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The original documents are located in Box 5 , folder “ (7)” of the NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, 1969-1977 at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

Copyright Notice The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald R. Ford donated to the United States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections. Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library. Digitized from Box 5 of NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, 1969-1977 at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 032799

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL GNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL GMemorandum

CREATOR'S NAME . W.R. Smyser, RichardT. Kennedy RECEIVER'S NAME Secretary Kissinger

TITLE Proposed NSSM on U.S. Military Assistance to

CREATION DATE 10/04/1974

VOLUME . 2 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID 033700248 COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES BOX NUMBER 5 FOLDER TITLE Korea (7)

DATE WITHDRAWN 03/03/2011 WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST TMH ~:1 E i\1 0 RAND UM 4599

THE WHITE 110 USE

WASHINGTON

~p sgGRET- GDS ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT: Proposed NSSM On U.S. Military Assistance to South Korea

Attached at Tab A is a draft NSSM requesting, in your name, a quick study of future U.S. military assistance to South Korea. The South have been pres sing us in recent months for clearer indications as to the future of our military assistance program in light of tightening Congressional constraints. Foreign Minister Kim raised this question with me here on September 2 7, and President Park can be expected to broach the matter with you when you visit next month.

RECOMMENDATION:

}' ~· That you approve my signing the draft NSSM request at Tab A. r t l DISAPPROVE------APPROVE ----- f

1<· I '

DECLA')SIFtED "FOP ~CRET GDS EO~,.,-,.,., ·. SEC3.3 NSC · ~~:- /3ir c, Dept. Guidelines 6 3 2 / ~ NARA, Date ~~11 J I 0 By r I Ii !c.-

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

GDS

National Security Study Memorandum

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of State The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: U.S. Security Assistance to the Republic of Korea

The President has requested a study of our Security Assistance Program to the Republic of Korea. The study should define basic U.S. objectives as regards our security assistance to South Korea, and should then lay out the policy options that will give effect to these objectives.

The study should assume no significant changes in the level or missions of U.S. forces in the Republic of Korea during the period of transition to new security arrangements following the termination of the UNC.

The study should include, but not necessarily be lin1ited to, consideration of the following issues:

--Should we fix a termination date for grant military assistance, and if so what should that date be?

--Should we accelerate the rate of shift from grant military assistance to FMS credits defined in NSDM 227, and if so what should the new rate be?

--What types and nUlllbers of high performance aircraft should be included in the Korean Force Modernization Program?

--What modifications, if any, should be made in the five year Modernization Program for the Republic of Korea pre scribed in NSD M 12 9? ' '' ~ ·· DECLASStFtEO E.o. 12~::;:;e r::," "-"~"~!:'ti} sec 3 3 NSC l'wlomo ,, '''Q'"- o.. . B '!"" 'vl,j ~0i5, -xate ~1t.ft~t~fines y ··· /41\ _NARA. Date "" f-L- ' ~OF ~J!;CRET GDS 2

The study should be prepared by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for East Asia. The study should be submitted no later than October 15, 1974, for review by the NSC Senior Review Group prior to its consideration by the President.

Henry A. Kissinger

cc: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

It. I I i J

li '

~ S.8CF.l!!'±' - GDS :l.D

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 032800

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL GNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL GTelegram

CREATOR'S TITLE CINCPACREP GUAM RECEIVER'S TITLE Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff

DESCRIPTION Re US-Republic of Korea Relations

CREATION DATE 09/27/1974

VOLUME . 5 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID 033700248 COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES BOX NUMBER 5 FOLDER TITLE Korea (7)

DATE WITHDRAWN 03/03/2011 WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST TMH ' .

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. Z0506

;:GP SECRET (.GDS) October 8, 1974

National Security Study Memorandum 211

TO: The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of State The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: U.S. Security Assistance to the Republic of Korea

The President has requested a study of our Security Assistance Program for the Republic of Korea. The study should define basic U.S. objectives as regards our security assistance· to South Korea, I and should then set forth the policy options that will give effect to these objectives. I1 The study should assume no significant changes in the level or missions ! of U.S. forces in the Republic of Korea during the period of transition to new security arrangements following the termination of the United Nations Command.

The study should include, but not necessarily be limited to, consideration of the following issues:

Should a termination date be set for grant military assistance, and if so, what should that date be?

-- Should the rate of shift from grant military assistance to FMS credits, defined in NSDM 227, be accelerated and, if so, what should the new rate be?

-- What types and numbers of high performance aircraft should be included in the Korean Force Modernization Program?

-- What modifications, if"any, should be made in the five-year Modernization Program for the Republic of Korea prescribed in NSDM 129? 'i'OP SECRE'Y' fCJ)S) z

The study should be prepared by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for East Asia. The study should be submitted no later than November 1, 1974, for review by the NSC Senior Review Group prior to its considera­ tion by the President.

lt---7 !1-. Henry A. Kissinger cc: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

-'i'OP SECRET d.,.GD_§J 4941 M£MORANDUM .l

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION Sii£RE':F • October 18, 1974

ME.A10RANDU~.r1 FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM: W. R. Smys_~~-­ . c---~ ~-;-_;;- SUBJECT: The President's Trip to Korea

We have r.ow received the State memorandum regarding the President's ; ~ trip to Korea (Tab B). The memorandum states objectives for the .,. trip and outlines a program. ';

I' ! We have recast State's paper as a memorandum from you to the President.

RECOMMENDATION: That you sign the attached memorandum to the President (Tab. A) •

t

i 1 ' l I i . ~ I _I I

~c~~4'- GDS

-,, ·~~ . . ., 4941 THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT: Your Visit to Korea

. Your visit to Korea comes in circumstances very different from those that marked the visits of President Eisenhower in 1952 (as President­ elect) and 1960, and of President Johnson in 1966.

Then we were in the midst of the Cold War and the Vietnani War. Now we are in a period of detente, improving our relations with Korea'' s two large Communist neighbors.

Then North and South Korea were sworn enemies confronting each other in imnmtable hostility. Now they have established some coi-ltact and they have made limited gestures toward each other, though they remain intensely distrustful of each other.

Then ·we wel'e providing considerable help £rmn what we saw_as virtually unlimited resources while Korea was struggling to establish its economy. Now we have to curtail our aid but South Korea is more able to take care of itself.

Then U.S. public opinion was prepared to accept the blemishes of our allies. Now it is quicker to insist that allies should be models of dernocracy. The Korean opposition kno\vs this. It and the Govern­ ment will both tr}r to gain some advantage from your visit.

While all this has changed, one geographic irnperative remains constant: Korea lies between three great powers, China, the Soviet Union and Japan. Each -..vould rather have us there than either of the others.

The Republic of Korea remains one of our closest friends, but we are living in a different time. Our problem is to keep our alliance a ;_'.! strong and effective deterrent in this different time, making the nec­ essary adjustments -..·vithout changing the basic relationship and its contribution to stability, and -yet to continue to move toward a lowering of tensions in Korea and elsewher~. ·

.... 't.; ''& ,., .. -·. $. ~DS 2 ll.I i I Basic Purposes of Your Visit II In the context of our changing relationship, your visit has the following. I ! basic purposes: I! I! -- To keep and its allies on notice that our support li for South Korea continues undiminished and that our interest in detente l will not lead to our disengagement from the peninsula. i l :I -- To reaffirm for Seoul our commitment to the Republic of ! Korea as well as our readiness to maintain our alliance relationship, l while providing the Korean leadership with a direct appreciation of I our Teduced resources. I

-- To maintain an equal distance between President Park and his opposition as regards internal South Korean political affairs.

Means of Achieving these Purposes

We do not expect to conclude any new agreements with the Koreans. You will, ·nonetheless, want to have a substantive meeting with FrP-sident Park ancl to n1et::t with othex Korean lcadc:::-s both in the government and in the oppo::;:tion.

You will also want to meet with American troops to unde1·line our continued presence, and you will want to make appropriate public appearances.

Your Program: Substantive Meetings

You will probably spend much of the afterr,oon after your arrival m private discussions with President Park. There should also be time for a brief wind -up meeting the next rr10rning which will include issuance of a joint com1nunique. vVe arc doing a I'\SSM. study on future military assistance levels to help prepare you.

There should also be a visit to the National Assem.bly and a brief televised address before th..-J.t assembly.

Protocol Events

There are a few protocol requirements that the Korea~s regard as essential:

--Airport arrival and departure ceremonies. . -B'!!:GRE'l- 3

-- Wreath-laying ceremonies at the tombs of Mrs. Park and of the Unknown Soldier.

-- A reception and a formal dinner hosted by President Park.

-- If your arrival schedule permits it, there may also be a brief lunch, which could be a formal working lunch with Park or a someY..rhat larger formal luncheon.

Your Program: Public Events

To imderscore the American presence in Korea, there are two public events:

--A visit to the U.S. Second Infantry Division on the morning of November 23.

--A brief meeting with American staff and community representatives.

Vfe are preparing a separate program for Mrs. Ford, though we

RECOMMENDATION:

That you authorize us to plan for your visit along the lines outlined above.

Approve ------Approve as Amended------

~CliET- GDS DEPARTMENT OF S rAt t:.

Washin&ton. D.C. 20520

1 •

October 18, 1974

"MEMORANDUM FOR LIEUTENANT GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT THE WHITE HOUSE

Subje~t: P-lanning for the President's Visit to Korea

Setting

The President's visit to Korea will be the- first Presidential visit since that of President Johnson in October 1966. It will occur at a time when the Korean government is greatly concerned that the long standing close relationship v1ith the U.S. may be in for fundamental changes. This concern is motivated in part by our new relationships with the PRC and USSR.but also by public and congressional criticism -of Kore~'s recent do~estic policies. The visit will se.!:"1.re to re~ssure thB.t the b~sj" AmF:;ri c::-~n att-~chm~nt to Korea continues. In addition to this symbolic aspect, the visit will provide opportunity for consultation on common issues at the highest level. These include: the anticipated dissolution of the United Nations Command; future re­ lationships 'l.vith North Korea, the USSR and the PRC; our changing relationship with the ROK and the nature of support and milital1 assistance {including troop levels) we will be able to maintain.

T~e visit to Japan and Korea comes as the two countries are seeking to restore normal relations which had been strained almost to--the breaking point by events surrounding the assassination attempt lvhich resulted in Madam Park 's death. The pause in the confrontation •· bet~·:een President Park and his critics occasioned by the tragic death of his wife has ended. The forecast is · that the visit also will occur at a time of heightened domestic tension in Korea resulting from the Government's renewed efforts to stifle political dissent.

SE_CRE':P XDS-3 -- . SB€RET- 2

All Koreans welcome the visit. But both sides the government and its critics -- will be seeking to use it to their own ends: President Park by attempting to portray the visit as U.S. backing despite criticism of his excesses; and. his critics by attempting to·focus world attention on the need for reform of his authoritarian ·· rule. · The latter will sea~ to create conditions through protest and demon­ stration prior to the vi·si t, and possibly during it, that will highlight their position. As a minimum their objective will be to block Park's attempt to use the visit to demon­ strate u.s. support of his rule, notwithstanding its authoritarian cast. As a maximum they vlill \vish to use the visit to force Park to move away from repressive govern­ ment.

In sum, the visit provides a timely opportunity for .a forceful reiteration of the American commitment to the security and welfare of the Korean people. To demonstrate these c onvictions against a background of internal dissention in Korea and increasing American public concern over Park's disregard for human rights will not be easy.

Korean Government Objectives

The ROKG ;;ru1ts ~'1e visit to:

-- reaffirm the continuity of our unique commitment to Korea, putting to rest public apprehension over what is feared as an intention to disengage froQ Asia.

-- assure that \ve \vill continue to give priority to .--. Korea, notwit.h.standing other demands on our resources. And in this connection that \ve will give highest priority to the completion o f the ROK Armed Forces Modernization Program. Moreover, that we will continue to station forces in Korea _ :.·· as clear evidence of our intention to defend the South from aggression.

--demonstrate to Park's domestic critics that we will not dissociate ourselves from President Park whatever the criticism of our press and Congress.

- - result in the a cceptance of the Korean felt need for additional F-4 a ircraft beyond those mutually projected in the modernization program.

r ' f .

. -""":' .. ..,. . '. 1 - t ...... ~ ' .. ~ ·-""'" · -sr:cREr 3

-- result in recognition of the ROK view that the threat from North Korea is increasing rather than subsiding and that we should caution the Japanese whom Koreans see as moving closer to the North.

Our Objectives

We expect the visit to:

reaffirm our commitment to the ROK in a time of rapidly changing circumstances which prompt Korean anxiety. At the same time to Froviqe the Korean leadership with an .:. increased appreciation of our limited resources available . to keep Pyongyang and its allies on notice that u.s. support for the ROK continues undiminished.

demonstrate that we are not partisan in our reaction to on-going Korean/Japan disputes and remind that the security interests of the two coun~ries are i~terdependent .

. - assure that the anticip.ated dissolution of the United Nations Command will not lessen our cooperation in mutual security matters.

-- reassure that we have no present plans for sub­ stantic..l reduci:ions in our forc.:e levels.

encourage the ROK to make more positive efforts to open a substantive dialog~e Hi th the North.

Elements of the Visit

Substantive Heetings

Most of the afternoon of November 22 will be devoted to private discussions with President Park. These may be preceded by a small working lunch Hith Park, depending on til!!e · of arrival, 1.vhich has not yet been e stablished. There also will be time for a brief wind-up meeting the next

morning 1 \vhich will include issuance of a joint communique.

Also planned is a visit to the National Assembly to call on the Speaker and the leade rship of both the govern­ ment and opposition parties. We have under consid~ration

-, -- .'"~'":'"'-~ - - ______. .. _ -'9'---·-· ... _...... ,..,. ..

'fll' ••}I 4

a Korean proposal that the President make a brief address to the National Assembly.

Social/Protocol Events

The following have been proposed by the ROKG:

-- Airport· arrival ceremony at which the President w...;_ll make a brief statement. The event vrill be televised.

-- On the way from the airport the President to lay wreaths at the tombs of Madam Park and the Unknown Soldier.

A reception and a formal dinner hosted by President Park on the evening of November 22.

Other Events

A visit to the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division the morning of November 23, which will allow the President to meet cur forces in the field.

E!:'ief meetiniJ with ~merican sta££ and community rep-resentatives.

Brief departure ceremony to include farewell remarks by the President.

Rec6rnrr.endati on

That we be authorized to proceed with planning and coordination with the Koreans on the basis of the above objectives and events. ~\1-~v~ George S. SpringsteeF ExeGutive Secretary . .

i:EC~FT . -·

... . :_ .. ·- . ._J.

. -·~ . -·- - ~--::--:--- . ------~--- · e---.. . ~ -- --;.- ...~ ... --. . NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 032801

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL GNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL GMemorandum

CREATOR'S NAME . Jeanne W. Davis RECEIVER'S NAME Secretary Kissinger

TITLE Talker for Meeting with Secretary Schlesinger, October 22 DESCRIPTION Re US Force Levels in Thailand and South Korea, and Military Aid for Vietnam

CREATION DATE 10/21/1974

VOLUME . 6 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID 033700248 COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES BOX NUMBER 5 FOLDER TITLE Korea (7)

DATE WITHDRAWN 03/03/2011 WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST TMH NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 032802

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ~National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . ~Memorandum

TITLE Long-Term US Military Force Levels in Thailand (FY 1976 and Beyond)

CREATION DATE 10/11/1974

VOLUME . 5 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID 033700248 COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES BOX NUMBER 5 FOLDER TITLE Korea (7)

DATE WITHDRAWN 03/03/2011 WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST TMH Ct:f-.Tn/· '~ tNTCLLfGENCF.: /\C~E:NC ,. \ 'A~Hif!c-:[0!-/ 1 [).C. .£.J:J05 ... , . ·. Sz ...... ' f.. . ll~· YJl

_. ------~-.. ---· ~ -··. - - -

J\.t3 notcll :in "1Ur prcv'iorJs response: (cb.tcd June 25, 1974), the ··~c'nt:l·u:i. Intclli~cncc /\r;<.,;ncy b:.:::l:i..cves ~Jn~.t the oxtcnt. of th2 c11".:?.'.,·r:Jm.'l1. of U.s.· 1!:ili L·tn; l:'on.:cs in. ·n:<:.i12nl rcco;::w·nde>.d in Q1tion. II FlJ.Y lead Hanoi tn conch;~ie t::i1<.1t t.he: U. S. 'is no longer ~ ::t:cs tr£1:i.nin;!, ·f::ctor · .nga1.ns't a 1'cne:·.·:aJ. of w~jor hostilit'i c.s in.. South V:l ctnam. Reflcc1:ing

'this c:onc.crn 7 i:be Ccnt-x-~1 Into11:i.gcnc.c !\zcncy doe:~s 11ojc concur in· ) .. :~CO~'.:"ilCJl.cliDg (\_)bon IT. The. CIA's vosibon is a~. :r~o11oHs:

A. 111l'~ c(~Dtl'<.ll. In :~o11igcnc:c /\f;C:::1C:Y b81ir;'.TCS t1l::ti.: an opt.i..cn cc1.J. liE~ fol' n r;n:du:1.l rc::-luc.!..:i en of H. S. D"~'rccs J.n ·nvd.. } a.nc'l c1,.,_d.J~g F1' 7li to ;:~ l0Yc1 sc:rc:i·:hc;·8 ·cc~~·:oca 0;Yt:i.c':1:·; I 1 ·;··,·l( J\...._ 11· '':1',-ld~· \...... • -o· \.,.,. .._s...· C''~~-2, }-il·c~·lv·-··'- ·-.r •L·o ...... ·l"''a1 '-• I.;.,.1o··L·.... 'l..t _ ~L·o cur·lr-1·..._. t ,'-'·--".·, _., .,,,.,tl..J c. · 'W:e U.S. \J:l:> ~~o~ inic;:dirJg 01.' 2bJo to l'C::O:.p.. i r,cn!c·.tllJ•l:.':nt i:hCI.t. tht:. U.S. would )X>ta tc 1...mi ts to •J 1;dJ.r:nd :frc:n tim8 to tim~. ·

n. )';'Jl'i1e [;'t'cm.t.in~ tlwt tl1e U.S, rrriJ.it.~1)"' presence jn

'1llni1:tn·1 i~> n;)·f :in. ·:nd .oi. it~;clf ~cli2 cc~1L1'0ll:i.1w0 c.\(:tc:r.L·c:lt ng.:Jj ns t.. )·~a1·t11 '··'ietn:'.Ji\:' sc mi Ji'L::~try action :in South V:i.c\.Jwra, n sh<.!Yj) -~·~·lu·.:Lion '.-:nuld rcpYcsc·nt a .s5.,r~11;-tl to Ilzmoi o£ U.S~ ; l.tci1t1 o:·ts. ·nw In tc.ll:i r;cncc Co:

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' 11 1(' 'j"'] •'J.: '1 <' 'J?tn· ...... , }··'l···c·"r··r ·q•,·, CO,....C''"J). .... ·5L 0\'~~· •. ,·11''t J.T,.,.~, )) • .. J .. ~ tt.L- .L ..... l ~ ~~J ·,)~ " _l\.l• V\"•.o..! (.4._,~ JJJ...---J. \.,;\., • \,...... l .. .. (J.. L.J..'"") .. ca.n C•l)':·ct t(">· f_:c:t ou~·. o:L tile~ cont::mJCc1 press:~c.c of U. ~. forces 1n Th:tiJ :md. (J11b concern opp1ic:; i.:o ;my of th~ opt.io;-:.s tm~lc1· con­ s:id('rtlUon.) ln. s"t~~:ct:, thr.~· ·n1.-:ti \·'.Jnt to 1~nc;: \·.·h~Lt t.h~; qu.i(l nro guo c 1 ...... ;,, , J.O~-: ...•. J)C) ·, --;-.-11 .•. L l..l.L:.>... , rr u ..c:.>. ·1·. 0 ~I C.:!:;·r. t 0 l -C:l ··l...•i' 1. 0Jl- ·•1A ~·1··i< 1 , ,(! .1.·1 1 0\.l. · · .-1.-:--· . .l ·t-:;:----co~t.;> . _, 1 \ o!Otl'Jcl. • )"l'lt' . ll':•"••<;•'•!)'i...._ . ..._ ...... ,".~-) ]" .l>C ]11.. \..I'"I'll · }~<.II·- (''';.'11\'))• .,.. ... , ... L · C., '1·'1\''• ..._ . C'''t"J.•• >.c l )].• .l ,.·,)lJJ,,..._ .. .,,..,l~~ Ll..... 0.,.'J.. C):pony.j em of ) oj n~: Thn:i ·U.S. ncU.v.i. t:i..c::_; (~;uc-.h as as~;i:;t~trh.:c on hi gil~·.'<.!)'- n.ncl ·r~:..i J.n)\"1\.l r:;;x1urnl::;.ttion Jn·o:J cct~-;, joint int•.;lb gt:OilCC Op0ntti.Gn~;, <:'tc.) \\'ouJ.(l·hcJp to m~lkc ·a cont:i.nu ~d U.S. presence more pa 1 <:tt~llJll~ to the Th:.1i. ·-._ .. -:-., .. .. t((;LJ~ce__ 1 1', • \E •. Colby 1 ' t Director

H. Dexter,. n~pt. of State-

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~~ET CDS

March 23, 1974

i Nation~] Sccnrlty Decision Memorandum 249 I I . ·' f 'TO: The Secretary o.f Defense t '( The Director of CentJ~a l bt clligcncc The Deputy Secretary of 'State .i SUBJECT: U.S. Deployments in Thailand

The President has revie·wed the studies submitted in response to ?\.S.SVf 171, !"elated studies, ;u:d the views of the conce1·ned Departments a::d Agencies. He has directccl that the following. actions be taken:

The Secretary of Defense should:

Withi:lraw unes!'.>cnlial non-strike aircraft (EC-12l' s and C-1301s) by June l, 1974.

Withd:ra·w US combat forces between 11ay 15 and December 31, 1974, to a residual level of nine tactical air squadrons , o::e AC-130 gunship squadron a11d 17 B-·52 1 s, as outlined in t!-J.e ?lan presented by the Secl'etary of Defense. The-se ,,·ithdra '.'2.. l.s should be spaced over the period in question, with the prec:se timing o.f lh "' '\vilhdr:o..w~J s to be determined in consultalio:: '.':i'th fhc Thai Govcr:11nent.

Reduce: M/\CTIL'\I/JUS?v1AGTH.l\I and U.S. Arn1y S"..lpport Com­ mand IY1<.11lpov..-c r by 3 0 perc cnt by Au[;u st 31, 197...;, co::s ol:. ~?. t e hcaclguarte:rs ,·.rhcrcvcr possible and cliL in::!ie all uncssc::::c.l hcar.lqu~rters and support units.

The Deputy Sccrcta:q• of State should:

lmmccJiatcJy initiate consultations with the Hoyal Thai Go,-crn rnent on the foregoing withdraw.:1l plans, on U1.C('..n::; of rcdecing the

I

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"l'hc .Secretary of Defense, in coordin:1tion with the De;puty Sccre­ tar}' of St:1tc, !>hould prcpJ.rc and subn.y· 1, 1974, rccommcnclettions as to cquip:ncnt and faciliti cs associ~lcd wjth US forces in Thail~nd that can be made available for turnover to the Thai a!:l US forces

'l'hc Sccretar;r of Defense shou)d c!.lso prepare and submit for the Prcsic1cnt 1 s coHsidcration no later tho.n May 1, 197-1, alternative plans and r eco!·nmend

The Secretary of Defense in coordination with the Director of .. Central Intelligence and the .Ocputy Secretary of State should su,b­ mit l'ccomrncndations on alter~atiYe long term (FY 76 and beyond) US rnililary force levels in Thaila:1d and p1·oposed withdr<::.wal pla:1s ~o r.mpport each of the altern2.ti\·es. These recornrn.endations should be t.ul>milted not later than June 30, 1974,. for consideration by the NSC Senior Re:vicw· Group. , ( /r---- 7 ;f-. ~~~------­,/-\ .Henry .A. Kif;sin:::;cJ· I !'

cc: Director, Office of :l\1

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'i t l\ . I 111 , ::.1e.,. . ~- - -... - &L ~ ~ 1·, 1 ~ c ns -~ - .. ·----

I l \ " NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 032803

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ~National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ~Memorandum

CREATOR'S NAME . J.R. Schlesinger CREATOR'S TITLE Secretary of Defense RECEIVER'S NAME Secretaries of the Military Departments et al

TITLE FY 74-SO Planning Guidance for Southeast Asia Force and Activity Levels

CREATION DATE 01/22/1974

VOLUME . 4 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID 033700248 COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES BOX NUMBER 5 FOLDER TITLE Korea (7)

DATE WITHDRAWN 03/03/2011 WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST TMH NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 032804

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ~National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ~Memorandum

CREATOR'S NAME . J.R. Schlesinger RECEIVER'S TITLE Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

TITLE U.S. Deployments in Thailand

CREATION DATE 01/22/1974

VOLUME . 3 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID 033700248 COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES BOX NUMBER 5 FOLDER TITLE Korea (7)

DATE WITHDRAWN 03/03/2011 WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST TMH NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 032805

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL GNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL GMemorandum

CREATOR'S NAME . J.R. Schlesinger RECEIVER'S TITLE Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

TITLE Carrier Alert Posture in Southeast Asia

CREATION DATE 01/1974

VOLUME . 1 page

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID 033700248 COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES BOX NUMBER 5 FOLDER TITLE Korea (7)

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Af!.c: con~; l dc.l·5;;G Deputy Scc~:c·.i.;·n-y Cl~;-ncnt.s• lYlc:rnor of.Octobcr )3, ) 9·13, t:J-::! Prcsit1<'·nt J)u.~: dcdc1~6 0);-,t·, i:1 light of the th :n~:tt .of :t J'~c~·ih .. ~ =r (! :;,---~ ~_; 7..:-~ :~ . :1 ..' -,;~;·~ ,~-:-.~:b~ :::-·-~;~.-~:::.~:-t~

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----·· - -;. - - --::----~-... ·-··-.-. -~ -;-~ . ___ __..:.,______.... __ -----... ------... ·--- ...... ---- THE WHITE HOUSE 4236

WASHINGTON

C£r'KTFIDE1qTIAL - GDS October 28, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Reduction in Manpower Authorization, Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Korea

The manpower authorization reduction proposed in your memo­ randwn of September 19, 1974, has been reviewed and is approved. However, no action should be taken prior to completion of the President's trip to Korea.

!cS~ , Henry A. Kissm~

eeN~IDEN'l'1AL -""CDS ,.ry/ ,;f,a.. " .... ;c o I'--

.. THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON .•

.. Date:Nov. 4, 1974

MEMO FOR: JEANNE DAVIS i -:. I -·-~ FRO~I: l~U~X:'iUKli~\rUC:OCW WARREN RUSTAND

The attached is for your appropriate handling. (Ltr. from Seoul, Korea, with signed Thank you. petitions re: conditions, vrelfare, and development of Korea)

'

. I •· •; ,,I (/t- ~ ~ o ,~\ ~e-etoherl:L, 1974- 1,:;' t'- f) SeoTu./1 r( :;fo~ea ---. (I C. • /,_/ 0 1 -' !('~~,}'"The Honorable ~ r. Gerald R •. Ford SCH~ . ULE r- I President of The United States c~". Tt: R~CEI 'ED I The ~bite House \iashington, D. C. NOV 4 19 : I IG>CA:~;'~~~EAU 74 - :0· ear r.. r . P reS.lQen· , t : !'OTHER ,,__ L.... ~ The signers of this letter are all men an&~~HE~~ra~ living and servi ng in the Republic of Koreao Out of our deep concern for the welfare and development of Korea and its peo- ple, we wish to bring to your attention the critical situation now existing in this nation. '•.'!e are sure that you are aware of the i mprisonment of scores of students, Christian clergymen, social leaders, law­ yers and common citizens. These men a.11d women have been ar­ rested on false political charges. The military courts that have tried them have prostituted ·even military court standards, let alone standards of normal civil procedures. Sentences of several years to death have been handed do·wn despite absence of evidence. Eight men are to die for their part in a so-called t:LuJ:-.!'.i.t>·1C./ w!1irh the eovernr'len.t has not been abl.e t~ prcYc s~.rc:::­ exist.:-J.. In addition to these dramatic violations of human rights , countless citizens are under the ruthless surveillance of the horean Central Intellibence Agency; professors et universities are examined lest they have "disloyal" ideas; businessr.1en are under constant police pressure to make political "contribu­ tions"; •Jorl:ers have had their rights to collective bargain­ ing and collective action taken away; aJJ.d ordinary citizens in the markets, tea rooms and other public places must care­ fully guard their speech lest they be overheard to offend the government in some me.nner o

~~:he Sf' crir.Jes against human rich ts and civil liberti cs are, ho :1ever, only the by-product of a more fundamental pro­ hle!!J; that being the "Yushin11 Constitution (" Revitalizing Reforms•• ). 'hin constitution, forcefully pressed upon the :t'-orean people under a of in October of 1972, eliminated deillocratic legislative covernment in Korea; made one man, Park Chunc Hee , virtual dictator for life; and e.llo\1ed -.. r. Park and his C.I.A. to suspend any person or group of their civil liberties at any time. ~he trar;ic events of 1974 are a conseauence of this Yushin constitution. Therefore large numb ers of ~te Korean people are demanding that the Yu- 3hin constitution be wi thdro·;;n and the democratic consti tut.it wh.i.ch existed up to 1972 be l'einstatedo This is a just <\¢ Jand •·

which must be recognized if Korea is to return to the path of democ~acy and development. Sor:,e rationalize that the Yushin constitution and the suppression practiced by Park and his C.I.A. are necessary in order to defend the country against a threatened invasion from 1-:ort.h :Lore a. In fact, however, the observable results are the exact opposite. South Korea is so filled with mis­ trust and fear arising from Park's constitution and there­ sultant ~olicies, that the soci al unity needed to defend against the Eorth. has certainly been weakened . I1oderniza­ tion of Aorea's military cannot restore the confidence of the citizens . in their government . Park's government has undermined its own military forces as well as those of the United States which just recently have again been pledged to defend the Republic of Korea. How will the rest of the world react to America' s con­ tinuing support of Park's dictatorial policies? The recent Congressional Hearings have clearly pointed out not only a shift in U.S. public opinion, but also the grave disadvan­ tages of the U.S. continuing its unconditional support of the Park regime. ',;e too are of the strong opinion that it >';ould be in ~;he best interest of both Korea and the U.S. -­ diplomatically, economically, and militarily--to convey strong disapproval of i:rlP. t:rend. of eve!lts in this cou?:It:r:y over the last fe~ years . . e feel that your visit, if it does not i?.1- clude this expression of disapproval, will only prove to mil­ lions of observers that the U.S. gover~~ent does, in fact, ful­ ly support the oppressive policies of the present Korean gov- ernment. · kr. President, we are writing this letter out of love and commitment to the people of I(orea. \~· e wish you to be fully in.formed of these facts when you make your visit here in Nov­ ember. ..Already Korean newspapers hm1e said that the government is likely to release some political prisoners before your visit. Of courBe, if this occurs, we, along with the people of Korea , will rejo5.ce at such a move. However, at the same time we must recognize this act for Vihat :i.t is: only a gesture to impress the world and particularly the United States. We would mourn the fact that it was done with such motivation rather than as a genuine attempt to restore the integrity of this nation. In light of these facts we ask that you strongly urge the leaders oi' the Republic of 1~orea to release all the poll tical prisoners apprehended since October, 1972; torescind the re­ maining i.merc;ency T easur_e""; and to abolj_sh the Yushin Consti­ tution, reinstating in its place the democratic . constitution which exlsted up to October~ 1972. \{e also strongly suggest that you meet with opposition religious, social, and political leaders. .... ,o ~ / • D (',.... •·

e, the signers, representing various churches, agencies, and o=ganizations , will be glad to meet with you or any o£ your a ccompanying party to discuss these matters directly. ;i e pray tha t your visit will have some influence in healing the p~esent tragic situation.

Sincerely yours,

The Undersigned . • 4 Signature Position

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... -..-- I f) ~ ~- -~/u~ e l e • 7 ~ -1-YI MEMORANDU M 5254 ' ,S· I • NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL / ,(-/!I ,. I ~I (, _[,, iJ I ACTION fie:;u~Yt "'L ~ ,; . II . '!./ November 5,' 1974 ~ II .:· ~~~, ,._ ~ C(j..(..r' G MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL SCf1WCROFT ~b-

I rec01nmend strongly against the President's seeing the eight Congressmen before his Japan-Korea trip. The Congressmen include some of those who have been the most strident critics of the Park Government and who have been at the forefront of Congressional efforts to pres sure the Park they go even farther, suggesting that the President tell Park that "unless human rights are restored to the Korean people, the U.S. will begin to disengage from South Korea. " It seems to me that for the President to meet with the Congressmen before his trip could complicate tactically our handling of this problem both with the Congress and with the Park Government.

I recomm.end that, instead, you suggest to Mr. Rustand that he inform the Congressmen that the President's schedule regretfully does not in fact allow him t o see th m before his trip to Korea, but that the President will be writing ihe Congressmen about this question in the very near future. I would intend to forward a draft Presidential reply to you within the next few days as soon 'as we are clearer on the scheduling possibilities for the President to address the South Korean National Assembly and to meet with non-govermnental l eaders in Seoul.

f 0 ~CNPIDENTIA L Get~f!!DEN'l'IAr:: ·--·· 2

RECOMMENDATION:

That you call Mr. Rustand suggesting that he inform the eight Congressmen as suggested above.

APPROVE------DISAPPROVE-----

Concurrence~~~ Mr. Janka1(}

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C!Congress of tbt ~nittb ~tates ~ou~e of l\epre~entatibe~ Rla~bington.ll.

October 24, 1974

The President The White House 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

Your decision to visit South Korea in November carries some grave risks for U.S. foreign policy. The situation with respect to human rights in South Korea has received extensive consider­ ation both by the Foreign Affairs Committee during the hearings and mark-up of the foreign aid bill, as well as during joint hearings by the Subcommittees on International Organizations and Movements and on Asian and Pacific Affairs. We would greatly appreciate having the opportunity to meet with you to discuss the Korean trip and how it can best reflect the common aspirations of the Korean and American people for the attainment of human~ights and fundamental freedoms.

As you are aware, President Park Chung Hee has in recent years placed severe restrictions on the exercise of fundamental civil rights and liberties. At the present time, approximately 200 people are in prison for violating which made it a crime to propose revisions in the Constitution or for students to engage in political activity. Those imprisoned include Protestant and Catholic clergyman, university professors, and political leaders. A former President of South Korea received a suspended sentence and the opposition candidate for the Presidency in 1971 (who received about 46% of the vote) was kidnapped from Japan and is under house arrest.

We are sure you would not want your visit to South Korea to be interpreted as approving or even condoning the unwarranted excesses of governmental power exercised by President Park. On the contrary, we hope that you will use this opportunity to convey to President Park the growing concern Americans have about the destruction of democracy in Korea. President Park should be informed that unless human rights are restored to the Korean people, the United States will begin to disengage from South Korea. The House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee have placed restrictions on military assistance to South Korea because of the oppression in that country. The President The White House Page 2

As you may be aware, members of the opposition political parties, as well as church and university officials, are advocating a revision of the Constitution to restore political freedoms. A debate has commenced in the National Assembly. Although President Park has lifted two emergency decrees he has not sho\~ any sign of responding positively to these demands. If, during your visit, you should meet only with leaders in the government, the Korean people would interpret this behavior as indicating approval for continuing the present authoritarian government. We therefore strongly urge you to address the National Assembly and meet privately with opposition leaders, as well as church and university officials.

/ We sincerely hope that you will be able to meet with us before ' making your trip to South Korea.

Sincerely yours,

to-r' 'V" Lloyd o;L."?.~/ ~~ Thomas P. O'Neill ~Q.l"' "? . --Lee H. Hamilton Morris K. Udall r~·t;.r'l ~~ ~~ 1-': ~ -~;r--/ (c{a,L(!___ tJ Patsy T. Mink ~/ i Charles W. Whalen ~-..: DMF: gw JJ ..JJ IV-. rJ..... J-iOR Ai\D U ~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

.November 6, 1974 lJ~'"'

MEr.10RANDUM FOP: GENERALSCOWCROFT . ~rJ FROM: JOHN A. FROEBE, JR .•..__-1~)\

SUBJECT: Preparation for the President's Japan and South Korean Visits

At Tab I is a draft mernorandutn frmn you to the President attaching background reading materials for his visits to Japan and Korea as he has reque ste d. I have also included in the mcn~orandum a brief resume o£ other aspects of the preparations for h.is visit to Japan and Korea which v,rill involve him next week.

3.3 NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 032806

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ~National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ~Memorandum

CREATOR'S NAME . Brent Scowcroft RECEIVER'S TITLE The President

TITLE Preperation for Your Japan and South Korean Visits

CREATION DATE 11/1974

VOL1JME . 2 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID 033700248 COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES BOX N1JMBER 5 FOLDER TITLE Korea (7)

DATE WITHDRAWN 03/03/2011 WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST TMH NATIONAL SECCRITY COUf\ClL

INFORJv1A TION

November 15, 1974

ME1v10RANDUM FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

I . " _/".'\\' / FROM: JOHN A. FROEBE, Jl\:_f,JIL..-

SUBJECT: Briefing Materials for Counsellors Hartmann and Rumsfeld

You have asked rnc to assern.ble State Dcpartrn_ent briefing materials on Korea and Japan that would be appropriate for Counsellors Hartmann and Rumsfcld,

Les Janka informs me that State is putting together a com.prehensive fact book for all persons accompanying the President on the trip. I believe this should meet Messrs. Hartmann and Rumsfeld 1 s needs as I under stand them. To provide n~ore would get into the substantive briefing n1aterials, which you said you did not think it necessary to provide.

··- ~' .;.,. "·.J

·r NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 032808

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL GNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL GMemorandum

CREATOR'S NAME . David Elliott RECEIVER'S NAME General Scowcroft

TITLE Sale of Canadian Nuclear Reactor to South Korea

CREATION DATE 11/18/1974

VOLUME . 2 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID 033700248 COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES BOX NUMBER 5 FOLDER TITLE Korea (7)

DATE WITHDRAWN 03/03/2011 WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST TMH NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 032807

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ~National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . ~Intelligence Report

DESCRIPTION Re Canada and South Korea

CREATION DATE 11/16/1974

VOLUME . 1 page

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID 033700248 COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES BOX NUMBER 5 FOLDER TITLE Korea (7)

DATE WITHDRAWN 03/03/2011 WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST TMH MEMORANDUM 5478

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

November 25, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: ~R. ELLIOTT

FROM: JEANNE W. DAVt

SUBJECT: Suggested Reply to Mr. LeRoy Brown Concerning His Recommendation that Dr. Kyo R. Jhin Accompany the President to South Korea

Attached at Tab A is a draft reply from you to Mr. LeRoy Brown, who wrote the President recommending that Dr. Kyo R. Jhin accompany the President on his visit to South Korea. I \ 'f )

Dear Mr. .8rown:

I have been asked to respond to your letter of November 11, 1974, to the President recommending that he include Dr. Kyo R. Jhin in his party for his visit to the Republic of Korea.

I can assure you that we gave careful consideration to your recommendation, and that we appreciated Dr. Jhin's qualifications.

Regretfully, however, it was not possible to bring Dr. Jhin into the preparations for the visit.

May I express our appreciation for your taking the time to bring

Dr. Jhin' s talents to our attention.

Sincerely,

Roland L. Elliott

Mr. LeRoy Brown State Superintendent of Education Department of Education State Office Building Montgomery, Alabama 36104 I~

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 032809

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ~National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ~Memorandum

CREATOR'S NAME . J.A. Froebe RECEIVER'S NAME W.R. Smyser

TITLE North Korean Tunneling

CREATION DATE 11/29/1974

VOLUME . 1 page

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID 033700248 COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES BOX NUMBER 5 FOLDER TITLE Korea (7)

DATE WITHDRAWN 03/03/2011 WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST TMH (/f\fO.•/ •

'"'5GRET

T.~ LKI:-.!G POINTS r'O?, THE P'RESLDENT ON HIS VISIT TO KOI\.Er\

·-- My Korean visit was marked by a genuine welcome of the kind we do not see nmch any more. There must have been 2 million people lining the streets between the airport and the hotel.

-- I think it was very important for me to have gone to Korea. If I had not gone, the North Koreans· might have underestimated our detern1ination to support our friends as well as our commitment to stability in the area.

-- What the Koreans have done economically is just astonishing. Seoul looks like a modern American city, with skyscrapers, cars, and an obviously thriving economy.

-- I was also very impressed by our troops in Korea. From all that I could see, their moral and their training are very high. I am glad I visited them so that they do not think that we have forgotten them..

It is clear that President Park believes he is directly menaced by North Korean aggression. He spoke of the tunnel that was recently disc~vcr.:;d as evi.dcncc:: o.r i.his. I think we have to recognize that he is going to want all the military aid that we can give him. More importantly, he regards the sustained level of our forces as vital, at least for the near term. He wants us to complete our program of assistance to the Modernization Plan for South Korean forces as soon as possible. I reaffirmed our support for the Plan, and said we hoped to speed up our military assistance in support of the Plan.

-- I told President Park that he can count on us to keep our forces in Korea at present levels and that he can count on our continued military and economic assistance subject to Congressional funding limitations.

-- I also pointed out that we maintain our.commitments in an era of.detente and that we will not take actions that affect their interests without consulting them.

--I did not dwell on President Park's internal policies and problems. I merely pointed out to him the possible impact of such problems on our ability to continue to support him.

~CftE1' -·

,>!. _-, . ' 5822 ttll MEMORANDUM ,~ l NATIONAL SECURITY COV~CIL ACTION i, LIMITED OFFICIAL USE November 29, 1974 f MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER FROM: W. R. Smyser"fll 1\,\ ]0nv i SUBJECT: My Meeting with American Missionaries in Korea '

I met in Seoul on November 23 with the American missionaries opposed to the Park regime, as you instructed.

Attached (at Tab A) is the requested report for the President on. the meeting.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the attached memorandum for the President (Tab A).

\ .

,~.:·c·~,>

·"', "- ~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE ~ ME:\IORA:" Dl":\1 5822

THE \\"IHT{~ HOCSE WASHINGTON I LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Meeting of the American Missionaries in Korea with a Member of the NSC Staff

One of the members of the NSC Staff met with a group of American missionaries in Korea after our departure. He met with them at their request to hear their views opposing the policies of President Park.

Tb.e missionaries, who belong to various Christian denominations, made the following principal points:

-- The Korean people feel alienated. from the Park Government. But they are not against the Government. They just favor things that the Government opposes, like certain democratic liberties.

-- The opposition does not want to overthrow the Government but to change its nature. It offers no alternative regime.

The principal opposition demand is to eliminate the new consti­ tution (which permits Park to rule beyond his original two terms).

-- President Park believes that all his opposition is linked to the communists, and he labels it as such. This is not correct.

-- The United States shares responsibility for events in Korea _because we lost nearly 40, 000 men and because we have been there since the armistice in 1953.

-- The Korean Government regards your visit and the communique with great satisfaction, but other Koreans are deeply disappointed.

-- President Park may become even tougher with the opposition now that he has been bolstered by the visit of the American President. This would be seen by Koreans as a direct insult to the United States, and the United States should speak out.

...... ~ LIMITED OFFICIAL USE . LIMITED OFFICIAL USE 2

The NSC staff member said that he would report the views of the .American missionaries, as he h

f j

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE ,. ' NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL VIA r-LD'~ Lf\fTTf-~f) OFFfC:TAL USE November 29, 1974 . . ... ------ATTACHMENT

MF.\fORANDUl\-f FOR:

}.Jr. Gc.:or~::c S. S;)ri:1g:~tcen Secretary Department of State

SUBJECT: Presidential Message to President Park

Will you please transmit the attached cable to Embassy Seoul for delivery to President Park.

Jeann~~~s Staff svYeUJ"

.• Attachment

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE ATTACHMENT

\.--·~· .'5.dl{W.::U: 4 :W ' B 4. -~. L) p;: .: . i§S

·1 .... J.T'.fTTT'TJ n~.~!:-ICL\ f. T'<.:S -. . -... ·- . ------

Please pass the following message for President Ford to President

Park:

Be gin text

Dear President Park:

Please let me express my appreciation for the cordial hospitality that

you and the people of the Republic of Kon:a extended to me during my visit.

The warmth of the welcome by so many of the Korean people was truly

overwhelming.

I appreciated the opportunity to exchange views with you during our

meetings and to greet other Korean leaders at the reception and dinner

that you kindly gave for me.

I believe that the United States and Korea will remain .firm friends in

the future as they have been in the past. I was pleased to reaffirm the

depth of our friendship and of ou~mmitment during this visit.

With best wishes, 0

Gerald Ford

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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