The Evolution of the Byzantine Legacy in Modern Church-State Relations in the West and in Russia

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European Journal for Church and State Research - Revue européenne des relations Églises- État 11, 125-137. doi: 10.2143/EJCS.11.0.2029500 ©2004 by European Journal for Church and State Research - Revue européenne des relations Églises-État. All rights reserved.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE BYZANTINE LEGACY IN MODERN CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS IN THE WEST AND IN RUSSIA

ELENA MIROSHNIKOVA

One of the disputed legacies of the Byzantine tradition is the evolution of models in church-state relations. The desired “symphony” between church and state in the Byzantine tradition can be seen in the spirit of mutual cooperation, mutual support, and mutual responsibility between church and state without serious encroachment by one into the internal affairs of the other. In a relationship of “symphony,” the state seeks from the church a policy of general encouragement and support, as well as prayer for public prosperity and overall success, and the church seeks from the state conditions of peace and prosperity for the citizens, as well as financial support1. What is the situation in church–state relations today in the Byzantine world? Does the desired “symphony” exist? Does it exist anywhere in the world? The answer to these questions is connected to the mutual influence of democracy and religion. This mutual influence is expressed on one side in the democratic legacy of religion, and on the other side in the religious legacy of democracy. Democracy is most effective when there is no discrimination on account of religion and belief, due to a policy that all religions are deemed equal under the law. Invariably, citizens respect such a policy toward religion and belief and thus honor the state with good citizenship. So it is in theory, although things surely operate much differently in real life. Consider, for example, the oldest parliament in the world, the English parliament, established in 1265. After finally obtaining its inde- pendence from the crown in 1688, a mere one year later it passed the famous Act of Toleration, a milestone in the development of religious

1 See: Fr. Vladislav Zypin, “The Relations between Church and State: Canons and Historical Reality,” in Historical Herald, Istoritcheskiy Vestnik N° 9-10, 2000. 9960_07_Churh_and_State_11_12 08-05-2008 15:21 Pagina 126

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freedom for all citizens of the crown. And yet what do we see in the 21st century? The parliament is considering passing new religious hate laws. According to the BBC, when English citizens were questioned soon after the terrorist attacks in the London tube in the summer of 2005, 51% agreed that hate law legislation was necessary as a means of preventing outbreaks of religious violence. But 44% (mostly nonreligious people) opposed such legislation because it would threaten freedom of speech2. So we are witnesses to a very important fact in the modern world: democratic efforts to protect free speech or other basic human rights sometimes clash with the goal of making religious freedom real. “Symphony” is indeed difficult to achieve. April 2006 is the 100th anniversary of the Russian parliament, a young parliament when compared to its English counterpart. But it is remarkable to note that among the most important documents of the first State Duma after the fall of communism in the early 1990s was the law concerning freedom of conscience. The provisions of that document were quite democratic (equality of all religions, the right to change one’s belief, the right to propagate one’s religion and belief, etc.). The destiny of that project was, unfortunately, like the destiny of the first Russian parliament, short-lived. The new Russian parliament is going to restrict the missionary activities of religious organizations in every region of Russia and stringently regulate all religions by the registration’s activities – a remarkable about-face given its early experiment with democracy. This is hardly symphony between church and state. In spite of so small an experience in parliamentary processes, Russia does have considerable experience in testing various church-state models. In the 20th-century, Russia experimented with three models: the integration model (established church), the pluralism model (but only for a short period following the February revolution of 1917), and finally the separation model (a first phase during the atheistic Soviet period, and a second phase beginning in 1990, based on the Western model of ideological pluralism, freedom of conscience, and equality of all religions). Many European countries have had similar experiments with more than one of these models.

2 See: HRWF July 19, 2005; Public split over new hate laws. 9960_07_Churh_and_State_11_12 08-05-2008 15:21 Pagina 127

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Models of Church-State Relations in Today’s World Officially, Russia has now adopted the separation model, but unoffi- cially it practices an integration model, allowing for privileges for the ROC. Atheists, supposedly protected and respected under the separation model, are ignored in Russia today, as if they did not exist, although polls indicate that about 20 % of Russians are avowed atheists. And such a policy is typical not only of the regions of Russia, but it seems to be the policy of the federal government as well. This policy can be clearly seen in several ways, e.g.: the efforts to mandate Orthodox religious instruction in public schools are increasing; the former Attorney-General of Russian Federation supported the introduction of Orthodox priests in the army; and the Orthodox priestly presence is seen also in state institutions such as universities, airports, and hospitals. Moreover, the language used by some Orthodox priests is just plain rude; there is nothing of tolerance and respect to those of differing beliefs. An example of such language is the letter of Archbishop Nikon, the leader of the ROC in Ufa and Sterlitamak, to the governor of Moscow, about the plans of the Krishna Society to construct a temple in Moscow. In the letter the Ortho- dox priest states that the construction of a Krishna Temple is “an offence of our religious feelings, it is mockery of a millennium of Russian religious culture; for most of the population, Christians and Muslims, Krishna is the bad demon, the sigh of the hell, the opposition to God3.” The use of such language by the ROC, the keeper of the “true religion,” is widespread and quite effective in government circles. It should be noted, by the way, that the Krishna Society, has got finally the approval to construct their temple. One might appropriately ask if Russia has moved from militant atheism to militant Orthodoxy. Under the separation model, the state is theoretically incompetent to judge which confessions are legitimate and which ones are not. It is sim- ply not the business of the state. The goal of the state is to provide human rights, including religious freedom, for all citizens–religious and nonreligious. In current Russian policy, however, we see something far different: we see the influence of the Byzantine tradition–the state has the right to decide what religion is true and what religion is false. As Alexan- der Solzenizyn says, “Russia is becoming free from the secularity4.”

3 See: Newsru. com//Religion and Society//1 December 2005. 4 Moscow News, N° 15, 2006 (28.04.2006). 9960_07_Churh_and_State_11_12 08-05-2008 15:21 Pagina 128

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The main classifications of models of church-state relations are based on two paradigms: the confessional state and the secular state. Any country in which the very basis of state authority is grounded in religion is a confessional state. The existence of an established church is a clear sign of confessionality. In a confessional state, religion and state are inseparable. By contrast, the mark of the secular state is the separation of church and state. Clearly, the Byzantine state was a confessional state. But in recent times, it is not so easy to delineate what is confessional and what is secular. Most countries are now secular. I would estimate that about 35% of the nations of the world are still confessional states, most of these are Islamic nations. Confessional attitudes are to be clearly seen in the way politics in general is administrated; in the way the commercial activities are regulated by sharia; in the role of women, and in the depriva- tion of basic civil rights. Altogether, 22 of the 44 nations with predominantly Muslim populations are either “Islamic states” or have designated Islam as the official religion of the state5. The Second Vatican Council (1962-1965), in its Declaration “Digni- tatis humanae,” said that the confessional state is gone, that is a sign of the past, that “perfect societies” are not possible. There are two main principles of church and state in the Declaration: the need for church autonomy and the need for cooperation between church and state. The Byzantine idea of symphony, which included the belief that the political power has to honor the true religion, was changed to the idea of religious freedom. It means that the state has to respect and guarantee the religious freedom of all citizens and it is not the province of political power to decide what religion is true and what is blasphemy. Hegel emphasized that any term is at first neutral, but over time assumes political-ethical implications. It is important for legal definitions of the reaction between state and church. For example, one can cite the discussion in Germany about the theory of coordination in the early 1950s. This theory, based upon the equality of state and church, was thought to be an alternative to the cooperation model with its main idea of neutrality. In the 21st century, the idea of symphony as a harmony between state and church is

5 See United Stated Commission on International Religious Freedom, The Religion- State Relationship and the Right to Freedom of Religion or Belief: A Comparative Tex- tual Analysis of the constitutions of Predominantly Muslim Countries 6 (2005), in W. Cole Durham, “Secularity and Laicite: Contrasting Visions of Freedom, Religion and the State,” paper presented at the Conference on Laicite (and Secularism) in the World and Post-Soviet Experience, Moscow, Russia, October 27-28, 2005. 9960_07_Churh_and_State_11_12 08-05-2008 15:21 Pagina 129

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developed to fit the paradigm of church-state separation, which com- bines religion and democracy based on the neutrality of the state to all religions. In most cases a nation does not issue a formal declaration of being a confessional state, but rather operates with a tendency to grant to God or to God’s agents on earth a strong role in shaping law and public policy. Some might call England a confessional state because the Anglican Church still has a very privileged position. But I would not make this assertion because in practical terms, the Anglican Church plays no more a role in administering political events than any other English group. Moreover, the number of English citizens who attend church regularly is only 7%, hardly the foundation of a confessional state. What about Russia? Is it correct to say that Russia is a secular state? The Constitution of Russia includes the main features of separation: no established church, institutional separation, secularity of the state, equality of beliefs. But Russia could easily be considered a confessional state if it continues to hitch its wagon to the Orthodox Church. It depends, as it does anywhere else, on the degree to which governmental affairs depend upon, are grounded in, or look to religious texts and personnel for direction etc. The point here is that in the modern world it is impossible to speak about the secular state or confessional state de facto and de jure. The fact of the established church is not the clear sign of the confessional state, nor do constitutional positions favoring separation guarantee separation in all respects. The Byzantine legacy in state-church relations must be examined in the context of the modern secularization process. Secularization from the historical point of view means: 1) to confiscate the property of the monastery and place it in the government’s hands; 2) to eliminate public aspects of religion; 3) to privatize religion, based on the separation of church from state. The Enlightenment idea of the freedom of religion can logically be extended to mean an atheistic worldview, a nonreligious weltanshauung. But secularity is not a synonym of atheism and should not be deemed such. The word atheism is repugnant to most religious people. But it is an inseparable part of freedom of conscience. To my mind it is best for the state (in the West, or in Russia) to aim toward protecting freedom of conscience, not just freedom of religion. In this respect, freedom of conscience includes freedom of religion; the former term is broader because it protects nonreligious beliefs as well as religious ones. Such a policy—protecting freedom of conscience– is more 9960_07_Churh_and_State_11_12 08-05-2008 15:21 Pagina 130

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objective and can help eliminate the preferential treatment toward some religions. Nevertheless, notions like secularization, secularity, secularism, laicite, secular intolerance, etc., do in fact complicate the realization of freedom of conscience. In Russia, we sometimes say, “We see not the forest, but only the trees.” The habit to solve the details, to discuss ideas without getting to the real heart of things, brings us away from the general idea of freedom, including freedom for religion and belief. There are, of course, different levels of separation in different con- texts. In fact, there are very few nations that adhere to a model of strict separation. Those that adhere to separation are hardly free of problems. Just consider China and France; both struggle to find the realization of any real genuine separation, due to public pressures. It is important to note in this context that in the 25 years since the adoption of the 1981 UN Declaration on Freedom of Religion and Belief, we continue to speak about the challenge of realizing freedom of religion and belief. In spite of problems with separation most nations in the modern world are secular (about 65%).The confessional state is clearly in decline. The best examples of this decline are the north European countries: Sweden (from 2000 it refused the integration model and privileged position of the Evan- gelical Church after more then 400 years); Norway (plans to divorce the state from the Lutheran Church in 2014); and Denmark (with the privileged position of Danish Volk church, the ideas about the reforms in church-state relations are very intense, especially after the recent episode concerning the cartoons of Mohammad). So, is it possible now to say that secularization has achieved its goals and religion is now outside the public domain? Is religion now only the private thing of the person? In the main, it is impossible to put religion outside of public life. The evolution of the world after the Enlightenment reveals this. From one side, of course, the influence of secularization is very strong. In Continental Europe, from which Christian evangeliza- tion began, it is proper to speak of the need for “reevangelisation” (Pope Benedikt XVI), according to the “Evangelii nuntiandi” (1975), to strengthen the belief among Catholics.. We see the weakness of the main Christian churches in England, north European countries, Netherlands, and France. The obligatory religion class is still part of the curriculum in the public schools in many European countries, despite the fact that the church is having a very small impact on young people. Very few children get religious education in the family, which puts even more stress on schools to offer something. The situation is almost the opposite in the USA where there is no mandate for religion classes in public schools, 9960_07_Churh_and_State_11_12 08-05-2008 15:21 Pagina 131

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but 80-85 % of the population, including pre-college students, attends religious services or engages in religious worship of some kind. In Russia a strange paradox prevails. Religious classes are constitu- tionally suspect, but the policy to introduce mandatory courses under the banner “Bases of the Orthodox Culture” has official support in many regions of Russia. Many officials believe it is only the way to keep the cultural traditions of Russia and to provide moral education. The latest example in this field is a decision in Belgorod6. From September 1-the beginning of the school year across Russia – this course will be in the curriculum of all public schools in Belgorod region. The main goal of this class, according to the vice-director of the department of Education and Science, is the education of students in spirit of traditional values and strengthening the family. By the way, it is interesting to note, inciden- tally, that according to a poll of the Russian Center of Research of Pub- lic Opinion, 72% of Russians think the main source of moral values is the family while only 4% think it is the church. Clearly, then, the international experience in religious education shows that the compulsory character of religious instruction in public schools is not the main way to foster respect to religion and morality. The education of the children in one religion is the main task of the family itself and the people’s chosen religions.It is important to provide education about religion as a phenomenon of the world culture. As for the public schools, they should provide knowledge about the history of the main world religions, but not prefer any religion over others. The fact is that is the parents and religious organizations should be more active in the education of their children and in religious life. The main conclusions of the question about European values 1999-20007 tell us that there are many passive members of the church in Europe; and the number of those who are leaving the church (and then do not pay the church tax) is increasing. The chair in the Sociology of Religion, University of Exeter, Grace Davie, notes a special form of recent religion -vicarious religion, and speaks about a mutation, the change from a culture of obligation to consumption in terms of the religious life. The idea of a personal God remains a very popular belief, but increasingly such a belief is based on how one believes, not what one believes also seems to be on the rise8.

6 http://religion.sovacenter.ru/events/13B7455/13DF6DE/7651E18, May, 31, 2006. 7 Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, Key West, Florida, 5 December 2005. 8 Grace Davie,” Believing without Belonging: Just How secular is Europe? The Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, 16.03.06). 9960_07_Churh_and_State_11_12 08-05-2008 15:21 Pagina 132

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The exodus from the churches does not necessarily imply a break from belief of any kind. Among European adults, about 70% still say they are religious (this figure parallels Russia). On the strength of figures like these, some might say that we are witnessing a process of deseculariza- tion. I disagree. Once born, secularization is not likely to diminish; the decline of religion becomes a reality. Change is in the air. The basic principle of secularization is that religion is a private thing; this creates a kind of pressure upon public institutions to give attention to religion. We are witnesses today of new forms of public religion. Hegel’s dialectic–thesis, antithesis, and synthesis–applies here. In this context I understand religion as thesis, secularization as antithesis, and the civil religion as synthesis. Civil religion is a topic for special attention. The role of civil religion is big in the USA, but it also grows in Europe. Germany in partic- ular is witnessing a growing interest in civil religion. The phenomenon of civil religion is an expression of a friendly state-church relationship and is a via media between separation and identification, between recognizing religion as a private right and as an institutional form. These ideas are most developed in the cooperation model. The cooperation model is a sort of golden middle between the state church and strict separation. The other titles of this model are thoughtful: “model of neutrality” or “European model.” In any case, most EU countries have it as a basic approach to the relationship between church and state. More- over, nations with a state religion are likely to move toward the cooperation model, one by one, and nations with separation as a constitutional principle are likely to do the same. In the USA we see the great role of civil religion, of faith-based initiatives, of vouchers – all “cooperation” features challenging the traditional separation model. As Congress continues to work toward final passage of a fiscal year 2007 budget, the Sen- ate reinstated $7 billion in spending for human service programs, including many that are delivered by faith-based and community orga- nizations9. All of this points toward greater use of the cooperation model. In Russia there are a number of covenants between the ROC and governmental institutions–for Railway stations, for education, for health and social work, for universities, for the war on drugs, etc. These efforts are a kind of mix between the cooperation and identification models, since the ROC gets many tax and property privileges. My hope is that this mix of historical experience and the lessons that can be learned by study- ing the experience of other democracies will lead Russia to adopt some

9 E-Newsletter for March 21, 2006. 9960_07_Churh_and_State_11_12 08-05-2008 15:21 Pagina 133

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form of the cooperation model of church-state relations, a model that is perhaps best exemplified in Germany. The cooperation model consists of a secular state that guarantees religious liberty and at the same time coop- erates with religious communities in the socioeconomic sphere and thereby achieves a balance between indifference and identity. Such a separation needs both distance and cooperation. But states like Germany that allow mandatory religious instruction according to denominations and grants certain religious communities the organizational structure of a “body of public law” and the right to collect taxes does not act in a reli- giously neutral manner. Any nation, according to Immanuel Kant, has the ability to use its own mind (intellect). Increasingly, in Russia, Europe, and the USA, neutrality is the goal. Different historical experiences in the individual nation- states have led to different conceptions of the relationship between religion and state. The state is a culturally and politically conditioned individuality, which is, among other things, also conditioned by religious elements and experiences. What can we say about the cooperation model in Germany? First, we can state that the principle of neutrality does work and seems to be on the rise. The number of public corporations is increasing. Recently, the Federal Administrative Court granted long-awaited (from 1995) recog- nition to the Jehovah’s Witnesses10. Islamic organizations, however, are not recognized in Germany. And this is the other particularity of the modern process in state and church. It is clear that church and state are both interested in social-political reforms. Globalization changes the state. The culture and national particularities are melting away, so to say. Reli- gion in this situation becomes the new status; it becomes a sign of national and cultural identity. Religion becomes as much a sign for the main population as for immigrants. In this context it is essential to be aware of the influence of immigra- tion and especially of Islam, of its increasing role and presence. Islam in Europe now is not only the other religion; it is another way of life. We are now seeing the emergence of the third generation of Muslims in the EU, especially in Germany, France, England, and the Netherlands. And the new generation of Muslims has no great wish to integrate. Their religion is a sign of national and culture identity. What is the state to do in this situation? State neutrality in religion and belief does not mean state indifference to its own culture, including traditions in church-state affairs.

10 HRWF, 21 Feb. 2006. 9960_07_Churh_and_State_11_12 08-05-2008 15:21 Pagina 134

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Thus, England does want to listen to criticism about reforms in the established position of Anglican Church. Likewise, Russia wants to keep its culture, where historically the ROC was first among religions. But these good ideas might not be so good in practice. Because the state tries to use the traditional religion for keeping its cultural identity, the result is that the rights of others are restricted. In Germany there is a brewing controversy about citizenship tests that include questions that arguably infringe the right to freedom of religion11. So, for example, people are asked, “In your eyes, were the perpetrators (of 9/11 and the 2004 Madrid attacks) terrorists or freedom fighters? Explain.” And, “If some- one said: ‘Free media are indispensable to a democratic society,’ would you agree or disagree?” Or, “How do you feel about criticism of your religion? Do you find it permissible?” Some contend that the model of state-church relations is not important; what is important is the real activity of the state. The separation model scores well on this kind of measure. The cooperation model also is an effective way to realize freedom of conscience, to strengthen the state and individual rights. We proceed in Europe and in Russia not through the struggle with atheism and secularism – these forces were untenable in society–but through the realization of freedom of conscience. The West thinks only in terms of freedom of religion, which to my mind is one of the problems in the providing of human rights. Solz- enizyn thinks it is a crisis of democracy in the West and the weakening influence of Christianity in the world12. The ROC has its own view of how to solve this problem—to find a way out of this crisis. The dignity of the human person emphasis appears in a Declaration on Human Rights of the II World (universal) Russian Peoples Council (Moscow, April 6, 2006). The main leader of this forum was the ROC. The main idea of this document is to respect the dignity of the person. It is especially important because of the turning point in history represented by this idea. The document speaks about the clash of civilizations. The ROC proposes to keep the attitude between morality and human rights, to strengthen the value of the human being. There are two kinds of freedom: freedom from evil and freedom of moral choice. Freedom of choice realizes its value, and the person realizes his/her dignity, if he/she chooses the Good. Human rights are based on the value of the person and should have as a goal the realization of a person’s dignity.

11 See: World Europe from the April 10, 2006 edition. 12 Moscow News, N° 15, 2006 (28.04.2006). 9960_07_Churh_and_State_11_12 08-05-2008 15:21 Pagina 135

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The ROC speaks about the values that are not lower than human rights, e.g.: belief, morality, sacred (holy) things and Mother-country. These are the main thoughts of this Declaration. And the Russian people seem to agree, at least to some extent. It is a good idea, to my mind, to add the political and civic freedoms with the moral responsibility. In a recent poll, 47% of Russians stated that they want a more active influence of the ROC upon the spiritual life of the society. Interestingly, 29% want the ROC and other religious organizations to focus on reducing influence of cults. Moreover, 18% want the influence of ROC not only on society, but on the state also. At the same time, 60% support the Western conception of the priority of individual rights. And 52% are not ready to sacrifice their own life for Russian common interests13. The document from the Russian People’s Council split Russian society, in spite of its goal of recognizing the dignity of the human person. Alexander Solzenizyn, by the way, agrees with the idea, that the realization of human rights should not threaten the existence of the Mother- land and should not offend the religious feelings of citizens. Those who disagree with the Declaration note the ideological attack on the Univer- sal Issue of Human Rights. To my mind it reflects the conflict between the international system of human rights (western values) and a special role of Russian civilization. It seems we are going back at least two centuries in history. The ROC refuses the positive experiences of modern western civilization. This is sad, since it makes Russia appear to be out of step with the rest of the world. This Declaration is an attempt to change the priority of individual human rights and to give first place to the collective rights. The ROC thinks it is necessary to develop restric- tions on individual rights to preserve social peace. Well, it is a vital question in modern world, especially in the context of the fight against world terrorism. But it should not give privileges for some religions. We can see in these words of the Declaration the very legacy of Byzantine symphony: a priori the state is the foundation of truth; indeed it always knows the truth. We are witnesses today of a fierce competition among human rights. What freedom has more value: speech or religion? I answer: freedom of conscience. The right for religious freedom and belief should be the responsibility of everybody. The person should not only demand his/her rights, but remember the other person and his/her rights. According to

13 See Russian Center of Research of Public Opinion, http://religion.sovacenter.ru/events/13B7354/14447D7/741CB20. 9960_07_Churh_and_State_11_12 08-05-2008 15:21 Pagina 136

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Leo Tolstoy, my well-known countryman, the conscience is the high law for everything, and this law includes not only rights, but love too. The state should not interfere in matters of personal belief or in the religious life of the church or similar religious institutions. The state should also love its citizens–despite differences in their beliefs. It would be better for church and state to cooperate more in welfare and social work. This is itself a kind of symphony. Are there differences in realizing cooperation in church-state relations in Europe and in Russia? Yes. The main difference is that the EU countries try to provide the cooperation on the basis of neutrality, so we can say it is a direction to the left, to secularity. In Russia, the cooperation moves in a direction to the right, to confessionality. Separation likes a wall between church and state. Cooperation wants not a wall, but symphony. This is true especially in the Byzantine tradition. We need to find this symphony as a harmony in modern society. Tolerance and democracy must go hand in hand. Can we say that democracy is the protector of tolerance? It is when religion and democracy support each other. It is when democracy supports freedom of conscience, when on the basis of separation it is possible not to keep the autonomy of the religious organizations and to respect its role in public life. There must be respect to nonbelievers as well. This is true democracy.

Conclusions The Byzantine legacy is great. I respect the Byzantine tradition in the way the Orthodox Church appreciates the profound mysteries of God and divinity. I respect such a position, and the great role of the ROC in the history and culture of Russia. Still, I do not have much respect for the Byzantine tradition on state-church matters. It delegates too much power to state authority. The legal status of religion and religious institutions vis-à-vis the state is a subject of considerable complexity. Throughout the course of history, the relationship between religion and state has been tense and unpre- dictable, owing largely to the comprehensive, authoritative, and sometimes competing claims of each. Much of the complexity is located in the dichotomy between the “person” (individual rights) and the “citizen” (communal obligations), which can often clash. My view might be sum- marized as follows: The Byzantine idea of symphony has been around for centuries, but it is incomplete. The modern expression is different. Free- dom and equality of faiths and Weltanschauung can find their maximum 9960_07_Churh_and_State_11_12 08-05-2008 15:21 Pagina 137

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development within the context of a legal order based on freedom of conscience and separation of state and church that presupposes mutual cooperation between governmental and religious institutions, especially in the area of welfare and social concerns. This framework provides real symphony. It is a model that has served the West well. It can serve Rus- sia favorably as well.