EUROPOLITY, vol. 9, no. 2, 2015
4 Continuity and Change in European Governance
EUROPOLITY, vol. 9, no. 2, 2015
4 Continuity and Change in European Governance
EUROPOLITY, vol. 9, no. 2, 2015
THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
THE NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF POLITICAL STUDIES AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
EUROPOLITY
Continuity and Change in European Governance
Vol. 9, no. 2 (New Series), 2015
Centre for European Studies
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Founding Director: Iordan Bărbulescu Director: George Anglițoiu Editor-in-Chief: Oana – Andreea Ion
Guest editors of the 2015(2) issue: Monica Oproiu, Miruna Troncotă
Executive editors: Mihai Cercel, Radu Ungureanu Book review editor: Radu Cucută
Section editors: • European Studies: Ioana Dodi • Evaluation: Ioana Melenciuc, Monica Chiffa • International Relations: Ana-Maria Costea, Mihaela Pădureanu
Editorial Board: Clayton Daniel Allen (Bush School of Government and Andreea Iancu (Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Iasi) Public Service, Texas A&M University) Robert Tyler Jones (Bush School of Government and Public Mihail Caradaică (National University of Political Studies Service, Texas A&M University) and Public Administration, Bucharest) Juan Andrés Ligero Lasa (Charles III University of Madrid) Răzvan Călin (National University of Political Studies and Gabriel Micu (National University of Political Studies and Public Administration, Bucharest) Public Administration, Bucharest) Cristina Dogot (University of Oradea) Gabriela Mihailovici (National Bank of Romania) Radu Dudău (University of Bucharest) Mihai Bogdan Popescu (National University of Political Dacian Duna (Babeș-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca) Studies and Public Administration, Bucharest) Iulian Fota („Mihai Viteazul” National Intelligence Adrian Popoviciu (University of Oradea) Academy) Constantin Țoca (University of Oradea)
Editorial Staff: Graphic designer: Alexandra Prelipceanu
Scientific Board: Nader Ahmadi (University of Gävle) Ioan Mircea Pașcu (European Parliament, Enrique Banus (International University of Catalonia, Brussels/Strasbourg) Barcelona) Nicolae Păun (Babeș-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca) Cezar Birzea (National University of Political Studies and Beatriz Peluffo (Central University of Chile, Santiago de Public Administration, Bucharest) Chile) Mircea Brie (University of Oradea) George Poede (Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Iaşi) Daniel J. Caron (École nationale d’administration publique, Joaquin Roy (University of Miami) Quebec) Andrzej Rychard (Institute of Philosophy and Sociology - Hector Casanueva Ojeda (Latin American Centre for Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw) Relations with Europe, Santiago de Chile) Jonathan Scheele (St. Anthony’s College, Oxford Daniel Dăianu (Romanian Academy) University) Cristina Dallara (University of Bologna) Vasile Secăreș (Romanian Banking Institute) Kozma Gabor (University of Debrecen) Stefan Sjöberg (University of Gävle) Ioan Horga (University of Oradea) George Voicu (National University of Political Studies and Adrian Ivan (Babeș-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca) Public Administration, Bucharest) Philippe Le Guen (Director - Association and Home of J. Peter Volten (University of Groningen) Monnet, Paris) Laurence Whitehead (Nuffield College, Oxford Ioannis Lianos (University College London) University) Francisco Aldecoa Luzzaraga (Complutense University of Madrid) Józef Niżnik (Institute of Philosophy and Sociology - Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw)
EUROPOLITY - Continuity and Change in European Governance is edited by the Department of International Relations and European Integration (DRIIE) – National University of Political Studies and Public Administration (SNSPA), through the Centre for European Studies Address: 30A Expoziției Bvd., Sector 1, Bucharest, Romania E-mail: [email protected]. Web: www.europolity.eu
EUROPOLITY - Continuity and Change in European Governance is published by C.H. Beck (Romania) Publishing House Address: 2 Nuțu Ion Str., Sector 5, Bucharest, Romania Phone: 00 40 21.410.08.47. Fax: 00 40 21.410.08.48 E-mail: [email protected]. Web: www.beck.ro
Copyright © 2015 C.H. Beck (Romania) Publishing House; Centre for European Studies – DRIIE, SNSPA All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, without prior written permission of the publisher or the editor.
ISSN (print) 2344-2247; ISSN (online) 2344-2255; ISSN-L 2344-2247
The Journal is indexed in CEEOL, DOAJ, EBSCO, HeinOnline, RePEc, SSRN, and Ulrichsweb.
*** The views expressed in the articles, reviews and other contributions which appear in the journal are the responsibility of the individual authors and do not reflect the views of either the publisher or the editor.
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CONTENTS
SPECIAL SECTION – THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE WESTERN BALKANS
FOREWORD Monica OPROIU and Miruna TRONCOTĂ 7
THE EU APPROACH TO THE WESTERN BALKANS: A SECURITY OR POLITICAL ISSUE? Ruth FERERRO-TURRIÓN 11
MEDIA FREEDOM - A CHALLENGE IN KOSOVO’S EUROPEAN INTEGRATION PROCESS Afrim HOTI and Dren GËRGURI 29
THE ROMANIAN CONSTITUTIONAL DISCOURSE BETWEEN MODERNIZATION AND EUROPENIZATION Dragoș IONIȚĂ 47
CHANGING FROM WITHIN? THE INTRA-ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS OF EU ENLARGEMENT Velibor JAKOVLESKI 83
THE WESTERN BALKANS BETWEEN INTERNAL TRANSITIONS AND THE EU INTEGRATION PROCESS Elira LULI 111
THE IMPACT OF EU CONDITIONALITY IN THE WESTERN BALKANS. A COMPARATIVE APPROACH: BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA – BULGARIA Octavia MOISE 127
CURRENT CHALLENGES FOR EU COHERENCE IN PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW IN KOSOVO Monica OPROIU 147
BOOK REVIEW - Gabriela Horoşanu. 2014. NATO-EU: A Smarter Collaboration, Bucharest, Tritonic Publishing House, 194 pages, ISBN: 978-606-8571-41-6. Monica OPROIU 179
BOOK REVIEW - Dan D. Lazea. 2014. Suveranitatea statelor si integrarea europeana a Balcanilor: cazul Serbiei (The Sovereignty of States and the European Integration of the Balkans: The case of Serbia), Timișoara, Western University Publishing House, 257 pages, ISBN: 978-973-125-440-1. Oana C. POPA 185
BOOK REVIEW - Miruna Troncotă. 2014. Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Critical Case Study of Europeanization, Bucharest, Tritonic Publishing House, 327 pages, ISBN: 978-606-8571-36-2. Radu Sebastian UNGUREANU 189
*
GENERAL SECTION
BENEFICIARIES OF THE SECOND ORDER ELECTION MODEL: RADICAL RIGHT PARTIES IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT Luiza – Maria FILIMON 193
MORE EXPECTATIONS TOWARDS THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY: THE CASE OF UKRAINE Mihaela – Adriana PĂDUREANU 225
MIGRATION, A CURRENT ISSUE: THE CRISIS OF TODAY, THE CHALLENGE OF TOMORROW Radu PĂTRAȘCU 241
CLAUSEWITZ VERSUS WOLFOWITZ. IRRECONCILABLE PARADIGMS Fernando PONZ CANTÓ 265
BOOK REVIEW - The Romanian Journal of European Affairs, Vol. 15, No.3, September 2015, 95 pages. ISSN print: 1582-8271, ISSN online: 1841-4273 Dacian DUNA 281
Call for papers – Vol. 10, no. 1, 2016 291
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SPECIAL SECTION: THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE WESTERN BALKANS
FOREWORD
Monica OPROIU, Guest Editor [email protected] Miruna TRONCOTӐ, Guest Editor [email protected]
National University of Political Studies and Public Administration Bucharest/Romania
The first part of this volume contains a selection of the academic contributions presented at the international conference “The European Union and the Western Balkans – Between Lessons Learned and Innovative Ways Forward”, organised on 17 June 2015 at the National University of Political Studies and Public Administration in Bucharest by the Department of International Relations and European Integration (DRIIE). The event was an opportunity to bring together young researchers from Romania, the Western Balkans and EU member states in order to explore the main achievements, failures and limitations of the last two decades of EU foreign, security and enlargement policy in the Western Balkans (1995-2015). Its aim was to highlight to what extent the European Union has succeeded or failed in each country of the region, and why there are differences among the region, thus encouraging a comparative perspective. The presentations touched a very diverse set of topics such as: EU enlargement in the Western Balkan – between a “freeze” of the process and a continuation by other means, rule of law assistance in the Western Balkans and the rise of the “new approach to enlargement”, comparative studies on the impact of conditionality on domestic political outcomes and the current political and security issues in the Western Balkans. The conference concept had two departing points: on the one hand, the perceived “freeze” in the enlargement process following the appointment of the new Juncker Commission in 2014 and on the other hand the potential impact of the latest events in Ukraine on the Western Balkans region. When Jean-Claude Juncker was elected President of the European Commission in 2014 with the self-assumed mission to create “A new start for
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Europe”, he announced that no new members would join the European Union in the following five years, but that enlargement negotiations would continue, because there were countries which needed a credible European perspective, especially in the Western Balkans. While this approach initially sparked fears that the European Union might start to “neglect” the region, there are signs of an on-going commitment to the integration of the Western Balkans, albeit at a much slower pace. The continuation of the EU-mediated dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo and the green light given by the Council for the entry into force of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Bosnia and Herzegovina are two cases in point. But political turmoil, stagnation and lack of progress in fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria in the Western Balkan countries, as well as specific difficulties in some cases, require alternative solutions to the established path of the EU enlargement process. On the other hand, the annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and the ensuing crisis in Ukraine brought the temptation to use comparisons with the Western Balkans for the management of international crises. From the “Kosovo precedent” invoked in support of the secessionist referendum in Crimea to the warnings regarding a potential “Bosnization of Ukraine” through internationally-mediated cease-fires, journalists, analysts and politicians alike used references to the Western Balkans to state their case. Although a look at past successes, failures and unintended consequences in the Western Balkans could be useful for designing better responses to secessionist claims and armed conflict in Europe, careful attention has to be devoted to the study of each case’s particularities in order to avoid the politicization of such comparisons. In the same context, some political discourses of current European leaders pointed to a sense of urgency in addressing Russia’s increasing meddling in the Western Balkans, thus raising questions about the European Union’s “monopoly” on the future development directions of the countries in the region. Hence, the conference was also meant to assess to what degree the EU still represents the main reference point in the region. Lastly, a distinct aim was to reflect on Romania's position towards the Western Balkans, and on the types of support that it can provide in both diplomatic and academic terms. Romania’s mandate of the SEECP presidency in 2014 was deemed as successful and helped reach important breakthroughs in regional cooperation. The papers in this volume address some of the main dimensions (political, social, security, sovereignty or diplomacy-related) of the European integration process of the Western Balkans, by focusing on country (or
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comparative) case-studies (papers of A. Hoti and D. Gërguri; D. Ioniță; and O. Moise) or by looking at the region as a whole (papers of R. Ferrero-Turion; and E. Luli). Moreover, some papers analyse intra-EU transformations and internal challenges triggered by an evolving enlargement process (papers of V. Jakovleski; and M. Oproiu). The book reviews in this volume focus on three innovative approaches in analysing the EU’s (and other international organisations') role in stabilising the region as a whole, or in individual case studies (Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo). The reviews highlight the theoretical and empirical contributions provided by the three young Romanian social scientists – Dr. Gabriela Horoşanu, Dr. Dan Lazea and Dr. Miruna Troncotӑ by placing their books in the overall European debate on the topic. To sum up, it is interesting to note that the general perspectives on the region’s future are not marked by pessimism and grim predictions anymore, but rather by pragmatic analyses highlighting both the advancement and drawbacks in this process. An important lesson learned from these academic contributions on the European integration of the Western Balkans is that political contexts may influence EU accession, but each country has its own ways of “learning by doing” in order to fulfil the required standards. And even if the process became more complicated throughout the years (through the Commission’s strengthening of conditionality benchmarks), the countries in the region – including those confronted with limited or contested statehood - found ways to continue the reforms as EU accession remains their most important incentive for democratic consolidation, economic development and regional cooperation. The online version of this volume is supported by the National Authority for Scientific Research and Innovation (ANCSI) through the 2015 Grants for Technical Scientific Literature, while the first part of the issue is printed with the financial support of the National University of Political Studies and Public Administration (SNSPA) awarded to the research project “Rule of Law Promotion by the European Union in the Western Balkans. Case- study: Kosovo” (2014-2015) managed by Dr. Monica Oproiu within the SNSPA internal grant programme. There are several people we would like to thank for their invaluable support in organising the conference and contribution to the publishing of this volume: Professor Iordan Bӑrbulescu, PhD, Dean of the Department of International Relations and European Integration (DRIIE), Lecturer Oana Andreea Ion, PhD, Editor-in-Chief of Europolity, our DRIIE colleagues Mihaela Aioanei, Ioana Borcan, Ionela Ciolan, Ana-Maria Costea,
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Mihai Ghigiu, and Ioana Melenciuc, as well as the participants in the conference and the reviewers. Ultimately, our hope is to enhance the Romanian expertise on the Western Balkans, including by facilitating contacts between local scholars and their counterparts from the Western Balkan countries. As more and more EU- funded research schemes require transnational/trans-regional partnerships, we would like to capitalise on this opportunity in order to create viable networks and position the National University of Political Studies and Public Administration as a regional hub of academic expertise in the field of European integration of Romania’s neighbours.
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THE EU APPROACH TO THE WESTERN BALKANS: A SECURITY OR POLITICAL ISSUE?
Ruth FERERRO-TURRIÓN Universidad Complutense de Madrid Madrid/Spain [email protected]
Abstract This paper will focus on the policies developed by the European Union towards the Western Balkans, especially those related to human mobility and visa liberalization. The main target of the paper will be to show how the conditionality policies towards these countries have been developed related to security, geopolitical needs and interests, instead of the objective/technical criteria stated in the communitarian official documents. We will see how the last enlargements of the Union have affected considerably the different positions adopted by member states in their approach toward the Balkan countries, especially in relation to chapters 23 and 24 of the negotiation agreements, dealing with issues of Justice and Home Affairs. Since then, the pragmatic approach of the Union has been reinforced, so that the accession of candidates has been delayed in time. However, some things might change, if we take into consideration the current refugee and Ukraine crises, the new relationships that have been developed with Russia (especially by Serbia), and Greece’s approach towards Moscow on the verge of the economic crisis. If the European Union has, until now, followed a stick-and-carrot approach towards the Balkans in order to maintain a security belt on its southeast border, this approach might change within a new geopolitical context. In this paper we will analyse the visa liberalization process and its developments since Thessaloniki 2003, to show how the decisions taken by the Union have been more linked to political matters related to security than to technical reasons related to passport design.
Keywords European Union; Geopolitics; Security; Visa Policy; Western Balkans
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1. INTRODUCTION
In 2015 a strong earthquake shook the values and institutional architecture of the European Union. When everyone was thinking about Greece and the Euro crisis as the main cleavages in Brussels, the refugee crisis appeared. In the words of Chancellor Merkel, this refugee crisis is the most difficult challenge for Europe for the time being. Over the last months we have seen how Member States were not reaching an agreement about which kind of actions should be taken in order to manage the increasing numbers of people arriving on the Old Continent from countries in conflict. This dramatic situation shot dead the Dublin System on Refugee and Asylum and put on the table the need of a proper European Asylum Policy. Also, this crisis provoked a deep questioning of the Schengen Space and the free movement of people, one of the main pillars of the European integration process. It had a domino effect on different states of the Union, like Hungary, Germany, Austria, Croatia, and Slovenia. In addition to this, the refugee crisis challenges the current decision- making process of the EU. Some already raised their voices asking for more integration of immigration and asylum policies over the intergovernmental system as it is now. Besides, it is compulsory to link the above mentioned issues with the Euro crisis and the Greek situation and the debates around who must be part of the Union. The third set of problems that arose in the last months, also linked to refugees, is the absence of a Common European Foreign Policy and the failure of the European Neighbourhood Policy. The crises in Libya, in Syria and in Ukraine are the consequences of a mistaken or even absent strategy of the EU that has also put on the table a hesitant relationship with Russia. In addition, in the middle of this complex situation we find the countries of Western Balkans, the next candidates to join the European Union. These countries have been waiting for their candidature for years and finally, when apparently everything was ready, the messages that they are receiving from Brussels are that there will be more delays. One of the first bad pieces of news for these countries was Junker’s declaration in September 2014 that there will be no further EU enlargement during his mandate as President of the European Commission. After this declaration, when the crisis in Ukraine was freezing Russia’s relationship with the EU, some Western Balkan countries started a rapprochement towards Moscow, as it was the case with Serbia. Uncertainties over their membership, Euro-scepticism, and corruption were
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putting their European perspective on stand-by. Moreover, it was like that until the refugee crisis exploded on their territories. First, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), and later Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia, were the countries in which the refugee flows had a strong impact, whilst Bosnia is still worrying about it. In addition, it was then that the European Union started to realize that the door towards Europe was in the Balkans and that more dialogue and negotiations with these countries were needed in order to find a complete and complex answer to this crisis. Without taking into account the role that the Balkans may play on the borders of Europe, the EU will not be able to find a reasonable solution for the refugee crisis. In this context, it is essential to frame the lines under which the relations between the EU and the Western Balkans have been based in their search for a European perspective. Moreover, that frame was given under the so-called conditionality policies. These policies were based on three main pillars: reconciliation, reconstruction and reform following the Copenhagen criteria. Basically, the external incentives model (Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier 2004, 663) has been used, which states that the EU establishes the conditions that aspiring candidates should meet in order to become members of the Union as their reward. One of the main features of this model is the necessity of material incentives from the EU in order to be effective, and especially significant are the advances achieved in the early phases of the accession process. In our case, as time goes by that effectiveness is losing track of the improvements by candidates. In addition to this, it is necessary to analyse the consequences of the reforms implemented by the governments in order not to lose the European track, sometimes with unexpected results (Glüpker 2013, 238). The question that arises at this point is whether the EU is using its conditionality policies towards the Western Balkans following security and geopolitical needs, or on the contrary, that the criteria are objective and technical. Or in other words, was the enlargement towards Central and Eastern Europe technical or political? And after these two last enlargements, is the EU ready to welcome the Western Balkans? If we consider the different positions of Member States (EPC 2015) we will realize that a vast majority of them are not particularly interested in a new enlargement, especially after seeing the situation in Greece, which is also a Balkan country. Under these circumstances, the EU has been trying to build and maintain a security belt on its Southeastern border according to a stick-and-
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carrot strategy, which in practical terms has meant the implementation of contradictory policies in the region. We will approach this issue from an institutionalist perspective, which will take into account the evolution of European policies towards the region in general since 2003. We will also try to explain why the delays and different approaches to several problems have been sorted out in a different, and sometimes contradictory, way. In order to do that, we will focus on a particular policy implemented between 2003 and 2011, that is, the visa liberalization process. By going through this policy we will be able to see how the decisions taken by the Union have been more linked to political matters related to security (internal and external, in different dimensions) than to technical reasons related to passport design, such as the inclusion of biometrical parameters. Practically, all the decisions taken on the Western Balkans in this particular policy had more to do with the institutional, political and economic crisis around and inside the EU than with the real situation in these countries.
2. THE ROAD TO EUROPE: FROM THE STABILITY PACT TO VISA LIBERALIZATION
The EU has stated several times that one of its main commitments towards the Balkan region was the creation of a peace and stability area, the integration of those countries into its economic and political structures being one of its main goals. The Stabilization and Association Process is the main EU instrument that affects Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia and FYROM. This process is individually adapted to the needs of each country and includes economic and financial assistance, cooperation, political dialogue, the construction of a free trade area, the integration of the acquis into national legislation, and practices and cooperation in Home and Justice Affairs policies. Thus, this process gives a long term perspective for integration into the EU, but under one condition: the candidate countries must show that they have the required economic and political conditions and must prove that they can develop regional trade and cooperation among each other. The Union has given those five countries important financial and technical assistance, framed first as the CARDS program, and later with the so-
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called Instrument of Pre-accession assistance (IPA). In the period 1991-1999 more than 4.5€ billion were distributed. Between 2000 and 2006 those funds increased substantively. The European Union considered that its own regional integration example would be a good model for the Western Balkans as it was stated in the Köln Declaration in June 1999, where European leaders adopted the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe. Following this philosophy, the IPA funds did not stop increasing over each of the seven years periods. Between 2007-2013 those funds increased up to 11.5 € billion and they were expected to reach 11.7€ billion for the period 2014-2020. Thus, the EU seeks to promote neighbourhood cooperation, both bilateral and multilateral, as it was the case for Eastern and Central European countries before signing treaties of good neighbourly relations with each other. This way it would be possible to recover the links that once existed in the region, to give an impetus for good neighbourly relations and boost economic and social relations with the EU. All these actions were intended to have only one target, as it was mentioned by some officials from the European Commission1, the prompt incorporation into the European institutions, at least apparently. As a matter of fact, it seems that some of these countries have accomplished the requirement demanded by the EU, whilst the EU is still delaying the enlargement process.
2.1. The Stability Pact and the Stabilization and Association Process
Since 1999 the EU has approached the Balkan region through the Stability Pact and the Stabilization and Association Process. The first one offers the general framework for the whole region, while the second one entails the bilateral instruments with each country. The Stability Pact (SP) started in 1999 as part of European Common Foreign and Security Policy under the aegis of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). It was a declaration of intentions signed by more than forty states in which they committed to help these countries in “their efforts to fulfil democracy, peace, respect for Human Rights and economic prosperity in order to reach stability in the region” (Köln, June 10,
1 Interview with Maurice Guyader and Clive Humboldt. Brussels, December 2005. Seminar “War and Peace in the 21st Century, Rethinking Europe: Crisis as Opportunity”, Fundació CIDOB, Barcelona, January 2006.
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1999). However, besides the strategy of “regional rapprochement”, in every case the integration process was guaranteed. Therefore, the pact complements the Stabilization and Association Process due to the fact that it links all affected actors and helps develop new regional ways of cooperation, as well as stimulates international financial support. Thus, the SP is focused on regional cooperation initiatives in areas such as business and environment, the fight against corruption and organized crime, suppression of any ethnic discrimination, reform of the security field and media independence. However, behind this goal of looking for peace and democracy, what we are able to find is a security perspective in the approach to the region due to the fact that the stabilization of the Balkans will ultimately mean be the stabilization of Europe (Vucetic 2001, 116). The SP classifies the areas to develop in the region under three chapters: Democracy, Economy and Security. Migration is located under “Security” with the title of the Regional Initiative in Migration, Asylum and Refugees (MARRI). The starting point of this initiative is the instability that irregular migration flows and displaced people from the wars provoke in the region. It establishes six priorities in this area: 1. Asylum: The Pact supports the development and harmonization of legislation, as well as other procedures and reception of applications in order to reach European standards. For this matter, regional cooperation is essential, especially the information and formation exchange. 2. Migration Flows: Migration flows to and from the Western Balkans are increasingly complex and multi-directional, so there are different migratory dimensions: humanitarian, economic, social and labour. In this case the SP supports the development of regional partnerships to help better manage these flows. 3. Readmission: Signing of agreements with countries of origin and transit of migrants. 4. Integrated Border Management: An integrated border management is the key to combating irregular migration, human trafficking, drug trafficking and weapons and goods smuggling (Ohrid Process on Border Security Management). 5. Movement of persons: According to the Thessaloniki Agenda, the SP seeks the liberalization of visas for citizens from the Western Balkans. Its main goals are to set up a European standards visa policy and consular cooperation.
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6. Return/settlement of refugees/displaced persons: the SP promotes permanent solutions for people who choose to return to their place of origin, and for those who decide to settle in another Balkan country in order to support anti-discriminatory measures in relation to access to services and the fulfilment of basic human rights. As mentioned above, the SP is implemented bilaterally between the EU and each country. Unlike other negotiation processes, in this case it is the EU who unilaterally decides when each country is ready to begin the accession process. To reach this point there is a path in stages. The first is the study of the feasibility of a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA), and later the signing of that agreement. The SAAs are adapted individually to the needs of each of the affected countries (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro and FYROM) and include economic and financial assistance, cooperation, political dialogue, achieving a free trade area, approximation to EU legislation and practices and cooperation in areas such as justice and home affairs. Although the SP was launched in 1999, it was not until the Council of Feira (2000) that the first EU statement was made in order to incorporate in their institutions the Western Balkans. However, the principle of conditionality is maintained at all times, and the "potential" of enlargement, since it is understood that these countries will join the Union at some point. However, the Thessaloniki European Council was where the guarantee was more explicitly shown by the EU. A document entitled "The Thessaloniki Agenda for the Western Balkans: towards European integration" (2003) emerged from this European Council. Since then, the European Commission carried on working in that direction and the result was the document entitled “Enlargement strategy and main challenges 2006-2007” published on November 8, 2006. This report continued giving these countries evasive unmarked concrete accession dates. Thus, it is in this document that made the announcement of the beginning of negotiations on visa liberalization with Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, FYROM, Montenegro and Serbia (Ferrero- Turrión 2009) was made. The discussions on this new step forward opened up an intense debate within the EU in 2006. The Vice President of the Commission, Franco Frattini, and Enlargement Commissioner, Olli Rehn, declared that "this step reflects the commitment of the EU to promote contacts between people of the Balkans and the EU", adding that this was the tangible proof of what a "European perspective can offer". However, the Commission report showed very clearly
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that the EU had made a clear line on future enlargements. So the way forward was marked at the Summit of Salzburg of 11 March 2006, in which the Commission document "The Western Balkans on the road to the EU" (COM (2006) 27 final), which already hinted that there would be a delay in the pre- accession process of Western Balkans, was discussed. Then, the European policies for the region were more focused on equitable and sustainable economic development (Ferrero-Turrión 2009). The proposal of the European institutions, therefore, was to apply more stringent criteria than in the past enlargements to improve the "quality of the accession process", so that the effects would be more effective, as we mentioned above. These strong criteria were included in the early stages of the negotiations in issues such as judicial reform and the fight against corruption. However, it seems that what really lies behind these documents, which are full of ambiguities, is the lack of political commitment to enlargement. A "lack of commitment" existed because of the absence of consensus among the EU Member States in relation to the objectives and priorities for the Balkans (Ferrero-Turrión 2009). "Enlargement fatigue" (O´Brennan 2013, 37-38) provoked by the identity crisis of the Union and the controversy over the candidacy of Turkey, also ensured that the Western Balkans received less attention and priority than before. Both factors could lead to a "political paralysis" of the region if the Union were to decide to postpone indefinitely the enlargement process.
2.2. The Wall of Schengen: visas for the Balkans
Once we know the strategies followed by the EU over the time towards the Western Balkans, we must know where we stand at this time. One of the first steps for any potential candidate to enter the EU was to achieve the visa liberalization. It is the tool used by the EU as a threat and as an incentive to push for reforms in these countries to approximate the standards of justice and home affairs marked by the Union. One of the issues we have to consider is that the entire Balkan region is perceived by the EU as a threat to its soft security. The perception is headed by irregular immigration (an estimated 100,000 people fall unevenly across the region, with 15% of these in the area itself followed by drug trafficking, with two thirds of the heroin entering the EU doing so through the Balkans). In addition, we have to remember here how the refugee crisis is drawing attention of European leaders towards the Balkan region, since the first route
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of access of refugees and asylum seekers are these countries, which are still candidates to the EU. Thus, when in 1995 the Western Balkans were included on the "black list" of visas established by the Council (a list with 101 countries), under the Treaty of Maastricht, one of the main issues incorporated in the political agenda of the candidates was visa liberalization. For its part, the EU has always put forward as a condition for such liberalization a direct link with the cooperation of these countries in terms of security, specifically in Justice and Home Affairs issues, in areas such as immigration and organized crime (International Crisis Group 2005). As we have seen, the EU is the one who evaluates the progress made by each country, so that the primary responsibility for progress on these issues has fallen on the countries themselves. The first steps taken by the EU to reach out to these countries were in 2006, in order to sign readmission agreements for irregular immigrants crossing through their territory to enter the Schengen area. The desire expressed by Frattini and Rehn on the promotion of contacts between the people of the Balkans and the EU was relegated to the background. The group of five Balkan countries (Albania, Serbia, Montenegro, FYROM, Bosnia) not only has encountered difficulties in implementing the technical issues required by Brussels through roadmaps, but has also had to face a hostile political climate towards its request of flexible requirements for visa liberalization by some Member States. Some of them were dissatisfied with how the same process had worked with Romania and Bulgaria, as many citizens of these countries breached the period of stay on Schengen territory and fell into irregularity with all the consequent complications. Among the most reluctant countries for the relaxation of the conditions were, and still are: Germany, Belgium, Austria, Italy, Holland and Spain (EPC 2015). However, the EU still needs to increase cooperation and the implementation of rule of law and strong institutions in the Western Balkans (surrounded by Member States) due to an evident security issue, specifically linked with accession chapters 23-24.
2.2.1. Reports of visas for Western Balkans
Having decided on the opening of a dialogue on visas with Albania, Bosnia, FYROM, Montenegro and Serbia in 2008, the European Commission established a list of fifty requirements that should be met by these countries.
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These requirements were exposed as the so-called "reports visas" (visa roadmaps). The first country that received its roadmap was Serbia (May 2008), coinciding with the process of Kosovo's independence. The last one was Bosnia (July 2008). These documents are virtually identical but take into account the specific situation of each country in terms of legislation and practice. They exposed conditions ranging from purely technical matters to implementing readable passports through infrared machines with a gradual incorporation of biometric information (including fingerprints) to the adoption and implementation of international laws and agreements, and more generic issues like the fight against organized crime, corruption and irregular immigration. Almost all of the requirements set forth in these documents are part of the acquis in the area of Justice and Home Affairs of the EU, although other conditions including respect for human rights, visa facilitation and readmission agreements were also there. Visa reports were divided into two distinct parts: the requirements related to facilitation and readmission agreements, and those related to document security, irregular immigration, public order and security and external relations (Council Regulation 539/2001, paragraph 5, also the annexes containing the white and black lists of Schengen).
2.2.2. The visa facilitation agreements
The visa facilitation agreements with Albania, Bosnia and Herzergovina, FYROM, Montenegro and Serbia, after months of tough negotiations between November 2006 and May 2007, began operating in January 2008. The main objective of these agreements was to facilitate issuing visas for certain categories of very specific people (students, scientists, members of NGOs, businessmen and journalists), but of course, the free movement was still far away. In some cases, the visa was issued within a period of ten days, the number of documents to be presented was reduced, the option of accessing a multiple entry visa was given and the rates were reduced to 35€ (previously they were 60€). However, there are many types of Schengen visa, the most common is short-term and only grants one entry. This visa is valid up to three months and does not allow any access to the labour market. Although the EU outlined a series of conditions that must be met to qualify for a visa, other requirements are at the discretion of the country of entry and the personal circumstances of the applicant who must justify the
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reasons for the trip. Before the visa was issued several documents were requested, presenting an invitation letter and showing that you were financially solvent and had medical insurance of no less than 30,000€. In short, it was obvious that visa facilitation agreements did not give a positive and fast solution for candidate countries. This conclusion is the same as the one reached by an empirical study on the subject conducted by the European Citizens Action Service in cooperation with some NGOs in the area. The study concluded that "there is a huge gap between the declaration of the European Council of 20 June 2008 on promoting people-to-people contacts between the Western Balkans and the EU, and what is happening on the ground. They could not find any positive response to visa facilitation in the region; people did not perceive the difference to the situation" (European Citizens Action Service 2008). Some Member States were familiar with this situation in 2008 trying to change the visa facilitation regime with one of liberalization. Slovenia, during its presidency of the EU, put the Balkans as a priority on the political agenda of the EU. Paradoxically, it entered in conflict over the secession of Kosovo in February 2008, which was used as a negotiation weapon. In late January 2008 Commissioner Frattini announced the opening of dialogue with Serbia on visas and with the other Balkan states. In June the same year, visa liberalization for Serbia was negotiated. In addition, in September 2008 Commissioner Barrot assured that free movement would be achieved with FYROM in 2009. Thus, in November 2008 the Commission sent its reports on the progress made by these countries. Some of the requirements were defined very clearly and technically, as those related to document security or the need to use machines to read the biometric travel documents, but others were more ambiguous and difficult to prove, such as those relating to public order and security issues, including the criteria for the fight against organized crime. According to these reports developed by the Commission, the two countries that were closest to reaching the EU criteria were FYROM and Serbia. The ambiguity of these criteria together with the need of an evaluation by Member States allowed the EU to extend the whole liberalization process until a unanimous political decision was taken.
2.2.3. Visa liberalization
The political decision on visa liberalization was taken on July 2009 based on the European Commission's proposal to grant visa free travel for
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citizens of the Western Balkans. The formal presentation of it was made by Jacques Barrot and Olli Rehn. According to this report, it would enable the citizens of Montenegro, Serbia and FYROM to travel freely to the Schengen countries with the new biometric passports. This Commission proposal needed to be approved by the Council after consultation with the European Parliament. The Council of Ministers of Justice and Home Affairs met and adopted this decision November 30-December 1, 2009. The liberalization was launched January 1, 2010. At that time, FYROM passed to the "white list" of Schengen immediately, while in the case of Serbia and Montenegro they had to fulfil some conditions requested by the Commission. These included issues such as the drafting of new laws on immigration, organized crime and corruption that work effectively, but also the necessary vigilance on the border with Kosovo in cooperation with EULEX and the Kosovo police structure. The Commission further considered in July 2009 that both the Serbian and Montenegrin authorities would be able to meet these conditions without major difficulties in October 2009, when a delegation of experts from the European Commission went to Belgrade and Podgorica to identify the progress achieved. The situation in Serbia depended primarily on issues related to Kosovo. Serbia needed to improve surveillance at the borders, including in particular the exchange of police information with EULEX / Kosovo, something complicated if one considers the lack of recognition of the country, despite the judgment of the International Court of Justice in July 2010. However, a main condition to pursue the European perspective is the integrity and security of the procedures for issuing biometric passports to Kosovo residents in coordination among authorities in both Pristina and Belgrade. The Commission also promised visa liberalization for citizens of Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina as long as they met the conditions set out in the proposal. Finally, they both got visa-liberalization in mid-2010. The European Commission recommended that the citizens of these two countries should be able to travel with biometric passports (including fingerprinting and picture) to a total of 28 states already in the Schengen area, or aspiring to join it. During the autumn of 2009 a controversy with Bosnia and Albania emerged, as some felt that their exclusion from liberalization was based on religious grounds. Therefore, the Commission acted fast and with this new movement intended to silence these voices. In addition, we must remember at
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this point that 2010 was an election year in Bosnia. At that time some still believed that the constitutional reform would be done soon. However, this Commission proposal brought to the surface some misgivings of some partners who believed that immigration was a very serious problem and those countries should face some integration issues related with ethnic minorities, as there had been demanded in recent times as a result of settlements of Roma in some countries in the EU. The arguments in favour of this process of visa liberalization were, on the other hand, quite obvious. On the one hand, it had shown that the visa system was inefficient when it came to controlling trans- boundary movements in the region, even if the introduction of biometric passports would ensure greater control of travellers from these countries with the immediate reduction of asylum applications. Other indisputable benefits of the liberalization process, in the Bosnian case, were the obligation of all political forces to work together to achieve the objectives set by the EU, which can facilitate the process of institutional reconstruction in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The case of Kosovo remained very particular. First, it has been acting as a de facto independent state for eight years, with an administrative situation like that of an EU protectorate (Sammary 2006). Second, and very important, it is the fact that Kosovo is not recognized by all EU Member States. Thus, Kosovo has been excluded from the liberalization of visas at two levels. On one side, they are outside of liberalization because the Commission for "security reasons related particularly to potential irregular migration coming from Kosovo, will only accept passports that had been issued under the supervision of the Serbian Interior Ministry and fulfil the conditions stated such as biometric passports”. So, Kosovo (under UN resolution 1244/1999) was added to the European blacklist of visas in the special category of "entities and territorial authorities that are not recognized as states by at least one Member State" (Council Resolution 539/2001), at the same level as Taiwan or Palestine. Kosovo will have to walk the same path as its Balkan neighbours did with negotiation, facilitation and liberalization. However, it is paradoxical that even though most of the EU Members have recognized Kosovo as a new state, the international standard that still has priority is UN Resolution 1244.
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3. CONCLUSIONS
It seems that the EU is committed to visa liberalization in the Western Balkans, which would open new business opportunities for the people of the region. But the EU always makes it clear that the option of freedom of movement within the Schengen area is only possible when safety conditions stipulated by European institutions are met. Furthermore, it is essential to consider so-called "enlargement fatigue", a term coined years ago, but which is now proving to be more relevant than ever due to the severe economic and political crisis being experienced by the EU. This enlargement fatigue risks becoming "political paralysis" in this region if it postpones sine die the enlargement process. Although "enlargement fatigue" is growing in many Member States and the debate on the absorption capacity of the Union is increasing, we must bear in mind that when the governments of EU new members are admitted they are convinced that the prospect of joining "the club" is central to the Western Balkans for the total stabilization of the region and to give incentives to the democratization and transformation throughout the region. To accomplish their objectives, so far these small states had to get visa facilitation and liberalization, as the first step towards joining the EU. Paradoxically, a weak political will and European public opinion against new enlargement may improve regional cooperation in order to get in a better position when negotiating with Brussels, a situation unthinkable 20 years ago. For the first time since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Balkan cooperation policy is attaining its goals, although not without its difficulties. It is necessary, therefore, that the EU speeds up the integration of these countries; if not, it may lead to the consolidation of what might be called the "Balkan ghetto" in which the continuing delays lead to withdrawal, national or religious hatred that breeds extremist intolerance at the heart of Europe, or even losing soft power in the region in favour of some other global actors, such as Russia. The visa road maps have been a clear example of how the conditionality principle has not been used correctly in these countries. Conditionality requires not only a clear and adequate reward, i.e. meeting objectives, but also the reward should be granted once the conditions have been met. In this case, the last part has not been accomplished. In this respect, the EU needs to strengthen its credibility, which has been damaged in the region. It is needed to create fertile ground for wider
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reforms and to promote more cross-border cooperation between competent institutions to combat common threats. A strong signal is important for countries like FYROM or Serbia where support for Europe can decrease in the current situation in which Euro-scepticism is increasing. If the EU wants to maintain its leadership in the region, it should act faster, as soon as the goals, one by one, are met. The EU has raised the conditionality in the Western Balkans, but must work on actions and attitudes that give credibility and that will allow it to continue exercising its "soft power" in the region in a win-win situation; it will only occur through cooperative-type policies and not through the imposition of a new liberal imperialism in the region. So, while it allowed the free (short- term) movement of people for the Western Balkans, there is still a long, hard road to fully join the European institutions. Arguably that will be delayed due to the global economic crisis and search for identity by the EU. Finally, the EU is now at a very crucial point of in its history. The refugee crisis has combined all crises in one: institutional, political, and economic. Now it is time to take decisions, ones that are also relevant to the Western Balkans.
REFERENCES
Barbé, E. and E. Johansson-Nogués (Eds.). 2003. Beyond enlargement. Bellaterra: Institut Universitari d´Estudis Europeus. Bogdani, M. and J. Loughlin. 2004. Albania and the European Union. Tirana: Daijti 2000. Bumci, A. 2004. Debating National Security. The Case of Albania. Albanian Institute for International Studies. Tirana. Burns, N. 2005. Hearing on Kosovo: A Way Forward? Comments submitted in the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, November 5. Carollo, V. 2008. Las perspectivas de la Unión Europea en materia de inmigración, seguridad y desarrollo según un enfoque integrado: la política europea de vecindad y la asociación euromediterránea. ReDCE nº10, July-December, 333-343. Crawley, V. 2005. Montenegro Referendum Will Set Tone for Relations with US, Europe. International Information Programs. [http://www.Usinfo.State.Gov] February 2006. Crawley, V. 2005. Ethnic Albanians, Serbs Must Decide Kosovo`s Future, US Says. International Information Programs. [http://www.Usinfo.State.Gov] November 2005. European Citizens Action Service. 2008. Does it Really Matter? Visa Facilitation in the Western Balkans, http://www.ecas-citizens.eu/content/view/138/146/. European Stability Initiative. 2006. Newsletter, February-March. Ferrero-Turrión, R. 2009. La política europea de visados para los Balcanes occidentales. ARI 51/2009 - 31/03/2009. Real Instituto Elcano. http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/web/rielcano_es/contenido?WCM_GLOBA L_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_es/zonas_es/demografia+y+poblacion/ari51-2009
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Glüpker, G. 2013. Effectiveness of EU Conditionality in the Western Balkans: Minority Rights and the Fight against Corruption in Croatia and Macedonia, Journal of Contemporary European Research. 9 (2): 223‐241. Guild, E. and S. Carrera. 2009. Towards the Next Phase of the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: The European Commission’s Proposals for the Stockholm Programme. CEPS Policy Brief nº 196. 20 August. http://shop.ceps.eu/BookDetail.php?item_id=1899. Houtum, H. and R. Pijpers. 2007. The European Union as a Gated Community: The Two-faced Border and Immigration Regime of the EU, Antipode 39 (2): 291-309. International Crisis Group. 2005. EU Visas and the Western Balkans, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l=4. O´Brennan, J. 2013. Enlargement Fatigue and its Impact on the Enlargement process towards the Balkans, in The Crisis of EU Enlargement, IDEAS Reports-London School of Economics, November, pp. 36-44. O´Brennan, J. 2014. ‘On the Slow Train to Nowhere?’ The European Union, ‘Enlargement Fatigue’ and the Western Balkans, European Foreign Affairs Review, 19 (2): 221–241. Samary, C. 2006. De la Federación Yugoslava a los protectorados europeos. Le Monde Diplomatique Spanish Edition. January, nº 123. Schimmelfenning, F. and U. Sedelmeier. 2004. Governance by conditionality: EU rule transfer to the candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Journal of European Public Policy 11 (4): 661-679. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. 2008. Crime and its Impact on the Balkans and Affected Countries, March, https://www.unodc.org/documents/Balkan_study.pdf. Vucetic, S. 2001. The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe as a Security Community- Building Institution, Southeast European Politics II (2):109-134. VVAA. 2005. A joint European Vision: free Movement for Goods and People in Kosovo and Serbia, Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs II: 43-51.
Primary Sources Communication from the Commission. Study on the links among illegal and legal migration. COM (2004) 412 final. Communication from the Commission. The Hague Program: ten priorities for the next five years. COM (2005) 184 final. Communication from the Commission. The Western Balkans on the Road to the EU. Brussels’ 27-01-2006. COM (2006) 27 final. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. Thematic programme for the cooperation with third countries in the areas of migration and asylum. Brussels, 25.1.2006, COM (2006) 26 final. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – A common immigration policy for Europe: Principles, actions and tools COM (2008) 359/4. Comunicación de la Comisión sobre. Prioridades de actuación frente a los retos de la inmigración. COM (2005) 621 final. Conclusions from the Presidency. European Council. Brussels, December 17th 2005 (15914/05). Conclusions from the Presidency. European Council. Brussels, November 4 and 5 2004 (1492/1/04 REV1). European Pact on Immigration and Asylum, European Council, September 24th 2008.
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Legal Aspects of Referendum in Montenegro in the Context of International Law and Practice. Key note speeches from the international expert roundtable, held in Podgorica, September 22- 25, 2005. Presidency Conclusions European Union, 19-20/VI/2008, Annex: Declaration on the Western Balkans. Proposal for a Council Decision from the Commission on the establishment of a mutual information procedure concerning Member States’ measures in the areas of asylum and immigration COM (2005) 480 final. Proposal for a Council Directive COM (2000) 303 final, 2000/0127 (CNS) of 24.05.2000 on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof. Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. Fifth report on the Post-Visa Liberalisation Monitoring for the Western Balkans Countries in accordance with the Commission Statement of 8 November 2010. Brussels, 25.2.2015 COM (2015) final.
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MEDIA FREEDOM - A CHALLENGE IN KOSOVO’S EUROPEAN INTEGRATION PROCESS
Afrim HOTI University “Hasan Prishtina” Pristina/Kosovo [email protected]
Dren GËRGURI University “Hasan Prishtina” Pristina/Kosovo [email protected]
Abstract Kosovo, like all EU members as well as those aspiring to join the EU, is fighting on different “fronts” aiming to attain EU and international standards. Among these standards, media freedom represents without any doubt one of the most difficult challenges as the country aspires to be democratic and transparent, as well as to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms. Having this in mind, the Kosovo Government is trying to accelerate the integration process by supporting the idea of free and transparent media as a precondition to EU membership. Such an objective has become an obligatory part of many documents deriving from the Kosovo constitution as well as other plans and strategies like the National Strategy for European Integration “Kosovo 2020”. In Kosovo’s integration process, there are several other obstacles, specifically with the opposition of some EU members to recognize the authority of the Republic of Kosovo, but with no doubt, media freedom is among the basic and fundamental ones. Thus, this paper attempts to present and analyse the approaches that the Kosovo institutions are using to improve the process of having a free, transparent and democratic media as an important component of the integration process and EU membership.
Keywords Democratic Media; EU Integration; EU Membership; Free Media; Progress Report; Transparent Media
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1. INTRODUCTION
The “power” of media is very important in the process of European integration for all countries, thus is the same for the Republic of Kosovo. The media are the main source of information for the citizens on a wide range of issues related to this process and beyond it. It plays a major role in informing the public on all aspects of EU integration, which it has to do correctly, fairly, in a balanced way and in a timely manner. Continuous and fair information minimizes bias and ignorance of the general public about the process of integration and prepares it to support the country on its way to EU membership. But in view of providing objective information and completely fulfil its mission, the media should be free. Therefore, today, media freedom is an important challenge for any country that aspires to join the EU, not only because freedom of the press is a fundamental right and one of the values of the European Union, but also because freedom of the media is considered an indicator of a country’s democracy. The media play an important role in the functioning of democracy through providing the right information, creating transparency and making the public “the supervisor” of the work of government and political institutions - namely, by fulfilling the role of journalism as a "watchdog", especially through what is called investigative journalism. These are the values on which the European Union is based, “the universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law” (European Union 2010). Ensuring media freedom is one of the challenges that Kosovo is currently facing. The number of media outlets in Kosovo is growing, while the institutions which must ensure the preservation of media freedom are not lagging behind. Cooperation between the media and state institutions and the strengthening of the justice system are fundamental factors for advancing the EU integration process. The issue of media freedom as a matter of concern for media workers, and not only, plays an important role in the integration process and is one of the basic criteria that Kosovo must meet in order to join the EU. Regarding the current legislation, Kosovo is quite good according to international organizations like IREX, which stipulates that “freedom of expression in Kosovo is firmly guaranteed, from a legal perspective” (IREX MSI Kosovo report 2015, 59), or KAS Media Program South East Europe, which concludes in a report published on its website that “from the strictly legal perspective, the constitution and specific laws adequately safeguard media freedom” (KAS 2015).
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The Kosovo Constitution ensures the protection of the freedom of media (Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo Art. 42) and also guarantees the implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo Art. 22). Therefore, it is crucial to focus on the aspects of improving the situation on the ground, a problem noted also by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), in a report for Freedom of Media and Safety of Journalists in Kosovo where is stated that “despite new legislation being in place, its implementation and enforcement continues to be problematic” (OSCE mission in Kosovo 2014, 11). The media, as an important actor in the process of European integration of Kosovo, occupies an important place in the National Strategy for European Integration "KOSOVO 2020", prepared by the National Council for European Integration. “Constructive cooperation and partnership between the policy makers and media still needs to be developed. Such partnership is crucial as it can lead to better public information and more transparent public policy” (National Council for European Integration 2013, 55). The national strategy identifies key priorities to achieve the main goal of the strategy, the better preparation of Kosovo for European Integration by 2020: Governance effectiveness; Fight against corruption and organised crime; Economic development; Engagement of stakeholders; Advanced (contractual) relations with the European Union (National Council for European Integration 2013, 9).
2. MEDIA LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN KOSOVO 1999 – 2015
The period after the war in Kosovo was characterized by different and difficult processes like democratic transition, negation of status, institution building, the Stabilisation and Association process, etc. Among them is the creation of the proper environment for free media. After 1999 the creation of democratic institutions in the country triggered the need to protect media freedom as an important factor evolving in Kosovo, in the context of developments and issues related to the transition of other post-communist countries in the Western Balkans. Bajomi-Lazar correctly showed that “Media
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scholars looking into the relationship between political and media systems in the former communist countries have often focused on media freedom and pluralism and worked on the assumption that many of the political parties were seeking control over the media in order to suppress critical voices and to earn favourable coverage so that they could influence public opinion and voting behaviour, but have barely explored political actors’ other possible motivations” (Bajomi-Lazar 2015, 59). After the war in Kosovo, two main pre-war mediums, namely Radio Television of Pristina (RTP) and the newspaper "Rilindja" did not obtain the right to continue broadcasting on behalf of two public mediums. Instead, in the second half of 1999 Radio Television of Kosovo (RTK) began broadcasting, originally with only a two-hour program. Meanwhile, since 1999, in addition to Pristina, multiple media have been established in other cities of Kosovo like Prizren, Mitrovica, Peja, Ferizaj, Gjilan, etc. In 1999-2002, the media in Kosovo was under the constant control of the Temporary Media Commissioner (TMC), while the Media Hearing Board had extensive powers. Moreover, the freedom of the media was limited by media regulations themselves. Thus, Regulation no. 2000/37 on Printed Media and Regulation for Licensing and Regulating the Broadcast Media no. 2000/36, which standardised the functioning of the media, were seen as restrictive measures against the media by journalists and editors themselves. Besides these general regulations, the OSCE issued some specific regulations that defined in more detail the scope of media freedom and behaviour, especially during election campaigns. These regulations have not helped in creating a free climate and more favourable environment for the media, and in some cases, they proved the contrary, conflicting with the Code of Rights of Journalists. Under this code, journalists were entitled "to publish or broadcast materials freely, without any mixture of government or other public authorities. Write critically about all those who are in state or public functions” (Dauti 2001, 18). Over the years, in different fields in Kosovo including the media the process of transferring responsibilities from the internationals to the kosovars began. Since 2005, the Independent Media Commission (IMC) has not had any authority to regulate printed media as the Press Council was established, and a year later, it went through a transition from the Temporary Media Commissioner to the Independent Media Commission. On 17 February 2008, Kosovo declared independence while its highest legal act, the Constitution ensured, among others, the protection of the freedom of the media. Article 22 of the Constitution stipulates as in the following:
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“1. Freedom and pluralism of media is guaranteed. 2. Censorship is forbidden. No one shall prevent the dissemination of information or ideas through media, except if it is necessary to prevent encouragement or provocation of violence and hostility on grounds of race, nationality, ethnicity or religion. 3. Everyone has the right to correct untrue, incomplete and inaccurate published information, if it violates her/his rights and interests in accordance with the law” (Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo Art.42). Simultaneously, the Kosovo Constitution guarantees the implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo Art.22). Currently, in Kosovo there are two independent regulators for the media: the IMC, which handles broadcasting licenses and promotes ethical, technical and professional standards, and the Press Council of Kosovo, which focuses on the written media and the protection of the freedom of expression.
3. EU LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Many researchers support the idea that media legislation has a great impact on the role of media in a democratic country, hence “...the role of the law, whether libertarian or authoritarian, in shaping or being shaped by journalism is undeniable” (Youm 2008, 290). Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union stipulates that “The freedom and pluralism of the media shall be respected” (Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art. 11). This means that the EU must defend the freedom of the media as a fundamental democratic value and consistently convey the need to respect this article by Member States and candidate countries for membership. "Media freedom and media pluralism are part of the rights, freedoms and principles enshrined in the Charter and in the ECHR and firmly rooted in the national constitutional traditions of the Member States, and, as such, form a normative corpus that already had and will potentially have a role in the interpretation and application of European law" (Brogi and Gori 2012, 67). The European Union, through Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), gives the Charter of Fundamental Rights the same legal value as the Treaties. “The institutional and judicial approval of the EU Charter has
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given it an ongoing salience even though its ultimate legal status remained undetermined” (Craig and de Burca 2008, 426). In the first paragraph of Article 6 of the TEU, the Union recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 7 December 2000, as adopted in Strasbourg, on 12 December 2007, which shall have the same legal value as the Treaties. With the second paragraph of the same article of the TEU, the EU guarantees the implementation of the ECHR: “The Union shall accede to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Such accession shall not affect the Union's competences as defined in the Treaties” (Treaty on European Union, Art. 6). Starting 25 May 2009, media freedom has been defended also by the European Charter on Freedom of the Press. In the recent years, in order to guarantee freedom of the media the European Union intensified its efforts to show that member states have to increase their degree of freedom of the media and become an example for the candidate countries for EU membership. Recently, the debates in the EU on media freedom have increased, especially after the deterioration of media freedom in some member states of the EU, such as Italy, Greece, Bulgaria, etc., as revealed by the 2015 Press Freedom Index of Reporters without Borders and the report of Freedom House in 2015. In 2011, the EU created the Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom in Florence. A project named “MEDIADEM” functioned for three years. The EU is trying to improve freedom of the media in the Western Balkan countries through the so-called "Speak-Up!" and "Speak-Up2!" conferences, in which topics such as the media in these countries and the forms of assistance that the EU can give to improve media freedom there are discussed. The European Commission will use instruments at its disposal (the annual Enlargement Strategy Paper and Progress Reports) to implement the Speak- up!2 conference conclusions. “Ensuring freedom of expression and of the media is one of the main challenges facing enlargement countries. Political interference in the media, economic concerns such as media concentration and various forms of harassment, including threats and violence against journalists, are issues of concern in the Western Balkans and Turkey” (Speak- up!2 conference conclusions, 1). After the first two conferences some progress has been achieved by the aspiring countries in the implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights (the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro), regarding the transparency of media ownership and limitations to media concentration in order to secure media pluralism (besides Kosovo, in other
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states the situation has improved), in strengthening the legal framework, through a review of legislation which affects the media's ability to report freely, etc. (Implementation of the Speak Up! conclusions, 1-3). The EU is considering the possibility to organise the third edition of the conference under the name "Speak-Up3!" and to continue its involvement in improving media freedom in the Western Balkans.
4. MEDIA FREEDOM – FROM THE LEGAL PERSPECTIVE TO THE PRACTICAL ASPECTS ON THE GROUND
The progress in the integration process of the Western Balkan countries is not equal as some of them have already achieved the status of candidate country and others are still seeking for it. However, in terms of media freedom all Western Balkan countries generally face the same problems but with different intensity. The main concerns are political interference and economic instability. Kosovo is in the course of fulfilling the obligations deriving from the Stabilisation and Association Agreement. Among the issues and areas where progress must be shown, freedom of the media is a bridge between politics and citizens. Only free media guarantees the realization and fulfilment of the right of citizens to be informed correctly. After the problems with the new Criminal Code in which articles 37 and 38 were considered as restricting the freedom of the press, the country completed the parliamentary procedure of amending the Criminal Code regarding the Criminal Responsibility of the Media and Protection of Journalists' Sources. Despite the fact that the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo guarantees media freedom, various international organizations have published many reports reflecting the negative aspects of the situation in this field in Kosovo, drawing attention to the pressures on the media and journalists, which threaten the progress and the establishment of democracy and an open society in Kosovo. Based on the Progress Report of the European Commission, which measures annually the pre-accession and candidate countries’ progress and represents the most important document for countries that seek integration into the European Union, we can easily conclude that Kosovo needs more time to apply all those observations made by the European Commission, in order to ensure that the media is in the service of society and democracy, rather than serving the interests of certain groups.
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The Progress Report of 2014 shows that Kosovo must have the highest implementation of the legal framework for media freedom, and to avoid excessive fragmentation of media laws. “Issues such as the autonomy of journalists and editors, protection of professional standards in journalism, the right to conscientious objection for journalists, and the right to reply and correction for the public remain unregulated by law. Editorial codes of conduct at individual media outlets would also be helpful in this regard. Threats and attacks, also from the police and public officials, on journalists persist” (Kosovo Progress Report 2014, 17). The report also points out the economic problems that sometimes constrain media independence. “Economic sustainability of the media is not ensured. Kosovo does not have effective rules for media ownership transparency. This results in excessive concentration and breaches of independence. Government advertisements have had an impact on the editorial policies of some of the media. The long-term financial sustainability of Kosovo’s public broadcaster (RTK) continues to be uncertain. Its current funding comes predominantly from the state budget, which undermines its editorial independence” (Kosovo Progress Report 2014, 17). The Progress report notes some improvements, such as the approval in the Parliament of the law on the protection of journalistic sources and the re- launching of the Independent Media Commission (with the four new members its board already has a quorum). Meanwhile, the organization "Freedom House", in its report “Freedom of the Press 2015” places Kosovo among the countries with partly free media and ranks it as the 97th with a total score of 49 points, the classification being from 0 (free) to 100 (not free). In both reports of "Freedom House" in 2014, "Nations in Transit" and "Freedom of the Press", again in the spotlight are the same problems like political interference and pressure in the media. “While Kosovo’s Constitution and legal framework provide for freedom of expression and freedom of the press, the media environment is affected by political interference, corruption, and financial pressure. A judiciary that is not considered to be fully independent and an underdeveloped civil society present further obstacles to media freedom” (Freedom of the Press 2015). The newest report “Nations in Transit” 2015 shows that the independence of media in Kosovo has improved in comparison with the four previous reports. From grade 1 representing the highest level of democratic progress to 7 as the lowest, Kosovo is estimated at 5.50 as a Semi-Consolidated Authoritarian Regime, with a 0.25 increase over the last four years. In general, this is the only improvement within this category. This report ranks Kosovo
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worse than other Balkan states as well as Central European states, but better than some Eurasian states, granting Kosovo 5.14 in the pillar of Democracy Score. “Kosovo has recently benefited from an increase in independent news outlets and investigative journalism online, but media in the country continues to suffer from problems common to most of its neighbours, particularly progovernment bias at public broadcasters, self-censorship caused by editorial pressure from political leaders and private owners, and harassment or attacks on journalists that usually go unpunished” (Nations in Transit 2015, 7). This can be shown in the figure below.
Figure no. 1. Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2015: Overview of ratings changes
COUNTRY DS 2015 (DS 2014) EP CS IM NDG LDG JFI CO Albania 4.14 (4.18) ↑
Bosnia and H. 4.46 (4.43) ↓ Croatia 3.68 Kosovo 5.14 ↑ ↓ Macedonia 4.07 (4.00) ↓ ↓ BALKANS Montenegro 3.89 (3.86) ↓ Serbia 3.68 (3.64) ↓
Bulgaria 3.29 (3.25) ↓ Czech Rep. 2.21 (2.25) ↑ Estonia 1.96 Hungary 3.18 (2.96) ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ EUROPE
Latvia 2.07 Lithuania 2.36 Poland 2.21 (2.18) ↓ Romania 3.46 ↓ ↑
CENTRAL Slovakia 2.64 (2.61) ↓ Slovenia 1.93
Armenia 5.36 Azerbaijan 6.75 (6.68) ↓ ↓ Belarus 6.71 Georgia 4.64 (4.68) ↑ Kazakhstan 6.61 Kyrgyzstan 5.93 (5.89) ↓ Moldova 4.86
EURASIA Russia 6.46 (6.29) ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ Tajikistan 6.39 (6.32) ↓ ↓ Turkmenistan 6.93 Ukraine 4.75 (4.93) ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ Uzbekistan 6.93
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↑ Improvement ↓ Decline □ Unchanged Categories: EP – Electoral Process, CS – Civil Society, IM – Independent Media, NDG – National Democratic Governance, LDG – Local Democratic Governance, JFI – Judicial Framework and Independence, CO – Corruption, DS – Democracy Score
Source: Author’s own compilation Data source: https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FH_NIT2015_06.06.15_FINAL.pdf [Accessed:24 July 2015]
Every year, reports are published also by "Reporters without Borders". According to the 2015 Press Freedom Index, Kosovo is ranked 87th, meaning seven positions lower than in the previous report. However, Kosovo remains before other Western Balkan countries like Croatia, Montenegro or Macedonia where the media situation continues to deteriorate, or even higher than some European Union member states, such as Greece or Bulgaria. The following figure reflects the data discussed above.
Figure no. 2. Reporters without Borders, Press Freedom Index 2005-2015
State 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Kosovo 100 70 60 58 75 92 86 85 85 80 87 Albania 62 80 87 79 88 80 96 102 102 85 82 Bosnia & H. 33 19 34 36 39 47 58 68 68 66 66 Croatia 56 53 41 45 78 62 68 64 64 65 58 Macedonia 43 45 36 42 34 68 94 116 116 123 117 Montenegro 65 45 58 53 77 104 107 113 113 114 114 Serbia 65 45 67 64 62 85 80 63 63 54 67 Turkey 98 98 101 102 122 138 148 154 154 154 149
Source: Author’s own compilation
The Media Sustainability Index of the IREX organisation (MSI) assesses the level of providing objective information by the media by measuring the indicators of freedom of speech, professional journalism, the plurality of news, business management and supporting institutions. Unlike the 2014 MSI report which reported an improvement of the situation in terms of pressure on journalists, the 2015 report notes the deterioration of Kosovo’s media sustainability. Self-censorship continues to be a serious concern to the media and media workers in Kosovo, according to the two latest MSI reports. In the 2015 MSI report media ranged from unsustainable/against freedom of the press, to sustainable, while Kosovo is ranked among the countries with media that are close to stability, the overall result being 2.27, near
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sustainability (IREX MSI Kosovo report 2015, 60). Out of the five objectives, the biggest deterioration occurred in the freedom of expression. In this category, Kosovo now has the result of 2.25 while in the last year’s report it was 2.65. “What really concerns the panelists is journalists’ safety. Although no journalist has been killed recently, the panelists said threats and physical assaults are escalating. Such crimes against journalists come mostly from business people and rarely from government officials directly” (IREX MSI Kosovo report 2015, 61). In the following figure Kosovo’s progress during the years in freedom of speech, professional journalism, the plurality of news, business management and supporting institutions is shown.
Figure no. 3. MSI Kosovo 2015
SUSTAINABILITY Unsustainable Unsustainable Near Sustainable anti-free press mixed system sustainability Free speech 2.25
Professional 2.13 journalism Plurality of 2.57 news sources
OBJECTIVES Business 2.02 management Supporting 2.36 institutions
Source: Author’s own compilation Data source: https://www.irex.org/sites/default/files/u105/EE_MSI_2015_Kosovo.pdf [Accessed: 31 July 2015]
The issue of the freedom of media and media workers as well as the problems reflected in their workplaces are analysed also in the Human Rights Watch 2015 report. Among other measures mentioned in the report, it calls the ombudsperson to protect journalists. “The ombudsperson condemned threats against journalists and called on media, prosecutors, and police to act within the full scope of their mandates and not use methods that violate people’s privacy and dignity” (Human Rights Watch - World Report 2015, 475).
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5. EU MEDIA FREEDOM AS REFERENCE
Since there is a group of countries within the EU with partly free media, this pushed the EU to deal more with media freedom. While six member states are among the top 10 states with the highest degree of free press in the world, six other states are categorized as having “noticeable problems” (Reporters Without Borders 2015). Today, Europe is facing an increasing gap between Northern countries, who are distinguished for their high level of media freedom and the Southern states that have degrees of media freedom similar to countries like Burkina Faso or Nicaragua. Concerns about media freedom in the EU were also raised by the former Vice-President of the European Commission responsible for the Digital Agenda, Neelie Kroes, who stated that “challenges to media freedom and pluralism are neither a recent phenomenon, nor one confined to just one or two Member States. But recent cases have been high profile and significant” (Kroes 2012). In the following figure the positioning related to media freedom of the world’s regions are shown.
Figure no. 4. Reporters without Borders, World Press Freedom Index 2015
Source: https://index.rsf.org/#!/presentation [Accessed: 28 March 2015]
This figure shows that globally, media freedom is respected more in the European Union and the Balkan states. However, last year's report shows that this region had the largest decline. “This disturbing trend reflects a two-
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fold phenomenon: the excesses of some member countries on the one hand and the inability of EU mechanisms to contain them on the other”, Reporters without Borders showed in the 2015 report published on their website (Reporters without orders 2015). In the EU, the 2015 report of Reporters without Borders shows the deterioration of media freedom in two countries in particular, Italy and Bulgaria. Italy descended from the 49th place in 2014 to the 73th in 2015. Bulgaria dropped from the 100th to the 106th. Andorra sank from the 5th to the 32th, Liechtenstein from the 6th to the 27th, Luxembourg from the 4th to the 19th. The three worst ranked EU countries are Italy, on the 73rd place sharing this position with Nicaragua, Greece on the 91st and Bulgaria on the 106th. The six EU countries in the top ten countries ensuring press freedom are Finland, Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, Austria and Estonia. Freedom House has also written about the increasing problems in some of the EU countries in its "Freedom of the Press 2015" report, which highlighted the decreasing level of freedom at the regional level for the second consecutive year. “Over the past decade, incremental erosion of the legal and economic environments, as well as interference with the ability of journalists to cover the news in person, have given Europe the world’s second-largest net decline since 2004, after Eurasia” (Freedom of the Press 2015, 14).
Figure no. 5. Media status in European countries
Source: Author’s own compilation Data source: Freedom House, Freedom of the Press 2015, p.14 https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FreedomofthePress_2015_FINAL.pdf [Accessed: 14 May 2015]
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6. CURRENT SITUATION AND CHALLENGES AHEAD
The power of the media in Kosovo is greater today than it used to be in the past. Therefore, media became much more important in general while in particular is important for the protection of human rights. “There are many examples where the misuses of power, corruption, discrimination and even torture have come to light because of the work of investigative journalists. Making the facts known to the public is often the first, essential step in redressing human rights violations and holding those in power accountable” (Council of Europe 2011, 7). The media in Kosovo is continuously facing various challenges. The main problem is its freedom, which according to the Association of Professional Journalists of Kosovo is in a poor position. “22 cases of physical violence and threats against journalists in Kosovo occurred between January - November 2014 - according to the Association of Professional Journalists of Kosovo” (Human Rights Watch 2015, 2). The statistics presented above show the increasing threats and violence against journalist comparing to year 2013. There are four main issues affecting the freedom of media in Kosovo. First, the lack of implementation of the law: As pointed out in the report of the European Commission (Kosovo Progress Report 2014, 14), Kosovo needs to focus in particular on improving the independence, effectiveness, accountability and impartiality of the judiciary. This relates to the freedom of the press, because only a strong system of justice can defend freedom of expression and the media. From a legal perspective, we mentioned already that media freedom is a constitutional right, guaranteed by law, but this has proved insufficient if there is no respect in practice, and unless there is a proper functioning of the judiciary to apply it. “Media freedom is truly effective only in an environment where other fundamental rights are protected; the judiciary and public bodies act in a genuinely independent way, and government authorities are accountable to the public through free and fair elections” (Horsley 2012, 25). Second, political pressure: Political pressure is another problem of media in Kosovo and in many cases it limits the freedom of the press. This is emphasized in the report of the Freedom House "Freedom of the Press 2014": “Editors frequently bar their reporters from publishing or broadcasting stories that are critical of the government or of particular officials due to the outlets’ political leanings” (The United States Department of Justice, 2). Politicians use different tools to approach the media, such as their links to media owners,
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editors or journalists; they can prepare personnel and their infiltration in the media, exert economic pressure on the media, condition donations in order to avoid criticism, etc. Human Rights Watch qualifies political interference / pressure as a serious problem in a report on media freedom in the Western Balkans: “Journalists told Human Rights Watch that in some cases politicians pressured owners and editors to drop critical stories” (Human Right Watch 2015, 3). Third, economic pressure: A separate challenge is the pressure on journalists by the media owners because of the media's own financial dependency. The journalists’ rights might be violated and their safety put at risk if they do not respect the "rules of the game" imposed by those who manage the media in Kosovo. This dependency factor has a double character: the more the society is economically developed, the more powerful and democratic the media will be; on the contrary, with less economic development of society, there come media dependency, control and undemocratic character. The Kosovo government continues to be the main employer and biggest contractor for the advertising media business. This position allows the government to exert economic pressure on certain media outlets, punishing them through the non-delivery of advertising if they publish/broadcast a critical report on the work of government institutions. This has been highlighted also by an OSCE report on the situation of media freedom in Kosovo. The report, based on an anonymous survey of Kosovar journalists’ notes, showed that financial/economic pressure from the government on the media can happen in two main ways - by advertising and funding (OSCE mission in Kosovo 2014, 13). This shows that local as well as central institutions in Kosovo tend to control the editorial content of newspapers/radio/TV by favouring them when it comes to the publication of government-sponsored advertising. Fourth, but not less important, economic sustainability: Economic sustainability is a global challenge for the media and media in Kosovo is not excluded. Despite the improved legal framework, journalists facing financial problems are subject to self-censorship. This is due to their survival concerns, while professionalism is to be converted into the service of others. According to the Media Sustainability Index of the IREX organisation, the salaries of employees in the Kosovo media are not considered sufficient to provide the necessary financial stability. An investigation on press freedom in Kosovo by Reporters without Borders in 2010 found that “many journalists begin an apparent career in the media as a stepping stone towards administrative or
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diplomatic careers” (Basile 2010, 4), because they do not see the work in the media as comfortable in financial terms. This is proved also by the suggestions of the European Commission’s Progress Report of 2014, which states, among others, that there has been limited progress in the improvement of ensuring economic sustainability of the media. This indicates that the situation has not changed for the better.
7. CONCLUSIONS
The right to a free press is a constitutional right in all democratic countries all over the world. Legislators and senior institutional officials cannot issue, approve and apply laws that limit the freedom of journalists and the media in providing information. Restrictions on the press and media in general are justified in cases dealing with national security only. These restrictions should be closely examined by the courts. Freedom from censorship or any other form of intervention in the collection and dissemination of information is the essence of the definition of freedom of the press. But, press freedom does not mean that journalists, consciously or not, can publish lies, half-truths, slander, etc., for which they could be charged and have to be accountable to the public and justice. Kosovo's integration process as well as the debate on it requires the full engagement of the media in order to succeed. Media should not limit itself to reporting only the titles of the decisions made or the national political reactions, but must analyse those decisions, explain the technical side and inform citizens about the country’s progress and political response to the demands of the EU. However, we can conclude that ensuring the freedom of media in Kosovo with its fragility, or “partial freedom”, as described by relevant local and international organizations and agencies’ reports, remains a difficult but not insurmountable challenge for the coming years.
REFERENCES
Bajomi-Lázár, P. 2015. Party Colonization of the Media: The Case of Hungary. In The Hungarian Patient: Social Opposition to an illiberal Democracy, edited by Péter Krasztev and Jon Van Til, 59–80. Budapest: Central European University Press. Basile, O. 2010. Kosovo: still not too late for press freedom…, an investigation for Reporters without Borders. Accessed September 10 2015. http://en.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/rapport_k_en.pdf.
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Brogi, E. and P. Gori. 2013, Legal analysis of the EU instruments to foster media pluralism and media freedom. RSCAS PP 2013/01, CMPF. Accessed March 26 2015. http://cmpf.eui.eu/documents/cmpfpolicyreport2013.pdf. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 2000. Accessed March 27 2015. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text_en.pdf. Consolidated Treaties of the European Union (Treaty of Lisbon). 2010. Accessed March 26 2015. http://europa.eu/pol/pdf/consolidated-treaties_en.pdf. Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo. 2008. Prishtinë. Council of Europe. 2011. Human rights and a changing media landscape, Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe. Council of Europe Publications. Strasbourg. Accessed April 11 2015. http://www.coe.int/t/commissioner/Activities/themes/MediaFreedom/MediaLandscape20 11.pdf. Craig, P. and G. de Burca. 2008. EU Law, Text, cases and materials. 4th Edition, Oxford University Press. Dauti, D. 2001. Gazetarët dhe zgjedhjet. Prishtinë. European Charter on Freedom of the Press. 2009. Accessed March 26 2015. http://www.pressfreedom.eu/en/index.php. European Commission. 2011. Implementation record of the Speak Up! Conclusions. Accessed September 12 2015. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/speak_up_2/implementation- record-speak-up-conclusions_v3.pdf. European Commission. 2013. Speak-up!2 conference Conclusions. Accessed September 12 2015. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/speak_up_2/20130801_speakup-conclusions.pdf. European Commission. Kosovo Progress Report 2014. Accessed March 26 2015. http://www.mei-ks.net/repository/docs/20141008-kosovo-progress-report_en.pdf. Freedom House. Freedom of the Press 2014. Accessed March 28 2015. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2014/kosovo#.VRwWGvmUeX0. Freedom House. Nations in Transit 2014. Accessed March 28 2015. https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/13.%20NIT14_Kosovo_final.pdf. Freedom House. Kosovo. Accessed March 28 2015. https://freedomhouse.org/country/kosovo. Freedom House. Freedom of the Press 2015. Accessed May 15 2015. https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FreedomofthePress_2015_FINAL.pdf. Freedom House. Nations in Transit 2015. Accessed July 24 2015. https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FH_NIT2015_06.06.15_FINAL.pdf. Horsley, W. 2012. The state of media freedom in Europe. The background Report presented at a session of the Committee on Culture, Science, Education and Media of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Accessed April 20 2015. http://www.cfom.org.uk/wp- content/uploads/2012/06/The-state-of-media-freedom-in-Europe-Horsley-Report.pdf. Human Rights Watch. 2015. World report 2015. Accessed March 31 2015. http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/wr2015_web.pdf. Human Rights Watch. 2015. A Difficult Profession Media Freedom under Attack in the Western Balkans. Accessed July 21 2015. https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/balkans0715.pdf. IREX. 2014. Europe & Eurasia Media Sustainability Index 2014. Kosovo MSI Chapter. Accessed March 31 2015. https://www.irex.org/sites/default/files/u105/EE_MSI_2014_Kosovo.pdf.
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IREX. 2015. Europe & Eurasia Media Sustainability Index 2015. Kosovo MSI Chapter. Accessed July 24 2015. https://www.irex.org/sites/default/files/u105/EE_MSI_2015_Kosovo.pdf. The United States Department of Justice. Freedom of the Press 2014 Kosovo. Accessed September 08 2015. http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2014/11/24/Kosovo.pdf. KAS. 2015. Media Freedom in Kosovo. Accessed July 23 2015. http://www.kas.de/wf/en/71.13602. Kroes, N. 2012. Speech at the European Parliament Seminar on Media Freedom in the EU Member States. Accessed March 28 2015. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12- 335_en.htm?locale=en. National Council for European Integration. 2013. National Strategy for European Integration “KOSOVO 2020” a participatory approach. Accessed April 01 2015. http://www.kryeministri- ks.net/repository/docs/National_Strategy_for_European_Integration_Kosovo_2020_ENG.PD F. OSCE Mission in Kosovo. 2014. Freedom of Media and Safety of Journalists in Kosovo. Accessed July 24 2015. http://www.osce.org/kosovo/122390?download=true. Reporters without Borders. 2015. World Press Freedom Index 2015. Accessed March 28 2015. http://index.rsf.org/#!/index-details. Reporters without Borders. 2015. World Press Freedom Index 2015. Accessed March 28 2015. https://index.rsf.org/#!/presentation. Youm, K.H. 2008. Journalism Law and Regulation. In The Handbook of Journalism Studies, edited by K. Wahl-Jorgensen and T. Hanitzsch, 279–294. New York: Routledge. Accessed April 09 2015. http://www.rasaneh.org/Images/News/AtachFile/30-9- 1390/FILE634600594129473750.pdf.
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SERBIA'S EU PATH: BEYOND THE COMPLEXITY OF AN INSTITUTIONAL PROCESS
Dragoş IONIŢĂ National University of Political Studies and Public Administration Bucharest/Romania [email protected]
Abstract This study seeks to bring a new understanding of Serbia’s European integration and the implications for its external policy in the context of the current geopolitical decisions taken in the region. The aim is to emphasize the complexity of the enlargement process, as well as the difficulties created by Kosovo’s decision to declare independence (2008). The first section focuses on the analysis of the consequences of ethnic and / or interstate conflicts from the ‘90s, in order to underline the importance of the wars for the disintegration of Yugoslavia in the accession process and their role in determining the further institutional steps of Serbia. The second section is dedicated to describing Serbia's rapprochement with the EU and its future steps towards joining the organization. The main hypothesis is that Serbia’s accession process is no different from that of former candidates. Nevertheless, the weight of the wars for the disintegration of Yugoslavia and Kosovo’s decision will play an important role in the negotiation process. The last section is dedicated to a case study on Kosovo, the decision of declaring its independence still representing a source of diplomatic disputes between Serbia and the EU. In order to give a better understanding of the implications of this decision, an analysis of the main challenges is conducted within this section. The analysis focuses on several topics: the reaction of the five EU opponents to the decision, the future of the Albania-Kosovo relation, the reaction of the main EU institutions and the development of a “Kosovo precedent”.
Keywords Diplomacy; Enlargement; European Union; Kosovo; Serbia
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1. INTRODUCTION
"A day will come when you France, you Russia, you Italy, you England, you Germany, you all, nations of the continent, without losing your distinct qualities and your glorious individuality, will be merged closely within a superior unit and you will form the European brotherhood" (Ames Mead 1904, 10). This was, in 1849, a glimpse into the future as seen by French writer Victor Hugo. The necessity of unity in diversity was also alive in the minds of Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman and Konrad Adenauer, the founders of the European Union (EU) when they decided to create an international organization bringing together European states on their way to post-war reconstruction. Forty-four years later, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), torn and isolated by a civil war, decided to break the challenges put by the Belgrade authorities (through the decision to create a single state for all Serb inhabitants of the former Yugoslavia) and start on the path of European integration. The aim of this paper is to bring a new understanding of the process of European integration of Serbia and how Serbia managed to evolve from an isolated country of Europe to a candidate in the EU’s enlargement process. The first section of this paper aims at analysing the impact of the 1974 constitutional reforms, political relations within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia after Marshal Tito’s death and the process of disintegration of the Yugoslav state in the early 90s. It is also important to emphasize the role of 1991-1999 inter-ethnic conflicts, as a contributing factor in the relation between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the EU and Serbia's accession process. Although this is just a historical overview, it is important to emphasize the main events that conducted to the isolation of Serbia for almost a decade. The next section will focus on the post-Milošević era, as Serbia worked to fulfil its commitments to international courts (mainly the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia). Nevertheless, the main focus of the analysis is Serbia’s capacity to fulfil its commitments as a future EU member state (as specified by the Copenhagen Criteria). The main analysis in this section concerns the steps taken by Serbia in the period 2000-2015, from the initiation of pre-accession until the start of the negotiation of the acquis chapters. I will also analyse the progress made by Belgrade since 2009 (when Serbia submitted its official application for EU membership) and finished in 2014 (the beginning of negotiations). Finally, I will provide a review of the
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following stages (from the evaluation and negotiation of the 35 acquis chapters until the completion of negotiations) and follow the medium term steps that Serbia and the EU will have to follow until the conclusion of the accession process (from obtaining consent from the Commission, EU Council and European Parliament until the completion, signing and ratification of the EU Accession Treaty). In the last section, I propose an analysis on the impact that the Kosovo’s declaration of independence had and continues to have on Serbia-EU relations and the process of finding peace in the Western Balkans (and not only). The aim is to identify the role / impact that the province's declaration of independence had on Serbia-EU relationship, in terms of how the main actors (mainly UN Security Council members) reacted. It is important to determine the source of the distrust shown by some EU member states with regard to Kosovo’s decision and how those states (Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain) can be persuaded to accept the geopolitical changes in the region. The development of a so-called "Kosovo precedent" is now a primary focus of security policy in the region, in the context of the ongoing events in Ukraine. This situation will also be analysed highlighting the differences between Kosovo and Crimea and the way the situation contradicts the idea of a "Kosovo precedent" in International Relations theory.
2. METHODOLOGY
In this project I follow a constructivist design, which aims to offer a better understanding to the development of post-war Serbia as an independent state, that wishes to fulfil its obligations to the international community and the European Union as part of the accession negotiations. It is also essential to follow the institutional developments that occurred after the wars for the disintegration of Yugoslavia. As Serbia (and not only) carries the weight of war actions, it is important to demonstrate that international obligations with regards to the targeted countries must also be fulfilled. In this particular case I selected a historical study in order to underline the developments that followed the reorganization of the party system and the belligerent actions taken by FRY (as successor of the socialist federation) in neighbouring countries. Following the historical overview, a chronological timeline is established in order to explain the institutional and legal steps taken by Serbia
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in the process of becoming candidate to accession, this part emphasizing not only the institutional challenges but also the geopolitical ones. The goal is to demonstrate the complexity of the accession process when political (will and interests of local and European leaders) and geopolitical (regional insecurity) factors intervene. Finally, a case study on Kosovo is presented, seeking to underline the main developments that followed the declaration of independence and the implications of that event. The case study is itself divided into several categories: the events that preceded the declaration of independence (using a historical study); the international reaction and influence on the structure and role of the UN Security Council; the reaction of the five contesting EU member states; the role of EU institutions in the process of independence recognition and EU accession; Albania’s role in Kosovo’s decision and the prospects of a “Greater Albania” in the near future; the impact on current international issues with emphases on the development of a “Kosovo precedent” (using a comparative study in which Crimea and the current events in Ukraine are taken into consideration). This multilevel analysis aims at establishing the facts and explaining the complexity surrounding Kosovo’s actual status its role in the international community.
3. THE WARS FOR THE DISINTEGRATION OF YUGOSLAVIA: INFLUENCE AND IMPLICATIONS
The disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) represented the beginning of a black period in the recent history the Serbian state (and not only). After the reorganization of the party system (1990), the ex-communists failed in their attempt to gain power. Most governments had taken up a nationalist platform, ensuring the public that national interests will be respected and protected. Following these results, SR Croatia, SR Slovenia and SR Macedonia suggested (in autumn 1990) the transformation of the SFRY into an improved federation, consisting of six republics that would enjoy greater local power. Slobodan Milošević rejected the proposal of the three republics, stating that Serbs have the same right of self-determination as Slovenians or Croatians. Also, Serbian politicians expressed their concerns about the constitutional changes brought by Croats – they involved, among others, that Serbs from Croatia had to be removed from
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the list of nations – narod – and included in the list of the minorities – narodi i manjine (Bokovoy, Irvine and Lilly 1997, 27-28). Between 1990 and 1991, three of the constituent republics of SFRY (Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia) organized independence referendums. The overwhelming results in all three countries conducted to their declarations of independence. As such, the three countries were recognized as independent by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC Resolutions 753/1992, 754/1992 and 817/1993). The problem of Bosnia-Herzegovina was by far the trickiest in terms of geopolitical consequences for the Bosnian state and the region. The republic, located in the geographical centre of the socialist federation, was a genuine ethnic puzzle (Council of Europe 1991, 3)1. This led to tensions related to the membership of each region (or even urban/rural entity) to a political entity. The main tool used throughout the indoctrination campaigns was the media: in Serbia, media outlets were promoting the inclusion of Bosnia-Herzegovina in a new Yugoslav union based on democratic governance. This campaign was never taken into account in Bosnia (Burg and Shoup 1999, 102). In January 1992, the Serbian Legislature of Bosnia proclaimed a Serb republic of Bosnia, separated from the rest of the country (the region took the name "Republika Srpska", after the Dayton Agreement of 1995), initiating the formation of the Serbian Autonomous Regions territory of Bosnia. Between 29.02-01.03.1992, Bosnia-Herzegovina held a referendum for independence. Although turnout was much lower than in other republics, the referendum was valid (despite protests over its constitutionality) and its clear result (99.7% of the participants voted in favour of independence) allowed local authorities to declare the republic's independence on March 3rd, 1992. Bosnia-Herzegovina was admitted as a UN member on May 20th, 1992 (UNSC Resolution 755/1992). As a result of geopolitical changes, on September 19th, 1992, the United Nations Security Council declared the cease of existence of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (UNSC Resolution 777/1992). The two remaining republics of the former communist state (Serbia and Montenegro) decided previously (on April 28th, 1992) to form a new Yugoslav state. The transformation of the former communist state was realized by adopting a new Constitution (April 27th, 1992). This meant that the new state would have been
1 Following the 1991 census from SR Bosnia-Herzegovina, the entity’s population was divided into: Muslim citizens / Bosniaks (43.5%), Serbs (31.21%) and Croats (17.4%).
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composed of two republics (Serbia and Montenegro) with equal rights. Also, the act “left an open door" to eventual former republics that wanted to join them (Constitution of FRY 1992, art. 1-2). On April 6th, 1992, with the international recognition of Bosnia- Herzegovina, ethnic Serbs from the newly established republic declared the independence of Republika Srpska, while triggering the siege of Sarajevo (capital of Bosnia-Herzegovina). This moment would mark the start of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992-1995). According to data provided by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the war lasted approximately four years and claimed the lives of about 89,186 people, of which 57,992 were Muslim (Bosniaks), 19,398 Serbs and 7,543 Croats (ICTY 2010, 14-15). One of the main consequences of the conflagration was the economic and political isolation of the FRY. This was realized through a succession of resolutions adopted by the UN in order to force the Yugoslav state to abandon the funding, support and involvement in the civil war in Bosnia and Croatia. The most important document in this regard was UN Resolution 757/1992. This document reaffirmed previous UN positions and decisions, while asking signatory nations (and all UN members) to impose severe political, economic and cultural sanctions on the FRY ensuring at the same time an increase of humanitarian aid to war-struck regions that represented FRY’s targets (UNSC Resolution 757/1992, art 4-8, 17). In 1997 the term of Serbia’s President Milošević expired. Thus, he decided to run for president of FRY. Enjoying the biggest political influence in the country, Milošević succeeded, thus being appointed President of the FRY. After taking office, he gained direct control over the military and Yugoslav security which he used to target separatists in Kosovo. The first step in the new war was made by the paramilitary forces in Kosovo, united under the name of "Kosovo Liberation Army" / KLA (Reveron and Murer 2013, 68-69). Attacks committed against Yugoslav authorities stationed in the region led to an increase of Serbian conventional and paramilitary forces, which triggered a campaign of revenge against KLA sympathizers and political opponents in the region. The campaign resulted in the deaths of 1,500-2,000 KLA fighters and civilians (Human Rights Watch 2001). After diplomatic attempts to resolve the conflict failed, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervened, stating that their intervention was a "humanitarian war" (New York Times 2007). This action precipitated mass expulsions of the Albanian population of Kosovo by Serbs, while the Yugoslav forces continued the fight during the
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NATO bombings. The latter were the main form of aggression against the FRY during this period; the operation lasted two months in the period March 24th - June 10th 1999, all without UN approval (Chomsky 2001). Different regions of the FRY were the targets, including the capital Belgrade. In total, NATO launched 2,300 missiles to 990 targets – mainly elements of infrastructure and communication channels (Amnesty International 2009), throwing approximately 14,000 bombs. More than 2,000 civilians were killed (including 88 children), while thousands of people were injured. Over 200,000 ethnic Serbs were forced to leave their homes in Kosovo. In Serbia, NATO attacks destroyed over 300 schools and 20 hospitals. More than 40,000 homes were either completely destroyed or suffered severe damage; in addition, 90 historic and / or architectural monuments were also destroyed (Chomsky 2001). Following the attacks, President Milošević decided to end the anti-separatist campaign and gave NATO forces permission to enter the territory of Kosovo. The Kosovo conflict left behind almost 3,000 deaths; in 2001 a Supreme Court under UN administration concluded that "there was a systematic campaign of terror by inducing murder, rape, arson and extremely serious mistreatment" although mentioning that the Serbian people tried to remove the Albanian population, not to eliminate it (BBC News 2001). The war was put to an end by the Kumanovo Agreement (June 9th, 1999). The agreement established a cessation of hostilities between NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR) and the FRY, a staged withdrawal from Kosovo by FRY forces, including the clearing of military assets (mines, booby traps) from communications lines, and use of necessary force by NATO to create a secure environment for the international civilian presence (NATO 1999, art. 1-2). Eventually, the KLA was dissolved, its members being divided between the National Liberation Army, the National Army of the Republic of Albania and Kosovo Police forces. In addition to this, as a result of the conflict, the province of Kosovo was placed under UN protection. The international organization took political and military control over the province, in order to prevent further conflicts between the Albanian majority and Serbian authorities who led the province. The key document in this process was Resolution 1244, adopted by the United Nations Security Council on June 10th, 1999. Among its objectives: the placing of Kosovo under UN administration (process conducted by UNMIK), authorization of presence of NATO peacekeeping forces in Kosovo, the return of refugees to their homes and the continuing efforts to establish autonomy for Kosovo, using the population’s will as a main instrument in the process of negotiation (UNSC Resolution 1244/1999, art. 7-11).
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As a consequence of the armed wars and following trials undertaken by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, several political and military leaders were accused of war crimes. The most important trials in this regard have focused on Slobodan Milošević (died while on trial, in 2006), Radovan Karadžić (former President of Republika Srpska during the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, charged by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia for crimes against non-Serb population of Bosnia) and Ratko Mladić (military leader of Serbians from Bosnia-Herzegovina, also charged by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia for crimes against non-Serb population of Bosnia). The main charges brought against the three include: genocide, persecution, crimes against humanity (extermination, murders, illegal deportations), war crimes (creating and spreading a state of terror, unlawful attacks committed against citizens, hostage taking). The year 2000 brought significant changes in the political sphere of the FRY. On September 24th the first democratic presidential elections were organized. Five candidates registered for the scrutiny; only two were ranked as favourites, Vojislav Koštunica and incumbent President Slobodan Milošević. Following the first round, no candidate managed to obtain the majority needed to claim victory (Government of Serbia 2000). On October 10th a second round was held, in which only the two frontrunners took part. After counting the votes, it was decided that Vojislav Koštunica obtained the required majority victory: 50.24% of the votes (Election Guide 2000). The period between the two rounds was marked by the many violent demonstrations against President Milošević. The protests were fuelled by accusations of electoral fraud, censorship against media organizations and arresting of members of a political organization (B92.com 2000). Following the protests, Milošević admitted his defeat in the second round, thus ending a bleak period in the history of the young state.
4. SERBIA IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM: THE ROAD TO THE EU
Until the conflict with NATO, Belgrade did not benefit from financial assistance from the US or Western European states. The only such aid came from traditional allies, Greece and Russia. After the elections in October 2000, aid coming from the EU increased, while the US embargo was gradually removed as the Yugoslav state met its obligations to the international
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community (active participation in identifying and handing over of war criminals to international tribunals, and improving relations with the targeted countries of the two conflicts of the 90s). Regarding the relationship with the EU, the Yugoslav state was virtually nonexistent on the humanitarian agenda of the organization, most of these actions being directed to states / regions targeted by the forces of the FRY in 1995-1999 (EU Commission 1995). In October 2000, the new president Vojislav Koštunica accepted the invitation made by European leaders to attend the summit in Biarritz, France (Government of Serbia 2014). At that meeting, EU leaders said that the FRY will be quickly accepted by Member States as a reliable collaborator. They also expressed their readiness to help the Yugoslav state. After the first day of the summit, Koštunica said that his participation as guest is "a confirmation that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro, are and have always been in Europe” (Los Angeles Times 2000). To show its support for the FRY, in 2000 the EU lifted the flight ban applied to the Yugoslav airspace and taxes on imports from the FRY. In November 2000, President Koštunica was invited to attend the EU-Balkans summit held in Zagreb. During the meeting, the prospect of a Stabilization and Association Process was settled, in accordance with decisions of the EU Council. It was also decided to establish a Consultative Task Force, which would allow the start of feasibility studies directed towards negotiating the necessary directives that would conduct to the implementation of the Stabilization and Association Agreement.
Table no. 1. Serbia's EU accession steps (2000-2014)
Period Event October FRY’s President Vojislav Koštunica invited to the EU Summit in Biarritz 2000 (French chairmanship), FRY joins the Stabilization and Association Process. The “Consultative Task Force”, which had the responsibility of preparing the July 2001 Feasibility Study for FRY, as a prelude to negotiations on the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA), held its first meeting. The Summit in Thessaloniki confirmed the European future of states in the June 2003 Western Balkans according to individual progress of each of them separately. The “regatta” principle1 was also adopted (Bărbulescu 2008, 71).
1 The "regatta" principle (proposed by the Spanish delegation at the 1997 meeting of the EU Council) requires all candidate states to start accession negotiation procedures simultaneously,
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The first meeting of the “Enhanced Permanent Dialogue” was held as a October substitute for the “Consultative Task Force”. Preparations took place for the 2003 Feasibility Study. It became clear that a single market of Serbia and Montenegro (SCG) would June-July not be established and that SCG would thus not be able to negotiate the 2004 economic part of SAA as one party. The EU adopts the “twin-track” approach according to which Montenegro December and Serbia would separately negotiate the trade chapters of the SAA, while 2004 SCG would as a state jointly negotiate on the political part of the SAA (Medjiak 2004, 1-3). October Negotiations were initialized between the European Union and SCG on 2005 concluding the SAA, which represents the first step towards EU integration. Due to insufficient cooperation with The Hague, negotiations with SCG May 2006 called-off. Negotiations called-off. EU’s reason was Serbia’s unwillingness towards May 2006 meeting its obligations towards the International Criminal Tribunal for the – June former Yugoslavia. Specifically, the EU expressed concern at Belgrade's 2007 inability to identify and capture of Ratko Mladić, the war crimes suspect (SETimes 2006). The negotiations on concluding the SAA between the European Union and June 2007 Serbia continued (after the establishment of a new Government). The Agreement on Visa Facilitation and the Agreement on September Readmission were signed between the European Union and the Republic of 2007 Serbia. November The SAA between the European Union and Serbia is initiated. 2007 The SAA between the European Union and Serbia was signed (the EU April 2008 adopted the decision not to implement the Interim Trade Agreement – TPA – signed along with the SAA). November The Council of the European Union published the document on visa 2009 liberalization with countries of the Western Balkans.
December Serbia submitted its application for EU membership. 2009
January The implementation of the TPA entered its second year, thus bringing the 2010 EU and Serbia into regulated relations. February The Interim Trade Agreement between the European Union and Serbia came 2010 into force. The European Commission adopted the decision on initiating the ratification June 2010 of the SAA between the European Union and Serbia. October The Council of Foreign Ministers of European Union Member States adopted
each state choosing its own path / tactic to follow in order to reach a final point, also common to all states.
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2010 the decision to forward Serbia’s application for membership to the European Commission for consideration.
January The European Parliament ratified the SAA between the EU and Serbia. 2011
European Commission presented its annual Enlargement Package in which it recommended that Serbia be given the status of candidate for October membership in the EU. The European Commission recommends the opening 2011 of negotiations with Serbia as soon as Belgrade achieves further good progress in normalizing its relations with Kosovo (European Commission 2011). March The European Council granted Serbia membership candidate status. 2012 The European Parliament adopted report on Serbia’s progress in the EU integration. April 2013 The European Commission recommended the start of accession talks with Serbia. European leaders at the meeting in Brussels decided to start accession June 2013 negotiations with Serbia in January of the following year. EU member states and institutions completed the ratification process of July 2013 theSAA. September The Stabilisation and Association Agreement entered into force. 2013 January The First Intergovernmental Conference was held in Brussels; the event 2014 marked the formal start of Serbia's negotiations to join the EU.
Source: EU Commission 2014
The period preceding the ratification process of the SAA was not a quiet one, as Serbian authorities encountered numerous obstacles. The most notable of these was the declaration of Kosovo’s independence (February 17th, 2008), rejected by the Serbian state and its partners (among others, Russia, China, and five EU member states1 have rejected Pristina’s decision). Serbia sneeringly reacted by calling on consultations with ambassadors of countries that recognized the declaration (Economic Team for Kosovo and Metohija 2008). In Belgrade, Government dissensions sparkled on the province’s decision, President Boris Tadić being forced to dissolve the Parliament and call
1 Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain have all rejected Kosovo's declaration of independence, using as arguments either the creation a precedent that would affect local political stability or the friendly relationship they had with Serbia.
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early general elections (B92.com 2008). The refusal to recognize Kosovo’s decision constituted the start of another postponement of Serbia’s negotiation process, the EU noting that Serbia must maintain stable (even peaceful) relationships with all its neighbours. Following Serbia’s decision, in late 2008, the EU decided (with UN’s approval) to send 2,000 troops (police officers, including four anti-riot units), prosecutors and judges to Kosovo, in order to ensure the respect of rule of law, democratic standards and provide support in the fight against corruption (EULEX 2014). In early 2011, the EU started talks to persuade Serbia to take part in negotiations with the aim of normalizing its relations with Kosovo (and enabling the process of negotiation). In 2008-2013, the two sides reached agreements on trade, fuel deliveries, diplomatic representation (through diplomatic liaison offices) and recognition of diplomas. However, Belgrade authorities said they will never recognize Kosovo's independence (Balkan Insight 2012). Following two-year talks, Serbia and Kosovo reached an agreement on the proper conduct of relations between the two political entities. The Brussels Agreement, signed in April 2013 stated that the two parties shall (Office of Kosovo’s Prime Minister 2013): establish an association of municipalities in Kosovo, inhabited mostly by ethnic Serbs. It would have a legal status; it can be dissolved only by decision of its members. Decisions would be taken by majority rule. The associations would have an obligation to ensure the development of local community members' access to education and health systems, and urban / rural planning. Other powers would be delegated by the central authorities in Kosovo. ensure the existence of a single police force called the Kosovo Police. All existing similar forces in the north of Kosovo would be integrated in the Kosovo Police. Members of other Serbian security forces would also take positions in the Kosovo Police; establish regional headquarters of Police for the four municipalities mainly populated by ethnic Serbs (North Mitrovica, Zvecan, Zubin Potok and Leposavić). The commander would be an ethnic Serb from Kosovo, nominated by the Ministry of Interior, following proposals from members of local associations; integrate legal authorities within the legislative framework of Kosovo. Pristina Court of Appeal would establish a panel of judges
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to ensure the fair conduct of trials in municipalities mainly populated by ethnic Serbs; organize municipal elections in 2013, with the participation of OSCE delegations, in line with Kosovo’s and international law; set up an implementation committee, with EU’s support. On January 21st, 2014 the first Intergovernmental Conference was held, marking the start of Serbia’s accession negotiations. In an analytical report, the European Commission made a forecast on how difficult it would be able to align national policies with the EU’s acquis. The 35 chapters were divided into several categories, based on the difficulty expected in the negotiation and alignment process. Upon preliminary analysis, the most difficulties are expected in the fields covered by chapters 23: “Judiciary and Fundamental Rights”, 24: “Justice, Freedom and Security”, 27: “Environment” and 35: “Other: Relation with Kosovo” (European Commission 2011, section 3.34: General Assessment). In the second half of 2013 the screening process of 34 of the 35 chapters of the EU’s acquis started. The first chapters submitted to the process were "Judiciary and Fundamental Rights" (25.09.2013), "Justice, Freedom and Security" (10.02.2013) and "Financial Control" (17.10.2013). The main objective of the evaluation was to identify the differences between Serbia’s legislation and the EU’s acquis. Following this analysis, the candidate must demonstrate that it is capable to accept the legislation and to iron out existing differences. Also, the candidate must state if it requires a transitional period to align with the acquis of the particular chapter. The screening process begins with an explanatory evaluation: the European Commission presents the acquis to the candidate state; the acquis is divided into chapters in order to facilitate the negotiation process. The next step is a bilateral evaluation process, resulting in deciding the degree of alignment of national legislation with the EU acquis, while establishing the necessary reforms to align. The European Commission estimated that in the case of Serbia, this process will take about two years: September 2013-June 2015 (MFA Serbia 2014). In March 2015 the screening process of all chapters was finalized (Balkans.com 2015). Following the meetings devoted to the evaluation process, the Commission will present a report to the Member States. This report will contain benchmarks to be considered for each chapter. The opening of negotiations for each chapter for which benchmarks were established can begin only after the EU Council decides that the candidate country has met these criteria.
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If the EU evaluation report contains the required benchmarks for opening negotiations, the EU Council will invite Serbia to talks, after which action plans will be presented, including measures to be taken during the process of alignment with EU legislation. As soon as the benchmarks for opening negotiations on a given chapter are met (and the recommendations are approved by the Member States), the EU Council will invite Serbia to present its position on a specific chapter (only if the level of alignment with EU’s acquis can be presented) and the remaining alignment program; Serbian authorities can also make requests for transitional periods or derogations (where they want permanent derogation in the implementation of the acquis in a given area). During the negotiations with the EU, Serbia will be able to submit amendments to its negotiating position (MFA Serbia 2014, section 2). After the evaluation process will be concluded, the European Commission will submit to the Council's Draft EU Common Position, the organization will state that either (MFA Serbia 2014, section 4): Serbia has reached a sufficient level of alignment with the EU’s acquis in the field of a chapter, not requiring further negotiations on that chapter (this situation is currently specific only to the “Institutions” chapter). In this case, the chapter will be closed; the level of alignment with the acquis does not allow the temporary closure of negotiation chapters, determining the necessary benchmarks for its closing (currently, a specific situation of most chapters); it takes determination of temporary / intermediate benchmarks (the specific case for chapters 23, 24 and 35). After fulfilling the respective benchmarks, the chapters can be closed. Moreover, within this document, the Serbian state can be asked to present additional information and analysis, necessary in areas for which transitional periods or derogations were requested. Based on the Commission’s proposal, the EU Council unanimously decides on opening negotiations on a given chapter, followed by the holding of an inter-governmental conference on all chapters (usually, with support from the European Council, General Affairs Council or the Foreign Affairs Council). In rare instances where there are no interim and/or closing benchmarks, a chapter can be opened and closed within the same inter- governmental conference. However, when the above-mentioned benchmarks do exist, the candidate country will continue to work on the fulfilment and will
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regularly submit a progress report to the European Commission (MFA Serbia 2014, section 3). Negotiations on a chapter are therefore opened and closed through intergovernmental conferences. If the benchmarks are met, the chapter can be declared "closed" within the conference only if the EU Member States representatives have declared their satisfaction on the progress made by Serbia. Regarding Chapters 23 ("Judiciary and Fundamental Rights"), 24 ("Justice, Freedom and Security") and 35 ("Relations with Kosovo"), Serbia will be obliged to submit monthly reports to the EU Council and the Commission on progress in those fields and to send experts to check their progress. As regards to Chapter 35, Serbia will be monitored by the European External Action Service. They will provide regular reports on progress made by both sides (Serbia and Kosovo). The EU Council can decide that negotiations on chapters must be temporarily suspended only when serious violations of the basic principles of the EU (ex. breaching the "Copenhagen criteria" or the four fundamental freedoms of the EU) are identified. The duration of negotiations will largely depend on Serbia’s capacity to respect its obligations as a result of EU membership, but also the organization's willingness to admit new members (MFA Serbia 2014, section 6). Accession negotiations will be concluded once Serbia and the EU will reach an agreement on all 35 chapters included in the process, an agreement that must be confirmed by the European Council. In October 2015, after concluding that Serbia continued to make progress as regards the political and economic criteria and acknowledging the country’s need to consolidate and further sustain its economic and structural reforms agenda, including on public administration reform and economic governance, the European Commission and the European External Action Service put forward the recommendation to the Council of Ministers and the EU Member States to open negotiation of acquis chapter 35, regarding the relation with Kosovo (European Commission 2015a). In November of the same year, Serbia’s Foreign Minister Ivica Dačič stated that by the end of the year Serbia will begin negotiations on two chapters: “Relation with Kosovo” and “Financial Control” (InSerbia 2015). On December 14th, 2015 Serbia officially began the negotiation the above mentioned acquis chapters, Prime Minister Alekasandar Vučić stating that he expects a rapid progress of the negotiation in the field covered by chapter “Financial Control” (Government of Serbia 2015). Meanwhile, EU Commissioner for Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, Johannes Hahn, announced that “in the first half of
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2016 it will be possible to open chapters 23 and 24” – concerning the fields of “Judiciary and Fundamental Rights” and “Justice, Freedom and Security” (Government of Serbia 2015). After the closure of each chapter, the Commission will report on the general situation of the negotiation process. This report will include remarks regarding the overall level of preparedness of Serbia to assume the responsibilities as member of the EU, as well as recommendations on the conclusion of negotiations. Such recommendations will also be provided by the General Affairs Council, in partnership with COREPER. The latter will determine the conclusion of the negotiation process, in a last intergovernmental conference, when the signing the Accession Treaty will be proposed along with a specific date of accession. This decision will finally be accepted by the European Council (MFA Serbia 2014, chapter V). Before the end of negotiations, it is necessary to decide a preliminary date of the official accession. Regarding this date, there is still a discrepancy at the EU level regarding the optimal time for Serbia's admission to the organization. Although the accession process is essentially a technical one, it largely depends on the political will of European leaders (both national and those who lead the main EU institutions). Thus, in 2014, with the appointment of Jean Claude Juncker as head of a new European Commission (marked by the renaming of the DG Enlargement), the extension has been placed in "waiting" state, the future head of the Commission European stating on July 15th, 2014 that "it is not expected that new countries to join the Union in the next five years", but that "ongoing accession negotiations will continue” (EurActiv 2014). The most likely accession period for Serbia was established as early as 2020. Although disappointed, Belgrade authorities proved to be confident, Serbian Deputy Prime Minister Kori Udovički confirming that Serbia aspires to become a European Union member state around the year 2020. She added that EU’s five years enlargement break does not mean that the accession prospects of the Western Balkans have decreased (EurActiv 2014). Negotiation results will be included in the Accession Treaty, which will also mention the date of accession, the conditions of accession and transitional measures required in areas identified by the Commission. The distribution of votes within the EU Council and European Parliament, and the foreseen number of MEPs for Serbia will also be decided and stated in the Treaty. The treaty will be initially examined by the Commission and the European Parliament, later to be signed by Serbia and the EU Member States representatives. Between the signing of the Treaty and the actual accession, the
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Treaty will be subject to ratification by Member States and Serbia. After this process is over, Serbia will be declared a full member of the EU (MFA Serbia 2014, chapter VI).
5. KOSOVO: A CASE STUDY
Since its debut, Serbia's EU accession process was marked and determined by the dynamics of the state’s relations with Kosovo. As mentioned before, since 1999 Kosovo has been placed under UN administration, following the UN Security Council 1244 Resolution (UNSC Resolution 1244/1999, art. 7-11). In February 2007 (following a meeting with the stakeholders), former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari was entrusted by UN to prepare his own version of a peace agreement between Serbia and Kosovo, which he would then send to the UN Security Council (UNOSEK 2007). Ahtisaari noted that during these discussions a final status of the region must be established. The Serbian Prime Minister refused to receive Ahtisaari’s visit, motivating his decision through the unclear status of the legislative power in Belgrade (Serbia did not have a functioning Parliament after the elections on January 21st of that year), having practically no mandate to discuss the matter of Kosovo with Ahtisaari. On 21 February 2007, Ahtisaari started a campaign of consultations with the two parties in order to finalize the agreement. He stressed that his proposal was (for the moment) a draft that will include compromises in the final set after negotiations. After this period of negotiations (and changes to the agreement), Ahtisaari agreed with the two sides on a high level meeting which had to take place in March 2007. Following this meeting, the leaders of both sides reported a total refusal to reach a compromise on the main themes of the Agreement (Kosovar Albanians’ desire to gain independence and Serbia's desire to maintain its sovereignty and territorial integrity). Concluding that there were no chances for reaching a common position, Ahtisaari went on to declare that he would send the proposals to the UN Security Council to finalize by March the province's final status (International Crisis Group 2007). However, Vojislav Koštunica was quick to declare that the proposed agreement was "illegitimate and unacceptable" because it "violates the UN Charter, by undermining the sovereignty of a UN member state - Serbia"(Government of Serbia 2007). President Boris Tadić finally received Ahtisaari; after talks, Serbian President swore that he would never recognize
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an independent Kosovo. Serbia's Foreign Minister warned that "it is now necessary to avoid an imposed solution that would lead to transforming Serbia into a “factor of instability" (Government of Serbia 2007). Nevertheless, US officials declared that Ahtisaari's proposal was "fair and balanced" (US State Department 2007), while EU leaders concluded that the proposal was "built on approximately twelve months of direct talks between Pristina and Belgrade” (German Presidency of the EU 2007). According to the International Crisis Group, the implementation of Ahtisaari’s Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement (as the agreement was officially called) would pose significant challenges. The think-tank also noted that decentralization was the key to peaceful transition. The Ahtisaari Proposal was seen as wisely ambiguous with regard to the powers and duration of the EU mission that will oversee this settlement, ensuring that the international community will retain the final word in Kosovo through its formative years of statehood. Although acknowledging the strong support for the use of the plan as base for the adoption of a resolution, the International Crisis Group recognized the importance of unity when it came down to positions assumed by UN Security Council, in order to avoid a Russian veto (International Crisis Group 2007, 1-3). In early 2008, Kosovars were determined to declare their independence. That decision came amid the tenth anniversary of the conflict with Serbia. The population of the region based itself on the inability of US President Bush to engage in a new international campaign (in 2008, Bush's term would end leaving him little time of manoeuvre in international politics), and also on the important positions in which two of the former SFRY republics were to be found1. Most likely, the decision to declare independence was postponed after presidential elections in Serbia (in order to avoid offering a new campaign topic to the nine registered candidates). On February 17th, 2008 the Parliament of Kosovo proclaimed the independence of the province, issuing the following statement (Parliament of Kosovo 2008): "We, the democratically elected leaders of our people, hereby declare Kosovo to be an independent and sovereign state. This declaration reflects the will of our people and it is in full accordance with the recommendations of UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari and his Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement. We declare
1 Slovenia held the Presidency of the European Council at that time, while Croatia had voting right within the United Nations Security Council as one of the 15 non-permanent members, elected by rotation.
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Kosovo to be a democratic, secular and multi-ethnic republic, guided by the principles of non-discrimination and equal protection under the law." The declaration was adopted by unanimous vote (with the presence of the majority of required quorum: 109 members). Eleven MPs representing the region's Serb minority boycotted the voting procedure, while other minority representatives participated in the vote (Parliament of Kosovo 2008). 108 of the 193 UN members have recognized Kosovo's independence (as of May 2015), the main challengers being Russia and China (permanent members of the UN Security Council), but also their traditional allies (India, Venezuela, Cuba, DPR Korea, etc.). The Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement according to which through the declaration of independence, Kosovo violated Serbia's sovereignty, the UN Charter, UN Resolution 1244/1999, and other international agreements. Russia declared their support to Belgrade, demanding the restoration of territorial integrity of Serbia (MFA Russia 2008). On the other hand, China refused to accept the declaration of independence, noting that it seeks to respect the territorial integrity of Serbia (B92.com 2009). The positions of the two countries thus assumed (and maintained until present day), leave little chance that any UN resolution on Kosovo recognition would be adopted, given that Russia and China have the right to "veto" within the United Nations Security Council. This again raises the issue of reform of this international institution, a necessary and long awaited one, especially by states like Germany or Japan (who recognized Kosovo). The reform would entail a reorganization of the Security Council by adding permanent members and eliminating the right of veto. This process would lead to a redistribution of spheres of influence in the process of dialogue and negotiation, a situation that could prove favourable to Kosovo (by increasing pressure on states like Russia or Brazil for accepting independence, reorganization of poles of influence in the negotiation process or the removal of the main obstacle that stand in the way of a favourable resolution for the Albanian province – the veto right). A special case is that of the EU. Like other international organizations, the EU lacks the legal power to recognize a state. Most Member States have recognized Kosovo, but in order to establish a common foreign policy towards Kosovo, the approval of all Member States is required, a situation that is currently inexistent. In February 2008, EU officials said they had "taken note" of the decision of the Kosovo Parliament (EU Observer 2008). At the time of declaration, 23 of the 27 EU Member States have recognized Pristina's decision. The refusal came from five countries: Cyprus,
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Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain, each motivating the decision in a different manner: Cyprus: the Foreign Ministry mentioned in 2008 that "Cyprus will never recognize a unilateral declaration of independence, which is outside the framework of the UN" (B92.com 2008). President Dimitris Christofas confirmed in March 2008 the decision not to recognize Kosovo's independence out of respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Serbia. He said that "the only thing Kosovo and Cyprus have in common is that the principles of international law and the fact that UN decisions are constantly violated," adding that "the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Cyprus and Serbia have been violated in the most brutal manner as possible" (B92.com 2008). The decision of the authorities in Nicosia has so far remained unchanged. The position assumed by the Cypriot state is clearly linked to the unclear status of the northern area of the island (occupied by Turkey in 1974 and proclaimed "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus", recognized internationally only by Turkey). Greece: has taken a neutral stance on the declaration of independence. After an analysis of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Greece took the decision not to recognize Kosovo independence, arguing that it violates the territorial integrity of Serbia (Kosovo Young Europeans 2010). Although this decision has remained unchanged so far, Greece has opened a liaison office in Pristina, facilitating communication with Kosovo (MFA Kosovo 2014a). Romania: the Parliament decided by vote not to recognize Kosovo's independence; the only support came from UDMR party, representing the Hungarian minority in Romania, in search of recognition of Transylvania’s autonomy (Reuters 2008). The Parliament’s position was supported by the Government and the Presidential Administration, while the following statement of President Traian Băsescu was recorded: "territorial partitions are unacceptable, regardless of the explanations that come in their support" (The Sofia Echo 2009). Up to now Romania’s position remains unchanged. However, there are signs of Bucharest and Pristina normalizing relations such as Romania's decision to open a liaison office in Pristina, facilitating communication between
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Romania and Kosovo (MFA Romania 2014) or the decision of Bucharest to recognize Kosovar passports (MFA Kosovo 2014b). Slovakia: Bratislava’s reaction was largely that of rejection of the declaration. The Foreign Minister said that there’s a need to analyze the situation. Meanwhile, the Deputy Prime Minister replied that Kosovo's decision, taken without Serbia’s approval, is a flagrant violation of international law, which could set a precedent. Reacting to that statement, specialists from Bratislava explained that the situation of Albanians in Serbia is totally different from that of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia (The Slovak Spectator 2008). However, in 2009, the authorities in Bratislava admitted that the process started by Pristina is irreversible. After Serbia-Kosovo relations improvement, former Prime Minister Iveta Radičová said that there is no reason for not recognizing Kosovo's independence, a position assumed by the new Slovak president, elected in 2014, Andrej Kiska (Nationalia 2014). Spain: is the only Western country that has refused to recognize Kosovo's independence. While acknowledging that the decision opens a new chapter in Kosovo talks between Belgrade and Pristina, Foreign Minister Miguel Moratinos maintained his position, noting that Kosovo's independence violates Serbia's sovereignty and territorial integrity, constituting a dangerous international precedent (20minutos 2010). Although this seems a bizarre statement, the precedent Moratinos referred to could affect Spain, where two of its autonomous regions (Catalonia and the Basque Country) are campaigning for independence. A possible "loss" of Catalonia (through the application of a "Kosovo precedent"), for example, would seriously affect the Spanish economy, significantly dependent on Catalan contribution. Nevertheless, Moratinos said that the situation would change in case of a revocation of the UN Resolution 1244/1999 (which would lead to changes in the province's status). Thus, a certain diversity can be identified when it comes to the external policies of the EU member states, Although being encouraged even by the EU‘s motto ("unity in diversity"), this principle now acts as an obstacle to the favourable development of EU-Serbia relations. This diversity will have to be harmonized with the EU's enlargement policy in the Western Balkans, in
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order to maintain a climate of stability and ensure a fluid and consistent European path for states in the region. Although the European Parliament (EP) has no authority when it comes to managing the organization’s foreign policy, in 2008 (during an inter- parliamentary meeting attended by representatives of Kosovo’s Parliament) it accepted Kosovo’s declaration of independence (Blic 2008). On February 5th, 2009 the European Parliament adopted a resolution (424 votes for, 133 against) designed to encourage EU member states to recognize Kosovo. According to the resolution, the idea of partition of Kosovo along ethnic criteria was rejected (European Parliament 2009, section E, art 1-6). The resolution was welcomed by representatives of EULEX in Kosovo, but was flatly rejected by Slovakia and Spain (B92.com 2009). In 2010, a new resolution was adopted by the EP, urging all member states to recognize Kosovo's independence in order to facilitate international recognition. The resolution called on Member States to adopt a common position on the EU's relationship with Kosovo (European Parliament 2010, section E, pct. 1-5). Finally, a third EP Resolution was adopted, calling on the five contesting Member States to recognize Kosovo (European Parliament 2012, section I). After the EU’s reaction, it became clear that Kosovo would develop its own relation with the organization, independent from that of Serbia. On October 10th, 2012 the European Commission declared (following a feasibility study) that there are no legal obstacles to the eventual signing of a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Kosovo, because this approach does not require full sovereignty of the state entity. Therefore, the Commission recommended that same year the start of negotiations for signing the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Kosovo. The only condition imposed by EU institution was for Kosovo to make progress in four areas of interest: rule of law, public administration, protection of minorities and trade (European Commission 2012, para. 4). On October 15th, 2012, Kosovo’s Prime Minister, together with the Ministerial Committee for European Integration approved the list of tasks to be fulfilled, to start negotiations on signing a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (Government of Kosovo 2012). European Commissioner for Enlargement, Štefan Füle, declared that by spring 2013 the Commission will report on the progress made by Kosovo. Following the Brussels Agreement, which facilitated relations between Serbia and Kosovo (where the two sides pledged not to interfere in each other's European course), the EU Council recommended the start of negotiations for
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signing the Stabilisation and Association Agreement EU and Kosovo (European Commission 2013a). On October 28th, 2013, the negotiations for the signing of the agreement were officially launched; they were concluded on May 2nd, 2014. In June of that year, Štefan Füle declared that Stabilisation and Association Agreement could be signed by the spring of 2015, as the Serbia-Kosovo relations improved (Tanjug 2014). Eventually, the agreement was signed on October 27th, 2015, being expected to enter into force by the first half of 2016 (European Commission 2013b). As it is the first to be signed after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between Kosovo and the EU will no longer need to be ratified by each member state (the member states not being any more a party individually), thus facilitating the process of entering into force (European Commission 2015b). An important role throughout Kosovo’s history (both until 2008 and after the declaration of independence) was that of its relation with Albania. When Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia on February 17th, 2008, Albania was one of the first countries to officially recognize the new republic. On August 18th, 2009, Albanian Prime Minister Sali Berisha said that "there should be no customs administration between the two countries" and that citizens of Albania should not "allow Albania and Kosovo to perceive each other as foreign countries" (SETimes 2009). The reaction was received with anger and indignation by Serbia’s authorities (SETimes 2009). Serbia’s fears towards the possible independence of Kosovo are mainly related to the possibility of an eventual annexation of Kosovo by Albania as part of a comprehensive process of creating "Greater Albania", a process that started at the end of World War II and which drew attention to both Albania’s neighbours (Serbia and Greece showing deep concern over the territorial aspirations of Tirana) and the "powerful states of Europe" (Bogdani and Loughlin 2007, 230-231). Such a process has been described by experts from International Crisis Group as a potential source for a new conflict in the Balkans in terms of similar aspirations of Serbia (in 1992-1999) and Croatia (International Crisis Group 2007, 5). A Greater Albania (described as "Ethnic Albania" by Tirana authorities) would constitute a new challenge on the world diplomacy scene, opening a potential 'Pandora's Box', given that both Serbia and Bulgaria (Savich 2011) have expressed or manifested expansionist tendencies in the region. However, the Ahtisaari Plan mentioned the adoption of a multi-ethnic “Kosovar” identity (rather than an Albanian one) as a condition for the region’s independence. However, a survey showed that 75%
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of Kosovo Albanians would prefer to live together with Albanians in Albania, under a unified state. The same support was observed in Albania, where 68% of citizens would opt for unification of Albania with Kosovo (Mabry et al. 2013, 182). Nevertheless, a de jure unification prior to full accession of the two entities might take decades and is impossible due to constitutional obstacles and opposition of international actors (Kalemaj 2014, 36-37). With regards to the future of the Albania-Kosovo relation in the next twenty-thirty years, Ilir Kalemaj analyses four possible scenarios, based on the relation between the two entities and their EU membership status (Kalemaj 2014, 29-ibid): Kosovo and Albania borders become gradually irrelevant as part of the EU if both are integrated at that stage. Ilir Kalemaj projects that “for Albania, the prospect of membership, if due reforms are undertaken and laws properly implemented, thus constituting the rule of law, can be as early as 2022-2023”, whereas Kosovo’s prospect of membership can be as early as 2030. Therefore, this scenario is considered to be “the most probable one” only when it comes to analyzing the relation on a long term perspective. Albania and Kosovo are part of one of the following regional forums: CEFTA, Balkan Union, Balkan Benelux, etc., but only one of them, most probably Albania, is part of the EU in the next ten years or so. This situation would transform the relation between Albania and Kosovo, making it clearly asymmetrical on the short- term. If Albania would benefit from the EU-member status, being able to access structural funds and develop its own economy, Kosovo would have to wait for a development of its relation with Serbia in order to become member of at least the aforementioned regional forums, without restrains. Albania and Kosovo realize a de facto unification before accession in EU. Kalemaj considers this scenario an unlikely one, although being claimed by nationalists from both sides of the border (political parties like Vetvendosje from Kosovo or PDIU in Albania). A de facto unification would culminate in either a free market zone, a custom union or a fully integrated economic zone, before or after EU accession for the two entities, depending on political willingness and geopolitical circumstances. Albania and Kosovo operate as functional countries without any projected unification of any kind, where Albania joins the EU, with
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Kosovo still to conclude its state-building process. Kalemaj sees this scenario as the most probable one, anticipating that Albania will join the EU by 2022-2023 (as it already received candidate status), with Kosovo having to wait until at least until 2035-2040 for that to happen, “unless there is a change of plans and the region is integrated in the block”. Kalemaj expects Albania to start negotiations on chapters, as it already received the “reform plan” form the EU. The author states that due to the recently decided five-year enlargement postponement, Albania will not be able to join the organization sooner than 2019, while Kosovo will have to deal with issues such as state-building in order to obtain the legal right to apply for membership. This position contradicts the expectations of Kosovo officials (i.e. former Minister of Foreign Affairs Enver Hoxaj) who stated that Kosovo will join the EU by 2024 (MFA Kosovo 2014). Though it may seem that Albania’s role in Serbia’s EU path is insignificant, its cultural and historical ties to Kosovo play an important part in the Western Balkans’ European integration process. Albania’s relation with Kosovo can be thus analysed (more than just the mere analysis presented in this paper) as an evolutionary model of the region in the context of EU enlargement process. Despite their EU neighbourhood processes being conducted separately, Serbia and Kosovo still maintain a state of unrest, determined by the bizarre dynamics of the relationship. Although Kosovo has expressed a clear desire to move closer to the EU, it remains to be seen how the five states contesting Kosovo's independence will be persuaded to accept the reality. Although apparently their relationship with Serbia is the main reason cited by these states, internal tensions between the ethnic majority from these states and minorities who aspire to greater autonomy (and in some cases even independence) can maintain this state of uncertainty for a long time. Thus, if Greece (a traditional partner of Serbia in international relations arena) could be satisfied only by a sessions of tripartite talks (Greece-Serbia-EU), the question remains tricky in the case of other states. In Romania, the members of the Hungarian minority (in search of recognition of Transylvania's autonomy) said that recognizing Kosovo's independence could be used as a model for Transylvania (Szekler National Council 2008). The situation is the same in Slovakia, where the Hungarian minority advocates for extension of rights and a wide autonomy of the region that forms the border with Hungary. Instead,
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Cyprus is a subject already under review, Kosovo's independence representing an opportunity to extend the negotiations with ethnic Turks to solve the above mentioned local territorial problem. Finally, Spain is a clear example of how central authorities wished to ignore the political changes at the international level, leaving the "door closed" to claims carried out by the autonomous regions (with a complex ethnic composition). In the current context of European security policy, Kosovo has been perceived by most opposing states (whether EU members or not) as a dangerous precedent that could be used by various minority entities within those states to obtain autonomy or even independence. This approach was most recently used by Russia. Although in 2008 the Russian representative to EU declared that Kosovo's independence "would create a serious negative precedent in terms of international law" (Financial Times 2008), the Russian state used the very same "precedent" as a mean to recognize the independence of Crimea (an autonomous republic within the independent state of Ukraine), which in March 2014 held a referendum for independence, a ballot that was contested and not recognized by Ukraine (as it is contrary to the Constitution of Ukraine 1996, art. 1 and art. 73) and the international community. The Venice Commission concluded that “circumstances in Crimea did not allow the holding of a referendum in line with European democratic standards. Any referendum on the status of a territory should have been preceded by serious negotiations among all stakeholders”, stating that “such negotiations did not take place” (Venice Commission 2014, Conclusion). Unlike Kosovo, where the decision has received wide popular support (since the 90s), being challenged only by the Serb minority in northern Kosovo, Crimea’s decision to secede from Ukraine and join the Russian Federation is easily contestable just by analyzing how the referendum was held. Besides the fact that there were no consultations between stakeholders (supporters versus opponents of the independence), the elections in Crimea were widely criticized for the overwhelming presence of military (and paramilitary) in and around polling stations, but also for the non-existence of a possibility for Crimea to maintain the status-quo (the voters had to choose between independence and joining Russia). Also, Kosovo's decision didn’t come as a result of pressure applied by a third state, while the referendum in Crimea was organized under the influence of Moscow (both at a statement level and through the deployment by Russia of "peacekeeping forces", which hindered the work of the Ukrainian administration in Crimea).
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On this issue, Hajrudin Somun, former ambassador of Bosnia- Herzegovina in Turkey elaborated a short comparison of Crimea and Kosovo, concluding that for several reasons, the two political entities are rather different when it comes to the manner in which their status should be approached (Today's Zaman 2014): Kosovar Albanians were subject to Milošević’s genocidal intent, seeking refuge in neighbouring countries. On the other hand, Crimean Tatars were never threatened or attacked by Ukraine’s administration or military. Kosovo was part of Serbia, but the Albanian majority that inhabited the province lost all its rights and local institutions during Milošević’s regime. In Crimea the situation was different: after gaining independence from the USSR, Ukraine did not strip Crimea’s Russians of their rights. On the contrary, they received the right to self-govern the region (Crimea became the only Ukrainian province with the status of autonomous province); Kosovar Albanians did not receive any support or interference in their fight for independence. In Crimea’s case, Russia sent ~ 16,000 troops to Crimea before the referendum for the province’s secession. Also, during the war in the '90s Albania did not enter Kosovo, nor did Kosovo ask for accession to Albania. Kosovo will remain significant only for the Balkan region and Serbia (as an important part of their history, due to the role played by the region during the Ottoman rule). If before 2000, Kosovo was a leading international issue, now the tone is slightly appeased. On the other hand, Crimea played for centuries a strategic role for Russian, Ottoman and other European empires. Now, though the geopolitical map has changed, the region still poses an interest for Russia and it’s perceived as a major pawn in the battle between East and West (in Europe and not only). The view that the two political entities are different (when it comes to reason and means of secession) is not general accepted. Luca J. Uberti states that “there is little contextual difference between Kosovo's and Crimea's secession claims: whatever their moral and political merits, both are made against a constitutional backdrop that asserts territorial integrity, and more or less explicitly proscribes secession” (Open Democracy 2014). Also, the role played by foreign powers is quite similar: neither NATO (in Serbia) nor
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Russian (in Crimea) interventions were authorized by the UN Security Council; in both cases, although it followed a multilateral process of conflict mediation, the military action itself was unilateral (Open Democracy 2014). In terms of perspective, the situation in Kosovo has been clearly defined by Western leaders. German Chancellor Angela Merkel declared in 2014 that the decision to recognize Kosovo does not violate international law, while Crimean referendum organized at the request of Moscow, constitutes a breach of international law, through the rapidity of the decision to organize the ballot, lack of appropriate training and rejection of foreign observers (EU Observer 2014). The Kremlin authorities' position on Kosovo's status remains ambiguous until now; while not accepting to recognize the province's independence, they are obviously using it as a means of legitimizing the decision taken (under pressure) by the Crimean population (Kremlin 2014). Thus, it can be said that Russia would continue to apply a double standard with respect to the status of Kosovo.
6. CONCLUSIONS
This paper aimed to underline the challenges faced by Serbia as a candidate for accession to the European Union. As opposed to the case of former candidate countries in the region (Romania or Slovenia) the local and regional particularities transform Serbia’s negotiation process. Whether the international community and current scholars accept it or not, the wars for the breakup of Yugoslavia still persist as a burden for the hopeful countries of the Western Balkans. The multiple issues rose by the events in the ‘90s (a consistent relation with the ICTY, a functioning rule of law, respect of human rights, with emphases on minority rights, economic and social reconstruction) are still recurrent in the process of negotiation. The legacy of Milošević’s regime does not pose a serious burden just for Serbia, but in this case it is important to demonstrate the ability of a former isolated state to rejoin the international community as a respected and respectful member. Being able to demonstrate that “there is life after Milošević” was an essential part of the negotiation’s debut. In the decade that followed the wars of the 90s, FRY, then Serbia-Montenegro (2003), became actively involved in promoting their interests by participating in a series of summits (Biarritz-2000, Zagreb-2000, Thessaloniki-2003), all designed to
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confirm the European course of the former Yugoslav state. This was just the beginning of the road for Serbia, whose administration and political leadership managed to improve relations with the EU in less than a decade, when the country was granted candidate status. Although the accession process is essentially an administrative one, its implementation largely depends on the political will of European leaders (both those at national level and those who lead the main EU institutions). Thus, in 2014, with the appointment of Jean Claude Juncker as head of a new European Commission, the enlargement process has been placed in a "waiting state". Currently Serbia wishes to join the EU in 2020, a realistic perspective, given the progress reached in the main areas of interest and the openness proven by Belgrade in the negotiations on Kosovo's status. With regard to the geopolitical aspects that hold back Serbia’s negotiation process, the dynamics of the Serbia-Kosovo-EU relation represent the main issue approached by the current paper. Since the declaration of independence, the political status of Kosovo has been the source of new diplomatic tensions between Belgrade and EU representatives. This decision also raised tensions between EU Member States, five of them refusing to recognize Kosovo's independence. These countries are in a delicate situation at least, being forced to choose between compliance with international law (and the principle self-determination of peoples, which themselves were formed on) and increased internal pressures, coming from ethnic groups that advocate for widening rights, autonomy or even independence. Their official reaction places raise the question of the relation between Serbia and the recognizing countries as well as the relation between Kosovo and the contesting countries, in the eventuality that they will decide to recognize its independence, at a given moment. This diversity, currently manifested in the external policies of the EU Member States, is also acting as an obstacle to the favourable development of EU-Serbia relations. It is clear that the five contesting Member States will maintain pressure on EU, forcing the organization to prevent the implementation of a coordinated foreign policy. But this internal diversity will have to be at some point harmonized with EU’s expansionist approach in the region of Western Balkans, all in order to maintain a climate of stability and ensure a fluid, consistent European path for states in the region. The complexity of Kosovo’s decision from 2008 still remains a topic of discussion among specialists in international relations. It is not just the impact on Serbia and the EU accession process that must be taken into consideration, but also legal aspects such as the creation of a “Kosovo precedent”, which
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could fuel similar decisions in the autonomous provinces of other countries. It’s would also why some EU Member States (mainly Spain, Cyprus and Romania) still refuse to recognize its independence. Moreover, the decision of the authorities in Pristina was widely used by Russia in the recent crisis in Ukraine, when the Russian state recognized the independence of Crimea (after a referendum which was largely disputed by the international community). This current situation places Russia in an ambiguous position, the state’s representatives refusing to recognize the independence of the Albanian province, but using it as a means of legitimizing the decision taken in 2014 (under pressure) by the Crimean population. As for the status of Kosovo and the decision of local authorities to start on a separate path from that of Serbia’s, the situation is not as unclear as it may seem. Although the process of independence recognition is expected to be a lengthy one, Serbia will be forced at some point to recognize a historical truth: since 2008, Kosovo is independent. When Belgrade will decide to recognize Kosovo's decision and the new state’s separate European path, relations between the two countries will witness real improvement. Such a development would force the challengers among EU Member States (and beyond) to accept the status-quo. So perhaps the key question is not "how can five EU members be convinced to accept Kosovo’s independence?", but "how can Serbia be convinced that Kosovo's independence will bring a part of the region’s much desired peace and stability?" In the event that the five EU challengers will decide to recognize Kosovo, this process will automatically lead to developing a coordinated (and long awaited) position of EU Member States, as well as a relief of diplomatic dialogue (both at EU level and internationally).
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European Commission, 2015a, Key findings of the 2015 report on Serbia; accessed 15.11.2015 at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-6037_en.htm. European Commission, 2015b, Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Union and Kosovo signed; accessed 30.10.2015 at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5928_en.htm?locale=en. European Parliament, 2009, Resolution of the EP P6_TA(2009)0052 / 05.02.2009 concerning Kosovo and the role of EU; accessed 30.05.2015 at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=- //EP//NONSGML+TA+P6-TA-2009-0052+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN. European Parliament, 2010, Resolution of the EP P7_TA(2010)0281/ 08.07.2010 concerning Kosovo’s integration process; accessed 30.05.2015 at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=- //EP//NONSGML+TA+P7-TA-2010-0281+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN. European Parliament, 2012, Resolution of the EP P7_TA(2012)0115 / 29.03.2012 concerning Kosovo’s integration process; accessed 30.05.2015 at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=- //EP//NONSGML+TA+P7-TA-2012-0115+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN. European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, 2014, What is EULEX?; accessed 30.05.2015 at http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/?page=2,16. Financial Times, 2008, Russia warns EU over Kosovo recognition; accessed 30.05.2015 at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/66cbd170-d51e-11dc-9af1- 0000779fd2ac.html#axzz3PHQVmNUT. German Presidency of the EU Council, 2007, EU Presidency Statement on the Kosovo status proposals to be presented today by Martti Ahtisaari in Belgrade and Pristina; accessed 30.05.2015 at http://www.eu2007.de/en/News/CFSP_Statements/February/0202Kosovo.html. Government of Kosovo, 2012, Prime Minister Thaçi: The Feasibility Study confirmed that the state of Kosovo is ready to start official negotiations for a Stabilization and Association Agreement; accessed 30.05.2015 at http://www.kryeministri- ks.net/?page=2,9,3129. Government of Serbia, 2000, Konačni rezultati izbora za predsednika Republike (Final results of the presidential election); accessed 30.05.2015 at http://www.arhiva.srbija.gov.rs/vesti/2000-09/28/21673.html. Government of Serbia, 2007, Pregovori o Sporazumu o stabilizaciji mogu biti za vršniza devet meseci (Stabilisation Agreement can be completed in nine months); accessed 30.05.2015 at http://www.srbija.gov.rs/vesti/vest.php?id=31550. Government of Serbia, 2014, Chronology of Serbia's EU accession process; accessed 30.05.2015 at http://www.seio.gov.rs/serbia-and-eu/history.60.html. Government of Serbia, 2014, Serbia to complete reforms by end of 2019; accessed 13.12.2015 at http://www.srbija.gov.rs/vesti/vest.php?id=113389&change_lang=en. Human Rights Watch, 2001, UNDER ORDERS: War Crimes in Kosovo – 4. March-June 1999: An Overview; accessed 30.05.2015 at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/kosovo/undword-03.htm. InSerbia, 2015, EU-Serbia Negotiations to Begin On December 15, First Chapter: Kosovo; accessed 21.10.2015 at http://inserbia.info/today/2015/11/eu-serbia-negotiations-to- begin-on-december-15-first-chapter-kosovo/.
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International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 2010, The Global Costs of Conflict; accessed 30.05.2015 at http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/OTP/War_Demographics/en/bih_casualty_under count_conf_paper_100201.pdf. Kosovo Young Europeans Blog, 2010, The Importance of the 2008 Kosovo Declaration of Independence; accessed 30.05.2015 athttp://www.kosovo-young.com/the-importance- of-the-2008-kosovo-declaration-of-independence/. Kremlin, 2014, Address by the President of the Russian Federation; accessed 30.05.2015 at http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/6889#sel=31:1,33:109. MFA Kosovo, 2014a, Hoxhaj takon Moschopoulos, pajiset me vizën e pare greke valide në zonën Schengen (Hoxhaj meets Moschopoulos to be given first valid Greek visa to the Schengen area); accessed 30.05.2015 at http://www.mfa- ks.net/?page=1,4,2336&offset=1#.Vg4uCOyqqko. MFA Kosovo, 2014b, Remaining “EU five” begin to recognize Kosovo reality on the ground; accessed 30.05.2015 at http://www.mfa-ks.net/?page=2,131,1768. MFA Romania, 2014, Alerte de călătorie – Kosovo (Travel Alerts – Kosovo); accessed 30.05.2015 at http://mae.ro/travel-alerts/2919#836. MFA Russia, 2008, Statement by Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Kosovo (17.02.2008); accessed 30.05.2015 at http://archive.mid.ru//bdomp/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/041c5a f46913d38ac32573f30027b380!OpenDocument. MFA Serbia, 2009, Albanian FM Answers Serbia's Protest Note; accessed 30.05.2015 at http://www.mfa.rs/Bilteni/Engleski/b210809_e.html. MFA Serbia, 2014, Information concerning the EU accession process; accessed 30.05.2015 at http://www.mfa.gov.rs/en/images/stories/pdf/Information-concerning-the- process-of-negotiations-process.doc. Nationalia, 2014, Slovak President-elect favours Kosovo recognition; accessed 30.05.2015 at http://www.nationalia.info/en/news/1842. NATO, 1999, The Military Technical Agreement between the International Security Force ("KFOR") and the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia (Kumanovo Agreement); accessed 30.05.2015 athttp://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/a990609a.htm. New York Times, 2007, Endgame in Kosovo; accessed 30.05.2015 at http://www.nytimes.com/packages/html/world/20071209_KOSOVO_FEATURE/. Office of Kosovo’s Prime Minister, 2013, First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalisation of Relations (Brussels Agreement); accessed 30.05.2015 at http://www.kryeministri- ks.net/repository/docs/FIRST_AGREEMENT_OF_PRINCIPLES_GOVERNING_THE_ NORMALIZATION_OF_RELATIONS,_APRIL_19,_2013_BRUSSELS_en.pdf. Open Democracy, 2014, Crimea and Kosovo – the delusions of western military interventionism; accessed 30.05.2015 at https://www.opendemocracy.net/luca-j- uberti/crimea-and-kosovo-delusions-of-western-military-interventionism-nato-putin- annexation-legal. Parliament of Kosovo, 2008, Extraordinary Plenary Session of the Assembly on the Solemn Announcement of Kosovo’s Independence to Be Held on 17 February 2008; accessed 30.05.2015 at http://www.assembly- kosova.org/common/docs/proc/trans_s_2008_02_17_al.pdf.
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Reuters 2008, Romania will not recognize Kosovo independence; accessed 30.05.2015 athttp://www.reuters.com/article/2008/02/18/us-kosovo-romania- idUSL18447620080218. SETimes, 2009, Serbia formally protests Berisha's statement; accessed 30.05.2015 at http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/newsbriefs /2009/08/19/nb-01. Szekler National Council, 2008, Kosovo, a model for ethnic Hungarians’ autonomy drive; accessed 30.05.2015 at http://sznt.sic.hu/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=188:kosovo-a- model-for-ethnic-hungarians-autonomy-drive&catid=16:hirek&Itemid=22. Tanjug, 2014, Fule: Kosovo has to work more on reforms; accessed 30.05.2015 at http://www.tanjug.rs/news/127809/fuele--kosovo-has-to-work-more-on-reforms.htm. The Economic Team for Kosovo and Metohija and South Serbia, 2008, Protest Conveyed to France, Britain, Costa Rica, Australia, Albania; accessed 30.05.2015 at http://archive.is/tI42d. The Los Angeles Times, 2000, EU Leaders Pledge $175 Million in Aid for Yugoslavia; accessed 30.05.2015 at http://articles.latimes.com/2000/oct/15/news/mn-36904. The Slovak Spectator, 2008, Slovaks divided on Kosovo; accessed 30.05.2015 at http://spectator.sme.sk/articles/view/30829/2/slovaks_divided_on_kosovo.html. The Sofia Echo, 2009, Romania ready to partner Serbia in World Court action against Kosovo; accessed 30.05.2015 athttp://www.sofiaecho.com/2009/09/04/779528_romania-ready-to-partner-serbia-in- world-court-action-against-kosovo. Today's Zaman, 2014, Five reasons why Crimea cannot be compared with Kosovo by Hajrudin Somun; accessed 30.05.2015 at http://www.todayszaman.com/op-ed_five- reasons-why-crimea-cannot-be-compared-with-kosovo-by-hajrudin-somun- _344554.html. UN Office of the Special Envoy for Kosovo, 2007, Press Conference by Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari; accessed 30.05.2015 at http://www.unosek.org/pressrelease/2007-02- 08-Press_Conference_by_SE_Martti_Ahtisaari,_in_NY_.doc. UN Security Council Resolution 1244/1999 (on Kosovo’s international status); accessed 30.05.2015 at http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1244. UN Security Council Resolution 755/1992 (on UN membership recognition of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina); accessed 30.05.2015 at http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/755. UN Security Council Resolution 757/1992 (on sanctions imposed to the FRY following the belligerent actions underwent in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina); accessed 30.05.2015 at http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/757. UN Security Council Resolution 777/1992 (declaring the cessation of existence of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia); accessed 30.05.2015 at http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/777. US State Department, 2007, Statement from the State Department Spokesman Sean McCormack on the Presentation of Kosovo Status Proposal to the Parties; accessed 30.05.2015 at http://pristina.usembassy.gov/press_02022007.html.
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CHANGING FROM WITHIN? THE INTRA- ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS OF EU ENLARGEMENT
Velibor JAKOVLESKI Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies Geneva/Switzerland [email protected]
Abstract This paper opens up the black box of enlargement, focusing on how the intra- organizational relationships among the Council of the European Union, the European Commission, and the European Parliament affect the process of enlargement. Formally speaking, enlargement is an intergovernmental process, suggesting that member states are firmly in control of its outcomes. However, the EU’s supranational actors, specifically the European Parliament and European Commission also attempt to influence enlargement at various stages. I posit that the process of enlargement to the Western Balkans has evolved, influenced by changing constraints which are operating on the aforementioned actors. The added value of this work is in disaggregating the enlargement process based on its institutionalized relationships in both a vertical and horizontal dimension. It provides a supply-side argument for how enlargement policy has evolved from within the EU, rather than simply as a function of external factors.
Keywords Change; Enlargement; European Union; Institutions
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1. INTRODUCTION
The process of contemporary EU enlargement is different from in the past. As Hillion (2011) has insightfully demonstrated, enlargement rounds have varied historically due to internal factors, such as the nature of membership composition, as well as factors external to the EU, like the political, economic and security climate of the day. The requirements for membership have also changed accordingly, producing unique constraints and incentives for actors to engage in the process. Today, the process of enlargement represents a relatively hierarchical, institutionalized and formal mode of governance. Designed to be an objective, predictable and linear process, enlargement is now guided by strict conditions and decision-making procedures, which have their basis in legal agreements and treaties. Those rigorous membership criteria are usually explained from a demand-side perspective. Specifically, the discrepancy between existing member states and candidates is sufficiently large to merit a rather formal and interventionist enlargement policy in order to bring non-members up to the EU’s standards (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004; Hillion 2011). Indeed, through contemporary enlargement the EU not only engages in building future members (e.g. Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro, Albania), but in some cases it also undertakes state-building within the broader enlargement context (e.g. Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina). The demand-side analyses disproportionately focus only on one dimension of enlargement, the relationships between existing members – which formally decide the fate of applicants – and non-members seeking to join the club. Those relationships entail what I term as the vertical aspect of enlargement; vertical in the sense that the conditions for membership are imposed top-down by the EU, through a highly asymmetrical institutional relationship with candidates. However, a limited focus on the vertical dimension does not address how enlargement policy is made within the EU. That is, how the conditions of enlargement are supplied to a candidate state. Enlargement is formally an intergovernmental process, suggesting that member states are firmly in control of its outcomes. At the same time, however, the EU is an aggregate of different sub-organizational actors and interests. It is a forum for intergovernmental bargaining among member states in the Council, which can also be shaped by supranational influence by the European Parliament and Commission. A focus on the horizontal relationships among those organizational actors can highlight the underlying processes of political contestation and bargaining which are
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missed by many leading studies of enlargement. An important question to ask therefore is how do the inter-organizational relationships within the EU affect the external application of enlargement policy? This paper incorporates both the vertical (EU-Candidate) and horizontal (intra-EU) institutional relationships, which are often not treated as theoretically relevant in the enlargement literature. It develops a preliminary model which attempts to shed light on the conditions under which enlargement policy has changed in its application to the states of South Eastern Europe (SEE). Specifically, I argue that enlargement policy has changed, becoming stricter and more demanding of candidate states, but not because of a deepening discrepancy between current and potential members, per se. Rather, enlargement has evolved as a by-product of the inter-organizational relationships within the EU, specifically among the Council of the European Union, the European Commission, and the European Parliament, and their jockeying to augment their respective influence over policy. That is, enlargement is changing from within, and not simply due to external factors. And while the end result is familiar, i.e. the persistence of member state authority, supranational actors have nevertheless managed to inform enlargement proceedings to a certain degree. In order to test my claim, I trace the relationship between the EU and SEE from early the 2000s, which codified their formal relationship and enlargement perspective. An emphasis is placed on the relationships among the three aforementioned actors, specifically in instances where their interactions resulted in the evolution of enlargement policy. In this case, I am concerned with the introduction of integration partnerships and the application of benchmarking during pre-accession, which made attaining membership status more difficult for candidates. By taking a process-based approach, spanning from the establishment of the initial formal agreement with a potential candidate through the process of pre-accession and ultimately membership, the nuances of the enlargement process begin to show.
2. THEORETICAL MODEL
In my application of the concept, enlargement is understood as an institutional process, rather than a final organizational outcome. Broadly speaking, it is the long-term process by which different actors coordinate their behaviours according to a set of common rules and objectives. It entails a
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gradual process of exporting the EU’s internal institutions to prospective members. Thus, enlargement can be studied as a continuous rather than a simple dichotomous variable. It can also be studied from two analytically distinct yet related dimensions, the vertical and the horizontal.
2.1. Vertical dynamics of enlargement
The vertical dimension of enlargement is set out in Articles 2 and 49 of the TEU, which establish the formal criteria for membership. The so-called Copenhagen Accession Criteria further augment the criteria, requiring conformity to additional political, economic, and membership requirements. The negotiation of the specific conditions under which a candidate state will join the EU is compartmentalized based on the various aspects of the EU acquis. Externally, the EU partakes in those negotiations as a unitary actor; the relationship is therefore bilateral at the macro level. However, little work has been done to explain how the EU reaches its common position, besides the usual starting point based on the state-centric assumptions of liberal intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik 2005). The external relationship is underpinned by conditionality, whereby the EU offers the long term reward of membership - as well as the short term financial, economic and political benefits - as external incentives, in exchange for gradual approximation to EU rules and standards (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004). However, a candidate simply meeting the EU’s formal criteria for membership is only a necessary but not sufficient condition for membership. These points are further clarified when the EU is disaggregated according to its constituent organizational actors below.
2.2. Horizontal dynamics of enlargement
The horizontal relationships within the EU are codified in Article 49 of the TEU: “The European Parliament and national Parliaments shall be notified of [membership] application. The applicant State shall address its application to the Council, which shall act unanimously after consulting the Commission and after receiving the consent of the European Parliament, which shall act by a majority of its component members. The conditions of eligibility agreed upon by the European Council shall be taken into account. The conditions of admission and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the Union is founded, which such admission entails, shall be the subject of an agreement between the Member
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States and the Applicant State. This agreement shall be submitted for ratification by all the contracting States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements” [emphasis added]. At its core enlargement is intergovernmental, because each member state must sign off on enlargement decisions, i.e. unanimity is required. Furthermore, according to Article 49 adjusting the formal requirements for enlargement is also based on an agreement among member states and the applicant. The less prominent supranational features are exemplified by the role of the Commission in providing its opinion and the European Parliament in providing its final assent. In short, the latter two actors have no formal role at some of the key junctures on the enlargement path. Only when there is agreement among its constitutive actors can the EU formally supply the conditions of enlargement to meet an external demand by an applicant. When both the vertical and horizontal planes are taken into account, they result in an enlargement bargain, which encompasses the congruence of the EU organizational actors’ preferences internally, and establishes the criteria an external state needs to meet in order for the accession process to unfold. In short, formally institutionalized rules fix into place the actors that are part of the so-called enlargement bargain, how they relate to each other procedurally, and the means by which their behaviour is regulated and directed towards the organizational objective, in this case integrating outsiders. Importantly, because the formal institutional rules of enlargement impart different roles and powers with respect to different actors, they embody different interests with regard to how enlargement evolves and how those actors interact. By disaggregating the EU according to its constitutive organizational actors and outlining their preferences and ability to influence outcomes, we can obtain a better idea as to how EU enlargement actually unfolds. The preferences of the actors with regard to enlargement decision- making, as well as the main constraints which operate on them, have been theoretically derived and subsequently corroborated though interviews. Despite some intra-organisation differences, by assuming that the preferences of individuals and their respective units are aggregated within each organisational actor, I subscribe to a unitary actor assumption.
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Council of the European Union (Council)
The Council serves as both the de jure regime maker and gatekeeper to the club. Unanimity is required on key enlargement decisions, meaning that all member state representatives in the Council serve as veto players. As a result, a high threshold of agreement must be attained for enlargement to proceed. Moreover, while sometimes member states disagree on enlargement decisions, where there is always agreement is that “all member states are in favour of strict conditionality” (Interview with Council delegate, 12.05.2014). As articulated above, the bargain is encapsulated in conditionality and the Council in particular is a staunch proponent of strict accession criteria. The overall objective is that if enlargement does indeed occur, it generally needs to ensure minimal distributional implications for incumbent members. In other words, the costs of enlargement must be borne by the external state. Accordingly, the Council is particularly attuning to issues of enlargement fatigue, and insists on strict conditionality in order to ensure maximum net benefits from accession. However, when the candidate meets the specific enlargement conditions and the Council fails to move the process forward, it can be perceived as not honouring its commitments. This is a direct consequence of its formal institutional role, which gives member states power over key decisions. As a result, the remaining actors can force the issue and pressure the Council, despite its final gate-keeping ability. Thus, a constraint operating on the Council is the obligation to ensure the credibility of the enlargement bargain. With regard to the other actors, the Council’s primary objective is to retain its already significant authority over enlargement decisions. This entails rebuffing overtures by the Parliament to increase its role in the process, which is a common theme in their relationships over internal EU policy, where the Parliament has succeeded in attaining greater legislative competence. Member states have also tacitly delegated authority to the Commission, which they monitor with caution. The Council can afford the Parliament its often extreme opinion on enlargement matters, “because there are no real consequences from its decisions”, while with the Commission, “the less [member states] are involved, the more room there is for the Commission to move its own agenda” (Interview with Council delegate, 17.03. 2014). In brief: Council’s preferences:
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1. Retain authority over enlargement (rebuff the Commission and Parliament); 2. Candidates pay the “full price” of admission (minimal cost to incumbent members). Council’s constraints: 3. Ensuring the credibility of the enlargement bargain.
European Commission (Commission)
Formally, the Commission is not an official signatory party to accession treaties. Its formal role can be described as one of a conditional agenda-setter, based on its role in monitoring and providing recommendations (Tsebelis 2001, 370). In effect, the Commission’s role is contingent on the deferral of authority by member states, because they can equally choose to ignore the Commission’s opinion. Because the treaties grant significant authority to member states, the main preference of the Commission is to eke out further influence over the process wherever possible. On the one hand, the Commission attempts to do this by expediting the enlargement progress. This is because the role of the Commission gradually increases the further along the process a candidate moves, due to its expertise and the technical nature of the final stages of accession negotiations. On the other hand, consistent with its pro-enlargement organizational posture, the Commission attempts to forge the highest common denominator agreement and push the enlargement agenda forward in the Council. Reconciling its egoistic interests with the fact that formal authority rests in the Council is, according to a senior level Commission official, the “paradox which we have to navigate” (Interview with Commission official, 13.05.2014). This paradox is compounded by the fact that the further along the path to Europe a candidate is, the greater the role for the Commission. A delegate of a state that recently joined the EU sums up the relationship between the Commission and Council quite well; because the Commission helps candidates and pushes enlargement forward it is “your best friend before membership”. But once those candidates join the Union, the Commission becomes “your biggest enemy after membership” because it then pushes existing members for furthering enlargement (Interview with Council delegate, 18.03.2014).
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Accordingly, there is a feeling among member states that the Commission is obsessed with showing success and can often become political in that regard, even pushing for enlargement when the political climate is not necessarily conducive (Interview with Council delegate, 17.03. 2014). However, if the Commission is overly ambitious and overtly contradicts the position of the Council, its authority can be hedged by the member states, which is a significant constraint operating on the Commission. Moreover, the Commission’s opinion and reporting on enlargement to the Council is also dependent upon its relationship with the external state. It must therefore show significant progress domestically in candidates and demonstrate the benefits of enlargement overall for the EU. Consequently, the Commission is better able to attain its preferences for enlargement when the candidate in question shows a good record of reform, and when the Commission can convince member states of the benefits of enlarging the Union. In brief: Commissions’ preferences: 1. Obtain a greater role over enlargement proceedings where possible. Commissions’ constraints: 2. The extent of its overreach vis-à-vis member states; 3. The ability to demonstrate the success of enlargement policy.
European Parliament (Parliament)
Compared to its influence on internal policy, the Parliament has a minor role in enlargement. Its direct influence stems from the formal requirement to give its assent to the final accession treaties based on a majority vote. This can be interpreted as a “partial veto” over the process of enlargement during its latter stages. However, during the intermediary stages of the process it is often completely side-lined by the Council. Thus, its main objective is to augment its status, ideally to co-legislator, according to the EU’s ordinary legislative procedure. Similar to the Commission, the Parliament also takes a pro- enlargement stance. Underpinned by its relatively higher democratic legitimacy, the Parliament has a more ideational approach to enlargement compared to the Commission and the Council. MEPs, for instance, find pride
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in the fact that it represents over 500 million people of the EU, which is a source of its “implicit power” (Interview with EP Secretariat official, 9.10. 2014). Yet, its involvement remains effectively decoupled from the actual decision-making procedures on enlargement policy. In many respects, the Parliament is left in the dark, as it depends on information provided by the Commission regarding the progress of candidates. Its inability to assert itself over enlargement matters in the early stages of the process is attributed to its lack of expertise on enlargement policy and weak capacity to institutionally engage in daily policy-making. This is because enlargement is a political game, and not a legislative game where the Parliament can assert itself and challenge the authority of member states (Interview with EP Secretariat official, 9.10. 2014.). In brief: Parliament’s preferences: 1. Attain co-equal status with the Council over enlargement matters. Parliament’s constraints: 2. Lack of expertise/capacity on enlargement matters.
2.3. Predicting change from within
By disaggregating the key actors and their respective constraints, one can begin to better predict the agents of change in enlargement policy and in which direction that change will occur. In theorizing how change might come about, I employ a hybrid rationalist-historical model rooted in neo- institutionalist assumptions. The neo-institutionalist elements are evident in my understanding of institutions. This paper shifts away from the traditional view of institutions as stable and recurring patterns of behaviour, i.e. as outcomes of equilibrium. Neo-institutionalism sees them as rule structures which not only influence the behaviour of individual agents but that can in turn be affected by those agents (Bulmer 1997, 7). Therefore, while institutions are designed with some end in mind, their creation or internal structure does not automatically lead directly to its attainment. Rather, as Thelen (1999) has argued, institutional agents must actively pursue their goals and maintain the direction of the institution. The historical influence on my approach draws on the tenants of path dependence and the argument that the establishment of formal institutional rules matters because they limit subsequent actors’ choices and consequently
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the scope of their outcomes (Pierson 1996; Levy 1997). In this case, rules codified in formal agreements (e.g. the TEU, Stabilization and Association Agreements) establish the institutional baseline according to which enlargement should proceed. They serve as a reference point to study precisely how enlargement has changed with regard to the Western Balkans from the structure that was put in place upon their initial engagement with the EU. Importantly, actors occupying different institutional roles will have variable interests regarding institutional persistence or change. This also draws on rationalist accounts, which focus on the maximization of individual utility, and is open to the idea of agents reforming exiting institutions to attain a new equilibrium. While actors like the Council have a tendency to preserve their power and promote institutional persistence which reinforces their power, less advantaged actors like the Commission and Parliament (and to a lesser extent a candidate country) are more likely to exhibit institutional agency and push for change, depending of their respective constraints. This is in line with a common answer as to who wants institutional change. As Mahoney and Thelen (2010) argue, losers from institutional creation seek to ameliorate institutional asymmetries, while those in a position of privilege should seek to reinforce the status quo. Thus, one can hypothesize generally about agents of change: H1: All else equal, institutionally empowered actors will seek to preserve the status quo and institutionally weaker actors will seek to alter it. However, this tells us little about whether actors will actually manage to elicit change. Informed by the specific formal institutional rules that were first set out under the TEU (and subsequently SAAs), actors produce contextually-dependent strategies once those rules come into effect, as elaborated in the section on the horizontal dimension of enlargement above. And while actors are constrained by institutions, they also actively seek to alter them to suit their individual interests, which results in renegotiation and contestation that can lead to the creation of new institutions down the line (Stacey 2010, 41). Expanding on the work of Stacey (2010), I argue that changes in institutional constraints result in an increased probability that evolution in enlargement will come about. A necessary condition for deviation from formal rules is the relaxation of constraints for institutionally weaker actors and/or the increasing constraints for institutionally powerful actors. Actors subject to changing constraints reach an impasse where they will no longer have
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appropriate outlets based on the previous institutional logic. Despite the unevenly distribution of formal ability to affect enlargement policy, actors are induced to find alternative means by which to define and advance their interests, either through a new institutional path that is more representative of their interests, or by adapting the existing one (Lieberman, 2002, 704). Simply stated, if constraints are unchanged, actors have the same incentives to follow formal institutional rules as they had at institutional foundation. If constraints operating on actors have changed, the incentive structure for actors is therefore different, and they are more likely to exhibit institutional agency in order to attain their interests under the altered environment. Under this scenario, the change in constraints provides the impetus for the relevant actors to seek change from the status quo, resulting in institutional adaptation and an altered enlargement bargain. Under such conditions, previously weaker actors like the Commission and Parliament will be better placed to attain their preferences on enlargement. Consistent with actors’ preference and constraints as outlined above: Council constraints + Commission constraints H2: If the enlargement bargain is challenged, and the Commission can demonstrate the success of enlargement without overreach, it will play a greater role and expedite enlargement. Council constraint + Parliament constraints H3: If the enlargement bargain is challenged, the Parliament will be afforded greater influence due to its legitimating role. The section below tests the above hypotheses by tracing how enlargement policy has unfolded in the case of SEE states. It begins with the establishment of a formal institutional relationship which bound them to the EU in 2001, and which also established how the actors within the EU itself were meant to interact moving forward. It then demonstrates how enlargement policy has evolved, through the introduction of supplementary accession partnerships and benchmarking, which effectively augmented the conditions of membership.
3. THE EVOLUTION OF ENLARGEMENT POLICY TOWARDS SEE
The wars during the breakup of Yugoslavia left the EU handicapped by its inability to prevent and manage conflict in its own back yard. As former EU Commissioner for External Relations Chris Patten admitted “the 1990s was
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a decade of despair, death and destitution in the region. It should have been the hour of Europe, but we blew it... We owe it to the people of the Balkans to do everything we can to make this vision [of EU membership] a reality” (Patten 2002). The war in and over Kosovo in 1999 eventually provided the political impetus for the EU which was previously lacking. And by late 2000 the Zagreb Summit sealed a new type of association agreement for the Western Balkans, codified as the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP). As key components of the SAP, bilateral Stabilization and Association Agreements were eventually negotiated with countries of the region. The SAAs served as an explicit link between the pre-accession process and the preparations for the obligations of membership (Avery 2004, 37). This was a notable shift in EU external relations; resulting in a proactive policy of enlargement based on governing rather than containing its neighbourhood. Part of that change entailed an increasingly rigorous process of pre-accession. The first of the SAAs came into force in 2004 for Macedonia, the same year that Croatia also gained its candidate status. However, in the wake of CEE states joining in 2004, the EU began to seriously question its ability to digest the new members and to remain operational and effective (Ross 2001, 56). France, for instance, made it explicitly clear that it was prepared to veto any future candidature for the states of the Western Balkans, even if the Commission had provided a positive “avis” on their membership applications. The French concern was that accepting other candidacies would send a signal to other neighbouring countries that enlargement would continue normally (Douste-Blazy 2005). At that point, the Dutch delegation was also weary of expediting the enlargement process, while the UK sought to reduce the budget allocation for pre-accession assistance, which would seriously hamper any candidate state. In response, then Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn attempted to reassure the sceptics that the granting of candidate status would not mean immediate accession negotiations. As a final compromise, member states were assured by the Commission that new conditions for membership would be established, clearly signalling that the “the next step could be very far away” (Beunderman 2005). But did the augmented form of the enlargement process really reflect the wishes of member states, or did pro-enlargement supranational actors like the Commission or the European Parliament succeed in expediting the process, consisted with their preferences? The section below reviews the main developments in enlargement policy during that period. It first explains the
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logic behind further institutionalizing the relationships with SAP states though so called integration partnerships. It then further specifies the intra- organizational dynamics within the EU, which ultimately shaped the substantive nature of the enlargement process towards states of the Western Balkans.
3.1. The integration partnerships: business as usual
After enlargement to CEE, the Commission proposed the development of a more objective and rigorous pre-accession process for the Western Balkans. Affirming that the integration of the region into the Union was a “priority”, the Commission called for further strengthening the pre-accession process by introducing integration partnerships “in order to supplement the SAAs” for the countries of the Western Balkans (Commission 2003). In application, this meant that more technical issues concerned with individual chapters of the acquis would be prioritized earlier in the enlargement process for the SEE states. This step was a departure from previous enlargements. It illustrates the increasingly rigorous pre-accession process for the Western Balkans compared to any other previous enlargements. This occurred in two institutionalized forms, first European Partnerships and then the updated versions in the form of Accession Partnerships. Similar instruments were used during CEE enlargement. However, in the case of CEE candidates agreed to implement the EU acquis upon accession to the Union, while the new process required approximation to EU laws and standards prior to starting accession negotiations. And because the Commission plays a greater role during the technical accession negotiations, by extension the new partnerships also assumed a greater role for the Commission in their formulation and implementation. Indeed, as initially envisaged, such partnership agreements did not foresee a role for member states, neither in their drafting, implementation nor subsequent amendment. The Commission’s reasoning then was that an active role by the Council would be too time-consuming for member states (Sajdik and Schwarzinger 2008, 33). While member states were willing to give the Commission some leeway, they did not relinquish full control over the development of the partnerships. Ultimately, it was concluded that the Council will decide on the broader principles and priorities of the partnerships, as well as their
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subsequent changes, because they were to have “a significant political impact” (European Council 2004). As a result, the partnerships are formally concluded between the Council and the individual candidate states. However, because the partnerships are supplementary political, rather than legal agreements – like the SAA - they are not formally subject to unanimity. Rather, the Council is meant to formally decide by a qualified majority, based on the Commission’s proposal, the contents and conditions of each European partnership as well as any subsequent adjustments (European Council 2004). Moreover, the altered procedural requirement altogether excluded the Parliament from the process. The lowered threshold of agreement to qualified majority voting (QMV) rather than unanimity – which is the usual decision-making rule for enlargement matters - makes their implementation more straightforward. Importantly, the absence of a veto threat by a member state indirectly enhances the role of the Commission, which is less constrained and would theoretically not be preoccupied with forging a consensus if one did not exist before. Thus, the lowered threshold of agreement by member states on the integration partnerships, and their increasingly technical nature should have resulted in a greater role for the Commission, as hypothesized above. Yet, member states continued to reign supreme over the process. Why did member states retain the usual decision-making procedure by unanimity, despite the fact that the formal procedure for determining the content of the partnerships was QMV? Heisenberg (2005; 2012) has shown the significant influence of the informal institution of consensus within the Council. Her work has demonstrated that informal consensus-based decision-making has persisted in the Council for over four decades, despite the fact that consensus sets a higher political hurdle for agreement than the formal treaty requirement of QMV. In the case of enlargement, the implicit norm according to which member states operated was “diffuse reciprocity”. Diffuse reciprocity can be defined as conformity to generally accepted standards of behaviour based on a series of sequential actions that entail mutual concessions within the context of shared commitments (Keohane 1986, 4). The objective is for all states to compromise and agree so that “nobody loses everything” because all states “have skeletons in their closet” and that must be taken into account down the road (Interview with Commission official, 13.05. 2014). In other words, existing members show solidarity with the “red line” contentious issues that their colleagues might have in the Council. This is particularly important in
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enlargement matters when there is an existing bilateral issue between a member and a non-member. There is also the socialization factor, which rings true particularly in the case of enlargement. Because the issues which are discussed are fundamentally about future colleagues with whom they will eventually share a table, the two enlargement working groups are known as “the diplomatic working groups” because of their insistence on agreement (Interview with Council delegate, 19.03.2014). Taken together, these factors contribute to a “pre-agreement” even before a draft common position is presented. By applying consensus informally in decision-making over the integration partnerships, the Council ensured that any decision does not step on any one member’s toes, which might be the case if the formal QMV rule is retained. This point will be further explicated below through the example of the introduction of benchmarking during enlargement.
3.2. Further attempts at supranational agency
The introduction of supplementary integration partnerships in the process of enlargement represented an additional procedural requirement. They also represented more opportunities for supranational actors like the Commission and Parliament to attempt to inform enlargement proceedings, despite the Council employing the informal norm of consensus and thus constraining them.
The Commission’s 3 Cs of enlargement
In the altered enlargement context, the Commission outlined its new approach for enlargement based on three fundamental pillars: consolidation, conditionality, and communication. Regarding consolidation, the objective was to reaffirm the EU’s interests in enlargement, arguing that “[e]nlargement has always been an essential part of the European project”; regarding conditionality, the Commission warned that “the pace of enlargement must take into consideration the EU’s absorption capacity” (Commission 2005). It also emphasized the need to enhance public support for enlargement, through better communication about its benefits and challenges (Commission 2007). The Commission’s pro-enlargement stance was affirmed in the syntax of its 3 Cs proposal; consolidating the EU’s interest in enlargement took precedence over concerns about integration capacity (Interview with
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Commission official, 13.05. 2014). Unsurprisingly, the Commission viewed the concept of absorption capacity in functional terms, concerned with whether the EU can simultaneously deepen and widen without jeopardizing its objectives as set out in the TEU. It was therefore not a question of one or the other, but how to manage both. For the Commission, future enlargements would nevertheless occur, although the terms thereof might have to be renegotiated.
The Parliament’s response: let’s get technical
The other proponent of enlargement, the European Parliament, took on the issue and developed a somewhat bold position in response. On the one hand, it pressed the Council to uphold the integrity of enlargement and on the other hand it criticized the Commission for “the superficial way” in which it dealt with the institutional aspects of enlargement (European Parliament 2006). The Parliament thus became more active in matters of enlargement. It started with three resolutions which reiterated the importance of continuing enlargement and further argued that the “responsibility for improving [the EU’s] integration capacity lies with the Union and not with the candidate countries”; the Parliament also attempted to augment its role by arguing that its formally proscribed “right of assent should apply not just after the conclusion of the negotiation process but also before the opening of membership negotiations” (European Parliament 2006). Formally, the Parliament assents to the accession treaty (i.e. the conclusion of the negotiation process), and it aimed to augment its status according to the ordinary legislative procedure. The push by the Parliament to focus on absorption capacity was in order to exert its influence on the decision-making scene, writ large (Interview with EP Secretariat official, 9.10.2014). In fact, the Parliament was rather more concerned with the internal institutional aspects that might be affected by enlargement. In other words, it wanted to make sure that further widening did not affect the deepening side of the equation. Arguably the Parliament was not interested in integration capacity vis-à-vis the Western Balkans as such. Rather it was pushing a parallel agenda based on a dual objective: the internal institutional and treaty reform of the EU, and the recalibration of EU external policy based on a more differentiated structure (Committee on Foreign Affairs 2009).
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Back to the status quo: the Council’s renewed consensus
Notwithstanding questions of integration capacity, the future European status of the Western Balkans was consistently affirmed by the European Council. For the states concerned, it became more a question of when their accession would occur, not if it would occur. The Council’s approach was paradoxical; on the one hand formally affirming the region’s European future, while on the other hand being politically concerned about its integration capacity. The Council attempted to reconcile this dilemma by further strengthening its pre-accession procedure, which would serve as a safeguard not only to ensure the EU’s interests, but also to keep the candidate countries (at that stage Croatia and Macedonia) on track in their reforms. The result was the so-called “renewed consensus” on enlargement in 2006, which was a synthesis of the Commission’s approach based on the 3 Cs, and the Parliament’s insistence on integration capacity. Member states thus agreed that “the enlargement strategy based on consolidation, conditionality and communication, combined with the EU's capacity to integrate new members, forms the basis for a renewed consensus on enlargement”; the consensus required that the EU “keeps its commitments towards countries that are in the enlargement process” based on a new focus on “strict conditionality” (Brussels European Council 2006). Enhanced conditionality and the renewed consensus emphasized a result-driven approach of enlargement. They were specifically manifested through the introduction of benchmarks in the pre-accession process, notably in the Accession Partnerships. While the “priorities” that were outlined under the European Partnerships had the makings of benchmarks, the new approach would be subject to strict timelines and based on explicit operational roadmaps: Their purpose is to improve the quality of the negotiations, by providing incentives for the candidate countries to undertake necessary reforms at an early stage. Benchmarks are measurable and linked to key elements of the acquis chapter. In general, opening benchmarks concern key preparatory steps for future alignment (such as strategies or action plans), and the fulfilment of contractual obligations that mirror acquis requirements. Closing benchmarks primarily concern legislative measures, administrative or judicial bodies, and a track record of implementation of the acquis (Commission 2006).
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Benchmarking affected enlargement at two levels, both in their formulation within the EU, and their application in the relationship between the EU and a candidate state.
3.3. Formulating benchmarks and inter-organizational implications
Although the intention behind the application of benchmarks during pre-accession was rather innocuous and indeed based on rational reasoning, it ultimately resulted in an unanticipated dynamic between the Commission and member states. Ultimately, their introduction resulted in perhaps the most significant procedural change in enlargement policy, as far as the Western Balkans were concerned. Below I detail their significance with regard to three dimensions: formal treaty reinterpretation, increasing the number of veto points, and agenda setting ability. Concertedly, the three dimensions augmented the role of member states in the process, particularly at the expense of the Commission and candidates.
Treaty reinterpretation
The Commission viewed the application of benchmarks in rather functional terms, to make the enlargement process more efficient and more transparent. Moreover, given the technical nature of benchmarks, which were tied to specific provisions of the acquis, the Commission expected to have the primary role in their formulation and measurement, as was the case during accession negotiations during CEE enlargement. Alternatively, member states employed benchmarks politically, which arguably had unforeseen legal effects. As in the case of the European and Accession partnerships, amendments formally remained the prerogative of the member states by qualified majority based on the formal procedure, because they entailed a change in the principles and priorities contained in integration partnership. The Council was also supported by the Commission in its capacity to provide recommendations and monitor progress of the benchmarks. In reality, the Council equated benchmarks during the pre-accession phase of enlargement to the benchmarking procedure used during the formal negotiation of individual chapters during accession negotiations, which was the penultimate step prior to the signing of the accession treaty. Although the two procedures were identical, in the latter case they have a greater standing because they serve as explicit agreements during accession negotiations. In other words, with each
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opening and closing of a benchmark the state becomes closer to full membership. However, SEE states were formally only subject to the Copenhagen criteria as required by their SAA and the TEU. In the pre- accession process under the SAP/SAA framework, benchmarks were nevertheless employed in a similar manner to when a state is negotiating accession. However, they remained a political tool because formally they placed no obligation on the EU to move enlargement forward if they were met by a candidate. Article 49 of the Lisbon Treaty amending the TEU states that the “conditions of eligibility agreed upon by the European Council shall be taken into account”. Benchmarks during pre-accession were therefore interpreted as such additional “conditions for eligibility” by member states. Because the TEU stipulations are invoked, it further set off the requirement of unanimity as contained in article 49 of the TEU for all enlargement matters. What was introduced as a political tool was interpreted in a legalistic manner, effectively rising the threshold for membership. The end result was the requirement of unanimity for decisions regarding the pre-accession criteria. And in the absence of a role by the CJEU, the broad interpretation of the treaty effectively gave member states primary law-making power (Hillion 2011, 212). Consequently, the Council was further empowered where formal procedures did not officially stipulate. Benchmarking might have witnessed an augmented role for the Commission had the QMV requirement been kept in place, thus shifting the inter-organizational balance towards the supranational pole. Contrary to expectations, member states reasserted their control over the formal procedure of enlargement by supplementing the existing procedure.
Veto points
The addition of benchmarks exponentially increased the gatekeeping role of member states in the enlargement process. In effect, it introduced more veto points along the path to Europe, opening further possibilities for lower- level re-evaluation and renegotiation of the accession criteria and the EU’s relationship with a candidate state. For instance, the number of formal veto points by incumbent member states included the legal junctures (SAA and Accession Treaty, which were also subject to a partial veto by the Parliament), and the political junctures (including the European/Accession partnerships and their respective benchmarks). Informal veto points (which have formal
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consequences) were thus introduced for opening and closing benchmarks for each chapter of the acquis. Not only did this informally augment the accession criteria for future members, but it also resulted in more complex and time consuming decision- making procedures. The initial idea behind benchmarks was that the Council would simply approve them based on a proposal from the Commission, and also to sign off on their satisfactory attainment by the candidate states. The Commission emphasized the use of benchmarks in order to increase the transparency and accountability of the process, and by extension increase its monitoring influence over it. The result, however, favoured the authority of the Council, which could control the process at the working group level before even sitting at the table to negotiate with the candidate. Despite the initial intentions, the pre-accession process became less efficient and more complicated; especially during the initial inclusion of benchmarks, which resulted in a “procedural mess” when trying to determine specific provisions for the candidates (Interview with Council delegate, 30.04.2013). In that respect, the broadening in scope of the formal institutional procedure resulted in increased transaction costs and further slowed down the pace of integrating of outsiders, because it required more bargaining among member states.
Ex-ante agenda setting
As established, member states managed to augment their influence over the pre-accession process by ensuring their final right of acceptance or refusal over benchmarks. According to the formal procedure, recommendations still remained in the hands of the Commission. The right to recommendation is guarded by the Commission at every opportunity, often trying to convince member states to just let them do their job without intervention (Interview with Council delegate, 19.03. 2014). This is helped by the fact that the latter stages of enlargement involve the highly technical issues of approximation to the acquis. As a result, the trend is one of increased deferral to the Commission during the latter stages of membership negotiations, where the Commission often takes the lead (Interview with Commission official, 17.4.2013). How can one reconcile the two seemingly disparate processes of deferral to the Commission on technical matters on the one hand, and the augmented veto capability of member states on the other?
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At the working group level, member state interaction with the Commission proceeds according to two unwritten rules. The first is the fact that once pen is put to paper, a draft position often remains unchanged. Despite the augmented role of member states, the Commission assumes an important role in drafting the initial proposal on the opening and closing of each benchmark, outlining the priorities and defining the EU common position on each point. Indeed, it is generally agreed that its deep knowledge of each country provides the Commission a significant advantage in the formulation of policy. As one official stated, “he who owns the information is boss” and the Council sometimes struggles to keep up with the Commission (Interview with Council delegate, 17.03.2014). Once the desk officers of DG Enlargement present their draft, it is rarely revised; the final outcome “boils down to the initial texts, the Commission defends quite well its interests” (Interview with Council delegate, 30.04.2013). The fact that drafts are difficult to change can be reduced to two factors. On the one hand, the Commission is typically aware (or it is made aware) of the particular position of each member state on any given issue. For instance, before drafting on an issue which is contentions for a specific member, the Commission gives the member states heads up so there are no surprises and so it can ensure agreement (Interview with Council delegate, 13.05.2014). Generally, the Commission does its best to predict the highest common denominator position among member states, while also taking into account its own position, in order to expedite the process (Interview with Commission official, 15.04.2013). On the other hand, member states operate based on consensus, as explicated above. The fact that unanimity is required in order for a draft to be adopted further complicates the issue of change. Member states, however, have been rather creative in circumventing this hurdle, which ironically they imposed on themselves due to the insistence on consensus. The second unwritten rule, therefore, is the ex-ante lobbying of the Commission by member states, which in effect infringes on the role of recommendation by the Commission. This tactic is strategically employed by member states. Specifically, member states choose their battles, exerting their influence only on highly contentious political matters that are perceived to affect their national interest. As a result, member state delegates focus their energies on impacting draft common positions on benchmarks, rather than attempting to change country progress report because they do not have to sign up to them (Interview with Council delegate, 18.04.2013).
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Importantly, once the Commission puts a draft position on the table, it generally remains unchanged. The Commission and respective member-states sometimes consult prior to the formulation of the draft in order to gauge the temperature of the relevant actors. The more proactive states in that respect are usually those that are more conservative on enlargement policy, suggesting a relationship between the degree of interaction with the Commission and their posture towards enlargement. Those that are particularly interested in an issue would literally fight over the placement of a comma, “as if we were writing the Bible” as one official recalled (Interview with Council delegate, 18.03.2014). Alternatively, states that are pro-enlargement are usually passive bystanders; in fact, there are some doubts as to whether they even read the Commission’s reports, or they simply approve them (Interview with Council delegate, 30.04.2013). In the event of lobbying, moreover, states are also aware of the requirement for reaching consensus, and thus often provide only “guidelines” to the Commission regarding their national position, in the anticipation that the Commission will round off any edges to ensure all sides as sufficiently content (Interview with Council delegate, 18.03.2014). In that respect, the feeling is that the Commission always has an open door to discuss issues a priori. However, the extent to which a national policy preference is reflected in the collective position can vary based on the salience of the issue (Interview with Council delegate, 19.03.2014). The more sceptical states want to ensure that the Commission does not come to them with something “too positive” and they imply a pre-emptive veto by making it clear ahead of time that “something wouldn’t fly anyway, so don’t put it in the document” (Interview with Council delegate, 30.04.2013). As a result, the Commission has to acquiesce to a certain degree to the ex-ante lobbying by proactive member states. The ex-ante lobbying by member states, therefore, translates to a de facto pre-emptive agenda setting role by the Council, at the expense of the Commission. Interestingly, although member states afforded themselves the right to formally veto a proposal by the Commission, as shown above, they rather choose to affect the policy-making process at earlier stages. This can be attributed to the fact that it is easier to convince one actor at the front end (DG enlargement), rather than 28 Member States at the back end. If a member state manages to successfully lobby the Commission, moreover, their interests would be effectively pre-approved by the Commission in the draft, and thus make them harder to change by other member states at the back end.
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3.4. Applying benchmarks in the vertical dimension
Regarding the implications for the external relationship with SEE states, the inclusion of benchmarks resulted in the “generalization of conditionality”, reflecting the increasingly conservative nature of the enlargement process (Hillion 2011, 202). Specifically, before the introduction of benchmarks, the start of accession negotiation was conditional upon a candidate meeting broad requirements like the Copenhagen criteria. The incorporation of benchmarks into integration partnerships resulted in a cascading or compartmentalized form of conditionality, whereby each step that a candidate takes towards Europe is scrutinized and must be approved by the Commission and Council. In effect, by reducing the negotiated aspects of the process, benchmarks contributed to the asymmetry of the relationship, precisely because each benchmark is tied to the relevant aspect of the acquis. Thus, parts of the acquis would be incorporated into the candidate state prior to the start of accession negotiation. This represents a significant change from previous enlargement negotiations, because during the penultimate stages of the process the candidate is able to better negotiate the terms of its accession. In effect, benchmarks front-load conditionality and place a greater strain on the enlargement bargain. Yet, the introduction of benchmarks was first perceived as an opportunity by candidates. The reasoning was that because the benchmarks were to increase the objectivity and the measurability of the process, the fulfilment of each benchmark would result in the gradual yet assured progress towards full membership. In other words, benchmarks resulted in the real expectation that once satisfied, accession negotiations would automatically progress (Interview with Macedonian diplomat, 13.05.2014). In reality, benchmarks eventually contributed to a gap between expectations and outcomes, and ultimately further questioning the credibility of the process. This is in part because the Commission and Council undertake a fine balancing act with regard to the enlargement bargain. On the one hand, they must keep the state sufficiently engaged, but on the other hand, they do not want to be overly positive on issues of key priority to the EU for fears that a candidate then leans back and relaxes (Interview with Commission official, 17.04.2013). Adding to candidates’ frustration is the fact that sometimes no one really knows where a benchmark really starts and ends (Interview with Council delegate, 19.04.2014). In some cases, the Council and the Commission
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interpret the same text differently, based on their respective interests. For instance, at one stage, the Council shared with the Commission’s assessment of the Macedonia’s “sufficient” fulfilment of benchmark criteria, but it did not approve proceeding to the next stage of the process (European Council 2011). Alternatively, in the case of Croatia the year prior, the Council also agreed with the Commission report regarding Croatia’s “sufficient” fulfilment of benchmarks, yet in that case, it proceeded to set a date for its accession (Interview with Council delegate, 30.04.2013). Thus, benchmarks also increase the opportunities for political manoeuvring by states and the Commission. Although they could be used strategically, the purpose of benchmarking was in fact to make the process more objective and measurable in order to precisely avoid such issues.
4. CONCLUSIONS
The conditions under which candidates can join the EU are becoming increasingly more demanding over time. This is not necessarily due to the widening gulf between members and non-members. Rather, as this paper has argued, it is also a function of internal factors, which originate within the EU. That is, enlargement is changing from within, as a side effect of the inter- organizational relationships between the Council, Commission, and Parliament. In other words, it is only that member states wanted to augment the accession criteria. It was also the fact that supranational actors like the Commission and the Parliament attempted to enhance their own role over the decision-making procedures of enlargement. In response, member states sought to reassert the formal authority over the Council, which subsequently resulted in more frequent and more demanding procedural steps during the pre-accession phase. In vertical terms, the application of enhanced conditionality through benchmarks at the intermediary steps of pre-accession further affirmed the asymmetry of the EU’s external relationships. Although SEE states were making sufficient progress in meeting its requirements of alignment to the EU acquis, the bar was progressively raised. On the one hand, states were consistently offered explicit guarantees of membership in order to keep them orientated towards Brussels. On the back of those assurances, the EU then augmented the conditionality, which underpinned the process. As a result, the enlargement bargain shifted the responsibility back onto the applicants.
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With regard to inter-organizational relationships and the horizontal dimension, the dynamic relationship among the Council, Commission and Parliament affirmed the first hypothesis. Most notable was the persistent influence of member states, in light of attempts by the supranational actors to exercise their agency. After the accession of CEE states, the Commission was dealing with the political debates about absorption capacity. Despite SEE states making gradual progress in reform and showing the continuing success of enlargement policy, it was therefore more difficult to argue for the further integration of more countries. In that respect the Commission was constrained from fully realizing its preferences. Responding to increased constraints, the Commission provided solutions to maintain the integrity of the enlargement bargain through more rigorous integration partnerships. Rather than the Commission augmenting its role, the Council was able to reassert its dominant position as the driver of the enlargement process. Importantly, in an instance where the Council’s authority might have been otherwise challenged, i.e. by operating based on qualified majority under the accession partnership and thus providing a window of opportunity for the supranational actors, the Council managed to informally employ unanimity. The point is revealing because under qualified majority rule, one might expect an increasing influence of the Parliament (and to a lesser extent the Commission), because the Parliament attempts to attain co-legislative status (and indeed succeeds in doing so in internal EU policy when the Council does not operate based on unanimity). It is interesting to note that the Parliament also had a broad interpretation of the formal treaty provisions on candidate decisions. Its failure is further surprising because it is arguably the most legitimate among the three actors considered herein, and has been actively pushing for a more value-based enlargement policy. The results can be attributed to the fact that the Commission, Parliament and candidates were more institutionally constrained than the Council. As a result, hypotheses two and three can only be partially accepted, and remain subject to further empirical scrutiny. The Council was thus able to not only preserve its formal authority, but also to supplement it informally. This was also the case with regard to its relationship with the Commission, where the evidence suggests that the member states can play the role of pre-agenda setters. Although formally the Council is granted the right to accept or revise Commission drafts, member states choose to make their voice heard before the Commission produces a draft position. This is in part due to the weight of the pen (of the Commission),
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informal consensus seeking (within the Council), and the implicit threat of a block by member states after a draft is submitted. Compounded with the introduction of further de facto veto points through benchmarks, the Council contributed to augmenting the conditions for enlargement as well as its standing in relation to the EU’s other actors. The introduction of enhanced conditionality and a more rigorous enlargement process therefore had some counterintuitive outcomes. Internally, rather than increasing the efficiency of the pre-accession process and augmenting the role of the Commission, the process became more complicated, primarily due to the reassertion of Council authority in the application of benchmarking. In the short run, those unforeseen consequences favoured the member states rather than increasing the authority of supranational actors. However, in the long run benchmarks also serve to externalize the price of enlargement. They placed increasing political and material costs on candidate states in order to meet the new requirements, rather than incumbents bearing the costs of allowing a less fit candidate to join the club. Over time, such changes place a greater strain on the enlargement bargain, which can gradually challenge the authority of the Council. In other words, the increasing concentration of authority towards the Council – which has a conservative stance on future enlargement – can result in increasing pressure for it to honour its previous commitments to the Western Balkans. As a result, it can counter-intuitively result in member states once more becoming susceptible to supranational pressure, opening the door to another phase of supranational agency.
REFERENCES
Avery, G. 2004. The Enlargement Negotiations. In The Future of Europe: Integration and Enlargement, edited by F. Cameron. Oxford: Routledge. Beunderman, M. 2005. Macedonia feels enlargement blues as Paris blocks EU status. EU Observer, January 13, 2014. Accessed March 4, 2014, https://euobserver.com/enlargement/20529. Bulmer, S.J. 1997. New Institutionalism, the Single Market, and EU Governance. Paper presented at the ECSA conference, May 29 – June 1, 1997, Seattle, USA. Council of the European Union. Brussels European Council 14/15 December 2006 - Presidency Conclusions. Brussels, 2006. Accessed on April 1, 2013, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/92202.pdf. Douste-Blazy, P.M. 2005. Press conference at the General Affairs and External Relations Council. Brussels.
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European Commission. 2005. Communication from the Commission - 2005 enlargement strategy paper. Brussels. Accessed on May 15, 2013, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal- content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52005DC0561. European Commission. 2007. Communication to the Council and the European Parliament – Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2007-2008. Brussels. Accessed on April 6, 2013, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV:e50027. European Commission. 2003. Communication to the Council and the European Parliament -The Western Balkans and European Integration. Brussels. Accessed on April 2, 2013, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/html/114088.htm. European Parliament Committee on Foreign Affairs. 2009. Report on Activities 2004-2009. Brussels. Accessed on July 3, 2013, www.europarl.europa.eu%2Fdocument%2Factivities%2Fcont%2F200907%2F20090727ATT590 83%2F20090727ATT59083EN.pdf. European Parliament. 2006. Resolution 2006/2252(INI) on the Commission's Communication on the Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2006–2007. Brussels. Accessed on November 5, 2013, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A6-2006- 0436&language=EN European Parliament. 2007. Resolution 2007/2271(INI) of 10 July 2008 on the Commission's 2007 enlargement strategy paper. Brussels. Accessed on November 4, 2013, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P6-TA-2008- 0363&language=EN European Union. 2004. Council Regulation (EC) No 533/2004 of 22 March 2004 on the establishment of European Partnerships in the framework of the Stabilization and Association Process. Brussels. Accessed on May 11, 2013, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal- content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32004R0533. European Union. 2007. Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community. Brussels. Accessed on January 3, 2014, http://eur- lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/ALL/?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:TOC General Secretariat of the Council. 2011. Enlargement and Stabilisation and Association Process – Draft Council Conclusions. Brussels. Document not available to the public. Heisenberg, D. 2005. The Institution of 'Consensus' in the European Union: Formal versus Informal Decision-making in the Council. European Journal of Political Research, 44: 65-90. Heisenberg, D. 2012. Informal governance and the decision-making of the Council of Ministers. In International Handbook on Informal Governance, edited by Christiansen, T. and C. Neuhold. Cheltenhan, UK: Edward Elgar. Hillion, C. 2011. EU Enlargement. In The Evolution of EU Law, edited by Craig, P. and G. de Burca. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Keohane, R. 1986. Reciprocity in International Relations. International Organization, 40, no. 1: 1- 27. Levi, M. 1997. A Model, a Method, and a Map: Rational Choice in Comparative Historical Analysis. In Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure, edited by Lichbach, M.I. and A.S. Zuckerman. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. Lieberman, R.C. 2002. Ideas, Institutions, and Political Order: Explaining Political Change. American Political Science Review, 96, no. 4: 697-712. Mahoney, J. and K. Thelen. 2010. A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change. In Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power, edited by Mahoney, J. and K. Thelen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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Moravcsik, A. 2005. Sequencing and path dependence in European integration. Paper presented at the Conference on the Sequencing of Regional Economic Integration, September 16-17, 2005, South Bend, USA. Patten, C. 2002. Transcript of speech to the UK Conference on Organized Crime in the Balkans. Accessed May 5, 2014. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH- 02586_en.htm?locale=en Pierson, P. 1996. The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutionalist Analysis. Comparative Political Studies, 29: 123-163. Ross, G. 2001. The European Union and its Crises: Through the Eyes of the Brussels Elite. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Sajdik, M. and M. Schwarzinger. 2008. European Union Enlargement: Background, Developments, Facts. New Jersey: Transaction Publishers. Schimmelfennig, F. and U. Sedelmeier. 2004. “Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to the Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe.” Journal of European Public Policy, 11, no. 4: 669-687. Stacey, J. 2010. Integrating Europe: Informal Politics and Institutional Change. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Thelen, K. 1999. Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics. Annual Review of Political Science, 2: 369-404. Tsebelis, G. 2001. Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Interview with Commission official, Brussels, April 15, 2013. Interview with Commission official, Brussels, April 17, 2013. Interview with Commission official, Brussels, May 13, 2014. Interview with Council delegate, Brussels, April 18, 2013. Interview with Council delegate, Brussels, April 30, 2013. Interview with Council delegate, Brussels, March 17, 2014. Interview with Council delegate, Brussels, March 18, 2014. Interview with Council delegate, Brussels, March 19, 2014. Interview with Council delegate, Brussels, May 12, 2014. Interview with Council delegate, Brussels, May 13, 2014. Interview with EP Secretariat official, Brussels, October 9, 2014. Interview with Macedonian diplomat, Brussels, May 13, 2014.
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THE WESTERN BALKANS BETWEEN INTERNAL TRANSITIONS AND THE EU INTEGRATION PROCESS
Elira LULI European University of Tirana Tirana/Albania [email protected]
Abstract The Balkan region is still a “hot” zone where old legacies of the past interfere with the present and contribute to the transition processes of the countries there. The region seems committed to follow an EU-bound path, although it faces many challenges in terms of meeting the standards for EU and NATO membership. Somehow, persistent conflicts delay finding solutions. The difficult democratic transition, the lack of will and shallow political culture of regional elites delay the process of bringing these countries forward. This profound transition unfortunately occurs while the EU, on one hand, is trying to play the arbitrator part having promised to assume full leadership role and, on the other hand, tries to restrain the voices of those Euro-Sceptics who have been increasing their numbers recently. Meanwhile, a deterioration of the situation in the Balkans might have a negative impact across Europe and decrease the credibility of the EU as the main foreign policy and security actor in the whole region. This paper will first analyse the transition processes in the Balkans and the back and forth efforts to leave behind the past and head toward a common European perspective. Secondly, it will analyse the required active role of the EU and the urgency for a closer monitoring of the situation in this region. Thirdly, it emphasises the need to encourage public diplomacy in the region in order to mitigate conflicts and promote cooperation between the people there.
Keywords EU Integration; EU Intervention; EU Role; Public Diplomacy of Western Balkan Countries; Western Balkan Transition Process
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1. INTRODUCTION
The latest developments in the international arena have had their impact also in the Balkan region. Since the break-up of Yugoslavia in the 90s, there have been many changes in regards to the international actors’ presence, their engagement in crisis management and integration of the region. Presently, the region appears to be completely under the competence of the EU, as an indispensable actor able to draw these countries towards integration. In a general overview, apparently the old-style political elites, inherited from the past are not helping enough to overcome the present challenges and domestic troubles that these countries are facing. Moreover, major institutional change, the transformation of the centrally planned economy into a market oriented system, the modernization of civil society and social life (Irrera 2011), the slow institutional bureaucracies and corruption, all contribute to the endless transition process of the Western Balkan (WB) countries. The issues of state-building capacity, implementing EU standards and the rule of law, remain crucial for these countries as they are the cause for the major differences with states that are already EU members. Balkan leaders have never shown unwillingness to participate in conferences, summits or other meetings in the name of the region’s integration in the EU, and they have always expressed enthusiasm and commitment to turn the country's integration project into a priority of their political agenda. In practice however, contrary to their statements, “these leaders deftly play on the European constituency in their countries and pass measures that please it. But they do so in ways that are reminiscent of the old ways (even if wrapped up in new ones), and at the same time, they slowly cement their grip on power and limit the scope for a plural space” (Lasheras 2014). This kind of predominant behaviour is causing an endless transition at a slow pace. The expectations for the consolidation of democracy in these countries are fading away and ongoing efforts to meet the EU criteria are turning into constant fatigue. The critical situation in the Balkans coincides with the increased euro-scepticism within the EU. “Euro-scepticism is widespread, fanned by politicians’ association of Europe with unpopular reforms, unwelcoming statements by EU politicians, and the reputational loss suffered by the EU in recent years” (Lasheras 2014). Despite these two unfavourable trends, on the one hand, the EU is dealing with enlargement fatigue and, on the other hand, the Balkan region being wrapped up in a stagnation process, events in the international arena are rapidly moving forward and changing. The engagement of the international
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actors is no longer similar to that of few years ago in the WB. For instance, the role of the United States (US) has already shifted to other international developments since the 90s with the intervention in Kosovo. Other issues are now at the core of US foreign policy, such as the fractious policies that Russia is pursuing in Eastern Europe, and moreover the emergence of Russia as a very dominant global player, as once in the Cold War period, as well as China`s global role, establishing the cooperation relation with post-US withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Israel–Palestine conflict, the deteriorating situation in Iraq and, recently, the emergence of ISIS, as a terrorist and fundamentalist factor spreading rapidly its influence in the Middle East. These events have increasingly reduced the role of the US in the region (albeit not its attention), giving the EU priority and full patronage over the latter. Russia, another emerging global power, with strong geopolitical ambitions, has always kept an eye on the region, as shown and confirmed in the case of Ukraine. However, whatever shifts or changes the global international relations undergo, the Western Balkan region is an integral part of the open European project, whose integration process is of imperative importance for the region. Therefore, whether global changes or internal EU issues make the EU regional approach to the Balkans easier or not, the WB region cannot be neglected by the EU under any circumstances. This paper aims to present a general overview of the current situation in the Balkans, by analysing the EU‘s role and pressure exerted on the WB countries in order to meet the accession criteria, as well the internal issues caused by the ongoing transitions in the WB region and the challenges that the region faces in the reconciliation process. The analyse will assess, through exclusively qualitative research methods, what has been done by the EU in the WB in terms of soft power, and especially normative power. The paper emphasises the role of public diplomacy in mitigating conflict among the Balkan countries, but also in enhancing cooperation, mobility and exchange among their people, especially from the young generation. The launching of public diplomacy programmes and initiatives in the WB region would help promoting the common values of the WB, enhance cooperation and tackle situations of turmoil, for a stable region in the future.
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2. THE WESTERN BALKAN COUNTRIES AND THEIR TIMELESS TRANSITION PROCESSES
After the accession of Croatia in 2013 it seemed like a new perspective appeared in the horizon for the Western Balkan countries aspiring to join the EU, but beyond hope the steps forward seem to be taken in slow motion by both the EU and the Western Balkan hopefuls. The transition processes of these countries are stagnating and have unfortunately been recently associated with unrest (the Kumanovo case) and immigration flows, which led them to take more steps backwards. Whilst the Balkan countries are dealing with their transition processes, the EU, preoccupied with its own issues, has intentionally or unintentionally set these countries at the periphery of its attention. This probably happens because the top-tier challenges are situated on the Balkan side, and the role of mediator or supervisor through normative power is not sufficient anymore in helping these countries overcome the challenges, despite the region’s numerous achievements. The latest negative developments, more related to troubled economies and poverty in these countries, have led to immigration flows. Although the WB faced some immigration flows also in the past, the ongoing transition processes contributed to the emergence of this phenomenon once again. Groups of people have been recently leaving their homeland, seeking a job and a better future in the Western developed countries. And last, but very important, the situation in Kumanovo, Macedonia is another major challenge to overcome. It seems like in the Balkans conflicts never cease, or if one might cease, another rises up or is likely to be repeated in another moment. The latest events in Kumanovo, despite the missing evidence about the target and nature of the attack, created instability and uncertainty about the future of the country and the neighbouring ones. This attack not brought a negative impact on the entire Balkan region, at the expenses of the lost lives, integration, reputation, security and democracy. The violent episodes in the WB show that not only have the countries there not learned any lesson yet, but neither did the international community. The Balkan countries are still incapable or not enough consolidated to prevent on time or to manage such cases, mostly because of the lack of governing skills. Traditional state instruments have lost their ability to prevent conflict, if there is no multilateral involvement or approach to prevent future conflicts and overcome transition processes. Hence, the Balkan region as a whole
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requires a comprehensive multidimensional strategy in the long run. “In this regard these countries must be considered a part of Europe; not a peculiar part of it, but a specific part of it, according to the simple idea that has always characterized the “soft power” European Union “every European member state, with its specific way of living, in a common way of being” (Beshku 2013, 57).
3. THE EU`S ROLE IN THE BALKAN REGION: IT IS TIME FOR SOME REASSESSMENTS
One of the main causes for the delays in the accession process of the Balkan countries to the EU is the lack of internal political stability or political consensus. This deficiency manifests itself in different ways and dynamics in each Balkan state. Domestic stagnation and economic crises in these countries unfold alongside the financial crisis in Europe and therefore the “enlargement fatigue” of the Union is also associated with the “membership/accession fatigue” of WB countries. The role of the EU as a transformative power is important in the Balkan region and beyond for its own reputation and position as a key player in the international arena, but the EU enlargement process has tightened the criteria for WB accession if we take in consideration the previous waves of enlargement. "First, the general trend towards these countries is the extension of terms, one can observe in the augmentation of new criteria for accession and the reinterpretation in an expanded manner of the earlier criteria. Second, the conditioning process of the WB aims to address and resolve sensitive political and regional issues of the past", even if the EU by “not giving a precise date for the membership of these countries reduces the credibility of conditionality”; apparently the EU will also continue to focus “more on conditions and monitoring process of these countries than in its absorptive capability” (Caka, Zajmi and Bishaj 2012, 58-59), given the Juncker Commission’s current perspective and stance on the enlargement agenda. Strong emphasis falls precisely on the challenges that the Balkan countries are not able to fight alone, as separate countries. Although the WB countries seem to show a cooperative spirit to co-ordinate actions and move at the same pace, in particular regarding Chapter 23 and 24 of the EU acquis dealing mostly with the political criteria, they are still lagging behind, namely
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with issues regarding the rule of law, judiciary system, fight against corruption, fight against organised crime, etc. The political culture inherited from the past years made these countries somehow immune to the ongoing crisis. The recent years noted a weakening in the EU`s ability to forecast events and their impact in the Balkan region. So maybe it is time for the EU to innovate its economic and financial initiatives, diplomatic projects and security tools. Nowadays, the events are unfolding with great velocity. From this perspective, the intensity of interactions (what is referred to as the ‘thickness’ of globalisation) and the actors’ responses to this mark the present era. Consequently, the ability to respond speedily to the ever-quickening flow of events is deemed to be a key measure of actor capacity, and this is reflected in the organisation and operation of diplomacy (Casrlsnaes, Sjursen and White 2004, 97). The EU and the national governments in the WB region are aware of the issues which hold the region endlessly in standby, such as the unresolved bilateral disputes and the issues related to the Copenhagen criteria (as mentioned above). Precisely these issues will continue to keep the region on standby position as long as their accession depends on their own speed of reforms or each country’s performance in meeting the standards. In a conference held in Berlin on 28 of August 2014 one could hear again the repeated statement from German Chancellor, Angela Merkel: "All states in the Western Balkans should have the opportunity to join the European Union if they fulfil the accession requirements" (Merkel 2014). This summit cannot go unnoticed because of the financial aid of 12 billion Euros for the period 2014-2020 that was granted in support of the Western Balkan countries. Under the Instrument for Pre- Accession Assistance, 20% of this funding would go to regional projects, as the EU strongly believes that by strengthening regional projects and investing in joint regional projects, a good relationship between people (not only physical) and a favourable business climate could be established. Still, doubts regarding the supportive role of the EU in the region exist, taking into consideration the approach of the region towards the East in the last years. As the author Milan Nic reports: “the new Balkan approach is a combination of slow EU integration along with a search for new loans and investment from the East. Last year, Turkey was among the top three foreign investors in Croatia and Serbia, and among the top five in Bosnia. The Serbian government is courting new loans from Russia and Asia as it needs $6 billion this year to service its debt (25% more than in 2012). In addition, state assets in energy and agriculture are being sold to Arab sheiks and Azeri oligarchs. A new bridge over the Danube in Belgrade and 140 km of highways in Serbia are being built by Chinese
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companies. Such diversification of investment partnerships, now common across the region, reflects larger shifts in the global economy, but also shows a degree of desperation. In any case, it will make the EU a less dominant partner than before” (Nič 2013). Considering all of the above, one can understand that there is no time to impose any other added criteria or any more conditions to the Balkan countries. The situation urges for joint action and more efforts on the ground in order to reach a common future, as in the Balkans there is already a predominance of non-European partners especially in the business domain. As Nye argues, transnational investment creates new interests and complicates coalition-making in world politics (Nye 1990, 161). This prompts countries to change their interests towards other actors or potential partners. If this shift towards other actors continues to increase, then it might become a loss for the European credibility and the role of the EU in the region, which can lead to further geopolitical shifts.
4. THE MECHANISMS OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN THE WESTERN BALKANS AS A LEVERAGE SYSTEM TO MITIGATE CONFLICT AND ENHANCE COOPERATION
Soft power has been at the core of EU security and foreign policy as a tool to promote its normative values and European standards that attract countries towards the integration process. As Portela (2007, 9) notes, soft power was not a concept “tailor-made” for the EU, unlike ‘civilian power’ and ‘normative power’ (Nielsen 2013, 726)1. Soft power is the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction rather than coercion or payment (Nye Jr. 2008, 94). Literally, the EU accession process itself is a kind of normative power to draw countries towards full accession. For analytical reasons, a short explanation on the difference between the concepts of soft power and normative power is required since this last section of the article focuses on the kind of power that the EU has exerted in the WB and on what needs to be done internally in the region in the framework of soft power, more
1 Still, the EU’s historical narrative of peaceful integration between previously warring states is a significant source of soft power – and one for which it received the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012 (Nielsen 2013, 729).
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specifically the public diplomacy instruments1 able to shape and strengthen regional cooperation, Soft power is not contrasting normative power2. But, when examining the WB countries in particular, the emphasis falls on “five core norms of peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law and human rights from the basis of normative power, set by the EU as criteria for membership” (Barkl 2013, 19); that is why the difference needs to be specified. Furthermore, “these norms are supplemented by the norms of social progress, anti-discrimination, sustainable development and good governance” (Barkl 2013, 19). On the contrary, soft power norms in general are not so much defined, unlike in the case of EU normative power. “Soft power is a descriptive, rather than a normative, concept” (Nye 2011, 81) and its norms might differ depending on each actor`s application of soft power, more specifically what norms or values an actor wants to assert and promote in relation or in cooperation with other actors and contexts. In the case of WB countries, the EU wanted for them to undertake reforms through applying its own to a certain extent, but has showed not to be efficient enough to pull the Balkan countries towards acquiring EU membership. If we examine the relationship between the EU and the Western Balkans since the 1990s, “the EU failed dismally in first preventing and subsequently ending the wars in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, eventually needing the USA and NATO to do the heavy lifting. Such failures did little at the time to bolster the EU’s soft power or credibility as a regional
1 In international politics, the resources that produce soft power arise in large part from the values an organization or country express in its culture, in the examples it sets by its internal practices and policies and in the way it handles its relations with others. Public diplomacy is an instrument that the government uses to mobilize these resources to communicate with and attract the publics of other countries, rather than merely their governments (Nye Jr. 2008, 95). 2 Both normative power and soft power theory shift the focus of power from traditional power such as military might and economic clout, to alternative forms of power such as changing norms and altering perceptions of power. Joseph Nye defined soft power as the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments and as a power arising from the attractiveness of a country`s culture political ideas and policies. Soft power is about getting other to want what you want, it co-opts people rather than coercing them (Nye 2004). Ian Manners defines normative power as such: “It is the ability to shape or change what passes for normal in International relation and which will undoubtedly have utilitarian social moral and narrative dimensions to it, just as it will undoubtedly be disputed (Manners 2001). Normative power is located in a discussion of “the power over opinion”, idée force or ideological power (JCMS 2002; Barkl 2013).
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pacifier. Its image has only gradually recovered through long and patient efforts at post-conflict stabilization, through peacekeeping and support for nation building processes, backed by the promise of eventual membership for all Balkan countries (Nielsen 2013, 731). Despite the fact that WB countries are now in the process of reaching EU membership (except Croatia), the criteria set by the EU are based on conditionality or a “standardized EU enlargement formula” which is argued to be “not functioning in the case of WB” (Troncotӑ 2014, 164). Although “the EU is a good model for Western Balkans countries and it can give good examples in terms of democracy, tolerance, integration and juridical aspects” (Beshku 2013, 57), the norms and criteria set by the EU to influence WB countries’ behaviours and reforms and to set a good role model to follow are still facing hardships in the implementation process. As the WB countries are still lagging behind on the domestic front, but also at a regional level as a block, they “could be surprised to see that for the next term the EU Commission will not “favour” the WB anymore and concentrate on other issues from its neighbourhood” (Troncotӑ 2014, 163). The major challenge that these countries have been facing as a block is their own lack of cooperation. In this regard “it is very important for the European Union to set off a more pragmatic and decisive foreign policy towards the WB territory, which has been a venue of ethnic and never-ending conflicts” (Beshku, 2013, 56). There have been some programs for regional cooperation, mostly in order to familiarize the Balkan countries with the EU. A policy of good neighbourly relations is of major importance not only for the region but also for the EU, as the latter itself functions on the basis of member states' cooperation and shared values. In a Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council called “The Western Balkans: Enhancing the European perspective”, the EU Commission highlighted the initiatives it had launched in order to intensify relations and promote cooperation with the Balkan countries, such as: people-to-people contacts; familiarizing people with the EU, visa dialogues, more scholarships for students from the Western Balkans, participation in Community programs and agencies; other activities in the areas of science and research, education, culture, youth and media; cross-border cooperation; good governance; cooperation in the area of justice, freedom and security; Parliamentary cooperation; trade integration – Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA); Economic and social development, etc. (EU Commission COM127 2008, 8-20).
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Another attempt by the EU to bring these countries towards integration and make them cooperate with each other has been implemented in the field of infrastructure investment by building networks like railways, highways, but also energy networks. This initiative was launched at the Summit of the Balkan countries in Berlin in August 2014, as mentioned above. These programs are designed to build bridges between the countries in the region and to bring them closer to the EU in a coherent way, but the reconciliation process is another issue. Obviously, these countries have a common destination which is EU integration, but approaching them in such a way as to defuse conflicts, and increase cooperation among them requires a more concrete foreign policy from the EU and from the Balkan countries among themselves. Since the “new Commission might not only put aside, but also further slowdown enlargement” in the framework of Junker`s policy “of taking a break” from enlargement” (Troncotӑ 2014, 170), the Balkan states could launch some reconciliation campaigns through public diplomacy (PD). The challenge is up for the political leaders of each country, their foreign ministries, diplomatic missions and diplomatic institutions, but to some extent the EU could help with incentives, “since the international projection of the EU relies heavily upon the promotion of the ‘domestic’ Union as exemplar – ‘you too could be like us” (Duke 2013, 3). PD campaigns generally focus on power over public opinion, in this context, cooperation between political elites to coordinate statements and political discourses that are in favour of integration by leaving behind nationalistic appeals in favour of mutual cooperation and taking a greater importance since they have a common goal which is EU membership. It is time for these countries to adopt new trends in public diplomacy, formulate foreign policies in favour of youth exchange and mobility of people, and enhance cooperation in different fields (in the first visit of Serbian Prime Minister Aleksander Vučić to Tirana, the leaders of Serbia and Albania set an example of the political stance to be followed from now on in favour of EU integration and of good relations and cooperation among countries that have experienced bitter pasts). Statements or messages conveyed by political leaders now take a much broader dimension, so the importance of communication and attracting “the publics of other countries” (Nye Jr. 2008, 95) through proper mechanisms is important in order to produce “the soft power” that the WB region needs in this case. The EU’s part should reside in constantly monitoring and assisting not only the political process and progress made on reforms by individual countries but also the political environment at the regional level. Regional
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cooperation is one of the essential features in the EU soft power, “but one of the complicating factors when considering the EU’s public diplomacy is that, historically, it has been directed primarily inward”, when “beyond the EU, public diplomacy is more normally directed to foreign publics and conducted abroad” (Duke 2013, 2-3). Considering this fact, from the WB countries’ point of view, the expectations should be low in waiting for incentives from the EU regarding the launch of PD trends in the region. The EU support in this regard might be helpful, but the turning point or change in the beginning should happen from within. The Balkan region has great potential and resources to use in favour of cooperation. “In terms of resources, soft power resources are the assets that produce such attraction” (Nye Jr. 2008, 95). The cultural and historical values could play an attractive role if they would be fairly promoted by political elites, by the respective foreign and diplomatic missions and multimedia technologies. The WB could elaborate more on the importance of public diplomacy in order to help the region in a near future setting its goals in this kind of policies and mark a watershed moment of cooperation and integration among them. The aims of public diplomacy cannot be achieved if they are believed to be inconsistent with a country`s foreign policy or military actions (Melissen 2005, 7). Therefore, building proper strategies of foreign policy in the service of promoting common values is essential not only for the purpose of connecting these countries and their people more with each other but also for the purpose of promoting their image outside the region. Despite public diplomacy policies that now the foreign ministries of the Balkan countries develop in the service of their own countries, coordinated public diplomacy policies could be developed also in favour of common regional goals which are cooperation, integration and good neighbourly relations, in favour of knowing each other better. The impetus of these countries to embrace public diplomacy must be truly linked to the integration motif among themselves and then further into the Euro-Atlantic structures. It is because of this reason that joint projects on public diplomacy might be very fruitful and show some results in the future. An incremental cooperative relationship between the EU and WB countries to find the right instruments that are required to promote the WB region and encourage them to undertake more reforms would be of major importance, in order to diminish the region`s risk of being left on the sidelines due to their crises and internal transitions.
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5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Conclusions
Today, more than 20 years after of the fall of communism and the breakup of Yugoslavia in the WB region, Europe finally needs to assume a greater role in pulling these countries within the EU, as their people still look towards the West and hope for full membership of the EU. It is time for the EU to make some reviews in its Balkan policy for many reasons. 1. The Balkans has always been a vital part of Europe, and although recently the region has been set aside at its periphery, it is still an indispensable part of the European history and constitutes the origins of European civilization. 2. The EU should be more active and present in the Balkans with economic investments and European regional projects. Indeed, the EU has been and still is a very significant donor in the Balkans, but the many deficiencies inherited throughout the years and the quicksand of corruption in these countries have been difficult to overcome by EU investments so far. The WB, likewise Europe after World War II, have been in need of a "Marshall Plan"-type of initiative since the 90s. Some analysts believe that the financial aid of 12 billion euro foreseen for a six year-period is something similar to a "Marshall Plan”, but if it is so, it is a bit late. For all the reasons mentioned above, the EU should make some adjustments in its role as a leadership factor in the WB. 3. Public diplomacy mechanisms should finally be implemented in the WB as part of a regional initiative that should happen from within, considering its crucial importance and the benefits it may provide in the reconciliation process and for the better external promotion of these countries.
Recommendations
The WB states should dedicate significant attention and efforts to joint initiatives to promote and support public diplomacy programs and projects. The EU could give assistance with sponsorship and financial aid for joint regional programs in this sector. 1. These countries should find the proper mechanisms to promote events in the field of culture, art, history and also sport. Some other activities might also be: folk festivals, various fairs in touristic seasons; scientific
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conferences for historical events, where the Balkans acted united, etc. These projects should be designed to attract the targeted audience not only in the Balkans but also beyond, and may help furthermore to foster exchanges, soften relations and create a good climate within the region of WB. 2. The cooperative spirit to co-ordinate movements and actions, to move in the same pace, should not only focus on the political field, in particular regarding Chapter 23 and 24 of the EU acquis, but also on other levels. It is important to strengthen links not only for political dialogue but also to further advance in a continuous engagement regarding media outreach and internet programs. The multimedia tools and instruments are necessary to launch and promote common values, traditions and culture. Starting from the national levels, PD sectors or bodies should coordinate commitments and moves regarding strategic communication for the messages that could impact and enhance the reconciliation process. 3. “Cultural diplomacy is the linchpin of public diplomacy” (Advisory Committee on cultural diplomacy 2005, 1). “The definition used by Milton C. Cummings, describes cultural diplomacy: the exchange of ideas, information, values, systems, traditions, beliefs, and other aspects of culture, with the intention of fostering mutual understanding", for no matter how convinced we may ourselves be about the superiority of our values, practices and achievements, we must still approach others with an open mind and a readiness to engage with everyone on equal terms” (Tuomioja 2009, 4). Cultural diplomacy could play a very supportive role for the reconciliation process in the Western Balkan countries. There are several initiatives that could be developed in this regard, like for instance: a) Common Values Initiative (Sharing the same values): The development of strategies and initiatives in the spirit of common values, beliefs, tradition and ideas exchanges would help the people of Balkan countries to get closer and get to know each other better. People of Balkan countries are used to refer to each other as “us” versus “them” (Itano 2007) but they are very similar to each other since they share a common history, tradition and culture. Television campaigns, advertisements, websites, newspapers, magazine, history books could be further explored as opportunities to illustrate and inform about the common history events, the style of living and common features that people of these countries express in their daily lives. b) Promoting Balkan tours and developing regional tourism: Developing the regional tourism sector would contribute not only to the
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economic growth of a country but also to regional development. Building the necessary infrastructure to interconnect the WB countries is necessary for the development of tourism. Some infrastructure projects were launched in the Vienna Western Balkans Summit on August 27. These projects will have a great impact on the development and interconnection of the region. “Among the so-called 'pre-identified' projects are the highway from Nis in Serbia to the Albanian coastal city of Durres through to the Kosovo capital of Pristina and the highway from Croatia to the Greek border via Montenegro and Albania. The construction of these two highways will increase trade exchanges in the Western Balkan region and promote tourism among these countries” (CC Law Office 2015). Developing regional tourism through the necessary infrastructure will help exchange tourism tours, promote values and cultures of the Balkan countries, and bring their people closer. c) Educational projects and joint history projects: There was a joint history project by CDRSSE1 initiated “in 1999, in an effort to change the way history is taught in schools across the Balkans. The founders are historians, diplomats and philanthropists. Today, the JHP is the gold standard in multi- perspective history teaching. The programme is therefore centred on education, on providing history-teaching materials for teachers that convey multiple perspectives of the same events, and on ensuring that these materials be used across the region. "Internationally, the History Workbooks have become effective advocacy tools for further raising awareness and putting on the EU policy agenda the importance of multi-perspective history teaching in promoting reconciliation," the USAID report stated. "It is critical that the JHP work continue in order to sustain achievements and impacts, especially in the current context of nationalism that still exists in the region" (CDRSEE 1999). Continuous joint history projects should be developed for the purpose of mitigating conflict and enhancing mutual understanding between Balkan people. Other educational projects could be launched and developed in order to approach the reconciliation process with an open mind, and to construct a common regional future and community based on so many similarities but also differences.
1 CDRSEE is a Centre for democracy and reconciliation in Southeast Europe aiming to foster democratic pluralist and peaceful societies since 1998. The JHP is the original CDRSSE program that not only aims to revise ethnocentric school history lessons, but also encourages critical thinking and debate, celebrates diversity and recognizes shared suffering and achievements (CDRSEE 1999).
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d) Other programmes and initiatives could be developed in the field of student and academic staff exchanges between Universities in the WB countries. There is a joint mobility programme called Eraweb by Erasmus1 offered by eight Western Balkan universities and six EU universities, but the mobility flows of students and academic staffs are targeted from the European Union countries to the partner universities in the WB, or from the eligible countries in the WB to the partner universities in the European Union. Similar initiatives or projects could be launched between Universities in the WB countries, to promote student exchange in many research fields. Building networks of youth exchange between WB countries like establishing regional organizations or other bodies would be the kind of initiatives that would contribute to the reconciliation process through youth activism and to the establishment of a tradition of regional cooperation between the young people of WB countries.
REFERENCES
Barkl, A. 2013. A theory comparison and empirical examination of Soft power China and normative power Europe in North Africa and Central Asia, Paper submitted to Central European University, Department of International Relations and European Studies. CEU eTD Collection, Hungary, Budapest. Beshku, K. 2013. Albanian and the Western Balkans in the European Context; At the beginning of 1990s: How did the normative power of the European Community/Union affect them, Cambridge Scholars Publishing. Caka F., Dr. Zajmi I, Bishaj A. 2012. Aderimi I vendeve të Ballkanit perëndimor në Bashkimin Europian: Një vështrim i shkurtër krahasues i kritereve të zgjerimit, Politikja (Revistë Shkencore), West-print. Carlsnaes, W., Sjursen H. and White B. 2004. Contemporary European Foreign Policy, Sage Publishers. CC Law office (Admin) 2015, EU will fund infrastructure projects for Albania and Western Balkans, http://www.cclaw.al/. CDRSEE. 1999. Joint history Project, http://cdrsee.org/projects/jhp.
1 Erasmus Western Mundus Balkans is a project offered by eight Western Balkan universities and six EU universities. Students and members of the faculty will benefit from the opportunity to study, teach and research abroad. The emphasis of ERAWEB is on research in medicine and health sciences.
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European Commission. 2008. Western Balkans: Enhancing the European Perspective. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, November 2008. http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/november/tradoc_141300.pdf Duke, S. 2013. The European External Action Service and Public Diplomacy, Discussion Papers in Diplomacy, Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’ The Hague; http://www.clingendael.nl/ Irrera, D. 2011. Albania through EU pressure and local conditions, Politikja (Reviste Shkencore) no. 01, Edlora Press. Itano, N. 2007. To avoid 'us vs. them' in Balkans, rewrite history, The Christian Science Monitor, March 14. http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0314/p01s02-woeu.html Lasheras, F. 2014. Europe must not neglect the Western Balkans, Commentary by Francisco de Borja Lasheras. http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_europe_must_not_neglect_the_western_balkans307 Melissen, J. 2005. The new public diplomacy. Soft power in international relations, Palgrave MacMillan Merkel, A. 2014. Merkel seeks to strengthen EU ties to Western Balkans; EurActiv Germany reports, 29 August. http://www.euractiv.com/sections/europes-east/merkel-seeks- strengthen-eu-ties-western-balkans-308093 Nielsen, K. 2013. EU Soft power and the capability–expectations gap, Journal of Contemporary European Research, Vol. 09, Issue 5. http://www.jcer.net/. Nye J. (Jr.). 1990. “Soft Power”. Foreign Policy, 80: 153-171, online at http://faculty.maxwell.syr.edu/rdenever/PPA-730-27/Nye%201990.pdf. Nye, Joseph S. 2011. The Future of Power. New York: Public Affairs. Nye J. S. (Jr). 2008. “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power”. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 616: 94-109, DOI: 10.1177/0002716207311699, online at http://ann.sagepub.com/content/616/1/94. Nič, M. 2013. The EU’s role in the Western Balkans after Croatian accession. http//:cepolicy.org. Pridham, G. 2008. Securing fragile democracies in the Balkans: The European dimension; European Journal of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 2. Report of the Advisory Committee on Cultural Diplomacy U.S. Department of State, 2005, Cultural Diplomacy The Linchpin of Public Diplomacy; http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/54374.pdf. Troncotӑ, M. 2014. The formation of the Juncker Commission and its impact on the Western Balkans. Europolity, Vol.08, No.02 New series. Tuomioja, E. 2009. The Role of Soft Power in EU Common Foreign Policy, International Symposium on Cultural Diplomacy Berlin 30.7. 2009; http://www.culturaldiplomacy.org.
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THE IMPACT OF EU CONDITIONALITY IN THE WESTERN BALKANS. A COMPARATIVE APPROACH: BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA – BULGARIA
Octavia MOISE Romanian Banking Institute Bucharest/Romania [email protected]
Abstract The purpose of this article is to analyse the security environment at the beginning of the XXIst century and to assess the impact of EU conditionality in the Western Balkans. The paper will analyse the redistribution of power and the new challenges that send the European Union at a crossroad. To explain such complex phenomena, we will use a comprehensive framework based on realism, liberal institutionalism, and constructivism. The central part of the paper will analyse EU conditionality in the Western Balkans – along with its characteristics, particularities, difficulties – and the impact of the degree of sovereignty. The case-study will provide a comparative analysis between EU conditionality in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Bulgaria proving that sovereignty matters for the conditionality-compliance relationship.
Keywords Bosnia and Herzegovina; Bulgaria; Compliance; EU Conditionality; Sovereignty; Western Balkans
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1. INTRODUCTION
After the collapse of communism, the dissolutions of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, and the beginning of reforms to consolidate liberal democracy and market economy, the European Union’s reaction has been to offer the possibility of EU membership to ten Eastern European states in 1993 and to five Western Balkans states in 2000. All waves of enlargement “including the historic expansion in 2004” mark “the reunification of Europe after decades of division”1. “The security of Europe depends on stability in the Balkans. They are also a test-case for Europe's enhanced Common Foreign and Security Policy. Nowhere more than the Balkans is the EU expected to deliver” (Solana 2001) said Javier Solana, the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy more than a decade ago, in 2001. Unfortunately, the Balkans are not a priority anymore, as the EU faces new types of both internal and external challenges. In the Western Balkans, there were two external interventions, in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, “and outside powers imposed settlements underpinned by internationally-controlled institutions” (Oproiu 2015, 2). Nowadays, the security agenda of the European Union is affected by different types of internal and external crises and the Balkans seem to disappear from the priorities, although their road to the EU is still incomplete. If we consider only the recent past, the EU has been struggling with institutional and political crises like the Centre – Periphery debate, two speed Europe / first class or second class members of the EU, the euro-crisis, the new members – old members debate on enlargement, the GREXIT, the refugee’s crisis and the list could continue. Still, the EU has a series of difficulties in sustaining a coherent long-term strategy regarding the region. The framework gets fuzzier if we think at the international system, that faces a stage of transition, with a non linear path of its consequences like the rise of new emerging powers, unpredictable consequences of globalization, a shift of wealth and economic power from West to East, a diffusion of power between non-state actors, etc. We are in a stage of transition that began more than twenty years ago with the dissolution of the former USSR, and reached the East of the Mediterranean, Middle East and North Africa, indicating a reshaping of the power equilibrium.
1 http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/from-6-to-28-members/index_en.htm.
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In the view of V. Secares, the first phase of this transition started with the strategic withdrawal of the USSR from Eastern Europe, by changing the configuration of the political and strategic system in the Euro-Atlantic area, leading to the reunification of Germany; it is indeed a surprise that the second phase of this transition started also with economic, political and strategic repositioning in the Euro-Atlantic area (marked by the economic-financial crisis, tensions among EU members because of different projects on the future of the EU) and continued with the Arab Spring, the crisis in the East of the Mediterranean, the Middle East, North Africa and more recently with the annexation of Crimea by Russia, the actions of ISIL and the refugees crisis (Secares 2014). This transition is reshaping the world order and in this context we have to analyse the future of the Western Balkans, bearing in mind the fact that the present process is reshaping the geopolitical map of the world through new coalitions and new positions. The prospect of EU accession was linked to the ability to set standards of democratic governance and for the Western Balkans to consolidate statehood structures after the Yugoslav wars of secession in the 1990s.
2. METHODOLOGY/RESEARCH GOALS
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the security environment of the EU at the beginning of the XXIst century and to assess the impact of EU conditionality in the Western Balkans1. The research question refers to the degree in which sovereignty influences the conditionality-compliance dynamic in Western Balkans. We will explain how the statehood of a candidate country influences EU conditionality and domestic compliance. The hypothesis is that sovereignty matters for the conditionality- compliance relationship. For a better understanding of how sovereignty matters, we will make the difference between states with contested sovereignty and states with uncontested sovereignty. In countries with
1 Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Kosovo under UN Security Resolution 1244, Montenegro and Serbia, according to http://eeas.europa.eu/western_balkans/index_en.htm.
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contested sovereignty, EU conditionality may be more invasive, as it can intrude in the sovereignty of a candidate state, calling for a redefinition of internal and/or external statehood structures. In states with undisputed/uncontested sovereignty, the EU conditionality generates democratic and economic reforms, and compliance at national level is consensual and sustainable. According to these categories we differentiated between two groups of cases: 1) Romania and Bulgaria (undisputed/uncontested sovereignty)1 and 2) Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Serbia, Montenegro, etc. (contested sovereignty). In the process of casing/case selection we decided that the “population" of the comparison would be Bulgaria and Bosnia and Herzegovina after 1990. The cases were selected according to the criteria indicated before (sovereignty); BiH represents a state with weak internal sovereignty, but strong external sovereignty, whereas Bulgaria represents a state of full sovereignty. The main variable we will use sovereignty, in the sense that variation of the level of sovereignty is connected to the formation of the state and that sovereignty of a candidate state influences the specific conditions/criteria the EU imposes in exchange of the promise of membership. The sovereignty- linked EU criteria represent an additional layer of conditionality to the Copenhagen criteria requesting high democratic and economic standards (Noutcheva 2006).
3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
To approach such a complex environment, we need a theoretical framework encompassing realism, liberal institutionalism, and constructivism. On the one hand, we will use this framework in accordance with the recent debates in International Relations Theory (Fearon 2008; Jackson 2011) stating that the classical distinction between realism, neo-liberalism and constructivism is not sustainable anymore: “Realism versus liberalism versus constructivism focused too much on what some master explanatory variable in IR is supposed to be: power (according to realists), institutions or domestic
1 Although there were some incidents, it did not affect the state structure and they do not relate directly with conditionality.
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preferences (for liberals), and norms (for constructivists)” (Fearon 2008). The author explains that it does not make sense anymore to find the best all- purpose explanatory variable, but to start from the things we want to explain and from the concrete problems we want to identify. They argue that there is not “an inevitable and necessary logical connection between object of study and methodological way of studying it” and that combining theory and methodology in new ways generated many interesting innovations (Jackson 2011). On the other hand, the analysis is a multi-level one and we will use the realist framework to explain that the recent events should be analysed in the framework of the redistribution of power, liberal institutionalism to underline the role of international organizations like the EU and the constructivist approach to explain how conditionality leads to socialization with norms, rules, procedures. The realist approach states that power is divided in cycles of systemic power that last for 100 years, with a major power – the hegemonic one – holding “the key of the balance”; the transition to a new cycle of power usually occurs through a hegemonic war (Modelski 1987, 214). We will refer to the transition of power theory, because it provides a framework to explain the events we are facing and possibly to envisage future directions of action. The international system is in a phase of transition to a new cycle of systemic power. The most relevant authors on the transition of power are A. F. K. Organski (1968, 339) - power transition theory, Robert Gilpin (1981) - hegemonic transition theory, George Modelski (1987, 214) – hegemonic cycle theory, Joshua Goldstein – long cycle theory, Charles Doran (2009) - cycle of relative power theory, Immanuel Wallerstein (2012) – world systems theory. The phase of transition implies that “the tectonic plates of the global structure are moving” (Secares 2014) and a new geopolitical map will arise from the confrontation for power between the most important poles. According to the hegemonic cycle theory, we are in a stage of transition to a new cycle of power, “translated into a real tough game of power and power politics, shaping the new hegemonic structure of the 21st century” (Secares 2014).
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Table no. 1 Hegemonic cycles of power at system level
Hegemonic Global war Strategic rival Strategic rival Successor cycle of the strategic hegemon rival Portugal (1517- 1585-1608 Spain Great Britain Netherlands 1580) Netherlands Netherlands 1689-1713 France Netherlands Great Britain (1609-1713) Great Britain Great Britain 1793-1815 France Great Britain Great Britain (1714-1815) Great Britain 1914-1918 Germany Great Britain USA (1816-1945) USA USA (1946- 1947-1989/1991 USSR USA USA 1989/1991) USA ? China USA ??? (1989/1991- present time) Source: George Modelski, ”The long cycle of Global Politics and The Nation State”, 1978, apud Soare (2013)
Regarding the future configuration of power, C. Layne offers a wide range of patterns of systemic polarity based on the American pre-eminence (Layne 2011): a) unipolarity - a passing “moment” in IR, a transition to multipolarity; b) unipolarity - an unprecedented reality in IR stating the “American unipolar era”; c) globalization, nuclear weapons and irreversible changes of the system led it to a new structure; this systemic polarity approach has three aspects: 1. ”uni-multipolarity”- the balance of power is diminished through the existence of one superpower, and reactivates (after the absence in the bipolar period) the regional balances of power; 2. “multi-multipolarity”- the systemic and regional levels are interfering; 3. “nonpolarity”- it highlights the idea that polarity became an obsolete concept in the new era of nonpolarity/a world dominated by many states having different types of power (Layne 2011). The neorealist approach provides the means to understand why the Balkan countries’ relations with the international system are different in terms of their sovereignty. It also provides the instruments to understand international action in the governance of protectorates and internally non- sovereign countries (Noutcheva 2006). For example, in the case of Bosnia in the
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early 2000s, the High Representative appointed by the international community who was also the EU Special Representative had the capacity to impose legislation and constrain officials if they did not cooperate, and to facilitate compliance with EU conditions (Knaus 2003, 60-74). The liberal school of thought provides the instruments to explain the East European states’ foreign policy orientation toward the West and their receptiveness to join the EU (Linden 1997, 164-191). When investigating external state behaviour through the lens of state-society relations, the liberal view offers primary importance “to the domestic social context in which state preferences are shaped” (Moravcsik 1997, 513-530). The liberal approach will explain the popular support for the EU across the Balkans. The constructivist approach represented by Alexander Wendt, Emmanuel Adler, Friedrich Kratochwill and John Ruggie developed after the ‘90’s from the struggle to explain social and political outcomes through contextualization. The theory argues that social interaction generates and develops identities, preferences, political structures (Wendt 1999). Applied to the subject of our analysis, this approach states that socialization generated by the Western presence in the Western Balkans has “created conditions for the host nation countries to adopt standards, norms and values convergent with those that NATO and EU hold dear” (Levkovska and Shane 2011). Colin Hay argues that institutions are socially constructed mechanisms and that EU institutionalization is a political outcome that can be best explained through constructivism (Hay 2006). Constructivists believe that in the process of Europeanization, identities and perceptions generate new institutions in the attempt to „adapt” the Western Balkans to the EU accession criteria (Troncota 2010).
4. THE IMPACT OF EU CONDITIONALITY IN THE WESTERN BALKANS
I. G. Bărbulescu defines Europeanization as follows: „regardless of the orientation of the process (top-down – from the centre downwards to the member states, bottom-up or bidirectional), it refers to both formal and informal establishment and dissemination of certain norms, principles, beliefs or attitudes related to the impact of the Community political system” (Bӑrbulescu 2009, 68). The difference between Europeanization and conditionality would reside in the fact that EU conditionality in respect to the
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Eastern enlargement is seen more as „Europeanization of candidate countries as a different category than Europeanization of member states” (Bӑrbulescu and Troncotӑ 2012). Conditionality was defined as the EU’s most important tool designed for candidate and potential candidate states in post-communist Europe (Anastasakis and Bechev 003), that developed gradually along with the evolution of the EU. EU conditionality in the Balkan region is multidimensional (economic- related criteria, political-related criteria, social-related criteria, security-related criteria) and multi-purpose (reconciliation, reconstruction, reform); the aims of EU conditionality in the Western Balkans were to integrate the Balkan states into the EU, to promote reforms, to prescribe criteria correlated to EU-granted benefits and to differentiate among countries (Noutcheva 2006). The challenges of conditionality were encountered in creating sustainable reforms, the inability to generate local consensus about the need for reform and the inconsistencies between the priorities of the EU and the priorities of local populations. If we are to explain the causes we would have to think at the lack of regional input in shaping the priorities, which slows the process of creating reform, the underlying heterogeneity that exacerbates antagonism and the mix of bilateral and regional conditionality that leads to suspicion: “the stronger feel that they are delayed by the weaker countries and the weaker do not benefit from the progress of the stronger” (Anastasakis and Bechev 2003, 3). The Balkan states have responded to EU conditionality in different degrees, with internal institutional and policy reforms in exchange of the prospect of membership. Also, these states are different with respect to their sovereignty, if we refer to domestic governance, independent of external actors – internal sovereignty and internationally recognized status –external sovereignty (Noutcheva 2006). We will explain how the statehood of a candidate country influences EU conditionality and domestic compliance. In semi-sovereign states, EU conditionality may imply higher costs for compliance (from a rationalist approach) because it might intervene in the attributes of sovereignty of a candidate country inferring a redesign of internal or external statehood. Such action by the EU may lead to the perception of inconsistency in EU’s policy. If the EU asks for compliance with sovereignty- sensitive conditions, local consensus and domestic politics might be divided and fragmented, leading to opposition to EU conditionality (Micu 2013). In states with uncontested sovereignty, EU conditionality implies democratic and
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economic reforms (Börzel 2011), the EU speaks with one voice decreasing the risk of inconsistency and increasing local consensus that favours domestic and sustainable compliance (Noutcheva 2006). R. D. Putnam argued that leaders have to play at two tables when bargaining for international outcomes, so the compliance decision is influenced both by the inside and the outside (Putnam 1988, 427-460). When using sovereignty as a variable for analysing the conditionality/compliance dynamic, we refer to the definition given by S. Krasner (1999, 20-25), stating that a state has the exclusive right to control/govern the territory, people, and that a state has a legitimate use of power and the application of international law. S. Krasner focuses on four conceptions of sovereignty in international relations: Legal sovereignty – states recognize one another as being independent; Interdependence sovereignty – state sovereignty is eroded by globalisation; Domestic sovereignty – state authority structures and their legitimate control within the state; Westphalian sovereignty – states determine their own authority. Authors like R. O. Keohane refer to sovereignty in terms of gradations along both dimensions – sovereign or non-sovereign (Keohane 2002, 743-765). Some states in the Western Balkans can be characterized as being both internally and externally sovereign – Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Albania whilst others show a variation of the degree of sovereignty depreciation, by functioning as international protectorates, having their external sovereignty undermined or their internal sovereignty compromised – Kosovo, Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia. A possible explanation of EU-Balkan relation arises from the neorealist approach, which gives importance to the asymmetry of power resources between the EU and the Balkan countries (Waltz 1979). When explaining why governments that are appreciated at the international level are voted no matter what is their external compliance record, I. Krastev argued: (…) „The biggest danger for democracy today is not sudden but rather slow death, meaning a gradual process of erosion and delegitimation that destroys democratic regimes even as their surface institutions remain in place (…). In this 'democracy without politics' scenario, the truly representative character of democracy is hollowed out from within, behind a shell of democratic institutions. This, and not some Southern authoritarian reversion, is the major risk that the Balkans face today” (Krastev
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2002, 41). Because the European agenda overwhelmed the domestic one, the political elites neglected the priorities of the society and this “led to a crisis of internal instability of Balkan political regimes” (Noutcheva 2006) and also generated a lack of popular trust in the democratic state institutions and the political parties. But the state – society relationship cannot be the only responsible element; the new political class and the public perception also play an important role. Regarding the motives driving the Balkan states’ compliance, we can exemplify the two options developed by G. J. Ikenberry and C. A. Kupchan (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990, 283-315) with concrete cases. External inducement/compliance through imposition is generated by direct intervention of an external actor, while internal reconstruction/compliance through voluntary action is the result of incentives offered by the EU. In states with uncontested sovereignty, the outcomes of EU conditionality are decided by internal political actors and internal political processes. In states with contested/constrained sovereignty, compliance is generated both by direct imposition and domestic choices. Another interesting differentiation between the mechanisms ensuring compliance is made in respect with the relation between conditionality and socialization (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990, 283-315). The outcomes of socialization-driven compliance are considered to be sustainable in time because changes occur as a result of beliefs change; political actors comply due to the legitimacy of EU demands, even if it is against their interest, so socialization is enough to modify actors’ beliefs. If political actors consider EU demands similar to their interests, but the legitimacy of EU demands is low, their outcome is called conditionality-driven compliance (Noutcheva 2006). Conditionality and socialization reinforce each other when they are complementary and the benefits compensate the high short-term costs, in a situation than can be defined as genuine compliance. The last option is called fake compliance, when the legitimacy of EU demands is low, the short-term costs are high and the long-term outcome is doubtful (in their view) The differences appear in the process of implementation. However, all these options are desirable instead of non-compliance that implies the highest costs.
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5. A COMPARATIVE APPROACH: BiH – Bulgaria
Conditionality in Bulgaria
Even if it was intended or not, a consequence of applying EU conditionality in Eastern and Central Europe was the differentiation between the countries there. The EU created one framework to manage relations with all aspiring states, but it also used bilateral ties. This envisaged the actual speed and support for reforms, but also the West’s heterogeneous strategic interests in these states. Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia were considered better prepared for integration (Woodward 1995, 150) due to their major commitment to democratization and economic reform. Bulgaria and Romania were considered “less promising and with much less political and economic capacity for reform” (Anastasakis and Bechev 2003). We will continue this section of the paper with a review of the European road of Bulgaria1. The cases of Bulgaria and Romania are especially interesting due to the fact that these countries were part of the “laggard group before they were exposed to EU conditionality from the late 1990s on” (Ahrens and Zweynert 2012, 291-307) and afterwards they continued the reforms. In 1993 the European Agreements were signed and in 1999 at the Helsinki Council the decision to open accession talks was taken (also due to political considerations in the aftermath of the Kosovo crisis). The requirements were defined by the Copenhagen criteria (1993), which refer to the political (democracy, rule of law, human rights, minorities), economic and legislative alignment. Among the benefits these countries were promised were membership in the EU access to funds: SAPARD (agricultural aid), ISPA (regional aid), PHARE (restructuring the economy). In 22 June 2004 the Association Committee meant good progress for the preparation of accession and the need for further reform on judicial structures, fight against political corruption and organized crime, Roma community, etc. On December 17, 2004, the Brussels European Council confirmed the conclusion of accession negotiations with Bulgaria and the 1st of January 2007
1 All data is available on the official website of the EU http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/bulgaria/eu_bulgaria_relations_en.htm; http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/result_of_neg_final_council_version_st05859_04 05_en.pdf.
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was set as date of accession at the Thessaloniki Summit in 2003 and confirmed in Brussels on 18 June 2004; on 25 April 2005 Bulgaria and the EU-25 signed the Treaty of accession. On 26 September 2006 the monitoring report of the European Commission confirmed the entry date as 1 January 2007. To underline the importance of this historic event for the EU, José Manuel Barroso, the President of the Commission at that time said: “The 1 January 2007 is a historic day to celebrate. I congratulate the people and leaders of Bulgaria and Romania for the courage, determination and work in preparing for membership. I thank the people and the leaders of the EU for their vision in supporting this project”. Researchers questioned at that time whether these states were prepared to join the EU or their accession was rather a geopolitical decision. François Frison-Roche from the National Centre for Scientific Research (CNRS) in Paris stated that "The decision for Romania's and Bulgaria's accession was more strategic, more geopolitical in a sense.” The author considers that given the regional instability, it was more appropriate to offer the opportunity of membership to these countries and help them “in this new capacity”, rather than “letting them become festering wounds”, having into consideration the instability and the conflicts of the Western Balkans, which could have had a spill-over effect in the entire region1. Although accession was postponed from 2004 to 2007, EU provided detailed roadmaps and increased levels of funding (Anastasakis and Bechev 2003). That trend seemed to be more promising in the case of Bulgaria, which “advanced more in the negotiation of individual chapters and has a better functioning market economy” (Anastasakis and Bechev 2003, 3). However, Bulgaria (and Romania also) suffered a number of restrictions in the sense that the citizens of these states did not have the same working rights in some older EU members as other EU citizens for the first years of their membership. In Bulgaria, EU political conditionality did not determine/influence directly the sovereignty of the state in the pre-accession phase. Although the criteria for EU membership involved “pooling of sovereignty” with other states in different policy areas, with competences being transferred to the EU level, the Copenhagen criteria does not undermine the formal aspects of sovereignty of an aspiring state like the case of Bulgaria’ pre-accession (Gateva 2010). There were changes in the national institutional structures, but they
1 http://www.euractiv.com/enlargement/analyst-bulgaria-romanias-eu-acc-news-509933.
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were determined by local actors who set the limits to external interference (Spendzharova 2012). The accession of Bulgaria and Romania completed the EU’s historic fifth round of enlargement “peacefully reuniting Western and Eastern Europe after decades of division”1.
Conditionality in Bosnia and Herzegovina
The road of BiH to the EU2 started in 1997 when the EU Regional Approach for the Western Balkans was adopted with the following requirements: preservation of one common state, respect for democratic principles, human rights, rule of law, protection of minorities, market economy reforms and regional cooperation. The benefits were focused on trade concessions, financial assistance, and economic cooperation. Later on, the reconstruction funds PHARE and OBNOVA were introduced. After the 1999 Kosovo war, the Stabilization and Association Process (upgrading EU relations with the individual countries) and the multilateral Stability Pact for South-eastern Europe (regional cooperation in politics, economics and security) replaced the Regional Approach. The requirements were: regional cooperation activities, free trade in SEE, democratic and market reforms, respect for human rights, to work for the return of refugees and cooperate with The Hague-based International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY), and to build up their capacity in the domain of justice and home affairs (Marsh and Rees 2012). The benefits were asymmetric trade liberalisation, economic and financial assistance as well as budgetary and balance of payments support, assistance for democratisation and civil society, humanitarian aid for refugees and returnees, cooperation in justice and home affairs. The following steps were the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) negotiations. Between 2000 and 2006, CARDS (Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation) programme replaced OBNOVA and PHARE. In 2000 at Santa Maria Da Feira Council the EU stated
1 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-06-1900_en.htm. 2 All data is available on the EU official website http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/detailed-country-information/bosnia- herzegovina/index_en.htm.
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that the SAP countries are ‘potential candidates’. On 1 June 2015 the SAA was ratified and entered into force (it was signed on 16 June 2008). The EU intervened in the post-war state-building process and offered incentives in exchange for strengthening the central level of government as “a pre-requisite for integration in the EU” (Noutcheva 2006). The EU reforms demanded as conditions for establishing contractual relations with BiH have, in essence, linked the membership perspective to changes in the internal statehood structure of BiH. Although the Dayton Agreements1 ensure “the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina in accordance with international law”, there are local actors like Republika Srpska2 who deny the common state, the internationally – legally recognized – sovereignty of the state. The EU conditionality – for a united state - represents a deterrent against local claims for altering the status quo. The power relation between the two components of BiH3 is influenced indirectly by the EU common state conditionality if we bear in mind the fact that the Dayton Agreement developed a decentralized state “with a high degree of ethnic institutionalization at the expense of governance effectiveness” (Noutcheva 2006). Only narrow areas of competences are assigned to the common state level4 and a wide amount of governmental attributes5 is assigned to the entities. The EU did not request directly the BiH institutions to strengthen the common state attributes, but it manifested its disappointment with the functioning of the Dayton arrangements (“from a perspective of European integration, it is difficult to argue that the current constitutional order is optimal”, European Commission 2003, 6) and insisted on “passing state-level legislation and strengthening the state-level institutions in all spheres of reform” (Noutcheva 2006).
1 http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/BA_951121_DaytonAgreement.pdf. 2 Administrative entity in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 3 Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska. 4 Foreign policy, foreign trade policy, customs policy, monetary policy, immigration, refugee and asylum policy, international and inter-entity criminal law enforcement, establishment and operation of common and international communications facilities, regulation of inter-entity transport, and air traffic control. 5 All other competences are the exclusive prerogative of the entities.
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For example, the principles for police reform for which the Commission recommended strengthening of the state-level competences in the state are: “1) exclusive police competence at the BiH level, but operational control at the local level; 2) police areas drawn up on the grounds of operational efficiency, not political control; and 3) no political interference in policing” (High Representative 2005). In BiH, the EU political conditionality has been intrusive in the sense that it has requested “a redefinition of the relationship between the entities and the state” (Noutcheva 2006) and as a consequence it influenced directly the internal sovereignty of the state, without denying the fact that it contributed to the stability of the region (European Commission 2012, 2). The state structure needs local/domestic forces to create it, whereas in BiH the federal solution/the new constitutional order was either imposed or suggested by an external actor (not initiated after consultations with the public or proposals from the public). The fact that the institutions did not assume the solution (that proved their incapacity to identify solutions for the communities) favours a negative attitude of the population in accepting the constitutional order. The fact that institutions are not able to provide solutions for the communities according to their identities and cultural particularities proves that first there must be identified the political communities, the identities assumed by the actors and then create the institutions. As M. Troncota argues, identity triggers forces of institutions. Instead of starting from these identities, the external actors imposed a new statehood (Troncota 2010).
Bulgaria BiH Aim membership reconciliation, reconstruction and reform Conditions improvement State-building/ particular constitutional changes of the state of democracy and rule of law stimulate preservation of one common state reforms a change in the internal balance of power between the central government and the two constituent entities - the Republika Srpska (RS) and the Bosno-Croat Federation Conclusion no direct affect the state of sovereignty impact on the more demanding sovereignty
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6. CONCLUSIONS
The EU has applied distinct levels of pressure on states in the region. The EU conditionality for BiH is more demanding than the Copenhagen criteria and conditionality in the Western Balkans had specific security objectives as the main objective was to preserve the integrity of those states and to prevent their disintegration. In other words, „the EU’s enlargement policy is a political project translated in the technocratic language of conditionality” (Troncotӑ 2013). In BiH, the EU submitted to the authorities a very specific list of criteria and did not allow them for much manoeuvring space, a situation that built a sense of direction for compliance measures, but also generated blockages in the political process. The objective of EU conditionality was to generate consensus on reforms in a much divided society that did not have a common understanding of the local reform agenda. From the EU perspective, the initial semi-protectorate status of BiH made them influence the institutional structure of the country. As many authors underlined and as previously proved, the EU has applied different level of pressure on domestic actors in the cases of Bulgaria and BiH. Because the EU criteria influences and even substitutes for sovereign decisions of Balkan states regarding the structure of the states, the costs of compliance with EU conditionality are higher (Anastasakis and Bechev 2003). The EU politics of conditionality may generate increased compliance costs because it may interfere in the sovereignty of a candidate - “suggesting a redefinition of internal statehood structures” (Noutcheva 2006). This is also related to the „misfit model” (Cowles, Caporaso and Risse 2001, 1-20) which states that ‘divergence’ or ‘convergence’ depends on the level of adaptation among aspiring states, which can be understood by the level of consonance that exists between the domestic and European criteria. We also noticed a deficit of commitment on both sides: the EU has a heterogeneous position regarding its offer to the Western Balkans. Support for the EU in the Balkan governments does not generate a consistent trend for sustainable reforms as a route to membership. There are numerous difficulties in applying conditionality in the Western Balkans: differentiation and regional antagonism, the un- sustainability of the reform process, priorities and the lack of regional input,
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internally divided states, rough neighbourhoods, ethnic conflicts, the consequences of war crimes (Anastasakis and Bechev 2003).
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Linden, R.H. Liberalization and Foreign Policy in Eastern Europe in Liberalization and Foreign Policy, M. Kahler (ed.), http://bdi.mfa.government.bg/info/Module%2001%20- %20Institucionalna%20ramka%20na%20vanshnata%20politika/dopalnitelna%20literatura/Lib eralization%20and%20Foreign%20Policy.html. Levkovska, L. and T.F. Shane. 2011. Constructivist Approach to Western Balkans’ Contribution Towards Peace and Stability http://www.analyticalmk.com/files/2011/01/1.pdf. Marsh, S. and W. Rees, The European Union in the Security of Europe. From Cold War to Terror War, London and New York, Routledge, 2012. Micu, Gabriel. 2013. State sovereignty in the context of European construction, Law Series XII. Titu Maiorescu University Law Review. Modelski, G. 1978. The long cycle of Global Politics and The Nation State, CSSH. Modelski, G. 1987. Long Cycles in World Politics. London: Macmillan. Moravcsik, A. 1997. Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics, International Organization 51: 513–53. Noutcheva, G. 2006. EU Conditionality and Balkan Compliance: Does Sovereignty Matter? http://d-scholarship.pitt.edu/7279/. Oproiu, M. 2015. Crafting a Wider Strategy for Conflict Management in the Neighbourhood? A Comparative Perspective on the European Union’s Civilian Missions in Georgia and Kosovo” Romanian Journal of European Affairs 15: 2 (June). Organski, A. F. K. 1968. World Politics, 2d ed. New York: Knopf. Putnam, R.D. 1988. Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games International Organization 42: 427-60. Secareş, V. (coord.). 2014. NATO and the Global Structure of Security: The Future of Partnerships. Bucureşti: Tritonic. Soare, S.R. 2013. Transition of power. In Contemporary International Relations, D. Biro (ed.). Iaşi: Polirom. Spendzharova, A.B. 2012. Catching Up? Consolidating Liberal Democracy in Bulgaria and Romania after EU Accession, West European Politics 35: 1. Troncotă, M. 2013. Abstract and Executive Summary of Ph.D. Thesis A Discursive Institutionalist Analysis on the Europeanization of Bosnia and Herzegovina (2003-2011). Troncotă, M. 2010. Bosnia Herzegovina, the Political Space of In-Betweenness A Constructivist Analysis of Identities and Institutions during Europeanization, http://www.drcsummerschool.eu/. Wallerstein, Immanuel. 2012. The Modern World-System, vol. I-IV, Berkely: University of California Press. Waltz. Kenneth. 1979. Theory of International Politics. New York: McGraw-Hill. Woodward, Susan. 1995. The Balkan Tragedy; Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War. Washington: The Brookings Institute.
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http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/result_of_neg_final_council_version_st05859 _0405_en.pdf http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/discours/ACF332. htm “High Representative Calls for Agreement on Police Reform to Enter Europe,” Press Release, 21 April 2005, available from www.ohr.int. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on a Feasibility Study for a Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Union and Kosovo, Brussels, 10 October 2012, p. 2, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2012/package/ks_feasibility_2012_e n.pdf
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CURRENT CHALLENGES FOR EU COHERENCE IN PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW IN KOSOVO
Monica OPROIU National University of Political Studies and Public Administration Bucharest/Romania [email protected]
Abstract The appointment of a double-hatted High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) and the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) were two of the main innovations brought by the Lisbon Treaty to the European Union’s foreign policy. According to their mandates, the High Representative and the External Action Service aim to increase the consistency of the European Union’s external action thus answering to on-going criticisms about the lack of a “single voice”. This paper aims to assess the policy implications of the main post-Lisbon institutional developments by using the concept of “coherence”. Understanding this concept as synergy among EU policies, the study will analyse the current challenges to the ways in which the EU is promoting the rule of law in Kosovo. Based on the critical analysis of EU documents and the academic literature, as well as semi-structured interviews with EU officials in Brussels and Kosovo, this paper questions whether the introduction of the High Representative and the creation of the EEAS improved the coherence of EU involvement in Kosovo, especially in the field of rule of law assistance.
Keywords Coherence; External Action Service; EULEX; High Representative; Kosovo; Rule of Law
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1. INTRODUCTION: WHY IS IT WORTHWHILE TO STUDY EU RULE OF LAW ASSISTANCE IN KOSOVO?
Fifteen years after the European Council in Santa Maria da Feira in June 2000 announced for the first time that the Western Balkans countries had the perspective of EU membership, the political, security and economic situation in the region does not provide many reasons for optimism. Croatia joined the EU in 2013, but the remaining contenders are challenged by unresolved issues including contested statehood and unconsolidated democracy. Meanwhile, the EU seems to have become weary of enlargement. Nevertheless, it continues its involvement in the Western Balkans since the promise of European integration of the countries in the region has been reiterated several times and is widely perceived as a guarantee of their stability and reform. As the region slowly moved away from posing significant “hard security” threats, the international community entrusted the EU with the tasks of conflict resolution, stabilisation and democratisation. When the security environment became relatively “safe and secure” in most of the Western Balkan region and as the possibility of relapsing into war diminished, the EU started focusing on “soft security” threats like organised crime, corruption, illegal immigration and lack of good governance. Consequently, it created instruments for helping these countries become more efficient in addressing the sources of instability and thus prevent potential spill-over into the EU. Due to the particularities of the legacy of violent conflicts in the Western Balkans, the EU designed the Stabilisation and Association Process as the main policy framework for engaging these countries. Moreover, based on the lessons from the previous round of enlargement in Central and Eastern Europe, especially regarding the transformation of the rule of law area in Romania and Bulgaria, which proved to be a difficult and lengthy process, the EU decided to address the identified shortcomings. The Enlargement Strategy of 2011 stated that the issues related to the judiciary and fundamental rights and to justice and home affairs respectively1 should be tackled early in the accession process, monitored
1 Chapter 23 includes four main elements: judiciary, fight against corruption, fundamental rights and EU citizens’ rights, while Chapter 24 is dedicated to the fight against all types of organised
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continuously by the Commission and targeted through the Instrument for Pre- Accession funds (European Commission 2011, 5). In 2012 the European Commission officially placed the rule of law at the centre of the enlargement policy (European Commission 2012c, 4). The topic of EU rule of law assistance in Kosovo1 is worth exploring for several reasons. Firstly, despite slowing down its pace, the enlargement process remains the EU’s most successful foreign policy tool. This was acknowledged once more in December 2012 when the EU was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for having “for over six decades contributed to the advancement of peace and reconciliation, democracy and human rights in Europe” (Nobel Peace Prize 2012). After Croatia’s accession, the EU needs another success story in order to maintain the resolve of the countries in the region to pursue the goal of EU integration and their commitment to painful reform, especially in the fields of rule of law and good governance. Despite its distant prospects and multiple issues to solve, the stakes are too high in Kosovo’s case for the EU not to try its best in proving enlargement to be an infallible tool for attaining stabilisation and promoting peace in Europe. Secondly, Kosovo together with Serbia have been recently enjoying widespread attention due to the successful mediation attempts by the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy in view of a “normalisation” of the relations between Belgrade and Pristina. In April 2013 a ground-breaking agreement was obtained, establishing a power-sharing arrangement in Serbian-dominated Northern Kosovo (Mitrovica), run by parallel structures supported by Belgrade after 2008. This was possible because the EU engaged both Serbia and Kosovo through the Stabilisation and Association Process and promised them a European future. The deployment of EULEX, an integrated rule of law mission targeting the police, judiciary and customs and the biggest civilian EU mission to date, the mediation efforts between Belgrade and Pristina, the visa dialogue, the activity of the EU Special Representative, the launching of the Structured Dialogue on Rule of Law, the financial assistance through IPA and IPA II are all part of the multifaceted EU involvement in Kosovo. Also, they illustrate a
crime, terrorism, the Schengen rules, border control and visas, as well as migration, asylum, judicial cooperation in criminal and civil matters and police and customs cooperation. 1 All references to Kosovo in this paper are in line with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244/99 and the opinion by the International Court of Justice on the Kosovo declaration of independence (2010), as acknowledged at the level of the European Union.
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particular emphasis on rule of law-related reforms as the essential premise of viable statehood for Kosovo and a sine qua non condition for becoming closer to the EU. The coherent use of all these instruments represents a relevant test for the European Union from a legal, political, public policy and administrative perspective. The works on EU enlargement and Europeanization mainly focus on the transformative power of EU accession and membership and analyse the impact of conditionality on domestic politics. The picture becomes more complicated when enlargement or pre-accession are accompanied by proper foreign and security policy initiatives, including state-building and conflict resolution. This brings into the discussion a whole new set of elements. The questions that arise are thus related to how to coordinate actors and instruments across the former EU pillars and create synergy in the EU’s external action or to the limits of conditionality in an environment that is less pro-European and also shared with other international actors undertaking similar activities (Papadimitriou and Petrov 2013, 123). The present study will try to explore the answers to some of these questions and offer an understanding of the EU’s involvement in rule of law assistance in Kosovo based on the analysis of the coherence of the Union’s relevant policies and instruments in this field. The underlying assumption is that a proper understanding of the EU external action from “within” is useful in order to evaluate what the Union is doing on the international scene in general and in various specific cases in particular. External variables aside, the intra-EU dynamics in Brussels and on the ground are essential for the Union’s capacity to devise common policies and implement them in a coherent manner. Based on the critical analysis of EU documents and the academic literature, as well as semi-structured interviews1 with EU officials in Brussels and Kosovo, and civil society representatives in Kosovo, this paper explores the extent to which the introduction of the High Representative and the creation of the EEAS improved the coherence of the EU’s involvement in Kosovo and the current challenges to its efforts in the field of rule of law assistance.
1 Interviews were conducted in October 2014 in Brussels and April 2015 in Pristina with financial support from the National University of Political Studies and Public Administration. One interview was conducted over Skype. All interviews were conducted in confidentiality, and the names of the interviewees (and their institutional affiliation, in some cases) are withheld by mutual agreement.
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2. STUDYING COHERENCE IN THE EU CONTEXT – BETWEEN ACADEMIC DEBATES AND TREATY REQUIREMENTS
The works on EU coherence are plentiful, illustrating both the legal and the political science perspectives. Legal scholars focus on the analysis of coherence as a constitutional principle in EU law enshrined in the Treaties, creating an obligation for EU institutional actors to implement a coherent European foreign policy (Hillion 2008; Hillion 2012). It is in this context that three main dimensions of coherence have been defined – horizontal, vertical and institutional – with some variations among authors (Tietje 1997; Nuttal 2001; Missiroli 2001; Gebhard 2011). On the other hand, empirical studies analyse the existing institutional arrangements and their potential for creating (in)coherence (Duke 2006; Portela and Raube 2009) or use case-studies in order to explore the specifics of the three dimensions of coherence (Juncos 2013). Due to the complexity of the EU system, a rich body of literature was created in order to identify various types of coherence, focusing on its internal and external dimensions, as well as on the relations between the member states and the Union and between and within the latter’s institutions. Ever since the Maastricht Treaty was adopted, scholars have begun analysing the sources of potential incoherence in the EU’s external action in parallel with the novel requirements for consistency, more so as the Union began defining its distinct identity on the international scene. Whilst a certain consensus regarding three general types of coherence has emerged, there are still some variations in the literature. Initially, Christian Tietje identified two types of coherence in the EU’s foreign policy, as institutionalised by the Maastricht Treaty. In his view, there was vertical (in the relation between the Member States and the Union) and horizontal (between the foreign relations of the EC and the Common Foreign and Security Policy) coherence (Tietje 1997, 224). Few years later, Simon Nuttal built on Tietje’s approach and provided a new categorization of what he termed “consistency”: horizontal (between the different EU policies), institutional (between the two different bureaucratic apparatuses, intergovernmental and Community) and vertical (between EU and national policies) (Nuttal 2001, 3-4). At the same time, he showed that after the Single European Act successive EU treaties failed to define bureaucratic boundaries,
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which meant that consistency issues had to be tackled through evolving co- operative practice, like in the case of the relationship between the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Council Secretariat in the aftermath of the Amsterdam Treaty (Nuttal 2001, 7). Whilst issues of institutional consistency were easier to solve, as his example showed, those pertaining to horizontal or vertical consistency required a thorough debate on the nature of the EU’s foreign policy and its identity as an international actor (Nuttal 2001, 10). Later on, Carmen Gebhard identified four types of coherence: horizontal (inter-pillar), vertical, internal and external, with the first three being in line with the literature of the field, whereas the fourth was treated more like a technical matter regarding the external representation of the EU (Gebhard 2011, 109). A more recent strand of literature looks at coherence as the basis for the emergence of an EU “comprehensive approach” to external action in general and crisis management or conflict prevention in particular. Alexander Mattelaer traces the quest for comprehensive planning in EU crisis management in the post-Lisbon era and, putting “empty promises” aside, he argues that the comprehensive approach is more of a “rhetorical phantom” which cannot be put into practice because of “a persistent unwillingness to concentrate planning and decision-making authority in the hands of single institutions or individuals” (Mattelaer 2013, 125). In his view, the result of this unwillingness is an “EU foreign policy bureaucracy characterized by omnipresent stovepipes” lacking unity of effort, which, surprisingly, is “both politically understandable and, for the time being, practically inconsequential” (Mattelaer 2013, 126). That is why “the search for coordination mechanisms cannot be a merely technical quest for efficiency: as strategic coordination must follow a particular policy agenda it represents a battle for political influence. This runs against the EU’s culture of dispersed authority and omnipresent checks and balances. The lack of policy coherence is therefore politically understandable and not necessarily «bad»” (Mattelaer 2013, 125). In other words, although not always deemed efficient, the set-up of EU crisis management (and if we extrapolate from it, of foreign policy in general) may represent a safety net against other dangers. Mattelaer even argues that “the EU’s political culture of dispersed authority and omnipresent checks and balances may work against strategic coherence, yet it also prevents the strategic miscalculations that bedevil more unitary actors”, like the United States (Mattelaer 2013, 127). So, by introducing the topic of crisis management
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into the equation he aims to debunk some myths and explore a less known perspective on coherence. Being the direct result of a political culture, which tries to prevent the concentration of authority and coordination in only one pair of hands, the EU’s complicated foreign policy bureaucracy and its implicit lack of coherence do not necessarily constitute a threat to EU strategic relevance. On the contrary, the debate on the comprehensive approach could be used as a smokescreen that masks the bigger picture of faltering ambitions, downsizing of member states’ capabilities and on-going financial difficulties for EU crisis management. Even fewer works look at the evolution of the consistency/coherence requirement1 in the EU treaties. Such requirements can be traced back to the Single European Act and the introduction of the European Political Cooperation as a means to increase coordination of the member states’ foreign policy. The Treaty of Maastricht institutionalised the pillar structure of the European Union and included specific references to consistency based on the spirit of solidarity and loyalty among member states, as well as on the principle of clear delimitation of competences between EU institutions. Subsequent treaties were meant to reform the institutional setting of the Union and streamline its functioning in view of the EU’s enlargement. Finally, the preamble of the Lisbon Treaty shows that the decision to amend the existing treaties was made by the European leaders “desiring to complete the process started by the Treaty of Amsterdam and by the Treaty of Nice with a view to enhancing the efficiency and democratic legitimacy of the Union and to improving the coherence of its action” (European Union 2007). There are several articles in the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) and one in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) which address directly the issue of consistency in external action. The following table provides an overview of the main provisions regarding consistency in the consolidated versions of the two Treaties after the Lisbon reform and groups them under the main categories identified in the literature: institutional, horizontal and vertical coherence, respectively. The aim is to highlight that the reform treaty aimed at a general streamlining of the EU external action in all
1 The term “consistency” is used throughout the Treaty on EU and the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU in the English version, but in other languages it has been translated as coherence (cohérence in French, coherencia in Spanish, kohärenz in German, coerenţă in Romanian, etc.) (Juncos 2013, 45). In most of the literature of the field consistency and coherence seem to be equivalent. Juncos (2013) provides a detailed analysis of this debate.
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its dimensions and at all levels, by entrusting both existing institutions and new players with the task of providing the much sought after consistency of EU action.
Table no. 1 Provisions on consistency in the consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon
Institutional coherence Horizontal coherence Vertical coherence Art. 13 TEU Art. 18 TEU Art. 4.3 TEU 1. The Union shall have an 4. The High Representative Pursuant to the principle of institutional framework, shall be one of the Vice- sincere cooperation, the which shall aim to promote Presidents of the Union and the Member its values, advance its Commission. He shall States shall, in full mutual objectives, serve its interests, ensure the consistency of respect, assist each other in those of its citizens and those the Union's external action. carrying out tasks, which of the Member States, and He shall be responsible flow from the Treaties. ensure the consistency, within the Commission for effectiveness and continuity responsibilities incumbent of its policies and actions. on it in external relations and 2. Each institution shall act for coordinating other within the limits of the aspects of the Union's powers conferred on it in the external action. Treaties, and in conformity with the procedures, conditions and objectives set out in them. The institutions shall practice mutual sincere cooperation. Art. 26(2) TEU Art 7 TFEU Art. 24 TEU […] The Council and the The Union shall ensure 3. The Member States shall High Representative of the consistency between its support the Union's external Union for Foreign Affairs policies and activities, and security policy actively and Security Policy shall taking all of its objectives and unreservedly in a spirit ensure the unity, into account and in of loyalty and mutual consistency and accordance with the solidarity and shall comply effectiveness of action by principle of conferral of with the Union's action in the Union. powers. this area. The Member States shall work together to enhance and develop their mutual political solidarity. They shall refrain from any action, which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive
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force in international relations. Art. 32 TEU […] Before undertaking any action on the international scene or entering into any commitment, which could affect the Union's interests, each Member State shall consult the others within the European Council or the Council. Member States shall ensure, through the convergence of their actions, that the Union is able to assert its interests and values on the international scene. When the European Council or the Council has defined a common approach of the Union within the meaning of the first paragraph, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Member States shall coordinate their activities within the Council. The diplomatic missions of the Member States and the Union delegations in third countries and at international organisations shall cooperate and shall contribute to formulating and implementing the common approach.
Source: Compiled by the author based on the text of the EU treaties available at http://europa.eu/eu-law/decision-making/treaties/index_en.htm. All highlights belong to the author.
The new High Representative and the External Action Service are the result of a long and continuous process of institutionalisation of EU foreign policy (and beyond, touching upon the entire spectrum of external action and
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internal policies with an external dimension) which, while aiming for consistency and effectiveness, tries to maintain the established system of multiple checks and balances and the firm grip of EU member states as well. At the same time, the treaties ensure that the member states are committed to devising and implementing common policies in the relations of the EU with the outside world according to the principles of sincere cooperation, mutual solidarity and loyalty. Although in practice foreign policy at the national level remains each individual state’s domain reservé, the member states are bound by the treaties to cooperate and support the Union’s foreign policy. Kosovo is a case in point. Although recognizing its independence remains the sovereign prerogative of each member state, helping the country reform and advance towards EU standards (including through a peace-building and, ultimately, state-building EU mission there) is a common goal of the Union, credited with bringing stability to the neighbouring Western Balkans region. Hence, whether we call it “consistency”, “coherence” or “convergence of actions”, the goal is for the Union to be able “to assert its interests and values on the international scene” (European Union 2012, art. 32 TEU). One of the most comprehensive definitions in the literature considers coherence to be “the lack of contradictions between policies/institutions/instruments, plus a variable degree of synergy as a result of policies/institutions/instruments working together in order to achieve a common objective” (Juncos 2013, 46). The view adopted in this paper is that the “institutional” and “horizontal” types of coherence are very difficult to separate in practice. In fact, as most authors have argued, the very basis of horizontal coherence is the existence of a “single institutional framework” for decision-making (and policy-making) according to both the “community method” and the intergovernmental one. Although the removal of the pillar structure by the Treaty of Lisbon aimed precisely to streamline the functioning of the European Union, increase its coherence and favour the emergence of a “comprehensive approach” to external action, it is difficult to avoid contradictions or overlaps and to create synergies between policies as the EU institutions jealously guard their prerogatives. At the same time, while decision-making procedures can affect coherence in Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), what is equally important is how objectives are set and instruments are combined across policies with an external dimension, as well as whether and how the member states put them into practice. The interplay between different types of coherence is obviously complex and much less evident in practice than in academic research.
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3. CURRENT CHALLENGES FOR COHERENCE IN PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW IN KOSOVO
The number of instruments used for implementing EU policies in order to strengthen the rule of law in Kosovo has gradually increased over time and the post-Lisbon arrangements had a significant impact on the institutional framework underpinning these policies. In a speech in November 2010, Stefan Füle, former Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy praised the post-Lisbon institutional set-up that enhanced, in his view, the coherence and efficiency of the EU’s external action. Going into details, he stated that: “with the Lisbon Treaty in force, the EU is now equipped to deal with foreign policy challenges in an efficient, coherent and innovative manner. The Lisbon Treaty removed the institutional bottlenecks in our decision- making, leading to increased efficiency. With the creation of a new position of High-Representative/Vice President - currently held by Cathy Ashton - the foreign policy of the European Union acquires increased coherence. As Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood policy, I combine forces with Catherine Ashton to address the key issues of the region. This process is innovative as we can now make full use of the 'Community toolbox' together with the Common Foreign and Security Policy (…) and establish broader and more strategic political conditionalities” (Füle 2010). Furthermore, he acknowledged that “Yes, enlargement is foreign policy but it goes far beyond that. The prospect of EU membership is the best mechanism to implement far-reaching political, economic and social reform” (Füle 2010). In other words, enlargement and CFSP policy tools had to be combined in order to tackle the issues in the Western Balkans region in a coherent and efficient manner, within a revamped institutional framework, according to the spirit and letter of the Lisbon Treaty. In the new context the onus was on the Commission and the High Representative (assisted by the External Action Service) to join forces in order to transform treaty requirements into coordinated external policies. In the particular case of Kosovo, with five member states not recognising its independence, harmonising positions and ensuring intra-EU coherence was an even greater challenge.
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3.1. The driving force in Brussels: the Commission’s role
The Commission has been working with the Government of Kosovo in the framework of the Stabilisation and Association Process on the one hand and pre-accession on the other hand, promoting the rule of law through a technical process based on the Copenhagen criteria and especially on chapters 23 and 24 of the EU acquis. Because of the five non-recognisers it is somewhat premature (and politically incorrect as well) to talk about the country’s future accession to the EU. However, given the fact that the EU’s approach to its relationship with Kosovo is based on the Copenhagen criteria, from a technical point of view the Union engages with Kosovo mainly in the enlargement framework. In fact, in a speech delivered in July 2013 before the Parliamentary Assembly in Pristina, Stefan Füle stated that “The European Commission has become a more important partner for you than ever before. Kosovo is now placed firmly in the enlargement mainstream” (Füle 2013). Within the Commission, DG Enlargement1 runs the general negotiations, while DG Home is in charge of the dialogue on visa issues, thus holding the key to the big “carrot” of visa liberalisation. The two have to coordinate closely in view of the annual progress reports and while their objective is the same, they sometimes disagree regarding the speed of the process. This is mainly because DG Enlargement needs to deliver tangible results in the pre-accession process, while DG Home needs to be strict and prioritise the interests of the member states (Interview with EU official 9.10.2014). Hence, even coherence within single institutions cannot be taken for granted as sub-institutional and bureaucratic structures with slightly different priorities can undermine it. This goes to show that when analysing horizontal coherence at EU level - understood as combining institutional and policy components - one must look at all possibly relevant sub-levels of policy- making in order to unpack the factors undermining or enhancing the potential for “synergy”. The member states keep a close watch on the political and technical processes of Kosovo’s approximation to EU standards and make decisions in the Council based on the Commission’s recommendations. Moreover, due to the sensitivity of such issues as migration, the member states are directly
1 In the Juncker Commission appointed at the end of 2014 DG Enlargement was renamed DG Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations.
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interested in Kosovo’s progress and in maintaining a firm control on the speed of the process of visa liberalisation, for example. That is why DG Home officials in charge of the Kosovo file regularly briefs to the member states representatives in the Council Working Group on the Western Balkans (COWEB) on the developments in the visa negotiations, the purpose being that of assuring them that no new migration routes are opened by liberalising the visa regime too soon (Interview with EU official 9.10.2014). Although both enlargement and visa dialogue are rather technical processes driven by the Commission, it is the member states that not only make the final decision, but in the end also dictate the speed of the process. In general, it is a common goal of the EU to ensure stability in Kosovo and although the degree of interest in this issue obviously varies within the Union, the big member states with high stakes in the region maintain a firm grip on the enlargement process. Despite not recognizing Kosovo as a state, the five EU members generally support its efforts to attain EU standards and share the common EU objective of promoting the rule of law, while requiring the observance of certain wording and rituals according to their official position (according to interviews with several national diplomats, October 2014). At the same time, security concerns are shared by all member states, the impact of which is mostly visible in the visa dialogue and the determination to keep EULEX on the ground in Kosovo as long as necessary. The visa dialogue launched in January 2012 is one of the most efficient avenues for incentivising the Kosovo authorities to undertake rule of law- related reform. The initial Roadmap for visa liberalisation included 95 requirements regarding readmission and reintegration, document security; border/boundary and migration management; public order and security and fundamental rights related to the freedom of movement that Kosovo would have to meet in order to advance towards a visa-free regime (European Commission 2012b). The first progress report featured 70 “recommendations” for Kosovo to follow in this regard (European Commission 2013a). The strictness with which DG Home assessed Kosovo’s initial progress is one thing, but the lack of clear priorities too becomes obvious under close scrutiny. Although sheer numbers are sufficiently intimidating, it is the fact that no priorities have been singled out among those 70 requirements that can create problems for EU assistance. Without priorities, it is not clear how the Commission would measure progress in Kosovo and weigh the fulfilment of some against others (House of Lords 2013, 14). If progress assessment criteria are not clear or transparent, the relationship with Kosovo could be affected,
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especially if they feel that their progress is not sufficiently rewarded. By the same token, issues may arise if Kosovo seems to be “rewarded” for insufficient progress. It is logical that all requirements have to be met in order for the EU to grant visa free travel to Kosovo citizens. Moreover, it can be argued that if it becomes obvious that one benchmark is more important than any other, this reduces the incentives for broad reform efforts and applying all recommendations. Whatever the approach the EU favours, it is essential that the authorities in Pristina understand what they need to accomplish as part of EU conditionality, in the visa dialogue or any other framework. From this perspective, it is interesting to note that DG Enlargement tries to “rationalise” the recommendations provided by DG Home and make them “operational” or more concrete for their Kosovo interlocutors (Interview with EU official 7.10.2014). While DG Home is “the master of the acquis” in its area of expertise, DG Enlargement deals with the people on the ground closely and more often (Interview with EU official 7.10.2014), thus building a different type of relationship with them. The progress reports on visa liberalisation are elaborated by the Commission following assessment missions on the ground, assisted by experts from the member states, the EU Office in Kosovo and EULEX (European Commission 2013a, 2; European Commission 2014, 2). The diversity of inputs ensures a diversity of perspectives, but also a close cooperation among EU structures involved in managing the relationship with Kosovo. Fundamentally, the visa liberalisation process touches upon issues related to the rule of law and helps channel EU member states preferences and concerns more directly. Moreover, it provides the opportunity to create synergies by aligning objectives from the SAP, enlargement policy and the external dimension of Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ). In practice, such opportunities have not been sufficiently used1.
1 The Court of Auditors’ 2012 report on EU rule of law assistance found two major policy shortcomings in this regard. First, because of the 5 non-recognisers Europol cannot enter into operational and/or strategic agreements with Kosovo authorities (European Court of Auditors 2012, 27). Second, the EU’s internal security priorities – included in the EU’s various strategies for the external dimension of Justice and Home Affairs have not been reflected in the EU assistance programming of IPA or the cooperation between the Commission and EULEX (European Court of Auditors 2012, 26-27; House of Lords 2013, 20-21).
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Furthermore, the member states’ input in delivering the actual rule of law assistance sometimes complicates the situation too. Since there is no EU model for various rule of law institutions set up in Kosovo, receiving conflicting advice from the “EU side” is often possible. As part of the visa liberalisation dialogue, expert missions from member states can sometimes offer different perspectives which undermine a more unitary EU approach (Interview with EU official 6.10.2014). This allows Kosovo authorities to play such technical inadvertences against the Commission and head for US support instead. Still very popular in Kosovo, the United States is enjoying undisputed influence and usually plays a constructive role. However, in some instances they provided solutions which proved to be incompatible with European Union standards, like a border management system they helped install (House of Lords 2013, 8). Consequently, the EU needs to coordinate its own policies as much as it needs to coordinate with the other main donors in the country. In October 2013 the negotiations for contracting a Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the EU and Kosovo authorities began. On the EU side, the negotiating team was led by the Commission, while the provisions on the political dialogue and the CFSP had to be negotiated by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (European Commission 2013c). The start of the negotiations on the SAA was considered as a “reward” for the landmark deal concluded between Pristina and Belgrade few months earlier. The negotiated SAA was supposed to be the first after the Lisbon Treaty and had to be signed together with an entity that not all EU member states recognised as a state. The solution was provided by the Lisbon Treaty. Having legal personality, the EU could sign the SAA as an EU-only agreement. The Commission made it clear that signing the SAA did not amount to recognition of Kosovo as an independent state just as full recognition was not a precondition for negotiations (European Commission 2012d, 3). Indeed, the SAA does not make any explicit reference to future EU membership but mostly to the Copenhagen criteria1. But this solution backfired nevertheless. On the one hand, it raised concerns among some member states that allowing
1 The Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the EU and Kosovo was signed in Strasbourg on 27 October 2015. On the EU side, it was signed by HR/VP Federica Mogherini and Johannes Hahn, Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations.
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the contracting of an EU-only agreement in this domain could trigger “competence creep” from the Commission (Interview with national diplomat/Council delegate 8.10.2014). On the other hand, some in Kosovo perceived this solution as a second-class agreement – different from the previous SAAs – because of the 5 non-recognisers. This difference fuels Kosovo’s apprehension towards an EU approach which seems to depart from previous cases in the region.
3.2. The newcomers: the European External Action Service and the High Representative
The European External Action Service (EEAS) - the newest EU body dealing with foreign policy - provides the political expertise for the Union’s relation with Kosovo, acts as the supervisor of EULEX and supports the High Representative in mediating the political dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia. The EEAS has been functioning since January 2011, but during the first months it was not in a position to play its role fully. When it finally started to do so, the decision to appoint the EU Special Representative in Kosovo as Head of the European Commission Liaison Office was seen as “the most significant change which the External Action Service wrought”, and was “the first of many improvements” in EU rule of law assistance in Kosovo (House of Lords 2013, 9). As far as the division of labour between the Commission and the EEAS regarding the Western Balkans is concerned, DG Enlargement has policy lead for the relations with pre-accession countries in the framework of the enlargement process, while the political aspects of the relationships with these countries are handled by small geographical teams in the EEAS (EEAS 2013, 8). The geographical desks are made up of people who worked on these issues under former High Representative Javier Solana too, thus maintaining a hub of dedicated expertise able to help the new High Representative deliver results in the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue. From this perspective, the transition from the Council Secretariat and Solana’s team to the new EEAS was mostly smooth; there were no major issues regarding the Kosovo/Western Balkans desk because basically all the people came from the Council since the Commission’s DG Relex did not have a unit on the Western Balkans (Interview with EU official 29.10.2014). Although some key figures left, overall the main team remained intact and other skilled diplomats were entrusted with key roles.
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Javier Solana himself had a huge personal knowledge of the Western Balkans and had been very engaged in the region throughout his mandate, often travelling there and knowing the local actors by their first names (Interview with EU official 29.10.2014). Moreover, he was the NATO Secretary General during the Allied bombing against Belgrade in 1999. All this made him very well known in the region and in Kosovo in particular. When Catherine Ashton became the new High Representative under the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 the Western Balkans were not her first priority. However, she soon became involved in the diplomatic quest to ensure that Serbia and Kosovo agreed to EU-mediated talks, as part of the UN General Assembly Resolution on the International Court of Justice (ICJ) Advisory Opinion on Kosovo, issued in September 2010 (United Nations 2010). The HR/Vice-President employed “a combination of policy tools, most clearly the conditionality associated with the perspective of EU membership, to encourage Serbia and Kosovo to support a reconciliatory resolution and to agree to EU-mediated talks” (Füle 2010). The US-backed EU effort to obtain the sanctioning of the UN for EU-mediated talks between Serbia and Kosovo opened a new chapter in the EU post-Lisbon foreign policy, as the talks themselves confirmed the EU’s predominance over Balkan issues – at least formally1. Starting in 2011, representatives from the governments in Belgrade and Pristina engaged in negotiations in view of a normalisation of relations under the auspices of the EU. Final status issues aside, the talks had to concentrate on the “practical coexistence” of Serbia and Kosovo and the highly political issue of the “parallel structures” run by Serbia in northern Kosovo. When the Serbia-Kosovo talks started, the HR delegated to her counsellor Robert Cooper the task of chief-negotiator in the technical level dialogue, and focused on setting up the EEAS during the first two years of her mandate
1 The high profile and great influence of the United States in Kosovo were reluctantly but candidly admitted in a debate organised by the House of Lords in the United Kingdom with the participation of senior officials from the European Court of Auditors, who authored the ECA Special Report on EU rule of law assistance in Kosovo. According to them, “the United States is popular and has played and is continuing to play an important role in supporting Kosovo. And as the United States does not have to explain the difference between the European Union institutions and [what] the European Union does, which occasionally on the ground creates some confusion about who does what, I think it is fair to say that the profile of the United States in Kosovo politically is generally considered on the ground to be slightly higher than that of the European Union” (House of Lords 2013, 11-12).
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(Interview with EU official 29.10.2014). The negotiation process was co-chaired by Robert Cooper from the EEAS and Pierre Mirel, Director for the Western Balkans in DG Enlargement, enabling the intra-EU coordination of positions. The High Representative became personally engaged in the normalisation talks between in October 2012 and the dialogue was linked to the enlargement framework. With both parties striving for progress on their EU paths, the High Representative managed to obtain a breakthrough. The ground-breaking agreement of April 2013 established a power- sharing arrangement in the Serbian-dominated Northern Kosovo (Mitrovica) run by authorities which had been supported by Belgrade after 2008. This was the result of both EU diplomatic efforts and the two capitals’ interest in advancing their relationship with the EU (Lehne 2013). A “game changer” in the EU’s involvement in Kosovo, it was later acknowledged among the main accomplishments of the High Representative Catherine Ashton’s mandate, as well as a great success for the EEAS. The two parties were promptly rewarded – the EU started negotiations for a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Kosovo and accession negotiations with Serbia respectively. The successful conclusion of over 20 agreements between Kosovo and Serbia since then represent a first in the short but tense history of the attempts to pursue normalisation between the two after the war in 1999, and the EEAS “has worked hard” alongside the two negotiations team to obtain these results (Interview with Kosovo official 1.04.2015). The relationship between the Commission and EEAS remains complicated, but in the end mutual dependency makes it work. There are voices who claim that the geographical desks within the EEAS actually duplicate the existing ones within the Commission or that the EEAS tries to use the technical rules for political purposes when dealing with Kosovo (Interview with EU official 7.10.2014). However, it is useful to note that coordination issues seem to occur rather within the EEAS or within the Commission than between the EEAS and the Commission. Inside the EEAS it is the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability who runs the daily business of EULEX, the Crisis Management Planning Directorate who is in charge of the strategic review of EULEX and the geographical desk dealing with the diplomatic and political aspects of the EU’s involvement in Kosovo (especially the Dialogue) that clash occasionally; within the Commission, DG Enlargement, DG Home and DG Justice sometimes bicker over issues of who owns what in terms of lower level negotiations in the field of rule of law (Interview with EU official 6.10.2014).
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3.3. EULEX – “the master of ceremonies” on the ground
On the ground in Kosovo, the EU’s rule of law mission EULEX has been the “master of ceremonies” (Interview with EU official 7.10.2014) and to a certain extent the most influential EU actor locally mostly due to its executive mandate. It is currently managed by the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) based in Brussels as part of the EEAS, whilst its budget is administered by the Commission as a civilian crisis management mission financed within the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Launched in December 2008, the mission’s aim has been to help Kosovo authorities strengthen the rule of law, specifically in the police, judiciary and customs areas. The EU conception of rule of law support through civilian crisis management missions is mainly focused on the justice sector, that is, judicial reform through capacity-building, undertaken by various EU actors by using specific instruments (from financial assistance programs to substitution of local authorities, if necessary). EULEX is an integrated rule of law mission entailing police and customs elements too, thus reflecting a wider perspective of institution-building and capacity-building for rule of law enforcement authorities in the context of the Stabilisation and Association Process (Spernbauer 2010, 9). Under the Stabilisation and Association Agreement, Kosovo will have to meet certain obligations regarding the rule of law, the judiciary, public administration, electoral reform and the Assembly, human and fundamental rights, protection of minorities, trade and internal market issues (European Commission 2012d, 13-14). By helping Kosovo strengthen the rule of law, improve the performance of its judiciary, tackling serious and organised crime together with fighting corruption, EULEX enhances the link between the Common Security and Defence Policy - CSDP (the civilian component) and the external dimension of the Area of Freedom Security and Justice, which share the objective of ensuring EU internal security. According to the EEAS, EULEX “forms part of a broader effort undertaken by the EU to promote peace and stability in the Western Balkans and to support the Kosovo authorities as they undertake necessary reforms, in line with their and the region’s overall European perspective. EULEX skills and expertise are also being used to support the key objectives in the visa liberalisation process, the Stabilization
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and Association Process Dialogue and the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue” (EEAS 2014, 1). In other words, this could be horizontal coherence at its best. The EULEX mission was reconfigured in 2012 and its personnel downsized by 25%, in order to “reflect increasing capacities of the Kosovo authorities” (European Commission 2012d, 6). Its mandate was bound to end in June 2014, but following an agreement between the Kosovo authorities and the EU a restructured EULEX was prolonged until June 2016 (EEAS 2014, 2). The main challenges for EULEX Kosovo in the current phasing-out stage are not only to transfer responsibility to the Kosovo authorities, but also to facilitate the transfer of capacity-building activities to the projects financed by IPA, a transition which sometimes causes friction between the EEAS and the Commission (Interview with EU official 6.10.2014). There are several reasons for this. On the one hand, IPA-funded projects can be used for supporting the monitoring, mentoring and advising activities of EULEX as it phases out its executive mandate, but the financial regulations in this regard do not allow for fast and flexible responses needed by the specific activity of EULEX. Moreover, EULEX does not have an in-built exit strategy and its mandate is renewed every two years, whilst the Commission’s involvement in Kosovo is open- ended and focused on the long term. The Commission and the EEAS have agreed in principle that the former will continue to pursue through Commission-funded projects the objectives of CSDP missions as they close down, but they still need to figure out the practical arrangements for this (European Court of Auditors 2012, 28). The main contentious issue is that the Commission does not really want to take over through projects the unfinished work of EULEX, preferring instead to help the Kosovo authorities assume direct responsibility for reforms (Interview with EU official 7.10.2014). In the end, that is the logic of external intervention and state-building efforts: external actors do the hard work - including by performing executive functions - to show that it is possible, they then do it together with the local institutions and then they transfer the responsibilities to the latter. Inter-institutional bickering aside, the executive mandate of EULEX does make an exit strategy problematic – the closure of the mission means that it fulfilled its objectives in Kosovo, but this assessment depends also on the country’s progress in the Stabilisation and Association Process (Spernbauer 2010, 34). In addition to this, terminating EULEX would be the equivalent of recognising Kosovo as a state (interview with national diplomat/ former
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Council delegate 28.10.2014), which is problematic for the 5 non-recognisers within the EU. The gradual downsizing and re-organisation of EULEX represent a step forward towards the exit, but as the EU made its credibility dependent on its achievements in the Western Balkans it cannot be too prudent when it comes to the legacy of its biggest civilian mission and will try to avoid a hasty end. The corruption scandal that has engulfed EULEX recently1 fuels the arguments of those who ask for the termination of the mission, either local politicians or Member States representatives. Representatives of civil society and local politicians alike contend that EULEX has been discredited by this scandal (interviews with government officials and civil society representatives in Pristina, April 2015) and some suggest that the internal corruption scandal actually explains why EULEX has not delivered the expected results (Interview with Kosovo official 1.04.2015). Although it may be true that the initial expectations generated by EULEX were unrealistic, it is also true that the corruption allegations make it an easy target for those arguing against prolonging the mission.
3.4. The EU Special Representative in Kosovo – towards an enhanced role
As EULEX is being scaled down the EU Special Representative in Kosovo - also acting as head of the EU Office - gains more influence. Established in 2008, the EUSR had the mandate to ensure intra-EU political coordination and guidance (Council of the European Union 2008, 88). After EULEX was launched the EUSR was entrusted with the mandate to provide it with political advice, and to generally increase the coordination between the EU Office and the rule of law mission in Kosovo. But until 2011 the EUSR was the International Civilian Representative2 as well, as part of a hybrid
1 The scandal is based on allegations of possible corruption among members of EULEX’s executive branch (judge and prosecutor), allegations which became public following appearances of another EULEX prosecutor in local media, who believed she had been victimised because she was the one behind the respective allegations. Erupting in the context of the strategic review of EULEX, the scandal was addressed by the High Representative and EEAS by appointing Jean Paul Jacqué (Honorary Director General and Counsellor to the Council of the EU) in November 2014 in charge of an investigation on the handling by EULEX of the corruption allegations. Published on March 31st 2015, his report is available on the EEAS website at http://eeas.europa.eu/statements- eeas/docs/150331_jacque-report_en.pdf. 2
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construction which proved to be dysfunctional. The separation of the two positions was among the initiatives which allowed an improvement in the coherence of EU assistance efforts in Kosovo (Interview with EU official 6.10.2014). In February 2012 Samuel Žbogar - a former Slovenian Minister of Foreign Affairs - was appointed as both EUSR and Head of the EU Office in Kosovo. Besides his “deep knowledge of the region and its personalities, as well as extensive diplomatic and EU experience”, which were deemed as beneficial for the EU’s activity in Kosovo, the fact that he was a former minister sent a strong signal regarding the Union’s commitment to Kosovo's European future (House of Commons 2014). The Court of Auditors’ 2012 Report on the EU assistance to Kosovo, analysing the period 2007-2011, noted that “until recently the EUSR has not made a substantial contribution to strengthening coordination between EUO and EULEX”, but “the combining in 2012 of the roles of EUSR and Head of EUO is likely to significantly improve coordination” (European Court of Auditors 2012, 28). As a consequence of merging the EUSR Office and Commission Liaison Office in Pristina in 2012, local stakeholders have started to acknowledge the EUSR as the main EU actor on the ground with both political and financial influence (through the EUO, which administers the Instrument for Pre-accession funds in Kosovo). This is in fact one major advantage which allows the EUSR to use more leverage in dealing with the local stakeholders. A supplementary advantage is that Kosovo aims to become an EU member one day, which make the local authorities more open to reforms suggested from Brussels. The latter is however undermined by the lack of unanimity within the EU on Kosovo’s independence which often makes it difficult for the Union to use the potential membership as an incentive. The EUSR has direct contact with the political situation on the ground, on which it reports to the EEAS. Moreover, the EUSR’s office aims to “shield” EULEX from the political factors in order for the mission to focus on its mandate (Interview with EU official 3.04.2015). Even though the work of EUEX is mostly technical, it touches upon issues that can be easily politicised or are fundamentally political like the rule of law, Kosovo’s sovereignty and the deep reform process undergone by the country. Of course, this refers more to the executive mandate that EULEX used to have, but as long as the EU mission remains in Kosovo, the EUSR has to work closely with it and provide local political guidance, without being part of a formal chain of command. The EUSR is thus an important political factor on the ground, alongside EU member states and the United States representatives. From this perspective,
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the EUSR can address political issues in his interactions with political stakeholders in Kosovo and push to solve those which cannot be dealt with effectively at the technical level through the dialogue between EU civil servants and their local counterparts. Samuel Žbogar is credited with having brought added value to the EU’s work in Kosovo by building important working relationships on the ground, including with Kosovo Serbs in the North which helped him secure the necessary compromises to implement agreements reached through the Serbia-Kosovo Dialogue (House of Commons 2014). This supports the idea that once the EU started mediating the Serbia-Kosovo Dialogue, all its relevant actors and instruments in Kosovo and in Brussels were refocused so as to help deliver results. Consequently, the EUSR, EU Office and EULEX work together in Kosovo for implementing the agreements reached in the Dialogue mediated by the High Representative and EEAS in Brussels, thus following the same objective and creating synergies to push EU policy further. In a similar manner, EUSR Žbogar used the relations with Kosovo Serbs to support the work of EULEX and “smooth over the inevitable tensions caused by a number of EULEX arrests of significant figures”; in parallel, he has been working to establish an “effective relationship” with EULEX and has given “sound political advice” to the EULEX Head of Mission (House of Commons 2014). With the existing potential for competition between the two, this is no minimal achievement. In fact, the incumbents of the two positions had to find a modus vivendi from the beginning and both carve out space for cooperation and work towards affirming their own profile in Kosovo. Without any formal hierarchy but with the requirement to cooperate according to their mandates, the EUSR and EULEX Head of Mission were in a position to contribute to the coherence of EU policy on the ground. By coordinating activities through their joint chairing of the Joint Rule of Law Coordination Board, the two have been able to present a unified EU front in relation with the Kosovo government officials participating in this forum.
3.5. In search of coherence: new coordination mechanisms on the ground
A recent addition to this crowded scene was the Structured Dialogue on the Rule of Law initiated in May 2012 by the former Neighbourhood and Enlargement Commissioner Stefan Füle, who conceived it as a high level dialogue involving himself and Commissioner for Home Affairs Cecilia Malmström on the EU side and the Ministers of Justice, Internal Affairs and for
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European Integration respectively on the Kosovo side. The Dialogue was designed to help Kosovo address the challenges in the field of the rule of law, by initially focusing on the judiciary, the fight against organised crime and corruption. By launching it in the context of the gradual transition from EULEX to the Kosovo authorities, Commissioner Füle wanted the new forum to “play an increasingly important role in confirming priorities and ensuring the necessary close coordination between the key actors” (Structured Dialogue 2012). Defining priorities for reforms in the rule of law field and monitoring and regularly assessing Kosovo’s progress regarding these priorities were the initial goals of the Dialogue (Government of Kosovo 2014). Stefan Füle emphasised from the beginning that “The Structured Dialogue is not a way around the accession process; it is not a substitute to the European aspirations of Kosovo. It is a way how to get Kosovo even closer to the EU” (European Commission 2012a). This new initiative had to be integrated in the existing EU assistance formats in Kosovo. Linkages had to be created between the Structured Dialogue on the Rule of Law, EULEX and the Stabilisation and Association Process Dialogue, as elements of a common EU framework for promoting the rule of law in Kosovo, with a particular focus on the areas of judiciary, fight against corruption and fight against organised crime, which the new forum dealt with. A personal project of former Commissioner Füle, the initiative seemed to embody the visibility and high level commitment that would push forward both reforms in Kosovo and coherence efforts in Brussels. In reality, the added value of this initiative was questioned even by some in Brussels (Interviews with EU officials 6.10.2014 and 10.10.2014). Moreover, it made it more difficult for authorities in Pristina to keep track of EU instruments involved in rule of law assistance and cemented some civil society representatives’ opinion that Kosovo’s sovereignty was being continuously undermined by the EU (Interviews with Kosovo civil society representatives, April 2015). The forum met again in 2013 and 2014 but it became more and more difficult to organise regular meetings involving such high-level officials and the initiative lost momentum (Interview with EU official 7.10.2014). In November 2014 the Joint Rule of Law Coordination Board co- chaired by EULEX, EUSR and the Kosovo Ministry of Justice became the supporting, lower-level forum for the Structured Dialogue on the Rule of Law. The three structures – EULEX, EUSR/ Head of the EU Office and Kosovo Ministry of Justice – signed a so-called Compact on Joint Rule of Law Objectives for the period until June 2014, when the mandate of EULEX was
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bound to end. The Compact thus set joint objectives in the rule of law field, to be pursued by Kosovo’s rule of law institutions, established a Compact Tracking Mechanism for measuring progress against clear indicators and benchmarks and established the Joint Rule of Law Coordination Board as the main forum to oversee the implementation of the Compact (JRCB 2013, 3-4). The Compact Actions detailing “specific activities and concrete goals with measurable benchmarks” in line with the overall objectives (Compact 2012, 3) included the requirements for the start of the SAA negotiations and in the Visa Liberalisation Dialogue. Hence, “overall EU accession requirements, EULEX, EUSR/EU Office in Kosovo and Kosovo rule of law institutions’ priorities were synchronized through the Compact” (JRCB 2013, 4). Again, this accounts for a step forward in ensuring coherence.
3.6. Enter the auditors: the EU addresses the coherence issue once again
With so many initiatives in Brussels and Pristina targeting rule of law promotion in Kosovo, at least two issues become prominent: creating synergies between relevant EU policies on the one hand and entrenching the rule of law in Kosovo without overstretching the local capacity to absorb assistance on the other hand. Neither of them allows for simple solutions. A special Court of Auditors’ report revealed in November 2012 the many shortcomings hampering EU rule of law assistance in Kosovo (European Court of Auditors 2012). In responding to the Court of Auditors’ conclusions and recommendations, the Commission and the EEAS showed, among other things, that: “as regards coordination with EULEX and EUSR, the Court's report reflects the challenges involved in coordinating different entities at the start of their respective mandates. The EULEX Joint Action was adopted in February 2008, EULEX deployment started in April and EULEX only became fully operational in December 2008. In parallel, the European Agency for Reconstruction was being phased out and the European Commission Liaison Office (now EU Office) became fully responsible for IPA assistance in Kosovo. [...] Coordination is currently being strengthened, especially between EULEX and the EC/EUO. An example is the Joint Rule of Law Coordination Board, where assistance and MMA are planned to feature more highly on the agenda. The double-hatting of EUSR and Head of EU Office (the EUSR also giving political guidance to EULEX) supports this development” (European Court of Auditors 2012, 50).
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The main remedies that the EU adopted were to streamline its presence on the ground and to adjust the mandates of EULEX and the EUSR through strategic reviews (Interview with EU official 3.04.2015). In fact, the EU had started to work towards increasing coordination even before the ECA report was published (Interview with EU official 3.04.2015). The latter served as an additional red flag to emphasise the extent of the harm done by the lack of coordination. In the aftermath of the Court of Auditors’ Report on rule of law assistance in Kosovo, the Commission also acknowledged the need for better coordination with EULEX in promoting the rule of law in Kosovo. One way of seeing whether it was put into practice is to look at what the IPA funds were allocated for and to what extent policy objectives and priorities were aligned. In November 2012 the European Commission announced that it allocated €63 million to support Kosovo's efforts to implement its EU-reform agenda, with the funds - part of the Annual IPA Programme – targeting reforms of the justice and public administration systems, support for readmission and reintegration of refugees and the improvement of correctional and probation services (European Commission 2012e). The Annual IPA programme for Kosovo also included provisions allowing the Commission “to respond quickly to political priorities that need financial support for their implementation, such as the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue, the strategic review of EULEX, and the visa dialogue” (European Commission 2012e). In other words, money seemed to follow political and development priorities across the spectrum of EU involvement in Kosovo. The same approach was maintained a year later. As EULEX will be slowly wrapping up, the EU Office in Pristina and the EU Special Representative there will take the forefront in managing rule of law assistance in Kosovo. The latest changes to the EUSR’s mandate include a role for him to play in guiding the transition from EULEX when the mission's renewed mandate expires in 2016, which is “a very important issue given the expectation that the EU Office will take on certain responsibilities for monitoring and assistance” (House of Commons 2014). A further change codified “the EUSR's role in using public diplomacy to build support for EULEX, which would continue to be a challenge as EULEX steps up its rule of law work”; as part of the future transfer of responsibilities and resources from EULEX to EUSR, nine staff involved in monitoring and assistance have been transferred to the latter (House of Commons 2014). For the time being though, the EUSR team does not have half as many people and expertise as EULEX
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(Interview with EU official 29.10.2014). Ultimately political, the decision to terminate EULEX has to take into consideration whether all elements are in place for a continuous EU presence which can ensure the irreversibility of reforms. The last change of its mandate was agreed in 2014 and entailed a further downsizing of its personnel by specialising in the areas which would make the most impact in the next two years; the main objectives in the new phase entailed focusing on capacity-building and security throughout Kosovo, and on the implementation of agreements reached in the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue in the north (House of Commons 2015). Moreover, the mission had to start phasing out its executive functions in the justice sector as part of a gradual handover of responsibility to Kosovo and complete its work on on- going serious cases (House of Commons 2015). In parallel, the Kosovo authorities had to create a special court to hear any trials arising from EULEX's Special Investigative Taskforce, which had been investigating the allegations against senior Kosovo political figures in the 2010 Marty Report. EULEX would have an important role in assisting Kosovo with the operation of this court too (House of Commons 2015). These changes were the result of both the ECA Report of 2012 and the EEAS Review of 2013. At present, EULEX is undergoing a credibility crisis threatening to have a significant impact on the perspectives for maintaining the mission on the ground. At the same time, with voices claiming that the rule of law is improving in Kosovo and others arguing that despite unsatisfactory progress the EU should diminish its presence anyway for financial reasons, it seems that the dominating narrative entails either a new re-organisation of EULEX or even its termination as soon as possible (Interview with EU official 3.04.2015). Its current mandate runs until mid-June 2016. With the EEAS in “damage control” mode, the decision on the future of EULEX has to take into consideration its increasing unpopularity. Finding ways for EULEX to avoid the faith of UNMIK and also protect what the mission has achieved so far represent the biggest current challenges for the EU in Kosovo.
4. CONCLUSIONS
Despite the proliferation of categories and definitions, “coherence” is a useful concept for unpacking and assessing the policy-making process of the EU in the field of external action. Depicting more than coordination among
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actors/policies/instruments, achieving coherence in the EU’s external action was one of the main desiderata in the Lisbon Treaty and the reason for streamlining its institutional framework. Developments in practice show that instances of coherence are much more fluid than academic categories. Also, they trigger the question whether the different types of coherence just co-exist or one is the prerequisite for the other. The Kosovo case makes it clear that member states maintain a firm grip of foreign policy and external action in general, thus making vertical coherence an important factor in any equation on EU coherence. However, a close look at EU instruments and policy components for rule of law assistance in Kosovo allows for an in-depth exploration of the post-Lisbon transformation of the framework for EU external action. Despite local specificities, the EU “machine” has to work coherently in order to achieve results. In Kosovo the EU draws on its most visible and important policies – enlargement, foreign policy, CSDP (as well as trade) to consolidate rule of law reform. Although the almost general opinion on the EU side is that EU success in Kosovo is seriously undermined by local context (lack of a tradition of self-governance, pervasive corruption, clan mentality, etc.), its lack of internal coherence and failure to transform its own rhetoric into tangible coordination of policy objectives and outputs play a significant part in the less than optimum results obtained in assisting Kosovo with rule of law. At the same time, the sheer concentration of EU instruments and its huge investments in Kosovo are too significant to be allowed to fail in the long run.
NOTE
Sections of this paper have been included in an article dealing with institutional conflict and cooperation in EU post-Lisbon foreign policy, published in the volume of the international conference “Challenges of the Knowledge Society” 2015 (9th edition, “Nicolae Titulescu” University Publishing House, Bucharest, 2015, 845-859).
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BOOK REVIEW
Gabriela Horoşanu. 2014. NATO-EU: A Smarter Collaboration, Bucharest, Tritonic Publishing House, 194 pages, ISBN: 978-606-8571-41-6.
Monica OPROIU National University of Political Studies and Public Administration Bucharest/Romania [email protected]
Part of a larger PhD dissertation defended in 2013, Gabriela-Cornelia Horoşanu’s book analyses the ways in which NATO and the European Union cooperate in Kosovo and Afghanistan through their missions on the ground, and makes recommendations for better defence planning and capability development. Her fieldwork in Kosovo which occasioned direct observation of both EULEX and KFOR and then later her work within NATO’s Emerging Security Challenges Division provide the book with both an academic’s and a practitioner’s perspective. The main explicit assumption of the book is that security in the new world order can only be achieved through collective action in regional and global institutional frameworks. This takes place in the so-called liberal order 3.0 as presented by John Ikenberry (Ikenberry 2009), the elements of which are summarized by the author: a post-Westphalian state sovereignty, with increased economic and security interdependence, a post-hegemonic hierarchy (multi-polar), the setting of a universal goal and an extensive cooperation of a comprehensive network-based system of rules (p. 39). In this type of order, the international community plays an increasing role in the functioning of the global system, specifically in the area of security, which thus becomes a public good, “artificially created through cooperation” (p. 16). Neo-liberal institutionalism, together with collective action theory and rational choice are the theoretical underpinnings of this book, presented in detail in the first chapter. Judging by the introduction, one could think that the main implicit assumption of this book (which the author does not state) is the fact that the EU is a collective security provider mostly through its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations. This entails, in its turn, a
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parallel discussion on how the EU – through its CSDP missions more specifically – actually contributes to international security and how the same missions help promote the liberal order (through rule of law promotion, security sector reform, peace-building, democracy promotion, etc.). It seems that this discussion fell beyond the scope of the book and the author based her analysis on the premise that the European Union does count as a security provider in the liberal order. The second chapter deals with the NATO-EU “strategic partnership”, the success of which is questioned in light of both the existing legal deadlock and difficulties in practice. The author highlights early on the main constraints on the contractual collaboration between the two organisations, pointing to the different views among some allies and the United States concerning the role of an autonomous defence of the EU on the one hand and the relations between Turkey and the EU on the other hand; whilst the first issue seems to evolve in a positive manner, no solution has been found yet for the second one. The compromise would be, in the author’s view, to accommodate Turkey and give it “some kind of involvement in CSDP, at least a similar status to the one it had in the Western European Union” (p. 46). The more practical aspects which affect the NATO-EU cooperation refer to a lack of investment and declining defence budgets and military spending in Europe, with a significant impact on capability development. The importance of the latter cannot be overemphasized as it could ultimately enhance the collaboration between NATO and the EU. The author could have included at this point a discussion on the nature of the EU’s power and the extent to which the development of military capabilities affects the EU’s predominantly civilian character. The literature abounds in scholarly labels for the type of power that the EU embodies, from “civilian power Europe” (Duchêne 1972) to “normative power Europe” (Manners 2002), with few (neo)realist attempts to look behind the myth of “civilian power by default” (Hyde-Price 2006) or to argue downright for endowing the EU with “the power of war” (van Ham 2010). Beyond academic debates though, during the last years, the reality has been that defence budgets are shrinking in Europe as the consequence of the economic and financial crisis, and public opinion concerns regarding a militarised CSDP are positioned somewhere in the background. However, with armed conflict occurring in both Ukraine and the Middle East, the debate on the need for a potential “European army” or at least acquiring more military capabilities by EU members could resurge once again. Even Ian
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Manners himself later reconsidered his argument, admitting that, in the end, “the militarization of the EU need not necessarily lead to the diminution of the EU’s normative power, if critical reflection characterized the process” (Manners 2007, 15). In other words, the EU could both enhance its military capabilities and maintain its moral standing in the world, as long as it achieves the former according to a strategy and through a reflective process. Gabriela Horoşanu also analyses briefly the changes in the EU’s external profile in the aftermath of the Lisbon Treaty, in particular the solidarity and mutual defence clauses, the permanent structure cooperation and update of the Petersberg (CSDP) tasks. She argues that the added value of implementing the permanent structured cooperation “is real for the EU, NATO, national governments and taxpayers alike” (p. 55) and explores it across seven dimensions: inclusiveness, coordination, cost-effectiveness, assessment, significant military contributions and “boots on the ground” (pp. 55-56). At the book's core, the author takes a close look at the EU and NATO missions in Kosovo and Afghanistan and assesses their collaboration on the ground, by also using semi-structured interviews and direct observation (third chapter). The main reasons for criticising the results of the NATO-EU cooperation are the “learning by doing” character of these operations and the lack of preparedness of both NATO and the EU for a new type of war and dealing with its aftermath. The solutions that the author suggests are: a new/optimised defence planning process, better intelligence sharing, good practices sharing and coordination of policies. Also, she advocates for the so- called reverse Berlin Plus arrangement which would allow NATO’s access to the EU’s capabilities for civilian crisis management. More specifically, in the case of Kosovo she advocates for “an efficient cooperation at all levels (political, strategic, operational and tactical) of all stakeholders”, together with joint training and exercises among EULEX, KFOR (and Kosovo Police), a political/strategic framework for cooperation as a good umbrella for tactical cooperation on the ground and the spill-over of lower level cooperation to cooperation mechanisms at the top level, while also maintaining local ownership for the security environment as much a possible (pp. 75-76). In more general terms, she highlights three main lessons learned from 13 years of state-building efforts in Kosovo. First, state-building in post- conflict countries is “a tough political exercise, requiring fundamental political decisions regarding the distribution of power and resources” (p. 73). Hence, the neutral stance of intervening parties cannot be applied to the letter, but as
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international state-building missions affect the local political order, they have to be well thought over, including sound exit strategies. Second, international actors intervening in post-conflict situations need to “realistic about what socio-political transformations they can actually achieve” (p. 74). In the case of Kosovo, despite the huge resources invested, the policies of external donors remain largely inefficient and incapable of actually shaping the state-building process. Third, a (future) state built according to the international institutions’ focus on stability will become an unbalanced one dominated by a powerful executive and weak legislative, especially if the control of the former belongs to them (as with the International Civilian Office and EULEX in Kosovo), thus endangering the democracy they were trying to build (p. 74). Fundamentally, in the author’s view, what was at stake in the two cases – Kosovo and Afghanistan - was the extent to which NATO can rely on other international actors - like the EU – for counterinsurgency and post- conflict stabilisation efforts, undertaken in the context of asymmetric threats and out-of-area operations. Of course, the fact that NATO and the EU share 22 member states should make it easier to have a fruitful, or using the author’s own words, a “smarter” collaboration. But overlapping membership is not enough and efficient cooperation mechanisms are needed. The next two chapters focus on NATO, its assessment of emerging security challenges and the author’s own model for the optimisation of the decision-making process in the Alliance. Finally, her conclusion is that NATO is a collective security brand which determines the Member States to act towards the common good (p. 181). Some states are lagging behind in fulfilling their commitments, but the security guarantee is technically beyond any doubt. We are used to talking about multi-speed Europe, but there is a similar situation in NATO. What differentiates the two organisations from this perspective is obviously the nature of their bond and the scope of the contractual relation established among the member states. Whilst there are some who argue that after the Lisbon treaty and the introduction of the solidarity and mutual defence clauses the EU is turning into a military alliance, NATO remains the go-to authority for security and defence matters for the time being. However, a smarter collaboration between the two could decide the future of the liberal order, as implemented in post-conflict stabilisation contexts and fragile states.
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REFERENCES
van Ham, P. 2010. The power of war: Why Europe needs it? International Politics 47: 574-595. Hyde-Price, A. 2006. Normative power Europe: a Realist critique. Journal of European Public Policy 13: 217-234. Ikenberry, J. 2009. Liberal Internationalism 3.0: America and the Dilemmas of Liberal World Order. Perspectives on Politics 7: 71-87. Manners, I. 2002. Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms? Journal of Common Market Studies 40: 235-258. Manners, I. 2007. Normative power Europe reconsidered: beyond the crossroads. In Civilian or Military Power – European Foreign Policy in Perspective edited by H. Sjursen, 14-31. London and New York: Routledge.
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BOOK REVIEW
Dan D. Lazea. 2014. Suveranitatea statelor si integrarea europeana a Balcanilor: cazul Serbiei (The Sovereignty of States and the European Integration of the Balkans: The case of Serbia), Timișoara, Western University Publishing House, 257 pages, ISBN: 978-973-125-440-1.
Oana C. POPA Western University Timişoara/Romania [email protected]
The present research is a most welcome addition to the fields of history and international relations alike, in an academic environment severely lacking regional studies related to the Balkans. Studying the Balkans is no easy task, as the subject is extremely complex and requires a thorough interdisciplinary approach. For the last 20 years, since the war for the dissolution of Yugoslavia ended, the most important decisions in Balkan politics have been heavily challenged by history, international law, security, political theory and international affairs. As such, the Western Balkans region offers a series of critical case studies and contested concepts in these fields. And that is only if we take into account recent and contemporary history. The region has been more commonly studied as a space where borders have constantly moved back and forth, where the interests of the great powers have always met at more or less friendly crossroads and where the fate of the peoples have rarely been decided by themselves. And in the end, with the prospects of the European Union integration all the former Yugoslav republics have finally come to a point where they can move forward. This does not mean forgetting the past, but rather coming to terms with it. The events which took place in the region in the past few years give reason for optimism: Croatia and Albania, two of the Adriatic Charter countries’ joined NATO, Croatia became an EU member state, Montenegro launched accession talks with the EU and last but not least Serbia received the much coveted EU candidate status and awaits the start of negotiations. Some, however, give further cause for caution. The recent events in Macedonia (FYROM), the constant unrest on Kosovo’s northern
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border with Serbia 7 years after the unilateral, but otherwise peaceful, proclamation of independence, as well as the ramifications of Islamic terrorism in places like Bosnia and Herzegovina, all against the background of rising nationalism and xenophobia in Western Europe, are troubling. Such an intricate combination of political phenomena represents a great intellectual challenge for a great number of scholars, and even more so especially for the ones from neighbouring countries. Nevertheless, the research on the Western Balkans is very limited in the Romanian academia and this should be underlined as the very first merit of Dan D. Lazea's book to start with – that it synthesizes the most important scholarly and policy debates in the field of EU integration in the Western Balkans and opens new focus points of reflection to the Romanian academia. The author’s analysis offers a very accurate understanding of this situation, as it focuses on the impact of Serbia's path to EU integration on the whole region. Prof. Lazea managed on the course of two sections with four chapters each to cover the topic of regional European integration using a mix of theoretical perspectives and data. By discussing some of the most widely used terms in international relations today, which also happen to be some of the most controversial terms to date - sovereignty and integration - the author uses the case of Serbia and its newly (re)found European path to discuss the perspectives for the country and the region in a wider EU and an interdependent world. In the first part of the study the main conceptual focus is the on debates around state sovereignty, minority policies and the tensions between identity and security in the EU. The analysis confirms that for at least the past 2 decades we have been discussing and moving around the same issues: the role of the international community in post-conflict states, the nation state and national sovereignty in the 20th and 21st century, the role of the EU, the US and Russia in the region, the importance of national minorities and their rights. This can only mean one thing: that there is still a great deal of “unfinished business” in the Balkans. In his in-depth theoretical approach, the author summarizes a number of approaches and discusses the most important concepts in the realist theories of IR. For example, independence proclamation and statehood recognition within the limits of international law are key concepts for the understanding of IR from a realist perspective, whereas identity-building strategies can be better assessed through the theoretical lenses of social-constructivism. All in all, the discussion on sovereignty represents a valuable theoretical contribution in the field, showing the limits of the concept as seen from the realist and neo-realist
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perspectives. In the final part of this section, the author applies both realism and constructivism to show how EU foreign policy instruments evolved in the case of Balkans from non-intervention (in the 90s) to political conditionality and membership negotiations (after 2000). Lazea suggests in this regard that both theoretical strands of thinking bring insights into the understanding of this intricate topic in complementary ways. However, the main challenge for IR in general is the discrepancy it features between theory and practice. If from a theoretical point of view, the Balkans can be analysed, quantified or judged by one or another theory, in practice things are oftentimes fluid and rapidly changing, forcing decision- makers to quickly adapt, or even improvise. It has happened in the Balkans more than once in the past 20 years that international law was bent to its limits, not to say completely overlooked. As far as Serbia is concerned, it is the case for the region and the EU and this is also what Lazea points out. Serbia’s complicated recent history and constant internal political entanglements, the wide variety of open issues with most of its neighbours, and the normalized, yet frail, relationship between Belgrade and Pristina, are all hanging heavily in the balance. Even though it has a rather emotional connection to Russia as the author argues, Serbia has however made a rational choice when deciding to pursue the EU path against the odds of the political conditionality required, which in some cases may be regarded as surrendering national sovereignty. In the second section of the book, Lazea argues that the European integration process is the final test for Serbia's stability, a test for long-lasting regional stability, but also a milestone for the Union per se. In the final section, the author critically reflects on the level of pragmatic strategies and coherence shown by both Serbia and the EU in the recent negotiations. Finally, the study shows that as long as the country is still confronted with its own internal reforms, but having to keep the promise of “Thessaloniki 2003” alive and keep delivering on it, its success will prove that the EU is a regional and global actor that should be taken seriously. In conclusion, the recent study of Dr. Dan D. Lazea The Sovereignty of States and the European Integration of the Balkans: The case of Serbia offers a valuable contribution to the scholarly debates focused on the Western Balkans in Romania. The book is a must-read for all graduate or postgraduate researchers and young scholars who take an interest both in the Balkans and in EU affairs.
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BOOK REVIEW
Miruna Troncotă. 2014. Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Critical Case Study of Europeanization, Bucharest, Tritonic Publishing House, 327 pages, ISBN: 978-606-8571-36-2.
Radu-Sebastian UNGUREANU National University of Political Studies and Public Administration Bucharest / Romania [email protected]
Initially coined for describing a particular way of policy-making inside the European Union, the term ‘Europeanization’ was progressively broadened. Nowadays, the concept encompasses many other dimensions of the EU’s peculiarities, including the transformative power of the EU exercised over those societies eager to join it. The conditionality employed by the EU in the accession of the candidate states in the enlargement process was rationally designed to ensure the compatibility of the potential future member states with the Union as a whole. Miruna Troncotă’s book is the result of a research made in order to put the Europeanization process to the most stressful test: the EU’s results in the effort of deeply changing Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) and transforming it into a peaceful, democratic, EU-compatible society. After discussing the term, Troncotă offers an understanding of Europeanization in a manner consistent with the meanings provided by Radaelli, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier. In order to observe it, she considers that two different narratives can justify the choice of BiH as a good case-study for this process – first, the “failure” of the process in this country, and second, its “exceptionality”. Inspired by the work of Vivien Schmidt, Troncotă opts for the theoretical framework offered by discursive institutionalism (DI), through which she intends to approach these two perspectives. She declares that the motivation of this option is “to argue for a middle grounded type of definition of Europeanization placed on the epistemological continuum between rationalist and interpretivist/constructivist perspectives.” (p. 52). The possibility of such a continuum is a matter of academic debate in the realm of Social Sciences. Despite her intention, it looks that Troncotă has, as many other researchers, inclined more to one position than to the other, in
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her case toward the interpretivist/constructivist perspective, as long as she defines the EU conditionality as “a discursive construct” (p. 53). The above- mentioned epistemological intention is reiterated when she discusses the theoretical lenses. DI “is placed in between rational choice theorists and postmodernist constructivists, going beyond the boundaries of methodological individualism and instrumental rationality” (p. 67). Even so, DI “regards discourse as a link between actors and institutions” (p. 62), based on the “assumption […] that policy-makers and stakeholders (as actors of Europeanization) construct Europe through language, discourse and every day institutional practices” (p. 67). Troncotă’s preference for constructivism in the epistemological balance is visible in the definition of Europeanization (as a “symbolic framework” – p. 70, or as “a transfer of meanings” – p. 71). She finally clarifies the stance in the conclusions of the book: “[b]ased on socio- constructivist theoretical lenses, the theoretical purpose of this study was to analyse the various ways in which the multitude of actors got engaged in the meaning making process of Europeanization in BiH” (p. 273), regarded as “a discursive arena where policies are shaped by complex discursive and institutional interactions” (p. 275). Methodologically, Troncotă built her research on a quite complex design. In order to investigate the perceived failure of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s Europeanization, she discusses the complicated political architecture put in place after the Dayton Peace Agreement (1995) that followed the inter-ethnic war. In BiH there are “four layers of governance […], 13 parliaments and governments […] with over 180 ministers and 760 members of legislative bodies. The country has three official languages for the three constituent peoples and two alphabets.” (p. 143). In this institutional context, the analysis of the narratives used by the stakeholders allows Troncotă to divide the EU conditionality in BiH in three stages – the construction (from 2003 to 2005), the diffusion (2006-2008), and the delayed institutionalization (2009-2011) – each having its own dynamic. Troncotă considers that these two issues are interconnected: European themes cannot be discussed separately from those concerning the need for a constitutional reform. Troncotă also conducted “an extended series of interviews” (p. 200) on the field, in Brussels and in BiH. The EU officials (in Brussels and in BiH) and the representatives of the BiH’s authorities, at various levels, “Eurocrats” and “Ethnocrats”, were thus given a voice. The analysis of the different narratives – for instance, that of “failure” and that of “war” – allows Troncotă to offer an explanation for the current status of the Europeanization process in BiH. Her
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main conclusion is that the local actors used the divergent interpretations of the EU conditionality in order to maintain their positions in the present constitutional order (p.279). In accordance with the tenets of constructivism, to which, as previously shown, she seems to adhere, Troncotă completes this agent-based explanation with a structural one, each of them clarifying the other: “The most contentious issue in the process [of Europeanization] was fragmentation of authorities (at both parties BiH and EU) and there was a lack of coordination between the various levels of governance” (pp. 283-284). Miruna Troncotă’s Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Critical Case Study of Europeanization offers good reasons for optimism regarding the fate of the European Studies, in general, and their future in Romania, in particular. Troncotă provides here not only a coherent insight in the recent directions of the field, but she also gives a proof of intellectual courage. There are at least three reasons for this observation. Firstly, she uses a new, still in the making, theoretical framework, and tries to contribute to its development; secondly, she had the ambition to approach a difficult case to discuss – and studying a “failure” is a challenge for any scholar; and thirdly (a very rare situation for Romanian scholars…), she had the courage of conducting the research on the field, on delicate political themes, in a country where the inter-ethnic war, by its consequences and interpretations, is still present in the mind of any member of the society. Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Critical Case Study of Europeanization represents not only a remarkable contribution in the Romanian landscape of European Studies, but also a very useful tool for those interested in a better understanding of the present state of affairs in BiH. As for the author, Miruna Troncotă made a promise regarding her future research, which is to be waited with interest.
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GENERAL SECTION
BENEFICIARIES OF THE SECOND ORDER ELECTION MODEL: RADICAL RIGHT PARTIES IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
Luiza-Maria FILIMON National University of Political Studies and Public Administration Bucharest / Romania [email protected]
Abstract After the latest European electoral cycle, right wing parties on the far side of the political spectrum along with right-wing euro-sceptics and conservative anti-federalists won 112 seats. The presence of the radical right in the European Parliament (EP), has often been attributed to the second order election model theorised by Reif and Schmitt (1980). In European elections, turnout is traditionally lower compared to “first” order national elections, parties in government tend to lose vote-shares while smaller parties benefit from the European system of proportional representation. This article analyses the relationship between radical parties and the EP by examining the French and Danish results in the 2014 elections. Though both constitute the third political force in their countries at that time, Front National and Dansk Folkeparti’s electoral support is representative of a second order election. The former party benefited from a classic sanction vote while the second one owes its breakthrough to a particular Danish voting behaviour, somewhat singular in the European Union. The article offers an in-depth overview of the literature on both the radical right, the Second Order Election model as well as radical right parties’ dynamic at the European Parliament level.
Keywords Dansk Folkeparti; European Parliament Elections; Front National; Radical Right Parties; Second Order Model
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1. INTRODUCTION
When the economy becomes a point of contention for the electorate, voters have been noted to sanction and reward parties on an asymmetric basis. In other words, the parties in government will be held responsible for economic hardships but will not necessarily be acknowledged in times of prosperity either (see Stevenson 2002, 45-47). In the case of the European Union (EU), the effects of the debt, banking and currency issues are compounded by the political crisis at the core of the European project in as far as voters are concerned (see Habermas 2012), especially those from the EU15 countries. In this context, the EU electorate is divided between the promises of economic advantages and development (more so in Central and Eastern Europe) and the threats to the ‘welfare status quo’ in Western Europe, posed by factors generally centred on immigration. Consequently, marginal internal political forces – be they proponents of Euroscepticism or hardcore nationalists – will ramp up the rhetoric of the 'house divided against itself' in order to further their political agenda and win over the dissatisfied and disenfranchised electorate. In turn, this poses the following questions: Are radical right parties registering higher electoral percentages during periods of economic turmoil shaped by welfare cuts and growing financial unrest?; Are there enough arguments supporting the claim that there is an ascending radical right pan-European trend in the EU?; How much are these parties influencing the decision-making process in the EU? The study looks at the voting behaviour in the European Parliament (EP) elections from a second order voting perspective in order to assess the relationship between “fringe parties”, electorates, economic climate and the EU, based on the results of the eighth EU parliamentary election. It further examines the 2014 European election – with a focus on the French and Danish cases – through the lenses of the Second Order Election (SOE) model, in order to better understand the mechanisms which have permitted small, radical parties (divided between the extreme right, the right-wing Euro-sceptics as well as the conservative anti-federalists), to win seats in the EP.
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Since 1979, the European Parliament (EP) has been elected by universal suffrage. From 1979 to 1994, the turnout for the European Parliament
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elections registers at over 50%: in 1979 – 61.99% (EU9: Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, the UK, Denmark and Ireland); in 1984 – 58.98% (EU10: EU9 + Greece in 1981); in 1989 – 58.41% (EU12: EU10 + Spain and Portugal in 1986); in 1994 – 56.67% (EU12). Afterwards, from 1999 to 2014, the turnout averages below 50%: in 1999 – 49.51% (EU15: EU12 + Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995); in 2004 – 45.47% (EU25: EU15 + the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Cyprus and Malta in 2004); in 2009 – 43% (EU27: EU25 + Bulgaria and Romania in 2007); while in 2014 – 42.54% (EU28: EU27 + Croatia in 2013) (EU Parliament 2014a)1. The turnout has declined from one election to the next even though potential voters from new Member States (MS) were added in seven out of eight electoral cycles. Hix and Hagemann (2009, 28) attribute the low turnouts to a weak “electoral connection” between Members of the EP, the politics of the EU and the national electorates. Is there any merit to the argument that in times of economic hardship2 – such as the Eurozone crisis – dissatisfied electorates vote for populist, nationalist and/or Eurosceptic radical right parties? Moroska cites Lawrence Goodwyn who defines a “populist moment” as “situations (changes, crises, conflicts) in society which favour [...] the emergence or electoral rise of the right-wing populist parties” (Moroska 2009, 302). Could they in turn form pan- European coalitions? Nikolaj Nielsen reports in the EUobserver that after the 2014 EP election, the Italian anti-immigration party, Lega Nord intended to abandon Europe of Freedom and Democracy (EFD) – the right wing Eurosceptic group, which also comprised of the British Ukip and the Danish People’s Party – in order to join Marine Le Pen’s Front National, in its attempt to establish a new political group more aligned with their parties’ agendas (Nielsen 2014). Leading researcher on populism and political extremism, Cas Mudde contends that at the aggregate trans-national level, this “motley crew” of right wing parties are the embodiment of the “house divided that cannot stand” in the EU. Despite being a staple in the fight against “European integration and solidarity (notably against the bailouts)”, radical right parties gained support
1 See also Turnout at the European elections (1979-2009): http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/000cdcd9d4/Turnout-%281979-20 09%29.html (Accessed 10 September 2015). 2 See: Von Mering, S. and T. Wyman McCarty (eds.). 2013. Right-Wing Radicalism Today. Perspectives from Europe and the US. New York: Routledge.
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in “only nine of the twenty-eight EU Member States” (Mudde 2014a, 100). At the 2014 elections, these parties won 86 seats in the EP (11.45%). The UK Independence Party (Ukip) secured 27.55% of the votes while Front National faired similarly, totalling a quarter of the votes in France. Other radical parties from the Czech Republic, Germany, Poland and Sweden, registered electoral breakthroughs as well (European Movement International 2014). This being said, Mudde argues that while in recent years some radical parties have gained a more notable position in the mainstream, most Member States had electorally failing far right parties before and during the economic crisis (Mudde 2014a, 101). The European elections have been already theorised as Second Order Elections (SOE); compared to first-order elections, SOE are characterised by: “a) lower turnout; b) brighter prospects for small and new parties; c) national government parties’ losses” (Hajner 2001, i). In addition, the electorate tends to vote based on the previous first order (national) stated options, instead of the opting for the potentially more second order (European) inclined parties (Hobolt and Wittrock 2011, 30). The analysis of the 2014 French and Danish elections indicates that the voting pattern is consistent with the SOE model. As Hix and Marsh’s have noted, only the first EP election could be regarded as less of a second order election, especially in regards to government performance. Afterwards, “the anti-government effect in European Parliament elections increased significantly between 1979 and 1994, fell slightly in 1999, [...] [and] re-emerged clearly again in 2004, 2009 [and 2014]” (Hix and Marsh 2011, 6). Rohrschneider and Clark’s study supports this claim, adding that the framework for the current second order model is “based on several assumptions about individual-level motivations [...] summarised by a transfer hypothesis: individuals presumably apply their evaluations of national-level phenomena to the EU-level when voting in EU elections” (Rohrschneider and Clark 2009, 645). The nature of the election can influence both the turnout as well as the party preference. Giebler theorises that the relevance of the election influences the case-by-case turnout, especially in the case of a traditional rational choice framework. Despite the fact that party and media resources invested in second order elections, are rather scarce, a substantial number of citizens still votes in these elections (Giebler 2014, 116). This can be attributed to the fact that being unable to maximise their personal utility in the EP elections, voters split their tickets (see Burden and Helmke 2009, 2). This voting behaviour is supported
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by the fact that “second-order voters tend to vote ‘differently’ in comparison to more important elections” (Giebler 2014, 116). Without disregarding the multitude of motives attributed to a complex political behaviour such as the voting one, in the case of EP elections, low turnout and other anomalous voting behaviours can be explained by the fact that “the process is not rewarding enough for voters” while “the perceived benefits of voting are often outweighed by the costs”; the voters do not feel represented by the political parties in the EU and the parties fail time and time again to connect the interests of their electorates with the EU mechanisms (Grand and Tiemann 2012), as shown by the constant dips in turnout across eight electoral cycles. Even though the EP elections are a reflection of the European citizenship across 28 Member States, 35 years later, Flickinger and Studlar remarked that the “mass level EU polity” has remained underdeveloped when compared to the national ones (Flickinger and Studlar 2007, 384). Moreover, the relation between “the Europeanization of the EP elections [...] [and the voters’] «anti-Europeanization»” (Manow 2005, 21), constitutes another second-order factor in assessing the results of SOE elections. Watts has noted that the voters’ position on European issues has almost no direct relation with how they vote in EP elections (Watts 2008, 130), especially since in the voters’ mistaken assessment, second order elections do not significantly contribute towards the establishment of a European executive (Almeida 2012, 141).
3. RADICAL RIGHT AND VOTING BEHAVIOUR IN SECOND ORDER ELECTIONS
In his study “The Far Right and the European Elections”, Mudde (2014, 98-99) identifies twelve radical right parties with parliamentary representation in “national legislatures of EU Member States (MS)”: Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ – Freedom Party of Austria), Vlaams Belang (VB – Flemish Interest, Belgium), Ataka (Bulgaria), Hrvatska stranka prava (HSP – Croatian Party of Rights, Croatia), Dansk Folkeparti (DF – Danish People’s Party, Denmark), Front National (FN – National Front, France), Golden Dawn (CA – Greece), Jobbik (Movement for a Better Hungary – Hungary), Lega Nord (LN - Northern League, Italy), National Alliance (NA – Latvia), Partij voor de
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Vrijheid (PVV – Party for Freedom, Netherlands), and Sverigedemokraterna (SD – Sweden Democrats, Sweden)1. In the European elections from 22nd-25th May 2014, these parties won 47 seats. Front National gained 23 mandates while Ukip (with 24 seats) became the largest party from UK in the EP. The majority of them are non-aligned: FPÖ (4 seats), VB (1 seat), FN (23 seats), Golden Dawn (3 seats), Jobbik (3 seats), LN (5 seats), PVV (4 seats). Ukip (24 seats) and SD (2 seats) are members of Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD), a right wing populist group while DF (4 seats) and Finns Party (2 seats) are part of the European Conservatives and Reformers (ECR), another right-wing group though not as hard Eurosceptic as EFDD. ECR won 6.1% of the votes and 45 seats while EFDD “won 5.1% of the votes and 38 seats” (Deloy 2014, 2). Initially, Front National’s and Party for Freedom’s leaders, Marine Le Pen and Geert Wilders did not meet the requirements needed to form a new group (at least 25 MEPs from at least seven countries). With only Austria’s Freedom Party, Italy’s Lega Nord and Netherland’s Flemish Interest, Le Pen’s initiative initially did not meet the minimum number of Member States required to form a new political group in the EP (Willsher and Traynor 2014). One year later, in June 2015, after a British MEP defected from Ukip’s group, Marine Le Pen succeeded in launching Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF) which boasts 39 members from: Austria (4 MEPs – Freedom Party of Austria), Belgium (1 MEP - Flemish Interest), France (21 MEPs – National Front), Italy (5 MEPs – Northern League), Netherlands (4 MEPs – Party for Freedom), Poland (2 MEPs – Congress of the New Right), Romania (1 MEP – United Romania Party, initially a member of the Conservative Party), United Kingdom (1 MEP – Independent, elected as Ukip) (De La Baume and Vinocour 2015). Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD) values “the cooperation among sovereign European States and rejects the bureaucratisation of Europe and the creation of a single centralised European
1 Highest results in national parliaments: Austria – 26.9% in 1999, with 20.5% in 2013 (FPÖ); Hungary – 20.3% in 2014 (Jobbik); Latvia – 16.6% in 2014 (NA); Netherlands – 15.5% in 2010 with 10.1% in 2012 (PVV); France – 14.9% in 1997 with 13.6% in 2012 (FN); Denmark – 13.8% in 2007 with 12.3 in 2011 (DF); Sweden – 12.9% in 2014 (SD); Belgium – 12% in 2007 with 3.67% in 2014 (VB); Italy – 10.8% in 1996 with 4.1% in 2013 (LN); Bulgaria – 9.36% in 2009 with 4.52% in 2014 (NSA); Croatia – 7.06% in 1992 with 3% in 2011 in coalition with Croatian Guard (HSP); Greece – 6.97% in May 2012 (CA) (Mudde 2014a: 99, adjusted for the 2014 national parliamentary elections).
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superstate” (Farage 2014). It also promotes the right of European states “to protect their borders and strengthen their own historical, traditional, religious and cultural values” (Faure 2014, 9). Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF) takes these notions further and doubles down on them. On the Mediterranean refugee crisis, Le Pen stated how she “wanted to stop foreigners from entering France” and that members of the group “are all opposed to mass migration” (Levy-Abegnoli 2015). Meanwhile, Geert Wilders, leader of Dutch Freedom Party and co-leader of the ENF, vowed that “together will fight mass immigration and the islamisation of our continent. We want to once again be masters of our laws, of our money, of our own country and this is what we are fighting for” (Levy-Abegnoli 2015). Radical right parties are defined as “a collection of nationalist, authoritarian, xenophobic, and extremist parties that [share] the common characteristic of populist ultranationalism’ (Minkenberg and Perrineau 2007, 30). Contrasting results lead to contrasting explanations. For example, Kessler and Freeman highlight the fact that the radical right benefits from “low electoral thresholds and high unemployment”, while “unemployment is inconsequential. [L]imited welfare state coverage, proportional representation, and insecurity are more indicative factors of an increase of the radical right’s share of the vote” (Kessler and Freeman 2005, 262). Compared to other parties, they tend to represent their voters better on issues such as immigration and EU integration (Walczak and Van der Brug 2013, 15) and advocate for “restrictions on immigration and on the ethnic, cultural, and religious diversification of Western European societies” (Ivarsflaten and Gudbrandsen 2012, 1). In the EU, radical right parties a direct, institutional access to policy making. Instead they compensate this insufficiency, on the rhetorical front, by appealing to latent, rising xenophobia in large swathes of the electorate, outside their regular voting pool. Currently, with the European Union in the middle of the Syrian refugee crisis – rather easily foreseeable where not for deficient policies – the ultra-nationalist radical right parties are capitalising on the impeding flux of refugees and are doubling down on the hate, anti-Muslim, anti-immigration rhetoric, couched in economic, employment and welfare state pragmatism. As far as the European Parliament is concerned, with the establishment of the ENF group, the radical right MEPs use the institution as a drive for electoral campaign. With an estimated budget of € 17.5 million over the next four years, the ENF members also gain access to a larger administrative support as well as more time to address and influence the plenary debates. In spite of these, at least for the current legislature, ENF’s influence on the EP remains low.
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Charles de Marcilly, head of the Brussels office of the Robert Schuman Foundation, notes that either in the case of proposing new legislation or introducing table amendments, ENF lacks the support of other groups (Stafford 2015). The problem – as with the refugee / immigration crisis – is that in the current atmosphere, the radical right trend, if left unmitigated, has the potential to become a more complicated crisis for the European Union, in the absence of a counterbalancing narrative / policies, aimed at moderating the anti-European / anti-establishment / nativist / segregationist message of the radical right. As indicated by factors such as “social position, personality traits and value orientation” (Arzheimer 2012, 38), the radical right electorate – though not homogeneous – is often represented by “young men, the self-employed, and working-class voters” (Givens 2005, 46). Usually part of lower-middle classes and of the “petite burgeoisie” (“self-employed professionals, own- account technicians and small merchants” - Norris 2005, 147)) and more recently, from well-educated segments of the middle class (as seen in Austria and Denmark), these voters remark themselves by their openly expressed authoritarian tendencies. Such behaviours are further explained: “the very nature of jobs in certain segments of the private sector predisposes their occupants towards mixture of market-liberal and authoritarian ideas”, such as those embraced by French Front National or the Austrian Freedom Party (Arzheimer 2012, 3). According to Flecker et al. in the study “Potentials of Political Subjectivity and the Various Approaches to the Extreme Right: Findings in the Qualitative Research”, radical right voters show high levels of frustration stemming from failed expectations about social status, work, employment, or standard of living. In addition, economic precarity, devalued occupations and overall political powerlessness add to these voters’ generalised anxiety, uncertainty and wariness about mainstream politics. The notion of a trans-European unified radical right trend is debatable because electoral success, voting behaviour and public opinion fluctuate from one country to another and while there are prominent cases from Ukip to Front National, Danish People’s Party or Golden Dawn, the notion of a transnational movement has so far been limited to a discursive reality. Instead, the more likely scenario is that where centre-right parties are contaminated by the radical right issues, would have higher chances of being elected and hence potentially negotiating quid pro quos with radical right parties, like in the case of Denmark (prior to the 2015 election). This being said, the risk of cross- contamination at the level of the European institutions – in our cases, the
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European Parliament - remains low. The European institutions should address the causes that led these parties to gain traction in the national mainstream and to reassess the medium-to-long term effects of prolonged austerity. The importance of this cannot be underestimated in a context where presently, MS are asked to take Syrian refugees, the Common European Asylum System has collapsed and there are heightened tensions related to terrorist attacks (such as the November 2015 Paris ones), on which radical right parties thrive on. Compared to previous years, many Europeans consider that the EP “does not take into consideration their concerns’ while trust in EU institutions has decreased. At the EU28 level, 52% (+12% compared to the 2009 elections) declared they did not trust the institutions of the EU. Of these, 43% voted in the 2014 EP elections while 58% abstained. On the other hand, of the 43% (-7% from 2009) who declared that they trust the EU institutions, 55% voted while 35% abstained. Moreover, 54% (+13% from 2009) declared that the EP does not take into consideration the concerns of European citizens. Out of 54%, 47% voted in the 2014 election, while 59% abstained” (Directorate-General for Communication 2014a, 5, 55). This attitudinal change is not limited just to the EU. In fact, it is part of a global trend characterised by an increased loss of trust in institutions and organisations at various levels of representation. The perceived prolonged failure of national and European institutions to manage the economic crisis (responsible for high levels of unemployment as well as work-related and social insecurity), have – according to a European Social Survey – greatly undermined the trust of European citizens in these institutions (Roos and Oikonomakis 2014, 124). Outside of the crisis, Schweiger argues that the European institutions’ problem solving capacities can only go so far in meeting the expectations of European citizens. In other words, the EU failed in assuring the citizens that critical events are better managed at the European level than the national ones. Moreover, the European system of multi-level governance lacks transparency and is therefore regarded as distant and unaccountable to the citizens without prior knowledge on the European Union (Schweiger 2014, 63-64). However, this has not influenced the overall performance of the radical right parties1 in the EU (Backes and Moreau 2012, 421). Generally, their
1 See Ivaldi, G. 2012. “The Populist Radical Right in European Elections 1979-2009’. In Backes U. and P. Moreau (eds.), The Extreme Right in Europe. Current Trends and Perspectives. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, pp. 15-34.
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electoral success is attributed to a precarious socio-economic context, characterised by high rates of unemployment and austerity measures. Since popular support is highly uneven in the EU, the economic crisis represents an insufficient, albeit necessary condition in some cases, for the long-term success of the radical right (Ansell and Art 2010: 3). In these circumstances, “political disaffection and partisan dealignement [...] prove significant but relatively weak predictors of electoral support for the radical right” (Norris 2005, 25). Allen puts forth the idea that the crisis and subsequent recession allowed these parties attract a different electorate, more economically vulnerable and sceptical of the mainstream parties (Allen 2014, 2-3). This is relevant in the case of first order elections where elected parties could potentially implement their proposed reforms and are sanctioned if they fail but it does not entirely stand the test of a SOE since the MPEs are hardly ever sanctioned or constrained by the electorates. Hence the EP is seen as a “forum for [radical right-wing parties’] views outside the national-level scrutiny that generally accompanies them” (Williams 2006, 73). The fluctuations in the configuration of the EP have yet to be a source of disturbance to the EU process. While the radical right has been steadily increasing the numbers of MPEs and is constantly trying to make itself more palatable to various constituencies by masking the radical rhetoric behind the agenda “of preserving Europe for the Europeans” (Williams 2006, 76), policy wise, it has not affected the decision-making process notwithstanding the crisis. EP elections represent a microcosm encompassing varied ideological views on a transnational scale, which help explain the contextual factors for different voting behaviours. European elections play an important role in the formation and consolidation of new political entities (as is the case of Lega Nord). If radical right parties do not treat European elections as SOE (De Winter and Cachafeiro 2002, 494), then we can hypothesise that neither do their core electorates, especially when “voters may feel less tied to parties that had [once] represented their social group” (Givens 2005, 50). In this case and whenever EU integration becomes a point of contention, “voters [are] disagreeing with the [mainstream] parties on European (second order) issues” instead of sanctioning “the performance of governing parties in the national (first order) arena’ (Hobolt et al. 2008, 95).
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Though EP elections cannot be reduced to just “second order protest events”1 (Weber 2009, 1), they are perceived as “safe”: the parties in government are not affected by the protest / sanction / no-confidence votes. As seen in the Danish and British cases, “[m]ainstream parties, particularly those in government, suffer defections among their Eurosceptic supporters, particularly if there is hostile media coverage of the EU during the campaign” (Whitaker and Lynch 2011, 6). In this context, Van der Brug and Fennema argue in favour of the idea of a protest vote in support for radical right parties, since “neither democracy, nor EU, nor government dissatisfaction play an important role in explaining radical support for [these] parties” (Schmitt 2010, 9). European elections present a platform compatible with their national strategies, where these parties “gain public visibility [...] mobilise voters”, and forge alliances (Almeida 2012, 141, 148). In the 2014 EP elections, among the 21 parties that lost representation, no less than five were right-wing: Ataka (Bulgaria), British National Party (UK), Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS, Greece), the Greater Romania Party (Romania) and the Slovak National Party (Slovakia) (Mudde 2014b). While prior to the Eurozone crisis, in the 2009 EP elections, in “18 countries where radical right parties participated in both national and European elections [...] 11 saw the radical right secure a larger share of the votes at the European level”. UK (+19.2%), Hungary (+12.6%), the Netherlands (+11.1%) and Finland (+5.8%) registered the most significant differences between the national and European results (Faure 2014, 9). Aside from individual exceptions (France and Greece in 2012), during the economic crisis, radical right parties gained support in ten of the 28 EU MS (35%) and only in four (14%), the electoral gains exceeded over 5% (Mudde 2013). This means that while radical right parties have mainstreamed some of their views on policy issues regarding immigration and minorities, their success or failure is dependent upon the local context, the type of election, the dominant political traditions or whether the parties benefit from an established position in the political system (as is the case with the radical right presence in the parliaments of Belgium or Denmark) or not (as in the case with Great Britain, Ireland or Germany, where these
1 Especially since as Stratulat and Emmanouilidis point out “the conditions that sustained the status quo have changed during the last EP legislature, [...] with the 2014 EP elections [...] the first since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. [The treaty] broadened significantly the legislative and budgetary powers of the EP [and] has also given the EP the responsibility to elect the President of the Commission [...]” (Stratulat and Emmanouilidis 2013, 2).
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parties failed in challenging the mainstream, across varied types of electoral campaigns). On the other hand, their success stems the traditional parties perceived inability or unwillingness to address socio-economic vulnerabilities, in favour of opaque macro-economic indicators, whose perceived importance is inaccessible to the regular voter. High unemployment and continued austerity measures, reflected in public spending cuts or restrictions, pushes the electorate towards more radical choices, even when there’s nothing behind their rhetorical grandstanding that would support their claims of a minimalist welfare state for the natives, fixed by expulsing the immigrants, other foreign nationals and especially the Muslim communities. This was the case, especially in France, where if we look at the latest results from the regional elections, Front National won 30% share of the votes to the Republican / UDI coalition (29%) and the socialists (22%), but which as experts warned, benefited from the earlier terror attacks. In Central and Eastern Europe, Pirro explained that “[t]hese parties tap into a 'syndrome' stemming from the disappointments of the transformation process and frame the populist radical right ideology according to the idiosyncrasies of their context [...] [which] is primarily reflected in the set of (electorally viable) issues fostered by these parties: ethnic minorities, corruption, and the EU (Pirro 2015, 188). At the national level, Pirro states that irrespective “of their electoral performance, the populist radical right in Central and Eastern Europe may have wielded direct or indirect influence over certain policy dimensions and prompted shifts within respective national party systems” (Pirro 2015, 118). More than the electoral performance, both at national and EU levels, it is important to take into consideration the degree in which radical right themes cross-contaminate the centre-right agendas as well as the degree in which centre-right parties compromise with the radical right in making alliances or governmental coalitions. Even if the radical right parties divided among multiple groups or simply non-inscrit, are “by no means a necessary interlocutor, as the key forces driving European policy-making (EPP, S&D, ALDE1) [have retained their positions], despite being squeezed by the extremes” (Gergely and Gautier
1 EPP (European People’s Party) won 28.5% of the vote and 214 seat in the EP (down by 59 seats in comparison with 2009). S&D (Socialists and Democrats) with 25.4% of the vote, won 191 seats (down by 5), while ALDE (The Alliance for Democrats and Liberals for Europe) won 8.5% of the vote and 64 seats (down by 19) (Deloy 2014, 2).
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2013, 5), Kallis notes that the 2014 electoral breakthrough is due in part to the mainstream parties inability or unwillingness “to reverse the mounting Euro- sceptic, anti-immigration, anti-Islam, anti-establishment / elite, and strongly nationalist mood in public opinion” (Kallis 2014, 8). The author observes that this “troubling trend [...] related only partly to the European Union itself” and that the world post-9/11 and post-worldwide economic crisis combined to upgrade the populist discourse of the radical right, building on the “old prejudices (formally de-legitimised but never truly eradicated)” and adding “new fears of a new alternative vision of radical political transformation in an anti-establishmentarian, anti-multicultural, and narrowly nationalist direction” (Kallis 2014, 8-9). As stated earlier, while “[EP] elections do not have a direct impact on the formation of the national government, they can be used by voters to influence the next national election or the policies of the current government” (Hix and Marsh 2007, 496), which is why the electoral performance of the radical right is indicative of a particular political mindset of parts of the electorate at a given time that is contingent on the internal and external state of affairs of a country and its relationship with the EU.
4. OCCUPYING THE FRENCH FRINGE MAINSTREAM: FRONT NATIONAL
The 1984 European elections “catapulted Front National [FN] from fringe into minor party status” and allowed it “to gain credibility as a force in national politics” (Norris 2005, 242-243). Founded by Jean-Marie Le Pen in 1972, Front National “combin[ed] different parties of the extreme right: fundamentalist Catholics, neo-fascists and the anti-immigrant populist right” (Howarth and Varouxakis 2014, 72). Outside the “protest dimension” of the French vote in second order elections, Norris observes how the institutionalisation of FN benefited initially, from a misguided change of the electoral system aimed at dividing the right, pursued by the Mitterrand government (Norris 2005, 243). In addition, particularities1 of the French political system allowed FN to portray itself “as the only «real» opposition”
1 For example, “when the president does not have a majority in parliament, and the system switches to cohabitation, it takes over certain traits of more consensual systems” (Bornschier and Lachat 2010, 122).
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while “strategic decisions [...] provided a context in which [the party] could reach significant electoral gains” (Bornschier and Lachat 2010, 122). In the rundown to the 2014 EP elections, FN – like its counterparts in the UK and Czech Republic, led an intensive campaign which began well before other parties (Van den Berge 2014, 4). Furthermore, it treated the March local elections, as a test-run in preparation to the EP [campaign] (Van den Berge 2014, 4) – these were “the first real ‘test’ for the government in a difficult economic and social environment” (Bendjaballah 2014, 30). At the 2014 EP elections, FN placed first (24.86% share of the votes compared to 6.3% in 2009), registering an 18.56% increase compared to the previous elections. In 2009, FN was the fifth party behind l’Union pour un Mouvement populaire (UMP) (27.8% – 2009), Parti Socialiste (PS) (16.48% – 2009), Europe écologie (16.28% – 2009) and Mouvement Démocrate (MoDem) (8.4% – 2009) (EU Parliament 2014b). These results were reminiscent of “the political context of the 1980s when [t]he socialist government [failed] to increase employment and reduce inflation” and was faced with “a public sanction at the urns” (Morris 1994, 148-149), which was similarly mirrored in the 2015 regional elections. Previously, in June 2012, at the national parliamentary elections1, in the first round, FN was voted by 13.6% of the electorate (3.528.373 voters) and by 3.66% (842.684 voters) in the second round. It gained two seats in the Assemblée nationale (National Assembly) (Election Guide 2012). In April 2012, in the first round of the presidential elections, FN’s candidate, Marine Le Pen was voted by 17.9% of the electorate (6.421.426 voters) (Bamat 2012). In the 2014 municipal elections, where FN had candidates in only 596 out of almost 36.000 municipalities, pollster BVA placed FN in third place (7% of the votes) behind UPM and PS (Vidalon 2014). The French EP election followed the SOE requirements as far as the parties, the candidates and the campaign themes were concerned. Firstly, as a party that “could not accede to power within the prevailing system”, FN’s priority has been to consistently participate in a “battle of ideas, to exert pressure on all the other parties, and on French political life” (Shields 2007, 187, 172). FN’s anti-establishment and anti- immigration stances attracted an electorate, dissatisfied by the Socialist president’s performance.
1 Unlike the proportional representation system utilised in the European elections, at the national level, the ‘two-round plurality system [...] strongly favours big parties’ (Spoon 2011, 54-55).
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In general, as Van der Brug, Fennema and Tillie have shown, the electorate is strongly responding to a mixture of “ideological (left/right) proximity and (antagonistic) attitudes towards immigrants” (Van der Brug, Fennema and Tillie 2000, 94). Complementarily, FN anti-system identification helps attract support from young voters, at the centre of the unemployment crisis and more dismissive, distrustful and dissatisfied with mainstream politics” (Ivaldi 2003, 139). Since the mid-90’s, FN developed an electoral base comprised “predominantly [of] male, blue-collar worker and petty-bourgeoisie support, with low education” (Ivaldi 2003, 139), representing “a cross-section of French society, from people concerned with high unemployment, crime and immigration” (Howarth and Varouxakis 2014, 72). True to the traditional radical right nativist agenda, FN’s political programme constantly promotes anti-immigration measures such as “the expulsion of all illegal immigrants”, shortening “the length of employment contracts of non-Europeans, reject[ing] the automatic acquisition of French citizenship by children born in French to foreign parents, [...] call[ing] for an end to dual citizenship” (Carter 2005, 29- 30). Secondly, in line with the SOE model, the selected candidates for the EP election, highlighted the fact “that appointments respond to domestic rather than European politics [...] [and] have been chosen according to national criteria and not [...] their EU background” (Bendjaballah 2014, 31). Aside from Marine and Jean Marie Le Pen who had previously won MEPs seats, the other FN candidates were selected based on their performance during the local elections (Bendjaballah 2014, 31). Thirdly, since European elections are in general not about Europe (Ferrara and Weishaupt 2004, 289), the campaign was dominated by the domestic agenda. A debate between Marine Le Pen and President of the EP, Martin Schulz, was cancelled because FN’s leader “claimed [that] the EU campaign was above all a «French one» and that she did not have «to discuss [such matters] with a foreigner»”. France was also one of the few member states that did not broadcast on public television “the key debate of the EU campaign, between the candidates for the European Commission Presidency on 15 May 2014” (Bendjaballah 2014, 31-32). Moreover, based on the electoral alliances1 that participated in the 2014 EP
1 These were: 1. Parti Socialiste allied with Parti radical de gauche (in the third place with 13.98%); 2. Alternative (Union des Démocrates et Indépendants + Mouvement Démocrate placed fourth, with 9.94%); 3. Coalition Front de gauche (FG) composed of Parti Communiste Français, Parti de Gauche,
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election, we can argue that the higher the percentage of mainstream and radical right in past elections, “the higher the probability that an alliance will form” (Spoon 2011, 60). Facing a “sanction vote”, the two left-wing alliances underperformed: PS placed third, while the extreme left-wing Coalition Front de gauche placed sixth (EU Parliament 2014b). Front National – which is at present, the third party of France – like Italy’s Lega Nord or Netharland’s Partij voor de Vrijheid, had made inroads in mainstream politics long before the onset of the debt crisis and the increased “polarization between richer and poorer nations, between the North and the South, creditors and debtors”, exploiting in Crame and Hobolt’s view, “popular anxieties about migration, globalization, Islam, and European integration to varying degrees” (Crame and Hobolt 2015, 4). Front National’s breakthrough (4.7 million votes) is an example of what Le Cacheux and Laurent regard as the success of the “anti-EU rhetoric [which] fuelled national populism [...] [i]n a context of very high abstention (56%)” (Le Cacheux and Laurent 2015, 17), which as we have shown earlier is characteristic of Second Order Elections. Outside the crisis, Front National prolonged electoral support, successfully tested in the 2014 elections, is attributed in part due to a “resurgence of a long tradition of French ethno-nationalism” that’s drawn to the Front’s “preservation and defence of national identity” (Rydgen 2004, 151). In François Beaudonnet’s view, “it was easy for people to vote for the Front National because it doesn’t have a direct impact on their daily lives. Europe is seen as very far away and, in any case, they know that the Eurosceptic parties won’t have a majority in the European Parliament. It was a way of showing they don’t agree with the general evolution of Europe today, and it was a vote against the elites” (Beaudonnet 2014). Practice has shown that “the established parties [...] are by and large successful in blocking the entry of [...] competitors”1 but Front National has proven to be the exception precisely because it has successfully managed “to
Ensemble and Front de gauche (sixth place with 6.33%); 4. Union pour les Outre-Mer (Parti Communiste Réunionnais and Parti Progressiste Martiniquais); 5. Alliance des régionalisters, écologistes et progressistes des Outre-Mer régions et peuples solidaires (ALE-RPS) (EU Parliament 2014b). 1 The number of seats held by the two main political groups in the EP across legislatures: European Peoples’ Party (221/2014; 274/2009; 288/2004; 233/1999; 156/1994; 121/1989; 110/1984; 108/1979); Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (191/2014; 195/2009; 217/2004; 180/1999; 198/1994; 180/1989; 130/1984; 112/1979) (Directorate-General for Communication 2014b, 14-28).
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exploit the potential offered by the second-order logic of EP elections” (Raunio 2007, 76-77). This comes in contrast to first order elections, where FN fairs poorly “when faced with strong competition from mainstream-right candidates close to their own ideology”1 (Beauzamy 2013, 183). France – Grossman suggests – “usually had a contradictory and unstable attitude towards European integration”, varying from “permissive consensus” when “neither governing parties nor major interest groups or public opinion were openly hostile to [it]”, to an outright rejection, as was the case with the referendum on the European Constitution; consequently, a France in crisis, whose “central position in European integration is challenged” by the enlargement of the EU (Grossman 2007, 983-984), solidifies “[t]he durability of the Front’s electoral appeal [...] [which] [u]nlike other ‘flash’ parties”, has remained a fixture in the national and European political landscape, long after its initial success (Morris 1994, 148).
5. BETWEEN NORDIC HOMOGENEITY AND EURO- PRAGMATISM: DANSK FOLKEPARTI
In Denmark’s case, so reticent of the “ever closer political union” (Axtmann 1996, 1), the second order election model applies distinctly in contrast to the other European countries. Of the Scandinavian Member States, Denmark has been the first to obtain EU membership in 1973 and has voted in European elections since 1979. Its EU membership has encountered its share of difficulties with the Danish voters deciding on two separate occasions, “to keep the country outside the most integrated parts of the modern Union” (Aylot, Bergman and Blomgren 2013, 50). The two rejected referendums2 and the large minorities that opposed the other four, indicate that the divergent positions on European matters tend to be divided between the population and the elites and not necessarily between the political parties (Friis and Parello- Plesner 2012, 2).
1 This was the case with the presidential campaign from 2007, when UMP decided “to incorporate FN themes as a counter strategy – [i.e.] [...] the appropriation of the theme of «national identity» by Nicolas Sarkozy” (Beauzamy 2013, 183). 2 The referendum in which the Maastricht Treaty was rejected, led to the inclusion of ‘op-outs’ on issues pertaining to the monetary union, home affairs, justice and defence (Friis and Parello- Plesner 2012, 2).
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In the 2014 EP elections, Dansk Folkeparti (DF) (Danish People’s Party) doubled its MEPs and placed first (26.6% of the votes, +11.8%). In the previous election, it secured the fourth place, behind Socialdemokratiet (S) (20.9%), Venstre – Danmarks Liberale Parti (V) (19.6%) and Socialistisk Folkeparti (SF) (15.4%). In 2014, with a turnout at 56.32% – higher than the European average – the 13 seats allotted to Denmark, were divided between: DF (four seats, member of the European Conservatives and Reformists Group), Socialdemokratiet (-1.8%, three seats, member of the S&D Group), Venstre (-2.9%, two seats, member of ALDE), Det Konservative Folkeparti (KF) (-3.2%, one seat, member of EPP), Socialistisk Folkeparti (SF) (-4.4%, one seat, member of the Greens/European Free Alliance), Det Radikale Venstre (RV) (+2.4%, one seat, member of ALDE), Folkebevægelsen mod EU (People’s Movement against the EU), (+1.1%, one seat, member of European United Left/Nordic Green Left) (EU Parliment 2014c). Among the Eurosceptic parties, DF (26.6%) matched Ukip, behind Cyprus’ Progressive Party of Working People (AKEL) and ahead of France’s Front National, Italy’s Five Star Movement or Austria’s Freedom Party. With the exception of AKEL (-7.9%) and Jobbik (-0.1%), the other main Eurosceptic parties registered higher electoral scores compared to 2009 (Emanuele, Maggini and Marino 2014, 13). In the national parliamentary elections from 2011, DF won 12.3% of the votes (22 seats) and placed third behind the liberal and social-democrat parties (Inter-Parliamentary Union). Similar results were obtained in the local elections held in November 2013, at the Regional and Municipal level (Levring 2013). In 1998, at its first participation in parliamentary elections, DF obtained 7.4% of the votes. In 2001, DF rose to 12% and 22 seats in the Folketing (the Danish Parliament) and became “the support party of a Conservative-Liberal minority government” (Bolleyer 2013, 188). This electoral success continued during the next decade and registered only “minor losses: 12.3% and 22 seats [in 2011] as opposed to 13.8% and 25 seats in the previous election” (Bolleyer 2013, 188). A poll conducted in 2014, revealed that if an election were held today, DF would receive 21.2% of the votes, ahead of other parties, such as Venstre – the main opposition party (20.9%) or the ruling coalition partners, the Social Democrats (19.8%) (The Local 2014). At the general elections held on 18 June 2015, the Danish People’s Party came in second with 21.1 percent of the votes, winning 37 seats, behind the Social Democrats and ahead of Venstre, the conservative liberal party which lost 21 seats compared to the previous election (Gani 2015).
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Unlike other right-wing parties that occupy the fringes of the political spectrum, DF is the third main political force in Denmark. It has evolved from a party that in the words of the former Prime Minister, Social Democrat, Poul Nyr Rasmussen (1994-2001), “would never become respectable in the Danish political system” to what Helle Thorning-Schmidth – the new social democratic leader – characterised in 2006, as “a typical right wing party” (Susi 2010, 22). DF opposes the EU, favours “Danish independence” and is against the “transformation to a multiethnic society” (Pia Kjærsgaard, the party’s co- founder cited by Moreau 2012, 102). Consistent with the nativist position, DF’s Work Programme from 2007 stated that: “Denmark belongs to the Danes... A multiethnic Denmark would mean the breaking down of our stable homogenous society by anti-development and reactionary cultures” (Fryklund 2013, 267). Similar to other Nordic radical right parties, DF has a “narrow outlook”: anti-immigration, anti-deeper integration within the EU (Pelinka 2013, 14), while advancing more drastic policies in both sectors (Abedi 2004, 41). Givens (2005, 142) observes that support for DF is higher when both unemployment and the level of immigration increase. This assessment is not entirely substantiated in practice. Since April 1993, when the unemployment rate was at 9.9%, it has been on the decline, registering its lowest level between February and May 2008 (3.1%) and its highest since, in May 2012 (7.9%). As of October 2014, the unemployment is at 6.4% (Eurostat). By comparison, according to the International Organization for Migration, as of 2013, immigrants were at 9.9%, with the net migration rate (2010-2015) at 2.7 migrants/1000 population (International Organization for Migration 2014). DF’s electorate is “much less likely to have a university education than any of the other radical right parties [...], with the exception of the German parties: men without higher education, from the blue-collar sector or self- employed” (Givens 2005, 140-142). By acknowledging and adapting to the popular trend, DF’s exclusionary policies have avoided outright controversies1. Furthermore, it has strategically politicised the EU so much so that in 2011, in exchange for DF’s support, the Liberal-Conservatives in government were acquiescing to measures such as the reintroduction of permanent border controls (Kelstrup 2013, 22). DF had previously rejected the
1 Only 2% of the news articles frame the DF as very different compared to the mainstream parties, according to a study conducted by Hellström and Hervik (2013, 12).
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Schengen Agreement precisely because it was perceived as weakening the national prerogatives on matters pertaining to border control, immigration law and crime prevention, seen as detrimental to the wellbeing of the Danish state (Topaloff 2012, 176). While it has somewhat toned down on the extremist rhetoric, DF’s influence on the European issue has made its presence known on various instances. When in 2011, the right-wing government took a measure that would undermine the Schengen border-free zone, by deploying “over 40 additional customs control officers to be permanently stationed at the border with Germany”, it did that after concluding a deal with DF (Adler- Nissen 2014, 65). In another instance pointed out by Wind, DF “demanded a special national agreement, specifying how fraud with regard to EU rules could be combated and how the national immigration rules for non-EU citizen could be tightened even further”; as a result, and though not prohibited by European directives, “the Ministry today randomly checks 50 per cent of all EU family unification cases for fraud. [...] cases where there is no particular suspicion of fraud” (Wind 2014, 170). At the EP level, DF is part of the European Conservatives and Reformists group, aligning itself strategically with the political group more likely to advance its agenda. Previously, in the 2009 election, DF joined the Europe of Freedom and Democracy. Though the Danish turnout is higher than in other European countries, it is still lower when compared to the percentage at the national elections (85.9% in 2015), hence fulfilling one of the criteria for Second Order Elections. Continuing in line with the SOE model, government parties lose more votes in a typical sanction vote, than the opposition, the left parties are sanctioned, while right and centre right parties are most successful. Bischoff and Wind (2016, 285-286) have noted how multivariate analysis shows that EP elections respond both to national issue / needs / critics. Due to the particularities of the political system1, European elections do not constitute an optimal ground for national parties to anticipate an upcoming electoral direction, as in the French case. While the prerequisites for SOE are met, EP elections in Denmark are insulated from Danish internal politics to such an extent that is almost unique in the entirety of the EU2 (Franklin 2006, 231).
1 Franklin argues that this is due to the fact that “the two Eurosceptical parties [...] compete only in European elections. Because they receive a significant share of the vote, which is taken from other parties in proportions that are hard to compute with any accuracy, these elections do not have the outcome that is readily interpreted in national terms” (Franklin 2006, 231). 2 UK constitutes another exception.
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Unlike in other Member States where the European Union issue is relegated to the back burner, in Denmark, this “issue has been severely politicized” (Kelstrup 2014, 22). Yet outside the referenda and the EP elections, Kelstrup finds that “there has been very little debate and European issues have hardly had any role in normal parliamentary elections” (Kelstrup 2014, 26). DF’s argument against the EU “is that it is saturated with planned economics and centralism, egregiously resembling the political and economic structure of the former communist countries” (Toppaloff 2012, 176). After the 2015 election, DF’s stated goals revolve around: “Denmark leav[ing] the Schengen area [...] boosting border controls [...] and mak[ing] it hard for EU migrants [sic] to claim benefits in other member states” (BBC News 2015). Presently, the Eurozone crisis combined with the contemporaneous flows of migration and the downside of globalisation have “exposed the disconnect between domestic politics in many countries and EU politics” (Erlanger 2015). Parts of the electorate no longer identify with the mainstream parties while the parties that push forward, are those aiming at changing the system, exploiting the fact that traditional parties failed to address to acknowledge the notion that they could still maintain their pro-European stance, while also criticising the EU (Erlanger 2015). The nationalistic DF’s anti-European position is not an exception but more of a symptom of the Danish ambivalence. In Fennema and Van der Brug’s assessment, Denmark is the only Member State where the political union or EU enlargement have been “politicised to such an extent that these EU-attitudes translate into electoral preferences” (Fennema and Van der Brug 2008, 17). If in the past, the left was more sceptical while the centre-right was pro-EU, today, both tend to favour a Eurosceptic stance (Fris and Parello- Plesner 2012, 2). Aylot, Bergman and Blomgren consider that this ambivalent position prompted a political cleavage – unique in Europe – which has “in turn created two parallel systems”: a national and a European one, respectively (Aylot, Bergman and Blomgren 2013, 57-58). As far as the Left is concerned, in De Vries’ opinion, “leftist voters have conceived of European integration as a market-liberal project that threatens to undermine leftist domestic policy – not because European integration is orthogonal to the left/ right dimension” (De Vries 2010, 22). The four opt-outs (on economic and monetary union, defence, justice and home affairs and citizenship) attest to the Danish aversion towards deeper political integration. Consistent with the Euro-reticence displayed by the political system, DF – which rejects a closer union and is opposed to the
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Danish membership – campaigns on European issues in the second order election (Franklin 2006, 222). To this end, in the EP elections, the Danish identity, sovereignty and citizenship are at the forefront of a strategic vote that balances economic pragmatism with the risks posed by the loss of autonomy and European citizenship.
6. CONCLUSIONS
If in 2009, Europe of Freedom and Democracy, the right-wing group founded and led by Ukip and Lega Nord, was the seventh and last group in the European Parliament, in 2015, with 45 MEPs (+11 from the 2009 elections), the reconstituted Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy occupied the penultimate position, before Le Pen’s Europe of Nations and Freedom (39 MEPs). Outside these two groups, the European Conservatives and Reformists with 74 MEPs (+ 20 from the 2009 elections) – which have also endorsed an Eurosceptic and anti-federalist stance – has moved from being the fifth group at the 2009 EP elections, to become the third group in the EP after the 2014 elections, by surpassing the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe and The Greens-European Free Alliance. While the EU is regarded by the sceptics as a “house divided against itself that cannot stand”, this assessment would seem to be a better fit for the radical rights populists. In support of this, Mudde finds that “far right parties seldom work effectively together within the European arena, [while] [...] FN’s leading role has often been both crucial and highly divisive” (Mudde 2014a, 103). In the French and Danish cases, both Front National and Dansk Folkeparti have been shown to abide by the Second Order model. At the institutional level, a wider coalition could transform the “radical right [into] the driving force in producing a new demarcation-integration cleavage in West European societies” (Grande 2012, 291). Yet this remains unlikely because as Kolaric points out, radical right parties in the EP “face limitations for effective performance”, while “many of the Eurosceptic radical right MEPs tend to not participate regularly in plenary voting” (Kolaric 2013, 13). This applies both in terms of average participation in roll-call votes as well as in drafting reports in the committees (Kolaric 2013, 17). This phenomenon is explained in the literature: “these are the European Parliament’s most conflicted politicians, working in an institution that they often oppose. [...] It makes perfect sense, then, that in this context populist radical right MEPs do not put their efforts
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into policy impact, but instead try to take a stand by speaking out in at plenary. That way they can show to their electorate that they are taking on the EU from the inside” (Kolaric 2013, 5). The radical right parties’ influence in the EP remains low, even though these parties benefited from the uncertain environment created by the economic and financial crisis affecting the European Union in general and the Eurozone in particular. This is especially the case in Member States where they already had an established presence on the political scene – as we have shown with the French and Danish examples. Moreover, the electoral behaviour in EP elections is not particularly indicative of national electoral trends across all 28 MS, when compared to first order elections. Though austerity measures proposed and implemented to combat the crisis, have reawakened national anxieties by underlining the divide between the “haves and have nots”, we are far from talking about a pan-anti-European popular trend clamouring for the rejection of the European Union. If the Greek debt crisis from summer 2015 showed us anything, it showed that even the people of Greece – that were faced with two terrible options: exit from the Eurozone and more austerity – still mandated their representatives to negotiate for a solution inside the Eurozone. Generally, while electoral breakthroughs on the part of radical right parties are indicative of a particular mindset of parts of the electorate which identify with their rhetoric, their lack of “credible expertise”1 in dealing with economic problems, makes them unreliable in dealing with policy-making. On a case by case basis, the problem posed by radical right parties lies in the fact that mainstream parties on the centre right, might appropriate pet themes of the radical right and radicalise their platform, in regards to immigration or Euro-scepticism (as seen with the British Conservative Party or France’s Union for a Popular Movement). When co-opted to the government, as seen with Dansk Folkeparti, the effects on policy making in regards to the EU, are even more drastic. These being said, at the EU level in general and at the EP level in particular, any long-standing radical influence in European decision making is undermined for the moment, both because these parties are divided across different groups or are non-inscrit and because their main focus remains on
1 In Mudde’s view: “During an economic crisis the political debate is dominated by socioeconomic issues, on which far right parties put little emphasis and have little credible expertise” (Mudde 2014a, 103).
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garnering publicity and not on “participating in policy-making activities” (Mudde 2014a, 103).
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MORE EXPECTATIONS TOWARDS THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY: THE CASE OF UKRAINE
Mihaela-Adriana PĂDUREANU Center for East European and Asian Studies, NSPSPA Bucharest / Romania [email protected]
Abstract Through the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the European Union aimed at offering a stable framework for the development of its neighbouring countries. The Eastern dimension of this policy, the Eastern Partnership, proved to be the catalyst for an unprecedented internal wave of protests. Ukraine, probably the most demanding country in the ENP, has posed a great challenge to this framework. In this article I offer an analysis of those events from the perspective of the EU to show that the factors for these surprising events are rooted in Ukraine’s internal structure. As the conflict in Ukraine is still ongoing at the moment of writing, I complete my analysis with the Minsk 2 agreements. My argument is that the aim to get close to the EU has been motivated by Ukraine’s desire to obtain a political system based on good governance, which was at the same time another goal. I explain the desire to sign the Association Agreement and the deepening of relations with the EU as attempts to ensure that the country would not transform its internal political regime in order to look more like the Russian Federation.
Keywords Conflict; European Neighbourhood Policy; European Union; Ukraine
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1. INTRODUCTION
As it is often the case with the events in the international arena, the recent developments in Ukraine represented an unpleasant and shocking reality-check for the European Union officials in the first place and for their US partners in the second. The Western world response to Crimea’s illegal annexation and invasion in Eastern Ukraine was mainly similar, showing a common position towards the importance of such concepts as sovereignty, free and fair elections (as the referendum in Crimea claimed to be) and the role of international norms in maintaining the order in the international system. At the same time, the response of other important actors, such as China or India, seemed to support Russia's claims that it took these measures in order to protect its citizens in the neighbouring country. They both encouraged a political solution to the conflict and did not condemn the act as a violation of Ukraine’s territorial integrity. The events showed once again, after the 2008 war in Georgia, that Russia is very serious in its aim of maintaining the influence upon the ex- Soviet Republics in the Caucasus (the Armenian case was easier to solve) and in Ukraine, with which it had been having a special relationship over the last centuries even if that meant using violence as an instrument to obtain its goal. In this situation, Russia seems to be trying to maintain a status-quo that was established during the Cold War by the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine of “limited sovereignty”, therefore the many comparisons made by the Western media that this is a “new Cold War”. But this misuse of terms is not justified, first of all because of the actors involved. Today’s Russia is very far from what the Soviet Union was in 1945 and using this term would put Russia in a different and more prestigious light than it is the case. Although undoubtedly a major actor, Russia is not a superpower anymore, its economic and political models have failed, its territory diminished and its current political elite seems unable to propose a credible political project, using natural resources in order to maintain its power position. The second major reason for not naming what is happening in Eastern Ukraine a second Cold War is both the way in which Central and Eastern Europe have transformed over the last 25 years, and the treaties signed in order to better manage the nuclear and conventional weapons in the world (New Start Treaty). Ukraine’s internal problems were the source of another major street protest after the 2004 elections, a movement that came to be known as the Orange Revolution. Ten years later, the society showed once again that the
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tensions within could not be resolved or contained by the political actors and then violence became a legitimate tool for the citizens who wanted to have an alternative to the existing political elite. Therefore, the causes that triggered the huge protest movements in November 2013 had mostly internal causes, while the European requests of those who were on the Maidan were more stressed after the overreaction from the authorities. In the following section I will briefly present two dimensions of inquiry that I consider relevant for the aim of this article. In order to do this, I want to identify the case in which a common problem for the West (understood here as EU and US) was resolved: the nuclear weapons in Ukraine. The second dimension explores the dialogue between Ukraine and the EU. The latest events in Ukraine sparked a new wave of interest towards this dimension within two major discourses: on the one hand, there are those who accused the EU for not doing more (Kubicek 2005) and on the other hand, there are those who said that the EU and NATO had done too much in the ex- Soviet space and provoked the aggressive response of the Russian Federation (Mearsheimer 2014).
2. AN EXAMPLE OF GOOD PRACTICES: MANAGING UKRAINE’S NUCLEAR ARSENAL
Ukraine, as an independent country managed to respond in the early ‘90s to the West’s worries regarding its nuclear arsenal and, under President Leonid Kuchma, joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Ukraine accepted to become part of the NPT after three major powers offered their guarantees that its borders would not be changed. However, for some of the elites, the nuclear weapons were the only guarantor of Ukraine’s independence and territorial integrity and they were reluctant to renounce them (Griffiths and Karp 2008, 205). The United Kingdom, the Russian Federation and the US, under what came to be known since 1994 as the Budapest Memorandum became the guarantors of Ukraine’s territorial integrity and political independence. These actors’ failure to respect the agreement has given rise to important questions regarding the way in which the international order would be supported and other agreements respected (Yost 2015). But with the signing of this agreement, in the early ’90s, Ukraine was seen as a potential issue for the evolution of Eastern Europe and also in the light of the effects a close
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relation between the EU and Ukraine could have on the EU-Russia relations. Also, the independence forces had a visible role since then; and the special relation with the Russian Federation and the impact of the ethnic tensions on the future of Ukraine was discussed immediately after gaining independence at the beginning of the ’90s, including the possibility of Russian intervention in the country (Larrabee 1994, 14). The geographic location of the tension did not change too much since the independence; the Eastern industrialized part of Ukraine had been closer to Russia; dual-citizenship, as well as a more important role for the Russian language, had been on those citizens' agenda since the early ’90s and Crimea had been looking for an opportunity to break free from Ukraine (Larrabee 1994, 16). This gloomy analysis, written more than two decades ago, has proved to be an accurate instrument for explaining the current crisis. Even more, we can say that Ukraine has been more or less in a constant crisis over the last twenty years with some moments (like the Orange Revolution and Euromaidan) more visible than others. To complicate the situation even more, Ukraine inherited from the Soviet Union the highest number of arms – not only nuclear - and ammunition, while some of them had been deposited in Ukraine by the ex-Warsaw Pact states. This led to the biggest project aimed at destroying arms supply which was conducted mainly in collaboration with NATO (Griffiths and Karp 2008, 202-207). But one of the critical moments in post independent Ukraine, the Orange Revolution, also had an important impact on the reform of the defence sector, through the Defence White Paper, a document that aimed at reducing considerably the ammunition found on Ukraine’s territory and the increased role of the President, Prime-minister and other civilian institutions (Griffiths and Karp 2008, 208-10). Thus, we can conclude that the country has managed to move, though through small steps, towards a more egalitarian relation between the military forces and the civilians, therefore improving Ukraine’s democratic record.
3. AIMING TO DEMOCRATIZE THE EASTERN NEIGHBOURHOOD. OBTAINING A PROXY WAR WITH RUSSIA
Apart from the successful manner in which the Western states and institutions have managed to resolve the arms problem in Ukraine and to involve this state in their own mechanisms of checking and controlling the
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arms’ use, there have hardly been other problems solved as well as this one. The most analysed dimension of the interaction between Ukraine (treated as a post-Soviet state) and the EU has been the democratization one. For example, the role of the EU in Ukraine’s democratization was analysed earlier by P. Kubicek, who links the 2004 protests with the need to resolve first and foremost the political (including democratization, the role of the citizens) and economic problems of the country. He views the EU as an actor which has the sticks and carrots to push for greater openness and democratization in Ukraine (Kubicek 2005). A more specific view on the topic of democratization was the one focusing on the role of the ENP in the Europeanization of Ukraine (Gawrich, Melnykovska and Schweickert 2010, 1210). The main instruments used by the EU for directing democratization are top-down or/ and bottom- up: the top-down process in the ENP involves political dialogue (summits, committee meetings and negotiations) and official statements, while the bottom-up approach aims to support non-state actors and institutions, the authors demonstrate that democracy promotion is only slightly effective, due to the lack of incentives and rewards (Gawrich, Melnykovska and Schweickert 2010, 1212-1224). One specific dimension of the democratization and the Europeanization processes was the importance given to the rule of law. O. Burlyuk shows that there is a significant gap between what is intended to be understood by this term and the meanings the actors give in practice to the term, which is mainly a concept used in relation with the countries that do not participate in the accession process (Burlyuk 2014, 28; see also Micu 2007, 28). But I do not agree with the author’s assumption that the lack of a clear definition for the rule of law is a deliberate choice from the part of the EU (Burlyuk 2014, 27) because this draws on a rationalist approach in conceptualizing the EU’s interests as fixed and exogenous, supposing that the actors do know what they want (to obtain). However, I am more inclined to consider the EU’s interests from a reflectivist perspective and perceive them as the result of interactions with other actors and the environment (Haas 2001, 33). In this context, the rule of law is a norm that has an important impact on the interests, identity and behaviour of the states from the ENP. Ukraine’s identity has been a complex and complicated issue in its history because of the relations it had inside and outside of the current territory, which is the most extended in its whole history (Rywkin 2014, 119). The EU has applied its own rules in trying to support a democratic regime in Ukraine, but its own partner's internal problems were too complex for what the EU had to offer. This was a case that proved once again that a one-size-fits all- approach is
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inconsistent and unrealistic if it aims to support a country on the road to the Western model of democracy. The EU’s dialogue with Ukraine lacked the most desired goal for Ukrainians, the possibility to join the Union and therefore it was far less attractive than it could have been. After November 2013, the analysis focusing on the Ukraine–EU relation have also been highly critical towards what it has been perceived as a too weak position on the part of the EU. This critique has two main dimensions: a political and an economic one. From the economic point of view, a major critique regards the commercial relations between the EU and the Russian Federation, as a factor that puts pressure on the EU officials in order to soften their position towards the sanctions that have as a subject the Russian Federation (Tran 2014). On the other hand, the EU did not want to engage with a country that was very different from the countries in Central and Eastern Europe, with elites not entirely convinced that their goal was to deepen the relation with the EU (Pridham 2014, 55). The EU’s policy towards the ex-Soviet space has been vehemently contested and in particular, as I have already mentioned, it has been strongly criticized for not offering a clear perspective for Ukraine’s EU accession. Even more, it seemed that the EU mostly focused on Russia and left behind the other ex-Soviet Republics by failing to propose a clear strategy to them (Wolczuk 2009, 187; Negrescu 2011). The first important step in stabilizing the framework for the EU-Ukraine cooperation was the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) signed in 1994, which came into force in 1998 that stressed the importance of political relations between the two actors (EEAS, PAC Ukraine). In March 2014, the political chapters of the Association Agreement, which would have replaced the PCA were to be signed and would have entered into force after the member states' ratification. The European Neighbourhood Policy launched in 2004 has proved inefficient in its relation with Ukraine, even before the Vilnius Summit, by failing to offer the incentives needed for deep transformations in the country, transformations that have been linked with the possibility to accede to the EU. The effects the ENP had on Ukraine’s internal dynamics were rather mild and related to the internal institutions that allowed domestic actors to have a strong motivation for the reforms they required and proposed (Wolczuk 2009, 188). The Eastern Partnership (EaP), the EU’s initiative for the Eastern neighbourhood has not done enough for mobilizing the resources considered necessary to trigger deep and important reforms in Ukraine. Even more, the EaP has been seen as an attempt to extend what Ukraine had already obtained
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to other countries in the East, a reason which makes the bilateral dimension of the EaP the framework preferred by this country (Solonenko 2011, 125). But at the same time, Ukraine has showed a very restrictive position on implementing reforms following instead more virtual policies that reminded of the Soviet era-style, which in turn attracts even less support from the Western world (Kuzio 2012, 395). T. Kuzio demonstrates that after 2010, when V. Yanukovych won the presidential elections, the domestic politics started to look more and more like Russia’s own internal situation. The main dimensions of that change were visible in the following areas: the increased role of individuals with a military background; the importance attached to the term stability, which became an aim of the government and the internal institutions; and the decreased role of educated elites (Kuzio, 2012, 560). The connections between the political elites and the economic ones, also known as the Family, who were close to Yanukovych, increased after the 2010 elections and transformed their qualitative dimension, from an oligarchic system, towards a more important role for the siloviki (Kuzio 2012, 564-565). This process has been noticed by the Ukrainian citizens and it was a major cause of the current events. At the same time, on foreign policy issues, V. Yanukovych showed his support for the Russian version of the events. In 2008, after the war in Georgia, the Party of Regions, argued for a „neutral” response on the part of Ukraine (Arel 2008, 18). All these problems had a complex effect on the supporters of the Orange Revolution who were now disappointed by their political elites. In this context, Ukraine’s path towards the EU seemed to be the country’s only alternative to a more authoritarian regime. The EU’s reaction to the events in Ukraine has been described as a failure of the European institutions to have a coherent policy for the Eastern neighbourhood, which was caused by the different interests the member states have towards Ukraine, interests that went from very high (Poland, Sweden) to very low (Italy) (MacFarlane and Menon 2014, 99). Also, these events showed the need to think critically with regard to the Enlargement Policy, the only one the EU had over the years and that was strong enough to motivate the changes required and foreseen by the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) (MacFarlane, Menon 2014, 98). Although the EU's sanctions against the Russian Federation have had important effects on the economic cooperation between the two parties, the long term benefits and disadvantages of this situation were debated. In the long run, EU energy dependence on Russian resources will be diminished, while Ukraine’s importance as a transit country will also decrease, due mainly to alternative energy source like those
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in Iran or Iraq and the US's capacity to export liquefied natural gas (Schubert, Pollak and Brutschin 2014, 51).
4. THE CRISIS IN UKRAINE: AN OVERVIEW
The crisis in Ukraine started on November 21st 2013, after President Viktor Yanukovych made public the fact that Ukraine would not sign the Association Agreement (AA) with the EU, which was supposed to happen at the Vilnius Summit. The citizens of Kiev began to protest against the announcement that Ukraine had been under pressure from the Russian Federation to decline the EU’s offer and on November 24th they started the so- called “EuroMaidan revolution”. February 2014 was the bloodiest month in the contemporary history of Ukraine, especially between February 18th and 21st, when more than 100 people lost their lives. February seems to be a key moment for understanding the events in Ukraine and there are two main reasons for this. First, while the protesters in the square were being targeted by unknown snipers, President Yanukovych met EU officials – the foreign ministers of Poland, Germany and France - and announced that he had agreed with the opposition to organize early elections. Then, on the night of February 21st something happened, Yanukovych left Kiev and the parliament decided to remove him from power. The following reports were contradictory: Yanukovych’s representatives said that he had intended to resign, while the President declared that he was the victim of a coup and that he was “the legitimately elected President” (Walker, 2014) while drawing a comparison between Ukraine and Nazi Germany. Thus every party tried to prove that it had told the truth and that it was the legitimate representative of the citizens. The subject of the coup and the illustration of the events from February 21st and 22nd as an illegitimate move made by the members of the opposition was then widely circulated by the Russian officials and the media as the main moral dimension justifying the Russian involvement in Ukraine. Ex-President Yanukovych had a large base of Russian-speaking supporters in Eastern Ukraine and his removal was being presented as a tool aimed at weakening the political representation of this part of the country. The second reason is that on February 20th, Vladimir Konstantinov, the speaker of the Crimean Parliament announced that Crimea could hold a referendum in order to separate itself from Ukraine. This was a clue regarding
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Russian intentions. At the end of February, the Russian army invaded Crimea and on March 16th a referendum was held, in which 97% voted to become a part of the Russian Federation. After Crimea’s annexation, the Ukrainian government lost control over Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, but despite these events, the presidential elections were held on May 25th. The Ukrainian army and the rebel forces continued to fight during the following months despite attempts to sign a durable peace treaty. The first major step had been made with the signing of the document named the Minsk Protocol, on September 5th – overlapping with the NATO Summit in Wales - but the deal was broken many times during the following weeks. Meanwhile, the situation of civilians in Eastern Ukraine continued to deteriorate and 6.417 people had been counted dead between April 2014 and May 2015 (UN Report, 2015). The events of the last year and a half have had an enormous impact on Ukrainians. The image of Russia in Ukraine, although affected by the famine from 1932-1933, the Holodomor, was still positive. According to Pew Center Surveys in 2002, 87% of Ukrainians had a favourable view of Russia; in 2011 84% had a favourable view of Russia, while in 2014 that percentage decreased to only 35% (Pew Research Center, Ukraine - Opinion of Russia). But surprisingly, 15% declared they were satisfied with the national conditions, the greatest percentage in all years (Pew Research Center, Ukraine - Satisfaction with Country's Direction). As for the Russians, they see the US as their biggest enemy, while Ukraine was considered together with Belarus, Kazakhstan, China, and Germany one of Russia’s allies (Wisniewski 2013). As for the relation with the EU, according to a Deutsche Welle survey in October 2013, only 50% of the Ukrainians supported the association agreement, while 48% wanted Ukraine to become a member of the Customs Union together with Belarus and Kazakhstan. At the same time, the effects of a closer cooperation with both organizations were perceived in economic terms while the political results of an Association Agreement with the EU (the improvement of democracy and rule of law) came forth in this survey. Regarding the views of Russians towards Ukrainians and those of Ukrainians towards Russians, there have been important changes in both directions. The number of Ukrainians who have a positive view of Russia decreased from 48% in September 2014 to 37% in December 2014 and, at the same time, the number of those who view Russia negatively increased from 41% in September 2014 to 48% in December 2014 (Ienin 2015). Also, in the same survey by Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS), the number of Russians who view Ukraine negatively increased from 55% in September 2014 to 63% in December 2014. Other
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important trends we can see from this survey are related to the border issue between the two countries: in Ukraine, 50% of those interviewed in December 2014 said that they wanted closed borders with Russia, compared to 45% in September 2014; in Russia, 32% said in January 2015 that they wanted a closed border with Ukraine, compared with September 2014, when 26% stated the same thing (Ienin 2015). What those results say is that even if the numbers of citizens who support a clearer distinction between the two states are still high, only half of Ukraine’s population thinks that there is no need to have a closed door with Russia. This fact has a direct effect on the way in which the rebels in Eastern Ukraine are receiving their weapons, due to the fact that Ukraine does not control its border. Also, the number of those who support the open borders policy, with no visas and customs between the two states, has decreased in Ukraine from 44% to 42% and in Russia from 62% to 52% (Ienin 2015). Therefore, there is a consolidating trend in the two societies which shows a separation between the way in which the future relation between Russia and Ukraine will be a colder one. The relations between the two countries seem to be set on a very difficult path: now, the Ukrainians know that they do not have a friend or a good neighbour in Russia and the options they have as a sovereign country are strictly restricted by it.
The crisis’ effect on the Ukraine – NATO relation
I also consider relevant for this article to talk about the effects the war in Ukraine had on NATO, due to the fact that at some point Ukraine wanted to become a member of the Alliance. The conflict in Ukraine offered a reason for a renewed approach on the part of NATO while the effect that the conflict had on the Western world is not difficult to measure: NATO found a new mission and the Alliance has been strengthened (Pifer 2015; Garamone 2015). As for the Ukrainians, there was no second thought on the part of the citizens or the main political parties. Even after the Orange Revolution, the three parties – the Socialist Party of Ukraine, the Communist Party of Ukraine, and the Party of Regions - from five that were in the Parliament were against Ukraine’s NATO membership due to Russian propaganda and the intervention in Kosovo (Kuzio 2006, 90). In 2010, the newly elected president, Viktor Yanukovych announced that Ukraine would not seek to develop its relations with NATO and passed a law that declared the country’s neutrality - a move that reflected the view of at least 51% of the population who said in a 2009 survey that they oppose Ukraine’s NATO membership, while 28% said that they supported
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such a move (Holzwart 2010). In December 2014, the Ukrainian Parliament has voted to renounce neutrality and seek NATO membership; also, the number of those who said that they associate NATO with protection has increased to 36% (Ray and Esipova 2015). These surveys confirm what one could only suspect when looking at the events in Ukraine: the support for EU integration was increased, while the Customs Union has lost some of its supporters. The highest number of those that stated they wanted Ukraine to join the EU varied between 67% (in a pool by Rating Sociological Group1) and 47.2% according to a survey by Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (Sakhno 2015). These numbers allow us to say that Ukraine’s foreign policy will probably have to distance itself even more from the Russian proposed unions in the former Soviet space. Losing a part of its territory and being in danger to lose even more of it, Ukraine will have to consider a reformed course for its foreign policy and to commit itself to bringing the country to higher standards of economic development and political stability in order to deepen the dialogue with its Western allies. The social unrest that manifested in the last two decades has shown that Ukraine’s problems are far more complicated to be resolved only with more promising from the European partners; it cannot be resolved without functioning political parties and leaders that are willing to commit themselves to the democracy path.
5. CONCLUSIONS
The Russian leader, Vladimir Putin, learned after the second war in Chechnya that an efficient strategy to negotiate with the EU, after it had criticized Russia for not respecting the European values, was to hold talks with individual powerful states which would automatically attract the support of the EU’s institutional structure as well (Haukkala 2015, 30). V. Putin also had an important role in constructing the first coherent alternative to EU’s model of development by organizing the Eurasian Customs Union, which became this year the Eurasian Custom Union (Haukkala 2015, 32). In this institutional framework, Ukraine’s role was a very important one for the initiative’s success
1 "Ukraine still prefers joining EU to CU membership, half of nation wants to join NATO – poll" (20.11.2014), Kyiv Post http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/ukraine-still-prefer-joining- eu-to-cu-membership-half-of-nation-wants-to-join-nato-poll-372517.html (22.05.2015).
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- pointing to the special relation that they had over the years. But the military invasion in Eastern Ukraine has shown that the EU’s soft power is simply not enough (Barata 2014, 42) to change the environment in which the negotiations are taking place. The choice between the political Russian model with its political and economic dimensions and the EU model has been made, at least for some of the Ukrainian citizens, mainly those in the Northern and Western part of the country. And even if some of Ukraine's political elites would like a more independent role for the country, which does not mean a status as an associate member of the EU or a member of the Customs Union, their incapacity to deliver prosperity and to respond to the democratic demands of their citizens is the cause for the instability in the country and the reason that will continue to fuel the turmoil. As for the EU, the events in Ukraine have only increased the need for a more coherent and comprehensive policy, as some of the state actors in the ex-Soviet space expect more from the European institutions. The EU’s actions towards Ukraine did not represent a strong incentive to mobilize the needed resources in order to engage the political elites in the democratization process. The Orange Revolution’s results proved to be another disappointment for the young urban participants and for all those that supported the movement. The Ukrainians had, in the first place, been disillusioned by their own political representatives before the Euromaidan, while drifting away from the EU, by not signing the AA, would have been as if they were choosing to live another decade in a grey area. At the same time, the EU found itself in a situation in which the international scene was expecting a clear reaction from its institutions and a coherent strategy that it seems it was unable to provide. The EU is unequipped or simply does not want to play according to the logic and rules that Russia has and endorses in this country and it will have to learn how to be more flexible in order to be able to respond to this kind of scenarios. The neighbours have great expectations from the EU and if the Union wants to be an actor on the international stage in the XXIst century, it will have to reflect on its position and try to identify and correct its mistakes - it cannot stop other actors' image about itself, but it can try to shape it. All in all, it would also seem that the political elites in Ukraine are not very far from the Russian actions, proving to be very resistant to the democratic demands of the citizens; and if they fail once again to change and govern in the citizens’ interest instead in their own, the social unrest will most likely continue.
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ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This work is based on the research grant Eastern Partnership. Civilian Security Need-Assessment and Development Opportunities/Options (PN-II- ID-PCE-2011-3-1014), funded by the Romanian Ministry of Education.
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MacFarlane, N. and A. Menon. 2014. The EU and Ukraine, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 56(3): 95-101, DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2014.920139. Mearsheimer, J. 2014. Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault. The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin, Foreign Affairs, September/October. Micu, G. 2007. Ordinea juridică instituțională comunitară. București: Paideia. Negrescu, V. 2011. The European cooperation for development policies: between national interests and communitarian norms, SGIR Proceedings – European Journal on International Relations. Stockholm. Pridham, G. 2014. EU/Ukraine Relations and the Crisis with Russia, 2013-14: A Turning Point, The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs, 49(4): 53-61, DOI: 10.1080/03932729.2014.965587. Pifer, S. 2015. Russian aggression against Ukraine, and the west’s policy response. Hampton Roads International Security Quarterly, 23. http://search.proquest.com/docview/1669501431?accountid=15533. Ray, J. and N. Esipova. 2015. Ukrainian Approval of Russia's Leadership Dives Almost 90%, Gallup. Accessed May 22, 2015. http://www.gallup.com/poll/180110/ukrainian-approval- russia-leadership-dives-almost.aspx. Rywkin, M. 2014. Ukraine: Between Russia and the West, American Foreign Policy Interests, 36: 119–126, DOI: 10.1080/10803920.2014.908048. Sakhno, J. 2015. Geopolitical orientations of Ukrainian Citizens: constants and changes of the last years (February 2012 – February 2015), Kiev International Institute of Sociology. Accessed May 22, 2015. http://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=507&page=1. Schimmelfennig, F. 2007. European Regional Organizations, Political Conditionality, and Democratic Transformation in Eastern Europe. East European Politics and Societies, 21(1): 126– 41. Schubert, S.R., J. Pollak and E. Brutschin. 2014. Two futures: EU-Russia relations in the context of Ukraine, Eur J Futures Res, 2(52), DOI 10.1007/s40309-014-0052-7. Solonenkop, I. 2011. Added Value? Eastern Partnership and EU–Ukraine Bilateral Relations, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Library, International Politics and Society 3. Tran, P. 2014. Mar 10). Amid Ukraine crisis, EU plays it safe. Defense News, March 10. Accessed June 03. http://search.proquest.com/docview/1509426495?accountid=15533. Walker, S. 2014. Ukraine’s former PM rallies protesters after Yanukovych flees Kiev, The Guardian, February 23. Accessed May 19 2015. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/22/ukraine-president-yanukovych-flees- kiev. Wisniewski, D. 2013. United States Once Again Russia's Worst Enemy, Radio Free Europe, June 19. Accessed 20 May 2015 http://www.rferl.org/content/russia-us-worst- enemy/25021735.html. Wolczuk, K. 2009. Implementation without Coordination: The Impact of EU Conditionality on Ukraine under the European Neighbourhood Policy, Europe-Asia Studies, 61(2): 187-211, DOI: 10.1080/09668130802630839. Yost, D.S. (2015). The Budapest Memorandum and Russia’s intervention in Ukraine. International Affairs, 91: 505–538. doi: 10.1111/1468-2346.12279. Persistent and grave’ human rights violations in eastern Ukraine – UN report. 01.06.2015, United Nations, June 1. Accessed June 3, 2015. http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=51016#.VXZ2pkbaPNl.
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Ukrainian support for EU association agreement declines, Deutsche Welle, October 29, 2013. Accessed May 20, 2015. http://www.dw.de/ukrainian-support-for-eu-association-agreement- declines/a-17189085. Ukraine still prefers joining EU to CU membership, half of nation wants to join NATO – poll, Kyiv Post, November 20, 2014. Accessed June 2, 2015. http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/ukraine-still-prefer-joining-eu-to-cu- membership-half-of-nation-wants-to-join-nato-poll-372517.html. European Union External Service Action, Summary of Treaty, http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/prepareCreateTreatiesWorkspace/treatiesGeneralDa ta.do?step=0&redirect=true&treatyId=217. New Start Treaty, US Department of State, http://www.state.gov/t/avc/newstart/. http://www.pewglobal.org.
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MIGRATION, A CURRENT ISSUE: THE CRISIS OF TODAY, THE CHALLENGE OF TOMORROW
Radu PĂTRAŞCU Intern at NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence Lithuania [email protected]
Abstract The present paper aims to portray a clear perspective of the problem of immigrants, who are arriving in Europe from the Middle East conflict zones (particularly Syria and Iraq) and from North Africa (mainly Libya). The causes that conducted to the development of such a phenomenon represent the motivation for choosing this theme, as well as its effects on the functionality of the EU at an institutional level and finally yet importantly the “trenchant” visions of the European public opinion, amplified by the mass media: the pros and cons of accepting the wave of refugees. The author's approach aims to put in balance both the positive effects of the phenomenon on the European continent, as well as the negative ones. Positive effects might consist in obtaining additional work force, as Europe is currently facing a demographic aging phenomenon. Furthermore, from the perspective of EU citizens, who believe in the cohesion of the European institutions, the acceptance of refugees represents a basic value for unity and further on stands for the formation of a homogenous European Union, therefore emphasising the importance of each individual. On the other hand, analysing the matter in the most realistic possible way, the risk of potential terrorist penetration in Europe is quite high and unmanageable. As a research method, we will use document analysis, referring to media articles and official documents. This phenomenon is particularly complex and the crisis result will depend on the effectiveness of the manner in which each national authority as well as the European ones will handle the issue.
Keywords Acceptance; Humanitarian Crisis; Immigrant; Integration; War
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1. INTRODUCTION
The objective of this paper is to address the refugee crisis which is of great importance to Europe at the present time; this immigration wave is an atypical one, unprecedented from the World War II, therefore it also unfolds in an atypical way, while the way it will end it is still unknown. In this paper, the author explains the reasons that make this new challenge a completely different one, alike the factors that influenced the course of the crisis from its beginning to the present time. In order to achieve such an undertaking, in the theoretical section we will address Eric Stern's theory regarding the definition of crisis and we will demonstrate its applicability to the analysed crisis. Therefore, we will present the specific elements of a crisis, meaning the three components a certain phenomenon needs to have in order to be a crisis, for afterwards to briefly describe the essential characteristics of the conflict zones, the ones that practically caused this mass migration phenomenon. Conclusively, we will analyse the several models of perception at the European level concerning these new challenges as well as the measures taken in this regard. From a methodology standpoint, this paper represents a document analysis, using media outlets as well as governmental institution sources. In order to provide a perspective on the problem, after the presentation of the theoretical part, the author will make a short summary on the key events, which occurred recently, taking into consideration the fact that regional wars are still unfolding. Subsequently, we will analyse the key points of European perception on the refugee issue, which is divided between two opposite poles: the pros and cons for accepting the current immigration wave. At the end of the paper, we will present four scenarios, which, from the point of view of the author, have real chances to materialize in the future, in the short and medium term, as well as in the long term. This part of the paper is purely creative and is based entirely on the personal assessment of the author regarding the future possible evolution of the refugee crisis. Choosing this theme is due to the importance, which, from the author’s point of view, the new immigration wave has upon Europe, in particular in terms of institutional cohesion at the EU level. Being a challenge of such high magnitude, it is essential to understand the succeeding stages and the obstacles faced throughout the crisis, in order to be able to expose as clear as possible the causes of the partial failure, and most especially the repercussions. The importance of fathoming the problem is doubled by the
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powerful example that war can have both on the countries where it unfolds, as well as on the adjoining areas, which are not directly involved in the conflict. Also, considering the negative consequences of war, measured both in terms of human life losses, but especially in terms of migration, in the current case it is extremely important to analyse how the issue of saving thousands of people fleeing from disaster is addressed, as well as the amendment, where possible, of the current legislation. This issue is one of particular relevance for Europe, which seems to have been caught unprepared for advancing an effective reaction to manage the situation. As a result, according to the author, it is necessary to address this problem both at a state level and at the EU level, in a collective manner, in order to maintain the institutional unity based on the founding principles of the European Union. Beyond the intention to highlight the issues, which the author considers essential in building the paper, there are sources that will both confirm and even sometimes rescind the author's opinion. Hence results the complexity of the situation, since there is not just a single approach generally accepted by all the states affected by the immigration wave. The refugee crisis is particularly complex and for this reason, the issue of unidirectional feedback will be avoided. We will try to present objectively the events and to conduct a review, complying with the chosen theoretical framework, in order to elaborate a study material as pertinent as possible on such a difficult problem.
2. THEORETICAL APPROACH. ARGUING WHY IS THE CURRENT MASS MIGRATION PHENOMENON A CRISIS, ACCORDING TO ERIC STERN'S DEFINITION OF THE CRISIS CONCEPT
XXIst century, Europe. Year 2015. Apparently, the events unfolding today in the international environment appear to be new, unprecedented, or at least encountered since the end of World War II, regarding both the refugee exodus towards Europe as well as the use of new warfare methods, hybrid type. However, history has shown us that the evolution process has a certain fluency following a logical flow of events, the principle of action-effect. We can also note here the refugee crisis that appears to be a challenge to the European political leadership, while long-term solutions are yet to be delivered.
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We cannot look at the refugee crisis by just focusing on the borders of the European states and on the perception of collective mentality at local level (or at regional level). An overall view is required, one that would include at least Europe, Russia and the Middle East. The mechanism of the unfolding events works on the principle of communicating vessels, just as in the case of exact sciences. Therefore, related the causes of the immigration wave, beyond some media speculations that the whole process might be intentionally controlled, the main reason lies in the instability of the Middle East and North Africa region. Basically, due to the existing threats to vital existence, the right to survive. Is this refugee exodus towards Europe a crisis in the true sense of the concept? To prove it, we will use the crisis definition provided by Eric Stern, namely that, when there is a sudden change of situation perceived by the decision maker in terms of three aspects: threat to fundamental values, state of emergency and state of uncertainty, we are facing a crisis situation (Stern 1999, 9). We shall go on by demonstrating how Stern's theory is applicable in the context of the flux of refugees migrating towards Europe, transforming this phenomenon into a crisis. According to the statistics provided by FRONTEX (European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union) the number of refugees who entered in 2014 the territory of the European states was somewhere around 282 thousand. However, in 2015, only in the first nine months of the year, the number of immigrants entering Europe rose up to 710 thousand, almost three times more than the previous year (FRONTEX, November 13th, 2015). Basically, to prove the applicability of Erik Stern’s theory on the analysed crisis, the main condition of the author’s definition, as stated above, namely to contain a sudden change of situation, is clear. Therefore, further on in our analysis we will enunciate the three aspects of a crisis, according to the theory above mentioned, namely: The threat to human fundamental values results from two aspects: the first consists in threats to the European institutions functionality, which do not seem prepared to deal with such a high immigrant influx entering the European territory in such a short time. It should be noted that we are referring not only to the administrative institutions, but to the overall assembly of institutions: the state and certain political and religious formations that may react in a xenophobic manner. Besides the institutions
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mentioned above, we refer to the average citizens as well, who may also be affected by this crisis (through discrimination - against Muslim families that are already at the second or third generation in the host country, or - by inoculating the sense of "invasion", a feeling induced by certain extremist political factions which take advantage of the refugee crisis in order to grow in popularity). Thus, if these political parties manage to come into power, the Schengen area will be at risk as well as the freedom of movement within the EU, regardless of being Schengen member states or not. As a result, the fundamental value of the European citizens, consisting in the free movement of goods, people and capital across the EU, is threatened. If we are to refer to the death threats against the citizens from the states affected by war, the second aspect consists in a factor that leads to emigration as a matter of urgency, or else the citizens risk losing their lives. The state of emergency, from the EU’s point of view, exists as the authorities act harder to manage effectively the integration of the refugees. The possibility of integrating the continuous flow of immigrants arriving in Europe in search of asylum decreases, while the feeling of xenophobia among the locals against immigrants increases, especially after the bloody attacks in Paris on November 13th, 2015. Furthermore, there is a clear need to take action as soon as possible since we are in full cold season and the number of refugees accommodated in inhumane conditions (some are living outdoors or with no medication available) is considerable, while the risk of frost or other diseases is very high (Topping, October 2nd, 2015). The state of uncertainty comes from the fact that at present time it is still unknown how this phenomenon will end and even more when it will end, since the Middle East and North Africa region (Libya) is continuously at war, an element that will cause a continuous emigration of residents from the respective areas. Practically we have demonstrated how the inflow of the phenomenon of immigrants arriving daily in Europe follows the defining elements of a crisis, according to the theory of Eric Stern, hence the fact that we can refer, in the true sense of the word, to this phenomenon as to a crisis. However, in the following sections, we will present a "radiography" of the causes that led to the creation of this particular crisis, focusing on its impact on Europe.
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3. THE CAUSES OF MIGRATION. CONTEXTUALIZING THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
Middle East has experienced a security paradigm of violence and warfare for entire generations, and the causes are too many and too difficult to be able to analyse them in a few pages. The same paradigm of violence is present in the North Africa region as well, as there are, for example, numerous similarities between Libya and Iraq. The first similarity is that both countries are rich in oil. Although we are talking about countries that are rich in oil, their population is living only on the minimum wage, while the civil society hardly exists. Despite the fact that the population is poor, the political leaders of these states lived in luxury and wealth, while under their dictatorial regimes, the population was oppressed. Moreover, once with the removing of the dictators, both states have been seized by chaos and terrorism outbreaks. Further on, it is not difficult to imagine that in such circumstances the local residents would try to emigrate, not necessarily for economic reasons, but rather to save their lives and to avoid death during the daily battles. However, in crisis situations speculators appear and identify easily new means for profit. We refer here to the traffickers from the respective areas, who claim exorbitant amounts of money, reported to the local purchasing power, in order to "guide" the local residents towards Europe, following routes that are not that secure1 (Le Temps, May 12th, 2015). We consider necessary to present a radiography of the main conflict areas in order to understand, in political and geopolitical terms, the complexity of the situation (we will make less reference to the cultural and psycho- sociological characteristics of the respective areas, since such an approach requires a separate work).
2.1. Iraq
Dictatorial state until 2003 under the leadership of Saddam Hussein, Iraq was considered a regional centre of power, in several cases provoking
1 See the case of the Syrian child who drowned in the Mediterranean and was brought by the waves to the shores of Turkey, link: http://stirileprotv.ro/stiri/criza-imigrantilor/imaginea-care- a-zguduit-europa-un-baiat-sirian-de-3-ani-inecat-este-adus-de-valuri-la-tarmul-meditaranei-in- turcia.html accessed on 14.11.2015.
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regional conflicts that led even to the formation of international coalitions (the first Gulf War) or to the usage of chemical weapons (during the war against Iran, in the Persian Gulf, in the ’80s). Once with the removal of Saddam Hussein from power, in 2003, the international environment wanted to establish a functioning, democratic Iraq. However, the bloody local history, stemming mainly from the religious conflicts between the Shia and the Sunni, facilitated instead the appearance of an instability outbreak in which various terrorist groups like Al Qaeda or more recently, the Islamic State, have encountered an environment favourable for their development. Currently, the terrorist organization Islamic State controls an important area of the northern Iraq and the critical battles were fought in 2015, for gaining control on Mosul, the third largest city in the state. Regional instability has led to the weakening of almost all Iraq’s national army, favouring instead the consolidation of Shiite militias, in order to counter the expansion of the Islamic State. Among the most significant Iraqi Shiite militias, we can mention The Badr Organization, Saraya al-Salam, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, Saraya Taleaa al-Khorasani and Kata’ib Imam Ali (Gulmohamad, April 17th, 2015). From a geostrategic point of view, the situation becomes even more complicated, as there are other forces interested in expanding their state control in the area. For example, the militias mentioned earlier are subordinated to the Hashd al-Sha’abi movement, entity that is under the coordination of Iran (Gulmohamad, April 17th, 2015). Even more, an important ally of Iran is the Russian Federation, which, since September 2015, has launched a military offensive against the Islamic State in Syria. The hazards of the Russian military involvement in the Middle East are numerous and perhaps the most important is the risk of "accidental" collision on the field, between the Western forces and the Russian ones. Once again, the issue is complex and requires a separate approach. Returning to Iraq, the Baghdad leadership may follow the Syrian model and the government in Baghdad may demand for military aid from the Russian Federation. The consequences would be detrimental not only to the region itself but to the entire Euro-Atlantic structure, since a more active involvement of Russia in the Middle East would strengthen its influence in the region and weaken the one of all Western states that have regional interests. Moreover, the dilution of Western presence in the Middle East would increase the state of chaos, as it has happened following the American withdrawal from Iraq or the one of the international coalition from Libya, since 2011. The fact
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that Russia would become involved military will not ensure, from any point of view, the maintenance of order in Syria and Iraq. Moreover, if we are to draw a parallel with the current Ukrainian situation or with other interventions from the past (as the one in Afghanistan in the '80s), we can argue that Moscow's involvement beyond its borders, in whatever form (military intervention or through hybrid war), can produce only chaos. Such a situation would require a more active involvement of the United States (being the first military power in the world, with the greatest capacity to intervene) in order to prevent the conflict evolution, otherwise the risk of increasing tensions in the area would be very high. The state is grinded by conflicts and the course of events does not seem to follow a positive trend of evolution, which is why we are justified to believe that Iraq will henceforth generate waves of refugees for a long period. Being in the middle of a precarious security situation, living in a country that finds itself in a permanent state of war, people from these areas are now trying to flee danger and establish themselves in safe areas, in terms of military and economic aspects, such as the Western European states.
2.2. Syria
In Syria, the situation is even more complicated, since, on one hand, the political government in Damascus lost its legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens, and on the other, in front of the West. Instead, it enjoys considerable support from Moscow, including through direct military intervention (Russian intervention in western Syria). Similar to the other totalitarian states in the region, Syria has been led by Bashar al-Assad (who currently has limited control) until the outbreak of a bloody civil war, which caused more than 100 thousand deaths in the last four years (according to the portal I am Syria, November 2015). The dramatic characteristic of the situation is difficult to describe in a few lines, but in order to help us form an incipient image of the area, we must, for example, understand who are the actors operating in Syria. Therefore, we have the rebels fighting against Bashar al-Assad and at the same time against the Islamic State, the forces which are loyal to Bashar al-Assad, the Islamic State, the Western forces which support logistically and with air strikes the rebels fighting against the Islamic State and more recently, the Russian Federation, which fights against any threats posed to dictator Bashar al-Assad. These threats are coming not only from the Islamic State but also from the rebel groups supported by the West, which are fighting against the Syrian
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leader. This fact can be easily understood from the Russians bombing actions on the Syrian city of Homs, as the city is not controlled by the forces of the Islamic State but by the groups fighting against Bashar al-Assad (Gulmohamad, April 17th, 2015). The Kurds, the spearhead in the fight against the Islamic State, could try to benefit from the conflicting policies between the United States, Russia and Turkey. While the United States aim at defeating the Islamic State, Russia tries primarily to defend its interests by protecting Syria's President, Bashar al- Assad. Turkey, however, seeks mainly to prevent the spreading of the Kurds and supports the rebel groups in the fight against al-Assad. Meanwhile, the main objective of the Kurdish militants is to create a Kurdish region starting from Derik to Efrin along the Turkish-Syrian border and to unite the three Kurdish administrations in the provinces of Koban, Efrin and Hasakah.1 Thus, we can deduce that the war in Syria will not be resolved in a short or medium term, so that the Syrians will continue to be part of the migration flows coming towards Europe and even more in an increasing number.
2.3. Libya
Muslim country located in North Africa, Libya differs from other North African states, in that the Arab Spring manifested here reflects a much more violent manner, while the overthrow of dictator Muammar Gaddafi was achieved through a forceful intervention of a Western coalition headed by France, Britain and the United States. Since many paramilitary groups struggled to monopolize power after Gaddafi's overthrow, in 2011, the country was seized by chaos. Currently, the legitimate government is exiled in the Eastern part of the country (the Parliament in Tobruk, the Government in Beyda), while the capital, Tripoli, is occupied by an illegitimate regime. Taking advantage of the regional instability, the Islamic State established terrorist factions inside Libya in an attempt to create a corridor from the Middle East to central Africa, if it is to correlate the influence of the network including on the
1 For a thorough understanding of the complexity of the reagional situation, the following videos are of great help: https://www.facebook.com/ezraklein/videos/10153793162638410/ and https://www.facebook.com/ezraklein/videos/10153737513773410/?pnref=story
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Boko Haram terrorist group, which has vowed loyalty to the Abu Bakr al- Baghdadi caliph (Akbar, July 13th, 2015). On the 2nd of November, the illegitimate regime in Tripoli threatened to send hundreds of thousands of migrants in Europe, in case the international community will not recognize its legitimacy. Jamal Zubia, spokesperson of the General National Congress, threatened, at the same time, indirectly the European Union with measures that would reverse the policies adopted by the Libyan state in order to stop the immigration wave heading towards the European continent, which include repatriation programs and the existence of detention facilities. "We protect the gates of Europe, but Europe does not recognize us and does not want to. So why should we stop the migrants here?", this being the statement of Jamal Zubia in an interview for The Telegraph newspaper, in which he dropped hints that such intentions still exist, while for the European Union, such an approach to the migrants’ crisis issue is a cause for concern (Freeman, November 2nd, 2015). Resorting to such an approach also indicates that the illegitimate regime is not an actor willing to abide to the international norms. On the contrary, forcing the hand of the European Union in a situation in which it manages with major difficulty the large number of migrants already finding themselves in Europe, while the number of those who are yet to reach the European continent is a cause for concern, indicates the not so good intentions of this regime concerning the solving of the migrants’ crisis. Regarding the manner in which such an action would take place (hundreds of thousands of people cross the Mediterranean using boats), it evidently indicates a low concern of the illegal regime for the fate of the migrants who could die drowned, and the possibility of transforming the situation into a weapon, used by the regime from Tripoli against the EU in their attempt to obtain international recognition, by forcing the hand of Brussels. As evidenced by the current situation in the country, following the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi from power, Libya became immediately one of the leading exporters of insecurity in the region, having direct effects on the EU's Southern border. Moreover, the immigration wave from Asia, the Middle East and Africa from the recent months, which has overwhelmed the EU member countries, mostly use Libya as starting point towards Europe (Freeman, November 2nd, 2015). Migration is not a new problem for the European continent but the scale of the phenomenon affecting Europe and the EU at present time is unprecedented. This is because the contemporary crises and conflicts
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occurring in certain parts of Africa, Asia and the Middle East have generated massive waves of migration. Even more, Libya, since 2011 until now, has gone through a troublesome stage in its evolution and quickly turned into a migration hub, a junction linking North Africa to southern Europe, the smuggling networks creating a bridge across the Mediterranean which ensure access for Africans, Asians and all immigrants from the Middle East to the European continent. In order not to face the today’s huge wave of immigration, the EU member states should have become significantly more actively involved during the previous years in the fight against terrorism in the MENA space (Middle East and North Africa) and should have fought networks such as Al Qaeda and its subsidiaries, the ones that became detached from it (Jabhat Al- Nusra and even the Islamic State). Furthermore, the strategic analyses should have been made in time, since the growing instability in the MENA space led to the increasing gap between these spaces and the European Union. Thus, specialists from the European countries should have anticipated that the precarious security situation from the conflict zones was to generate immigrants, who would try in an increasing number to benefit from the European Union’s "open door" policies in order to penetrate easily on its territory by requesting asylum. If the European Union would have addressed earlier the current situation, the European institutions would not be now pressured for taking such quick decisions. The whole matter is focused on the concept of time. Perhaps the European involvement in settling the regional conflicts would not have had an overwhelming success, but the timely preparation of strategies, in order to cope with a situation of massive migration, would not have put so much pressure on the European countries, facing a situation in which they must quickly manage the problem.
4. EUROPE'S REACTION TO THE IMMIGRATION WAVE
The most used routes in order to enter Europe via the Mediterranean are through Italy, Greece, Spain, or via Turkey. The growing number of refugees arriving from the conflict areas raises concerns at the European Commission level, while new studies and analyses that would prepare the European institutions in managing the new crisis are necessary. Thus, going through the official documents issued by the European Commission, we can deduce an all too technical approach of the institution, lacking a long-term
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vision, a strategic approach towards the phenomenon, which would involve a series of predictions on how the integration of the refugees in the European societies could be achieved (European Commission, October 14th, 2015). According to the Commission's assessment, the arrival of 3 million people in Europe would mark a 0.4% growth of the European continent’s population and about half of those entrants will qualify for obtaining the refugee status (European Commission, October 14th, 2015). Thus, integrating such a large number of people would increase the costs of the EU budget, but as we stated earlier, there are also opinions saying that the refugees could bring advantages to the European economy, acting as growth incentives. "It will represent an impact on growth, a weak but positive impact for the EU as a whole, which will determine the increase of the GDP with 0.2 to 0.3 percent by 2017", according to the European Commission (BBC News, November 5th, 2015). However, beyond the pure "technical" impact, we must look at the problem, dealing with an impressive number of immigrants arriving, from different angles, as they have a very different culture with strong traditional and religious tendencies. When we speak about European institutional capacity to receive refugees, beyond the economic issues, we must refer also to the cultural aspects. In this respect, according to the latest Eurobarometer opinion poll commissioned by the European Parliament in September 2015, at the European level there are strong opinions regarding the refugee wave. Everyone accepts that we are dealing with a crisis, but the views are totally opposite when it comes to the ultimate challenge: do we have the capacity to integrate them within our societies or will we close the borders, meaning that we will close the principles of the European Union as well? (European Parliament News, October 16th, 2015). For example, in Croatia, according to the results of the opinion polls conducted before the parliamentary elections from November 2015, the situation proved to be one close fight between the centre-left wing, the social- democratic tendencies and the conservative opposition. The latter militates in favour of strengthening the border control, as the rules for crossing the country are very strict (Al Jazeera, November 8th, 2015). The programmes promoted by the candidates including on how they will manage the large numbers of refugees that cross Croatia to reach Western Europe help candidates to rise in polls. It depends only on the choice of the electorate, whose members are subjects to the propaganda messages promoted by each political entity (Al Jazeera, November 8th, 2015).
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Germany, by contrast, has adopted from the beginning policies that encourage the arrival of immigrants, arguing that they have to create inclusively the opportunity for going to school for the refugee children. An association of teachers "states the need for an additional 25 thousand teachers. Some schools simply accommodate refugees, and most of them, however, do not speak German. It is therefore necessary to create elementary schools for children", says Ludger Wössmann, member of the IFO Institute, a research think - tank for social and human sciences (The Economist, October 24th, 2015). The basic idea of such an approach regarding the integration of all immigrant children into the same class, regardless of age, can be interpreted as an attempt to avoid later discrimination in society. The argument is that despite the age difference among children, in terms of education level and language knowledge, all have the same characteristics, being necessary to allocate attention and focus equal efforts on each. Most economic analysts from Commerzbank or from central administrations believe that the economic effects of the refugee crisis are positive. Additional costs provided by Germany for hosting and feeding the refugees, estimated at 4 billion euros for this year and 10 billion euros for the coming years, are incentive programmes that should facilitate the integration of immigrants within the German society (The Economist, October 24th, 2015). The analysts from Commerzbank, the second largest bank in Germany, consider that this will be a growth in the German economy from 1.7% to 1.9% in 2016. Local, state and federal German administrations will continue to have a budget surplus of 23 billion euros this year and 13 billion in 2016, according to different estimations made by four leading German think – tanks (The Economist, October 24th, 2015). These positive effects could arise from the fact that it creates additional work force, which would increase the efficiency of German institutions, in the case that a proper integration of immigrants in the labour market would indeed succeed. However, it is harder to measure whether the cultural differences between the immigrants and the native population will be manageable on the long-term. After the attacks episode in Paris, on November 13th, 2015, there is a high probability across Europe that the feeling of intolerance against Islamists will grow. In this respect, for example, in the neighbouring country, namely Poland, "Solidarity within the European Union is a key feature, but the European countries should not bear the burden of their EU allies for which they make themselves responsible", these being the words of the Prime Minister Beata Szydlo, in a statement to the Parliament (The Jerusalem Post
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apud Reuteurs, November 18th, 2015). Thus, the Polish Prime Minister draws attention to the actual definition, or redefinition of the term "solidarity". The head of the Warsaw Government pronounced itself in this way against the import of problems created by others. Polish Prime Minister benefits of support from a high percentage of the electorate in her attitude towards the receiving of Islamic immigrants. According to a study conducted in 2013 by the Centre for the Research of Preconceptions – a professional academic centre under the aegis of Warsaw University – revealed that over 69% of Poles do not want the ones who belong to other cultures, diametrically opposed to the indigenous, to settle in their country (Leszczyński, July 2nd, 2015). Thus, we can deduct quite easily that Poland will align its immigration policies to the similar ones of Slovakia, the Czech Republic or even Hungary, if at the society level the current trend will be maintained. Returning to Germany, although the first European power is also the main driver concerning the refugees’ accommodation (along with Sweden), the issues concerning their integration were immediate. One of the main reasons consists of the difficult integration into the educational system and the labour market for the unskilled refugees. The World Bank estimates that the illiteracy rate among those aged between 14 and 24 years old as follows - 4% for the Syrians, 18% for Iraqis and 53% for Afghans (The Economist, October 24th, 2015). In addition, the minimum income offered by the government for each individual, about 8.5 euros per day, is not of great help. Asylum seekers, who do not secure a job, end in the situation of being unemployed, which is not productive at all for the German economy. In this respect, the argument belonging to the expert Ludger Wössmann, member of the IFO Institute, regarding the creation of special classes for educating young immigrants regardless of age, is applicable. However, pros and cons of adopting such measures will always exist. Thus, according to the figures provided by the Agency for Employment in Berlin, it is easy to notice that the percentage of asylum seekers who have managed to get a job increased by 8% every year around July, but on the other hand the percentage of those unemployed increased by 23% (The Economist, October 24th, 2015). The number of unemployed is much higher among Syrian asylum seekers (The Economist, October 24th, 2015).
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The chart below illustrates the number of applicants for asylum in Germany, scattered by country of origin. We observe that the number of those coming from Syria after the war is much higher than the rest1.
At the European level, the opinion differences problem on the refugee crisis, having on one hand countries like Germany and Sweden and on the other the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary, comes from the specific policies adopted by the governing parties in each of these countries. For example, in Poland, Law and Justice Party came to power in November 2015 and Beata Szydlo is today’s Prime Minister. Following a series of measures and dismissals taken at the state institutional level, the direction promoted by the new government is marked by Euroscepticism, while it advocates for strengthening relations with the United States. The Euroscepticism position is due also to the different approach to the refugee crisis, after the terrorist attacks in Paris Poland pronouncing itself against accepting the immigrants’
1 Apud BBC News, September 29th, 2015, link: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe- 34392080 accessed on 18.11.2015.
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quota determined in Brussels (Deutsche Welle, November 14th, 2015). And this precise element puts Poland in an antagonistic position regarding Germany. Hungary is in a similar position, stating that the differences in opinion between the conservative party led by Viktor Orban, FIDESZ, and the European Union are even much more pronounced than in the case of Poland. The causes of these differences are multiple, one of them being the forthcoming relations between Hungary and Russia, due to the expansion (2014-2023) of Paks nuclear power plant, while there are different approaches as well regarding the refugee crisis and the immigrants acceptance rates. From the very beginning, Hungary placed itself in opposition, when it was determined at the EU level for each country to receive a refugee quota depending on its economic and administrative possibilities (Salzmann, September 26th, 2015). In addition, all these opposite directions among the Central European states and Brussels can cause more stringent border controls, halting free movement in the Schengen area and the European Union in total and can eventually lead to the dismantling of the EU. Regarding Romania, accepting mandatory quota allocated by the Union triggered controversial debates in the domestic press, in some cases reticence on the receiving being obvious. Opinions are divided between those who support the receiving of refugees, on the one hand, and in opposition those who aver that there would be only risks in this regard and no benefits, thus ruling against (Isaila, September 11th, 2015). However, from a political point of view, it seems that Romanian decision makers have a permissive attitude towards receiving refugees, militating in favour of separating the terrorist issue from the issue of the immigrants who are fleeing the war. "The tragedy of Paris should be taken as such. It is a terrorist attack against France amid a huge wave of refugees who are looking for safety in Europe, for themselves and for their families. (...) We are not allowed to let the social fabric of our countries be destroyed, we must not let xenophobia, ultra-nationalism, chauvinism to become relevant in our society", declared President Iohannis, being asked whether Brussels should change its approach after the attacks in France, in terms of mandatory quotas of refugees (HotNews.ro, November 18th, 2015).
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5. POSSIBLE EVOLUTIONAL SCENARIOS
At the European level, opinions about the management of the crisis caused by the massive flow of immigrants are clearly split, as well as the policies adopted by each state. For this reason, the situation is extremely complex, as there are countless possibilities for future evolutions. Of these, we chose four scenarios, which we will further discuss.
5.1. Best case scenario. Effective integration in the European societies
Complicated situation for the present time, the crisis is caused by a large number of refugees who are fleeing war and seeking shelter in the developed countries of Europe. However, Europe will prove, if not on the short-term (6 months – 1 year – 3 years), then on the medium term (3 – 5 years) and on the long term (10 – 15 years), a high absorption capacity and labour market integration for the newcomers. This would be gradually accomplished through special education policies and programmes. In turn, a high percentage of immigrants will prove a powerful ability to adapt, many of which being already specialized in various fields of activity. Thus, they will make their contribution in the economy of the European countries, according to the predictions of some economic analysts, such as Pierre Moscovici, EU Economic Commissioner, and other representatives of the European Commission (BBC News, November 5th, 2015). Initially this fact will happen in the more developed states of Europe such as Germany, Sweden or France, being the first who showed a higher degree of tolerance, but over time the effect will spread and the other member states of the European Union will be encouraged by the success in integrating the immigrants and will widely open their doors in order to receive them. Conflicts in the Middle East and Africa, particularly in North Africa (mainly Libya) are unlikely to diminish in intensity, even in this best case scenario event, which will continue to generate waves of refugees. However, as we mentioned, Europe will prove the capacity of absorbing the immigration wave and the principle underlying the formation of the European Union will maintain itself and will even strengthen the continental alliance, which in future decades will turn into the United States of Europe.
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5.2. Worst case scenario. The dissolution of the European Union and the spread of extremism
Europe, if we can still talk about unity within it, was caught unprepared in the refugee crisis context, the administrative institutions of the EU proved their inefficiency through inadequate policies or even through their absence in facing the external challenges. On short-term (several months – 1 year or up to 3 years) member states will have to act individually as they will perceive the wave of immigrants as a threat against their national security, not necessarily for reasons related to terrorism, but taking into consideration economic reasons. Basically, the local citizens will reject the idea of allocating funds for integrating foreigners who are often perceived as inferior, different and uneducated (Leszczyński, July 2nd, 2015). Therefore, danger lies in two things: first, the spreading of terrorism hot spots throughout Europe. The weak controls at the southern European border will facilitate the infiltration of terrorist members of the Islamic State or of other extremist networks. Therefore, the terrorist attacks will increase, giving the risk that the recent episode, which occurred in Paris in November 2015, to repeat countless times, while as a result the reaction against Muslim communities will become tougher. Secondly, because of the murderous attacks, that will keep on having victims in an even higher number in Europe, the political parties belonging to the far right wing will grow in popularity, following that on the medium term (5 years) to take power in most countries of the old continent. Therefore, the idea of unity within the EU will be forgotten, while extremism and chauvinism will take roots much easily within the states not following a collective and common policy, the central point being Brussels. From this point until the repetition of the Holocaust events will not take long, since these states will be under the leadership of far-right parties. If such a scenario will happen, it will prove that history has taught us nothing and that the world does not progress over time, but rather it may even show regressive tendencies, heading rapidly towards self-destruction.
5.3. Most probable scenario. The crisis will continue, there will be few solutions
It has been proved that we are facing a crisis in the true sense of the concept. More than that, it is quite clear that the situation is difficult to manage, primarily because of the lack of unity inside the EU. Member states
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cannot be forced from outside to take political directions, only their own citizens can influence this process. Nevertheless, the population is subjected to the media propaganda, while the political actors use mass-media to promote their "ideologies". Practically, there is no ideal type of approach, which will guarantee that following a certain set of rules would minimize the costs and produce incomparable greater benefits. We live in a world dominated by realism and wars will continue to unfold in conflict areas, which will automatically continue to produce mass migrations. Consequently, the European states will face continuous waves of refugees, many of them reaching a certain point when they will be bound to close down the borders because of their inability to handle the situation. Even Germany, the promoter of accepting refugees, began to have difficulties in managing the asylum applications, which in the near future will not generate positive results, if the current migration flows continue as such (The Economist, October 24th, 2015). Despite the fact that it is difficult to precisely predict what will happen in Europe within the next 15 years and given that the policies regarding the refugee crisis are changing from day to day, the most probable scenario consists in numerous attempts adopted by the European states to handle the high number of refugees, while the difficulties regarding their integration will increase. Furthermore, divergences between the European states regarding the management of this crisis will continue to exist, some countries being for accepting immigrants while others, as noted above, adopt a counter position. In this case, a common approach to the issue of tackling the crisis in a unitary direction will be impossible to achieve. Only time will show whether we will evolve in a favourable direction, towards unity and cohesion, or if things will rotate 180 degrees.
5.4. Less probable scenario. The idealist world and the ending of wars
From this moment on, if there will be an increasingly active involvement of the West in the conflict areas to eradicate terrorism, process that will indeed require time, within a few years, the Western world, led by the United States (the country with the highest military capacity for military interventions for the campaigns carried out in the Middle East and North Africa), will be able to manage the conflicts unfolding in the Middle East, North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa. Russia will give up on its own initiative regarding the involvement in the Syrian conflict, as Kremlin will realize that unsustainable costs are necessary in order to back up these campaigns. Bashar
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al-Assad will be ousted and instead a democratic scheme will be established, while in 15-20 years a certain degree of political maturity will be achieved, producing a level of internal stability even adequate to attract foreign investors. The situation will be similar in Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Eritrea and other countries from the third world. With such an evolution, the development of the respective states will be gradually felt. As a result, by next generations, we will no longer talk about refugees coming into Europe, but about business travellers or tourists from the former conflict zones. This scenario is unlikely to occur and the chances are minimal. The wars in the Middle East and Africa even have a tendency to increase. In this respect, the bodies of the United Nations will have to become more active since, although we, as inhabitants of Europe, live decently and the hazard of death is not acute, somewhere just two thousand kilometres away, people leave their houses in the morning fearing that at the end of day they may not be alive. The four scenarios mentioned above are just a few directions in which things can evolve, but the author admits that there are an infinite number of possibilities and even immixtures between these scenarios.
6. CONCLUSIONS
The first, essential and most profound act of thinking that a political decision-maker and his advisers must make is the one related to the nature of the crisis they are facing; not to confuse it, nor try to change it into something that it is against its nature. From the author’s point of view, the refugee crisis is one in which, due to many complex reasons and in a context which is difficult and rich in events of major impact, the reason of humanity and also the vision on reality and pragmatism have been lost. In the present paper, I tried to analyse the main directions of the humanitarian crisis generated by war, both in the decision-making process, but also as a way of implementation, aiming also to identify the causes of a possible failure. It is necessary to note that by failure, the author does not mean the failure of the European states existing in their national form, but he refers to the failure of the Union's cohesion on the one hand, and on the other, the author refers to the inability of reaction in the event of a humanitarian crisis. A first conclusion was that, in terms of accepting refugees who are trying to save their lives, the decision was legitimate, lawful, fair and legal.
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However, in this regard a problem is the answer to the following question: Which are the chances that among these refugees, economic migrants or even terrorists could be infiltrated? The answer, most likely, does not exist. If there were a way to know with certainty what will be the finality of the crisis when adopting any type of strategy, the decision to apply or not a specific strategy would have been greatly simplified. Even when there are sufficient and legitimate reasons to engage in a process of this magnitude, which involves significant resources, both human and financial, it will not be an easy choice, since costs can be so great that, in the end, to say regretfully it was a failure. Among the consequences that can occur, taking into account the unforeseen course that the situation can take at some point or another, there are the unknowns which represent the biggest obstacle in taking such decisions. Secondly, regarding the final section of the analysis part, an attempt was made in order to provide a possible answer to another question: can such a humanitarian crisis, unfolding at the present time across all Europe, be efficiently managed? If yes, what would be the most appropriate manner? And which would be the results in the short, medium and long term? Once again, although it is difficult to find the best answer to this question, the author considers that the West involvement in a unified and collective formula in order to resolve the conflicts directly at source, in their home countries, is beneficial, as well as necessary. The statistical data presented in the paper revealed the complexity of the current mass migration phenomenon and the lack of cohesion the EU is facing at the present time, in front of an external challenge that might soon become a domestic one. In the author's opinion, this is the most relevant issue and here stands the failure of a common and more effective management of the refugee crisis strategy. Regarding the social integration component, in the author's opinion, the difficulties which have been encountered have two causes. Firstly, until now, the failure of the efforts meant to integrate the immigrants within the labour market and the educational system through the phenomenon called acculturation, is due to trying to transform the immigrants world into a totally different one. This desire is best reflected in the antithesis between liberalism, which characterizes the autochthonous population, and the religious and traditionalist nature of immigrants. The integration plans will probably have to be adapted to the reality of this category of immigrants, in a manner that would not emphasize the inter-ethnic and inter-religious tensions already existing. Secondly, the reconstruction of a state that is still at war is an utopian thinking in the author’s point of view (Syria, Iraq, Libya), which is why the
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West should engage more actively to stop regional conflicts. Finally, reconstruction must be carried out by local governments, with the support, by all means, of the Occident. To ensure that the measures shall be applied, the existence of a framework to enable such an ambition is necessary, while the states that are in a permanent armed conflict do not fit in the pattern. Thirdly, reconstruction must be, above all, a desire and a target belonging to the local administrations of the countries from the third world, and not to the West. The Occident must stop the conflicts and provide support for these states, for them to be able to develop in the future. However, the task of adequate reconstruction must firstly be attributed to the local power structures. From this point of view, though in the vast majority of the duration of war and on a declarative level support and adhesion to implement democracy were offered, facts have proven that such a concept is difficult to implement, and the more it stretches in time, the more it will lead to the development of new crises, such as the refugee crisis. In the process of analysing these challenges, brought by the immigrant crisis, the author has encountered also limits, the most important of them being the adaptation to a particularly high volume of information that a situation of this magnitude generates. Due to the desire to synthesise, but at the same time to include the key points, it is the reason why certain important parts of the phenomenon have been neglected. Nevertheless, presenting all the relevant aspects and the dimensions generated by the regional wars, as well as the multitude of effects which they had on Europe, would have been an unrealistic target. Taking into account the information presented in the paper, this work represents, in the author's opinion, an attempt to simplify the process of understanding the refugee crisis, taking into consideration the reasons for which it is difficult to be managed, as well as the challenges that will continue to exist.
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Al Jazeera, November 8th, 2015. Croatia votes amid refugee crisis and economic woes, available at http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/11/croatia-votes-refugee-crisis-economic-woes- 151108060153406.html accessed on 18.11.2015; BBC News, September 29th, 2015. Migrant crisis: Germany tightens Balkan asylum laws, available at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34392080 accessed on 18.11.2015; BBC News, November 5th, 2015. Migrant crisis: Three million expected to reach EU by 2017, available at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34732415 accessed on 18.11.2015; Deutsche Welle, November 14th, 2015. Poland to stop accepting refugees after Paris attacks, available at http://www.dw.com/en/poland-to-stop-accepting-refugees-after-paris- attacks/a-18850522 accessed on 10.12.2015; European Commission, October 14th, 2015. Refugee Crisis: European Commission reports on progress in implementation of priority actions, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press- release_IP-15-5839_en.htm accessed on 15.11.2015; European Parliament News, October 16th, 2015. Survey: Two out of every three Europeans want migrant crisis tackled at EU level, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news- room/content/20151015STO97982/html/Survey-Two-out-of-every-three-Europeans-want- migrant-crisis-tackled-at-EU-level accessed on 09.12.2015; Freeman, C., November 2nd, 2015, Libya warns it could flood Europe with migrants if EU does not recognise new self-declared government, published in The Telegraph, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/11970313/Liby a-warns-it-could-flood-Europe-with-migrants-if-EU-does-not-recognise-new-Islamist- government.html accessed on 15.11.2015; FRONTEX, October 13th, 2015. 710 000 MIGRANTS ENTERED EU IN FIRST NINE MONTHS OF 2015, available at http://frontex.europa.eu/news/710-000-migrants-entered-eu-in-first- nine-months-of-2015-NUiBkk accessed on 14.11.2015; Gulmohamad, Z.K., April 17th, 2015. A Short Profile of Iraq’s Shi’a Militias, published in The Jamestown Foundation, available at http://www.jamestown.org/regions/middleeast/single/?tx_ttnews%5Bpointer%5D=2&tx_tt news%5Btt_news%5D=43805&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=675&cHash=cd366486dbdfef1648ec 1f795d907e7f#.VkewINLhDIU accessed on 15.11.2015; Hotnews.ro, November 18th, 2015. Iohannis respinge ideea unei schimbari a abordarii Romaniei fata de refugiati dupa atacurile teroriste din Franta, available at http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri- esential-20603288-iohannis-respinge-ideea-unei-schimbari-abordarii-romaniei-fata-refugiati- dupa-atacurile-teroriste-din-franta.htm accessed on 19.11.2015; I am Syria, November 2015. Current Total Death Count in Syria: 250,000+ Children: 30,000, available at http://www.iamsyria.org/daily-death-toll.html accessed on 15.11.2015. Isaila, E., September 11th, 2015. Problema imigrantilor: Viitorii romani sau o alta fabrica de teroristi?, published in Ziare.com, available at http://www.ziare.com/invazie- imigranti/romania/problema-imigrantilor-viitorii-romani-sau-o-alta-fabrica-de-teroristi- 1381870 accessed on 19.11.2015. Leszczyński, A., July 2nd, 2015. 'Poles don't want immigrants. They don't understand them, don't like them', published in The Guardian, available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/02/poles-dont-want-immigrants-they-dont- understand-them-dont-like-them accessed on 18.11.2015.
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Le Temps, May 12th, 2015. Trafiquants de migrants, l’insaisissable nébuleuse, available at http://www.letemps.ch/monde/2015/05/12/trafiquants-migrants-insaisissable-nebuleuse accessed on 14.11.2015. Salzmann, M., September 26th, 2015. Hungary deploys army against refugees, published in World Socialist Website, available at https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2015/09/26/hung- s26.html accessed on 10.12.2015. Stern, E., 1999. Crisis Decisionmaking: A Cognitive Institutional Approach, Dept. of Political Science, University of Stockholm. The Economist, October 24th, 2015. The migrant crisis. German flexibility, available at http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21676781-no-one-was-sure-germany-could- handle-its-migrant-crisis-it-turns-out-it-can-german-flexibility accessed on 18.11.2015. The Jerusalem Post apud Reuters, November 18th, 2015. Polish PM says refugee crisis can't be 'exported' within EU, available at http://www.jpost.com/Breaking-News/Polish-PM-says- refugee-crisis-cant-be-exported-within-EU-434498 accessed on 18.11.2015. Topping, A., October 2nd, 2015. Calais refugee camp conditions diabolical, says report, published in The Guardian, available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/02/calais-refugee-camp-conditions- diabolical-report-jungle-bacteria-hygiene accessed on 14.11.2015. Van Wilgenburg, W., October 30th, 2015. The Kurdish Predicament in Syria: Balancing Russia, Turkey and the United States, published in The Jamestown Foundation, available at http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Bswords%5D=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576 261ae3e&tx_ttnews%5Bany_of_the_words%5D=syria&tx_ttnews%5Bpointer%5D=1&tx_ttnew s%5Btt_news%5D=44539&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=8486bd23c8514e4651c718b62 5557469#.Vkh_j9LhDIU accessed on 15.11.2015.
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CLAUSEWITZ VERSUS WOLFOWITZ. IRRECONCILABLE PARADIGMS
Fernando PONZ CANTÓ PhD Candidate, Instituto Universitario Gutiérrez Mellado. European Union official. Madrid/Brussels [email protected]
Abstract Carl Clausewitz's main book, "On War", suffered from its inception continued misinterpretations and distortions, compounded by the frequent opacity of the text itself. One of the most damaging such misinterpretations has probably been the one suggested by Paul Wolfowitz in the framework of the so-called "Wolfowitz Doctrine". The primary objective of the present note is to demystify the situation and to correct the main points of incoherence, in order to contribute to a more accurate interpretation of Clausewitz's thinking. We identify first the main characteristics of "On War" including its implicit moral dimension, and subsequently examine the main areas of incoherence in Wolfowitz's interpretation, among which the excessively ambitious definition of "minimum objectives" originated in an erroneous understanding of the concept of "Total War". As a result, we see that this latter misinterpretation frontally clashes against what is most likely Clausewitz's main thesis, i.e. War as a Rational act. War is a political act and as such is part of a dynamic in which decisions must be taken considering their likely effects, in order to reach the optimal outcome. Given that armed conflicts invariably produce damaging, undesirable losses, preventing them and limiting their scope and duration are obvious demands of rational decision-making, clearly implied in Clausewitz's work. Limitation of war is thus a desirable, appropriate, necessary and efficient objective, contrary to the Wolfowitz's misinterpretation, which needs urgent correction.
Keywords European Union; International Security; Peace; Political Rationality; United States
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1. INTRODUCTION: UNDERSTANDING WAR
Very few works have so profoundly marked war theories as the complex, multidimensional text that Carl Clausewitz succinctly titled "On War" (or "About War")1. Its fundamental thesis, deceptively simplistic, may perhaps be summarized in a few words: War does not interrupt politics, but is an essential, inseparable part of them. This is not, as some still repeat from very diverse political perspectives, a celebration of conflict, and even less a cynical boutade. The point is, quite the reverse, to demonstrate that contrary to the perspective that makes War an illogical exceptionality, armed conflicts have always their internal logic. True, in order to de-cypher this logic, one needs to have the necessary keys and information elements, and Clausewitz tells us without any doubt that this is a formidable task. But it is also an essential one because, ultimately, in order to avoid war or at least to minimize its consequences, it is absolutely necessary to understand its dynamics, reasons and possible solutions. Thanks to Clausewitz – and this is, perhaps, his greatest and more lasting contribution – war is no longer an un- understandable escape from logic, the more or less apocalyptic triumph of folly, but a social, political process which, as any other such processes, has certain origins, certain motivations, certain objectives and solutions. It is impossible to limit this idea to just one particular quotation because it is present throughout the work of Clausewitz; but it is very important in this respect to read in depth the whole of Chapter 1 in the First Book of "On War". It must be noted that Clausewitz carefully avoids any far-reaching moral judgement. This is perhaps one of the reasons why this book has been systematically presented by some as lacking moral sense. This is not the case. The simple fact is that the author is conscious that his objective is not to pass ethic judgement about human behaviour, but to point out that armed conflicts are part of that behaviour, and that they are therefore covered by the same laws applying to any other area of social activity. This is, beyond doubt, the first essential step for any further moral or ethical reflection. In that sense, Clausewitz's contribution precedes and facilitates such a reflection.
1 We will use for this study the authoritative 1976 Howard and Paret translation (see references).
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2. CLAUSEWITZ IN HIS TIME
Carl Von Clausewitz (1780-1831) was not a philosopher, even less a moralist, but he was not without moral sense either. The fact is that his objective in "On War" was simply not in the field of ethics. This distant approach has provoked continued misunderstandings, compounded by the fact that some of his expressions are certainly obscure and could be interpreted as signs of a certain degree of bellicism. In order to understand why the German thinker may seem sometimes to celebrate violence – although this is not, as we will see, the author's position – it is useful to review the historical background and context of the time when the book was written. The most important factor during that historical period was beyond any doubt the Napoleonic Wars, whose horror and nature, so different from previous conflicts, impregnated Clausewitz's works: “Clausewitz’s insights are thoroughly grounded in the military experience of the Napoleonic Wars, especially that of the Russian campaign— he was, after all, both a historian and a theorist” (Drohan 2006). Napoleonic Wars in this context must be understood in the first place as a subversion of existing order at all levels, and especially concerning the total mobilisation of society, as well as the ideological component of conflict as a confrontation of peoples and nations, no longer part of a dynastic logic. The leadership element, accepted by the whole of society and therefore mobilising it, is closely connected to the influence of the French Revolution and the global participation of citizens in the common effort, be it of social or bellic nature. Clausewitz understood very well that the profound social changes brought to the whole of Europe by the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars had not been defeated by the triumphant Allies and the Vienna Congress but, on the contrary, and even though Napoleon's own troops had been defeated in the battlefield, the ideological contributions that they disseminated throughout Europe had profoundly permeated the Continent. Clausewitz does not seem interested, however, in the social, moral or philosophical dimensions, rather and almost exclusively he is focused on the consequences of such a situation on the military doctrine area. And it is in this field that the clearest consequence of these cataclysms creates a new military doctrine which considers War not as a punctual, exceptional event, but as a political act which may be more or less frequent but which is always regulated by the same inexorable laws.
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3. THE LOGICAL CONSTRUCTION OF CLAUSEWITZ
It is essential to understand and highlight that Clausewitz is not an author who advocates unlimited or absolute war. On the contrary, his positions lead logically to the rejection of this possibility, as lacking rationality. War is, certainly, an act of violence aimed at compelling the enemy to accept and implement our will. But it is an act whose limitation is precisely, according to the author, rationality: it is an instrument, possible but not necessarily desirable, that must be kept "at hand" and that, if need be, must be carefully and sensibly dosed. It must however be recognised that the bellic phenomenon has its own dynamics and feedback processes; in that sense it is not an exaggeration to affirm that the "natural" tendency of War is towards the extremes: human passions, once unleashed, will suffer few brakes; on the other hand, the temptation to maximise the impact and the benefits of such strenuous efforts and incurred sacrifices will be correlated to the dimension of the sacrifices themselves, and this is an endless spiral potentially leading to indefinite confrontation. Unless, of course, we accept Clausewitz's thesis and we, therefore, consider that conflict is always oriented towards the achievement of some kind of political objectives; and must never be left to its own laws and dynamics. This takes Clausewitz to a new stage of thought, in which he considers that in order to be really absolute, and therefore lacking in logic, War must necessarily be conceived as an isolated act, external from politics and State dynamics, conducted exclusively by the operating armies, and aiming at a total final result. Clausewitz clearly considers such an idea preposterous and without foundation, as he firmly believes – and demonstrates – that War follows the laws of politics. Accordingly, it simply does not make sense to preconize an absolute, ultra-political War. However, Clausewitz does not take his brilliant approach to the field of moral or ethical conclusions, even though at that stage of his reasoning he could perfectly well have chosen to follow that road, if only to support his main thesis. He is, however, eminently a military person, a thinker on War, and he carefully abstains from passing any moral judgement. With a coherence and consistency which one is tempted to brand as traditionally Germanic, he sticks to his field and refuses to venture into other connected, but different areas. Perhaps he considers that other thinkers may be better placed to do that. Indeed, there is no scarcity of philosophers contemporary to Clausewitz who will focus on the subject of violence from the moral or ethical
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viewpoint. For Hegel, as for Clausewitz, war is an essential feature of human life: it is not absolute evil, but a rational possibility. Under a clear influence of the French Revolution, Hegel tells us that modern War mobilises the entire citizenship and through that means it reinforces the coherence and consistence of societies. The most pessimistic side of the author seems focused on the problems and challenges in ensuring respect for international law, which will always be closely correlated to the capabilities of states to exercise pressure, in a dynamic in which, naturally, the most powerful states will have a tendency to adapt their respect of the law to the extent to which it is consistent and supportive of their own interests and motivations. Nonetheless, Hegel proposes to always try to ensure respect for at least certain principles, even in situations of War: „The fact that states reciprocally recognise each other as states remains, even in war — the state of affairs when rights disappear and force and chance hold sway — a bond wherein each counts to the rest as something absolute. Hence in war, war itself is characterised as something which ought to pass away. It implies therefore the proviso of, the jus gentium — that the possibility of peace be retained (and so, for example, that envoys must be respected), and, in general, that war be not waged against domestic institutions, against the peace of family and private life, or against persons in their private capacity” (Hegel 1821, 319-320). This logic is similar to that followed by Fichte, albeit the latter takes a somewhat more extreme position, while keeping in line with a comparable logic. Fichte, whose postulates are otherwise quite different from Clausewitz's – even though the two are often associated – thinks that War may be a sacred cause, even a moral necessity for a Nation (in this case, the embryonic German fatherland). True, there may be other interpretations, with different nuances and perspectives, of the author's position (Martinez Cinca 2004), but it can be safely argued that Fichte provides the basis for subsequent ideologies and even for the virulent nationalism of the XXth century. He thus becomes, at least to some extent, and more or less consciously, the intellectual inspirer for the processes which would eventually lead to extreme nationalistic violence the following century. Whichever is the exact degree of Fichte's responsibility and bellicism, it would be plainly wrong to associate Clausewitz to this trend. Fichte is contradicted in a most direct way by his own mentor, Kant, whose intellectual construction considers war as a clear evil, to be eradicated, a radical idea which goes far beyond any positions of both Fichte and Hegel. Nonetheless, it is clear that Kant is not the utopian idealist that some current neo-Hobbesian thinkers would like to depict, in an almost cartoon view. Such a simplistic approach is perhaps best represented by Kagan's works and in
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particular in his "Paradise and power" (Kagan 2003). This particular book is not far from the easy maniqueism and simplistic style of fashionable self-help best sellers. Immanuel Kant speaks to us, in reality, of an ever closer movement towards perpetual peace; it is not about the establishment of a Kingdom of Peace on Earth, and even less about the creation of a utopian society. What the Prussian thinker proposes is much more rational: a contractual model through which war becomes more and more difficult and therefore less likely. It is not difficult to find this idea in the foundational thesis behind the birth of the current European Union; on the contrary, this is part of the basic approach of founding fathers such as Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman, whose historical gamble for a Community bringing together former rivals had a Kantian flavour from the very start. There was and there is, however, a constant realistic approach underlying the process of European integration, combined with an idealistic element: it is a possibilistic logic, a Kantian one. This is also what has been given the name of "functional" method of European integration: the achievement of broader goals through realistic, small steps. One clear reference to this can be found in a relatively recent and rather courageous speech pronounced – perhaps with a bit wishful thinking – by former Commission President Prodi at the University of Ulster in 2004: „Kant may have been pleased to see what we have done in the European Union - a form of supranational democracy in a Union of sovereign Member States. In some way, our Union enshrines the essence of Kant's federation of sovereign democracies” (Prodi 2004). In that sense, Kant is not at all in contradiction with the deeper level of philosophy underlying Clausewitz's works. Both authors are in agreement that violent conflicts follow a social, collective, political logic; that they are not just punctual interruptions of reason, but, unfortunately, part of the nature of human society. None of them, on the other hand, preconizes the necessity or desirability of war. True, Kant (1795) condemns from the start bellic violence from a moral point of view while Clausewitz does not explicitly do so. But we must bear in mind that passing any kind of global moral judgment is not at all the objective of the latter. This coincidence, or confluence, between Kant and Clausewitz, is an important point which deserves to be highlighted, as Clausewitz is too often mistakenly associated to a supposedly active bellicism, and this erroneous interpretation is at the origin of the appropriation of the thesis of the German thinker by the "hawks" from different schools of thought, past and present, across the Planet, as we will see in subsequent chapters.
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4. AN IMPLICIT ETHIC DIMENSION
As we have noted earlier on, Clausewitz is careful to avoid any grand declaration of principles either in favour or against the legitimacy of war; beyond a small number of side comments which are often of difficult interpretation, there is no significant explicit declaration in either sense. However, this does not mean that his work lacks any implied prescriptive ethical dimension. Quite the opposite: his insistence on the strength of moral reason, even though considered from a utilitarian point of view (that is to say, moral reason plays a role in military affairs because it has a strong impact on effectiveness and therefore must be taken into account by any military planner), constitutes a clear re-introduction of the moral dimension in the bellic area. Even from that limited, utilitarian point of view, military action has in that sense a complex implicit moral dimension: it can become the resort of the weak, whenever they are motivated by the belief in a just cause, to successfully defeat a more powerful, but less convinced of the sanctity of his mission, enemy. It is interesting indeed to take a moment to examine the consequences of this important aspect of Carl Clausewitz's work. Military strategy, intelligence, and understanding of the laws ruling War is for the author a weapon not necessarily at the disposal of the most powerful contender, but belongs to those who have the intellectual capacity and courage to accept the true nature of armed conflicts. It is absurd to see in Clausewitz a proponent of absolute War and even less, as some tried to demonstrate after World War Two, the inspirer of the remarkably desperate and unreasonable resistance by the Nazi forces and German society at large, long after the disappearance of any reasonable expectation of victory, when any rational observer would have concluded that defeat was certain and imminent. Clausewitz's conception is precisely the opposite: he prones rational analysis of conflicts, and limitation of those to the achievement of the political objectives of the actors. It necessarily follows that both absolute War as well as continuation of the conflict when the result is clearly certain, and it is only a matter of time to reach it, lacks any
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sound rational foundation, according to the author. In that sense, numantine1 resistance – or extermination War – do not fit in Clausewitz's construction. Military strategy as the weapon of the righteous weak: this is indeed an extrapolation, among many other possible ones. Clausewitz himself never goes as far as that, because that would be a moral prescription and we have abundantly made it clear that this is not the point of the author. Neither in one sense, nor in the other. It would be as wrong to criticise an imaginary ultra- militarism, as to utilise Clausewitz to support absolute War, or War to the point of extermination.
5. WOLFOWITZ'S PARADOX
In 1990 Paul Wolfowitz outlined on paper his main thesis, which would prevail for very long years in the United States' official military doctrine, which it continues to influence today – perhaps in a more insidious, indirect way – on the basis of a model which claimed to be based, among others, precisely on Clausewitz. In a very summarized way, we could say that his basic point is that the United States, endowed with unprecedented power and with the appropriate structures to make it work, must prevent its adversaries from reaching positions of power through all necessary means including, if need be, unlimited (in terms of intensity) and preventive war. „I think one has to say it's not just simply a matter of capturing people and holding them accountable, but removing the sanctuaries, removing the support systems, ending states [emphasis added] who sponsor terrorism. And that's why it has to be a broad and sustained campaign” (Wolfowitz 2001). Long before the above declarations, Wolfowitz had put on paper in a famous draft the pillars of his doctrine for pre-emptive and unilateral action in the draft Defence Planning Guidance (US Dpt. of Defense 1992); and he had also signed, together with a remarkably large number of those who would be the future "hawks" in the George W. Bush Administration, a very telling collective letter: „The only acceptable strategy is one that eliminates the possibility that Iraq will be able to use or threaten to use weapons of mass destruction. In the near term, this means a
1 Numantia, Celti-Iberian village in Central Spain, is said to have resisted Roman conquest until the very end, when according to traditional accounts, most of the surviving inhabitants and warriors burnt their city and threw themselves into the flames. Gaius Plinius Secundus sang the courage of the defenders.
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willingness to undertake military action as diplomacy is clearly failing. In the long term, it means removing Saddam Hussein and his regime from power. That now needs to become the aim of American foreign policy” (Abrams et al. 1998). This is in stark contrast with the Powell Doctrine, which was predominant at that stage and which advocates i.e. for proportional use of force and exit strategies. As Powell (1995) himself put it, prior to deciding to go to War, all "political, diplomatic and economic means" must be tried. Some eminent thinkers have tried to link this line of thought with a so- called new-Wilsonianism (Nye 2004); they seem to forget, however, that the Wilson Doctrine can't be narrowed to the promotion and defence of the interests of the United States, but refers to values globally valid and supported by supra-national institutions, both points – in particular the latter – inapplicable to the Wolfowitz Doctrine. Proposals such as Fukuyama's, which could be interpreted as aiming at helping failed States (Fukuyama 2004), are in reality motivated by concern regarding the effects the de-composition of the institutions in such States could have on other Countries. This is, obviously, not Wilson's motivation. What is more, the underlying subplot in Wolfowitz's thesis is precisely an alleged – but not demonstrated – failure of progressive interventionism, with the collapse of its hopes that the World would be marching towards a set of common rules which would effectively safeguard Peace (Bacevich 2013). We are actually much closer to the realism of Huntington, which, with total clarity, upholds the same type of ideas: „Western belief in the universality of Western culture suffers three problems: it is false; it is immoral; and it is dangerous. That it is false has been the central thesis of this book” (Huntington 1995). It is urgent, according to Huntington, to revise Western action and to undertake an effort to win allies and create safety firewalls, in order to maintain techno-military superiority: „[…] and, most important, to recognize that Western intervention in the affairs of other civilizations is probably the single most dangerous source of instability and potential global conflict in a multicivilizational world” (Huntington 1995). Wolfowitz's thesis is, as we can see, an intellectual manifestation which is very close, almost identical, to the rather apocalyptic doctrine of Huntington. It has little to do, however, with Clausewitz, whom he claims to appreciate as one of the sources for his thinking. The paradox is that Clausewitz's thought, when analysed in depth, is actually supportive of conclusions opposite to those of he who claims to be his pupil. Indeed, the Prussian thinker clearly distinguishes between total war – the destruction of the enemy, illustrated by the above quoted language of
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"ending states" – and ideal war – the achievement of sufficiently satisfactory, limited objectives. Moreover, his main thesis, on the rationality of war, is implicitly in frontal contradiction with extermination war or total destruction. The latter is usually impossible and therefore not a rational option except in extremely limited circumstances, and in that case it would not be desirable anyway: in a situation of such a disparity of power, that would permit one side to destroy the other so thoroughly, the same objectives could surely be obtained through more limited efforts. Indeed, war is for Clausewitz – and this is perhaps the best definition ever proposed – violent action to compel one of the subjects to submit to the will of the other. Under such premise, rationality of the process and of the subjects impose limitation of war to the minimum required for submission. When the enemy fulfils our will, war ends. Now, the only situation in which an enemy on track to defeat will continue to fight until its destruction – a situation likely to lead to "total War" – is when conditions for Peace are not rational enough to offer incentives preferable to the continuation of war, even if that leads to certain defeat. That is to say, war will continue to its ultimate consequences whenever the demands by the prospective victors will not have sufficient rationality in order to offer a minimum acceptable to the impending losers. This may happen in particular when decisions are taken outside the rational process, by emotional, visceral or mystical reasons, impervious to logic. What to say, then, about the appropriation of Clausewitz to justify pre- emptive war? A good example, and another profoundly misleading misinterpretation, can be found in the final version of the famous 2002 US National Security Strategy, which, while loosely claiming Clausewitzian roots, indicates that: „[The] greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction – and the more compelling case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. To forestall or prevent such an attack by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act pre-emptively” (NSS 2002). On such basis, the intellectual civil and military group associated to Paul Wolfowitz concludes that the "anticipatory action", better known as "pre- emption", is not only compatible with Clausewitz's thought, but it emanates somehow from it. Pre-emption would be for those authors a "success", and it would have "successfully completed a regime change in Afghanistan and Iraq, via its military instrument [and] has made more progress in ten months than the UN has made in ten years" (Dungan 2004, 3). More than a decade after the invasions, with war raging in Afghanistan and Iraq and conflict extended to a
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point never seen before in the Middle East, it is difficult to suffocate a feeling of bitter irony, evoked by such unfounded triumphalism. Other thinkers have more sophisticated approaches, such as the one which distinguishes between "pre-emption" and "prevention", in order to justify at least partially such doctrines. However, and very significantly, even those admit that "On War" might misinform people who are considering preventive war as a policy option (Gray 2007). Indeed, reality is quite different: "On War" can't in any case be interpreted as specifically supporting any doctrine advocating preventive – or pre-emptive – use of War. It is simply a question which does not feature in the book parameters: Clausewitz does not pronounce himself on the matter. Nonetheless, and on the basis of his position on the diverse, multidimensional nature of War, mixing reason, luck, and passion, it can be inferred that the author is clearly reluctant towards any unnecessary initiation of an act of incalculable and profound consequences, unless all other options are clearly exhausted. I underline all other options because, naturally, there will always be a very large number of options before conflict becomes inevitable. Ultimately the demand for exhausting all possible reasonable options implies a rejection of preventive military action. We can however accept that the limits between "pre-emption" and self-defence may sometimes be blurred: but only the latter is specifically supported by Clausewitz's work. We can therefore conclude with reasonable certainty that the rationality of War as a political act, which is Clausewitz's main underlying theme in "On War" – without prejudice of his accurate consideration of emotional and random aspects of conflict – is a very powerful antidote against preventive War, as well as against extermination War. Regarding the latter, it is important to underline that Clausewitz preconizes the utilisation of overwhelming force only in the battleground: that is to say, in the area of tactics, not in the field of strategy, and even less in the area of politics.
6. PRESENT IMPACT OF THIS INTERPRETATION
Paul Wolfowitz's thesis is, as we have seen, just the opposite. This is probably due, at least partly, to the extraordinary ambition of his "minimum objectives", which are basically nothing less than to destroy USA's opponents. This is really almost the opposite of what Clausewitz proposes – in particular in "On War"; yet the former author invokes frequently the Prussian writer. Such a misappropriation - perhaps misinterpretation – of Clausewitz's
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positions has been a regular feature, a historical constant, which has created numerous, unnecessary problems, hindering efforts to apply Clausewitz's real thinking to the quest for Peace and stability. One could almost say that the works of the Prussian, and in particular "On War", are cursed with such a misinterpretation: indeed, from the very beginning, from the very first print, "On War" suffered spurious alterations which, even though subsequently corrected, seem to have left as a strange heritage a certain trend to permanently "correct" the work of this author in one sense or another, with overly numerous reviews being in turn criticised by other, equally numerous authors. For example, it is worth highlighting the criticism of professor Keegan's interpretation which is presented by C. Bassford in "War in History". In essence, Bassford maintains that professor Keegan's rejection of Clausewitz stems precisely from this type of bellicist misunderstanding (Bassford 1994). The Wolfowitzian version of this constant misunderstanding could perhaps have been relegated to the obscure realm of abstruse political science curiosities, had it been conceived under different circumstances. As it happens, it was established just before one of the main cataclysmic events in recent times, one of a particularly spectacular nature, which gave it unprecedented global repercussion. This, combined with a conjunction of political circumstances, created the conditions for Wolfowitz's thesis to receive, despite their evident mistakes, a remarkable impulse and momentum, with consequences lasting to this date. That cataclysm was, of course, the set of terrorist actions perpetrated on the 11th of September 2001. The thesis of Wolfowitz would play over the next years a key role in the definition of policy reactions by the Republican George W. Bush Administration. And, in spite of later developments, they continued to play a certain role in subsequent events, with continued consequences in present times. That is so because, despite the rapid succession of rise and fall in Paul Wolfowitz's subsequent career, and the loss of personal prestige after his removal from the World Bank, his thesis remained relatively unaffected. A historical misunderstanding was thus stabilised and continues to be regularly brought back to the fore today. This misunderstanding is most particularly widespread among those who support the most bellicist theories within neo- conservative movements, but other sectors are not unaffected either. Notwithstanding the existence of a real stream of interesting academic contributions recalling Clausewitz's works real meaning, the Wolfowitzian misinterpretations continue to create confusion. It is an urgent task to address this problem, so that the theoretical contributions from "On War" can play to
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the fullest their enormous role in promoting reason and pragmatism. And, ultimately, to ensure that the cool-head thinking of the Prussian is not misinterpreted as a celebration of war: „As war is no act of blind passion, but is dominated over by the political object, therefore the value of that object determines the measure of the sacrifices by which it is to be purchased. This will be the case, not only as regards extent, but also as regards duration. As soon, therefore, as the required outlay becomes so great that the political object is no longer equal in value, the object must be given up, and peace will be the result” (Clausewitz, Book I, Chapter II).
7. CONCLUSIONS
Sadly, Clausewitz died before the publication of "On War", thus depriving upcoming generations from possible revisions and updates, and more importantly, from any clarifications by the author on the most obscure chapters of his work. Both Clausewitz's demise and the publication of his work preceded by one decade and a half the arrival of the 1848 wave of nationalistic revolutions throughout Europe; the latter would have been, undoubtedly, a most interesting element to integrate in the military analysis of our thinker, both on the mass mobilisation element, as well as on what concerns the purely military aspects of the confrontations. Clausewitz's work relative ambiguity and even cryptic nature – the latter often hidden behind a false façade of simplicity – also contribute to the remarkable diversity of interpretation, including on key premises. Nevertheless, Wolfowitz misinterpretation, closely connected with the general postulates which provided the framework for the disastrous organisation of the Second Iraq War adventure, remains beyond any doubt one of the most damaging ones, in terms of theoretical and practical impact. This crystallised, notably, in an approach which overlooks any meaningful gradualism, dismisses global inter-departmental approaches, and conspicuously ignores the need for an exit strategy. The traumatism created by the collapse of the actions undertaken under this approach has greatly contributed – and this is possibly one of its gravest consequences – to subsequent unfortunate decisions and even to a trend towards inhibition in the face of pressing needs to act in other conflicts where a more rational approach – a more Clausewitzian approach- would have clearly been more appropriate and more effective in stopping or at least reducing violence and instability. The case of Syria seems a very clear illustration. In view of the evolution of events, it is fair to say that the wrong
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decisions and mistakes made on Iraq have saddled subsequent key decisions in Syria – while the situation in that Country remains terribly chaotic. The extremism of Wolfowitz's postulates, and the tendency towards inhibition in front of highly complex, almost un-understandable conflicts, which are not considered political but cultural, are actually two sides of the same coin. Confronted with an imaginary irrationality of war, leaders and citizens seem naturally deemed to choose between inaction or excessive action. Under this approach, intermediate options seem to be lacking. It is in that context that an appropriate interpretation of Clausewitz is more necessary than ever: the Prussian tells us clearly that War is a political act, necessarily situated in the realm of reason, and only reason can provide effective, appropriate and lasting solutions and responses. This is an exercise which, quite naturally, requires many nuances and balancing acts, beyond the simplicity of the previously examined extreme positions. In summary, war is a political act; has always been, will always be. This could perhaps be the formulation to capture Clausewitz's best and longer lasting intellectual legacy. It is important to stress that this does not mean that war is inherent to politics, that it is necessary, nor that Peace is a utopian state of affairs. True, Clausewitz is clearly not proposing to "abolish War". He is not, however, opposed to defending Peace as the most desirable state, and he never hints at any kind of opposition to the regulation of possible cases where war can or cannot be legitimate. Indeed, an in-depth reflection on the thesis of political rationality of war could reasonably lead to the conclusion that in order to avoid armed conflicts from a preventive point of view, as well as to limit their destructive reach and duration once they have started, rationality, moderation and regulation are appropriate, necessary and effective instruments. It is my belief that this is a natural extension of Clausewitz's postulates, and that this conclusion is consistent with his key "On War" masterpiece on the matter. On the other hand, it is clearly incompatible with Wolfowitz's interpretation, and its subsequent variations. I believe we have demonstrated that this is because Wolfowitz's vision can't reasonably claim to be based on Clausewitz's work. In these turbulent times, it is urgent to correct this misinterpretation.
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REFERENCES
Abrams, E. et al. 1990. Letter to President Bill Clinton. Project for a New American Century. Washington DC. Bacevich, A.J. 2013. A letter to Paul Wolfowitz, occasioned by the tenth anniversary of the Iraq war. New York: Harpers. Bassford, C. 1994. „John Keegan and the Grand Tradition of Trashing Clausewitz”. In War in History, 1: 3. London: Sage. Drohan, B. 2006. „Carl Von Clausewitz, his Trinity, and the 1812 Russian Campaign”. In Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 19:2. Oxon: Milton Park. Dungan, M.A. 2004. A Global Hegemon's Prerogative: The Bush Doctrine of Pre-emption and the Road to Iraq. Carlisle PA: US Army War College. Fukuyama, F. 2004. State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century. New York: Cornell University Press. Gray, C.S. 2007. The implications of Pre-emptive and Preventive War Doctrines: A reconsideration. Carlisle PA: US Army War College. Hegel, G.W.F. 1952. Philosophy of Right. Alderley: Clarendon Press. Huntington, S.P. 1997. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order., New York: Simon and Schuster. Kagan, R. 2003. Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order. New York: Knopf. Kant, I. 1795. Zum ewigen Frieden. Ein philosophischer Entwurf. Nicolovius, Königsberg: Nicolovius. Martínez C. and C. Diego. 2004. Los Discursos a la nación alemana de Fichte: un paso atrás en el proyecto político de la Ilustración. Madrid: Philosophia. Nye, J. 2004. Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. New York: Public Affairs. Powell, C. 1995. My American Journey. New York: Random House. Prodi, R. 2004. Europe and peace. University of Ulster Speech. US Department of Defense. 1992. Draft Defense Planning Guidance (leaked document). New York: New York Times. National Security Strategy Archive. 2002. US National Security Strategy. http://nssarchive.us/national-security-strategy-2002/ Von Clausewitz, C. 1976. On War. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Wolfowitz, P. (Interview). 2001. How Wide a War? PBS Newshour.
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BOOK REVIEW
The Romanian Journal of European Affairs, Vol. 15, No.3, September 2015, 95 pages. ISSN print: 1582-8271, ISSN online: 1841-4273.
Dacian DUNA Babeş-Bolyai University Cluj-Napoca / Romania [email protected]
1. INTRODUCTION
The Romanian Journal of European Affairs is a peer-reviewed research publication of the European Institute of Romania from Bucharest, Romania. The journal is published since 2001 on a quarterly basis and it is the first Romanian publication with strong focus on the European integration debates and the role of Romania within the European Union. The journal is dispatched in a printed version and a free of charge online version. Since the year of its debut the journal has constantly improved its international visibility and recognition, being indexed in numerous databases, including Proquest, Ebsco, SCOPUS, Index Copernicus and many others. The journal had already established its reputation for bringing and bridging together authors from different backgrounds (political practitioners, academic, economic, civil society, etc.), sharing a common research interest on European issues. The number of September 2015 which is in our focus clearly confirms two long established patterns: 1) the journal is clearly encouraging inter- disciplinarity by accepting the work of scholars coming from different backgrounds such as political science, international relations, economics, or conflict and security studies; 2) the research is not solely based on a single methodological paradigm: the scholars have different epistemological stances, from positivism or post-positivism to hybrid approaches. Moreover, the journal is encouraging young promising researchers from Romania and abroad to publish their articles in its pages, alongside more experienced scholars – a clearly positive feature of the publication released by the European Institute of
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Romania. The number is presented in a simple yet elegant graphics. It comprises four articles in English, one in French and two book reviews.
2. RETHINKING THE EUROPEAN UNION: FROM UNITY IN DIVERSITY TO DIVERSITY
The author of this article is Professor Florin Bonciu, PhD, Vice- president for Research at the Romanian-American University in Bucharest and Senior Researcher at the Institute for World Economy in Bucharest. Professor Bonciu is investigating the recent evolution of the European Union - marked by economic crises - pleading for a ‘fresh restart’ of a Union „adapted to the new realities, efficient and competitive in an ever more integrated global economy” (p. 6). Taking into account the long term perspective, the author has convincing arguments that the EU has been in a declining position not after the 2008 crisis but much earlier before. It is a process that is unfolding since 1980, according to the empirical evidence compiled from Business Monitor Research and the IMF. Professor Bonciu notices that „the share of European Union in world GDP in PPP expression has declined constantly from about 29.775 % in 1980 to about 16.939 % in 2014” (p. 6). Correctly interpreting the data, the author stresses that the European Union was amongst the most affected of the world’s entities in terms of GDP per capita. It is also true that the relative decline of the EU in terms of contribution to the global GDP was expected since the population of the world has increased exponentially since 1980 and new global competitors emerged. The global stage of the 1980s and the one of the 2000s are fundamentally different. The passionate argument of professor Bonciu for fundamental not incremental change is transparent throughout the entire article. The author is using the European documents to illustrate it (such as Global Europe 2050 Report or the more recent Global Trends to 2030…). It is not only about containing a „catastrophic decline” (p. 12). It is also about finding a common purpose, a common identity for the citizens of the EU, or to rebuild trust. The EU excells when it is about motivational papering. It is a perfect source of international law and research data. Nevertheless, the failure to address the challenges of the global crisis is found by the author to be at the core of the European construction: the
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overimposition of the „unity in diversity”. Instead, professor Bonciu is proposing that the EU should embrace „diversity in unity” as its core principle of organization. He actually proposes the abandonment of the pressures to unite from above (federalism) in favor of a functional approach (p. 18). One could argue that embracing „diversity in unity” could mean a Europe with more speeds – a recurrent idea of the Great Powers of the EU, rejected by the smaller states. It is unclear how this would provide the means to stop the further fragmentation of the European Union.
3. LA CONSTRUCTION NATIONALE DU CONCEPT EUROPÉEN DANS LA VIE POLITIQUE ET CULTURELLE DE LA ROUMANIE DE L’ENTRE-DEUX-GUERRES - LA PREMIÈRE MOITIÉ DES ANNÉES 1920. LE GRAND DÉBAT. PRÉMISSES INTRODUCTIVES
The article written in French by Mihai Sebe, a Postdoctoral fellow from the Institute for Global Economy, is an interesting insight into the past. The author is presenting the debates between the Romanian interwar elites concerning their European ideas with a clear focus on the 1920s. The work begins with an understanding of the European and international context, marked by the ideas of Woodrow Wilson, the emergence of the League of Nations, and the structural characteristics of the Romanian political system after the First World War and the Great Union – the birth of the Greater Romania. It was a time of great social and political upheaval, of great contradictions, marked by the emergence of new social forces having the purpose to obtain a political representation, claiming revolutionary change, such as the peasantry. The second part of the article approaches the cultural life developed in the Greater Romania with a focus on the debate between Europeanists (Eugen Lovinescu, Ştefan Zeletin), that insisted upon the syncronization with the West, and the traditionalists, that idealised the past and rejected the „import” of Western ideas (Nicolae Iorga). It was also a debate between journals. The Europeanists were grouped around the review Ideea europeană (The European Idea). The traditionalists, initially grouped around a short-lived prewar review, Sămănătorul (1901-1910, in English The Sower), had developed a political movement around the historian Nicolae Iorga – sămănătorismul (the sowerism). The period is marked by the emergence of European and regional
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integration ideas, from authors like Oskar Iaszi to Mihail Manoilescu, fitting perfectly into the European debates on federalism, illustrated by the Pan- Europe movement for European unity of Richard N. Coudenhove-Kalergi (1923). Mihai Sebe insists upon the project of Manoilescu (1929) that envisaged a custom European Union that would reject the condemnation of the least developed Member States to stagnation or even underdevelopment. In modern terms, it would not a Europe with different speeds, but one more related to a successful model of federalism, the United States of America. Clearly, Mihai Sebe succeeds in understanding the atmosphere of intellectual emulation in the 1920s’ Romania that it is not totally different from what was going then and now in Europe. For instance, the debate between the Euro-optimists and Euro-skeptics is still backgrounded by a sequence of crises, from the sovereign debt crisis to the more recent refugee crisis, in many regards similar to the events of the interwar period.
4. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF MINIMUM INCOME GUARANTEED SCHEMES WITHIN THE MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
The author of this article is Simona Maria Stănescu, senior researcher at the Research Institute for Quality of Life from the Romanian Academy. The article is a convincing analysis of the state of the social policy in the European Union, using comparative methods to approach the safety nets for the most vulnerable people supported by the EU’s Member States. Using the MISSOC (the EU's Mutual Information System on Social Protection) databases of the Union, the author attempts to explain the diverse frequency of the regulations for minimum income in the EU Member States from the moment of their accession to the community bloc. The main finding after the complex screening of the safety nets offered by the Member States of the EU is that the “common goals of promoting a decent life standard and the free movement of workers especially but not exclusively for EU citizens within member states involve a continuous assessment of social security arrangements” (p. 49). The focus on guaranteed minimum incomes is particularly helpful. It partly explains the discrepancies in what concerns the quality of life for the citizens of the European Union between countries like Romania on the one side, and countries like France on the opposite side of the
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spectrum. Even though the author does not emphasise the need to develop a European common social policy, her findings are particularly useful for the scholars and practitioners that would support such an endeavour.
5. THE CHANGING NATURE OF SECURITY IN EUROPE: THE TRIANGLE BETWEEN RUSSIA’S NEW FOREIGN POLICY, THE CSDP AND NATO
Katerina Veljanovska, Professor of Political Systems at the Faculty of Security, Criminology and Financial Control at MIT University, Skopje, proposes a thourough strategic analysis of the current security situation of Europe, involving a triangle formed by the European Union (with its CSDP), Russia (with its new assertive foreign policy) and NATO, which according to Professor Veljanovska, is „the first military alliance ever formed during times of peace” (p. 52). This last idea could be oppossed by the very fact that in 1949 it was nothing less than a relative peace between the West and the USSR. One must recall that the emergence of NATO was related to the first Berlin crisis, a situation of quasi-confrontation between the US and the Soviets. The author is switching easily from national to international security, using the interface of societal security, without mentioning it explicitly. The following statement is suggestive: „Inside the European Union, the national security and the national identity are more vulnerable and threatened because of immigrations, foreign ideas or products, which means that the control of the state is going over these issues” (p. 55). The use of national security and national identity in the context of the European Union would suggest that the author is a neoclassical realist since it forces us to think that the EU is just an international society formed by states responsible for their security and identity. However, the next section of the paper – regarding the development of the CSDP – sees the European Union as an ambitious world player, acting as a Great Power, competing for global influence with the United States. This would suggest the adherence of the author to the neorealist idea of the EU as a future superstate. While apraising the achievements of the CSDP, Professor Veljanovska criticizes its weaknesses: it is underfinanced; „the diversity and complexity of the decisions delivered on a short notice” (p. 58) (an idea shared with a defensive realist, Charles Glasner).
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The third chapter of the paper written by Katerina Veljanovska is addressing, as the title clearly suggest, the „Challenges for New Security Policy of Europe: critical aspects”. The tone of the chapter is perhaps too imperative and normative to account for a realist narrative. There is an apparent contradiction present in the text: on the one hand, the author is pleading for the unity of European Union and the complementarity between the EU and NATO. It even suggests that the Russian „aggression” on Ukraine should be responded by the others actors of the international scene. However, at the same time, the author is for a common strategy of the EU and NATO for improving their relations with Russia. The author is approaching the Minsk agreements and the prospects of the NATO summit of Warsaw (set for 2016) and the terrorist attacks from 7 January 2015 in Paris. In fact, the best part of the paper regards the international and regional security situation, the terrorist attacks and the Russian aggression against Ukraine and its defiant attitude toward NATO and the EU being seen as the most dangerous issues claiming priority on the European agenda. The author is masterly defining the complex nature of the Russian politics and the need to find a solution for returning Russia to a pro-Western attitude. The article signed by Katerina Veljanovska reflects today’s contradictions regarding the European security from the point of view of the „triangle” European Union – NATO – Russia. It is difficult to find a middle ground between the pragmatic necessity to have good relations with Russia and the normative necessity to implement sanctions against it following the annexation of Crimea and the conflict fueled in the Donbas region. The solutions are rather precarious. The article is a serious call for European common action in the field of security without tackling the impediments to it stemming up from the intergovernmental nature of the European Union’s CSDP and NATO.
6. UKRAINE IN THE WTO: EFFECTS AND PROSPECTS
This article represents the contribution of three authors: Elena Anatolyevna Bessonova is Doctor in Economics, Professor, and Head of the Department of Accounting, Analysis and Auditing, Southwest State University, Russia; Оksana Yurevna Mereschenko is a postgraduate fellow of Southwest State University; Nina Sergeyevna Gridchina is MA student with the same university. They are presenting a complex and systematic analysis of
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the effects of Ukraine’s accession to the WTO and its lessons for a possible WTO membership for Russia. The research results are obtained after a careful consideration of expert opinions, the interpretation of facts and figures regarding the foreign direct investment in Ukraine, the evolution of various sectors in Ukrainian economy including their financial performance, the changes in consumer market. The tableau is extremely suggestive and well done. It identified the causes of Ukraine’s failure in obtaining positive results after the accession to the WTO. The initial poor terms of the accession to the organisation (for Ukraine) are especially considered to be responsible for this negative trends (p. 81). Ukrainian economy lost considerably especially due to low competitiveness especially in high added value products (aircraft, automotive, agricultural and transport machinery), agriculture (livestock, wine) and the textile industry (p. 82). The positive aspects of the WTO membership are not forgotten: „the ability to conduct an equal dialogue with trade partners, the enhanced competitive advantages of the major manufacturers in the real economy, the introduction of new technology, improvement of product quality to enhance competitiveness” (p. 82). Based on Ukraine’s experience, a post-Soviet country with many similarities with the Russia Federation, the authors have been able to underline a number of policy recommendations so as to minimise Russia’s losses and maximise advantages which derive from the accession to WTO” (p. 82). The work of Elena Anatolyevna Bessonova, Оksana Yurevna Mereschenko, and Nina Sergeyevna Gridchina actually becomes an excellent model of how universities can offer quality expertise to governments.
7. BOOK REVIEWS
The final section of the journal presents two ample and well written book reviews. The first one is signed by Gheorghe Octavian Roşca, MA student in Conflict Analysis and Resolution at the Department of International Relations and European Integration, National University of Political Science and Public Administration, Bucharest. The author is reviewing the Europolity Journal, Continuity and Change in European Governance, vol. 9, no. 1, 2015. The second one, signed by Bogdan Mureşan, one of the experts of the European Institute of Romania is reviewing the book published by Professor Paul Dobrescu, Lumea cu două viteze. Puterile emergente şi ţările dezvoltate (Two-Speed World: Emerging Powers and Developed Countries) (Romania: Comunicare.ro,
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2013, 205 pages). The reviewers have thoroughly scrutined the work done by the authors of the two volumes, correctly emphasising the best findings, an indirect invitation to reading and understanding interesting contributions to the study of politics and society.
8. CONCLUSION
A final remark on this interesting number of the Romanian Journal of European Affairs (Vol. 15, No. 3, September 2015): this successful academic journal of the European Institute of Romania is once again succeeding in finding the perfect balance between topics of global interest which are not alien to Romania’s foreign policy objectives. The articles and reviews are positive attempts to understand the international context and explain the need of policymaking in such fields as the national and European security, social and economic policies, or the adaptation of the European Union to the new global challenges of the 21st century.
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CALL FOR PAPERS
Europolity – Continuity and Change in European Governance Vol. 10, no. 1 (2016)
Place of publication Romania
Type of publication Online and print
Publication date June 2016
Edited by The National University of Political Studies and Public Administration – Department of International Relations and European Integration/Centre for European Studies
Published by C.H. Beck (Romania) Publishing House
ISSN Online 2344-2255; Print 2344-2247
Topics Europolityis a leading international journal for publication of new ideas, research results and fundamental advances in all aspects of International Relations, European Studies and Political Science. Europolity publishes well developed innovative articles, in English, and encourages emerging researchers to share their professional and academic knowledge. Contributions regarding international relations, European studies, political science, security studies and other related fields are strongly encouraged.
Deadlines Authors should send their abstracts (200-250 words) to [email protected] before February 15th (2016). Early submissions are strongly encouraged. Applicants will be informed about selection until February 29th (2016). The deadline for paper submission is March 31st (2016).
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Editorial Policies and Guidelines for Contributors Manuscripts should be written in English and they have to comply with the editing requirements of the journal, as presented in the Paper Template available on the journal’s webpage. Only articles following these style rules will be taken into consideration for publication. Publishing an article in Europolity is free of charge. Authors should ensure that their submissions are original contributions and should not be under consideration for any other publication at the same time. All submitted articles are subject to a rigorous peer review process, based on initial editor screening and double-blind refereeing by a minimum of two reviewers. Full guidelines for the presentation of the papers and more details about the editorial policy of the journal are available at the editorial policy section from the website (http://europolity.eu).
Other details Abstracts should be in Word format with the following information and in this order: a) author(s), b) affiliation, c) email address, d) title of abstract, e) body of abstract, f) up to 6 keywords. E-mails should be entitled: Europolity vol. 10, no. 1 – abstract – [author(s) name(s)]. Please use plain text (Times Roman 12) and abstain from using footnotes and any special formatting, characters or emphasis (such as bold, italics or underline). Please note that the printed edition is planned for the beginning of June 2016. We acknowledge receipt and answer to all paper proposals submitted.
Book Reviews We are also looking for reviews of books published between 2011-2015 dealing with developments in the fields of Political Science, International Relations Theory and European Studies. Reviewers must have their own copy of the book. Book reviews should have 1,000 - 1,500 words and should not only present the book, but also critically discuss the main issues it raises. Deadline for book reviews submission is March 31st (2016).
Further inquiries should be sent to the editorial board at [email protected]
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CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN STUDIES
The Centre for European Studies (CES), established by Government Decision No. 1082/2003 is a teaching and academic research structure within the Department of International Relations and European Integration (DIREI) of the National University of Political Studies and Public Administration (NUPSPA). CES promotes education and professional training in the European Studies and International Relations field, contributing with its research projects, analysis and evaluations to a better understanding of the functioning and evolution of the processes and dynamics of world politics. CES supports in-depth innovative investigations of the European and international polity, politics and policies, stimulating debate and facilitating academic networking of scholars interested in these topics. The members and volunteers of CES prepare analytical research papers, offer consultancy on diverse European and international themes, organise and participate in national and international programs and projects aimed at promoting cooperation and information dissemination in these educational and research areas. The sustained and comprehensive dialogue and debates on various aspects regarding the complex dynamics on the international arena are promoted by CES through conferences and seminars and the resulted expertise is extremely useful not only for researchers and the academic field but it is also significant for the civil society, Romanian national institutions contributing in the end to a better understanding of the current international system. With the Master's programmes it promotes, viewed in the wider context of all the other educational programmes of DIREI and together with the analysis of different International and European aspects, the expertise offered in the end by CES is able to respond to the practical needs of the Romanian society, economy and administration, being thus a way of improving them, contributing also to an actual construction of identities at a European level. CES brings together at different debates researchers (know-how providers) and actors involved in public policies who represent the main beneficiaries, in order to raise the quality standard of the domestic input in the process of analysis and policy- making at national, European and international level. Thus, CES is trying to illustrate how enhancing the academic, theoretical research is useful in the practical policy-making process and how important is to have national experts trained in undertaking research in the European and international studies field. At a national level, CES cooperates with Romanian state institutions, public administration, private sector, NGO`s in organizing various seminars and debates which promote the European participatory democracy in action and European social values contributing to a deepening of the European integration process and being a valuable instrument for the global affirmation of the significance of the European Union in a broader context of International Relations. Initially, the strategic mission of CES was to contribute to improving the teaching supply at post-graduate level for those willing to form or deepen their professional training in the area of European studies in the context of Romania's increasing efforts to complete the accession negotiations, and thereafter to smoothly and effectively adapt and work within the institutional and political system of the European Union. Therefore, since it was established, the Centre for European Studies contributed to the expansion of the educational offer of the Department of International Relations and European Integration by initiating the „European Politics and Economics” Master's Programme, developed in a new modular format involving training for both general and specialized competencies concerning the intersection of analysis and dissemination of theories of European integration and public policy. In this regard, the program succeeded in co-opting some important names of scientists from the academia of Bucharest; one can refer here to professors as Daniel Dăianu, Iordan Bărbulescu, George Voicu and Liviu Voinea. The syllabus included for the first time the area and the policies of the migration phenomena in the context of EU enlargement, border security and asymmetric risks/threats in the wider neighbourhood. In 2010, a second master's project was implemented. Called „Evaluation of European Public Policies and Programmes”, this project was dedicated to a niche specialization absent from the Romanian labour market, but much needed, given the procedural requirements regarding the consistent application of the structural funding projects. In the same year, CES has initiated the first MA programme in English, ,,Security and Diplomacy”, where the involved professors have both a recognized university career and a significant public activity: Ioan Mircea Paşcu (MEP, Vice-president of the European Parliament), Vasile Secăreş (NUPSPA founding rector, former head of the Presidential Administration), gen. Mihail Ionescu (Director of the Institute for Political Studies of Defense and Military History / Director of the Institute for Studies of Holocaust Elie Wiesel), Bogdan Aurescu (former Minister of Foreign Affairs), Constantin Buchet (CNCSAS Secretary), George Angliţoiu (Adviser on lobby and communication to the President of the Competition Council), etc. A new master's programme in English on
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Development, International Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid was launched starting with the academic year 2013- 2014; one year later, it was followed by a new Master in Romanian on Social Economy. Since 2012, CES is also a partner of the Romanian Association of International Relations and European Studies (ARRISE), Romania’s representative in ECSA World, to edit/permanently coordinate the publication of RoJIRES – The Romanian Journal of International Relations and European Studies. Moreover, CES started to edit a new series of the academic journal Europolity – Continuity and Change in European Governance, a biannual peer reviewed open access international academic journal. Designed in 2007, Europolity was primarily addressed to young researchers, giving them the opportunity to publish academic papers and opinion articles on topics related to European Union study. Nowadays, edited by CES, Europolity is mainly oriented towards multi-disciplinary scholarly work in European Studies, supporting therefore relevant theoretical, methodological and empirical analyses connected to this field and coming from EU Studies or International Relations, but also from International (Political) Economy, Law, Sociological Studies, Cultural Studies, etc. CES supports excellence in academic research, the development of partnerships, and it tries to increase the visibility for its research and analysis results. The academic staff members have conducted research projects with impact and had a number of publications in this field. CES has collaborations with other prestigious research institutions abroad such as the Jean Monnet Chair within the Political Science Department of the Complutense University (Madrid), the European Institute of the London School of Economics, and the Romanian-based Altiero Spinelli Center of the Babes-Boylai in Cluj-Napoca. Between 2014 and 2017, DIREI and CES are hosting a Jean Monnet Chair focused towards “Bringing European Studies to Journalism, Agriculture, Engineering, Philology, Economics, History, Law and Sociology students”, chaired by prof. Iordan Bărbulescu. Moreover, as a staunch promoter of European integration, CES is overseeing the implementation of two Jean Monnet projects aimed at supporting innovation and the spread of European Union related content within the time frame September 2015 – August 2018. Firstly, the Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence In and Out: Understanding the European Union beyond its Borders intends to develop border management trainings for frontier workers from Romania, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, as a means to improve knowledge and practices on European policies, in particular those related to border management and security. Secondly, the Jean Monnet Module EU*RO Media. European Standards, Romanian Application: The Media Roadmap for Romania’s EU Council Presidency is designed to contribute to the Europeanization of the public sphere which must better understand the direct and indirect implications of the EU’s impact on the member states and, last but not least, the importance of Romania holding the EU Council Presidency in the second half of 2019 and the potential contributions of the public sphere to the agenda-setting. Finally, CES also manages research grants for the complex and interdisciplinary field of International Relations and European Studies. For example, in the period 2012-2015, CES monitors the implementation of five exploratory research projects - "Romania-Russia bilateral relationship: national and European perspective", "Implementation of the social market economy in Romania as a way of Europeanizing the Romanian society," "Operationalizing an evaluation model for the institutionalization of forms and practices of the social market economy in Romania", "The European Union and the Latin America – an interregional analysis", "Citizens and MEPs: Representation, Legitimacy and Political Participation" -, while actively supporting the involvement of young researchers. From this point of view, an important aspect of the CES activity consists in collaborating with NUPSPA’s undergraduate, post-graduate and PhD students; in this regard, since 2009, CES is working closely with the Academic Club of European Studies (CASE), organizing events and activities designed to foster excellence in European research issues. CASE aims to be a via media, but also a connection point between academia and public institutions that can influence Europeanization, which is why CES supports the work of this NGO perceived as the youth component or the nursery for future researchers. Through all its activities, CES contributes to enhance the image of the Department of International Relations and European Integration as an important research and teaching academic actor.
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