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Will We Be Able to Achieve Herd Immunity Against COVID-19?

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Will We Be Able to Achieve Herd Immunity Against COVID-19? 35 Will We Be Able to Achieve Herd Immunity Against COVID-19? Series | COVID-19 & response strategy Authors: Clara Marín, Oriana Ramírez, Carlota Dobaño, Jeffrey V Lazarus, Gemma Moncunill and Adelaida Sarukhan (ISGlobal)* [ This document is a one On 10 May 2021, the Spanish prime defines herd immunity as “the indirect of a series of discussion minister announced that, if the vaccine protection from an infectious disease that notes addressing delivery schedule is met, Spain would happens when a population is immune fundamental questions reach the government’s desired level of either through vaccination or immunity about the COVID-19 herd immunity—70% of the population developed through previous infection”2. crisis and response vaccinated—in 100 days, i.e. on 18 Au- Since the start of the pandemic, the pos- strategies. These gust1. Given the available evidence, is this sibility of achieving herd immunity documents are based claim realistic? has been touted as a way to avoid shut- on the best scientific ting down the economy or accelerate its Since COVID-19 was declared a pan- information available re-opening. However, this proved to be a demic in March 2020, our societies have and may be updated as double-edged sword. Countries such as undergone profound changes, starting new information comes Sweden and the United Kingdom tried to light.] with government-imposed restrictions on to base their strategy on achieving early fundamental rights such as freedom of herd immunity by allowing a majority of movement and freedom of assembly. An the population to become infected. These effective vaccine against SARS-CoV-2 strategies were either rectified, as in the was seen as the great hope for a way out United Kingdom, or mortality increased of the health and economic crisis caused by 11 June 2021 to an unjustifiable extent, as in Sweden. COVID-19 and attention soon turned Today, with the availability of highly effec- Photo: Free-Photos / Pixabay to the question of herd immunity. tive vaccines and an unprecedented vacci- The World Health Organisation (WHO) nation campaign, herd immunity is once * Clara Marín is a resident physician in preventive medicine and public health at Barcelona’s Hospital Clínic who collaborates with ISGlobal’s Policy and Global Development de- partment. Oriana Ramírez is a physician specialised in preventive medicine and public health and global health policy analysis coordinator and associated researcher at ISGlobal. Carlota Dobaño is the head of the Malaria Immunology Group at ISGlobal. Jeffrey V Lazarus is the head of ISGlobal’s Health Systems Research Group. Gemma Moncunill is a researcher in ISGlobal’s Malaria Immunology Research Group. Adelaida Sarukhan is an immunologist and scientific writer at ISGlobal. 1 Jessica Mouzo. Sánchez asegura que España está “a 100 días de lograr la inmunidad de grupo”. El País. 10 May 2021. 2 World Health Organisation (WHO). Herd immunity, lockdowns and COVID-19. www.isglobal.org 1 again the great hope for countries to re- ganism. In the case of SARS-CoV-2, the gain some semblance of normality. herd-immunity threshold is not yet known, and some of the key questions raised by In reality, there is no magic immuni- this objective are worth addressing sation rate that provides herd immunity . against any pathogen; instead, it depends on the characteristics of each micro-or- What Percentage of the Population Must Be Vaccinated to Achieve Herd 1. Immunity? “Because the basic First, it is important to note that the could fall below one. When each car- herd-immunity threshold is not rier infects less than one new person, reproduction known with any certainty, because it is an outbreak slowly fades away. Two number of based on the virus’s basic reproduction out of three is 66.7%; hence the 60%- SARS-CoV-2 4 number or R0 (the average number of 70% range for herd immunity . is an estimate cases that will be caused by an infected However, several factors have caused and we do not individual during the period of infection). the scientific community to raise know for sure Because the R0 of SARS-CoV-2 is an es- doubts about this range. First, the data how it responds timate and we do not know for sure how from China did not include asympto- to factors such it responds to factors such as space or matic patients and therefore underes- different variants of the virus, we cannot as space or timated the R0 of the virus. Second, the accurately calculate the vaccination rate different variants virus itself is mutating and some of the needed to reach herd immunity. Any es- variants that have emerged are more of the virus, we timate is just that: an approximation that contagious; this changes the R0, and thus cannot accurately we currently have no way of testing. the range for herd immunity. In an inter- calculate the In the early days of the pandemic, the view with the New York Times, researchers vaccination rate WHO3 and other experts estimated that at the Harvard School of Public Health needed to reach 60%-70% of the population needed to be estimated that the threshold could be 5 herd immunity.” immune in order to achieve herd immu- 85% or higher . The Centers for Disease 6 nity. This estimate was based on informa- Control and Prevention (CDC) have not tion from early outbreaks in China and offered an estimate; their website states Italy. As the number of cases in those out- only that we are still learning how many breaks doubled rapidly, it was calculated people need to be vaccinated before herd immunity takes hold. The same is true that the R0 for this virus—i.e. the number of new victims infected by each carrier— of the website for the European Cen- tre for Disease Prevention and Control was approximately three. Therefore, two (ECDC)7. out of every three potential victims would have to become immune before the num- In addition to the percentage of vacci- ber of people infected by each carrier nation coverage, we should also be con- 3 World Health Organisation (WHO). Herd Immunity. 4,5 Donald G. McNeil Jr. How Much Herd Immunity Is Enough? New York Times. Published December 2020, Updated April 2021. 6 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Key Things to Know About COVID-19 Vaccines. 7 European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC). Questions and answers on COVID-19: Vaccines. www.isglobal.org 2 cerned about whether immunisation is If we take the example of measles—the evenly distributed. If, for example, the most contagious vaccine-preventable in- vaccination coverage rate is 90% in one fectious disease—95% of the population geographical area and 60% in anoth- needs to be vaccinated in order to achieve er, the overall vaccination rate will not elimination. Since SARS-CoV-2 has been reflect the reality, which is that people in shown to be less contagious than measles, the latter area are much more exposed we can set an upper bound on the per- than those in the first. The same is true centage of the population that needs to be of different populations, such as people vaccinated (assuming a strategy of elim- with irregular migration status8 or other ination, not just functional control), but groups at risk of social exclusion. In addi- the lower bound is not yet known. tion to monitoring the overall proportion of vaccinated people in the population, we need to be aware of how access to the vaccine is distributed. Moreover, some populations, such as children, are not yet vaccinated, and others, such as immu- nocompromised people, generate sub- optimal immunity—or do not do not generate immunity at all—even if they are vaccinated. Therefore, the vaccination coverage rate in the immunocompetent adult population needs to be higher in or- der to compensate for this. It is worth noting that the critical vacci- nation level varies depending on whether the goal is to achieve disease elimina- tion rates, as with polio or measles, or to achieve sufficient vaccination coverage to aid in effective disease control, as with in- fluenza or pertussis. The latter approach is often taken with infections for which we do not have highly effective vaccines to stop transmission or when there are pockets of vulnerable populations. In the case of SARS-CoV-2, it is not yet clear whether we will fully eliminate the disease or achieve only functional control of the pandemic (preventing hospitalisations and deaths through vac- cines and possibly future treatments). 8 José Domínguez. Osakidetza inmunizará a la población extranjera irregular. El Correo. 1 June 2021. www.isglobal.org 3 Table 1. Critical immunisation rates. Percentage of the population that must be vaccinated in order to create herd immunity against various diseases. The percentage is related to the contagiousness of the micro-organism, which in turn is related to the infectivity of the pathogen, transmission route, host susceptibility and immunogenicity (for example, vaccines are generally less immunogenic in older people), as well as environmental factors such as solar radiation and socio-economic determinants. Disease Vaccine efficacy Critical Main Public health (vaccines vaccination mechanism of approach marketed in threshold transmission Spain)9 for herd immunity10,11 Measles One dose 93%, two 92%-96% Airborne and Elimination doses 100% contact Rubella One dose 93%, two 84%-88% Respiratory Elimination (mainly doses 100% droplets congenital rubella) and vertical transmission Mumps One dose 78%, two 88%-92% Respiratory Effective control doses 88% droplets and contact Pertussis Acellular vaccine 92%-96% Respiratory Effective control 85% droplets and contact Polio Three doses 99%- 80%-85% Faecal-oral and Elimination and 100%, parenteral pharyngeal global eradication inactivated secretions poliovirus vaccine (IPV) Seasonal 70%-80% N/A Respiratory Protection of the influenza depending on the droplets most exposed circulating virus and airborne and vulnerable under certain groups circumstances COVID-19 94% Moderna To be determined Respiratory To be determined 95% Pfizer droplets 76% AstraZeneca and airborne 66% Janssen 12 under certain circumstances N/A (not applicable): This vaccine is not included in the childhood immunisation schedule and is not administered at the population level; herd immunity is not the objective.
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