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The Evolution of the Byzantine Legacy in Modern Church-State Relations in the West and in Russia

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The Evolution of the Byzantine Legacy in Modern Church-State Relations in the West and in Russia 9960_07_Churh_and_State_11_12 08-05-2008 15:21 Pagina 125 European Journal for Church and State Research - Revue européenne des relations Églises- État 11, 125-137. doi: 10.2143/EJCS.11.0.2029500 ©2004 by European Journal for Church and State Research - Revue européenne des relations Églises-État. All rights reserved. THE EVOLUTION OF THE BYZANTINE LEGACY IN MODERN CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS IN THE WEST AND IN RUSSIA ELENA MIROSHNIKOVA One of the disputed legacies of the Byzantine tradition is the evolu- tion of models in church-state relations. The desired “symphony” between church and state in the Byzantine tradition can be seen in the spirit of mutual cooperation, mutual support, and mutual responsibility between church and state without serious encroachment by one into the internal affairs of the other. In a relationship of “symphony,” the state seeks from the church a policy of general encouragement and support, as well as prayer for public prosperity and overall success, and the church seeks from the state conditions of peace and prosperity for the citizens, as well as financial support1. What is the situation in church–state relations today in the Byzantine world? Does the desired “symphony” exist? Does it exist anywhere in the world? The answer to these questions is connected to the mutual influ- ence of democracy and religion. This mutual influence is expressed on one side in the democratic legacy of religion, and on the other side in the religious legacy of democracy. Democracy is most effective when there is no discrimination on account of religion and belief, due to a policy that all religions are deemed equal under the law. Invariably, citi- zens respect such a policy toward religion and belief and thus honor the state with good citizenship. So it is in theory, although things surely operate much differently in real life. Consider, for example, the oldest parliament in the world, the English parliament, established in 1265. After finally obtaining its inde- pendence from the crown in 1688, a mere one year later it passed the famous Act of Toleration, a milestone in the development of religious 1 See: Fr. Vladislav Zypin, “The Relations between Church and State: Canons and Historical Reality,” in Historical Herald, Istoritcheskiy Vestnik N° 9-10, 2000. 9960_07_Churh_and_State_11_12 08-05-2008 15:21 Pagina 126 126 E. MIROSHNIKOVA freedom for all citizens of the crown. And yet what do we see in the 21st century? The parliament is considering passing new religious hate laws. According to the BBC, when English citizens were questioned soon after the terrorist attacks in the London tube in the summer of 2005, 51% agreed that hate law legislation was necessary as a means of preventing outbreaks of religious violence. But 44% (mostly nonreligious people) opposed such legislation because it would threaten freedom of speech2. So we are witnesses to a very important fact in the modern world: demo- cratic efforts to protect free speech or other basic human rights sometimes clash with the goal of making religious freedom real. “Symphony” is indeed difficult to achieve. April 2006 is the 100th anniversary of the Russian parliament, a young parliament when compared to its English counterpart. But it is remarkable to note that among the most important documents of the first State Duma after the fall of communism in the early 1990s was the law concerning freedom of conscience. The provisions of that doc- ument were quite democratic (equality of all religions, the right to change one’s belief, the right to propagate one’s religion and belief, etc.). The destiny of that project was, unfortunately, like the destiny of the first Russian parliament, short-lived. The new Russian parlia- ment is going to restrict the missionary activities of religious organi- zations in every region of Russia and stringently regulate all religions by the registration’s activities – a remarkable about-face given its early experiment with democracy. This is hardly symphony between church and state. In spite of so small an experience in parliamentary processes, Russia does have considerable experience in testing various church-state mod- els. In the 20th-century, Russia experimented with three models: the integration model (established church), the pluralism model (but only for a short period following the February revolution of 1917), and finally the separation model (a first phase during the atheistic Soviet period, and a second phase beginning in 1990, based on the Western model of ideo- logical pluralism, freedom of conscience, and equality of all religions). Many European countries have had similar experiments with more than one of these models. 2 See: HRWF July 19, 2005; Public split over new hate laws. 9960_07_Churh_and_State_11_12 08-05-2008 15:21 Pagina 127 THE EVOLUTION OF THE BYZANTINE LEGACY 127 Models of Church-State Relations in Today’s World Officially, Russia has now adopted the separation model, but unoffi- cially it practices an integration model, allowing for privileges for the ROC. Atheists, supposedly protected and respected under the separation model, are ignored in Russia today, as if they did not exist, although polls indicate that about 20 % of Russians are avowed atheists. And such a policy is typical not only of the regions of Russia, but it seems to be the policy of the federal government as well. This policy can be clearly seen in several ways, e.g.: the efforts to mandate Orthodox religious instruction in public schools are increasing; the former Attorney-General of Russian Federation supported the introduction of Orthodox priests in the army; and the Orthodox priestly presence is seen also in state insti- tutions such as universities, airports, and hospitals. Moreover, the lan- guage used by some Orthodox priests is just plain rude; there is nothing of tolerance and respect to those of differing beliefs. An example of such language is the letter of Archbishop Nikon, the leader of the ROC in Ufa and Sterlitamak, to the governor of Moscow, about the plans of the Krishna Society to construct a temple in Moscow. In the letter the Ortho- dox priest states that the construction of a Krishna Temple is “an offence of our religious feelings, it is mockery of a millennium of Russian reli- gious culture; for most of the population, Christians and Muslims, Krishna is the bad demon, the sigh of the hell, the opposition to God3.” The use of such language by the ROC, the keeper of the “true religion,” is widespread and quite effective in government circles. It should be noted, by the way, that the Krishna Society, has got finally the approval to construct their temple. One might appropriately ask if Russia has moved from militant atheism to militant Orthodoxy. Under the separation model, the state is theoretically incompetent to judge which confessions are legitimate and which ones are not. It is sim- ply not the business of the state. The goal of the state is to provide human rights, including religious freedom, for all citizens–religious and nonre- ligious. In current Russian policy, however, we see something far differ- ent: we see the influence of the Byzantine tradition–the state has the right to decide what religion is true and what religion is false. As Alexan- der Solzenizyn says, “Russia is becoming free from the secularity4.” 3 See: Newsru. com//Religion and Society//1 December 2005. 4 Moscow News, N° 15, 2006 (28.04.2006). 9960_07_Churh_and_State_11_12 08-05-2008 15:21 Pagina 128 128 E. MIROSHNIKOVA The main classifications of models of church-state relations are based on two paradigms: the confessional state and the secular state. Any coun- try in which the very basis of state authority is grounded in religion is a confessional state. The existence of an established church is a clear sign of confessionality. In a confessional state, religion and state are insepara- ble. By contrast, the mark of the secular state is the separation of church and state. Clearly, the Byzantine state was a confessional state. But in recent times, it is not so easy to delineate what is confessional and what is secular. Most countries are now secular. I would estimate that about 35% of the nations of the world are still confessional states, most of these are Islamic nations. Confessional attitudes are to be clearly seen in the way politics in general is administrated; in the way the commercial activ- ities are regulated by sharia; in the role of women, and in the depriva- tion of basic civil rights. Altogether, 22 of the 44 nations with predom- inantly Muslim populations are either “Islamic states” or have designated Islam as the official religion of the state5. The Second Vatican Council (1962-1965), in its Declaration “Digni- tatis humanae,” said that the confessional state is gone, that is a sign of the past, that “perfect societies” are not possible. There are two main principles of church and state in the Declaration: the need for church autonomy and the need for cooperation between church and state. The Byzantine idea of symphony, which included the belief that the political power has to honor the true religion, was changed to the idea of religious freedom. It means that the state has to respect and guarantee the religious freedom of all citizens and it is not the province of political power to decide what religion is true and what is blasphemy. Hegel emphasized that any term is at first neutral, but over time assumes political-ethical implications. It is important for legal definitions of the reaction between state and church. For example, one can cite the discussion in Germany about the theory of coordination in the early 1950s. This theory, based upon the equality of state and church, was thought to be an alternative to the cooperation model with its main idea of neutrality.
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