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Economic Analysis by Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz
BEFORE THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. Civil Action No. 98-1232 (CKK) MICROSOFT CORPORATION, Defendant. STATE OF NEW YORK ex rel. Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Civil Action No. 98-1233 (CKK) MICROSOFT CORPORATION, Defendant. DECLARATION OF JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ AND JASON FURMAN TABLE OF CONTENTS I. QUALIFICATIONS ........................................................................................................... 1 II. PURPOSE............................................................................................................................ 2 III. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................... 2 IV. THE MODERN ECONOMIC THEORY OF COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY .6 A. Acquisition of a monopoly............................................................................................ 7 B. Potential for competition............................................................................................ 10 C. Consequences of monopoly ........................................................................................ 12 D. Monopolies and innovation ........................................................................................ 14 V. FACTS AND LEGAL CONCLUSIONS RELATING TO MICROSOFT.................. 16 A. Monopoly power.......................................................................................................... 16 B. Anticompetitive behavior .......................................................................................... -
Politics Aside, a Common Bond for Two Economists by N
The New York Times, June 30, 2013 Politics Aside, a Common Bond for Two Economists By N. GREGORY MANKIW ONE of the cool things about hanging around a place like Harvard, where I have been a professor for almost 30 years, is that you get to meet some supertalented people long before the world recognizes their talents. I had a vivid reminder of this just a few days ago, when President Obama appointed Jason Furman as chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, a position that I held under George W. Bush. Jason was once a student of mine at Harvard. As the president noted in announcing the appointment, I was chairman of Jason’s Ph.D. dissertation committee. He and I have remained friends ever since. In Washington these days, comity between Republicans and Democrats is rare. Yet my relationship with Jason has never been hampered by our differing political affiliations. During the campaign of 2004, I was part of the Bush administration and he was working for two Democratic candidates, first for Wesley K. Clark in the primary season and then for John Kerry during the general election. Yet the fact that our bosses were steeped in a political battle at the highest level did not stop us from enjoying regular dinners together. For me, and I suspect for Jason as well, friendship trumps politics. Our friendship is based in part on the common bond of all economists. The field of economics offers a lens through which to view the world. For those who buy into it and pursue it as a career, it provides a foundation of a personal and political philosophy. -
Senate Section
E PL UR UM IB N U U S Congressional Record United States th of America PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 113 CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION Vol. 159 WASHINGTON, THURSDAY, MARCH 7, 2013 No. 33 Senate The Senate met at 10 a.m. and was ator from the State of Hawaii, to perform get back to regular order, they say, we called to order by the Honorable BRIAN the duties of the Chair. could function again. Yesterday, we SCHATZ, a Senator from the State of PATRICK J. LEAHY, saw both sides of that. Hawaii. President pro tempore. On the one hand, my Republican col- Mr. SCHATZ thereupon assumed the leagues did practice regular order. On PRAYER chair as Acting President pro tempore. the other, they didn’t. Let’s take the The Chaplain, Dr. Barry C. Black, of- f one they didn’t. fered the following prayer: They demanded a 60-vote threshold RECOGNITION OF THE MAJORITY for confirmation of a very qualified Let us pray. LEADER God, our fortress, we live under Your nominee, Caitlin Halligan, to be United protection. Keep America safe from the The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem- States Court of Appeals Judge for the forces of evil that come against it. pore. The majority leader is recog- DC Circuit. Republicans once again hid behind a cloture vote—filibuster, by Lead our Senators away from the trap nized. another term—to prevent a simple up- of trusting only in their resources so f or-down vote on this important nomi- that they will never forget that noth- SCHEDULE nation. -
Ten Nobel Laureates Say the Bush
Hundreds of economists across the nation agree. Henry Aaron, The Brookings Institution; Katharine Abraham, University of Maryland; Frank Ackerman, Global Development and Environment Institute; William James Adams, University of Michigan; Earl W. Adams, Allegheny College; Irma Adelman, University of California – Berkeley; Moshe Adler, Fiscal Policy Institute; Behrooz Afraslabi, Allegheny College; Randy Albelda, University of Massachusetts – Boston; Polly R. Allen, University of Connecticut; Gar Alperovitz, University of Maryland; Alice H. Amsden, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Robert M. Anderson, University of California; Ralph Andreano, University of Wisconsin; Laura M. Argys, University of Colorado – Denver; Robert K. Arnold, Center for Continuing Study of the California Economy; David Arsen, Michigan State University; Michael Ash, University of Massachusetts – Amherst; Alice Audie-Figueroa, International Union, UAW; Robert L. Axtell, The Brookings Institution; M.V. Lee Badgett, University of Massachusetts – Amherst; Ron Baiman, University of Illinois – Chicago; Dean Baker, Center for Economic and Policy Research; Drucilla K. Barker, Hollins University; David Barkin, Universidad Autonoma Metropolitana – Unidad Xochimilco; William A. Barnett, University of Kansas and Washington University; Timothy J. Bartik, Upjohn Institute; Bradley W. Bateman, Grinnell College; Francis M. Bator, Harvard University Kennedy School of Government; Sandy Baum, Skidmore College; William J. Baumol, New York University; Randolph T. Beard, Auburn University; Michael Behr; Michael H. Belzer, Wayne State University; Arthur Benavie, University of North Carolina – Chapel Hill; Peter Berg, Michigan State University; Alexandra Bernasek, Colorado State University; Michael A. Bernstein, University of California – San Diego; Jared Bernstein, Economic Policy Institute; Rari Bhandari, University of California – Berkeley; Melissa Binder, University of New Mexico; Peter Birckmayer, SUNY – Empire State College; L. -
A Reconsideration of Fiscal Policy in the Era of Low Interest Rates
A Reconsideration of Fiscal Policy in the Era of Low Interest Rates Jason Furman & Lawrence Summers Presentation to the Hutchins Center on Fiscal & Monetary Policy and Peterson Institute for International Economics December 1, 2020 Interest rates are low despite debt being high Note: Debt-to-GDP forecast is the CBO 10-year ahead forecast (2030 from June 2019 Alternative Fiscal Scenario for 2020). Real interest rates are based on 10-year Treasury Inflation Protected Securities (TIPS) from January 2000 and February 2020. Source: Congressional Budget Office; U.S. Department of the Treasury; authors' calculations. Interest rates have fallen everywhere, starting before the financial crisis and continuing after it Real Ten-Year Benchmark Rate Percent 12 Canada France Germany Italy 10 United Kingdom Japan United States 8 6 4 2 0 -2 -4 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 Note: Inflation measured by one-year changes in the core consumer price index (core personal consumption expenditures for United States). Source: Bank of Canada; Statistics Canada; Eurostat; Japanese Statistics Bureau; U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis; Macrobond; authors’ calculations. Interest rates are expected to stay low Ten-Year Treasury Rate Percent 16 2030:Q4 Market expectations: 14 72% probability FFR < 0.25 12 five years from now 10 Historical 1.4% FFR a decade from 8 now 6 -0.9% real FFR a decade from now 4 CBO 2 2% nominal 10-year rate a Market-implied decade from now 0 1964 1974 1984 1994 2004 2014 2024 Note: Dashed lines are projections. Market-implied rates as of November 27, 2020. -
HAMILTON Achieving Progressive Tax Reform PROJECT in an Increasingly Global Economy Strategy Paper JUNE 2007 Jason Furman, Lawrence H
THE HAMILTON Achieving Progressive Tax Reform PROJECT in an Increasingly Global Economy STRATEGY PAPER JUNE 2007 Jason Furman, Lawrence H. Summers, and Jason Bordoff The Brookings Institution The Hamilton Project seeks to advance America’s promise of opportunity, prosperity, and growth. The Project’s economic strategy reflects a judgment that long-term prosperity is best achieved by making economic growth broad-based, by enhancing individual economic security, and by embracing a role for effective government in making needed public investments. Our strategy—strikingly different from the theories driving economic policy in recent years—calls for fiscal discipline and for increased public investment in key growth- enhancing areas. The Project will put forward innovative policy ideas from leading economic thinkers throughout the United States—ideas based on experience and evidence, not ideology and doctrine—to introduce new, sometimes controversial, policy options into the national debate with the goal of improving our country’s economic policy. The Project is named after Alexander Hamilton, the nation’s first treasury secretary, who laid the foundation for the modern American economy. Consistent with the guiding principles of the Project, Hamilton stood for sound fiscal policy, believed that broad-based opportunity for advancement would drive American economic growth, and recognized that “prudent aids and encouragements on the part of government” are necessary to enhance and guide market forces. THE Advancing Opportunity, HAMILTON Prosperity and Growth PROJECT Printed on recycled paper. THE HAMILTON PROJECT Achieving Progressive Tax Reform in an Increasingly Global Economy Jason Furman Lawrence H. Summers Jason Bordoff The Brookings Institution JUNE 2007 The views expressed in this strategy paper are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of The Hamilton Project Advisory Council or the trustees, officers, or staff members of the Brookings Institution. -
Uncorrected Transcript
1 CEA-2016/02/11 THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION FALK AUDITORIUM THE COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS: 70 YEARS OF ADVISING THE PRESIDENT Washington, D.C. Thursday, February 11, 2016 PARTICIPANTS: Welcome: DAVID WESSEL Director, The Hutchins Center on Monetary and Fiscal Policy; Senior Fellow, Economic Studies The Brookings Institution JASON FURMAN Chairman The White House Council of Economic Advisers Opening Remarks: ROGER PORTER IBM Professor of Business and Government, Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business and Government, The John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University Panel 1: The CEA in Moments of Crisis: DAVID WESSEL, Moderator Director, The Hutchins Center on Monetary and Fiscal Policy; Senior Fellow, Economic Studies The Brookings Institution ALAN GREENSPAN President, Greenspan Associates, LLC, Former CEA Chairman (Ford: 1974-77) AUSTAN GOOLSBEE Robert P. Gwinn Professor of Economics, The Booth School of Business at the University of Chicago, Former CEA Chairman (Obama: 2010-11) PARTICIPANTS (CONT’D): GLENN HUBBARD Dean & Russell L. Carson Professor of Finance and Economics, Columbia Business School Former CEA Chairman (GWB: 2001-03) ALAN KRUEGER Bendheim Professor of Economics and Public Affairs, Princeton University, Former CEA Chairman (Obama: 2011-13) ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100 Alexandria, VA 22314 Phone (703) 519-7180 Fax (703) 519-7190 2 CEA-2016/02/11 Panel 2: The CEA and Policymaking: RUTH MARCUS, Moderator Columnist, The Washington Post KATHARINE ABRAHAM Director, Maryland Center for Economics and Policy, Professor, Survey Methodology & Economics, The University of Maryland; Former CEA Member (Obama: 2011-13) MARTIN BAILY Senior Fellow and Bernard L. Schwartz Chair in Economic Policy Development, The Brookings Institution; Former CEA Chairman (Clinton: 1999-2001) MARTIN FELDSTEIN George F. -
Peter R. Orszag
PETER R. ORSZAG Peter R. Orszag is Vice Chairman of Corporate and Investment Banking and Chairman of the Financial Strategy and Solutions Group at Citigroup, Inc. He is also a Nonresident Senior Fellow in Economic Studies at the Brookings Institution and a Contributing Columnist at Bloomberg View. Prior to joining Citigroup in January 2011, Dr. Orszag served as a Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and a Contributing Columnist at the New York Times. He previously served as the Director of the Office of Management and Budget in the Obama Administration, a Cabinet-level position, from January 2009 until July 2010. From January 2007 to December 2008, Dr. Orszag was the Director of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). Under his leadership, the agency significantly expanded its focus on areas such as health care and climate change. Prior to CBO, Dr. Orszag was the Joseph A. Pechman Senior Fellow and Deputy Director of Economic Studies at the Brookings Institution. While at Brookings, he also served as Director of The Hamilton Project, Director of the Retirement Security Project, and Co-Director of the Tax Policy Center. During the Clinton Administration, he was a Special Assistant to the President for Economic Policy and before that a staff economist and then Senior Advisor and Senior Economist at the President's Council of Economic Advisers. Orszag has also founded and subsequently sold an economics consulting firm. Dr. Orszag graduated summa cum laude in economics from Princeton University and obtained a Ph.D. in economics from the London School of Economics, which he attended as a Marshall Scholar. -
Snake-Oil Economics
The second voice is that of the nu- Snake-Oil anced advocate. In this case, economists advance a point of view while recognizing Economics the diversity of thought among reasonable people. They use state-of-the-art theory and evidence to try to persuade The Bad Math Behind the undecided and shake the faith of Trump’s Policies those who disagree. They take a stand without pretending to be omniscient. N. Gregory Mankiw They acknowledge that their intellectual opponents have some serious arguments and respond to them calmly and without vitriol. Trumponomics: Inside the America First The third voice is that of the rah-rah Plan to Revive Our Economy partisan. Rah-rah partisans do not build BY STEPHEN MOORE AND their analysis on the foundation of profes- ARTHUR B. LAFFER. All Points sional consensus or serious studies from Books, 2018, 287 pp. peer-reviewed journals. They deny that people who disagree with them may have hen economists write, they some logical points and that there may be can decide among three weaknesses in their own arguments. In W possible voices to convey their view, the world is simple, and the their message. The choice is crucial, opposition is just wrong, wrong, wrong. because it affects how readers receive Rah-rah partisans do not aim to persuade their work. the undecided. They aim to rally the The first voice might be called the faithful. textbook authority. Here, economists Unfortunately, this last voice is the act as ambassadors for their profession. one the economists Stephen Moore and They faithfully present the wide range Arthur Laffer chose in writing their of views professional economists hold, new book, Trumponomics. -
Moneyball for Government Principles Moneyball for Government All-Stars
Two-hundred twenty-seven local, state, federal, nonprofit and academic leaders from all across the political spectrum and throughout the country support the following Moneyball for Government principles. Moneyball for Government Principles Government at all levels should help improve outcomes for young people, families, and communities by: 1) Building evidence about the practices, policies, and programs that will achieve the most effective and efficient results so that policymakers can make better decisions; 2) Investing limited taxpayer dollars in practices, policies, and programs that use data, evidence, and evaluation to demonstrate how they work; and 3) Directing funds away from practices, policies, and programs that consistently fail to achieve desired outcomes. Moneyball for Government All-Stars You can view the full list of Moneyball for Government All-Stars goo.gl/1rBMWW. Founding All-Stars • Melody Barnes (Former Director, White House Domestic Policy Council, President Barack Obama) • Michael Bloomberg (Former Mayor, New York City) • John Bridgeland (Former Director, White House Domestic Policy Council, President George W. Bush) • Jim Nussle (Former Director, White House Office of Management and Budget, President George W. Bush) • Peter Orszag (Former Director, White House Office of Management and Budget, President Barack Obama) Federal All-Stars U.S. Senate: U.S. Senator Michael Bennet (D-CO); U.S. Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT); U.S. Senator Robert Portman (R-OH); U.S. Senator Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH); U.S. Senator Mark Warner (D-VA); U.S. Senator Todd Young (R-IN); Former U.S. Senator Kelly Ayotte (R-NH); Former U.S. Senator Mary Landrieu (D-LA) U.S. -
Union Calendar No. 78 ACTIVITIES
Union Calendar No. 78 112TH CONGRESS " ! REPORT 1st Session HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 112–128 ACTIVITIES OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION JUNE 2011 (Pursuant to House Rule XI, 1(d)(1)) Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov http://www.house.gov/reform JUNE 28, 2011.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 99–006 PDF WASHINGTON : 2011 VerDate Mar 15 2010 01:47 Jul 02, 2011 Jkt 099006 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 4012 Sfmt 4012 E:\HR\OC\HR128.XXX HR128 rfrederick on DSKD9S0YB1PROD with HEARING congress.#13 COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM DARRELL E. ISSA, California, Chairman DAN BURTON, Indiana ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland, Ranking JOHN L. MICA, Florida Minority Member TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of JIM JORDAN, Ohio Columbia JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio CONNIE MACK, Florida JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts TIM WALBERG, Michigan WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts JUSTIN AMASH, Michigan JIM COOPER, Tennessee ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois RAU´ L R. LABRADOR, Idaho DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee PETER WELCH, Vermont JOE WALSH, Illinois JOHN A. YARMUTH, Kentucky TREY GOWDY, South Carolina CHRISTOPHER S. -
The Lack of an Empirical Rationale for a Revival of Discretionary Fiscal Policy John B. Taylor Stanford University Prepared
The Lack of an Empirical Rationale for a Revival of Discretionary Fiscal Policy John B. Taylor Stanford University Prepared for the Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association Session “The Revival of Fiscal Policy” Chair: Martin Feldstein January 4, 2009 10:15 am Published in American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 99 (2), May 2009, pp. 550-555 Mailing Address: John B. Taylor, Herbert Hoover Memorial Building, Stanford University, Stanford, California 94305. Phone: 650-723-9677, Fax: 650-725-5702, Email: [email protected] The Lack of an Empirical Rationale for a Revival of Discretionary Fiscal Policy By John B. Taylor* A decade ago in a paper, “Reassessing Discretionary Fiscal Policy,” published in the Journal of Economic Perspectives, I concluded that “in the current context of the U.S. economy, it seems best to let fiscal policy have its main countercyclical impact through the automatic stabilizers….It would be appropriate in the current circumstances for discretionary fiscal policy to be saved explicitly for longer term issues, requiring less frequent changes.” This was not an unusual conclusion at the time. As Martin Eichenbaum (1997) put it, “there is now widespread agreement that countercyclical discretionary fiscal policy is neither desirable nor politically feasible,” or, according to Martin Feldstein (2002), “There is now widespread agreement in the economics profession that deliberate ‘countercyclical’ discretionary policy has not contributed to economic stability and may have actually been destabilizing in the past.” Despite this widespread agreement of a decade ago, there has recently been a dramatic revival of interest in discretionary fiscal policy. The purpose of this short paper is to review the empirical evidence during the past decade and determine whether it calls for such a revival.