 11) concur with this opinion. They believe that the establishment of a legal norm creates a public conscience and a standard for expected behavior that check overt signs of prejudice. They also believe that creating institutional arrangements in which exploitive behaviors are no longer reinforced will result in changing attitudes. The question of whether the defendant's conduct is "extreme and outrageous" must be answered on a case-by-case basis. If practically everyone holds some prejudiced values, beliefs, and attitudes, every crime by a member of one group against a member of another group might be a hate crime, at least it ought to be investigated as such.

9 How much hate crime there is and what the appropriate response should be depends upon how hate crime is conceptualized and defined. In constructing a definition of hate crime, choices must be made regarding the meaning of prejudice and the nature of the casual link between the offender's prejudice and criminal conduct (Jacobs and Potter 1998, 15-27). Perhaps, these two different opinions are not so different. Put it in other way, the concept of minority rights is a short term-concept to improve the situation of certain groups of society (as put by Professor Anton Pelinka in discussion, in Racism in…,, 2000, p.10). The concept of individual human rights can be then seen as long-term concept. In general, some distinguish between "hard" and "soft" racism. Hard racism is then understood as harsh physical violence. Soft racism includes jokes, ignorance and lack of will to help minorities as well as stop various forms of discrimination.

3.1. LEGAL REGULATION OF HATE SPEECH IN SLOVENIA

The Constitution of Slovenia contains relatively broad provisions concerning equality before the law, protection of ethnic and national minorities as well specific provisions concerning of racial hatred and of incitement to inequality and intolerance. According to Article 36, any incitement to national, racial, religious or other inequality and the encouragement of national, racial, religious or other hatred and intolerance is prohibited by the Constitution. Special laws should be passed to regulate the position and special rights of the Romany communities which live in Slovenia (Article 65). Slovenian Constitutional case law comes close to the foreign case law in its approach to fundamental rights. However, in the early 1990s, Slovenian judges ignored decisions of the European Court of Human Rights.

Penal Code of the of Slovenia gives some freedom of expression in Article 20: "The perpetrator who, at the time of the committing of a criminal offence, was either not aware of a statutory element of such an offense or that he erroneously believed that circumstances were present which, if they were true, would justify his conduct, shall not be held to be liable under criminal law." But this law is strict with respect to negligence: " If the perpetrator was in error due to his negligence, he shall be held liable for the committing of a criminal offence when such a degree of criminal liability constitutes a statutory element of the offence in question."

10 The Penal Code deals with "Punishability of Editor-in-Chief" in Article 30. The editor can be punished if the author is unknown or information was released without his approval and there was a criminal offence committed through the media. The editor-in-chief shall not be punished if he had justified reasons not knowing about the circumstances or about the information itself. The paragraph deals with punishability of the publisher, printer and manufacturer. Sentences can include imprisonment and fine, but this paragraph is not used in practice in Slovenia.

Among the more positive features, Article 157 deals with punishment in the case of "prevention" of printing and .

Insult is dealt with in Article 169. There is either a fine or imprisonment for not more than six months if an offence is committed through the press. However, if it is done in "a serious piece of criticism" or in " a piece of journalism" (among others) in the course of political or other public activity or in the defense of justified benefits the offense shall not be punished. This is the case if the manner in which it was expressed or the circumstances of the case indicate that this expression was not meant to be derogatory.

Article 170 of the Penal Code deals with slander. False information capable of damaging honor or reputation of a person and which the author knows to be false shall be punished by a fine or imprisonment for not more than one year if committed through the press. If circulated through the media, defamation defined as false information capable of causing damage to honor or reputation can result in a fine or imprisonment for not more than six months. If grave consequences exist, the offense can be punished up to one year. However, if the perpetrator proves either the truth of his assertions or that he had reasonable grounds to believe in the truthfulness of what was asserted or circulated, he shall not be punished for defamation but may be punished either for insult or for falsely and scornfully accusing someone of a crime.

Then there is calumny (Article 172), which deals with personal and family affairs. For this crime, committed through the media, there is a fine or imprisonment (for six months). If grave consequences occur, not more than a one-year sentence can be given. Immunity is given if it is done in the exercise of official duty, political or other public activity, the defense of any right or the protection of justified benefits. However, either the truth of his assertion must be proved or he had reasonable grounds for believing in the truthfulness

11 of what has been asserted or circulated.

There are also articles dealing with an insult to the Republic of Slovenia (174), insult to a foreign country or international organization (175) and insult to Slovene people or the national communities (176). In all cases there is either a fine or sentence, and the crime must be committed publicly.

Article 141 of the Penal (Criminal) Code deals with the offence of infringing equality, meaning to deny anyone for reasons of nationality, race, religion, etc…any human rights or fundamental freedoms recognized by the international community or stipulated by the Constitution or law. In addition, harassing an individual or organization supporting the equality of people is included under the protection of this Article. The sentence is up to one year, but up to three years if an official commits it.

Article 300 deals with stirring up ethnic, racial or religious hatred, strife or intolerance. The sentence is up to two years or up to five years (for example, if there is also desecration of national, ethnic or religious symbols).

The new press law, called the Mass Media Act, was adopted in 2001. Its size is in itself an interesting fact with 70 pages and 168 Articles. Article 6 defines media activities. These activities shall be based on the freedom of expression, the inviolability and protection of human personality and dignity. There is the personal responsibility of journalists and other authors/creators of pieces and of editorial personnel for the consequences of their work. Article 8 deals with the prohibition on incitement to inequality and intolerance. The dissemination of programming is prohibited if it encourages national, racial, religious, sexual or any other inequality or violence and war, or incites national, racial, religious, sexual or any other hatred and intolerance. No advertising may harm human dignity or incite discrimination on the grounds of race, sex or ethnicity, or political or religious intolerance (Article 47).

There are strict and explicit penalties (Article 129). A fine of at least 2,500,000 tolars (more than 10,000 USD) for an infringement shall be imposed upon a publisher (legal person) if through advertisements via its mass medium it harms human dignity, incites discrimination on the grounds of race, sex or ethnicity, or political or religious intolerance. A fine of at least 350,000 tolars shall be imposed upon the legal person that commits an infringement specified and on the responsible officer of Radiotelevizija

12 Slovenija. A fine of at least 100,000 tolars shall be imposed upon a publisher (natural person) who commits an infringement specified in the first paragraph of this Article.

Article 26 gives the right to correct of a published report. Any person shall have the right to demand that the responsible editor publish free-of-charge a correction by such person to any report published that infringed upon the person’s rights or interests. The term »correction« entails not only a correction in the narrow sense, i.e. the correction of erroneous or untrue statements in the published report, but also any citation of facts and circumstances that disproves the statements in the report published, or significantly adds to the purpose of disapproval. If the responsible editor fails to publish a correction within the period in the manner stipulated by the present act, the person that demanded the publication of the correction shall have the right to file a suit against the responsible editor at the court competent for civil disputes.

Article 42 defines the right to reply to information published. According to this right, any person shall have the right to demand that the responsible editor publish free-of-charge a reply to information published by which that person through demonstrable statements denies, significantly corrects or significantly elaborates upon the statement of facts and figures in the information published.

It was interesting to observe that a course on media law was first introduced into postgraduate studies in Slovenia only a year or so ago.

3.2. LEGAL REGULATION OF HATE SPEECH IN SLOVAKIA

The Constitution of the Slovak Republic guarantees supremacy of international treaties recognized by Slovakia, if they guarantee greater protection of basic rights and freedoms. Among these treaties is the European Convenant on Human Rights and Basic Freedoms. In practice, however, there are a lower number of arguments for limiting freedom of speech in the Constitution than in the European Convenant. The Constitution guarantees freedom of speech and the right to information (Article 26). The Constitution does allow limiting or canceling freedom of speech in the interest of protecting the rights and freedoms of others. It respects attempts to achieve equilibrium between freedom of speech and the rights of others. Additional reasons for limiting freedom of speech are security of the state, public order,

13 public health and morality. Limitations must be necessary in a democratic society (Rohárik 1997, Drgonec 1999).

The legal system of Slovakia does not guarantee any exception or privilege for the media with respect to protection of personal rights. The Constitution of the Slovak Republic guarantees the right to personal dignity, personal honor, good reputation and protection of name, as well as the right to protection against illegal intervention into private and family life and the right to protection against illegal collecting, publishing or other abuse of personal data. These rights are dealt with in more detail and sanctioned by the Civil Code. In general, the legal system provides protection of citizens under the Civil Code, Press Law and Criminal Law. There is a clear difference between these three kinds of protections. These legal measures are not interconnected.

Under the Civil Code, there is no strict time limit for legal or moral satisfaction, and causes for legal protection are not strictly limited (there are only examples). Violation of the law is damage to someone's good reputation. A person can demand justice in the form of a written or broadcast apology and in the form of a financial reimbursement. This law can be applied when, for example, an author of an article is not employed in an editorial office, and thus, it would be difficult to ask the office to publish a correction, as is the case in Press law.

The problem here is that the right to honor can be broken even when the allegation is in itself correct but is seen as illegally entering into the private sphere. This means that if allegations are put in such a way or in such relations that create a deformed image, which is not according to the truth, they can be seen as defamatory. In some cases the truthful information can not be made public if the interests of a person are above the interests of the public. Private interests of a person are under the protection of the Constitution. For example, correct information that explains a person lives in a disharmonic marriage must not be published, with the exception of persons of public interest. It is legally irrelevant whether the damage was caused deliberately or unintentionally, with or without good faith. Criticism must be substantiated (vecné), concrete, formally appropriate and adequate to its aims (Lipšic and Valko 1999, 2); true, substantiated and objective in its aim; or, taken into account (Vojèík 1999) or true and appropriate in form (Rohárik 1997). Legal protection can be applied only if the arguments used are fundamentally untrue or if they deform the truth. The limits of criticism can

14 not be broken and criticism must be appropriate in form and content. Arguments used must be capable to cause damage to a person's reputation (Vojèík 1999). Rohárik (1997, 68) argues that it is enough if an act (intervention into personal rights etc.) was objectively capable to interrupt or threaten personal rights under the protection of the Civil Code. In other words, it is legally unimportant whether the act was caused deliberately or not, with or without knowledge. There may not be consequences, it is enough if there was possibility for threatening to or breaking the rights of physical persons.

The plaintiff must submit supporting evidence in a legal case of this kind. In cases related to protection of a person there is since 1995 a one-year "deadline" when the court must decide it. In addition, the court that decides the case resides in the place where the plaintiff lives (Lipšic and Valko 1999, 2).

Defamation of a nation, race or religion as well as inciting to a national or racist hatred is forbidden (Mihálik 1999). Paragraph 198 of the Penal Code forbids defamation of a nation, its language, race or groups of people because of their political ideology, religion or . This can be punishable up to one year or by fine. If this is done by a group of at least three people, the punishment can be up to three years in prison.

Changes in Penal Code (paragraph 198a) made it difficult for judges to argue that since the Roma are of an Indo-European race, then an attack on Roma can not be classfied as racism. Paragraph 198a states that encouragement of national or racial hatred is punishable up to one year in prison or by fine. Hatred motivated by ethnicity is now at the same level as hatred motivated by race.

Paragraph 260 says that support and propagation of movements that can lead to suppression of rights and freedoms of others, or which promote national, racist, class or religious hatred (zášť) is punishable between one and eight years in prison or between three and eight years in prison, if this crime was committed through the media or in an organized group.

However, in practice it is very difficult to find evidence of hate speech. The Criminal Law Code (Trestný poriadok) according to Igboanusi requires two to three witnesses in the case of hate speech before the court. This is often impossible to guarantee. Even if there are witnesses, or even when accused

15 confess to the use of hate speech (plus additional illegal behavior), it still can happen that the court gives no punishment or very low punishment (suspended sentence), says human rights activist Igboanusi. For this reason many people do not report hate speech to police.

The Press law allows only the right to correction. This right to correction can be applied to electronic media too. There is a time limit: two months from the day the article or issue in question was published or broadcast. The publisher must react in eight days. If the publisher does not accept the request (which must be clear in what should be published or broadcast), then the person who demands the correction must go to court in 15 days at the latest. In this case, however, only substantiated facts are taken into account, not criticism or opinions (Vojèík 1999).

If one applies the Civil Code, it is still possible to apply for justice in Penal Law. In Penal Law, libel is a crime. Libel is understood as untruthful information, which can cause to significant degree damage to the respect of a person among citizens. One can be punished for libel by prison of up to two years or with financial penalty. A person can be penalized between one and five years of imprisonment or by a ban on activities if he or she caused this damage through the media. This act must be caused on purpose (deliberately) or by ignorance of duty. Only if one is absolutely sure about the fact then there is no need to verify information.

In contrast to the Civil Code, the Penal Code requires intention, direct and indirect (possible intention). If a person publishes untruthful information and is sued under the Penal Law, the defendant can argue that he published this information in good faith, i.e. that she believed that it was correct information. Further, in contrast to the Civil Code, it can not be a crime if it was true information. What is the definition of a crime? Here it is better to identify what is not a crime in the Slovak legal system. There is no crime according to the Penal Law if the degree of danger for society is minimal (nepatrný); although, it can otherwise show features of a crime. Further, it must be intentional, unless the law allows otherwise. The degree of danger is left to the personal evaluation of the prosecutor or judge. The prosecutor or judge must take into account protected interests, the way the act was committed, conditions, personality of accused, and his or her participation and his or her motives. The Penal Code defines specific cases of libel related to defamation of the President, state institutions and public figures. Paragraph 102 of the Penal Code says that whoever defames the Republic, the

16 Parliament or the Constitutional Court, can be sued up to two years in prison. Paragraph 103 extends this punishment to the President of Republic. It is very broadly formulated in that it covers all activities of political life of the President. Defamation of the President is understood as a brutal, offensive argument that tends to insult, dishonor or making the President look ridiculous (Mihálik 1999). There were ten cases of completed investigations by the prosecutor under these two paragraphs since the independence of Slovakia till the end of 2001. However, these two paragraphs were declared as unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court in 2002.

In the case of criminal law, the prosecutor can sue, as a representative of the state. Penal Code is tougher in a sense that one cannot take back his case. It is only possible not to give agreement for further criminal persecution or the prosecutor can stop the case. Paragraph 206 of Penal Code gives for libel up to two years in prison or fine or one to five years in prison if libel was done in the media or in a similar way. There were 236 cases of completed investigations by the prosecutor under this paragraph since the independence of Slovakia till the end of 2001. The long-term trend seems to be a decreasing number of cases.

In general, if one argues that he believed in what he wrote and says he is sorry for the mistake or misinterpretation, then one can be safe before the court. This is also true if a newspaper apologies the next day for incorrect information. For example, a newspaper published news that a well-known actor was at dinner with Mafia people. The newspaper apologized next day. The actor still sued the newspaper but did not win the case. The Slovak legal system does not accept by definition the personal evaluation (opinion) (hodnotiaci úsudok) of a person as an opinion and, therefore, not punishable. This is more and more clear since Slovakia is under the European Court of Human Rights jurisdiction. But, there are still some jurors who do not accept legal examples set by this court. Certainly, Slovak courts do not accept everything as personal evaluation. In some cases there is strong controversy whether what was said was personal opinion, hate or defamation speech. In general, not everything can be seen as personal evaluation (opinion). It is necessary that before personal evaluation is expressed, some description of situation, of events, must be presented. Even personal opinion cannot be illusory (based on incorrect data).

What matters both in finding guilty and in awarding a level of financial compensation are not facts but personality or personal opinion of a juror. It

17 can be seen that there is something wrong in the legal system in Slovakia since, according to the editor of weekly Plus 7 dní, if they lost a case in the first round, they won in 90 percent of cases in the second round.

In practice, the Penal Code is rarely used against the media. There was only one case of a journalist who was sued effectively using the Penal Code (with valid judgment) up to the end of 2001. But there was a case when even the President launched legal action under paragraph 103 against journalists because of commentary written in May 2001. This case was similar to a Slovenian case from the early 1990s (Nežmah case). The Slovak journalist criticised the as an "egomaniac incapable of leading a country." Commenting on a state-of-the-nation given by the president he wrote that the president had "indicated signs of mental incapacity to lead a country that is trying to join modern and developed nations."

Journalists believe that they should not be sued under the Penal Code if the case is related to a top politician. Indeed, the Constitutional Court suspended paragraphs 102 and 103 of the Penal Code on the defamation of state and public officials, including the president, in early 2002. This was justified on the grounds that in practice these paragraphs threatened freedom of speech. This act followed an initiative in the parliament in November 2001 to change these sensitive and controversial paragraphs. This parliamentary motion failed by one vote at the time. At the same time the Parliament passed a law against approving doubts, approval, denial or justification of Holocaust crimes. So, it seems that the trend is to give a larger freedom to criticism of politicians while stronger punishment for hate and especially Nazi speech.

4. HATE SPEECH

No people in Europe has been at once so persistently maligned and so excessively romanticized (as Roma) (Belinda Cooper 2001/2002)

In both countries, hate speech seems to be related primarily to the concepts of race and foreigners (or people perceived as foreign or strange). The hate speech is by and large the result of xenophobia. In Slovenia hatred and xenophobia are primarily reflected in attitudes towards Roma, immigrants and refugees, in Slovakia there are often racist and xenophobic attitudes and remarks towards people with dark or "yellow" skin, Roma and sometimes against ethnic Hungarians but also to Jews. The Jews, who create a very tiny fraction of the population in both states, are still surprisingly targets of hate

18 speech. This suggests the role of prejudices and of popular memory (in this sense).

An interesting role in this process is played in both countries by various EU bodies and representatives on the one hand and population by large on the other hand. While the former entities represent or push for human values and rights, an increasing number of people in many European countries express hate speech or, at the minimum, xenophobic attitudes. Solomos and Schuster (2000, 79) comment about the rise of extreme-right , and neo- fascist movements and parties in Western and Eastern European societies, which has resulted in the development of new forms of racist politics and in the articulation of popular racism and violence against migrant communities. Sometimes the EU member state politicians can cause problems abroad or at least tensions. This can happen when the bilateral agenda is translated in the European agenda. For Slovenia, one can think about relationships to and Berlusconi or Haider in Carintia, while for Slovakia the most visible example is discussion about so called Beneš decrees directly vis a vis former Orbán´s Government in and indirectly against Hungarian minority in Slovakia.

Xenophobia (and similarly the anti-homosexual malice) does not primarily consist of holding certain irrational beliefs about foreigners, but in hatred or disregard of them (Garcia 2001, 262). But xenophobia is not simply an indiscriminate fear of strangers in general. It is fear of individuals who look or behave differently than those one is accustomed to. Xenophobia is an alarm reaction to a threat to the rational coherence of the self. It is a paradigm example of reacting self-protectively to anomalous data that violate one's internally consistent conceptual scheme. Xenophobia engenders various forms of stereotyping: racism, sexism, anti-Semitism, homophobia and class elitism. It selects certain perceptually familiar properties of the person falsely taken to be exclusive, definite and paradigmatic for that person for primary disvalue and distorts or obliterates those that remain. For the xenophobe, this results in a provincial self-conception and world conception, from which significant data are excluded. This picture is sustained with the aid of denial, by enforcing stereotypes (Piper 2001, 198-200). Stereotypes, when applied to individuals, can easily become self-fulfilling prophecies (Rist 1973 in Donmoyer 2000, 51; Delgado and Stefanic 1997, 10). These stereotypes are often communicated either explicitly or implicitly through racial insults. Stereotypes are based on the probability of events. In this way, they are helpful in day-to-day decision-making. However, if stereotypes become too

19 dominant, they can become a burden that does not allow us to change any of our decisions. But it also clear that stereotypes reflected in prejudiced media serve to fill complex personal and social-psychological functions, for example, to build relationship among social groups (Gruber 19991, 46-47). In general, stereotypes have a positive cognitive function, which is to decrease the information processing load (Leudar and Nekvapil 2000, 490). Sometimes prejudices (e.g. Anti-Fascist) are considered good, some relatively innocuous, but other prejudices provoke strong social and political censure (Jacobs and Potter (1998, 11). So, not all stereotypes are negative or only negative. Wagner (cited in Gruber 1991, 15) has evaluated available literature and suggests to differentiate between on the one hand cognitive and on the other hand evaluative and relational aspects of a "stereotype". It is then possible to distinguish between general opinions and stereotypes. Stereotypes use a lower number of characteristics, these characteristics come out from a very narrow area of meanings (Bedeutungsbereich) and are applied to all members of a group. As a result, the foreign group is clearly separated and various foreign groups are judged in the same way, these groups are supposed to have extreme qualities in the applied characteristics. All these characteristics are usually attributed for or over a long time span. Finally, these characteristics are strongly believed to be correct.

This theory has been confirmed by empirical research carried out by Leudar and Nekvapil (2000). The authors found that participants in television discussion in the did not simply describe Romanies, they provided the descriptions and, in doing so, presented some of the descriptions as matters of common knowledge and others as facts. Not all "common knowledge" of Romanies was, however, held in common by both and Romanies. Negative descriptions of Romanies were not made in order about Romanies, they instead accomplished their social and economic rejection. Both attitudes and image of particular minorities widely held by the dominant culture become internalized directly through scenes of shame, following that particular scripts generate and profoundly shape minority identity. By reproducing shame, these scripts (self-blame, comparison making and self-contempt) become the source of the pervasive self-hatred attached to being a member of any (Kaufman and Raphael 1997, 82).

Modern understanding of racism offers a new perspective on the controversy over efforts to restrict racist "hate speech". Unlike racially offensive speech, which is defined by its (actual or probable) effects, racists hate speech is

20 defined by its origins, i.e., by whether it expresses and is thus an act of racially directed hate. So we cannot classify, argues Garcia, a remark as a racist hate speech simply on the basis of what was said, we need to look to why the speaker said it. Speech laden with racial slurs and epithets is presumptively hateful, but it will be difficult to give some convincing evidence of an ugly motive behind controversial opinions whose statement is free of racial insults, argues Garcia (2001, 272-273).

Social scientists who have studied the effects of racism have found that speech that communicates a low regard for an individual because of race tends to create in the victim those very traits of inferiority that it ascribes to him. This is in addition to the more general harms associated with racism and racist treatment and specific mental or emotional distress (Delgado and Stefanic 1997, 8).

5.1. HATE SPEECH IN SLOVENIA

All Slovene intellectuals interviewed, both experts and non-experts, agree that hate speech and related xenophobia are problems (some say a permanent feature) in Slovenia. Sometimes hate speech takes more of an "innocent" form of jokes. As put by Zlatko Šabič, in a small country people are by definition xenophobic because people tend to relate to others. Indeed, it seems that problems with hate speech in Slovenia are reflected  as everywhere  at the most basic level in the "we-them" dilemma. These issues come up in certain moment of crisis (or in moments seen as crisis). However, there are some groups that are permanently seen as "others", people from former , especially from Bosnia and Hercegovina and Roma people. There are about seven to 10,000 Roma in Slovenia. Homosexuals (60.3 percent) and Roma (53.5 percent) were among the most unwanted social groups in Slovenia in an 1998 opinion poll (Toš 1999 in Erjavec, Hrvatin and Kelbl 2000, 39).

In the years between 1995 and 2000, the government adopted two programs aimed at the promotion of Roma in different fields of social life (Klopčič 2001, 79). Still, Roma and other groups are by and large seen as lazy and stupid, while Slovenes consider themselves as being hardworking and good people. Then there is the naming of people who committed a crime according to their ethnic origin or other specific status (e.g. refugee). The treatment of refugees and asylum seekers from other ex-Yugoslav, East European and

21 Third World countries is predicated on an essentially intolerant nationalism and racism. A public opinion poll carried out by the Slovene organization CATI revealed that together some 61 percent of respondents describe themselves in terms of completely and slightly racist. In short, the majority of Slovenes have little problem (or indeed shame) with publicly describing themselves as racist in one way or another (Jeffs 2002). Interestingly, the Jews are the third and fourth least popular group of neighbors in Slovenia, although there are estimated to be less than one hundred in Slovenia.

A very influential factor in xenophobia seems to be the international environment. Nationalist or populist politicians in Italy and certainly contribute to this kind of defensive nationalism in Slovenia. It is difficult for a foreigner to notice this issue, unless he or she belongs to a minority or "controversial" group of people.

THE MEDIA: It seems that the media are not very critical towards each other with respect to possible hate speech or other wrongdoing. Sometimes the media do criticize politicians for their speech, which is close to, or is indeed hate speech. Dailies Delo and Dnevnik are known for their sometimes very radical hate speech towards Roma, and there are some racist comments in the right-wing weekly MAG. Some say that it is commentator Boris Jež who is or used to be a prime example of racist commentaries, at least implicitly. Slovenske novice daily publishes some hate speech in a more tabloid or scandalous way, argue observers in Slovenia.

An analytical study of one column (Nočna kronika, Nightwatch) in Sunday's edition (Nedelo) of serious weekly Delo shows clear examples of borders of racism and chauvinism. Tonèi A. Kuzmaniè (1999) conducted this study between the summer of 1995 until September 1998. Regular quasi-reports based on quasi innocent or common "bar-flies" discourse shows that "dangerous" or unwelcome people are foreigners (often refugees) from the South (meaning former Yugoslavia). These people were called Balkan creatures, then there were transvestites, chics and women in general. The "bar flies" discourse was special in that it "reported" on what the "true" subjects of the statement had said.

Besides this Sunday daily, the proportion of hate language was even higher in the daily Slovenske novice, not analyzed by Kuzmaniè. What was morally problematic, was that this phenomenon was not addressed either by the wider journalistic community, intellectuals or legal authorities. Most observers or

22 readers found this series amusing. For the "bar flies" in Slovenia, the most worrying and festering wound was Slovenianness. There are then two major sub-issues related to hate speech in Slovenia: refugees and Roma. The third group includes ad hoc cases such as the most recent gay issue. Importance or salience of both issues depends on the international environment; if there is a wave of refugees, then this issue becomes dominant on the agenda. There were two big waves of refugees in Slovenia since their independence: in 1991/1992 (Croatian war) and in 1992/3 (Bosnian war). The third smaller wave of refugees from happened between November 2000 and April 2001. This time some civil society activists believed that the situation was so dangerous that somebody could even attack foreigners. Despite the negative image of refugees, the media in Slovenia do not attempt to offer an explanation or discussion on this issue. Very rarely are scholars or independent experts invited to public television programs on refugees. The Slovenian experts agree that the media have their own "favorite" experts and quasi experts. These people are familiar to journalists and talk or look nicely. Most of the time there is not even disagreement in discussions.

The issue of rhetoric used towards refugess by politicians and the media between April 1992 and March 1993 was analysed by Horvat, Verschueren and Žagar (1998-2001). Although one could hardly call this rhetoric as "hate speech" in most cases if at all, it still shows some symptoms of it. Clearly and interestingly, it shows a discrepancy between self-imposed standards of legitimitation and applied policies. The authors wrote that after a self- categorization of the new state, a hierachy of values was established. Then, a crisis rhetoric supposedly supported by an international authority was constructed, to present refugees as a problem. This legitimized deviations from certain principles as exceptional measures which, in addition, did not mean a break with a more fundamental and "stable" moral system. Finally, the refugees were portrayed as people who do not deserve and do not appreciate help from Slovenes. Significantly, the media simply replayed the official version of events and facts. The journalists strongly identified with the nation and national interests under what they perceived as a threat.

The rhetoric on the third wave of refugees in Slovenia was analysed by Jalušič (2001) and Kuhar (2001a). In the view of Jalušič, discourse was explicitly stigmitazing and discriminatory towards refugees. The print and some electronic media first mostly recounted and represented the popular opinions.The result was xenophobic and racist discourse, argues Jalušič. Later the media created two groups: one opposing the thesis about

23 xenophobia or considering it exaggerated (Mag, Slovenske novice and Nedeljski dnevnik plus some journalists from Delo, Večer, Mladina), the other group attempted to analyse this phenomenon (Dnevnik, Mladina, and some journalists from Delo and Večer). It should be mentioned here that Kuzmanič (2001, 61) argues differently; there is "the media consesus in Slovenia about the non-existence of xenophobia and racism." Roman Kuhar's discourse analysis (2001a) of the articles in the Slovenske novice (the newspaper with the highest circulation) suggests that the media gave more space to the intolerant and xenophobic statements by anonymous citizens. The result was a "black and white" picture of "us" and "them". In addition, the Slovenske novice published sexist discourse (Kuhar 2001b).

Initially, state authorities did not react to this mood in the media and society. Only after a few months of silence there was intervention of the government. This was partly caused by EU integration ambitions of Slovenia, when the good image of a country could be destroyed by a negative attitude towards immigrants. It was facilitated by a revival of civil society activists.

Sašo Gazdič analysed three hotly debated issues that in his mind "changed the minds of the people in Slovenia." Gazdić analysed newspaper’s reports on inter-ethnic violence in Slovenia. According to his analysis, three of them were symbolical turning points in Slovenian perceptions of violence toward "Non-Slovenes" (the term, used exclusively for ex-Yugoslavs). In the first case in 1991 (shortly after the armed conflict between the federal army and Slovenia, which gave a certain and legality to the use of violence in inter-ethnic conflicts) the leader of the nationalist party was prosecuted because of the use of a gun in a certain case of inter-ethnic conflict. Political implication was that Slovenes were not (any more) legally allowed to use arms against "Non-Slovenes". The second case, when young a "Non- Slovene" gang leader was prosecuted for bullying, the blame for inter-ethnic violence was ultimatelly burdened on the back of "Non-Slovenes". In the third case, when the court released a Roma husband who was under suspicion of torturing his under age wife. In dilema ethnic versus women rights or collective rights versus individual rights, the court decided in favor of the former. Political implication was that the Roma community was de facto outside of Slovenian jurisdiction. Wider supposition, used by all arguing parties in the debate, was that Roma people and "Non-Slovenes" in general are violent by the nature, which is the main reason for their special treatment.

Erjavec, Hrvatin and Kelbl (2000) analyzed how the Slovenian media

24 described the Roma in 1997 when the citizens in a small village set up a village watch to prevent the settlement of a Romani family who bought a house in their village. The mood of the coverage was mostly as "problems". This was done in two ways: either the media were explicitly writing using terms Romani issue or Romani problems or the media were not interested in Roma issues unless they turned into a conflict that also threatens to affect the majority population. The second approach clearly reflects structural bias of the news media. This pattern was noticed by the authors: "The more the content deviates from the normality, the more it corresponds to the ideal type of message as understood by the popular media", p.18). But the first approach more reflects the assumption that the Roma are different. Erjavec, Hrvatin and Kelbl (2000, 7) described how using stereotypes and generalizations the media concentrated on negative traits of the Roma. The authors conclude that special media exclusion (Roma only rarely appeared as individuals) and isolation (the journalists referred to Romani sources eight times less often than to the sources of majority population, and often if included, their representation was discriminatory) couples the spatial, economic, cultural and social ghetoization of a minority. In addition, there was denial of intolerance and accusations towards the victim.

In the summer of 2001, as the Slovenian nation was becoming a civil society, or perhaps more correctly as a new revival of civil society was noticeable, and no flow of refugees was present, the issue of tolerance shifted towards gay and lesbian rights and tolerance of difference in general. Perhaps surprisingly, there was an increase in intolerance towards homosexuals in Slovenian society in the last decade. While in 1992 42.5 percent of those asked would mind a homosexual neighbor, in 1998 similar to 1995, over 60 percent would mind (Velikonja 1999). In general, the media were in favor of homosexual rights, or were neutral. Initially, there was a lack of attention paid to this issue. While the POP TV broadcasted information about the first Slovenian gay and lesbian parade, Slovenian TV did not broadcast information about that parade but about the Italian gay parade. More oddly, this was broadcasted in the section "curiosities". But public pressure forced the editors of public television to focus on the gay and lesbian issue as a political issue. Again, it was the same weekly, Mag, that was strongly against homosexuals, calling them "hot brothers" and patronizing them ("we should help them"). On the one hand not only the media, but also some top politicians, including the President, were more sensitive and tolerant in contrast to the society by and large. On the other hand, media were too much interested in an opinion of an extravagant psychiatrist because he was a

25 "clown" (Roman Kuhar).

In early 2002, another issue related to homosexuals caused uproar in some strata of the . The transvestite trio, The Sisters, won a contest to represent Slovenia at the Eurovision song festival in . The juries' vote gave the trio the win by a single vote, despite apparently overwhelming public tele-vote support for the second-place finisher. Doubts about the fairness of the popular vote had been voiced before the final results were announced. Editor-in-chief of RTV Slovenia's Entertainment Program ultimately said the tele-voting had been declared invalid. Rules clearly state that the juries' decision would count if tele-voting broke down. This victory caused a huge media storm in Slovenia. Ten days of homophobic hate-speech followed when readers and viewers expressed their outrage at the choice in the press and vowed they would lynch "those faggots". Questions were also raised in the national Parliament about the participation of The Sisters at the Eurovision Song Contest. Some people questioned the fairness of the voting system (TV Slovenia - RTV - acknowledged irregularities), while others argued that the issue was not fairness as such, but the fact that some people did not like the idea that Slovenia would be represented abroad by transvestites. This issue was discussed even in the EU and the Council of Europe bodies. The Slovene politicians by and large did not want to talk about this issue, although there was a debate in the parliament. Individual members of the parliament expressed themselves in a way that one could describe as hate speech. The press was divided into yellow journalism, which followed a more popular discourse, while broadsheets were more balanced. Slovene intellectuals were mostly left by surprise at how this issue had developed.

The weekly Mag was typical also of its strong anti-communism. The Kovačič (2001) study shows that the principal axis of intolerance was the struggle against "the communist forces of continuity" (called also Mafia or pseudo- state). Mag equates the left with the illegitimate and anti-state violence.

Ceglar (2001) carried out a special analysis of hate-speech in rap music. This analysis, together with the problematic level of Slovak humor, suggests that forms of various open and tacit forms of hatred are more often present in society than we are willing to acknowledge. Billig (2001) indeed suggested that there are integral links between extreme hatred and dehumanizing, violent humor. Most importantly, these jokes, that are not just jokes, mock restraints against racist violence. They celebrate such violence by

26 encouraging enjoyment without pity for the dehumanized victims.

There was only one controversial case of hate speech in public television according to the editor; a correspondent remarked that "usually a lot of things are stolen because many Roma live here." This caused some reactions in the public as well as some special reports to correct this damage, including special letters on how to deal with issues of this kind. Until then, influential media such as TV Slovenia (RTV) or the Delo newspaper habitually constructed various definitions of migrants according to racist stereotypes and alarmist claims already presented by others; for instance, the Police trade union protesting about the conditions its members had to work in (Jeff 2002).

Some observers argue that the RTV tries to be neutral in its broadcast of apolitical issues since it has become more of a governmental mouthpiece for NATO and EU enlargements. There are clear professional standards and ethical principles of journalism in RTV Slovenia. These standards, effective since May 2000 (allegedly the first standards in Central and Eastern Europe), have almost 100 pages.

THE INTELLECTUALS and CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS: Some intellectuals and civil society organizations seem to increase awareness about hate speech issues but their low appearances in television broadcast, undoubtedly the most important medium, is somehow hindered by structural conditions of television broadcast. Nevertheless, an already mentioned revival of civil society lead to their more visible appearance in the media as well as on the streets. For instance, in February 2001, the Office for Interventions (OFI), a loose coordination of concerned NGOs and various individuals organized a public manifestation against intolerance and xenophobia in Ljubljana. The manifestation was not given permission by the police. It proceeded nonetheless with some 1500 participants.

POLITICIANS: It seems that in some "hate speech" crisis situations the Slovenian politicians do not manage very well. Under normal conditions, there is not much interest in sensitive issues. The attitude towards these issues depends on opportunism among politicians. There is the Slovenian National Party (SNP), which from time to time is seen as extremist. Yet this party is a maverick party. This means that whatever is the mainstream, it goes in opposite directions. The SNP has completely reversed its policy in relationship to various ethnic groups, especially as far as foreign countries are concerned. In general, discourse of a majority of politicians is getting less

27 and less nationalistic; although, it is still seen by many as largely nationalistic. Some observers see it almost as a discourse about a "chosen nation." For example, in November 2000, the major of Ljubljana, Viktorija Potocnik wrote to the then Minister of Interior, Peter Jambrek, warning him that the Home for the Removal of Foreigners was degrading the quality of life in its immediate environment and that its presence represented an infringement of human rights for local inhabitants.

5.2. HATE SPEECH IN SLOVAKIA

The major targets of hate speech in Slovakia seem to be Roma in general, Hungarians in a few radical media and by some nationalist politicians and, surprisingly, the Jews among underground (or rather Internet) extremists (and in early 1990s to some degree in Zmena and Hlas Slovenska weeklies, later also occasionally in Literárny týždenník and daily Slovenská republika, according to Jewish activists). In addition, homosexuals, feminists, Vietnamese and Chinese migrants, including their children born in Slovakia, and some other groups like Africans are often targets of disregard in the form of specific jokes (at the minimum). For example, there was one case when mobile phones of one provider were flooded with racist messages, offering 50 free minutes of using the network for each killed Roma (Ochrana menšín…, 2001, 3).

According to Daniel Milo, representative of the NGO, the People Against Racism, about half of all monitored cases of racially motivated hate speech target Roma and the other half target Jews (in Internet chat discussions and e- mails sent to this NGO). Milo defines hate speech as any words of graphic expression of ideas spreading hatred. Out of 18 cases of racism submitted to police for investigation in 1999 by this NGO, 15 were related to hate speech. In 2001, out of 60 monitored cases of racism by this NGO, up to 20 were classified as hate speech.

One can assume that there may exist at least an indirect relationship between hate speech and hate acts. The official police statistics for 2001 reports 40 racially motivated crimes (Pravda, 18 March 2002, p.2). The People Against Racism estimate the real number to be up to 100 times higher. Columbus Igboanusi from the League of Human Rights Activists (Tolerancia 6/2002, p.2) reported 85 racially motivated crimes for 2001. The police statistics for 2000 suggests that there were 35 racially motivated crimes, and for 1999 there were officially 21 racially motivated crimes (The

28 Slovak Spectator, -31, 2002, p.3). The Office of the Attorney General also presents 35 cases in 2001, but only 15 racially motivated crimes were reported in 1999 compared to 21 for 1998 and 19 for 1997 (The Slovak Spectator, February 4-11, 2002, p.2).

Although this increase may be due to better monitoring, there seems to be a real increase in the number of cases of hate speech in the last year or two. This is probably partly due to the fluctuation of racism and hate speech in Slovakia. In other words, it depends how "popular" racism in general and hate speech in particular becomes in a given period among high school students for example.

There were five cases of a legally binding court's decision based on § 198 and/or 198a of the Penal Code (defamation of nation, race of belief and encouragement to national or race hatred) since the independence of Slovakia and 27 cases of completed investigations by the prosecutor under these two paragraphs to the end of 2001. The trend seems to be an increasing number of completed investigations by the prosecutor (although there is wide fluctuation of number of cases).

There were 37 cases of a legally binding court's decision based on § 260 and/or 261 of the Penal Code (Support and promotion of movements leading to suppression of rights and liberties of citizens, and public expression of sympathy toward fascism or a similar movement) since independence of Slovakia, 16 of these happened in 1997 (in one criminal case). From three cases sued under paragraph 261 in 1999 and four cases in 2000, all accused were sued conditionally or for fine. There were 99 cases of completed investigations by the prosecutor under these two paragraphs since independence of Slovakia to the end of 2001. However, there were very few cases of this kind in 1993 and 1994 respectively, while about 15 each year since then.

There have been six racially motivated murders in Slovakia since 1993 (The Slovak Spectator, February 4-11, 2002, p.2). The first murder happened in 1995. The court in this first case prosecuted the killers for 7.5 years, 27 months and 8 months in prison respectively. The other 13 accused in the same case were prosecuted conditionally for between 6 and 10 months (Dostál 1998, 166).

Regular research suggests that the majority of Slovaks explicitly do not

29 approve of racist and nationalists hate speech. Two thirds of respondents of a survey in March 2000 requested stricter punishment of racist and national hatred. Five years earlier, in 1995, eleven percent of respondents would agree to participate in pressure action against intolerance, 43 percent were willing to participate at demonstration and 70 percent were willing to sign a petition (Vašeèka 2001a, 246-2487). However, at the same time about 20 percent of adults considered Roma as a danger for Slovakia (in Benkoviè 2001, 110). In comparative terms, Slovaks were the third nation among six compared nations with the most negative attitude towards Roma in 1999 after and Hungarians (Tolerancia 3/2002, p.2). In late 2001, 83 percent of Slovaks would not like it if their child marries a Roma (64 percent for an Arab and 61 percent for a black) and 65 percent would not like to have a Roma neighbor. The intolerance towards members of the largest minority in Slovakia, Hungarians, was better. Only one third of Slovaks would not like a Hungarian to marry into the family and even less, 16 percent, would not like to have an ethnic Hungarian neighbor (Sme, 14 2001, p.2).

From a comparative perspective of opinion polls (declared attitude, not necessarily the real one), between 1993 and 2001, based on an earlier study by Bútorová, Bútora and Fialová (1993), tolerance towards "different" has improved since independence. While 94 citizens would not like to have a Roma neighbor in 1993, it was almost 87 percent in 1999, but only 65 percent in 2001. Similarly, while 34 percent would not like to have a Hungarian neighbor in 1993, it was 26.5 percent in 1999 and only 16 percent 2001. A similar trend can be observed in the attitude of Slovaks towards possible "close relatives" among minorities, although it can be also argued that there was in general a peak of intolerance towards "different" in the first year of Slovak independence (see Bútorová, Bútora and Fialová 1993). The authors concluded that these negative attitudes towards Roma and Jews were comparable to , but higher than in the Czech Republic and Hungary at that time.

Earlier research on Jews suggests that while anti-Semitism was not a crucial component of independent Slovakia, a cautious attitude toward Jews was present (Bútorová, Bútora and Fialová 1993). Only 28 percent of the adult Slovak population showed at that time a distinct anti-Jewish attitude, while 31 percent were free from any anti-Semitic prejudices and 41 percent showed a confused and inconsistent view. However, only 15.6 percent of Slovaks would mind to have a Jewish neighbor in 1999 (Holokaust…). There was one legal case when a publisher was sued for publishing anti-

30 Semitic books (or rather for propagation of fascism, paragraph 260 of the Penal Code) in the early 1990s. The problem was, as it is probably in most cases of this kind, that it takes a long time for the case to comes to a conclusion.

HUNGARIAN MINORITY: Research by Attila Š. Béda (2000-2002) suggests the following interesting conclusions: - Negative communication of readers (letters from readers) of some daily and weekly press with hatred toward the Hungarian minority in Slovakia comes mostly from places where there are no ethnic Hungarians (also nationalistic parties are strongest in ethnically "pure" Slovakia). This is in line with the research, which shows that the relationship between Hungarians and Slovaks in southern Slovakia (where ethnic Hungarians live) satisfy 65 percent of Slovaks and 81 percent of Hungarians. Only 2.3 percent of Slovaks and 0.8 percent of Hungarians are really unhappy. Further, the closer the relationships are at the village level the more positively these relationships are evaluated (Šinka 2001). - There were about 150 to 170 articles and letters from readers published in five monitored daily newspapers in 2000 with some kind of hatred towards ethnic Hungarians, but almost all "hate speech" articles were published in only one daily newspaper, the Slovenská republika and later in its ideological successor Nový deň - There were only nine authors who published more than five articles of this kind in the monitored press in 2000 - There were three authors who seemed to be the most active or the most negative about Hungarians - Neither editors, authors or intolerant politicians answer critical letters that react to their "hate speech" articles - There is also a weekly Extra plus that publishes a kind of hate speech, mainly against Hungarians. In 2000, there were 16 different terms used (hate speech words or words with negative connotation) 163 times in this weekly. That the concept of "hate speech" is very fragile can be seen in later acknowledgment by the very researcher Attila Š. Béda, who on July 16, 2002 told to the author that he sometimes took some sharp criticism of ethnic Hungarians and Hungarian politicians and party as hate speech. Therefore, he asked to correct (to cut) his earlier suggestion of monitored hate speech by one quarter.

ROMA AND GYPSY MINORITY: In the first years of the Slovak

31 independence the authorities often ignored and denied the breaking of human rights of Roma although evidence was available. Secondly, procedures of legislative, social and some other bodies limited the ability of Roma to integrate into the major part of the society. Finally, there was state paternalism, which hindered independent development of Roma (Cahn and Trehan, 1997, 7). By and large, the major part of society would prefer segregation of Roma and harsher legislation for Roma (Ochrana menšín…, 2001, 3).

Local authorities are also not free from institutional racism. Two East Slovak village passed an order forbidding entrance of Roma in their villages. If the Roma moved into the city, the citizens would have the right to expel them (Dostál 1998, 168). This order was later canceled by the Parliament. Another village mayor with Roma inhabitants suggested to shoot some Roma in order to solve Roma problem in 1999 (Ochrana menšín…, 2001, 5).

THE MEDIA: Research on Roma image in selected Slovak media (the six most popular daily newspapers and main news programs of Slovak Television, TV and with slightly different methodology also Slovak Radio) carried out between June 1998 and June 1999 suggests that almost 91 percent of information about Roma was published in the print media (in relative numbers, there was almost five times more items in the print media than in the electronic media). The Ministry of Interior stopped providing information about nationality or race of criminals in November 1998, which led to a significant decrease in the quantitative information of this kind available in the media.

For our research it is interesting to note that the second most often discussed or reported topic according to this research report were human and civil rights. The socio-psychological characteristics or rather stereotypes (the lowest number of items out of six categories) of Roma were most often described as irresponsibility, arrogance, noisiness, parasites (abusing privileges), low adaptation, laziness and cunningness. Among these popular socio-psychological characteristics the artistic talent of Roma population was evaluated predominantly positive in almost 75 percent cases, but with low absolute number of news items. There were two typical differences among the print media: the liberal daily, Sme, was most interested in human and civil rights of Roma among the dailies while the most popular daily, a tabloid Nový Čas, showed the highest interest in Roma criminality. In general, the

32 author argues that the information about Roma issues basically reflected real Roma problems. However, almost 60 percent of the news about stealing and deception related to Roma were either in form or in content explicitly negative towards Roma. In the case of violent criminal acts, this ratio was even higher, 78.5 percent. It was typical that if the nationality of a criminal was mentioned it was only that of Roma. On average, 73.3 percent of information published about Roma was presented in neutral form, which was determined with the overall largest type of information (news and wire reports). Yet in some cases even information without emotions and fact- based, created negative images about Roma. Ethnic affiliation in value- negative cases and generalizations based on single cases was perhaps the most salient issue in reporting about Roma. Authors conclude that the image of Roma in the Slovak media is marked with latent demonstration of racism and intolerance of the major society. The media themselves do not recognize their own prejudices and stereotypes. Therefore, the media do not acknowledge their own behavior as racist.

Another monitoring (www.memo98.sk) of main news programs of STV, TV Markíza, TV Luna, Slovak Radio and Radio Twist revealed in 2000: • The media reported relatively little about the minorities (between 1 and 2 percent). • The Roma minority issues were most often presented among minorities (more than 93 percent). • Information offered was presented neutrally (86.6 percent) or negatively (13.3 percent) and very rarely (1.6 percent) positively. Both private and public radio stations paid more attention to minority issues than television stations in absolute terms. In relative terms it was similar to television broadcast. Here the best statistical results were achieved by the private TV Markíza, which in relative terms, broadcasted the most about minority issues. But this was also the most negative news reporting. It is important to mention that four major news media at that time: STV, TV Markíza, TV Luna, Slovak Radio and Radio Twist, broadcasted almost one hour devoted to (criticism of) intolerance in 2000. The lion share of this broadcast was in radio. But much more attention was paid to various scandals, statements and other cases. These cases (such as emigration of Roma, racially motivated murders, but also legal initiative aimed at preventing stealing potatoes from fields) created more than 6 and half hours of all news time in all five monitored media in 2000. Eighty-seven percent of all cases towards minorities were presented in neutral way, 0.5 in a positive way and 11.6 percent in negative way. The worst ratio of negative cases was

33 on the private TV Markíza and then on the Slovak public Radio. The authors conclude that monitored broadcasting suggests that news reporting about minorities is dominated by campaign style, searching for scandals that are presented in so called neutral style. This style of news reporting contributes to negative attitudes towards Roma.

Klára Orgovánová, the Governmental for Roma Communities blames the media for strengthening negative attitudes towards Roma in the Slovak society (Tolerancia, 3/2002, p.3). It is hard to argue differently, because even supposedly "neutral" information can have negative impact on the image of Roma in a society.

A third available monitoring analysis (www.rada-rtv.sk) focused on news programes of STV, TV Markíza and TV Luna in June 2000. This monitoring also included coverage of minorities. Less than 1 percent of all news items were to related to minorities. STV and TV Markíza reported only about Roma minority, and this was related to its allegedly politically and racially motivated emigration.

Some observes friendly to Roma support the claim (at least indirectly) that Roma have indeed different cultural habits that do not reconcile easily with the major ethnic culture. For example, Isabel Fonsecová (1995-1999) suggests in her ethnographical book that Roma people commonly lie to non- Roma people. The motivation of this behavior is meant to be a kind of entertainment. The Roma people are noisy. She explains this behavior by the need for sociability and likeness of noisiness in general. Fonsecová even argues that the majority of Roma do not like organized work but rather self- organized work. The Roma community seeks and expects early pregnancy of girls and loves children. Only the female work at home is standard behavior. The Roma people see misinforming non-Roma as natural because this serves as protection for survival in a potentially dangerous environment. The Roma people are also fastidious, argues Fonsecová. Sekyt (1998) also accepts a different "mentality" of Roma. In his view, Roma have a different behavior, culture and values because of their Indian . For example, he explains that Roma lie in a different way. Sekyt believes that Roma lie because there is a different structure of their language that makes it difficult to differentiate between reality and fiction. In addition, there is a strong empathy among Roma, and thus, they "say what we want hear." Finally, truth is not logically based but morally based. Thus, it is difficult to say that the image of Roma among Slovaks is based

34 entirely on prejudices or false stereotypes. Certainly, there are many exceptions, but the same applies for the study of political culture in general.

In view of Columbus Igboanusi, a Nigerian-born director of a human rights organization monitoring racism in Slovakia since 1996, the best reporting on human rights issues and especially hate speech was provided by marginal TV Global (since March 2002 called JOJ TV and expanding its coverage) then STV, and the least objective reporting comes from the national private TV Markíza. In the last case, the major imbalances were caused by a single journalist Tribula. (It should be mentioned that even TV Markíza changed its attitude towards Roma in recent months to a more neutral one. Others argue that TV Markíza have had positive evaluations of Roma since 2000/2001. This may be related to political aims of one of its co-owners, although one would perhaps expect the opposite. Perhaps it is exactly because he left the post of director).

The most popular tabloid newspaper, Nový Čas, reports with mixed objectivity, but sometimes only from one side (does not give space to other side). The other major daily newspapers — Pravda and Sme — are more often balanced than not, especially daily Sme. Again, in the case of daily Sme one can find, according to Igboanusi one reporter who makes the overall positive picture darker. The media sometimes create or report racial tensions that do not exist. Sometimes the media are not sensitive enough to hate speech. For example, when Ján Slota, at that time leader of requested extradition of . Igboanusi, no media condemned this proposal. In general, however, the media have improved its reporting. The media play a negative role in racially motivated crimes, in view of dr. Jakubčík's lawyer who specializes in racially motivate crimes. This is due to an inherent tendency of the media to seek sensations, not substance. The media ignore potential negative consequences of their reporting on victims. Obviously, if there is a case when Roma attacks a non-Roma, this event attracts the attention of the media. This happened in Slovakia in March 2001. That this case from March 2001 was seen as something extraordinary can be seen in fact that the Parliament's Minute of Honor was held for the victim. This unusual act of the Parliament happens very rarely. The next time it happened after events of September 11, 2001. According to Jakubčík, the media misinformed the public when they reported important details. Therefore, Jakubčík sued some major media outlets. Perhaps even more serious was the impact of media reporting on the evidence of the witness. The witnesses offered negative evidence because they followed the media news,

35 argues Jakubčík. Probably due to extensive coverage of this case in the media, a group of extremists killed a mentally handicapped Roma a few weeks later. In another case from 2001, the media coverage of Roma initiated violence resulting in much worse consequences for Roma as it would be otherwise. Further, not only the media have implicitly negative attitudes towards Roman, but also, logically, the larger part of the public is tacitly racist along with some judges, argues Jakubčík. Some judges treat Roma and non-Roma cases differently. There is little interest to follow racially motivated cases before the court or by police investigators. This lack of interest of police can be found in earlier reports on the Roma situation (see for example Monitoring Minority Rights, 2/98, , Slovak Committee).

Among the politically oriented media with some hatred towards minorities (or in general with higher intolerance) there are Nový Deň together with weeklies Zmena (political yellow press) and Extra Plus (and before that Slovenská Republika daily till its collapse). During its existence, the daily Slovenská republika attacked journalists from the other media, for example from daily Pravda, because of their different opinions. There are three important political weeklies: Extra plus, Domino fórum and Slovo. While Extra plus is often highly intolerant towards the Hugarian minority, weekly Domino fórum is from time to time critical about racism and intolerance in general (although at political level is often intollerant), while leftist weekly Slovo has began publishing a bi-weekly supplement against racism.

The media know that they are under permant informal, and in some caseses formal and official check of both governmental and non-governmental organizations, as well as by some independent activists. Tom Nicholson, editor of The Slovak Spectator (a weekly that pays probably the most attention to intolerance in a society), also argues that racism and sexism, although present and important issues, are in practice side issues for the Slovak society. This relates to the media that, with the exception of the daily Sme, usually do not consider these issues as news worthy for front pages or for main news. But the fact that most if not all colored people are afraid of travelling by public transport by night is far more frightening than a single case of alleged Roma violence. As put by the lawyer Jakubčík', "there has been no martial law declared in Slovakia for minorities…"

POLITICIANS: In practice, some Slovak politicians do not mind to express

36 racist stereotypes or prejudices. For example, the chair of the most popular political party does not mind to use the expression that another politician "does not lie, he deceives like a gypsy" (The Slovak Spectator, April1-7, 2002, p.4). As argues Vašečka (2001b, 195), in some cases it is deliberate policy of radical politicians in most cases. Among the most radical politicians are those representatives that belong to the Slovak National Party and the Real Slovak National Party. For example, Ján Slota, at that time leader of Slovak National Party, said in late 1997 that the "Hungarian are bad luck for Europe" and that the national minorities are "the tool of cosmopolitans to cause conflicts and through these conflicts to liquidate nations" and "Hungarians are bad people who killed a lot of our (grand)fathers and (grand)mothers" (Dostál 1998, 168). In March 1999 at a meeting of the Slovak National Party, Ján Slota, under the influence of alcohol, urged the party to attack Hungary with tanks. His call was sharply criticized in the media. In 2002 Ján Slota, now leader of the Real Slovak National Party, said that he would sue human rights activist Columbus Igboanusi for "racism against whites". Slota said that the court case would be his contribution to the March international anti-racism week in 2002 (The Slovak Spectator, March 25-31, 2002, p.2). Politicians from some other parties occasionally joined these two radical or at least often intolerant politicians and political parties in the years 2000-2002. For example, the leader of Smer party (usually the second most popular party in opinion polls throughout 2001-2002) strongly criticized Roma for chopping down wood in the national park (see Voda 2002). In fact, Roma cause much less damage to nature and society than some other people do. The most discussed case of hate speech relates to a member of parliament for the Real Slovak National Party3, Víťazoslav Móric. Móric was accused in 2000 for promoting national and race hatred. M.P. Móric suggested in his speech at party press conference to create special reservations for "difficult to accommodate" (neprispôsobivých) Roma. The Parliament gave approval for his investigation by the police. The Police and the prosecutor did not finish the investigation of the case in early 2002 due to various legal objections from the prosecuted and police investigator. Here it should be noted that according to Garcia (2001, 271-272), de jure racial segregation violates political morality primarily because (and, therefore, when) it expresses a majority's (or minority's) racial indifference, contempt, or ill will). De facto racial separation need not be morally

3 Slovak National Party split in 2001 into Slovak National Party, while dissenters (more than half of MPs for this party originally in the Parliament) established Real Slovak National Party.

37 problematic at all when it happens to result from decently and responsibly motivated individual or social actions, argues Garcia. However, it will be immoral if its bad effects are accepted out of racist hard-heartedness. Racial discrimination is not always racist discrimination, argues Garcia. Was this such, in a sense, the case? Even more importantly, should an MP be limited in his freedom of speech for such statement? Did he break the limits of what is allowed in a decent society?

Politicians of the Mikuláš Dzurinda government (1998-2002) had political will to solve problem of racism and racists hatred but there was largely a missing political interest, in the words of Columbus Igboanusi. While under the Vladimír Mečiar government (1994-1998) there was no governmental office to complain to or to discuss racist issues with. Dzurinda´s government has created some institutions (e.g. office of the vice-prime minister for minorities and human rights, office of the ombudsman since early 2002). But even Dzurinda´s government acts more often than not if it is under international pressure and the Parliament condemns some racist act. The Parliament, however, does not create committee to discuss racist problems in Slovakia. This can be partially explained by the fact that the Slovak public, as mentioned above, does not show much interest in hate speech and issues of racism or intolerance. The police attitude towards racially motivated issues has not improved in the last years either argues Igboanusi. For these reasons, out of more than 80 Africans in 1999 only 22 remained in the country towards the end of 2001. Igboanusi says that the situation in Slovakia is in this respect much worse than in other neighboring countries with the exception of . The League of Human Rights Activists reported 70 different cases of complaints of Roma in the year 2001, out of which 15 were further pursued in a legal action.

What are state authorities doing in this matter? There is a draft of the anti- discrimination law in Slovakia. This law, according to Igboanusi, prepared with good intentions may actually cause some damage. If there will be strict equality, then some or all Roma projects may be closed. There is no positive discrimination in draft law. However, this draft law was rejected by the Parliament in summer 2002. A new definition of the wording "publicly expressed", which should also include the Internet is also planned.

Yet, in practical terms, there are only ten policemen specialized in racially motivated crime and extremism, while in the twice as large Czech Republic there are 140 specialized policemen. So, while racism and racist motivated

38 hate speech is not so different in both , there is a difference of another kind (qualitative one) on how much attention and sources is paid to this issue (Daniel Milo, also SLOVO, 13 March 2002, supplement). The weekly, The Slovak Spectator, often deals with frustrated foreigners with a different color of skin. These foreigners are frustrated with the lack of attention of police for their cases related to racism. The police often does not report the evidence or start investigations.

Although there were various plans of the state authorities to fight against intolerance, these were often only formal (like education) and also only formally checked as fulfilled (see Vyhodnotenie….2002, and Ochrana menšín…, 2001). Also, this evaluation does not include all activities. Out of those evaluated activities, some could have potentially significant impact if conducted properly. For example, the Ministry of Interior established the Monitoring Center for Racism and Xenophobia in 2001 as well as defined the methodology for unveiling, clarification and documentation of criminal acts motivated by racist, nationalist and other intolerance or carried out by supporters of extremist groups. There were also various anti-tolerance campaigns in the electronic, print and outdoor media against racism supported by the Government in late 2001 and early 2002, with various degrees of innovation and effectiveness (see Frišová 2002). The Cabinet on March 6, 2002 unveiled a new Action Plan Against Racism for 2002 and 2003 (There were some earlier governmental programs, see for example Dostál 1998, and Ochrana menšín…, 2001). There should be more anti- racism education for children as well for police on "sensitivity training" followed by a law on anti-discrimination and a new Center for Equal Treatment. It seems that the political decision or the politician's interest in solving the issues of hate speech (and racism or intolerance in general) is crucial for success. In addition, there must be coordination of all efforts. In some cases, there are human resources and money available, in some other cases there are only ideas. Finally, there must be enough money available on time, but this is often in contrast to long-term planning of both the Government and foreign donors like the EU. Foreign experts are useful, but need introduction to local conditions.

There was a first report published by the Ministry of Interior on the state of extremism in Slovakia in early 2002. This report claims that there are 2,500 extremists, 500 of them activists (leaders) and 2,000 (more passive) supporters.

39 The importance of political will can be seen with the example of the Czech Republic. The Czech government adopted very concrete measures against racially motivated acts in 1995, after one brutal murder of an innocent Roma (see Prištenská 1998, 25-26). Some recommendations were suggested by an NGO to the Slovak Government in a report by Cahn and Trehan (1997, 57- 58). Some of these recommendations as well as others have been adopted by the Government in April 1996 (see Cahn and Trehan 1997, 61-67). It is not clear how successfully these measures were actually implemented. In the view of the above facts, it can be said without much success.

7. COMPARISON AND CONCLUSIONS

Is there xenophobia and intolerance in Slovakia and Slovenia? Certainly, there is xenophobia and intolerance in both countries. These phenomena are not unique, or at least much surprising, if there is a sudden wave of refugees as it was the case in Slovenia. But it is very worrying that if there are almost no refugees or very few members of a certain minority group, and majority people (at least a large part of them), including a few politicians, are very intolerant, very xenophobic. This is the case in Slovakia and in some areas in Slovenia. Are cases of hate speech found in these two countries extreme or in any other way unique? Certainly, there are elements of racism, chauvinism and hate/defamation speech in every country. As already mentioned, there is an alarming increase in racist and xenophobic tendencies in all European countries since the 1990s. Xenophobia is perhaps structural but usually a marginal feature of all societies. Thus Rex (2000, 69) suggests that there is a minority in most societies of perhaps between 10 and 25 percent that will seek to exclude or to repatriate immigrants together with their descendants. Indeed, the above presented opinion polls show that there is about 15 percent of hard-core (self-declared) intolerant people in Slovakia.

It is also true that in both countries there are perhaps by and large many more serious problems, namely in Slovakia, and the salient issue of this study is question of everyday ethics of journalism, which is closely related to a degree of professionalism. There is certainly a problem of public relations in journalism work in both countries. In contrast to Slovakia, it seems that Slovenian journalists and media are much less critical about their colleagues or other media work, but due to the revival of civil society in the last year or so, there is at least one voice heard. Yet politicians in both countries became more sensitive to the issue of racism and xenophobia, in

40 part due to the pressure from the EU. As far as xenophobia and intolerance are concerned, the Slovak government adopted significant measures to combat racism and intolerance towards the end of its mandate. This issue was much less pronounced among Slovene politicians who were in power in 2001/2002.

With respect to the media, the situation in Slovakia is different only to the degree that journalists criticize only the mainstream media. There are certainly some racist, nationalist or xenophobic media with a very low audience in Slovakia. But there are also the major media with humor that is hardly funny and certainly sexist, racist, intolerant and in general offensive. For example, the New Year's program in the most popular TV Markíza was full of this kind of primitive and sexist humor (see Puková 2002). There are two editors in important positions in Slovenia who worked in the US (public television and the most important serious daily) while there is only one editor in Slovakia who worked for a significant time in the UK (public Slovak Radio) and one editor who was a dissident under communism. It is not clear whether this really makes a difference, since some claim that the editor of Delo newspapers does not really edit this newspaper. Similarly, the daily Sme in Slovakia (with former dissident as editor) seems to be without a clear editorial line. This allows, among other things, for reports and commentaries that are seen by some as biased or racists to be included. Yet it is the daily Sme that is the most tolerant and most interested in minority and sensitive groups issues.

In general, both societies seem to have not so different political cultures. There is by and large a peaceful, non-controversial political culture with tendencies to soften all quarrels in Slovenia. However, some argue that Slovenian politicians are very intolerant. Slovak political culture seems to be similar, perhaps much more polarized but still socially conservative. There are many intolerant politicians too. This in itself is a more favorable for the spread or articulation of xenophobia and racism. For example, the Slovak Parliament approved a Declaration on of EU Member States in Cultural-Ethical Issues in early 2002. Some left and liberal politicians and intellectuals argued that this was a clear sign of political xenophobia and isolationism (see Gluchman 2002, Sýkora 2002, Weiss 2002).

The problem of hate speech can be tackled with these measures (based on recommendation in Tehranian 1997, 58):

41 a) Constitutional checks and balances. Constitutional guarantees already exist in Slovakia and Slovenia. If there is a problem, then it is in the lack of interest in their fulfilment by the police or prosecutors. This reflects the low interest of politicians in these issues unless some civil society or international actors push them. Sometimes difficult definitions of racist speech and acts by courts occur. Ultimately judges who are able and willing to implement the law creatively are crucial to the success of anti- discrimination legislation (Racism in..., 2000, p.16). b) intermediate checks and balances. This does not really work in both countries. Journalist associations and civil society activists should be more involved in this kind of activity. Slovenia is a better example than Slovakia in this respect. c) Journalists' own codes of ethics. There are codes of ethics in both countries, but very few journalists respect them. Would ethical codes in journalism or press councils help? Half of Slovenian journalists are not members of any of two professional/trade union associations, according to Sandra Bašiè-Hrvatin. The precise number of journalists associated in two professional bodies in Slovakia is known (about 3,000 together), but certainly many prominent Slovak journalists are not members of the Syndicate of Slovak Journalists or the Slovak Association of Journalists. Slovenian dailies do not have their own code of practice. In Slovakia and Slovenia, the public media and in Slovakia some dailies (e.g. daily Pravda) have their own codes of practice. In Slovenia journalists (or the current leadership of the Association of Slovenian Journalists) are skeptical about establishing the Press Council. Slovak journalists established the Press Council in March 2002. However, the Government indirectly facilitated this. In Slovenia, even before introducing an ethical code, code of conduct in public television, there was a fierce debate and strong resistance among young journalists as well as some university lecturers who accused the editor of an attempt of censorship. d) better historical and cultural education for journalists. This is a long-term goal. It needs to improve higher education standards in Slovakia. Some short-term courses may help but are no substitute for long-term education. There are also some special programs for Roma journalists organized by the Center for Independent Journalism in Slovakia.

42 e) better coverage of news context in relation to news events. This would be perhaps the most useful advice and approach. It would tackle at the same time ethics and professionalism. In this way, it would probably be the least questionable suggested measure by all actors. Especially public media should be very careful about their standards. As suggested by MEMO´98, the public media should have their own concept of minority presentation in broadcasting. This concept should guarantee (also) positive presentation of minority issues. Educational, cultural and other programs should regularly inform about Roma and other minorities (not only or mainly about Hungarian minority as it is case at present), their culture, traditions, history. MEMO´98 suggested also to solve Roma minority representation in public media (among journalists). Finally, the Plentipotentiary for Roma minority should regularly inform in the public media about his or her activities. Here it should also be mentioned that the Council of Europe has suggested rather detailed recommendations for minority presentation in the media in 1995. These recommendations have been translated in many languages, including (see Odporúčania pre rozhlasové a televízne vysielanie. Ako správne zobraziť etnické menšiny v európskych krajinách.Published by Informačné a dokumentačné stredisko o Rade Európy, Bratislava, not dated. Check also wwww.radaeuropy.sk). f) Shaming the aggressor by publicizing information about the persecution of minorities. This measure might be useful. It can, however, backfire, if carried out in the wrong way. Broad alliances with a range of civil society and media actors might be useful, and in some cases necessary for monitoring and publishing information and creating pressure on the media and politicians. g) Bringing international pressure to bear on violators of human rights. The EU pressure seems to work well already in this way. More international pressure would be useful from international NGOs. This should be supported with serious academic research and policy papers, which are by and large missing.

Why is the role of the media in fighting hate and libel speech so important? If civil society is weak or non-existent (as it is in Slovakia, although there were some cases of successful lobbing and protesting in the recent past) or if it is active only from time to time (as it is in Slovenia) and if politicians are ignorant about certain issues (which is nothing surprising), then the media

43 should take the lead. This is because journalism is not only about news reporting. Campbell (1999) and Teo (2000) suggest that journalism: - Is in the problem solving business not the truth business - Its product is a contribution to understanding but not a fully finished state of understanding - Therefore, journalism is as much about models for understanding the world as it is about information about the world. - It is an amplifier spreading and reproducing the existing unequal power relations in society. - It is a philosophical construct of what is worth paying attention to and how best to pay attention to it. Indeed, a US study on relationship between media use and social and political trust (Moy and Scheufele 2000) suggests that reading newspapers and watching television entertainment enhances social trust, while watching television news undermined trust in others. The study also claims (with some self-doubt) that political trust is not at all a function of media; rather, it stems from education and political ideology. Media use has a much more pronounced effect on social trust. But absence of social trust can lead to low political trust. The authors conclude that the media are capable of promoting not only individual-level, short-term political behavior, but also longer-term, aggregate-level attitudes and behavior necessary for the healthy functioning of any democracy. If this is so, then the media should be (at least partly, and certainly in some cases of social discourse fully) responsible for their activities for their reporting and commenting. As we have seen and will see, the role of the media in publicizing actions is crucial in two senses.

How can civil society activists, either individuals or organizations, help in preventing or limiting xenophobia in general and hate speech in particular? There are four primary factors, which determine the power of protest groups: the level of social, political and media status; the amount of organization and resources; the amount of newsworthy behavior; and, the level of media dependency.

At the micro level, the four components of antagonist´s strength can be summarized by the term newsworthiness. If there are no other choices and especially the smaller the protest group, disorderly conduct is often used as door for gaining access to the news media attention. Here the social legitimacy of a protest group has a major impact on how it is covered (Wolfsfeld 1991). Yet this is an unlikely or extreme solution for civil society

44 activists.

At the macro level, Koopmans and Statham (2000, 32-37) suggest that levels of mobilization are not a direct outcome of national differences in periods of modernization, but are rather mediated by a country's particular structure of political institutions and its configuration of power relationships. Important roles play the national cleavage structures (such as conflicts over national identities, center-periphery conflict…). Then there are formal institutional or legal structures, informal procedures and prevailing strategies. While civil society actors can not do much about the first three variables, they can choose the right strategy. A particularly conducive situation for mobilization is when political élites are internally divided. Social movements have to define issues as problematic concerns, identify causes, present solutions, and make the political actors who are considered responsible for implementing policy decisions visible and accountable in the public domain. In addition, they have to convince their potential adherents that collective action is a necessary and potentially successful means towards these ends. The success of discursive efforts depends not just on the argumentative quality of the framing strategies used by collective actors, but on their fit with hegemonic discourses and on the institutional opportunities for inserting challenger frames into the process of policy formation and implementations. Since only perceived realities can affect collective action, then it follows that civil society organizations should focus on the type of political opportunities that are rendered publicly visible. In addition to a more stable institutional and cultural dimensions that can be derived from political systems (discussed above), there are more volatile dimensions of political opportunities, and this is where political discourse dynamics play a crucial role. Here the media can play a role in making public dissent among élites. Through amplification the dispute is transmitted further, and other collective actors enter into arena. The likelihood of success for challengers who attempt to mobilize their claims in the public sphere is dependent on their ability to achieve three strategic aims: visibility, resonance and legitimacy. It seems that there is legitimacy in claims for intolerance against the intolerant. Certainly, as we have seen, Slovaks and probably Slovenians too reject hate speech. Even though this may be only declaration, it can be supported and promoted by the media and politicians. In this way, what may be only intention may become a self fulfilling prophecy. In other words, the same phenomenon that applies to negative consequences of racism, can be utilized in the fight against intolerance and xenophobia.

45 We have discussed the current situation in various areas related to xenophobia in general and hatred in particular. These are important issues and will become even more so in the distant future. While Slovenia has already learned what can cause a sudden wave of refugees, Slovakia will only face this challenge. There was a huge increase in asylum seekers in the last year in Slovakia. While 1,556 refugees asked for asylum in 2000 (236 up from 1999, and only ten gained the status of refugee), there were 8,151 applicants in 2001 in Slovakia (Tolerancia 6/2002, p.2). Almost all of these refugees and asylum seekers see Slovakia as a transition country. Still, if this number continues to rise in this speed, will Slovakia be able to deal with them in a better way than Slovenia? In the light of presented facts, the answer is probably NO. Perhaps, as many times in Slovakia's history, the international environment will play its role. This time it will be the integration in the EU. The EU integration should facilitate the burden of intolerant and even more ignorant politicians. Civil society actors in cooperation with the media could certainly contribute to this aim. This overall plan may sound naïve considering the new wave of xenophobia in traditionally tolerant countries like the . But the Dutch and others tolerated and accepted a large number of foreigners for a quite long time. My point is that under current conditions Slovakia will face serious problems with xenophobia even with very low number of asylum seekers. Slovakia already faces serious problems with racism and hate speech in various forms. The Slovenian example with its revival of a civil society and its role in tackling issues of this kind can be seen as instructive.

8. SOURCES:

1. Interviews in Slovenia with: Bernard Nežmah, Mladina weekly, Slovenia, 9 2001 Igor Žagar, Pedagogical Institute, Ljubljana, Slovenia, 9 October 2001 Sandra Bašič- Hrvatin, The University of Ljubljana, Slovenia, 9 October 2001 Sašo Gazdič, researcher at the Republic of Slovenia National Assembly, 10 October 2001 Roman Kuhar, The Peace Institute for Human Sciences, Ljubljana, Slovenia, 10 October 2001 Mitha Meršol, daily DELO, Ljubljana, Slovenia, 5 February 2002. Slavko Splichal, lecturer, Department of Theoretical Communication, University of Ljubljana, 6 February 2002. Uroš Lipušček, editor-in-chief of Slovenian Television (RTV), 5 February

46 2002. Prof. Ada Polajvar-Pavznik, lecturer, Faculty of Law at the University of Ljubljana, 5 February 2002. Barbara , lecturer, Faculty of Law at the University of Ljubljana, 5 February 2002. Zlatko Šabič, lecturer, Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Ljubljana, 23 May 2002. Jernej Pikalo, lecturer, Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Ljubljana, 23 May 2002. Nikolai Jeffs, independent human rights activist, Ljubljana, 27 May 2002.

Interviews in Slovakia with: Miloš Lukár, editor in chief of weekly Plus 7 dní, presentation at workshop Media and Corruption, Bratislava, 17 May 2001. Pavel Haulík, head of the MVK agency (opinion poll research agency), Bratislava, 29 November 2001. Columbus Igboanusi, director of League of Activists for Human Rights, Bratislava, 7 7, 2002 Milan Stanislav, deputy editor in chief, Pravda, 15 January 2002 Nora Slišková, editor, Pravda, 28 January 2002. Stanislav Jakubčík, lawyer, 30 January 2002. Katarína Lukáčová, editor in chief, Zemplínsky denník, , 22 February 2002. Andrea Krajniaková, Head of Department of Press and Information, and spokesperson of the Ministry of Justice, 15 February 2002. Tatiana Veselá, editor in chief, weekly Moment, 15 February 2002. Daniel Milo, lawyer, People Against Racism, 7 March 2002 Tom Nicholson, editor in chief, The Slovak Spectator, 15 March 2002. Attila Š. Béda, independent researcher on hatred towards Hungarian minority, March 2002 Adriana Lamačková, The Office of the Government, 22 March 2002 Katarína Staroňová, Open Society Institute, Bratislava, 15 April 2002.

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