Canada, the Freeloader, Rather Than Vested Defence Partner in NORAD and the Defence of North America
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCES DND photo/National Defence Image Library Defence DND photo/National A Canadian CF-18 Hornet intercepts a Russian Tu-95 Bear long-range bomber. Canada, the Freeloader, Rather Than Vested Defence Partner in NORAD and the Defence of North America by Andrew Wood Lieutenant-Colonel Andrew Wood is an artillery officer carry out its assigned missions, failure to respond to, and lacking having served in the British Army for 20 years, including on the capabilities required to respond to current and evolving threats operations in Northern Ireland and Iraq, as well as on exchange in to North America. Army Doctrine before transferring to the Canadian Army in 2012. Currently serving in 1st Canadian Division HQ; he previously This article contends that a political commitment to the served on the Strategic Joint Staff as the Canada-US plans desk Canada-US relationship, combined with the policy and capability officer involving a myriad of NORAD related issues. This article investments required to modernise NORAD, is urgently needed to was developed for submission as part of the Joint Command and restore the relevance of NORAD and render it an effective deter- Staff Programme. rence. These factors are, however, unlikely to be considered, due to the short-term political vision of Canadian politics, the unwill- Introduction ingness to commit the required funds to re-balance the capability relationship, and the belief that the U.S. will ultimately guarantee he North American Aerospace Defence Command Canada’s security. Canada, while considering itself equal, has (NORAD) is often framed as the benchmark in the always been the junior partner in an unequal relationship, and as Canada-United States (U.S.) relationship, which cel- the threats and organisation have evolved, that gap has widened. ebrated its 60th anniversary in May 2018. It is charged with defending North America in the Air and Maritime The article will also briefly examine the mutually beneficial Tdomains.1 The Cold-War origins of the relationship benefited both circumstances that led to the creation of NORAD, and for parties and traded space for capability and protection. Yet, despite 30 years of its life, provided an effective defence of North America. Canada’s repeated commitment to NORAD and the defence of It will then examine some contributory factors in the decline of North America,2 a lack of political willingness, a diverted focus its relative value and lost opportunities degrading deterrent effect, in favour of overseas operations, and a failure to invest in the resulting in a flawed Canadian assessment of its own relevance capabilities required to maintain NORAD as a credible defence, and the utility of NORAD. Linked to this assertion, it will also has resulted in the Command’s falling behind in its effectiveness to examine the corresponding decline in its relevance to the U.S., Canadian Military Journal • Vol. 21, No. 2, Spring 2021 5 and offer an opinion as to whether this is, in fact, due to Canadian and threats faced by Canada and the United States. Its missions neglect or other factors. The article will constrain itself to the extant expanded in the 1960s to ballistic missile early warning with the NORAD Mission set and not venture into additional domains that emergence of intercontinental (ICBM) and submarine launched are addressed through the Tri-Command sponsored Evolution of (SLBM) ballistic missiles. Subsequently, post 9/11, it assumed an North American Defence (EvoNAD)3 study. asymmetric mission set, consisting of Operation Noble Eagle One to intercept and interdict civil aircraft with potentially nefarious Historical Perspective intentions, and to the war on drugs, with its Aerospace Control Mission and a Maritime Warning Mission.6 orth America has the advantageous position of facing N potential threats at standoff distances. Separated from The evolution of NORAD manifested itself in the Americans not potential aggressors by the Atlantic, Pacific and Arctic Oceans, wanting Canada to be a liability in its defence against Soviet aggres- Canada and the U.S. share an unparalleled defence relationship sion, and the recognition that Canada was incapable of defending forged by a shared geography, common val- itself.7 The U.S. therefore, identified the need for ues/ interests, deep historical connections, cooperation with Canada to acquire territory and and highly integrated economies. These airspace in order to provide strategic depth against factors inevitably elevate the task of defend- “North America has potential Soviet targets.8 This led initially to the ing North America to the strategic level. the advantageous construction of the Pine Tree Line Radar warning Equally important has been the commitment position of facing installations, followed shortly afterwards by the to work together to defend North America, Distant Early Warning (DEW) line radar-warning initially through the joint commitment of potential threats at system.9 Concerns over Canadian sovereignty the Ogdensburg Declaration in 1940,4 and standoff distances.” were addressed in terms of Canadian inclusion since 1957/1958,5 through the Bi-National in site selection, and the application of Canadian NORAD command. legal status and title.10 Cooperation at the military level led to the develop- ment of protocols for the cross-border inter- ception and control of aircraft.11 These proto- cols were subsequently accepted at the political levels of both govern- ments, resulting in the NORAD agreement with its corresponding checks and balances,12 to become responsible to both nations for the shared defence of North America. The NORAD Agreement, most recently renewed in 2006,13 deliberately highlights the endur- ing nature of the bi-national relationship. However, the passing of 40 years since the last significant series of investments exposes Library and Archives Canada/C-016768 Canada/C-016768 Archives Library and the neglect both govern- ments have placed upon Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King and President Franklin D. Roosevelt at Ogdensburg in 1940. continental defence, despite the rhetoric14 embodied in subsequent The Cold-War Soviet nuclear threat, initially through manned defence policies and national military strategies. Other factors have con- bombers, led to the combined military conclusion that defence tributed to this neglect, namely, the end of the Cold War and a subsequent would be most effectively and efficiently met through a shared shift from continental defence, to expeditionary operations, and the command and control structure. Based upon this conclusion, historical belief that the defence of North America is best achieved NORAD was founded in 1957, centred upon the shared interests far away from national territory.15 6 Canadian Military Journal • Vol. 21, No. 2, Spring 2021 power conflict subsided, to be replaced by primarily-American led or supported Western military interventions. This resulted in a shift in direction towards expeditionary deploy- ments to address post-Soviet Union security impacts, such as those experienced in Bosnia and Kosovo. The second factor was 9/11, which rep- resented a NORAD failure through, neither predicting, nor being able to respond to the events of that day. “We found that NORAD, which had been given the responsibility for defending U.S. airspace, had con- strued that mission to focus on threats coming from outside America’s bor- ders. It did not adjust its focus even though the intelligence community had gathered intelligence on the pos- sibility that terrorists might turn to hijacking and might even use planes INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCES as missiles.”17 This did lead to the creation of Operation Noble Eagle mission to address the asym- metric (terrorist) threat under NORAD DND/National Defence Image Library/PCN70-87 DND/National Defence auspices, and subsequently, the creation of United States Northern Command Close up of a radar antenna with the dome in the background. This DEW Line site is located at (USNORTHCOM) to inwardly address Cambridge Bay in the Arctic. homeland defence missions. NORAD is often described as the benchmark of the Canada-United States relationship, and yet it largely exists ‘beneath the political radar,’ success- fully operating in the military domain, out of sight and out of mind. As such, there are few motivating factors for either government to concentrate efforts on North American Defence. “NORAD today is largely out of sight and out of mind, best known as the organization that “tracks Santa.”16 These initiatives and shared per- spectives set the scene for the bi-national relationship, and provide the reference point as to how NORAD has diverged from its founding intent. Catalyst for Change hree factors served as a cata- T lyst for change with respect to NORAD’s focus. First was the end- Winnipeg Wing Publishing 17 ing of the Cold War, which viewed the marginalisation of the continental Figure 1: The vastness of Canada’s Arctic is graphically driven home through this overlay of Europe upon defence mission as the threat of great the region. Canadian Military Journal • Vol. 21, No. 2, Spring 2021 7 The final catalyst factor for change is the re-directed and the ability to exercise sovereign control would be hugely international focus, following the events of 9/11, towards global taxing for Canada alone, yet outsourcing to the U.S. to provide counter-terrorism operations, initially in Afghanistan and subse- this on our nation’s behalf erodes Canada’s sovereignty. Therein quently Iraq. In the absence