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COLLECTIVE BICKERING: THE 1970 POSTAL STRIKE AND LABOR’S DECLINE
______
A Thesis
Presented to the
Faculty of
California State University, Fullerton ______
In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts
in
Public History ______
By
Matthew Franklin
Thesis Committee Approval:
Alison Varzally, Department of History, Chair Volker Janssen, Department of History Carrie Lane, Department of American Studies
Spring, 2018
ABSTRACT
The 1970 Postal Strike, beyond being the largest wildcat strike in U.S. history, served as an important milestone in the decline of the American labor movement in the second half of the twentieth century. The events of the strike, the rank-and-file’s reasons behind the demonstration, and their leadership’s response revealed the major flaws and problems that kept unions from maintaining their power after the 1960s: members’ feelings of disrespect from union leaders, said leaders’ unwillingness to adapt to the changing times, and a president and congress that focused less on mutual cooperation and more on “trimming the fat” of government spending. Although postal employees succeeded in gaining pay raises and numerous benefits, the lack of meaningful reform and union democratization failed to correct many of the major issues that caused the strike in the first place.
The decades following the postal strike show a series of events that confirm 1970 as the start of a national trend toward a more austere political and economic atmosphere—and a sign that American labor as a single entity could not adapt to this change. This failure to adapt allowed anti-union elements within the government to turn public opinion against organized labor and further speed its decline.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT ...... ii
Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION ...... 1
2. LACK OF RESPECT TO THE RANK-AND-FILE ...... 16
3. UNWILLINGNESS TO ADAPT ...... 22
4. EVOLVING OPPOSITION IN BUSINESS AND POLITICS ...... 37
BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 59
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In March of 1970, postal workers in New York City made a very important decision. For decades, the postal service refused to address the growing volume of mail, the deteriorating workplaces, and the stagnant pay of its employees. Despite the need for drastic improvement, both management and union leadership failed to address and act on these problems, thus leaving the rank-and-file members of the postal unions no choice but to implore Congress for better pay and conditions on their own in an act referred to by them as “Collective Begging.”1 With conditions continuing to worsen and the government ignoring their pleas, the members of the Manhattan National Association of
Letter Carriers (NALC) branch 36 voted to go on a “wildcat strike”—a strike without the authorization or planning of the union leadership. This demonstration was not only illegal but unprecedented in the 178 year history of the United States Postal Office Department.
The act of one local branch tapped into a well of discontent and anger so deep, the scope of the strike surprised even the members who started it. In the span of barely a week, the strike spread from coast to coast, involving over two hundred thousand postal workers and effectively crippled the infrastructure of major U.S. hubs like New York, Chicago, and San Francisco. Leaders of postal unions including the NALC, the National Postal
Mail Handlers Union (NPMHU), and the National Rural Letter Carriers Association
1 Harry Reasoner, CBS New Special Report, March 22, 1970.
2
(NRLCA), failed to predict the anger of the workers, and fought desperately to regain control of the situation. From March 18th to its end on March 25th, workers refused to listen to the orders of either union leadership or federal government officials, even
President Nixon himself.
The nationwide demonstration, to this day the biggest wildcat strike in U.S. history, saw the reformation of the Post Office Department into a corporate entity and the merger of five different postal unions into the American Postal Workers Union (APWU).
The leadership’s realization they could not contain the strike changed their goal from ending it immediately to placating its participants into submission. The striking postal employees received higher pay, amnesty regarding the strike, and the right to directly negotiate with congress. However, many criticized their union leadership for acquiescing too quickly and failing to address long-standing issues regarding union democratization.
Despite the unexpected and uncontrolled nature of the strike, President Nixon successfully maneuvered for a less costly alternative to the inefficient Post Office
Department—something that benefitted the government more than its postal workers.
The strike represents a failure of the American labor movement, a time when the rhetoric of union leaders could not measure up to the reality of their broken promises.
The year 1970 sits as a turning point not only for postal workers, but for the nation itself. In addition to uncertainties and divisions wrought by the war in Vietnam and the social movements of the 1960s, the advance of automation and globalization reduced manufacturing jobs that formed the backbone of American labor. In response, the government began a massive change in approach: rather than actively trying to nurture a
“Great Society” as President Johnson described it, a more austere and conservative
3 federal government would encourage a more cut-throat and individualistic society in an effort to keep the American economy competitive. As a result, blue collar workers grew more and more unsure of their futures, and looked to the leaders of the nation—whether in labor, government, or American culture—to help them understand these changes and adapt. The leaders of the AFL-CIO and its associated unions largely failed in this responsibility. The disruption of the rank and file postal workers during the wildcat strike and the response of labor and government leaders proves this point by highlighting three major reasons for the decline of the greater American labor movement: First, the AFL-
CIO’s lack of respect and understanding of the workers’ grievances toward their problems, both economic and social; Second, an overly cautious leadership that refused to sufficiently adapt to stagnation and changing circumstances; Third, the U.S. government’s change in approach from supporting and cooperating with labor to treating them as the enemy.
While the issues of distrust and resentment in the rank-and-file, complacency in the union leadership, and oppositional factions in the federal government existed in some part in the preceding decades, they became increasingly prevalent and obvious during the rapid changes of the mid-twentieth century. The decline of labor that accelerated in the
1960s stemmed in part from union leadership’s missed realization: that the social fervor of the mid-twentieth century constituted the same unrest that fueled labor’s greatest victories during the Great Depression. By the 1970s, the economies of World War II combatants like Germany and Japan recovered to the point where they could directly compete with the U.S. on the global market. Likewise, Middle-Eastern nations like Iran grew more and more resistant to American pressure—as seen with the emergence of the
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Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). As other nations began to assert their own influence back onto the world stage, the United States faced the reality of its own faltering hegemony. Fewer people lined up to purchase American products, and events like the 1973 Oil embargo signaled an end to the relative economic security of the preceding twenty five years—a security that encouraged and protected the unity of labor.
With workers enjoying good pay and job security, many were unwilling to “rock the boat” when it came to reform or democratization of their unions. In the words of AFL-
CIO president George Meany: “we now have a membership that’s got a great deal more to lose by a strike than they had when wages were low and they didn’t have the pension rights and insurance rights and all this sort of thing . . . they’ve got kids going to college.”2
Despite the progress of the labor movement and the new financial and political gains for its members, these benefits also hid a number of fundamental issues regarding
American labor: a lack of respect towards its rank and file, The 1970s saw many
Americans growing frustrated and doubtful by the nation’s perceived decline, and they needed reassurance that they could affect real and positive change in their country.
Whereas labor previously spearheaded this movement in the 1930s and grew strong for it, the failure to recognize and capitalize on this sentiment forty years later arguably brought that period of strength to an end. The failure to predict and adapt to changing circumstances such as the Civil rights movements and economic globalization stemmed in a big way from the national leadership’s stubborn and overly-cautious attitude.3
2 George Meany, interview by George Hermann, Face the Nation, CBS, September 6, 1970.
3 Jefferson Cowie, Staying Alive: The 1970s and the Last Days of the Working Class (New York, NY: The New Press, 2010), 3.
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The prosperity of the “Golden Age” of American labor—mainly the 1930s to the
1960s—may give the impression that issues like corruption, complacency, and disrespect for American workers largely abated. However, major events like the widespread economic downturn of the 1970s and America’s attempts to adapt reveal this is not the case. The wildcat Postal Strike of 1970 stands as a great example of this: a lens through which the modern reader can gain an understanding of labor’s missteps coming into a new era of American history.
Beyond the widespread disruption of American infrastructure, the reorganization of the
Post Office highlighted the change in government sentiment regarding business and the role of the government, and the strike itself shook the foundation of the relationship between leadership and the rank and file. The federal government’s new focus on
“trimming the fat” caused union leadership to balance their negotiations with employers against avoiding a more contentious relationship with the White House and Congress.
With their attention focused elsewhere, they further marginalized the needs of their rank and file members, who wanted support and guidance more than ever during the uncertain transitionary period of the 1970s.
If the 1970 wildcat proves such an important milestone, why then, is this strike not explored further? With the exception of a few labor law journals in the seventies and the internal publications of postal unions like the NALC, this strike does not carry the same interest in the greater realm of historical academia. The major body of work in regards to the strike lies with Philip F. Rubio, a labor historian who formerly worked as a veteran letter carrier himself. Within the prologue of his book, There’s Always Work in the Post Office, Rubio cites the initial inspiration for his book as his interaction with his
6 co-workers, many of whom participated in the strike. While hearing their personal stories on the struggles of the postal workers and the disruption of their rank-and-file rebellion,
Rubio himself wondered why so few accounts of their efforts persisted into the present day.4 Furthermore, Rubio brings up the fact that public sector labor unions in general don’t receive the same attention as their private-sector counterparts, and that only in the past few years is the body of work on the subject expanding with works like From the
Jaws of Victory by Matt Garcia and On the Ground by Liesl Miller Orenic.5 From the
Jaws of Victory addressed the trials of Caesar Chavez and the United Farm Workers who confronted significant opposition from other unions, and benefited from the support of
Governor Pat Brown. On the Ground by Liesl Miller Orenic discussed the emergence of airline unions, and how unskilled airline employees like baggage handlers eventually found success in unionizing by crossing craft lines and organizing with airline mechanics.
The lack of attention to workers in both the public and private sector as well as the strike itself motivated him to collect their stories and assemble a full chronology of the strike that brought widespread disruption to the nation and asserted the power of several massive unions formerly neglected. A work equally important for understanding the context for the strike as well as its effects is Jefferson Cowie’s book Staying Alive. Cowie writes in-depth about the general malaise of the 1970s after the tumultuous social activism of the civil rights and anti-movements in the previous decade, and the effects of
America’s decline from the post-World War II “golden age.” Cowie’s work blends
4 Philip F. Rubio, There’s Always Work at the Post Office: African American Postal Workers and the Fight for Jobs, Justice, and Equality (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2010), xi – xiii.
5 Phillip F. Rubio, “Who Remembers the Nationwide Postal Wildcat Strike of 1970 (And Why Does That Matter)?, Save the Post Office, March 20, 2015, https://savethepostoffice.com/who-remembers- nationwide-postal-wildcat-strike-1970-and-why-does-matter/
7 perfectly with Rubio’s research into the postal unions and the 1970 strike, and this intersection sheds much insight into transformation of the United States and its labor movement during the twentieth century.
This research will show how the 1970 strike signified a transitionary period for the American labor movement. The passing of the Wagner Act in 1935 gave unions true recognition within the U.S. government, and forced businesses to treat them as official institutions, while the hardships of the Great Depression convinced many of a union’s necessity. Leaders like Walter Reuther of the United Auto Workers and John L. Lewis of the United Mine Workers of America connected with their rank-and-file members and inspired them into demonstrations that turned their jobs into gainful employment, which helped to establish the period of American middle-class prosperity that lasted decades.
By 1970, however, the labor movement, under the guidance of George Meany and the
AFL-CIO, saw their gains threatened by economic decline and civil unrest, while dealing with a buildup of resentment from dues-paying members who no longer felt the connection to their elected officials that they once did. The leaders’ reluctance to proactively correct these issues turned the 1970s into a time of great uncertainty, as blue collar workers no longer fully trusted their unions to aid and protect them during the period of globalization and automation. By the 1980s, the political right formed into a firmly anti-labor organization, which capitalized on this uncertainty as well as the complacent leadership and internal conflicts within the labor movement itself. Politicians like Ronald Reagan and George Schultz succeeded in convincing many Americans that unions were obsolete, inefficient institutions that stood as an obstacle to a healthy U.S. economy.
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This transformation becomes especially apparent when comparing the 1970 postal strike with the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO) strike of 1981.
While the decades following the passing of the Wagner Act stood as a time of great strength and success for American labor, the 1970 strike revealed the emerging schism between union leadership and its rank-and-file. The 1981 strike revealed how the discrepancy between the wants of the dues-paying members and the goals of their elected leaders advanced another change in labor’s place in American society, this time for the worse. Rather than an accepted and important part of the American economy, the public saw the conflict and hand wringing within these unions and began to once again question whether labor had a place in society, in a situation similar to before the Wagner Act.
Despite Nixon’s reluctance to acquiesce to the postal worker’s demands, the wildcat strike ultimately succeeded in securely pay raises and bargaining rights. By comparison,
PATCO’s strike was an unmitigated failure, causing the termination of thousands of air traffic controllers as well as the dissolution of the union itself.
Though separated by only eleven years, these two events show the difference in the success of strikes in regards to support from the administration and the American people. Nixon clearly wished to exert a more business-like approach to such an important segment of government infrastructure, but lacked the support and political capital to effect his desired change. He needed to settle for compromise. Reagan, on the other hand, capitalized on the benefits of a more austere political landscape and an American public more disillusioned to organized labor. Reagan’s enormous triumph revealed the rise of anti-labor conservative thinking in the United States. Nixon’s more careful and diplomatic approach denoted the different political atmosphere only eleven years earlier:
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The American public held a distrust of authority and major unilateral decisions. Nixon’s approach stemmed from the need to avoid this title and prevent his administration from earning the ire of the people. Less obvious, however, is the fact that the Reagan’s (and by extension, the neo-liberalist figures of the time’s) efforts were aided by these long- standing issues with the labor movement—a lack of nation-wide unity across the AFL-
CIO, heavy-handed tactics in regards to their own rank and file members, and a less-than- proactive approach to the country’s changes in the twentieth century. These issues led to the 1970 Postal Strike, exacerbated its length and magnitude, and were ultimately not addressed.
Many labor historians consider the General Motors Sit-Down a turning point for
American labor. Until that point, unions largely operated on opposite sides of the economic spectrum: either militant groups on the fringes of society striving for social and economic change, or isolated pockets of skilled workers pooling their collective manpower within the existing industrial landscape. With the passing of the National
Labor Relations Act of 1935 (named “the Wagner Act” after New York senator Robert F.
Wagner)6, the American labor movement gained official and irrevocable federal recognition through the newly formed National Labor Relations Board and became an inexorable part of the American economy. While solidly a victory for organized labor, it came with a price. With the passing of an act that could affect the way labor and business interacted nationwide, it allowed opposition to target labor as one collective group. Prior to 1935, unions existed largely as one of two radically different groups: a relatively small and conservative group, almost invariably organized along specific crafts; conversely,
6 “The 1935 Passage of the Wagner Act,” National Labor Relations Board, https://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/our-history/1935-passage-wagner-act.
10 they could take the form of a socially-reactionary group often organized according to entire industries to bolster their numbers and influence, like the Industrial Workers of the
World (IWW)—whose co-founder Eugene Debs once stated, “the most heroic word in all languages is revolution.”7 Though both ostensibly worked toward the same economic end—greater influence over their pay and workplace—these two basic archetypes had different goals and occupied very different places in the political and social landscape.
The Wagner act gave them influence at a price—to enjoy the protection of the United
States government, unions had to “play by the rules.”
One of the major underlying reasons for the Postal Strike came about through these rules. The act guaranteed American workers the right to form unions and bargain collectively for better pay and conditions, even to go on strike if negotiations failed.
However, it specifically exempted public employees from these rights under the reasoning that the workers could directly bargain with the federal government. This decision came about through a concern that while private sector unions held a personal interest in the continued prosperity of its employer, a public sector union could effectively “bleed” the government of taxpayer dollars. Congress saw fit to handle pay and working condition disputes themselves, believing they could adequately gauge fair pay for its employees and remain proactive enough to address the issue before more drastic measures became necessary.
Regardless of this exclusion, the act allowed private-sector unions to make a string of victories against unfair work practices and oppressively low pay. With the official legal and political support, American labor made its greatest victories and met
7 "Revolution" in New York Worker (27 April 1907).
11 with success not seen before or since: the United Auto Workers (UAW) won a five percent raise, the right to talk during their lunches, but most importantly, the rank and file’s faith in their ability to get results. In the following year, UAW membership skyrocketed from thirty thousand to five hundred thousand members.8 John L. Lewis inspired the members of the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA) in 1946, granting health benefits and retirement for miners and their families.9 But labor’s biggest break also paved the way for the creation of one of its biggest hurtles. The Taft-Hartley
Act, passed only twelve years after the Wagner Act’s official recognition of labor unions, sought to change several fundamental aspects of the new labor-management relationship.
In the interim between 1935 and the act’s passing in 1947, congress saw two hundred and thirty separate attempts to change the Wagner Act or repeal it outright—a great example of the constant opposition toward organized labor. The act’s changes included the allowance of “right-to-work” laws, which prevented “closed shop” workplaces that required union membership. It also barred management from negotiating with the union alongside the ordinary employees. Perhaps most importantly, it forbade “secondary” strikes, in which other unions could join an existing strike as a sign of solidarity.10 In the following decades (and even to this day) these conditions fostered an adversarial
8 BBC, "The 1936 - 37 Flint, Michigan Sit-Down Strike," Last modified February 6, 2012. http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/place-london/A672310.
9 "The Promise of 1946," Umwa.org, last modified 2013-11-11, http://umwa.org/news- media/journal/the-promise-of-1946/.
10 “1947 Taft-Hartley Substantive Provisions,” National Labor Relations Board. https://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/our-history/1947-taft-hartley-substantive-provisions.
12 relationship between workers and management, severely limited the impact of major strikes, and allowed individual states to set up hard barriers against union expansion.11
Public sector unions enjoyed federal protections that private sector unions did not.
However, they faced a different set of dangers though: a public employee union could have its rules and regulations drastically changed not just by congress, but by the president himself—even congressional approval was not necessary to affect the course of organized labor. Executive Orders could dictate how, when, or even if unions could negotiate with their employers—for better or worse, provided congress did not pass a bill to counteract the President’s order. President Kennedy proved a more understanding president to public employees, passing Executive Order 10988 on January 16, 1962, allowing federal employees to collectively bargain.12 The order came out of a recommendation in a report filed by the Task Force on Employee-Management relations in the Federal Service the previous year. “A continuous history, going back three quarters of a century has established beyond any reasonable doubt that certain categories of
Federal employees very much want to participate in the formulation of personnel policies and have established large and stable organizations for this purpose. This is not a challenge to be met so much as an opportunity to be embraced.”13 This act is considered an important milestone, and one of the primary reasons public employee unionization
11 Harry S Truman, “Veto of the Taft-Hartley Act,” June 20, 1947, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12675.
12 John F. Kennedy, “Executive Order 10988,” Jan 17, 1962, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=58926.
13 President’s Task Force on Employee Management Relations in the Federal Service, “A Policy for Employee—Management Relations in the Federal Service,” Nov 30, 1961, https://www.flra.gov/system/files/webfm/FLRA%20Agency- wide/50th%20Anniversary%20EO%2010988/Report%20of%20President%20Kennedy's%20Task%20Forc e.pdf.
13 surpasses that of the private sector; for the first time since its creation, the Post Office
Department could negotiate for higher pay. The negative side of this executive power manifested itself within the same decade and demonstrated how a difference in presidents could drastically affect public sector labor rights. Nixon passed EO 11491 on October 29,
1969, an act which partially reversed Kennedy’s order and denied collective bargaining rights for any union not certified as exclusive: that is, any union that does not solely represent the workers of a postal union branch.14 This act gave an enormous advantage to
AFL-CIO craft unions like the NALC while excluding more militant industrial unions that relied on joint representation, like the NAPE and NPU. Despite the drastic changes in the way government dealt with unions, leadership of unions like the NALC did little to actually improve government-labor relations or ease the mounting troubles of the rank- and-file through the middle of the twentieth century.
By the late-1960s, postal workers suffered horrible conditions in run-down buildings with a workload that increased as the nation’s population and economy continued to grow. At the 1995 panel for the National Postal Museum in Washington
D.C., NALC president and strike veteran Moe Biller stated, “working conditions were deplorable—ancient dungeons for postal facilities, with no heat in the winter, no air conditioning in the summer, and minimal indoor plumbing year-round . . . It was downright medieval.”15 In Chicago, the decaying state of the Post Office buildings, mixed with the rapidly rising volume in mail, prompted Postmaster General Lawrence F.
O’Brien to state in a 1967 congressional report, “ten million pieces of mail were
14 “Executive Order 11491—Labor-management relations in the Federal Service,” National Archives. https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/11491.html.
15 Rubio, Always Work, 446.
14 logjammed. The sorting room floors were bursting with more than five million letters, parcels, circulars, and magazines that could not be processed. Outbound mail sacks formed small grey mountain ranges while they waited to be shipped out.”16 By that year, conditions reached such a perilous low that national turnover for post office jobs reached twenty-three percent a year. Postal workers made pitiful money compared to many other government jobs, and it took an obscene twenty-one years of service to reach the highest level of pay for postal work. The combination of high turnover and length of employment required ensured that the vast majority of postal workers never reached the highest pay grade—in fact, eighty percent of employees left the Post Office in the same pay grade in which they started.17
These already-unfair rates proved even more inadequate for a country marked with rising inflation. Despite the importance of the postal system, the government continued to deny higher wages for postal workers and other federal employees. In 1954,
H.R. 9265 made it through congress with the purpose of raising postal worker pay by seven percent, the first raise since 1951. The National Federation of Post Office Clerks
(NFPOC) and the National Alliance of Postal Employees (NAPE) both supported the bill, while Postmaster General Arthur Summerfield called the proposed increase “nothing less than an all-out raid on the United States Treasury” and refused to support it due to the
16 U.S. House Hearings Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Departments of Treasury and Post Office and Executive Office of the President, 90th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1967), 5.
17 Deanna Boyd and Kendra Chen, “The History and Experience of African Americans in America’s Postal Service,” National Postal Museum, https://postalmuseum.si.edu/AfricanAmericanhistory/p10.html.
15 added strain on government funds.18 The bill underwent revision to further include an increase in longevity pay for employees and a removal on the amount of permanent appointments to postal positions. President Eisenhower pocket vetoed the act, and vetoed another act granting a general pay raise in 1960 under the reasoning that federal employees should not be granted a straight pay raise across every type of government work.19
Despite Kennedy’s support of public employees, he vetoed Senate Bill 1459 to increase within-grade longevity pay for postal workers in an attempt to trim the federal budget.20 To add to the discontent, pay scales for postal employees stayed level across the nation. Dollar for dollar, postal workers in one state made the same in any other. While letter carriers and postal clerks in the inexpensive rural areas could cover the costs of living, postal workers in places like New York City, among the most expensive areas to live in the country, needed to work multiple jobs to keep a roof over their heads. 21
Harold Hillard, future Vice President and Treasurer of Branch 36 stated, “[just prior to the strike] I was paying sixty bucks a month rent, and I needed half my paycheck to pay that. So, we knew we had to do better."22
18 “Treasury Raid: Summerfield Defends His Proposal,” Chicago Tribune (Chicago, Il.), April 7, 1964.
19 Dwight Eisenhower, Veto of a Bill To Increase the Salaries of Federal Employees, June 30, 1960, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=11859.
20 “87th Congress Presidential Vetoes,” U.S. Senate, 1961, https://www.senate.gov/reference/Legislation/Vetoes/Presidents/KennedyJ.pdf.
21 Rubio, Always Work, 233.
22 The Postal Record, The Strike at 40: Celebrating NALC’s Heroes of 1970, Documentary (2010), Web Video, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qEW-Te-jKgo.
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CHAPTER 2
LACK OF RESPECT TO THE RANK-AND-FILE
The full history of American labor always included conflict between the rank and file members and their leaders hoping to harness discontent to affect change, either in the workplace or in the minds of businessmen and policy-makers. Even during the 30 and
40s, when union leaders lead their members to great victories and achieved widespread support, groups sought to change unions from within, usually in the hopes of further democratization. These leaders fought a continuous battle to maintain control. Even John
L. Lewis, founding member of the CIO and hero to the mineworkers he represented, felt top-down control of the union was essential to its continued success. At the 1944 United
Mine Workers’ Association convention, he stated, “I am sick and tired of some of these elected officers in some of these districts, when we asked them why they don’t do this or that, and have them tell me, ‘Why, I am autonomous.’ What the hell do I care whether they are autonomous or not? I want action, I want service, I want loyalty.”23 This attitude only grew stronger in the following decades. As the AFL-CIO further cemented its power and influence over the American economy, it became more resolute in its responsibility to maintain its reputation and prevent any displays of opposition.
Ironically, efforts to weed out such dissent could actually intensify animosity among local leaders and social activists. Dolores Huerta, a now-legendary leader in
23 John L Lewis, “Lewis’ Address” (lecture, Biennial UMWA Convention, September, 1944).
17
California and long-time colleague and friend of Caesar Chavez, worked with the AFL-
CIO after the formation of the Agricultural Workers Organizing Committee (AWOC).
Initially proud of the collection of labor activists assembled, including Filipino leader
Larry Itliong, she grew increasingly frustrated with the political baggage and uncooperative nature of the Federation leadership: “I kept telling them to bring Cesar in, you know, because Cesar was doing this really successful project with CSO in Oxnard.
And they didn’t want to bring Cesar in. I think there was probably a little bit of racism, a little bit of jealousy, but they should bring Cesar in.”24 Despite serving as the secretary of the organization, she asserted that Federation employees would change strike tactics without her consent. Her frustration reached a point where she walked into an office full of labor contractors and exclaimed, “All I got is a bunch of crooks here!”25
The 1970 wildcat strike failed to convince senior leadership of the importance of listening to and respecting the thoughts and wishes of its members and allies, or of the perils of such an autocratic approach. Rather, the strike served as a warning for union leaders seeking to maintain control over the rank and file. During the Taxi Strike of 1971, union leader Harry Van Arsdale attempted to push forward a contract for the following year that would lower commission for drivers from between forty-nine to fifty percent to between 42 to 49 percent.26 He continued to push the contract despite strong objection by the rank and file. During a meeting in which members would vote on the contract, rumors that the taxi drivers would largely vote “no” prompted the union boss to bolt the doors to
24 Dolores Huerta, interview by Ray Rast, Cesar Chavez and the Farm Labor Movement, California State University, Fullerton, July 26, 2011.
25 Ibid.
26 Frank J. Prial, “3 Officials of Taxi Union Defy Van Arsdale on Contract,” New York Times (New York), June 22, 1971.
18 the meeting hall and deny entry, only for members already inside to chant “open the doors” until the leadership complied.27 When a rank and file member attempted to use a microphone and address Arsdale directly, the microphone feed was cut, resulting in much of the crowd rising up and angrily tossing chairs. The taxi drivers’ union publication The
Hot Seat published their own account “Why the Chairs Flew” in which they say: "Our
Unions leaders have been trying to blame the violence at Manhattan Center on outside elements. But the blame must fall on Harry Van Arsdale who made every attempt to crush free speech by refusing to listen to the angry voices of the rank and file.”28
In some horrifying cases, the struggle to reform and democratize the United Mine
Workers turned ugly, as with the murder of Jock Yablonski after his attempt to call out the highly unpopular and unscrupulous union president Tony Boyle. In the words of
Jefferson Cowie in his book, Staying Alive, “the slayings were evidence of a once venerable union—the detonator of labor’s explosive growth back in the 1930s—gone terribly wrong.”29 The fact that a union like the UMWA, co-founder of the CIO and a major combatant against employee exploitation in the 1930s could perpetuate and even escalate the oppression of the rank and file further stoked the discontent of an increasingly distrustful and disgruntled membership.
Conflicts like these came to characterize the relationship between dues-paying members and the leaders who represented them. The lack of respect, concern, or attention to the rank and file helped to foster a workforce that grew resentful of its union
27 “Why the Chairs Flew,” Rank and File Currents No. 4 (New York), June, 1971.
28 Ibid.
29 Cowie, Staying Alive, 33.
19 leadership—and of unquestioned authority in general. But not only would the upper leadership not show proper respect to its normal members, it would take a superior attitude in regards to other, less major unions. The expansion of the labor movement and the influence it enjoyed brought an attitude that only those at the top could truly understand the struggle of maintaining and organizing union power in the face of their political and social opposition: with congressional bills and executive orders able to directly affect unions nationwide, high-ranking representatives like Meany and Kirkland thought mainly on a national level, with attention firmly focused on the economic and political rather than the social. Their drive for the AFL-CIO to maintain the gains of the past would often take the form of limiting the ability of more militant unions—like the
National Alliance—from affecting their own change in the labor landscape: During the
Postal Strike negotiations, NAPE faced exclusion from the bargaining table, largely due to the Kennedy’s 1962 executive order that granted collective bargaining to unions organized solely by craft.30 The National Alliance, the official publication for NAPE, brought up accusations of unfairly favoring the more conservative craft unions over the more socially active industrial, and conveyed the union’s disgust and feelings of betrayal at its exclusion from the talks:
The credibility of the entire Administration is debased when a National Administration that can land men on the moon, that maintains that it can police the world, an Administration that can conscript millions and millions of American men into the armed forces and ship them to all areas of the world, when this same Administration professes itself unable to get craft union representatives to sit down with representatives of industrial unions.31
30 “Executive Order 10988—Employee-Management Cooperation in the Federal Service,”
January 17, 1962, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=58926.
31 “Alliance Pickets Postal Negotiations,” National Alliance (Detroit, MI), May, 1970.
20
NAPE President Ashby G. Smith, Vice President Wyatt C. Williams, and several district presidents stood outside the Sonesta Hotel and picketed the negotiations in protest. By their account, they arrived prior to any official postal representatives, which required each member of the craft union leadership walking past them—an ironic reversal of crossing a picket line. NAPE president Ashby B. Carter reportedly sent a letter of protest to Postmaster General Winton M. Blount, a letter that received no response.32 While
NAPE could not participate directly, the fact that the craft unions present refused to even acknowledge the presence of the picketers displays a lack of concern and respect toward the more militant industrial union. To this day, NAPE does not affiliate with the AFL-
CIO.
Unsurprisingly, the AFL-CIO completely rejected this series of events in favor of their own narrative in which they lead a unified front against the injustices the postal workers faced in the preceding years. A large cartoon featured prominently on the front of an issue of AFL-CIO News depicted a large strong man ringing a bell labeled “AFL-
CIO postal unions” while a crowd of people labeled “postal workers” smiled and cheered in the background. The cartoon’s caption below read “Hear this!”33 The complete lack of attention to the discontent of one of the largest postal unions in the nation betrayed a concerted effort by the AFL-CIO to control the narrative of the strike. If the leadership of the NALC, whose members initially spurred the strike, could not stop it from the beginning, they could at least portray themselves as the head of a united front of representatives negotiating for the good of their membership.
32 Ibid.
33 “Meany Calls on Congress to Enact Full Postal Plan,” AFL-CIO News No. 15 (Washington D.C.), Apr 25, 1970.
21
Efforts to contain and focus the energy of the wildcat strike continued even after the picketers returned to work. The renewed energy of the postal workers served as a terrifying threat for much of the senior leadership of the unions, especially for James
Rademacher. The NALC spent the following months after the strike changing his management strategy within the union. The NALC retreat in September of that year took a noticeably more informal attitude in regards to its proceedings, with the senior leaders taking off their jackets and ties in an attempt to address the issues of the rank and file in a more equitable atmosphere.34 During the opening address, Rademacher spoke about the prolific demonstrations in March, stating "The actual strikers, the potential strikers, put enormous pressure on the representatives of management at the bargaining table. If there had not been such pressure, there wouldn't have been any bargaining table at all, and any negotiations that would have been attempted would have been a failure, so I congratulate you all."35 Despite his ceaseless pleading to end the strike and return to work as well as his assurances they could reach an agreement, Rademacher readily admitted to the
NALC’s representatives that the pay raises and full collective bargaining rights they secured would not have happened without the disruptive and outspoken resistance from the wildcat strikers. It is clear that while union leaders at the national level may have a better view of national issues pertaining to labor, their distance from the jobs they protected and people they served also limited their ability to fully understand the thoughts and feelings of normal dues-paying members.
34 1970 NALC National Convention, Video, The Postal Record (September. 1970), Television.
35 Ibid.
22
CHAPTER 3
UNWILLING TO ADAPT
These reactions to legitimate concerns denoted a persistent view by many of the older union leaders that the current system of labor in America had reached a level of refinement perpetuating the members’ economic security through changing times and dire economic circumstances. Ironically, many of these leaders personally participated in the unions victories of the 30s and 40s, a movement that in and of itself constituted a move from the status quo. During the minority report of the 1935 AFL-CIO convention, soon-to-be sit-down strategist Wyndham Mortimer spoke to the executive council of the national leadership, despite vocal resistance, and scathingly stated, “I have sat there and heard a number of older trade unionists say, ‘in all my forty years in the labor movement
. . . ’ trying to impress us working delegates with their long experience. Well in my opinion, too many of you can remember too far back.”36 The more conservative AFL members, exemplified by the then-current president William Green, believed unions worked best when in the form of smaller craft unions. To this end, they often used misleading and underhanded tactics—such as fabricating endorsements from President
Roosevelt or creating false connections between their industrial unionism and communist
36 Wyndham Mortimer, Organize! My Life as a Union Man (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), 92.
23 activist— in an effort to curtail the spread of progressive thought and prevent reform from ruining what they felt was a system decades in the making.37
The closed-minded and outdated method of thinking not only limited labor’s ability to adapt to changing times, but instilled a deep sense of resentment in those who felt labor could do better. This sentiment reappears in the postal workers protesting not only against an uncaring Federal Government, but a leadership that stubbornly felt they were the only ones capable of leading their respective unions. In an interview with “Face the Nation” in September after the strike, George Meany answered the accusations of younger union members that the AFL-CIO was taking labor in a more conservative direction: “That may be right, but what has the young generation got to demonstrate to any other generations, not just my generation but the people in the 40-45, 50 year—what have they got to demonstrate that they know the answers?”38 Meany brought up the students’ occupation of administrative buildings on the Columbia University campus as proof of the lack of merit the younger generation held, and their lack of worthiness in taking up labor’s struggle against decline. He ended his indictment firmly with, “Now, this doesn’t demonstrate to me that they have the capacity to lead the nation or tell the older generations what to do. It just doesn’t make sense.”39
Beyond the obvious denouncement of youthful activism, Meany’s words show a certain insight into his view of the situation. Instead of a new generation of labor warriors, ready to fight for the common good of the blue collar worker, these men and
37 Ibid.
38 George Meany, “Face the Nation”
39 Ibid.
24 women instead become competitors, people ready to usurp the hard-fought positions which the senior leadership held in order to “tell the older generations what to do.” He denies the possibility that the younger generation may benefit from the experience of older members or that the younger generation may have unique insights regarding the sentiments and sensibilities of the contemporary era. Young Americans grew more distrustful of authority and resentful of older generations. Meany stood as the de facto representative of the very concept of unionism in the United States, and his dismissal of many rank and file members’ concerns did not provide comfort or inspire confidence in his leadership. Rather, his words served to cause alienation and helped to sow doubt about the place of labor in the U.S. even after his death in 1981
The stagnancy of the American Labor Movement in the 60s and 70s did not seem to hold a serious concern for Meany or the rest of the national leadership. For an institution that now largely considered itself an inexorable part of the American economic landscape, the question of the movement’s further growth was beside the point. During the 1972 US News and World Report, Meany made a statement now-infamous among labor historians: "Why should we worry about organizing groups of people who do not appear to want to be organized? If they prefer to have others speak for them and make the decisions which affect their lives without effective participation of their part, that is their right."40 The idea that the American economy might change, or that labor might come to rely on new industries as sources of support or funds apparently never factored into
Meany’s reasoning.
40 “Interview with George Meany,” US News & World Report (Washington D.C.), February, 1972.
25
Comments and behavior in this vein convinced more and more people that
Meany’s leadership did not reflect the changing needs of the American worker and that he did not fully understand the country’s changes since labor’s finest years in the 1930s.
However, up until his retirement and death, Meany continued to cut an imposing figure in the labor movement, and many wondered who could possibly keep such a massive and varied institution together, especially in such trying times. Such doubt kept any real opposition to Meany from coalescing during his career. Essayist Wilfrid Sheed shows this in his writings on labor’s course in the mid-20th century with the assertion that
American labor’s stagnancy made “the Roman Catholic Curia look downright flighty,” while also describing Meany’s power as, “a nebulous network of favors which may retire when [he] does.”41 The AFL-CIO president’s personal talents and experience often aided the institution of American labor, legitimizing strikes, lending influence to pass legislation, or using his reputation and oratorical gifts to defend labor leaders or political and social allies.
However, Meany’s hegemonic presence within the movement also allowed him to impose his personal vision on the AFL-CIO for decades and made the prospect of taking the organization in a new direction even more daunting. Sheed goes on to describe the
1970s as, “George Meany’s last hurrah,” and states, “A marvelous character, George.
Nobody minds waiting a few years for his vibrant successor. And so change never comes.”42 The enormous effort needed to oust Meany from the presidency—if at all possible—would have weakened the national labor movement at a time when its enemies
41 Wilfrid Sheed, Three mobs: Labor, Church, and Mafia (New York: Universal Press Syndicate, 1974), 22.
42 Ibid., 21.
26 were gaining political traction and asserting their influence upon the American public. To cause a massive internal struggle would legitimize their detractors’ views and solidify the image of unions as disruptive and obsolete groups unable to address the problems of a changing economy and set the nation along a path that would return it to strength and prosperity. Despite any criticism of his views or methods, many detractors decided to bide their time and wait for Meany’s eventual retirement and death, during which his successor could take American labor in a “new direction.”
Meany’s chosen successor, Lane Kirkland, failed to meet such high expectations in the eyes of many. Beyond the hope of stepping out of his mentor’s shadow and differently leading the American labor movement, Kirkland faced a newer, broader, and more complicated set of issues. The increasingly difficult interaction between business, labor, and government required a leader who could manage political lobbying on behalf of labor, fundraising from influential groups, and organize a public relations effort that prevented the public from further turning against the labor movement, while understanding the demands of the modern worker. These myriad responsibilities required a labor leader who was more accustomed to a courtroom or office building rather than a mine shaft or factory floor. In the words of Arthur Schwartz and Michele Hoyman, “The labor leaders of the past had less education. They started out working on the shop floor of the plant or the mill and had a strong ideological commitment. The new breed of union leader has more formal education and fewer direct roots in the working class. The new labor leader may be less pugilistic, less rough and ready, and more sophisticated and accommodating."43 The differences between old and new were not just a matter of
43 Arthur B. Schwartz and Michele M. Hoyman, “The Changing of the Guard,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 473 (May, 1984), 65.
27 priorities, but also skills, experience, origins, approach, and temperament. Lane Kirkland stood perfectly as an example of this change. Whereas union heroes like John L. Lewis,
Walter Reuther, or George Meany originated from the rank-and-file, Kirkland started as a lawyer before making his move to organized labor.
The American labor movement’s size and influence gave it significant power, but also made it extremely difficult to fully adapt to change on a national level, especially if senior leadership felt little need to reconsider their tactics. Individual union leaders could attempt to make changes within their own union, but did not always meet with success on a wide scale. Even long-standing and well-respected figureheads such as Walter Reuther felt this resistance. Reuther’s efforts both within the United Auto Workers and the Civil
Rights movement gave him some influence, but for years he struggled to move American labor into a more proactive and socially progressive force. At the 1959 convention for the
AFL-CIO Industrial Union Department, he voiced his concern regarding what he considered a stagnant leadership: “The labor movement has gotten prosperous . . . prosperity somehow does make people a little bit soft . . . flabby. We need to . . . tighten up and regain some of the early spirit so we can get marching again.”44 While the decades of success enjoyed by labor allowed for unprecedented influence, Reuther’s words gave voice to the sentiment that unions had largely started to “rest on their laurels” and neglect the tactics and strategies that allowed them to gain their success in the first place. As
Nelson Lichenstein notes in the biography The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit, though
Reuther faced the risk of appearing a social deviant or communist sympathizer, the UAW
44 “Unions Set Organizing Campaigns,” The Daily Chronicle (Centralia, WA), December 3, 1959.
28 leader never failed to lend his opinion on the matter of union activism, and unceasingly spoke out to encourage more initiative within the labor movement.45
As expected from a man who marched alongside Martin Luther King Jr., Reuther sought to use his influence as a force for social good, and to benefit the nation as a whole, not just middle-class workers. During his speech, he elaborates on what his experience within the labor movement showed him: that the rank and file membership would be willing to take a more active role if their representatives were more willing to lead by example. “We have all the resources we need . . . There is nothing wrong with the rank and file. We are the problem, we who are charged with the responsibilities of leadership.
We have failed to provide the program essential to getting the rank and file marching.”46
Reuther felt banding together with other groups such as the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) or the Southern Christian Leadership
Conference (SCLC) could not only affect positive change, but provide a cause to unite the labor movement and create allies where previously there were none. By refusing to enthusiastically train a new generation of proactive and creative leadership, unions across the nation were setting themselves up to be unready not only for future hardship and tragedy, but change of any kind. Reuther continued to call out the leadership for their unwillingness to lead by example, citing the adoption of the Ethical Practices Code in the roulette room of the Monte Carlo Hotel in Miami as an ironic example of their lack of
45 Nelson Lichtenstein, The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit (Champaign, Il..: University of Illinois Press, 2007), 47.
46 Ibid.
29 sincerity in leading their respective unions.47 This divide eventually erupted into a schism that separated the UAW and the AFL-CIO from 1968 to 1981.48
This insincerity came to bear when the members of branch 36 decided to strike.
During the meeting on March 18th, Harold Hillard recalled, "So when they called the meeting to order, I'm looking to see the President, general officers, [and] they wasn't[sic] there."49 After future NALC president Vincent Sombrotto—at the time a normal letter carrier—stood up to direct the meeting, Hillard mistakenly believed Sombrotto was the branch president. He later stated, “Once I found out that Vince wasn't the president that day, I knew he should have been."50Another branch 36 member, Anthony Puccio, also praised Sombrotto’s leadership, calling him a “firebrand.”51 During a time when postal workers faced broken promises and orders to keep working, the men of NALC branch 36 valued results. Instead of NALC representatives being present to address their members’ concerns in hopes of preventing a strike—or at least mitigating its widespread disruption—leaders like Rademacher and Branch 36 president Gus Johnson were forced to “catch up” to the militant yet inexperienced rank and file leaders and do damage control.
The efforts to end the strike prematurely, mainly through the same tired promises of higher pay and job stability, only increased the resentment of the rank and file. The reassurances of Rademacher and Meany faced conflicting testimonies from everyday
47 “Organizing Campaigns,” Daily Chronicle, 5.
48 “UAW Unit Votes to Rejoin AFL-CIO,” Washington Post (Washington, D.C.), Apr 29, 1981.
49 “The Strike at 40”
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
30 workers on the street. The rebellious sentiment that launched the strike from the local 36 branch in New York continued to fuel the wildcat strike despite desperate attempts to bring the demonstration under control. Letter carrier Robert Chuckne, in a response to union orders to return to work, stated to reporters, "Well, I don't think the national leaders who are saying 'go back to work' are speaking for the people who are in the street.”52 He firmly explained the desperation and anger faced by many postal workers, not only at the unions and the government, but at the cost of living that increasingly took its toll. “We're out here because we're sick and tired of promises that have been broken for eighteen months. Our butcher and our baker can't wait to negotiate with us. We need the money now."53 The lack of trust bred over the years of delayed progress and broken promises resulted in an army of postal workers who would cease their rebellion only in the face of real results. Another worker, angrily referring to Congress’ passing of a forty one percent pay raise, asserted confidently that he did not trust the promises of President Nixon, who, he stated “has given us nothing but broken promises rather than a decent living wage.”54
Rather than return to work on the faith of their government or union leadership, he reaffirmed his loyalty solely to the rank and file, and said, “Let [the President] make us an offer, and let us take it from there. We will go by the mandates of our people."55
While they stood to gain much from their demonstration, the workers had no legal right to strike, no prior planning, and no strike fund. This mixed the power and influence of the wildcat strike with a terrifying realization of the high stakes of their demonstration.
52 ABC Evening News, Television Broadcast, March 19, 1970.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
31
Branch 36 letter carrier Barry Weiner remarked on the war veteran postal workers with families to support, who “had already put so much on the line in their service to their country. And then, now, were risking everything,” and said, “those folks will always be heroes to me."56 When CBS News reporter Kenneth Gayles asked letter carrier George
Boyles if he was aware of the illegality of the strike, Boyle stated with complete conviction, “I don't care. Now, I know it's against the law, that's in the constitution, it's in my contract. If they want to put me in jail, put me in jail. But they haven't got a jail big enough to put all of us in."57 The anger that bred such a large act of rebellion would be long-standing and almost impossible to miss, something confirmed by the eyewitness accounts of many Branch 36 members. However, these same members remarked upon how NALC refused to humor the complaints of its members, even until the eve of the strike itself.
The driving force behind the strike remained the need for more money and better work conditions. As the reason for the creation for a union in the first place, this took a primary role in their concerns, a focus which over time became known by the increasingly pejorative term “bread and butter unionism.” But the lack of money, the poor working conditions, and the unresponsive attitude of union leaders carried an undercurrent of disgruntlement and resentment that highlighted another important responsibility for a union. The labor victories of the 1930s did not happen entirely due to economic desperation or government support at the highest level; while those major factors certainly made a difference, events like the 1936 General Motors strike succeeded
56 “The Strike at 40”
57 CBS Evening News, Television Broadcast, March 20, 1970.
32 so spectacularly because UAW leaders could relate to common concerns that transcended superficial differences between workers. The Great Depression brought an overwhelming sense of financial desperation to American families; for millions of Americans, finding a steady source of income became an increasingly improbable goal. Unions like the UAW could tap into that sentiment by promising their workers a larger share of profits.
However, leaders like Wyndham Mortimer and Walter Reuther did not succeed solely through that appeal. Beyond the economic desperation lay the need to feel a modicum of control over their lives. In a relationship where the owner and manager held the power, the union provided a way for these workers to affect influence over their own collective destinies. Walter Reuther succeeded as a leader due to his talent in framing labor conflicts not only as wage disputes, but as a way to rectify a system that unfairly rewarded those at the top and robbed hard-working employees of their agency, security, and dignity. As the federal government did not initially protect labor organizations by law, the earliest unions met long-term success only when organized by craft. However, it was industrial unions and their march for widespread social, political, and economic change that brought the American labor union into its most powerful and respected incarnation.
The major union victories of the 20th century involved the invocation of these emotions and deep concerns, strengthening the resolve of striking union workers through a reassurance that they were fighting for the good of themselves and their coworkers.
Vincent Sombrotto illustrated the sentiment perfectly when talking about a veteran postal worker and fellow striking worker:
33
I had a carrier, he was a wonderful guy. He never took a day off, he never called in sick, that's the kind of guy he was. What was his life? His life was going to work, being a letter carrier, and watching the Yankees. He was a diehard Yankees fan. That was his life: he loved the Yankees, and he loved his job, and he was a dedicated worker. He said to me that he had been working at that time maybe 28, 29 years. He said 'I don't know what I'm doing. This is the first time I ever felt like a man.' Because he was fighting for himself.58
Sombrotto’s account resonates with many other unions in their struggle to maintain their collective dignity. During a 1978 boycott against J.P. Stevens, a worker and member of the Textile Workers of America (TWUA) stood up for his union, saying that, “TWUA knows that a good contract means more than higher wages. Dignity and self-respect must be part of any union card.”59 As Zaretsky mentions in her book No Direction Home, the
American working man tied his value and very identity to the job he held, and the labor he lent to his country. The loss of his job, or even the prospect of termination, threatened not only his financial security, but his mental well-being and place in society.60
The push for the democratization of the unions and transparency within union leadership ultimately stemmed from the rank and files’ need for respect from their elected representatives, and more importantly, the need to feel they had control over their organization and could affect change over its purpose. While a union’s main responsibility remained negotiating wages and working conditions, the sentiment behind the intensive push for organization came on the heels of the desperation of exploitation of employees during the Great Depression. For those downtrodden workers, the union signified a way to enact control over their workplace and counter-act the “take it or leave
58 “The Strike at 40”
59 Textile Workers Union of America, Boycott J.P. Stevens (1978).
60 Natasha Zaretsky, No Direction Home: The American Family and the Fear of National Decline, 1968-1980 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 26.
34 it” attitude many employers exercised during that time. The explosion of political activism during the 60s and into the 70s stemmed from that same sentiment: that political and social forces within our society created change that limited the public’s ability to change their nation for the better. America’s transformation during the 1960s and onward— the Civil Rights movement, globalization, and its resulting changes—left many without a sense of direction or hope for the future. With the state of affairs so drastically altered, the rank and file members of the American labor movement looked to their leaders, both local and national, who defended their rights and agency in the preceding decades. Changes in society and the economy gave the labor movement a responsibility to mold a new, more dignified identity for the working man, but at a time when blue collar workers needed guidance now more than ever, the leaders of unions like the NALC and APWU showed remarkable resistance to understanding their members’ needs and fears, or even the changes they faced every day: the loss of jobs due to automation and globalization, which also led to more austere and unforgiving management, the government’s prioritization of aiding employers, and something simple yet vitally important—the belief that their unions were adequately understanding their members’ needs and fighting for their well-being.
Many of the rank-and-file during that time, especially younger members, saw a solution to these issues through internal reform, and sought to turn labor into a force for social changeThe National Alliance agreed with Walter Reuther’s assertion that labor could become more secure and influential than ever by allying with civil rights groups and adopting their more active approach.. Many union leaders resisted, either out of conservatism, complacency, or the fear they could lose their hard-fought gains from the
35 previous decades. When questioned on the topic of union activism, United Federation of
Teachers president Albert Shanker remarked, “Most teachers join our union because we have a contract, we process their grievances, and we manage a welfare fund, and we get them salary increases. They didn’t join because they want us to support great social legislation.”61 Shanker’s views did not resonate with everyone, and the push for greater activism in the labor movement refused to abate. The publication Rank and File Currents continued to assert the need for labor to evolve and strengthen itself by forging new alliances rather than solely trying to prevent layoffs or to hold on the financial gains it had won in better times. "There will be some in our union who will object to bringing in these issues into our fight for job security - who would have the union opt for so-called bread and butter unionism. What I am trying to point out is that it is precisely this inability to link the issues and to form workable coalitions of all people who are affected by the cuts that reinforces the threat to our jobs.”62
With an organizing strategy that started to focus solely on wage increases and job stability, American labor suffered a damaging blow to their respect and prestige. In the austerity of the 70s and 80s, political opponents succeeded in framing these pursuits as obstacles to a robust and well-oiled economy that allowed the United States to measure up to the emerging overseas competition. While a union’s primary responsibility, the fixation on percentage increases and layoffs provided figures that painted a clear picture of labor’s decline and decreasing ability to keep their promises. Furthermore, it did little to increase labor’s support base at a time when unions desperately needed new sources of
61 J.B.S. Hardman, Labor at the Rubicon (New York University Press, New York, 1972), 29.
62 Rank and file Currents No. 3 (New York), July, 1970.
36 support and influence. Instead of spending the 1970s organizing new industries or finding new allies, the national leadership of the AFL-CIO continued to attempt to assert its influence into a political landscape that grew increasingly hostile to labor interests.
37
CHAPTER 4
EVOLVING OPPOSITION IN BUSINESS AND POLITICS
The passing of the Wagner Act and its creation of the National Labor Relations
Board rightfully serves as a major point of progress in U.S. labor history. But while the
Act gave American unions real legitimacy and greater protection, it also forced these unions to function in a more political sense. Binding arbitration, a practice that grew more common as the 20th century progressed, relied on a third party to impartially mediate and settle labor disputes in a fair and equal manner. While unions functioned increasingly as political entities, their need for political support also increased. President
Franklin Roosevelt’s well-known stance on labor allowed unions to operate more boldly, confident of support from the executive branch. Likewise, Lyndon B Johnson’s support for labor and his domestic policies of the “Great Society” helped labor maintain their power through the 60s. Johnson’s refusal to run for reelection in 1968 caused a massive shock throughout the AFL-CIO; the federation itself and many individual unions threw their support behind Hubert Humphrey, a staunchly pro-labor candidate.63 The lengths gone through to elect Humphrey betray labor’s intensive need for strong politics allies.
As proven by Taft-Hartley, support in the political sphere and reform of labor law could drastically change the way unions could operate in the United States.
63 Cowie, Staying Alive, 82.
38
President Nixon sought to reduce government spending and combat inflation while allowing the economy to grow in the wake of the ongoing recession. With those ends in mind, the Postal Strike was an inopportune event that threatened to spiral into a catastrophe. The success of a wildcat strike could inspire other unions to do the same, which would inhibit economic reforms and undermine the President’s authority and influence. Nixon won the 1968 presidential election by only .7 percent of the popular vote, a slim victory best credited to public disinterest in the Democratic candidate, Hubert
Humphrey. While Nixon made use of the discord festering within the Democratic Party, he nevertheless needed to maintain high public opinion for his political and financial reforms to succeed. This required taking a conciliatory stance on the Postal Strike; he agreed that the strikers’ concerns were valid, and stated, “From the time I came to
Congress 23 years ago, I have recognized that the hundreds of thousands of fine
Americans in the mail service--the Post Office Department--are underpaid and they have other legitimate grievances.”64
However, he also subtly referred to the strike as a series of “illegal walkouts” and deliberately brought attention to the millions of vulnerable Americans who suffered directly from the lack of mail service—mainly those on welfare and soldiers in Vietnam waiting for letters from home.65 The President’s response to the strike required finesse and tact. His political position remained precarious due to rising inflation and continued racial tensions at home as well as the escalation of the Vietnam War and its unsanctioned expansion into Cambodia. The widespread domestic unrest coupled with authoritarian
64 NBC Evening News, Television Broadcast, March 28, 1970.
65 Ibid.
39 actions overseas struck a nerve with the American people, and Nixon knew he ran the risk of appearing uncompromising and uncaring to a political base that showed greater and greater distrust of the government.
To add to this, postal workers long served as a very noticeable representation of the federal government: a well-known group that served an important purpose and interacted with the public on a daily basis. The letter carriers held such a positive reputation amongst the community that several news magazines nicknamed the strike
“The Revolt of the Good Guys.”66 During the CBS broadcast of the strike, Dan Rather referred to the average mail carrier as “kind of a friendly neighbor . . . a very quiet person that you wouldn't expect to act this way.”67 He also showed the striking workers in a firmly positive light, as he stated, “They've been taken for granted for a very long time and they've been very patient in this matter with their wages despite the fact that they've broken their agreements.”68 Despite the clear violation of their agreements to the Federal government, Rather portrayed the workers as men and women pushed into desperation by the government’s unwillingness to proactively cooperate and attend to its employees’ needs. In this way, the postal workers’ strike was not just a matter of raising wages and improving workplace conditions; Rather’s comments showcased how long postal workers suffered.
NALC president James Rademacher felt the need to “toe the line” in regards to the strike, though for different reasons. Rademacher needed to show solidarity with the
66 NALC, “1970—A Strike is Called,” Carriers in a Common Cause, https://www.nalc.org/about/facts-and-history/body/1970.pdf.
67 CBS Evening News, Television Broadcast, March 22, 1970.
68 Ibid.
40 rank-and-file members he represented, but needed to reduce the risk of another wildcat strike that could jeopardize the postal union’s reputation with the government and
American people. In an interview following the President’s official response to the strike,
Rademacher stated his disappointment at the strikers’ behavior, and framed the strike as a grossly irresponsible and unnecessary act. “Throughout the nation, you have almost complete support of two hundred million Americans, you have the support of the
Congress, which is ready to act, now we need the support of the people that are withholding their services, to go back to work.”69 By using this terminology, Rademacher sought to shift the blame for the situation from the unresponsive union leadership to the workers, ignoring the fact that both Congress and the White House, for a full decade, effectively froze postal pay raises. Rademacher downplays the desperation behind the workers’ outrage and paints the striking workers as the unreasonable element against the reasonable, proactive government willing to reach an agreement. This underhanded tactic displayed not only the contentious attitude taken by the leadership toward the rank and file, but also the close correlation between labor success and its support from the White
House.
Though Nixon’s predecessors took too much of a conservative role with regards to postal pay raises, the President’s actions after his 1968 election did little to soothe the high tensions and discontent of the workers. Nixon’s long-term goal of a smaller Federal government included the reorganization of the United States Postal Service. Since its creation, the Post Office Department operated as a government organization, with the
Postmaster General serving as a part of the executive branch. The President planned to
69 The Huntley-Brinkley Report, NBC Evening News, Television Broadcast, March 19, 1970.
41 remake the service into a private corporation with the sanction of the Federal
Government. The decline of American prosperity placed additional pressure on
Washington to reduce spending and taxes. Nixon’s push for a leaner postal service stands out as one of the earliest acts of the conservative drive toward limited government that persists into the twenty-first century.
On the Today Show, Representative Thaddeus J. Dulski spoke in an interview regarding his thoughts on the strike, the President’s reaction in calling it an “illegal walkout,” and the subject of postal reorganization. As the Chairman of the House Post
Office and Civil Service Committee from 1967 to 1974, Dulski held an almost unparalleled understanding of the relationship between the Post Office and the Federal
Government. When asked what steps Congress had taken to accommodate its postal workers over the past few years, Dulski defended the House of Representatives and placed the blame on the President’s shoulders: "We passed [postal pay raise] legislation,
HR 13000, on October the 14th in the house, on December the 12th in the Senate. Now,
I've continually hoped that we would have a conference. Well, the other body, the Senate, they didn't want a conference on this because they were told, and it was expressed by the president that he will not vote on any bill or sign any bill that does not have postal reform."70 When asked if the issues of the strike and postal organization must be reconciled together, Dulski stated very firmly that postal reform and the strike were in no way intertwined; not only could the strike end without broaching the subject of postal
70 CBS Evening News, Television Broadcast, March 22, 1970.
42 reorganization, the underlying issues behind the strike itself could be addressed without such drastic changes to its foundation.71
Despite Dulski’s position as chairman and his strong words on the subject,
President Nixon continued to cite the “obsolete postal system” as the cause of the workers’ grievances and asserted that “if postal reform had become law, we wouldn’t have that current crisis.”72 These comments showed Nixon’s desire to privatize the Post
Office Department and his efforts to do so by influencing public opinion and framing the inefficiencies of the postal system as the catalyst of the strike, rather than negligence on the part of the government. Faced with a public largely supportive of the strikers and distrustful of his pro-war stance, and desperately backpedalling in an attempt to end the hugely disruptive strike, the President used rhetoric to frame the workers as the problem and reorganization as the solution. This, coupled with his (failed) show of force involving the National Guard, highlights the actions of a man who sought to conquer the issue of dissatisfied workers rather than reach an amenable agreement.
After a week, the strike ended with an agreed pay raise of twelve percent, a truncated pay raise timescale, and the right of collective bargaining and forced arbitration. These improvements also included the Postal Office Department’s reorganization into the United States Postal Service which the president had so fiercely sought. Nixon’s eventual success and the reorganization of the Post Office came as a betrayal in the eyes of postal workers across the nation. Not only seen as an ineffective and opportunistic measure to address the issues of the Postal Service, the Postal
71 Ibid.
72 CBS, March 22, 1970.
43
Organization Act originally called for the removal of civil service benefits and job protections for its employees, while still denying postal workers the legal right to strike.
These conditions indicate the Act’s main objective: to turn the Postal Office into a more ruthlessly efficient organization, rather than one that more adequately addresses the needs of its employees.73 The union representatives’ lack of resistance came as a tacit endorsement of the act’s push toward austerity as well as a reminder of their skewed priorities. By focusing on pay raises, they continued to ignore the workers’ push to be treated as human beings with voices and senses of agency. Strike leaders like Sombrotto and Miller continued to face resistance from the NALC and APWU in their fight for union democratization from the bottom up, while the U.S.P.S. remained fixed on reducing expenses rather than easing employee workload. The push for greater efficiency in the Postal Service at the expense of worker well-being eventually took the form of the
“Kokomo Plan.” The U.S.P.S. would analyze and standardize the time necessary to process individual pieces of mail. Failure to work at the standardized pace could result in disciplinary action. The uncompromising imposition of efficiency led a St. Louis delegate from NALC branch 343 to exclaim to his colleagues, “Brothers, if this system is allowed to be implemented, letter carriers are going to be reduced to nothing but automation, and letter carriers aren’t robots, they are human beings.”74 This outcry summed up the blue collar workers’ common fears that automation would cost them their jobs, but more importantly, it encapsulates the thoughts and feelings that led to the 1970 strike in the first place: that rather than merely parts of the postal machine to be replaced when
73 Rubio, Who Remembers?
74 Rubio, Always Work, 270.
44 necessary, they were men and women worthy of respect and consideration. This basic sentiment lay at the heart of any rank and file member and in the origin of any union in general.
Despite the importance of the 1970 wildcat strike, despite the cries of victory from postal workers when union leaders struck a deal, major issues persisted within the newly-formed United States Postal Service. In a further effort to streamline the mail delivery or make it more efficient, the federal government established a number of Bulk
Mail Centers (BMC) throughout the nation. Closer to factories than mail centers, the
BMCs utilized new automation technology with the aim of reducing the need of greater manpower and further transforming the USPS into a more efficient government institution. Postmaster General William Blount hoped the new BMCs would reduce the operating budget of the USPS by five hundred million dollars a year and allow it to better compete with private sector mail carriers like the United Parcel Service (UPS).75 Citing the disruption of black militants, many of whom fell under the banner of the NAPE, these facilities often existed firmly in the suburbs, in order to limit the employment of black postal workers who primarily lived within urban centers.76 Sixty percent of the jobs lost to consolidation of postal regions were held by African-American postal workers. To them, the Post Office Department stood out as a refuge from unfair and discriminatory employment practices, and it was not uncommon for black postal workers to hold college degrees. The abundance of educated workers facing racist policies first-hand definitely contributed to the spread of progressive and activist thinking amongst mail workers, both
75 Rubio, Always Work, 177.
76 Ibid.
45 before and after 1970. For black labor activists in the postal unions—especially NAPE, which under the Postal Reorganization Act, could not collectively bargain—the move away from urban centers to suburban areas was an act of aggression aimed at reducing the chance of future rebellion. NAPE vice president Wesley Young referred to the move as “breaking the backs of the black middle class.”77
While the BMCs, by design, should have been better equipped to deal with the large volume of mail, postal workers continued to be overwhelmed by the scale of work required. NPMHU official Jeff Perry described the conditions that sound eerily similar to those of the mail centers eight years before: We were working six, seven days a week— ten, twelve hours [a day] . . . Conditions were very rough. The place was a powderkeg.
The day after the contract expiration, it didn’t actually take much to pull people out, it was so oppressive.”78
At midnight, on the start of July 21, 1978, the contract for U.S. postal ended.
Workers from the APWU and NALC refused to accept the new contract, with the slogan,
“No Contract, No Work.”79 In addition to the pay, the workers also cited the dangerous working conditions, including the automated machines from the BMCs which could cause serious harm. They also went on strike over disappointment in their unions’ inability to correct these issues through official/legal means and had effectively “sold them out” through their tacit endorsement of the U.S.P.S.’s automation and efficiency
77 Ibid., 179.
78 Jeff Perry, interview by Phillip F. Rubio, in There’s Always Work in the Post Office (New York: The New Press, 2010).
79 Jimmy Higgins, “Dave Cline, Rank and File Rebel, Part 1,” Fire on the Mountain , November 12, 2007, http://firemtn.blogspot.com/2007/11/dave-cline-rebel-worker-i.html
46 measures. As a striking worker in San Francisco stated frankly, “the union has not put itself on the line. They are putting us on the line.”80
Despite their anger, many did not believe a strike would prove necessary to change the details of the contract. David Cline, postal worker, APWU member and leader of the Good Contract Committee, stating his intention for a nation-wide “Vote No” movement on the contract. We did not think strike action was in the picture at all . . . We thought an anti-contract demonstration could possibly spearhead a significant rank and file opposition, a “Vote No” to the contract.” Cline’s efforts to resist a top-down change from both union leadership and the Federal Government underscored how little the situation changed in the favor of the postal workers over the course of the 1970s. Both the contract negotiations in 1978 and 1974 saw major walkouts, with the 1974 demonstration called “the Battle of the Bulk”—a name referring to the large stacks of mail the workers faced on a daily basis, and the unfair factory conditions of the BMCs.81
Union members still felt cheated and marginalized, while continuing to work long hours with heavy workloads. The unrelenting militancy and anger clearly demonstrated that the conditions behind the original wildcat strike were still present and unaddressed—postal workers wished for greater control over their unions, and met with a leadership that remained as uncooperative as ever; workers like David Cline hoped to reverse the trend of dehumanizing business practices within the Post Office, and instead met with a system that sought to further turn men and women into machines. Additionally, the 1978 strike
80 Tami Gold, Dan Gordon, and Erik Lewis, Signed, Sealed, Delivered: Labor Struggle in the Post Office, Documentary (1980), Video.
81 Higgins, “Rank and File Rebel”
47 revealed that the government’s main priority remained the creation of a reformed postal system that reduced strain on the federal budget but not its own workers.
The strike lasted from July 21st to July 25th, and ultimately carried less weight and went against a different federal government than eight years prior. Postmaster General, in addition to ordering Postal Inspectors to film and harass the picketers, arbitrarily fired
125 workers, suspended 130, and issued letters of warning to 2,500.82 Workers angrily gathered outside the building where negotiation occurred, and voiced their displeasure at the unions’ failure to return the fired workers to their jobs. One worker in particular shouted to union lawyer Michael Klein, “Klein, you made every move in that courtroom to block amnesty and you know it!” When another worker asked Klein if he truly represented them, he responded, “I represent the union.”83 In response, the APWU voted to pay out over fifty thousand dollars to the families of fired workers. In his defense,
APWU president Emmet Andrews resignedly stated the deal was “the best [they] could get” under the current economy.84 Postal workers and their unions were livid at President
Carter’s attempt to curb inflation by capping wage increases for federal employees and his refusal to grant amnesty to the striking workers.85 In 1980, the APWU heavily pressured the Democratic National Committee to expel Carter from the presidential ticket or risk losing the votes of almost five million people.86
82 Signed, Sealed, Delivered
83 Ibid.
84 Mike Causey, “Postal Group Favors Strike,” Washington Post (Washington D.C.), August 16, 1978.
85 Signed, Sealed, Delivered
86 Ibid.
48
The adoption of binding arbitration created a very different outcome than the
1970 wildcat strike and its high stakes “all or nothing” conclusion. The resolution of the
1978 strike showed how the establishment of a system of binding arbitration may not have been the leap forward that postal activists hoped for. After collective bargaining failed, President Carter appointed Harvard University professor James J. Healy to decide an outcome. While granting modest pay raises and cementing job security for long-time postal employees, his decision loosened job security for less experienced workers, and made it easier for the U.S.P.S. to fire those employed for less than six years.87 The lukewarm resolution of such a tense struggle that resulted in the layoffs of hundreds of employees, combined with the ignominious fact that a third party had effectively determined their raises and job security, further incensed the already mistreated and downtrodden workers.
The necessity for arbitration signaled to many postal workers that their representatives failed to adequately fight for their interests. James Rademacher stepped down from the presidency in 1976 over the continuing turmoil within the U.S.P.S., and his successor, J. Joesph Vacca, lasted only two years before losing the position to Vincent
Sombrotto by a vote of 75,137 to 43,407.88 While the average postal worker’s opinion of
Rademacher was not wholly negative, many postal workers had lost faith in his ability to make the necessary changes to the Postal Service they felt they deserved.
The 1978 strike showed that the postal workers continued to direct their anger and discontent toward both union leadership and Washington. Throughout his presidency,
87 NALC, “1971-1978: In the Aftermath of Victory,” Carriers in a Common Cause, 27.
88 NALC, “J. Joseph Vacca Records,” Records of the President, Walter P. Reuther Library, Detroit, MI.
49
Carter’s general unpopularity extended to many rank-and-file members who felt increasingly unsure of their economic future. In the atmosphere of this resentment,
Ronald Reagan built his candidacy for the 1980 presidential election, strongly targeting labor for support. Mentioning his status as the only candidate to ever serve as a union president (the Screen Actors Guild), Reagan then recited a quote by the recently-deceased
George Meany. He vowed to work closely with representatives of organized labor and made the emphatic and grandiose statement, “where free unions and collective bargaining are forbidden, freedom is lost.”89 Further criticizing Carter, he made a jab at the
President’s insistence on classifying the economic downturn of the late-70s as a recession rather than depression: “human tragedy, human misery, the crushing of the human spirit.
They do not need defining—they need action.”90 Reagan’s efforts to appeal to labor signified a belief in the separation of organized labor from the Democratic Party, and the hope that he could portray himself as a hero of the blue-collar workforce. Reagan’s strategy worked, and the California governor received endorsements from numerous unions, including the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO). Forty- five percent of union households voted for Reagan, compared to thirty-eight percent for the 1976 republican candidate, Gerald Ford.91
President Reagan’s successful wooing of union membership as well as PATCO’s endorsement become very ironic in the face of his actions as president. Within the history of an administration noted for its strong pro-business attitudes and opposition to
89 Ronald Reagan, “Labor Day Address” (speech, Liberty State Park, Jersey City, NJ, September 1, 1980).
90 Ibid.
91 Roper Center, 1980 Presidential Election results, https://ropercenter.cornell.edu/polls/us- elections/how-groups-voted/how-groups-voted-1980/.
50 government intervention in the private sector, one of the most controversial events in
1980s political history occurred when the air traffic controllers decided to go on strike the following year. Within his first year as president, Reagan faced a walkout of almost thirteen thousand air traffic controllers, authorized and coordinated by PATCO.92 The air traffic controllers’ refusal to work brings up several parallels to the Postal Strike eleven years prior. Like the postal workers, the controllers constituted an essential part of
American infrastructure: much like the traffic of mail, air travel became more and more commonplace while the infrastructure needed to maintain it stagnated. Over the years, the air traffic controller struggled with longer hours and harder work while their employer, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), refused to implement beneficial changes and technological improvements.93
Reagan made a passing attempt to comment about his former union membership before making his oppositional stance perfectly clear: “We cannot compare labor- management relations in the private sector with government. Government cannot close down the assembly line. It has to provide without interruption the protective services which are government's reason for being.”94
The President cited Taft-Hartley as legal grounds for termination and gave the workers two days to return to work, after which they would lose their jobs.95 The president made good on his promise: he not only fired the controllers, but barred them from future
92 Eric Arnesen, Encyclopedia of U.S. Labor and Working-class History (CRC Press, Boca Raton, FL, 2007), 1124.
93 Ibid.
94 Ronald Reagan, “Response to the Air Traffic Controllers Strike,” NBC Evening News, Television Broadcast, August 3, 1981.
95 Ibid.
51 government work, and dissolved PATCO as well.96 Despite his vaguely positive pro- labor comments during his campaign, Reagan’s greater economic strategy as president involved a far more confrontational relationship with labor than his predecessors. Prior to
PATCO’s demonstration, he made several preparations aimed at victory over the union, not reconciliation. In February 1981, he hired Morgan, Lewis and Rockius, a law firm well-known for strong stances against organized labor.97 For head of the Federation
Aviation Administration (FAA), he appointed J. Lynn Helms, who gained a reputation during her presidency at Piper Aircraft as a woman uncompromising toward union members.98 Lastly, during contract negotiations with PATCO, Reagan revised official
White House contingency plans in case of a strike: twice as many flights as the number proposed in President’s Carter plan would be allowed , and airlines now gained the right to specifically chose which flights would be cancelled. These changes were not made known to PATCO officials.99
Reagan’s heavy-handed and highly adversarial approach to the PATCO strike clearly communicated his stance on labor relations: he would not suffer any striking public employees, and would not compromise in any degree, regardless of how justified their grievances were. Beyond that, however, his actions confidently stated to the private sector that his administration would not serve as a stalwart protector of labor. Rather,
Reagan proved more than willing to use existing labor laws to put down strikes
96 Arnesen, U.S. Labor and Working-class History, 1125.
97 Sheila Hershow, “Law Firm Helped DOT Control Air Strikers," Federal Times (Tysons, VA), August 30, 1982.
98 Robert Reinhold, "Enigmatic FAA Chief," New York Times (New York), August 11, 1981.
99 John Richardson (data control officer, FAA) in telephone interview, September, 18, 1981.
52 forcefully, a stance his predecessor Nixon proved unwilling to adopt. This precedent inspired businesses to more aggressively put down labor groups, threaten legal action against striking workers, or negotiate more one-sided agreements at the bargaining table, confident that government interference would be kept to a minimum. Looking back on
Reagan’s approach, his Director of U.S. Office of Personnel Management, Donald J.
Devine, stated, “When the president said no . . . American business leaders were given a lesson in managerial leadership that they could not and did not ignore. Many private sector executives have told me that they were able to cut the fat from their organizations and adopt more competitive work practices because of what the government did in those days.”100
This serves as an example of how union power (in the public sector as well as the private) slowly eroded in the face of constant pressure over the twentieth century. In the years after the 1970 strike, a common source of this pressure was formerly one of labor’s greatest allies: the President himself. The economic hardships and general uncertainty of the 1970s convinced many Americans that the nation required a stronger, more austere approach to keep America competitive. The lack of improvement during Carter’s presidency, coupled with Reagan’s oratorical gift in framing the political right as an ally of the blue collar workforce, led to conservative politicians gaining significant political ground for the first time since the 50s. Nixon’s choice for Secretary of Labor, George
Schultz, illustrated the emerging viewpoint of many conservative politicians during that period, especially. Labor, rather than an essential part of the American economic
100 Donald J. Devine, Reagan's Terrible Swift Sword (Ottawa, IL.: Jameson Books, 1991), 84.
53 landscape, was increasingly viewed as a group to placate, and then later, an obstacle to overcome.
Though Reagan’s actions brought the anti-labor push into its fullest expression,
Nixon largely started the reversal of pro-labor attitudes and policies embraced by the presidents of the mid-twentieth century. Whereas Nixon had a contentious relationship with AFL-CIO president George Meany and largely abandoned attempts to gather widespread labor support, President Johnson became known as the last president to serve as the figurehead for the “New Deal Coalition”: a political alliance forged largely between the labor, minorities, and the Democratic Party. Johnson, partially due to his
“Great Society” programs that focused on domestic inequalities, drew much support from various unions nationwide. In April 1967, the AFL-CIO officially praised Johnson’s actions during his time as president, with George Meany stating firmly: “America is now beginning to reap the harvest of the great social legislation advanced by the Johnson
Administration and adopted by the 89th congress.”101 The two would periodically contact one another to discuss policy and relay important information, and their amiable relationship would result in Johnson presenting Meany with the Presidential Medal of
Freedom in 1963.
Secretary Schultz took an adversarial view of the strike—in his words the “only thing worse than a wildcat strike is a wildcat strike that succeeds”—and believed in a hands-off approach to labor that involved letting unions and businesses struggle against one another without direct mediation on the part of the Federal Government. This policy failed to maintain an even playing field between unions and the private sector and, as the
101 “AFL-CIO Celebrates President Johnson,” AFL-CIO News (Washington, D.C.), April, 1967.
54 following decades showed, gave businesses even greater room to capitalize on the decline of labor-dominated areas—mainly the manufacturing industries that enjoyed the mass organization in the 1930s. It is perhaps telling that George Schultz served as Secretary of
State from 1982 to 1989—almost the entirety of Reagan’s presidential career.
The aggressive tactics used against PATCO illustrate the difference White House support can make for the success of labor unions as well as the difference between
Nixon’s and Reagan approach to a widespread strike. Despite the president’s long-term goals of government austerity, New York letter carrier and 1970 striker Richard Thomas remarked at Nixon’s surprisingly conciliatory attitude despite his strong words on television: “It was a little shocking that President Nixon was pushing it, because he was a
‘law and order’ guy. We thought we’d have to bump heads . . . The only thing we got penalized was five days of pay, but we were willing to go through it.”102 Nixon felt the need to avoid antagonizing the postal workers and the American public, while at the same time trying to push forward the conservative agenda and government downsizing on which his presidency and political reputation depended. Reagan, conversely, crafted his response to the PATCO strike as message of his resolve in putting down widespread strikes. It conveys more than that, however. Nixon’s lighter touch when dealing with the unions shows a lack of solid, lasting political support, and a public that maintained a certain level of distrust toward the government. Nixon’s actions with Vietnam and his attempt to direct control the economy for the sake of stability triggered that distrust and helped to paint him as a member of the powerful elite.
102 Rubio, Always Work, 401.
55
Regardless of Nixon’s “lighter touch,” his actions as president, coupled with the decline of manufacturing and the rising uncertainty and discontent of the modern worker, should have signaled major warnings within the AFL-CIO leadership. Instead, Meany’s successor Lane Kirkland used union dues on causes that, while well-meaning, did not hold relevance to the American blue-collar worker. A life-long opponent of Communism,
Kirkland used millions of dollars to help fund Solidarity: a Polish labor movement seeking to organize Polish factory workers while fighting Communist rule in their country.103 Although the aid proved invaluable to the cause, dues-paying members felt that their union dues should be better and more locally spent. . The misdirection of union dues further convinced the already dejected and betrayed rank-and-file that their new leader cared more about his personal causes than the people he vowed to support and protect. Deliberate efforts by companies like GM to curb union influence by moving factories overseas signified an all-out attack on American labor, and many in the rank and file saw Kirkland’s actions as either misguided at best, and corrupt or cowardly at worst.
Actions like this (or rather, the lack of action) only confirmed suspicions of members of unions like the UAW that labor leadership had become “too friendly with management.”104 Instead of helping to guide the American working class into a newer, healthier, and more stable place in society, money raised on union workers did not benefit the American working class at all.
103 Lane Kirkland, interview by James F. Shea, Don R. Kienzle in Frontline Diplomacy: The Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, November 13, 1996.
104 Roger and Me, directed by Michael Moore (1989; Burbank, CA: Warner Home Video, 2003), DVD.
56
Furthermore, Kirkland gave, at best, half-hearted support to the most proactive and ambitious program in labor’s attempts to adapt: the Organizing Institute (OI).
Adapted from a program implemented in New York during the late seventies, the OI addressed the concern that leaders with labor experience needed training to adapt to changing circumstances, and newer, younger leaders, required training and guidance to reach their fullest potential.105 Thomas J. Donahue, executive assistant to George Meany, sought to establish the OI as an official part of the AFL-CIO, but succeeded only in a limited implementation of what was called “The Organizing Model.” It was only until
Spring of 1989 that the OI was official established, and only until Kirkland’s forced expulsion from the Executive Council in 1995 that the program received significant funding.106 Until his death in 1999, however, Kirkland continued to take credit for the
Organizing Institute, and refused to admit any error in his approach during the 1980s and
90s.107
The respective ends of Meany’s and Kirkland’s careers shed light on the differences between the two figures and their respective times: though seen as “behind the times,” Meany’s respect and reputation kept any threat against his presidency at bay, while Kirkland failed to measure up to his predecessor’s legacy-- from the start of his
AFL-CIO presidency in 1955, Meany grew the American labor movement and capitalized on the economic boom of the post-war era. His work allowed him to make use of the New Deal Coalition’s alliance between labor groups and the Democratic Party
105 A. H. Raskin, “Management’s Hard Line: ‘Class War’ or Labor’s Chance to Reform?,” Monthly Labor Review (Washington, D.C.), February, 1979.
106 “AFL-CIO to Beef Up Organizing," Chicago Tribune (Chicago), September 25, 1995.
107 Kirkland interview by Shea and Kienzle
57 while largely keeping unions with the image of economic necessity, rather than a partition issue. Meany’s skill kept him in the presidency for twenty-five years. While admittedly against bleaker circumstances, Kirkland failed to inspire faith in his leadership or address the issues of the 1980s sufficiently, leading to his forced ousting. Additionally, the 70s lacked the out-and-out desperation unions felt during the 80s; while Nixon showed a greater resistance to unions than Johnson or Kennedy, the unified conservative front against labor was still in its infancy, and would not fully coalesce until Reagan’s presidency. Union membership did not start their decline until well into the 70s, and so the majority of the rank and file as well as leadership trusted Meany’s assurances that labor could survive the period of decline relatively intact. By comparison, Kirkland’s ousting denoted a more anxious atmosphere in which drastic and proactive changes were necessary. Tellingly, a major schism within the labor movement produced a new collaboration of c the International Brotherhood of Teamster, the Service Employees
International Union, the United Farm Workers, and the Communications Workers of
America.108
The skewed priorities and lack of foresight displayed by Kirkland and national leaders only helped the burgeoning conservative movement. Reagan succeeded in framing himself as a man seeking to eliminate the constant specter of “big government,” in effect shifting the image of the powerful elite out the presidency and onto the concept of government itself. Reagan’s success in the PATCO strike and his continuing support by the American public afterwards denoted that he succeeded in equating elitism with labor as well, and convincing many that unions could be far more obstructive than
108 “About Us,” Change to Win Coalition, http://www.changetowin.org/about-us/.
58 beneficial in a time of economic hardship and austerity. Whereas the 70s saw a slow decline within American unions, the 80s brought a “dark age” to the American labor movement that only now may be ending.
59
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