Frederick Matthias Alexander and John Dewey a Neglected Influence
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FREDERICK MATTHIAS iiLEXANDER AND J A NEGLECTED; INFLUENCE by EKIC DAVID McC'>RMACK 195ft ^ / (J^^t I FREDERICK MATTHIAS ALEXAWDER AND JOHN DEWET A NEGLECTED INFLUENCE by ERIC DAVID McCORKACJi A Thesis submitted in eonfonnitj vdth the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the University of Toronto 1958 G?G5HZ UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES PROGRAMME OF THE FINAL ORAL EXAMINATION FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY of ERIC DAVID MCCORMACK 3:30 p.m., Friday, October 31, 1958 at 44 Hoskin Avenue FREDERICK MATTHIAS ALEXANDER AND JOHN DEWEY A NEGLECTED INFLUENCE COMMITTEE IN CHARGE Professor B. Wilkinson, Chairman Professor F. H. Anderson Professor T. A. Goudge Professor M. Long Professor J. C. Wey Professor J. A. Irving Professor J. M. Kelly Professor W. Line Professor L. E. Lynch Professor A. A. M aurer Professor C. E. Phillips Professor D. Savan BIOGRAPHICAL 1911 -Born, Jamaica, New York City, U.S.A. 1934 -A.B., St. Vincent College, Pennsylvania, U.S.A. 1936 -A.M., St. Vincent College, Pennsylvania, U.S A. 1943 -L.M.S., Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto 1948 -M .A. , University of Toronto 1940-45; 1957-58 -School of Graduate Studies, University of Toronto 1945-- -Assistant Professor of Philosophy, St. Vincent College. THESIS FREDERICK MATTHIAS ALEXANDER AND JOHN DEWEY: A NEGLECTED INFLUENCE (Abstract) In his eightieth year John Dewey said that he owed the concrete form of certain of his ideas to contact with the work of F. M. Alexander and his brother, A. R . "Alexander . These ideas, previously held ab- stractly, were his "theories of mind-body, of the coordination of the elements of the self and of the place of ideas in inhibition and control of overt action. " Since only two of his books. Human Nature and Conduct (1922) and Experience and Nature (1925), nnention F. M. Alexander's name, and then only in footnotes, this thesis proposes to investigate the nature and effect of Dewey's contact with the Alexanders and their work. Other references to Alexander in Dewey's published writings have been sought, and inquiry made into his association with the Alexanders. The first chapter of the thesis outlines the problem and the method of proce- dure followed. The second chapter gives a brief account of the life and writings, of F. M. Alexander, and of the general features of his doctrine. Born in Tasmania in 1869, he taught and practiced elocution in Melbourne and Sydney, Australia. A throat difficulty which resisted medical treatment led him to seek its causes for himself. This search led him to a physiological discovery upon which his subsequent theory and practice were erected. On the recommendation of doctors, he went to London in 1904, where his ideas won him significant attention from theatrical people and some prominent physicians. His first book, Man's Supreme Inheritance , was published in 1910. Before this time his writing had been confined to sporadic newspaper articles and pamphlets of a controvers- ial nature. In 1914 or 1915 he came to the United States, began teaching his technique, and published a second edition of his book which was introduced by John Dewey. Three other books followed, in 1923, 1932, and 1941, respectively, to two of which Dewey also wrote introductions. Alexander returned to England in 1943, and remained there until his death in 1955. A. R. Alexander, whose role was simply that of a practical teacher of the method, came to America in 1935 and returned to England in 1945, the year in which he died. Alexander's technique is built on the physiological premise that the integrated activity and consequent well-being of the psycho-physical organism depends upon the maintaining of a certain functional relationship between the parts of the organism. This relationship, which is his " "discovery", he first called the "position of mechanical advantage, and later the "primary control of use." It consists basically in a head- " neck-torso coordination which insures correct "use of the self. The physiological aspect of Alexander's method was later connected by his medical patrons with the work of the Dutch physiologist, Rudolph Magnus, and still later with that of the American biologist, George E. Coghill, who introduced Alexander's last book. The Universal Constant in Living (1946). Although Alexander maintained that the practice of his technique constitutes a preventive of most or all diseases, he drew conclusions which extend far beyond the physical level. He held that his discovery proved that mind and body were not separate entities, that his method promoted moral progress, and that its universal application, especially to the education of the young, was the prerequisite for the survival of civilization and for further evolutionary progress. Specific points of his doctrine are that present conditions of civilized life have rendered man's instincts and sensory equipment conoenitally unreliable, largely through incorrect postural habits which these conditions have imposed. These rigid habits have not only sub- stituted conflict and tension for coordination in man's actions, but have impaired his judgment at all levels, intellectual and moral as well as sensory. Since the operation of these habits is automatic and "below the plane of consciousness," they cannot be altered by direct voluntary acts. This is because such acts and the judgments from which they issue are framed in the false terms of the very habits which are to be remedied. The only way out of this vicious circle is to inhibit all habitual activity and at the same time set about reinstating the "primary control" at the basic, physiological level. One must concentrate not on the end to be gained in executing a given act, but, in Alexander's terminology, on the "means-whereby. " Once the "primary control" is established, it becomes the most basic of all habits, the framework within which all other habits are formed, and according to which all acts are performed. It is the fundamental, integrating principle of action and thought, and the ultimate governing factor of all "means-whereby", and of the conscious control of man's actions. The present stage of evolutionary development requires that his actions be brought at least indirectly under conscious control, since instincts which were reliable in former, less complex situations are now no longer adequate, and are even perverted. The "debauched sensory appreciation" of modern civilized man is proof of this. Dewey encountered F. M. Alexander and his teachings at a moment in his life which was critical both personally and doctrinally. In Alexander's terms, he was badly coordinated physically, and he had undergone a personal crisis in connection with his views on World War I. Doctrinally he was at a turning point in his philosophical development. The newer physiological psychologies, especially the behaviorist move- ment initiated by John B. Watson, the new social psychology, and the ethical issues connected with and following upon World War I were among the influences which caused Dewey to re-think his philosophical position at this time. This turning point, which has been noted by Ratner and Allport, the thesis places between the years 1915 and 1919, the period of Dewey's first meeting and early association with F. M . Alexander. This background material occupies the third chapter. The fourth chapter compares some of the essential doctrines of Man's Supreme Inheritance (1918) with Dewey's Human Nature and Conduct, the substance of which was presented in a series of lectures at Stanford University in 1919. Alexander's ideas are not only dis- cernible in this latter work, but he is named as the source of a theoretical position which Dewey adopts on habit, voluntary action and related questions. Although the theme of Human Nature and Conduct is much broader than Alexander's psycho-physical theories (Dewey called it "An Introduction to Social Psychology"), nevertheless the discussion revolves around the notion of habit in each of the three parts of the book. Alexander's influence on various issues, in addition to Dewey's express identification of it, is pointed out. The priority of habit to right activity leads to a discussion of habits of sensation in relation to know- ledge and thinking, touching incidentally on the mind-body relation, a discussion of means and ends in action, the relation of habits to character, and the socio-ethical nature of the latter. Habit, earlier considered by Dewey to be constitutive of mind and, in its operative aspect, of intelligence, is now declared to constitute will. By providing a technique whereby rigid, unthinking habits can be brought under integrated, flexible, conscious control, Alexander seems to have enabled Dewey to see nnore concretely how readjustements to environmental considerations, physical, social, and even moral, might be effected. In the fifth and final chapter the importance of some aspects of Alexander's doctrine for Dewey's philosophy is taken up. Particular attention is given to two basic theses of Alexander which, if scientifically warranted, would have far-reaching implications for the whole of Dewey's thought. These are (1) that all or most of the civilized world suffers from faulty and deceptive "sensory appreciation, " and (2) that there exists in man a basic integrating mechanism which normally would coordinate all bodily activities, and which Alexander discovered, described, and employed in his technique. The contention that the sensory equipment of civilized man is seriously impaired has important implications for the doctrine of Human Nature and Conduct . Sensations and perceptions are integral factors in cognition and judgment, so that defects in the former imply correlative defects in the latter. Further, if conduct is moral and essentially social, then civilized society is laboring under serious defects, and is by the nature of the case perpetuating them.