Mr. 47% and the Seven Dwarfs Lauren Rosen Game Theory And

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! Mr. 47% and the Seven Dwarfs! Lauren Rosen! Game Theory and Democracy! Duke University! ! November 2013! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! Lauren Rosen! Game Theory and Democracy! November 2013! ! Mr. 47% and the Seven Dwarfs! Summary! ! !When President Barack Obama took the Oath of Office in 2008, he had momentum. His campaign was smart, his message was widespread. Images of “hope” and “change” had swept the nation and his inauguration was an emotional and unforgettable experience not only for those present, but also for any American watching. But looking past the historical significance of the commencement of Obama’s Presidency, he was faced with the monumental challenge of picking the country out of !the economic hole created during the Bush Administration.! !This aforementioned whole was so deep and insurmountable that come the end of Obama’s first term, the country was far from back on track. This meant that the 2012 Presidential election was relatively open in comparison to other races with incumbents. In a year which should have lead to a fierce, unpredictable battle, the Republican Party chose to run an ill-conceived race. Where they should have moved towards the center, they drew themselves farther to the right. When they should have championed their leading man, they consistently introduced weak supporting actors—detracting !attention from the main character (Mitt Romney) and tattering his image as a whole.! !In order to win an election in a two-party race, candidates should draw themselves towards the middle of the political spectrum in order to maximize their chances of winning 50% or more of the votes. With two candidates, the Nash equilibrium strategy would be for each candidate to position him/herself as close to the center of the range as possible, as from this position neither candidate has a stimulus to move. Obama utilized this strategy well in 2008, while the Republicans faltered. They strayed from this method in that John McCain’s political position fell in the middle of the right wing, then moreover chose a running mate in Sarah Palin who was even more conservative—thus not gaining any swing votes. The conservative Republicans would never have chosen Obama over McCain anyhow, but the Party gained few voters from the left. Subsequently, the Republicans should have put more consideration into centrist candidates in 2012, like Jon Huntsman, but instead played a game very resemblant of their failed strategy in 2008. Huntsman excelled in places where Romney faltered, yet was largely overlooked by his party and the populace because of his ties to the Obama !Administration—an ignorant reason to withhold support.! Lauren Rosen! November 2013! !Game Theory and Democracy! Mr. 47% and the! Seven Dwarfs! !As it does every fourth year, campaign fever swept the United States in 2012. In a year which should have lead to a fierce and unpredictable battle, the Republican Party decided to run an ill-conceived race. Where they should have moved towards the center, they drew themselves farther to the right. When they should have championed their leading man, they consistently introduced weak supporting actors—detracting attention from the main character (Mitt Romney) and detracting from his image as a whole. With every media cycle, and every debate, Romney was consistently picked on like the smallest kid on the playground. But ultimately, Romney was (and may have always been) the strongest candidate in the field. For this reason, he should have received support throughout the race, not only in its closing months, when it seemed to !be too late to salvage a victory.!! !But the Republican loss can not solely be attributed to the gradual wear and tear on Romney’s reputation. There is also the fact that in order to win an election in a two- party race, candidates should draw themselves towards the middle of the political spectrum in order to maximize their chances of winning 50% or more of the votes. With two candidates, the Nash equilibrium strategy would be for each candidate to position him/herself as close to the center of the range as possible, as from this position neither candidate has a stimulus to move. Obama did this well in 2008, while the Republicans faltered. They strayed from this strategy in that John McCain’s political position fell in the middle of the right wing, and then moreover chose a running mate in Sarah Palin who was even more conservative—thus not gaining any swing votes, as the conservative Republicans would never have chosen Obama over McCain anyhow. Subsequently, the Republicans should have put more consideration into centrist candidates in 2012, like Jon Huntsman, but instead played a game very resemblant of !their failed strategy in 2008.! !But it should also be said that Romney was indeed a very qualified candidate. Beginning in 1984, Romney served as president and sole shareholder of private equity investment firm, Bain Capital. From 2003 until 2007, Romney was governor of Massachusetts. He is well educated, well spoken, and well regarded. It became relatively clear throughout the primaries that he would likely receive the nomination, as none of his challengers appeared to be able to maintain a prosperous campaign over the long primary season. He became the seemingly universal favorite—he was the most present in the media, and the most talked about and talked to throughout the primary debate spell. With every month, a new member of the smaller seven candidates—or ‘seven dwarfs’ for the purposes of this paper—seemed to rise from the pack and challenge Romney, only to be quelled back down to the group or be expelled from the race entirely. For whatever reason, the Republican Party played a seemingly endless ‘Anybody-but-Romney’ game, thrusting as many candidates into the limelight as possible, even though these candidates were proven weaker than Romney himself. They were not necessarily weaker politicians, or weaker minds, but none of the other seven major candidates had the demographic base or funding that could rival Romney. It was clear to many Americans from a very early point that Romney would ultimately receive the Republican nomination, leading us to wonder why the entire primary process—which seemed to be a gradual tearing down process against Romney—was !even necessary. !! !This aforementioned tearing down process was facilitated by the intermittent focus placed on the other seven major candidates—Newt Gingrich, Rick Santorum, Ron Paul, Herman Cain, Michele Bachmann, John Huntsman, and Rick Perry—during the primary season. While the media took time to focus individually on each candidate, giving each an arc complete with rise and fall, Romney saw his reputation tattered as each of these candidates squared themselves off to fight him during their periods of !hype.!! !If the Republicans had chosen to utilize the equilibrium strategy, an unlikely candidate might have become their winning candidate. Jon Huntsman Jr. was the only centrist candidate who might have been able to steal Obama voters. But the ‘Obama’ name itself plagued Huntsman’s campaign. Huntsman received the nomination to the post of Ambassador to China on May 16, 2009. This nomination came shortly after President Barack Obama’s inauguration, which took place in the preceding January. But neither Obama nor Huntsman’s Party affiliation was a primary factor in this Ambassador nomination. Though the Obama Administration is a Democratic one, and Huntsman identified as Republican, the President chose Huntsman for this most prestigious post because of his qualifications. Not only did Huntsman serve as Ambassador to Singapore, but he also speaks fluent Mandarin Chinese. This nomination to Singapore came in 1992, making Huntsman the youngest U.S. Ambassador in over a century. Such diplomatic experience in the region, coupled with Huntsman’s linguistic capabilities, made him a logical candidate for the position—not the liberal Obama-favoring candidate he was accused of being throughout the campaign. The Republican Party’s overlooking of Huntsman as a legitimate candidate may have been a mistake. Those behind enemy lines viewed Huntsman as a threat—Jim Messina, President Obama’s 2012 campaign manager, claimed, “I think Huntsman would have been a very tough candidate.” Based on the Republican Party’s odd movements in terms of strategy, they knocked Huntsman out of the race early, ultimately closing his bid on January 16, 2012. !! !! !Huntsman never received the widespread party support he needed, but had such support been given, he was likely the only man with the potential to take Obama’s seat. Based on equilibrium strategy, when challenging Obama, Huntsman possessed appealing qualities of a centrist Republican which the other candidates simply did not have. Of the eight contenders, Huntsman easily proves to be the most liberal. He also has two very sell-able factors in the age of modern media—he is young, and he is smart in a non-stuffy way. The Such stuffiness was cited by many as a chief criticism of Mitt Romney. Nobody denied Romney’s intellect, but challenged his relatability—ridiculed for being a stiff, elitist, northerner throughout his campaign (Saturday Night Live put it best when depicting Romney as physically uncomfortable with his sport coat jacket unbuttoned). Huntsman had many of the qualities Romney lacked, yet was largely overlooked by his party and the populace because of his ties to the Obama !Administration—an ignorant reason to withhold support.! !Rick Santorum presents himself as Huntsman’s spectral antithesis—the most conservative member of our seven dwarfs. Economically and socially as far to the right as they come, Santorum never would have stood a chance against Obama. But his campaign outlasted most of his comrades, standing tall (though occasionally wavering) !with his values and spreading his conservative agenda until April 12, 2012.! !Sitting at a seat near Santorum along the left-right spectrum of American politics is Michele Bachmann.

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