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The US Environmental Protection Agency The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency A Historical Perspective on Its Role in Environmental Protection Inaugural-Dissertation zur Erlangung des Doktorgrades der Philosophie an der Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München vorgelegt von Xin Liu München 2010 Erstgutachter: Prof. Dr. Michael Hochgeschwender Zweitgutachter: Prof. Dr. Christof Mauch Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: 07.07.2010 Liu iii Table of Contents Lists of Tables…………………………………..………………………………………………….vi Lists of Figures……………………………………………………………………………………vii Lists of Abbreviations…………………………………………………………………………...viii 1. Introduction…………………………………………………….………………………....1 1.1. Environmental Protection: Preconditions, Push-Factor and Value Change……......…1 1.2. Development of Federal Environmental Protection from the Nixon to the Clinton Administration………………………………………………………………………...5 1.3. Description of this Study……………………………………………………………...8 1.3.1. Why does this Study focus on the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency? ….8 1.3.2. Why does this Study focus on the Era from 1970 to 2000? …………………...9 1.3.3. Subject, Method and Procedures……………………………………………...11 2. The EPA Context: Origins, Principles and Legacies………………………………….20 2.1. The Context of the EPA’s Organization……………………………………………..20 2.1.1. The EPA’s Goals, Responsibilities and Functions……………………………22 2.1.2. Organizational Structure……………………………………………………....23 2.1.3. Environmental Regulation Process……………………………………………32 2.2. Political Involvement in the EPA’s Decision-making and Development…………...34 2.2.1. The President, his Administration, and the EPA……………………………...34 2.2.2. Congress and the EPA………………………………………………………...38 2.2.3. Courts………………………………………………………………………….41 2.2.4. Interest Groups………………………………………………………………...47 3. The Historical Context: Shaping the EPA, and its Changing Roles………………….61 3.1. The EPA under the Nixon-Ford Administration…..………………………………... 62 Liu iv 3.1.1. Environmental Understanding from President Nixon………………………...62 3.1.2. Environmental Understanding from Administrator Ruckelshaus and Administrator Train…………………………………………………………....65 3.1.3. Presidential Election of 1972………………………………………………….67 3.1.4. The EPA under Administrator William Ruckelshaus…………………………68 3.1.5. Energy Crisis and the Fading of Environmental Protection………………......75 3.1.6. The EPA under Administrator Russell Train………………………………….77 3.1.7. “Quality of Life” Review……………………………………………………...84 3.1.8. Congress, Courts and the EPA………………………………………………...86 3.1.9. Interests Groups and the EPA…………………………………………………90 3.2. The EPA under the Carter Administration…………………………………………...95 3.2.1. Strengthening Environmental Enforcement with Civil Litigation…………….97 3.2.2. The EPA pursuing Superfund Legislation on Hazardous Waste……………...98 3.2.3. Establishing the Bubble Policy……………………………………………….101 3.2.4. Regulatory Reform from the Carter Administration…………………………102 3.2.5. Interest Groups and Court……………………………………………………107 3.3. The EPA under the Reagan Administration………………………………………...110 3.3.1. Environmental Stand from President Reagan………………………………..112 3.3.2. Administrator Anne Gorsuch Burford……………………………………….113 3.3.3. The Change from William Ruckelshaus……………………………………..114 3.3.4. Administrator Lee M. Thomas………………………………………………114 3.3.5. The EPA under President Reagan and his administrators…………………...115 3.3.5.1. The EPA under Administrator Anne Gorsuch Burford……………..116 3.3.5.2. The EPA under Administrator William Ruckelshaus……………….119 3.3.5.3. The EPA under Administrator Lee Thomas…………………………123 Liu v 3.3.6. Federal Regulatory Reform from the “Quality of Life” Reviews to Reagan’s Regulatory Relief……………………………………………………………..129 3.3.7. Congress, Court and the EPA………………………………………………..138 3.3.8. Interests Groups and the EPA………………………………………………..146 3.4. The EPA under the George H. W. Bush Administration…………………………...153 3.5. The EPA under the Clinton Administration………………………….......................166 3.5.1. President Clinton and Vice-President Gore…………………………..............167 3.5.2. Administrator Carol Browner………………...………....................................168 3.5.3. The Optimistic Beginning…………………………........................................169 3.5.4. Hard Reality in Clinton’s First Two Years……………...…………...............170 3.5.5. Clinton’s Achievement on Environmental Protection……………………….172 3.5.6. EPA Initiatives under Administrator Browner…..……………………..........175 3.5.7. Congress, Court and the EPA……………..…………....................................192 3.5.8. Interest Groups and the EPA………...………………....................................198 4. Case Study: Automobile Emissions………………………….......................................204 4.1. What are Automobile Emissions?…………………………......................................204 4.2. The EPA Role in Controlling Automobile Emissions…………………………........205 5. Conclusion…………………………................................................................................215 5.1. Strategies, Methods and Problems in the EPA’s Roles……………………………..215 5.1.1. Strategies and Economic Incentives forming the EPA’s Roles from the Nixon to the Clinton Administration…...……………………....................................219 5.1.2. Problems………………...………....................................................................226 5.2. The EPA and Science……………...…………..........................................................229 Workcited………………………….................................................................................233 Liu vi Lists of Tables Table 1: Patterns of Party Control of Congress and the Presidency, 1972-2000……………12 Table 2: Media and Functional Offices……………………………………………………...32 Table 3: Principal Congressional Oversight Committee and Subcommittees (1993)……….40 Table 4: Membership Trends of Selected National Environmental Organizations………….52 Table 5: Registrants for Environmental Issues by Organizational Type…………………….58 Table 6: Client for Environmental Issues by Organizational Type………………………….58 Table 7: The Regulation Reform Act………………………………………………………104 Table 8: Regulatory Reform Bills, 1979-1980……………………………………………..105 Table 9: History of Regulatory Analysis…………………………………………………...131 Table 10: The EPA’ Major Rules…………………………………………………………..134 Table 11: The EPA’s Benefit-cost Analyses: 1981-86……………………………………..135 Table 12: Selected Cumulative Environmental Benefits…………………………………...186 Table 13: The EPA’s Budget and Workforce, 1970-2003………………………………….217 Table 14: EPA Research and Development Budget Appropriations Account Compared with EPA Budget Authority, FY 1976-1996…………………………………….230 Liu vii Lists of Figures Figure 1: The EPA’s Budget and Workforce, 1970-2003…………………………………...13 Figure 2: Functions Transferred to the EPA from other Agencies…………………………..24 Figure 3: The EPA’s Organizational Structure in 1970……………………………………...27 Figure 4: The EPA’s Organizational Chart in 1971…………………………………………28 Figure 5: The EPA’s Current Organizational Chart…………………………………………29 Figure 6: Geographic Areas Serviced by the EPA’s Ten Regional Offices…………………31 Figure 7: Executive Branch Agencies with Environmental Responsibilities………………..37 Figure 8: The Dual Court System……………………………………………………………44 Figure 9: Environmental Laws Passed, Protest Activity and Public Opinion, 1960-1998……………………………………………………………….60 Figure 10: Sources of Auto Emissions……………………………………………………..206 Figure 11: Basic Controls for Exhaust and Evaporative Emissions………………………..206 Figure 12: Typical Canister System for Evaporative Emissions…………………………...208 Figure 13: EPA Research and Development Budget Appropriations Account Compared with EPA Budget Authority, FY 1976-1996……………….231 Liu viii Lists of Abbreviations AQA Air Quality Act AQCR Air Quality Control Region AWF African Wildlife Foundation BLM Bureau of Land Management BOB Bureau of the Budget CAA Clean Air Act CAFE Corporate Average Fuel Economy CEQ Council on Environmental Quality CERCLA Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act CPSC Consumer Product Safety Commission CRE Center for Regulatory Effectiveness CSE Citizens for a Sound Economy CWA Clean Water Act CWPS Council on Wage and Price Stability DOE U.S. Department of Energy DOJ U.S. Department of Justice DOT U.S. Department of Transportation EDF Environmental Defense Fund EIS Environmental Impact Statement EOP Executive Office of the President EPA U.S. Environmental Protection Agency EPCRA Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act FDA Food and Drug Administration FEA Federal Energy Agency Fed. Reg. Federal Register Liu ix FEO Federal Energy Office FFDCA Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act FIFRA Federal Insecticides, Fungicides, and Rodenticides Act FOIA Freedom of Information Act FQPA Food Quality Protection Act FWPCA Federal Water Pollution Control Act GAO Government Accountability Office GDP Gross Domestic Product GNP Gross National Product HEW U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare HSWA Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments HUD U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development HWETF Hazardous Waste Enforcement Task Force IEA International Energy Agency LCV League of Conservation Voters LEV Low Emission Vehicle MTBE Methyl Tertiary-Butyl Ether NAAQS National Ambient Air Quality Standard NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration NEJAC National Environmental Justice Advisory Council NEPA National Environmental Policy Act NIMBY No-In-My-Backyard NPDES National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System NRC National Research Council NRDC Natural Resources Defense Council NWF National Wildlife Federation Liu x OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development OEO Office of Economic Opportunity
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