Digital Developments: Extremists’ Use of Modern Communications Tools March 2019 Digital Developments Extremists’ Use of Modern Communication Tools The rapid adoption of state-of-the-art communication tools—with an emphasis on Internet-based applications—has been critical to the organization, expansion, and success of terrorist networks. Terror groups use modern communication technology in myriad ways, from fundraising, radicalization, and recruitment, to issuing threats, inciting violence, and planning attacks. While Osama bin Laden used fax machines and satellite phones in the 1990s, the early 2000s saw a boom in new media applications that enabled terrorists to communicate undetected across borders more swiftly and effectively. The Internet essentially became another extremist battlefield. Encrypted software became a popular modus operandi for jihadists, and many groups established media departments and online recruitment magazines such as al-Qaeda’s Inspire. ISIS’s communications tactics, such as its high production value beheading videos and its “Mujatweets,” have grabbed international headlines. The terror group has hacked thousands of international websites, replacing their content with pro-ISIS messages. In January 2015, ISIS hacked the social media accounts of the U.S. Central Command and posted the personal contact information of numerous retired military officers, waging psychological warfare on men and women in uniform. Lone-wolf terrorists have also taken advantage of advancements in digital communications. In March 2019, a suspected white supremacist livestreamed shooting attacks on two New Zealand mosques that left at least 50 people dead. The suspect broadcasted the massacre on his Facebook account, where he also posted his manifesto. Terrorists’ use of communication technology has shifted tremendously in the past two decades, demanding a greater understanding of these new threats—and a strategy to deal with them. “The time has come to have the media take its rightful place, to carry out its required role in confronting this aggressive campaign and the open declared Crusader war by all means that can be seen, heard, and read.” – Osama bin Laden, 2002 (Source: Terrorism and Political Violence) 1990-1996 Payphones, Cellphones, and Encrypted Emails Throughout the 1990s, al-Qaeda operatives communicate via public pay phones, cellphones, and encrypted emails sent from Internet cafés throughout Asia and the Middle East. Osama bin Laden’s operatives also store and disseminate information on CD-ROM disks. (Source: PBS NOVA) 1996-1998 1 Satellite Telephones In November 1996, al-Qaeda operative Ziyad Khalil purchases an Inmarsat Compact M satellite phone and more than 3,000 pre-paid hours from a suburb in upstate New York. It retails at $15,000 and is the size of a laptop computer. The phone is for Osama bin Laden, who uses the device to coordinate terror activities from his hideout in a mountainous region of Afghanistan. The satellite phone works by bouncing phone calls off of an Inmarsat satellite in orbit above the Indian Ocean. For two years, bin Laden and his military operations chief Mohammed Atef use the satellite phone to make more than 900 calls to al-Qaeda operatives in Britain, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the U.S., and Yemen. Using the satellite phone, bin Laden organizes the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Bin Laden stops using the satellite phone in August 1998 following the embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania out of fear that the connection is not secure. Instead, he begins to rely on couriers to hand-deliver his messages. (Sources: Bloomberg Business, PBS Frontline, RAND, Wall Street Journal, BBC News, Secret Intelligence: A Reader, PBS NOVA) August 1996 / Fax Machines, Television, Radio and Print Media Osama bin Laden releases a video of his first fatwa, or religious decree. He also faxes the text of the fatwa to Arab newspaper al-Quds al-Arabi in London for publication. The fatwa, titled “Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places,” authorizes attacks on Western military targets in the Arabian Peninsula. Bin Laden declares there is “no more important duty than pushing the American enemy out of the holy land.” In the following years, al-Qaeda releases numerous video and audiotapes—often through mail or messenger—to Arab news stations such as Qatari-owned Al Jazeera and Saudi-owned al- Arabiya. (Sources: NBC, Telegraph, PBS Newshour, Heritage Foundation, U.S. Congress Archive, NBC) 1997-present / The World Wide Web, Online forums, and Television Programs Controversial Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood cleric Yusuf al-Qaradawi founds Islamonline.net in Doha, Qatar in 1997. The website serves as a forum providing young Muslims with information on politics, family, and social issues. Around the same time, Qaradawi launches a television program on Al Jazeera called al-Sharia wa al-Hayah, “Sharia and Life,” on which he lectures on extremist Islam. Through his website and television series, Qaradawi calls for the murder of British and American troops in Iraq, the execution of homosexuals, and the murder of Jews. He also supports domestic violence to enforce a woman’s submission. 2 (Sources: Guardian, MEMRI, Guardian, Middle East Forum, Spiegel) Yusuf al-Qaradawi (Source: AFP) 1998 / Al Jazeera In February 1998, Osama bin Laden faxes his second fatwa, “Declaration of the World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and the Crusaders,” to al-Quds al-Arabi for publication. (Source: Foreign Affairs) During the summer, bin Laden sends a fax from Afghanistan to London-based cleric Omar Bakri Mohammed, a militant Islamist leader who claims to be the “mouth, eyes and ears of Osama bin Laden.” The fax contains instructions for holy war against the U.S.: “Bring down their airliners. Prevent the safe passage of their ships. Occupy their embassies. Force the closure of their companies and banks.” (Source: Los Angeles Times) Al-Qaeda begins using Al Jazeera as a conduit for broadcasting bin Laden’s messages. Al Jazeera then provides the videos to CNN and other Western media outlets. Bin Laden eventually agrees to an interview with Al Jazeera, hoping to help disseminate al-Qaeda’s message. Critics of the television station claim that by cooperating with bin Laden, Al Jazeera becomes a participant in the conflict rather than just an impartial observer. (Sources: Marshall Center, Guardian, NBC) 3 Bin Laden’s second fatwa published in Al-Quds al-Arabi newspaper (Source: BBC) Early 2000s Media Departments Al-Qaeda launches the Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF) and the Al-Fajr Media Center. GIMF provides translation and dissemination, while Al-Fajr supports network usage and enables numerous websites and media outlets to host the same video content. (Source: Forensic Science Communications- FBI) September 2000 Al-Qaeda launches its new media department, “As-Sahab.” In one of its first videos, also aired by Al Jazeera, bin Laden calls for more attacks on the U.S. The video is released just three weeks before the bombing of the USS Cole. As-Sahab proves to be an important force for al-Qaeda. The media arm is responsible for producing video files of interviews, documentaries, speeches, and news programs, and disseminates these videos from central and southeastern Afghanistan. As-Sahab also serves as an official source, verifying the legitimacy of al-Qaeda’s videos. By 2005, As-Sahab produces its videos in formats that can be watched on a cellphone, broadening its reach and influence. The video and audiotapes serve to galvanize recruits and fighters, provide footage of attacks, claim responsibility for attacks, issue threats, and offer incentives to fighters. (Sources: Marshall Center, NBC, Telegraph, PBS Newshour, Heritage Foundation, U.S. Congress Archive, NPR, NBC, Washington Times, The Globalization of Martyrdom) 4 As-Sahab Media Department Logo (Source: As-Sahab) 2001 The American-Yemeni Islamist militant Anwar al-Awlaki, dubbed the “bin Laden of the Internet,” releases hundreds of his sermons online. The videos and recordings are further disseminated by jihadi websites. By 2008, Awlaki is “all over YouTube and the rest of the Internet, and his website [is] skyrocketing in readership,” according to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (Sources: ICSR, Huffington Post, USA Today) June 2001 Osama bin Laden celebrates the October 2000 attack on the USS Cole in a recruitment video released by As-Sahab. Bin Laden calls on Muslims to join his jihad, and urges viewers to distribute the video. The Associated Press and Reuters publish the video. (Sources: NBC, ABC News, The Globalization of Martyrdom) September 11, 2001 The 9/11 hijackers use conventional email and online chat rooms to gather basic intelligence on targets, share information, and coordinate the attacks. They also use the Internet to steal Social Security numbers and obtain fake drivers’ licenses. Any messages sent between the hijackers are coded or encrypted. (Sources: United States Institute of Peace, MIT Technology Review) Following 9/11, al-Qaeda moves towards a more decentralized structure resulting in its heavy reliance on new media. The simultaneous expansion of the World Wide Web enables continued communication between its operatives. The terror group expands its influence through the online publication of written statements, blogs, online Arabic-language magazines, and articles written by its ideological leaders. The number of jihadi websites metastasizes in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. Notable websites include al-Qaeda’s “Alneda.com” and the online jihadi forum “Qalah.” Alneda.com acts as a 5 clearinghouse for al-Qaeda leadership statements, and displays pictures of the 2001 Afghan war, celebrations of the 9/11 hijackers, and lengthy theological justifications for jihad. In July 2002, a statement on Alneda.com reads: “The U.S. enemy, unable to gain the upper hand over the mujahedin on the battlefield, has since Sept. 11 been trying to gag the world media… America will lose the media war, too.” During this time, Anwar al-Awlaki becomes involved in Qaradawi’s Islamonline.net.