Backwaters of Ontology: The Special Composition Question and Its Discontents BY JANELLE DERSTINE A dissertation submitted to the Graduate School—New Brunswick Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Graduate Program in Philosophy Written under the direction of Dean Zimmerman and approved by ___________________________ ___________________________ ___________________________ ____________________________ New Brunswick, NJ October 2014 ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION Backwaters of Ontology: The Special Composition Question and its Discontents by JANELLE DERSTINE Dissertation Director: Dean Zimmerman The goal of the present work is to explore a wide variety of answers to the so- called special composition question (hereafter SCQ), which asks, given some things, the Xs, when is it that the Xs are some one thing, rather than many? For instance, given some pieces of wood, e.g., the wood (and perhaps other materials things like epoxy) compose a canoe? As with the aforementioned cases, it seems obvious that sometimes, e.g., some lumber composes a fence, some molecules compose an organism, or some quantities of alcohol compose a martini. In other situations, it seems questionable whether there is anything one could do to make some things compose another thing. For instance, is there anything one could do to make two persons and an apple pie compose one thing, some single thing such that it is two parts person and one part pie? As a rather famous example of the latter “strange kind,” David Lewis postulates “fusions” of such disparate and ii heterogeneous things as “trout-turkeys,” composed of the front half of a turkey and back half of a trout. The previous illustrations are all cases in which we can ask, when do some things become one whole, and is there a general and uniform answer to be searched for? There are three standard answers in “material object metaphysics” that philosophers have thought have some promise in answering the SCQ: sometimes, always, and never. The present work examines each of these answers, and some variants thereof, in detail. One of my primary aims is to sort the tenable answers from the untenable ones. In each chapter, I provide a general statement of the view, its alleged advantages and disadvantages, and then evaluate the cogency of arguments in favor of those allegations. In Chapter six, I argue that noncontingentism regarding existential statements about when composition occurs have often ended in stalemates. I recommend that the relevant kind of contingentism, along with an empirically informed metaphysics, will better serve those wanting to know when composition occurs, if at all, in our world. iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This dissertation would not have happened without the support of many philosophers, friends, and my family. First off, I wish to thank my parents, Elaine and John Derstine; their love and steadfast support has been a great source of encouragement and motivation over many, many years. A special thanks to Mom for the endless stream of care-packages (including: baked goods, dinners, vitamins, newspaper clippings, stamps—you name it), her sober advice, unflappable devotion, sensible fiscal guidance and assistance, intelligent conversation, and especially for all those “little-big” things moms like her do as if it was second nature (e.g., picking up feed for my horse Areion and dropping it off at a barn far away). You are amazing, mom! Onto my significant other, a certain Mr. John O’Neill. He has provided not just love and laughter, but stood stalwart as my person of refuge when the weight of the world was (as it appeared at the time) on my back again. He was and is my go-to person for everything—from bedside barista, to chess challenger, to a rockin’ night out (and in). Ahem. Anyway; moving on (tally ho). My siblings—Jeff Derstine, Joel Derstine, and Julie Fosbenner—were a wellspring of inspiration and comic relief: thank-you. Another thank-you goes out to my iv friends that hail from Philadelphia: Brubaker, Lauren Hamilton, James Tony McCalla III, and Jacqueline Mendelson deserve special thanks for helping me keep my humor and my sanity. A heartfelt thank-you to my friends and cohorts from Rutgers, in particular: S. Kate Devitt, Gabriel Greenberg, Alexander Jackson, and Bernard Molyneux, for stimulating arguments and for teaching me how to be philosophically penetrating without being accusatory or disrespectful. Lastly, the remaining crew that made this all possible: Sea-star Heidi Derstine, Barbara Evenson, Mercedes Diaz, Victor Nash, Jeff Nofziger, and my wonderful nieces and nephews: Richard Sholly, Trevor Sholly, Emma Derstine, and Quinn Derstine: you are what makes it all worthwhile! A special word of thanks goes out to my chair and my advisors: Dean Zimmerman, Ted Sider, Jonathan Schaffer, and Andy Egan. I deeply admire and respect these four amazing, authentic, and cerebral individuals more than they dare to imagine. I am eternally grateful to Dean Zimmerman in particular; the time, effort, and meticulous care he put into his advice on the present work has made it far better than I ever dreamed was possible. Ted Sider also went above and beyond; especially in the early stages, by giving detailed comments and helpful suggestions. A great many of the arguments within this dissertation would not be as strong as they are now if the suggestions of my advisors had not v imbued them with the clarity and logical precision they otherwise would have lacked. vi DEDICATION: To Jeff Derstine, in appreciation of your unwavering admiration and inexhaustible faith. vii TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION............................................................. ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................................................................... iv DEDICATION: ...................................................................................................... vii TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................ viii CHAPTER 1 ............................................................................................................. 1 1.1 A CRAZY METAPHYSIC .............................................................................. 1 1.2 CARNAP AND THE POLISH LOGICIAN .............................................. 4 1.3 HOW DID MODERATE METAPHYSICS GET LEFT BEHIND? ...... 7 1.4 WHAT LIES AHEAD .................................................................................... 13 1.5 CAVEATS AND ASSUMPTIONS ............................................................. 16 CHAPTER 2 ............................................................................................................ 17 2.1 EASY COMPANY .......................................................................................... 17 2.2 EASY CONTACT ........................................................................................... 19 2.3 EASY BONDING ............................................................................................ 21 2.4 BRUTENESS .................................................................................................... 23 2.5 MIDDLING ANSWERS TO THE SCQ ................................................... 29 2.6 OBJECTIONS TO SERIES-STYLE ............................................................ 35 2.7 REJOINDER ON BEHALF OF SERIES ................................................... 44 CHAPTER 3 ............................................................................................................ 49 3.1 HYLOMORPHISM ......................................................................................... 49 viii 3.2 KOSLICKI’S HYLOMORPHISM ............................................................... 51 3.3 OBJECTIONS TO KOSLICKI’S ACCOUNT .......................................... 61 3.4 ORGANICISM ................................................................................................ 68 3.5 OBJECTIONS TO ORGANICISM ............................................................. 73 3.6 THE ARGUMENT FROM VAGUENESS ................................................ 80 3.7 CHALLENGING THE ARGUMENT FROM VAGUENESS ............. 84 CHAPTER 4 ............................................................................................................ 96 4.1 INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 96 4.2 THE ATTRACTIVE BITS............................................................................. 97 4.3 THE BIG DEAL ............................................................................................ 104 4.4 CAI AND INNOCENCE ............................................................................ 106 4.5 AGAINST CAI S ............................................................................................ 118 4.6 CAI S DOES (NOT) ENTAIL UNIVERSALISM .................................. 132 4.7 UNIVERSALISM SANS INNOCENCE ................................................. 138 CHAPTER 5 .......................................................................................................... 146 5.1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 146 5.2 INTERNAL COHERENCE ........................................................................ 147 5.3 THE DENIAL ............................................................................................... 152 5.4 THE