Carriers in a Common Cause 74 1970

A STRIKE IS CALLED

otsurprisingly, New York was the center of the drama, for the city itself had been a cauldron of social unrest, with protests against theVietnam War, urban race riots, strikes by teachers, transportation and sanitation workers dominating the news for several years. Angry Branch 36 members had already raised their voices protesting the federal government's indifference to their plight and their own union's ambivalence, and they became enraged in early February 1970, when Nixon deferred a wage increase scheduled for July 1. But the spark that lit the fuse was the news that on March 12, a House committee approved a bill reflecting the Nixon-Rademacher compromise. At the regular branch meeting that same day, Branch 36 President ~ustaveJohnson was interrupted as he delivered a report about the Nixon-Rademacher bill. Although the branch's executive board had earlier directed stewards to tell carriers to oppose calling for a strike, angry carriers exploded with shouts of "No, no! Not enough! Strike! Enough talk! Strike!" and demanded a strike vote. Raucous debate verging on a brawl ended with an agreement to meet again the next Tuesday, March 17, and hold a strike vote at that time. But with Branch 36's leaders, supported by Rademacher, dead set against a strike and fearful that a meeting might work to the benefit of the more militant members of the branch, the officers arranged only for the vote. With members' credentials challenged in an effort to discourage voting and creating long limes at the voting machines, the vote on March 17, 1970 at the Manhattan Center dragged on until around 10:30 p.m. Some 30 minutes later, the results were announced to the members: 1,555-yes; 1,055-no. NALC's largest local had chosen by a 3-to-2 margin to strike against the U.S. Government regardless of whether the national union joined the strike.

CARRIERS IN A COMMON CAUSE 74 1970

Johnson told the cheering members, “There will be no mail delivery tomor- row in New York,” adding, “Your voice has been heard tonight.” The leader of New York Metro Area Postal Workers, the union representing the inside workers in the post office, said his members would honor carriers’ picket lines even though they could not vote whether to strike until the union’s next regular meeting in three weeks. But Brooklyn Branch 41’s president immediately announced that his carriers would join the strike. Letter carriers had taken a stand. The long-threatened strike was on. Since Branch 36 had night routers, the strike began throughout Manhattan and the Bronx earlier than elsewhere in the New York area. At 12:01 a.m., March 18, members of Branch 36 set up picket lines outside post offices and, although not all the members had voted, almost every letter carrier in Branch 36 stayed out. Immediately, over 25,000 postal clerks and drivers— members of the giant Manhattan- Bronx Postal Union—honored the picket lines. And later in the morning, when carriers in Brooklyn and in many parts of Long Island, northern New Jersey and nearby Connecticut should have reported to work, many of their branches joined the strike. And then the wildfire swept the nation: Branch 34, Boston, Massachusetts; Branch 157, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Branch 1, Detroit, Michigan; Branch 40,

Cleveland, Ohio; Branch 84, Pittsburgh, Jack Manning, The New York Times Pennsylvania; Branch 214, San Francisco, Postal strikers at the 369th Regimental Armory in New York City refusing to California; Branch 9, Minneapolis and return to work.

Carriers in a Common Cause 3 75 Bill Braginetz said it best—in fact, said it so well that today, years later, I remember it word for word: “For the first time,

I finally feel like a human ‘being,” he told me with tears in his eyes on the afternoon of

March 18, 1970, as we walked up and down East 45th Street in front of the Grand Central Station post office in Manhattan where we had ‘ worked together for more than two decades—Bill, always the perfect carrier, on time all the time, and me, always the cut up and far from perfect. Pickets on duty at the Dearborn, Michigan Post Office. Ira Rosenberg, Detroit Free Press Shortly before midnight, I walked across Manhattan toward Grand Central Station post office on the East Side First day on a with two other Grand Central new job: A soldier ‘carriers—Eddie Morris and from Fort Dix, NJ Charlie Sprinkle. Eddie and sorts mail at the Charlie had grabbed sheets of Brooklyn General

oak tag from my truck for pick- Post Office. Barton Silverman, et signs, and we carried some The New York Times wooden barriers, used earlier

that day for the St. Patrick’s Day parade, over to East 45th Street outside the post office. At midnight, about a hundred night letter carrier routers and ‘ all the clerks and other postal employees poured out of the building to join us, and every carrier and clerk just then coming to work honored the line.

Personal recollections of Vincent R. Sombrotto, Branch 36, New York, NY

Carriers in a Common Cause 3 76 1970

Victory!

lmost immediately after ABranch 36 set up picket lines on March 18, the Nixon administration began maneuvering to crack the workers’ revolt. Government lawyers in New York obtained an injunction ordering a return to work. But Branch 36’s strikers defied the order. As the walk-out spread, more court orders were issued, and local NALC leaders found themselves in the nearly unprecedented and certainly uncomfortable position of seeking legal aid and, in some cases, dodging Minneapolis Tribune federal process servers. As the strike reached across the Branch 28, St. Paul, Minnesota; Branch country, NALC President James 47, Denver, Colorado; Branch 11, Rademacher was caught between his Chicago, Illinois. In large and small com- loyalty to his members and his concern munities alike, from coast to coast, letter for the union’s future. Of course, the carriers and postal clerks walked off their incendiary rhetoric he had employed jobs, joined the picket line, and dug in for in New York the previous year when, in the duration. By March 23 the strikers the aftermath of the two job actions in numbered over 200,000 strong. the Bronx, he had promised to lead a United Press International

The troops arrive in New York City. United Press International

Carriers in a Common Cause 3 77 Striking letter carriers in Paterson, New Jersey. United Press International

strike if pay legisla- negotiations, and in a spirited, noisy tion was not enact- session, hundreds of local leaders ed within a few accepted the idea with this proviso: weeks, had helped If agreement were not reached in five fuel the flames of days, NALC would stage a nationwide revolt. Rademacher work stoppage. understood all the The next day, Saturday, March 21, reasons why his Rademacher sent a telegram to all members walked 6,500 NALC branches outlining the off their jobs to plan—return to work Monday and fight. Yet he feared allow five days for negotiations before that if he assumed leadership of the taking the promised nationwide wildcat strike, making it official, the action. But the back-to-work appeal government would totally crush the had virtually no impact on the picket union—bankrupt it with fines, padlock lines, because for many of the strikers, its offices, strip away its jurisdiction, the wildcat was aimed as much at the jail its officers and fire its members. union’s failures as it was at the govern- Rademacher later would acknowledge ment’s. At a meeting of Branch 36 the that there are times when workers have same day, the members voted almost no choice but to strike—he simply felt that the morning of March 18 was not unanimously to stay off the job, and such a time. across the country other branches Trying to escape his dilemma and voted to walk out or stay out. end the crisis, Rademacher first His efforts at persuasion having attempted to persuade the strikers to failed, Rademacher turned on the return to work. After being assured by strikers: At a press conference Sunday, the Nixon administration that negotia- March 22, he charged that the New tions would begin once the strike York City walkout had been instigated ended and only then, the NALC presi- partly by “subversive” elements— dent carried this message to an emer- members of the left-wing Students gency meeting of the presidents of the for a Democratic Society. Rademacher union’s 300 largest branches on March also threatened Branch 36’s leaders 20 in Washington, DC. He personally with expulsion from the NALC, and urged the presidents to call their mem- sent national officers out to the field bers back to work so he could pursue to quash support for the strike.

Carriers in a Common Cause 3 78 1970

But on the picket lines, most strikers possessed. Still, Nixon’s use of ing carriers and clerks were not listen- soldiers as scabs, his implied threat to ing to the administration’s promises send troops to other cities, the mount- nor those of Rademacher, for despite ing legal pressure and threatened the pleas from the national union, fines, criticism of the wildcat action by fewer than 60 of some 200 branches AFL-CIO President George Meany plus out on strike returned to work. Pres- Rademacher’s appeals and claims of ident Nixon, with business interests progress, together convinced many clamoring for action and the effects of postal workers to return to work. But the strike rolling across the country, not the strikers in New York City. went on the offensive on March 23 in It was only when the officers of an effort to end the crisis. On nation- Branch 36, relaying information wide television, Nixon took his case to provided by the union’s national the American people and declared a leadership, assured the striking letter national emergency. He also ordered carriers that an agreement had been 25,000 soldiers into New York City to reached with the administration that move the mail. Not since Grover seemed to meet nearly every demand Cleveland became the first president did the carriers and clerks in New York to order troops to break a strike by City put down their picket signs and calling infantry, cavalry and artillery return to work. But no such agreement units to end the 1894 Pullman railroad existed, for what became known as the strike in Chicago had a president “phantom package” was simply NALC’s resorted to such a desperate and ill- proposal—a retroactive 12 percent pay conceived move. The troops were inef- increase, fully paid health benefits, an fective: They never moved much mail, eight-year pay scale, collective bargain- The mail began to pile up as letter carriers and as shipments had been embargoed ing with binding arbitration, and full postal clerks went out across the country and the military amnesty for the strikers. Whether this on strike in Chicago. units had none of the skills craft work- was a deliberate deception, as many AP Wide World Photos

Carriers in a Common Cause 3 79 believed at the time, or a misunder- August 12, 1970, that the Postal standing, the effect was an end to the Reorganization Act became law. strike. The New York carriers never Letter carriers and other postal formally voted to return to work, but workers had, at long last, achieved the eight-day revolt was over. First to full collective bargaining with their go out and last to go back, New York employer. Ironically, Rademacher City’s letter carriers had shown a himself would be partly vindicated, resolve and courage that would not for as the decades ahead proved, be forgotten. the postal reform legislation he The years As soon as the New York strikers had supported brought collective returned to their jobs, Rademacher bargaining to postal employees, of what and other postal union leaders, freeing them from “collective beg- some deemed assisted by the AFL-CIO, began ging”—the total dependence on the “collective round-the-clock negotiations with good wishes and wisdom of their the Post Office Department. By April elected representatives. begging” 2, the parties reached an agreement Still, only with the strike could were over. they believed would satisfy the carriers have achieved substantial demands of the carriers and clerks economic and legislative gains. The who, at great personal risk, had long struggle of letter carriers for defied both the federal government dignity and justice had taken a great and their national leaders. step forward. The strike—what news The “Memorandum of Agree- magazines at the time termed the ment” expressed the postal unions’ “Revolt of the Good Guys”—was an and the Department’s accord in four uncoordinated, spontaneous upris- basic areas: pay increases totaling ing of aggrieved workers, longing 14 percent—6 percent retroactive to not only for economic justice but also December 27, 1969, and another 8 for a voice and a recognition of their percent effective whenever a postal dignity and humanity. reform bill was enacted; support for For many letter carriers, it was the establishment of an independent also a protest against local and postal authority; collective bargain- national leaders whose concern for ing over wages, hours and working their members was outweighed by conditions with unresolved issues to their understandable fear of what be settled through final and binding an all-powerful federal government arbitration; and “compression” of the could do to their union and their time required for postal workers to own liberty. As a result, they vacillat- reach the top step of their grade level ed while the anger and resentment from 21 years to eight. of carriers in New York and elsewhere Congress quickly approved the in the country grew. In the end, the 6 percent retroactive pay increase, strikers changed the Postal Service and this became law on April 15. and their union. And yet the struggle Obtaining congressional approval for dignity and justice would contin- of the remaining elements of the ue in the years ahead—on different Memorandum of Agreement proved battlefields and with different more difficult, and it was not until weapons.

Carriers in a Common Cause 3 80 IN THE AFTERMATH OF VICTORY I

n 0th the strike of 1970 and the passage of the Postal Reorganization Act which soon followed jolted the course of NALC history. For whether letter carriers joined picket 1111 lines or stayed on the job, their working Lives and their union lives would never be the same. Carriers now worked for a new employer. The old Post Office Department had been put to rest, replaced by the U.S. Postal Service. But more had changed than simply a name or the patch carriers wore on their sleeves. Congress told the new employer to be "business-liken- to take whatever steps might be necessary to "break even" on the accounting ledger. For carriers this meant speed-ups, harassment, over-supervision and, most important, a renewed dependence upon the union to combat management's more aggressive style. The NALC, too, would never be the same, for the strike released forces that would revolutionize the union from within. Local strike leaders did not quickly forget their successful challenge to the NALC national leadership as well as to the courts and the federal government. Nor did it escape their notice that while they had been victorious on the picket lines, they were still relatively powerless withii the union.

CARRIERS IN A COMMON CAUSE Tc 81 then called. Shortly thereafter, the rank- and-filers challenged the incumbent branch president and other branch officers in what was the first contest for branch leadership in over 20 years. On December 2, 1970, the membership of Branch 36 swept Vincent R. Sombrotto and the remainder of the 20-man rank-and-file ticket into office. And, as was true of the strike earlier in 1970, events in New York anticipated those throughout the country: during the next four months rank-and-file slates won victories in Minneapolis, Philadelphia, Boston and other cities. This political upheaval at the local level in early 1971 was taking place at the same time the NALC and the other postal unions were entering into the unions’ first national contract negotiations with the new U.S. Postal Service. The wildcat strike had been led by Letter carriers hoped their newly won NALC President James collective bargaining rights would lead Rademacher signs the rank-and-file members of Branch 36 in to substantial improvements in wages first collective bargaining New York. It was in New York that the and working conditions. In New York, agreement with the Postal movement to change the NALC—to where the militance that had ignited Service in July 1971. reshape it into a modern union capa- the 1970 strike had not yet died, these Also shown (from left) are: ble of dealing as an equal with modern Postmaster General Winton feelings were transformed into action management—was launched. New M. Blount and Federal on June 30, 1971. On that day, 12,000 York carriers without influence in Mediator William Usery. postal workers in the city rallied in branch affairs organized their own support of “a no contract—no work” party with the slogan, “Get the leaders position which was aimed as much at to change or change the leaders.” They the national leadership of the NALC criticized both the branch and national and other postal unions as it was at incumbent officers for failing to give management itself. leadership to the strike, for lack of suc- The collective bargaining agreement cess in dealing with postal manage- that the NALC signed with the Postal ment and—what was at the heart of Service on July 20, 1971 fell short of the the matter—for retaining internal expectations of many carriers in New union procedures and practices which York and elsewhere. Nevertheless, it prevented average letter carriers from was in many respects a major accom- becoming a political force within their plishment, because not only did the own union. contract provide for wage increases In October 1970, candidates sup- and a cost-of-living adjustment—the ported by a newly formed rank-and- first ever for postal employees—it also file movement in New York City were contained a “no lay-off” clause which elected in 22 out of 24 contests for sta- prohibited the Postal Service from tion delegates, as NALC stewards were laying off carriers and other bargain-

Carriers in a Common Cause 3 82 1971-1978

ing-unit employees “on an involuntary elimination of carrier assignments; basis.” Still, some carriers criticized the accelerated changes and additions agreement’s failure to improve fringe to letter carriers’ routes; deteriorating benefits and to preserve strict craft service which would bring unfair lines between carrier and clerk duties. criticism from the patrons to the letter In addition, the wide disciplinary pow- carrier; and an overall and large-scale ers granted management were soundly problem of low morale.” attacked. While prospects of a more authori- One New York rank-and-file leader, tarian, more heavy-handed postal believing that the contract had given management clearly concerned many unbridled authority to the new budget- of the letter carriers associated with conscious postal management, articu- the local rank-and-file movements lated what many dissenting carriers springing up throughout the country, felt: that the new contract would lead these carriers were equally troubled by to “increased supervision and harass- what they perceived to be an authori- ment of letter carriers; arbitrary tarian, heavy-handed NALC national discipline; increased productivity with leadership. During the 1971 negotia- no benefits; reductions in personnel; tions, the national union had placed

Branch Mergers

hile to a great extent numbers and resources, dele- branches a greater opportunity NALC was first organ- gates to the 1970 National to send members to state and Wized in large cities— Convention in Hawaii approved national conventions and training Detroit, Milwaukee, Buffalo, for an amendment allowing branches sessions. example—by the early 20th to merge with one another. All in all, since the 1970 Hawaii century more and more of the This provision was rapidly convention, the union has gained union’s branches were exceed- implemented throughout the tens of thousands of members, ingly small. Increasingly, branches country. In 1973, 103 branches while reducing the number of represented a single work station, on Long Island came together to branches dramatically. By the with only a handful of carriers. form Long Island Merged Branch end of 2005, This provided a sense of intimacy 6000 with a combined member- NALC’s 301,000 and loyalty, but it also resulted in ship of over 3,000. Across the members were an enormous number of branches. continent, 26 southern California distributed By 1970, NALC consisted of over branches totaling 2,000 members among 2,500 6,600 branches, many of them joined forces as Merged Branch branches. with only one or two members. 1100. By the end of that year, Only those in the nation’s largest there were 23 mergers in New cities could support full-time officers. Jersey, 13 in Texas, and 12 in With the passage of the Postal Ohio. Merger fever has continued Reorganization Act, the union ever since as more and more intentionally set out to modernize branches recognized that merg- its structure. Recognizing that the ers could improve representation challenges of collective bargain- by making part- and full-time offi- ing would require a pooling of cers more feasible and by giving

Carriers in a Common Cause 3 83 Branch 36—then in the early days of ing proxy system which allowed dele- Vincent R. Sombrotto’s new rank-and- gates to national conventions to cast file administration—under trustee- ballots on behalf of the absent mem- ship. Although cut off from the union bership—even on behalf of members dues which would normally have of branches not in attendance at a flowed from national headquarters in convention. Second, the union’s Washington, Sombrotto and his team regionally based national field direc- maintained control of the union’s tors—precursors to the national busi- affairs for almost the entire six months ness agents—should be elected only of the trusteeship. This defiant show of by members from the directors’ own self-reliance strengthened the resolve regions. Under such a provision, a of other rank-and-filers throughout letter carrier in California could no the country who were already con- longer vote for the regional represen- vinced that the national leadership tative of a Massachusetts carrier. was either uninterested in or perhaps Finally, all nationally negotiated col- even afraid of the mass participation lective bargaining agreements would of letter carriers in union affairs. have to be submitted to the member- At a conference of concerned letter ship for ratification. carriers in Minneapolis on October 13, The rank-and-file movement 1971, local rank-and-filers formed achieved all three of these goals themselves into the National Rank- during the next three years. Delegates and-File Movement with a permanent at the 1972 national convention in coordinating committee. The confer- New Orleans adopted the “one-man, ence also set out three basic tenets. one-vote” amendment when NALC First, all national officers should be President James Rademacher, recog- elected directly by the membership. nizing which way the winds of changes These “one-man, one-vote” referen- were blowing, acceded to the wishes of dum elections would replace the exist- the membership and reluctantly

Top: President Emeritus William C. Doherty installs NALC national officers in January 1975 in Washington, DC following the first “one-man, one-vote” referendum election in the union’s history. Left: NALC President James Rademacher (right) checks the 1973 tentative “Working Agreements” as they are placed in the mail to be sent to the membership for ratification.

Carriers in a Common Cause 3 84 1971-1978

endorsed the amendment. However, the other two democratizing measures —one providing for regionally elected representatives in each of the 15 NALC regions and the other demanding membership ratification of collective bargaining agreements—were both defeated in New Orleans. But these proved to be only temporary setbacks for the rank-and-filers. In 1973, after the national leadership had negotiated a tentative collective bargaining agreement with the Postal Service, the NALC Executive Council sent the agreement out to the ‘Kokomo membership for ratification—which was accomplished by a vote of more is Dead!’ than 2-to-1—even though there was no constitutional mandate. After this, lmost from the beginning of incorporating membership ratification Athe new, cost-cutting Postal into the NALC Constitution was a Service, postal management formality which was accomplished in had been determined to raise produc- 1974 at the Seattle convention. There, tivity. Managers soon put car- the delegates also approved the riers under unprecedented regional election of the regionally pressure to deliver their In April 1974, postal based representatives—by then known routes at break-neck speed. management announced as national business agents or NBAs. Unresolved grievances piled In retrospect, these victories were up in response to this new it would begin a pilot major milestones on the road to trans- speed-up. In fact, anger at the work measurement system forming the NALC into a modern union increased workplace pressure —LCRES––which would but not the culmination of the process. was at the heart of the opposi- In fact, it was not until 1978 that the tion to the 1973 National make the scientific members would take full advantage of Agreement—which was reject- management experiments the democratic procedures adopted at ed by 31 percent of those of Taylor and others prior the 1972 and 1974 conventions. voting in the first membership Nevertheless, these earlier conven- ratification of a contract. to World War I seem tion battles sent a message to postal The main test was yet to benign by comparison. management that in the future it come. In April 1974, postal would have to deal with the will of the management announced it would entire NALC membership—a force the begin a pilot work measurement system union’s top leadership could not always called LCRES—Letter Carrier Route control as the 1970 strike had demon- Evaluation System—which would strated. This message could not have make the scientific management been more timely, for the Postal Service experiments of Frederick Winslow was intent on making letter carriers Taylor and others prior to World War I pay for their union’s successes in win- seem benign by comparison. To be ning wage rates comparable to those tested first at South Kokomo station in enjoyed by workers in the private sector. Kokomo, Indiana, the “Kokomo Plan”

Carriers in a Common Cause 3 85 Retired Members

rom the earliest days of the NALC, retired members to fear that the union might ignore their inter- carriers have retained their membership in the ests. After all, these members reasoned, if the Postal Funion, thus passing along to future generations Service was not legally obligated to bargain over retiree history and traditions of both the craft and the union benefits and if the union was going to devote more while also adding to the union’s collective strength and more of its time and resources to bargaining especially in the political and legislative arenas. over the wages and working conditions of its active The importance of NALC retirees to the union— members, then who would speak on behalf of retired and of the union to retired members—has become letter carriers? clearer over the years. The union has been far better This line of thought led retired members to demand equipped to fight for and defend retirement benefits than their own voice in union affairs through an elected any individual carrier. Conversely, for the more than half- national officer concerned solely with the needs of century that the 1939 Hatch Act limited the political rights retired members. The position of Director of Retired of working carriers and other postal and federal workers, Members with eligibility for the position limited to retired retirees played an essential role in furthering the union’s members was overwhelmingly approved at the 1976 legislative objectives—a role they continue to play even Houston convention. Three primary duties were assigned though the 1993 reform of the Hatch Act substantially to the newly created position: to provide information and loosened the Act’s restrictions on working carriers’ political service to retired members and those members nearing activities. retirement; to monitor legislative issues of particular The contributions of NALC’s retirees have long been concern to retired carriers; and—as a national officer acknowledged by the union, first at the union’s golden not covered by the Hatch Act—to administer COLCPE, anniversary convention in Milwaukee in 1939, when the union’s political action fund. delegates established the practice of presenting Gold In the decades since the position was created, the Cards to carriers with 50 years of membership, and Director of Retired Members’ responsibilities and con- at subsequent conventions where special honors for stituency have increased substantially. The Director 60-year, 70-year and 75-year members were heads a Retirement Department that at the end of 2005 created. Moreover, to encourage carriers to maintain was serving over 86,000 retired members. A toll-free their NALC membership in retirement, delegates to the number provides retirees and survivors access to both 1956 national convention created a lower national dues general and individual-based information on retirement structure for retirees. issues. The Department also publishes informational But despite the historically high regard the union had guides, conducts training on retirement related-issues, shown for its retirees, the advent of collective monitors retiree-related legislative proposals and plays a bargaining following the 1970 strike led some retired leading role in the expansion and development of COLCPE.

Carriers in a Common Cause 3 86 1971-1978

(as LCRES soon came to be known) To letter carriers, the announcement was to be introduced in every station of the “Kokomo Plan” was virtually a in the country—if judged a success by declaration of war. At the NALC’s management. national convention in Seattle in August The “Kokomo Plan” involved estab- 1974—three months before the testing lishing work and time standards for at Kokomo was scheduled to begin— each letter carrier function. These speaker after speaker rose to denounce would be put into a computer which the plan. A delegate from Branch 343 in would then determine an eight-hour St. Louis summed up the delegates’ route for each individual carrier. Two anger and fear: “Brothers, if this letter carriers from Branch 36 who system is allowed to be imple- visited Kokomo after the Service began mented, letter carriers are testing the system in November 1974 going to be reduced to nothing described what they saw: but automation, and letter The efficiency experts measured and carriers aren’t robots, they are timed how far a carrier walks to and human beings.” In the end, the from the time clock, and how he delegates—well aware that a walks in pulling his case. The dis- postal strike would be illegal tance the carrier’s arm moves in —voted to authorize NALC casing a letter was noted. They even President Rademacher to call a measured to the split second the time nationwide strike if the Postal it took for the carrier to move his Service implemented LCRES and “if it is Branch 36 President eyes from the letter to the case and not to the liking of the letter carriers.” Vincent R. Sombrotto the time it took for the carrier to The Service’s testing of LCRES soon at the microphone at move his eyes from the case back to began, first in Kokomo in November the Seattle Convention the next letter. At this rate, if you 1974, and then in Rose City Park station in 1974. Below, a teller sneezed, you could be charged with in Portland, Oregon in February 1975. counts delegates delay in the mail. The situation at Rose City Park was standing for a vote.

Carriers in a Common Cause 3 87 ted the union to delay any attempt by postal management to implement as a permanent program new national work and time standards until an arbitrator had determined that the standards themselves were “fair, reasonable and equitable.” And NALC President James Rademacher clearly believed that LCRES A Branch 82 carrier especially appalling. After 38 letter car- was far from “fair, reasonable and equi- continues delivering his riers had been tested for eight months, table.” Rademacher also reasoned that route in Portland, Oregon nine carriers had transferred, three had if by some cosmic miscarriage of jus- in 1975, ignoring the retired, two were disabled and one had tice, the arbitrator did rule against the Postal Service’s time- died. In all, close to half of the original union, then the NALC could still call a and-motion expert who work force was gone in less than a strike to prevent the Postal Service from is recording the carrier’s every action as part of the year—a situation which prompted one implementing the system. Service’s testing of the Portland carrier to write: “For 1976 we The arbitration hearings began in infamous “Kokomo Plan.” hope and pray that our national officers November 1976. NALC counsel argued will be successful in receiving a ruling that by adopting predetermined time by the arbitrator to have the Kokomo standards for each work function, plan disallowed, so that carriers will the Postal Service had unilaterally again be treated as humans instead of increased the work load of letter robots and we will have a return to carriers, thereby violating the National better service.” Agreement. Moreover, the system itself The Portland carrier’s prayers were placed carriers under unbearable physi- eventually answered. NALC had cal burdens. The arbitrator issued an demanded arbitration of the LCRES dis- interim decision on July 8, 1976, pro- pute on September 9, 1975—one day hibiting management at the Rose City after the Postal Service had announced Park Station in Portland from forcing that it was converting LCRES from a carriers to work overtime. One month test to a permanent program at Rose later, on the eve of the NALC’s national City Park station. A Memorandum of convention in Houston, the full award Understanding which the postal unions was announced: LCRES was in violation had negotiated with the Postal Service of the National Agreement. The NALC during 1975 bargaining clearly permit- position was upheld, and convention

Carriers in a Common Cause 3 88 1971-1978

delegates roared their approval decent and secure working conditions as President James Rademacher could be won through collective bar- announced, “Kokomo is dead.” gaining alone. No longer, as in the years before the Postal Reorganization Act, did NALC even attempt to mass letter Rebuilding carriers together in giant pay rallies or the Legislative grind out thousands of pieces of mail to members of Congress. In fact, by the Machinery mid-1970s, the powerful Doherty and Keating legislative machinery had all he union’s attention to workplace but withered away. Tissues—a natural outgrowth of By this time, however, the national both the advent of collective leadership began to realize that legisla- bargaining and the more aggressive tive issues were still of vital importance stance of the new, “business-oriented” to the union. Having negotiated two Postal Service—for a time masked the collective bargaining agreements with fact that many issues affecting letter the Postal Service, they were now more carriers were still being determined in aware than ever before that the lack of the halls of Congress. But in the some- the legal right to strike was a severe what heady and certainly contentious restraint on their ability to negotiate a days immediately following the Postal contract that would be satisfactory to a Reorganization Act, this was not readily still restive membership. Bills legalizing apparent to many union leaders. The the right of postal employees to strike NALC President leadership no longer systematically lob- and granting the postal unions some Rademacher (back bied the Congress, once the only means form of union security—which at the to camera, c.) testi- of improving letter carriers’ wages and minimum would require that even fies on the Postal working conditions, believing that non-members pay the unions for the Subsidy Bill in 1975.

Carriers in a Common Cause 3 89 NALC President J. Joseph Vacca (third from left) and other postal union negotia- tors face management as bargaining for the 1978 National Agree- ment begins.

representation they tives. The NALC Executive Council were receiving—had took an additional step on July 21, languished in the 1975, when it formally christened the Congress as the NALC small political action fund the union turned its back on the had established the previous year as legislative process. the Committee on Letter Carrier Furthermore, certain Political Education—COLCPE—with letter carrier benefits the aim of “determining and imple- and protections, such menting programs to collect voluntary as the workers’ com- funds” and the responsibility of dis- pensation program, persing these “contributions to, or Federal Employees’ expenditures on behalf of, candidates Health Benefits for federal elective office.” Program, and the Civil In retrospect, it is clear that these Service Retirement steps were just the beginning, for the System, were federal results were, at first, meager. Relying law and thus subject exclusively on appeals at various to congressional union meetings and regular exhorta- attack. Union leaders tions in union publications, union also began to realize leaders were unable to convince the that the collective membership of the importance of con- bargaining rights postal employees tributing to the union’s political action enjoyed were themselves a product of fund. In the 12 months ending March congressional action—and what 31, 1978, COLCPE raised only about Congress could give, Congress could $70,000. The Legislative Liaison certainly take away. Network itself was more of a paper Once union leaders recognized that expression of what should be done Congress would continue to be instru- than a smoothly functioning grass- mental in the fight for better pay, roots operation. Appeals to write working conditions and benefits, they Congress were issued—and responded took the first steps in what would to—from time to time by a constantly prove to be a lengthy process—the changing cadre of legislative liaisons, rebuilding of the NALC legislative but during this period, NALC’s grass- machinery. In March 1975, NALC roots efforts never reached beyond a launched a Legislative Liaison relatively small number of activists. Network designed to build an exten- Most members of the union—and sive network of members who would even many local leaders—remained write their congressional representa- indifferent to legislation.

Carriers in a Common Cause 3 90 1971-1978

NALC President William Hero of the Year Awards H. Young with 2002 NALC Heroes of the Year.

alking their routes daily on virtually every street in the nation, letter carriers have often been the first to arrive at the scene Wof an accident, disaster or crime—and the first to offer assistance. They have also frequently been the first to notice and respond to a community problem: families without food, senior citizens alone at holiday time, substance abuse among neighborhood youth. NALC established the Hero of the Year awards in 1974 to pay annual tribute to letter carriers who risk their lives to save the lives of others. A new award—the Humanitarian of the Year—was initiated in 1978 to honor carriers who make sustained personal contributions to the betterment of their communities. In 1986, the union announced the establishment of a Branch Service Award to recognize an NALC branch involved in an on-going community service program. A fourth category— special Carrier Alert Rescue—was created in 2002 to honor letter carriers who, due to their alert observations of conditions and people on their routes, save customers’ lives. Judges representing the labor community, community service organizations, and emergency public services review items published in The Postal Record’s “Proud to Serve” column and select the annual winners. Carriers are recognized annually at the To focus public attention on not only the award winners but also the Hero of the Year award ceremony for putting thousands of other letter carriers who deliver more than the mail, the their lives in peril to protect others. Above, a member tends to a woman he helped NALC began in 1985 to honor the Heroes of the Year with an annual evacuate from a house fire in 1993. reception at NALC Headquarters in Washington, DC. NALC officers, Rick Sforza, Inland Valley Daily Bulletin members of Congress, the postmaster general and other USPS offi- cials, and AFL-CIO leaders have joined the heroes, their families and their branch presidents at the official ceremony.

Carriers in a Common Cause 3 91 This combination of indifference And the union was at least beginning and concern was generally unproduc- to recognize the importance of estab- tive. The union was able to protect the lishing a program to deal with the Private Express Statutes guaranteeing major legislative issues of the day. the Postal Service’s monopoly over let- These developments, as significant as ter mail and to stall efforts to bring all they were in the evolution of the postal and federal employees under union, were not enough to heal the the Social Security system—but these wounds the strike had opened. congressional attacks on carrier bene- Tired of the continual turmoil, fits were rare and mounted with little President James enthusiasm by their supporters. On Rademacher announced the other hand, the union lost the one that he would not seek percent addition to retirees’ cost-of- re-election in 1976. living adjustments and was unable Controversial during to enact legislation which would keep his term of office, Rade- the public service subsidy, restrict the macher nevertheless led right of postal management to curtail the NALC through the service, improve the retirement pro- transition from an “asso- gram, or amend the Hatch Act. These ciation” with few rights in defeats underscored the union’s inabil- the workplace to a labor ity to mobilize a politically sophisticated union empowered to bar- army of grassroots volunteers. gain collectively with its But the national leaders’ lack of employer. He skillfully success in rallying the membership to negotiated three collec- support the union’s legislative agenda tive bargaining agree- was not surprising. The internal politi- ments with the Postal cal turbulence unleashed by the strike Service, thus setting the of 1970 had not yet abated. Only when standards upon which his the reins of power had passed to a new successors could build in the years group of union leaders would the ahead. Moreover, Rademacher left NALC be able to fashion an effective a legacy of fairness and integrity, for legislative program. he oversaw the implementation of the democratic reforms which the membership had demanded. Triumph Recognizing that the forces for of the Rank- change were, in the long run, irre- sistible, he graciously accepted what and-Filers he could not prevent and thereby eased the NALC’s transition into a new y 1976, the forces of change let era. Upon his retirement, even those Bloose by the strike of 1970 had who had long opposed him paid him changed the NALC markedly. tribute, for none could deny James The union had substantially strength- Rademacher’s commitment to the ened itself by adopting internal consti- working letter carrier. tutional reforms. In its dealings with Rademacher was succeeded by the the Postal Service, the union was incumbent Executive Vice President J. developing new skills in grievance Joseph Vacca, who, in the fall of 1976, handling and contract administration. defeated Branch 36 President Vincent

Carriers in a Common Cause 3 92 1971-1978

R. Sombrotto in a hotly contested national negotiations between the election. Vacca’s narrow margin of vic- postal unions and the Postal Service in tory foreshadowed the difficulties he 1978. Under pressure to gain substan- would face as growing membership tial improvements in wages and work- criticism of the union’s inability to ing conditions, Vacca faced a postal redress workplace conditions ade- management which came to the bar- quately had now passed to his shoul- gaining table with a number of “take- ders. For example, members and away” demands including the elimina- branch officers were outraged by a tion of the no-layoff clause that had Branch 36 members picket in July 1978 in Washington, DC as part of a rally in support of NALC’s negotiating team.

report that of the 3,022 grievances first been negotiated in 1971. In the submitted to arbitration from mid- agreement reached during the early 1975 through mid-1977, the NALC had hours of July 21, 1978, union negotia- lost 87 percent. To many, this was a tors settled for three annual wage sign of a lack of leadership on the part increases of two, three and five per- of the new administration. Adding to cent each plus a cost-of-living provi- the dissatisfaction of the rank and file sion which “capped” the payment of was a grievance backlog—itself a the cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) result of continued management at the amounts payable during the harassment and workplace pressure— previous contract—regardless of how which was causing substantial delay in high inflation might actually rise. resolving workplace disputes. At the Despite a number of significant same time, the union was experienc- changes in the provisions of the con- ing a financial crisis which was, at tract pertaining to working conditions— least in part, a result of the decline in the guarantee of two 10-minute breaks the number of letter carriers employed and additional protections in route by the Postal Service. examination procedures, for exam- The union’s internal difficulties ple—the members were dissatisfied by were the backdrop against which both the pay package and the capped Vacca faced his first major crisis—the COLA and, for the first time, used the

Carriers in a Common Cause 3 93 ratification procedure to reject an sidered an unacceptable agreement, NALC-negotiated contract. the arbitration of only two issues The union resumed negotiations rather than the entire contract, and, with the Postal Service, but the talks finally, the fact that an outsider had quickly deadlocked. The parties then determined the wages and the extent agreed to bring two issues—the pay of letter carriers’ job security—all this package and the no-layoff clause— increased the membership’s concern to a hybrid dispute resolution process about the effectiveness of the existing called “mediation-arbitration” which leadership. In the national election held out the possibility that the parties held during and after the “mediation- might still reach a negotiated settle- arbitration” process, Vincent R. ment. Harvard University Professor Sombrotto, still the president of James J. Healy functioned in this dual Branch 36 in New York, defeated Vacca capacity of mediator-arbitrator and on by a vote of 75,137 to 43,407. The wide September 15, 1978—after less than two margin of victory helped propel into weeks of office most of the candidates running “mediation” on the Sombrotto slate, many of whom failed to defeated incumbent officers. achieve a Sombrotto’s victory, the culmination settlement of a process which had begun at least among the as early as the 1970 strike, was the final parties— triumph for the rank-and-file forces. Healy Forged by the fires of militancy the assumed the strike had ignited, these men and role of impar- women fought throughout the 1970s tial arbitrator. for the reforms and the issues which In deciding made the new president’s election pos- the two sible. Without the “one-man, one-vote” issues, he national elections, the membership clearly took ratification of collective bargaining a middle of the road position. Healy agreements, and the emphasis upon removed the cap on the COLA, management harassment and speed- increased the annual wage increases ups, Sombrotto and his supporters slightly, and relaxed the no-layoff clause would not have catapulted to national to allow the Postal Service to terminate office in 1978. employees with less than six years of In another sense, however, the tri- service (although also providing life- umph of the rank-and-filers was sim- time job security for those carriers ply the latest stage in the union’s con- and other postal employees who were tinuous struggle to improve the rights working for the Postal Service when of letter carriers. Sombrotto, himself a the decision was issued). student of NALC history, was aware of While the arbitration award could the union’s long heritage. But the new be viewed as an improvement over leadership also recognized that it what the parties had originally negoti- would be judged by its ability to shape ated, the entire collective bargaining the future. Unified within, with a con- process left considerable political tinued commitment to the rights of wreckage in its wake. The rejection of letter carriers, the NALC prepared to what the membership obviously con- face the future with confidence.

Carriers in a Common Cause 3 94 ON THE CUTTING EDGE OF CHANGE

nstalled in January 1979 as NALC's sixteenth president, Vincent R. Sombrotto took the helm of a union deeply affected-some would say weakened-by the previous decade's turbulence. With the union deeply .in debt, Sombrotto immediately called upon the membership to put the union back on a sound financial footing. Members responded by approving overwhelmingly a monthly assessment on top of the regular dues. For its part, the new administration slashed expenses, cutting back severely in virtually every area. This combination of additional revenues and reduced expenditures turned the union's balance sheets around, and by spring of 1980, the union was in the black. The union also suffered from internal divisions. The recent election had swept from office a number of longtime national officers, and their supporters were, at the very least, dubious that the new president could administer the union as effectively as he had criticized those who had previously held national office. Adding to the potential for continued divisiveness was the fact that the new administration included officers who had supported first James H. Rademacher and then J. JosephVacca during the 1970s. At the same time, a contentious lawsuit arising from the Postal Service's failure to observe the overtime pay requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act-New Deal legislation regulating private sector employment practices extended to postal employees in 1974-was pitting one group of members against another.

CARRIERS IN A COMMON CAUSE Tc 95 The new administration’s goal in the was so cumbersome that during the FLSA case was to find a solution that 1978 contract negotiations it was would treat all carriers equally, not an replaced by a new system. easy task since only a portion of the But the backlog survived the inau- membership, those who had joined the guration of that new procedure. To private lawsuits previously settled, had reduce it, the new administration received a financial benefit from the instructed the union’s national busi- case. In February 1979, NALC found a ness agents to meet with their Postal legal mechanism which allowed its Service counterparts to resolve as general counsel to intervene in the many as possible of the pending griev- ongoing litigation to represent the ances, an effort that was only partially interests of the thousands of letter car- successful. In early 1980, the NALC and riers not part of the private lawsuits. the Postal Service entered into After almost four years of legal maneu- “Operation Shakeout,” a crash program vering, a federal judge in October 1982 in which specially appointed teams of approved a comprehensive $400 million union and management representa- settlement of the case. The settlement tives reviewed the thousands of still- fulfilled the union’s mission of achiev- existing grievances to try to resolve as ing “equal treatment” for all carriers by many as possible and withdraw those securing payments based upon the lacking any merit. Only those cases same formula used earlier to settle the where the parties could not reach private lawsuits. agreement were to be appealed to Internal divisions and financial arbitration. By the summer of 1980, woes were not the only hurdles “Operation Shakeout,” plus another facing Sombrotto upon assuming intervention by the national business the presidency. The turmoil of the agents, had all but eliminated the 1970s had prevented the union national-level grievance backlog. from developing the staff and This grievance backlog was sympto- administrative resources neces- matic of a larger problem confronting sary to meet its responsibilities the NALC. The advent of collective to the membership in the more bargaining, particularly the policing of complex workplace environment a nationally negotiated contract with a that the Postal Reorganization multi-step grievance-arbitration Act created. This disarray was procedure, had added heavily to the symbolized by a back- burden of the union. Since grievances log of 6,000 unre- alleging non-discipline violations of solved national- the contract could wend their way up level grievances to Washington, the national union was, resulting from to a large extent, functioning as an deteriorating enormous local union. labor-management Concentrating its energies on what relations, the were often local grievance problems increased work prevented the national union from pressures pervasive doing what only it was in a position to in the reorganized, do—focus on the institutional Postal businesslike Postal Service issues affecting all letter carri- Service, and a cum- ers. Most of these issues were being bersome grievance determined in Congress where NALC procedure. In fact, the was no longer the force it had been in grievance procedure earlier times. The job confronting

Carriers in a Common Cause 3 96 1979-1989

Flanked by the massive legal record of the Fair Labor Standards Act litigation, still in process, NALC Pres- ident Vincent R. Sombrotto explains to a 1980 press conference the union’s goal of “equal treatment for all carriers.” Also shown are Executive Vice President Tony R. Huerta and Vice President Frank Conners (far right).

Sombrotto and his fellow officers was the membership. By 1979, NALC’s to determine which tasks and respon- legislative program was still an idea sibilities could best be handled by whose time had not yet come. NALC’s branches and regional offices. This changed dramatically during Then the national union could tackle the next few years. Recognizing that not only bargaining table issues, but the effectiveness of NALC’s also those concerns of both active and Washington-based lobbying efforts retired carriers still determined by the depended heavily upon the union’s Congress. “grassroots” legislative activity, the Sombrotto administration acted to make a grassroots network a reality. Legislation to The network was built from the bot- the Forefront tom up. Active legislative volunteers were recruited to work with an n the mid-1970s, NALC leaders appointed legislative liaison in Ihad recognized that although the each congressional district. In turn, union had acquired the right to legislative liaisons reported to a state bargain collectively for its member- legislative chairman—almost always ship, a strong and influential presence the state association president. This in the halls of Congress was still entire network was coordinated by imperative. Attempts to rebuild the the national union, which provided powerful grassroots lobbying organiza- training and communicated the latest tion that had functioned during the legislative developments to the field by Doherty and Keating years began at mail and telephone. By the mid-1980s, that time. The union also formed its the entire network numbered over political action committee—the 10,000 volunteers capable of rapid Committee on Letter Carrier Political response to calls from the national Education, or COLCPE—to raise funds union for assistance. for contributions to friendly congress- Building an effective grassroots men and senators. But these efforts lobbying network was only part of the had met with little enthusiasm from task confronting the union. By the late

Carriers in a Common Cause 3 97 was one of the most successful political action committees in the country, raising more than $1 million nearly every year. Ironically, the effectiveness of NALC’s legislative efforts was most evident in a campaign which was, in the end, unsuccessful. In late 1982 and early 1983, Congress put on the fast track a bipartisan legislative program to “reform” Social Security. Among other actions, postal and federal employees— protected since 1920 by the Civil Service Retirement System—would be brought under the Social Security umbrella. Concerned that this would leave working letter carriers without adequate retire- Thousands of NALC ment protection while eroding leaders enter a the CSRS benefits of those carriers Washington, DC already retired, NALC pulled out all hotel ballroom to rally stops in an attempt to derail the “uni- against “universal versal Social Security” train. President Social Security” in Sombrotto testified before numerous February 1983. congressional committees, and the union regularly delivered comprehensive background information to con- 1970s, it was clear that influence in gressional offices. Advertisements national politics required contribu- presenting the union’s case were pur- tions to Congressional campaign chased in newspapers throughout the funds. Since its creation in 1975, country, and NALC members were COLCPE, NALC’s political action com- asked by letter and telephone to urge mittee, had been noticeably unsuc- their congressional representatives to cessful in raising the amounts of vote against “universal Social Security.” money necessary to do this. To raise This activity culminated in late more money, the union turned to February 1983 in a giant legislative direct mail. Buoyed by its experience rally in Washington, DC. Nevertheless, in 1979 and 1980 when the union’s a few weeks later, Congress passed and WAR (Win-A-Sure Retirement) cam- President Ronald Reagan signed the paign netted almost $900,000 in 11 Social Security Reform Act which, months to preserve the independence although leaving existing letter carriers of the Civil Service Retirement System, under CSRS, mandated Social Security the union expanded and refined its coverage for postal and federal employ- techniques for its first direct-mail ees hired on or after January 1, 1984. COLCPE campaign. That campaign— Despite this result, the magnitude of “Budget Battle ’81”—raised over the union’s efforts convinced many in $250,000. By the mid-1980s, COLCPE Congress and elsewhere in government

Carriers in a Common Cause 3 98 1979-1989

that the NALC had become a true also confronted by a postal man- political and legislative force—a force agement emboldened by the which could not be ignored. This per- anti-labor posturing of the ception would serve the NALC well Reagan administration. during the remainder of Reagan’s Management’s “get-tough” first term and throughout his second. stance was revealed immediately. Time after time, the union successfully In mid-April, one week prior to repelled attempts to increase the cost the opening of the 1981 negotia- of health benefits for both active and tions, the Postal Service, contend- retired letter carriers; to reduce carri- ing that the existing multiple craft ers’ retirement benefits; and, with one structure made bargaining too exception, to eliminate the cost-of- “complicated,” asked the National living adjustments retirees received. Labor Relations Board to determine the “appropriate” bargaining unit or Labor- units before it would begin negotiating. Finally, in June, the full Board Management upheld an NLRB regional director’s earlier rejection of the Service’s Conflict—and move, and negotiations began—two Cooperation months late and in an atmosphere poisoned by the Service’s machinations. incent R. Sombrotto faced his Against this backdrop, the NALC Vfirst round of national collec- committed itself to retaining the tive bargaining in 1981 under “uncapped” cost-of-living adjust- pressure to negotiate a contract ments—since the “capping” of COLA acceptable to a membership whose in the 1978 negotiations had been the expectations he had helped to raise major reason letter carriers had reject- during the previous decade. He was ed that negotiated contract. Late in the

With the 1981 negotiations deadline only a few weeks away, letter carriers picketed post offices throughout the country in response to management’s stalling tactics.

Carriers in a Common Cause 3 99 1981 process, management proposed protesting harassment and violations of freezing wages and capping COLA. In the contract by management mounted. response, the NALC and its bargaining Even outside observers were depicting ally, the American Postal Workers labor-management relations within the Union, picketed post offices through- Postal Service as unnecessarily adver- out the country and then augmented sarial and postal management as local action with a rally in Washington, rigidly authoritarian. DC. There the leaders of the unions Joint recognition by top postal man- made it clear that the membership agement and NALC’s national officers should be prepared for any eventuality of the necessity to improve relations if a satisfactory agreement was not took concrete form in the spring of reached by the contract deadline. 1982 when the parties established a Finally, management relented. In the committee to devise a joint process to early hours of July 21, 1981, the unions reach the workfloors of postal facilities and the Postal Service reached an throughout the country. Taking its cue agreement which retained the in part from similar cooperative uncapped COLA, provided wage processes in the private sector, the increases and eliminated mandatory committee—now called the NALC- route inspections, a long-sought goal of USPS National Joint Employee the union. Letter carriers throughout Involvement Committee—agreed that the country registered their over- its goal should be to improve the quali- whelming approval of the contract, ty of the working lives of both carriers ratifying the pact by a 6-to-1 margin. and their supervisors. It then created a Despite NALC’s success at the bar- structure revolving around facility- gaining table, relationships between based, 8- to 10-member work teams of the union and the management were in carriers and their supervisors which disarray at all levels of the system. The would meet regularly to discuss work- workplace pressures which had erupted place problems and possible solutions. in the 1970s continued as grievances In September 1982, Sombrotto and

An Employee Involvement work team of carriers and their supervisors discusses work-related problems.

Carriers in a Common Cause 3 100 1979-1989

Postmaster General William F. Bolger signed a joint statement setting forth the goals of this new joint Employee Involvement—or EI—process. The first work teams and EI facilitators were trained in early 1983, and by the end of the year, work teams and local joint steering committees—NALC-USPS local oversight committees—were functioning in 17 localities. EI was clearly plant- ed and growing. What impact it would make was still an open question. It soon became clear that EI was The arbitration panel neither a panacea for all the ills of the which resolved the Postal Service nor had the emerging 1984 contract dispute spirit of cooperation on the workroom deliberates prior to floor affected the relationships between issuing its award. At far right is impartial the NALC and the Postal Service at the arbitrator Clark Kerr. highest levels. Even before the 1984 To Kerr’s right is NALC national negotiations began, the postal General Counsel Board of Governors—the Service’s policy- Bruce H. Simon. making body of part-time political appointees—indicated that the Gov- ernors and not postal management would be calling the shots. These shots, the Reagan-appointed Board majority made clear, would be aimed at the pay of letter carriers and other craft employees. Once negotiations began, the Postal Service proposed freezing or reducing virtually every benefit and establishing a “two-tier” workforce. This new tier was to be composed of low- paid employees who would receive only a few benefits. When management refused to budge from its hard-line stance, successful negotiations were doomed. Shortly after midnight on July 21, 1984, negotiations broke down. For the first time since postal reorganization, a third-party arbitrator would cates” resolved the largest interest decide the terms of an entire contract. arbitration case ever conducted in the The arbitration hearing was held in United States. The decision granted sig- Washington, DC in December 1984. nificant wage increases, retained the Scores of witnesses were examined and “uncapped” cost-of-living adjustment, cross-examined, hundreds of exhibits and rejected the Service’s call for reduc- were introduced and thousands of tions in benefits in almost every area in pages of testimony compiled. Finally, the contract. However, in rejecting the on December 24, impartial arbitrator Service’s proposal for a “two-tier” Clark Kerr and four “arbitrator advo- wage structure, the arbitration panel

Carriers in a Common Cause 3 101 NALC and American stretched the single structure to include arguments it had made with unre- Postal Workers Union lower “steps” for new workers. strained confidence at negotiations had leaders march in front For the unions, the arbitration award not persuaded an impartial third party. of Postal Headquarters was as great a victory as could reason- Arbitration had been a costly experi- in Washington, DC during the closing days of ably have been expected. Still, the ence for the Service—one the Service the 1987 negotiations. NALC recognized that the panel had itself would try to avoid in the future. added lower rungs to the pay ladder. Second, the NALC-USPS Employee Equally important was the fact that Involvement process had survived the the contract had been fashioned by an acrimony and name-calling that had arbitration panel, and not the parties pervaded both negotiations and the themselves. This was a blow to the arbitration. In fact, the entire EI collective bar- apparatus—work teams, steering gaining process committees, facilitators—functioned that the NALC with only occasional interruptions did not want to throughout the last half of 1984. see repeated. That EI had outlasted the bitter But if the process of creating the 1984 contract stalemated bar- suggested that perhaps the next round gaining and sub- of bargaining might be conducted with sequent arbitra- more candor and less hostility. Such tion of the 1984 proved to be the case in 1987 when contract was the the Postal Service bargained far less low point of labor contentiously than it had previously. relations in the Despite substantial differences between period following the Service and the unions—chiefly the Postal over postal management’s call for the Reorganization creation of a low-paid, part-time work- Act, there were force—the parties reached agreement still reasons for just hours after extending the deadline. optimism. First, NALC members ratified the proposed the Postal Service agreement overwhelmingly. Collective was now well bargaining in the Postal Service was aware that the still viable.

Carriers in a Common Cause 3 102 1979-1989

Preparing for targeted in their attacks. In their minds, rates were too high and rate increases NALC’s Second too frequent, postal management bloated and incompetent—and postal Century employees overpaid and underworked. For the NALC, these criticisms— he final years of NALC’s first whether motivated by ideology or self- century saw the union grap- T interest—focused attention on what pling with how best to fulfill the the union’s role should be when the union’s historic mission of serving the very legitimacy of its sole employer was interests of letter carriers in the years under intense scrutiny. The union’s ahead—years that would begin NALC’s responses were several: first, by the late second century. This process of self- definition was in part a continuation of activities and processes begun earlier in the 1980s. Yet the union was also acknowledging that the challenges ahead were of a different order—and thus demanded different responses. The central problems confronting the NALC at the end of the decade were the very same as those confronting the Postal Service. To a degree unprecedented in the Postal Service’s history, the belief that the United States required a nationwide public institu- tion to provide uniform mail service at uniform rates came under attack. Some of those leading the charge were ideological advocates of one or more 1980s, it was clear that improved labor- NALC President “privatization” theories. These individ- management relations were essential. Vincent Sombrotto uals wanted to reduce the size and Recognizing that adversarial relation- (right) and Postmaster scope of a public Postal Service, if not ships and practices persisted at the General Anthony M. eliminate it altogether, on the assump- local level despite the beneficial impact Frank sign a document tion that the private sector of the of the Employment Involvement in 1988 committing economy could always outperform the both parties to reducing process, Sombrotto and Postmaster public sector. grievances and other General Anthony M. Frank agreed in adversarial activity. Other 1988 to push the joint effort to improve USPS photo critics of the the quality of work life more directly Postal into the arena of labor-management Service— relations. Union and management rep- many of resentatives were directed to reduce them substantially the kinds of behavior speaking leading to grievances and related for large adversarial activity during the coming business fiscal year. By mid-1989, the parties mailers— were well on their way to reducing were less the grievances themselves. Whether sweeping carriers and their supervisors would, and more through the EI process, be able to

Carriers in a Common Cause 3 103 Right: Comedian Jerry Lewis chats with Executive Vice President Bill Young at MDA Telethon. Below: Letter carri- change the kinds of behavior that had ers from winning branches prompted grievance activity was still an appear on Telethon. open question. By this time, it had become obvious that if the Postal Service were to survive and prosper, the NALC and the Postal Service at the highest levels of both organizations would have to work together on a variety of workplace and non-workplace issues. That this might be achieved had been demonstrated when the parties successfully conducted a joint legislative campaign in December 1987 and early 1988. The Reagan administration and the Congress had agreed to a budget resolution which, while preventing the Service from raising rates, would force the USPS to cut services and all but halt its capital spending program. NALC and the Postal Service, joined by other postal organizations, pulled together to fight this move. Together Sombrotto and Postmaster General Preston R. Tisch visited con- gressmen and senators to explain the NALC and the Muscular postal community’s positions. As a Dystrophy Association result, Congress scaled back the Reagan administration’s proposals substantially, ALC’s participation in fund-raising activities although still forcing the Postal Service on behalf of the Muscular Dystrophy to reduce services and postpone some N construction projects. Association is only one example of carriers’ strong commitment to serving their fellow Americans Less visible than this union-manage- in ways other than simply delivering the mail. ment legislative effort was NALC’s In 1953 the union became MDA’s first national spon- recognition that if letter carrier work sor. That fall, the union organized the “Letter Carriers’ was to change because of the automa- March for Muscular Dystrophy” which raised over $3.4 tion of postal operations, the NALC million. Since then, the union has raised additional should be a partner in redesigning and millions to help find a cure for neuromuscular diseases. restructuring the work of carriers. An Beginning in 1986, the union, in cooperation with outgrowth of the 1987 negotiations, a the MDA, has acknowledged those branches in different joint task force to study all aspects of membership categories that have been most successful carrier work—from equipment to the in raising funds for MDA. Representatives of these design of routes to the method of deter- branches appear every year on the MDA Labor Day mining compensation—began work in Telethon along with the NALC president and, more the spring of 1989. With the task force’s recently, a representative of the NALC Auxiliary. recommendations perhaps months, if Thanks to the more than half-century of efforts of not years, away, carriers could at least tens of thousands of concerned letter carriers, com- be assured that for the first time their bined with the contributions of millions of other caring union would be a partner in managing citizens across the country, MDA research has achieved and directing change—rather than dramatic breakthroughs. simply reacting to it.

Carriers in a Common Cause 3 104 1979-1989

But cooperation with the Postal to stagnation as Service, both on the workroom floor and the amendment’s on Capitol Hill, was only one of NALC’s opponents had strategies to preserve the Service and, as charged remained a result, the jobs and benefits of letter an issue only time carriers. By the end of the 1980s it was would decide. obvious that only a strong, stable and Sombrotto and his administration professional organization could suc- now turned to the task of achieving cessfully repel challenges to members’ long-run financial stability. After acri- rights and interests by the Executive monious debate, delegates at the 1984 Branch, Congress or the Postal Service convention in Las Vegas, Nevada, while simultaneously working with approved an amendment establishing a postal management to improve labor- “minimum dues structure.” Dues would management relations and defend now increase as carriers’ wages rose. the Service from external attacks. Thus NALC presidents would not be Fortunately, the NALC had already forced to ask convention delegates taken steps to prepare for this task. every two years for additional funds to Attempts to achieve internal stability pay for the union’s increasing expenses. began soon after Sombrotto assumed But a growing NALC bank balance office in 1979. At the 1980 National would be worthless unless the union Convention in Atlanta, the NALC Executive Council proposed extending the terms of national officers from two to four years. Although the convention delegates defeated the proposed amendment—reminding Sombrotto that he had opposed similar amend- ments when vying for national leadership—delegates to the San Francisco convention two years later passed an identical amendment. No longer would officers begin campaigning for their next term immediately upon assuming office. For Sombrotto and his fellow officers elected with only occasional opposition during the decade, the amendment re-created the stability that had marked NALC politics before the 1970s. But whether stability would lead

Carriers in a Common Cause 3 105 could improve its capacity to respond tions were created, existing ones to the critical issues facing both the improved, and the union began to use Postal Service and letter carriers. This videotape to communicate with the the union did during the remainder membership. With the talents of addi- of the 1980s. Staff was added in such tional professionals, the union’s opera- areas as contract administration, tions became more sophisticated and legislation, legal, communications, effective, and the union’s status within economic research, information serv- the labor movement grew. ices, computers, retired members The NALC had been represented on services, and public relations, and the the AFL-CIO Executive Council since union’s Washington, DC headquarters 1981 when Sombrotto’s election as a building was renovated to accommo- Federation vice president gave the date the new personnel. New publica- union a seat on the country’s most important labor body for the first time Participation in the since William C. Doherty served on the nation’s political Council in the 1950s and early 1960s. process was essen- But participation in the Federation was tial if the NALC were only one aspect of NALC’s greater to continue to protect visibility in the labor movement. the rights, benefits Internationally, the union became and economic secu- increasingly active during the decade rity of letter carriers. in Postal Telegraph and Telephone

Carriers in a Common Cause 3 106 1979-1989

Centennial Celebration

f history is a continuous, if zigzagging, letter carrier and union history; educational Irecord of human existence, then from seminars highlighting the past and the future time to time there are markers that of letter carriers; “The Letter,” a 90-minute organize the past and give cause for celebra- musical tour through NALC history that tion. NALC's Centennial in August 1989 in blended real events with elaborate fantasies Milwaukee, Wisconsin, where the union had and thought-provoking commentary on the been founded 100 years earlier, was such an role of the NALC and letter carriers in occasion. There, more than 5,000 letter carri- American society; a first day of issue ers, retirees, auxiliary members, families and ceremony unveiling a new stamp honoring friends attended four days of commemorative letter carriers; and the dramatic close of the activities to honor the past and learn from it. festivities directly across the street from the Highlights of the event were the arrival at site of NALC’s founding meeting where a the opening ceremonies of a giant Centennial bronze statue commemorating America’s envelope sent during the preceding months letter carriers was unveiled. to each of the 50 states in the union for cere- Specifically designed to be festive, the monial postmarking; a 12,000-square-foot Centennial Celebration was also educational historical exhibit that displayed nearly a and reflective because only by understanding thousand documents, artifacts, photographs, the past can the union properly prepare for vehicles and uniforms evoking key events in the challenges ahead.

Carriers in a Common Cause 3 107 International—the Geneva-based the country. The 152 WIN workshops group uniting worldwide unions rep- conducted by November 1988 also resenting postal and other communi- mobilized NALC members, principally cations workers which later, through retirees and Auxiliary members, to mergers, became part of the larger, take an active part in the 1988 presi- more broadly based Union Network dential campaign, and for the first International, or UNI. Closer to home, time NALC members won delegate the union took a leadership role in positions to a national political party both a union-dominated coalition convention. which in 1985 and 1986 mounted a Although still hampered severely successful effort for tax reform, and by the 50-year-old Hatch Act’s limita- the development of the Fund for tions on partisan political activity of Assuring an Independent Retirement— postal and federal employees—limita- or FAIR—a group of postal and feder- tions the union made substantial al unions and employee associations progress toward overturning during whose legislative interests were far the late 1980s—carriers nevertheless broader than its name would suggest. recognized that participation in the That NALC’s increasing promi- nation’s political process was essen- nence in the labor movement was tial if the National Association of largely in the area of legislation was Letter Carriers were to continue to hardly surprising since by the mid- protect the rights, benefits and 1980s, the NALC had developed one economic security of letter carriers. of the labor movement’s most effective grassroots lobbying organizations and arguably the most successful political action fund. But beginning in April 1987, the union took a giant step forward by establishing an educational program—“WIN,” for “We’re Involved Now”—to teach grassroots lobbying and politics to thousands of NALC and Auxiliary members throughout