UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA POLITICAL SCIENCE UNDERGRADUATE ASSOCIATION VOLUME 5

Precious Udeh PSUA President

Sam Goer z Robert Bilak Jeremy Mort VP Finance VP External VP Internal

Ravia Dhaliwal Anusha Kav Azan Esmail VP Events VP Communications. VP Events

Abigail Kohler VP Academic

Danielle Bailey-Heelan Kael Kropp Katey Champigny Submissions Editor Submissions Editor Submissions Editor

Chloe Dizon Keysel Besa Oriya Baraness Distribution Manager Compilation Editor Distribution Manager LETTER FROM THE EDITOR

The Political Science Undergraduate Review (PSUR) takes pride in being an academic journal that publishes the highest quality of articles written by undergraduate political science students at the University of Alberta. Not only do we create a unique opportunity for undergraduate students to be published, but we also create the opportunity for undergraduate students to experience the peer-review process. It has been an amazing year for the PSUR as we have had the pleasure of working with a devoted editorial team and authors to create a journal we are proud of.

I would like to thank the editorial staff for their contributions, and the authors who submitted their work this year. The journal is heavily dependent on the University of Alberta’s political science student body; we would not be able to annually publish without our devoted editorial staff and the wide selection of submissions we receive. This year's editors, Danielle Bailey-Heelan, Katherine Champigny, Kael Kropp, Keysel Besa, Chloe Dizon, and Oryia Barness, always embodied enthusiasm and integrity in their work, and contributed what they could to fulfill the journal’s potential. As a result, the PSUR has the highest quality of publications which is presented in an effective and interesting way. I also owe thanks to Sarah Severson from the Library Publishing and Digitization Team at the University of Alberta. Sarah provided all of the necessary tools and training sessions to properly train our staff and maintain our operations. Lastly, the Political Science Undergraduate Association (PSUA) must also be thanked for their continuous support in publishing the PSUR. Thank you to this year's President of the PSUA, Precious Udah, and the other executives for helping in the promotion of our journal across the department and beyond.

Reading this year's aggregation of submissions was an eye-opening experience for the editors and I. Our team had little to no experience with the PSUR beforehand and, speaking on behalf of our editors, our expectations of the department were blown away by the diverse and large pool of talent we were exposed to. For that reason, I would also like to thank all those who submitted to the journal this year, and a special thanks to our publishing authors for their extra effort to refine their work to ensure the high quality of publication. The political science department at the University of Alberta allows its students to explore the different streams in the field of political science to find where their passion lies. From debates on youth enfranchisement to gender quotas, we hope there are topics of interest for all readers of this year's edition.

I hope you enjoy reading this year's edition of the PSUR as much as we enjoyed creating it! Thank you for your support of our journal.

Abigail Kohler, Managing Editor

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Historical and International Influences in Contemporary Politics

Make Canada Great Again: The Influence of Donald Trump on the Canadian Right Wing Identity 1-8 By Parul Singh Kanwar

Red Toryism and Neo-Liberalism in Alberta Conservative Ideology 9-16 By Trista Peterson

The Role of Gender Stereotypes in a Political Campaign 17-24 By Brianna Morrison

Demographics in Discussion

Universe of Support: Suburban Voters in Canadian Federal Elections 25-33 By Seeon Smith

Youth Enfranchisement: A Case For A More Democratic Canada 34-37 By Leonard Patterson

Technology in Politics: Friend or Enemy?

The Influence of Media in the Evolution of Canadian Political Parties 38-45 By Madelaine Ware

The Effects of Modern Data Analytics in Electoral Politics 46-52 By Evan Oddleifson

International Governance Relationships

The Subsidiarity Arrangement of Global Governance and Sustainable Development 53-64 By Grace Li

Legitimacy & Accountability in Government-NGO Relationships 65-72 By Catrin Thomas

China’s Challenge to the Institutions of Global Governance and US Soft Power 73-83 By Evan Oddleifson POLITICAL SCIENCE UNDERGRADUATE REVIEW VOL. 5 Winter 2020 ARTICLE 8

Make Canada Great Again: The Influence of Donald Trump on the Canadian Right Wing Identity

By Parul Singh Kanwar

Introduction

Canadian identity and politics are based on the accommodation of diversity in the essence of true equality (Kymlicka 2014, 21). Canadians widely believe that they live in a “multination” (22, emphasis in text) with ethnocultural distinctiveness as a result of colonization, conquest, and confederation as well as immigration (23). However, the Canadian identity is not an isolated entity and its full comprehension is not possible without a thorough examination of the extreme web of economic social, cultural, security, and political ties” it has with the United States of America (Brooks 2014, 437). The United States’ similar culture, close proximity and same language have a crucial impact on Canadian values, behaviors and institutions (439, 440). Therefore, changes in the political climate in the United States can lead to changes in the Canadian identity and an upsurge in different ideologies.

In 2016, the United States elected its 45th president: Donald Trump. Trump “ran an explicitly racist, sexist and xenophobic campaign” which called to “Make America Great Again” (Perry et al. 2019, 143). The campaign's ideologies were applauded by Canadians who wanted to revert back to the Canadian when multiculturalism was not its official national culture (151). This essay argues that the election of Donald Trump as the President of the United States led to a resurgence of the Right-Wing identity in Canada, which exposed the climate of difference within the country and created a strain on the Canadian multicultural identity. This is significant because, through an analysis of the impact of American politics and identity on Canadians, the limitations of the foundation of Canada’s identity, which is Anti- Americanism, can be explored (Brooks 2014, 441). This essay will begin by conceptualizing the meaning of Canadian identity and its relation to the United States; it will then explore how the election of Donald Trump changed what Canadian identity looks like for extremist groups, the government of Canada and other Canadian groups. Lastly, it will look at prior foundations of right-wing sentiments that might have increased the receptiveness of Trump’s ideology in Canada.

Identity Politics and The Far Right

Identity politics is defined as the inclination for individuals of a specific religion, ethnicity, social background etc. to form exclusive political alliances, to step away from standard broad-based party politics (“Identity Politics”). Primarily, identity politics govern how cultural identities are created and how they translate into political demands that are “infinitely fluid and malleable” and can be understood as both progressive and reactionary (Bondi 2004, 83). Identity politics can be used to explore how expansive representation of identities in a state can become undemocratic, violate individual rights, eliminate gender justice, and establish the status quo. While identity politics often refer to actors outside the traditional heteronormative narrative focusing on white male subjects of Canadian politics, it is an essential theme in the radicalization of the far-right (Abbas 2017, 60). Within the context of political identities, the ‘far-right’ is associated with white heterosexual individuals’ “ultranationalist, chauvinist, xenophobic, racist, or reactionary” views that translate into their political opinions and activities (Carlisle 2005, 693). Although Far-Right voices are not predominant in the popular discourse, they do play a significant part in determining the direction of politics in western countries and hold influence over policy outcomes (Carlisle 2005, 693). The election of Donald Trump revived a “form of right-wing populism convergent with an emboldened white supremacy” which emerged in multiple western countries, including Canada (Perry and Scrivens 2019, 145). Far-Right populism can be defined as an emphasis on the sovereignty of the people where “bad others” are juxtaposed against “good people” in terms of race and sexuality (Barbara 55). While populist platforms are the favoured mode of expression of Far-Right ideology, extremist identities- which operate outside mainstream politics-are a growing concern in Canada (Carlisle 2005, 694).

Canadian Identity and the United States

The United States being so close has been beneficial for Canadian exports and Canada, to a great extent, has been focused on the United States in terms of economic and military foreign relations (Brawley 2014, 420). Economic and military relations between the two countries also influence each other’s social and political identities as they define the lifestyles of citizens. However, such interdependence can lead to Canada being held at “political leverage” by the United States as it can get entangled in the American ideologies, even if they contradict the collective Canadian identity (420). For instance, after 9/11, Canada participated in the War on Terrorism (Bush 2001) as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). From its inception, NATO contained a mutual defense clause which the USA invoked for the first time after 9/11 declaring that should the US take military action, its allies would be implored to do the same (Daley). Therefore, all members of NATO committed to “the use of force” (Daley 2001) in order to secure the USA, including Canada. The Canadian participation in the NATO missions provided a platform for the right-wing Canadian politicians, think tanks and extremist groups to beat the war on Islam and created a xenophobic environment in Canada. Thus, the mission led to the rise of identities contradictory to the Canadian multiculturalism policy that accommodates for different cultural communities and promotes their “desire to participate in and contribute to the larger community” (Kymlicka 2014, 37).

Trump’s Effect on Canadian Right Wing Identity

While Canada’s official stance remains one of multiculturalism and does not align with ideologies of far right nationalism (Kymlicka 2014, 37). However, since the 2016 American presidential election, Canadians from different walks of life such as politicians and citizens have expressed their want for leadership similar to Donald Trump with policies focusing on Far-Right Populism (Perry and Scrivens 2019, 165). Donald Trump declared his candidacy in 2015 with a speech which portrayed the “white voter, as the victim of the establishment, globalization, particularly trade imbalances with Asia, immigration, the media, political correctness, and a failure of leadership by then-President Barack Obama” (King and Leonard 2019, 1). Trump took a tough stance against immigration, anathematizing countries with dominant populations of people of colour. The following excerpt from Trump’s campaign provides a demonstration of the racism descriptive of his campaign.

they (sic) are not sending their best. They are not sending you [in reference to good civil citizens]. They are not sending you. They are sending people that have lots of problems, and they are bringing those problems with them. They are bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They are rapists” (DelReal 2015). By using anxiety-inducing rhetorics against different groups, Trump “restat[ed] longstanding negative association and restabiliz[ed] persistent social hierarchies” in the United States (King and Leonard 2019, 2).

This association between immigrants and crime incentivized the far-right and led to an overall increase in hate crime (Modi and SLAAT 2018). One fifth of all attacks documented as hate crimes referenced Donald Trump or his policies during their commission and garnered support from individuals of the “racist right” such as the “neo-Nazi[s], Ku Klux Klan [members and], white nationalists” (Modi and SLAAT 2018; Barnett 2019, 78). Therefore, Trump has legitimated formerly tabooed white power movements ideology by relying on beliefs and language “that divides, demeans, and demonizes” part of the American population while implementing policies that exacerbate inequalities ((King and Leonard 2019, 4).Trump, through the course of his campaign and presidency, became the symbol of the far-right and an embodiment of hate which infiltrated Canada.

The Canadian Far Right’s ideology used social media to broaden its reach globally by aligning their identitarianism and white identity politics with Donald Trump’s platform as journalists found links between the Canadian far-right groups and Donald Trump through the latter’s re-tweets on Twitter (Kusz 2019, 114). The virtual space has been used to informally infiltrate the public with political messages by different groups, especially the right spectrum of politics by leaders from various countries. Twitter, amongst other social media platforms, during Donald Trump’s campaign, became a space to demonstrate “white rage” (Kusz 2019, 116).

Since 2016, far-right views have manifested in Canada due to the popularity of social media and the World Wide Web, which has familiarised the Canadian population with Donald Trump (Perry and Scrivens 2019, 156). Canadians are users of US-owned social media platforms such as Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter which provide constant access to Trumps toxic rhetoric and opposes Canada’s official policy of multiculturalism and have formed virtual ties between Trump” and Canadian Right Wing Extremism which disregards Canada’s inclination towards creating a diverse and inclusive state (Perry and Scrivens 2019, 156; Treasury Secretariat). Similar to Trump, Maxine Bernier, the now-leader of People’s Party of Canada, tweeted: “More diversity will not be our strength, it will destroy what has made us such a great country” (Wente 2018). Therefore, while he did not use the official political channels such as press conferences and news outlets to express his xenophobic beliefs, he indirectly appealed to the fundamental ideology of the far-right. Although Canadians are prone to dissociate themselves from American identity, they are influenced by the United States’ political discourse of inequality (Brooks 2014, 442).

One of the first signs that “Canadians are not immune to the appeal of racialized politics” was observed shortly after the 2016 Presidential elections in the United States (Perry and Scrivens 2019, 149, emphasis in text). Canadian media documented occurrences exuding Islamophobic, homophobic, xenophobic sentiments across the country; this was the first instance when the magnitude of the far-right identity was encapsulated as a concern (Perry and Scrivens 2019, 149). According to Statistics Canada, police-reported hate crime was up 47 per cent in 2017 (Smith 2012). Many of these incidents could have been coincidentally timed with the American elections were it not for the use of Trump’s slogan, name and speeches at these events which provided a distinct link between Trump’s ideology and the identity of the far-right Canadian citizens (Sharpe 2016). One of the first instances of such hate crimes was documented in Regina, Saskatchewan where a wall was graffitied with: “niggers go to the U.S. and let Trump deal with you” (Sharpe 2016). Following this, Ottawa saw a period of violent hate crimes between November 13-19, 2017 during which a Jewish prayer house, two synagogues, a mosque, and a church with a black minister were vandalized with spray-painted racial slurs and white supremacy symbols” (Perry and Scrivens 2019, 150). Similar events followed in Montreal, Toronto, Hamilton, Edmonton and other Canadian cities (Perry and Scrivens 2019, 150). Therefore, it was evident that the values of multiculturalism, liberty and equality were overtaken by xenophobic, racist and homophobic tropes that were fundamental to Donald Trump’s campaign and escalated the far-right movements in Canada (Silverman 2014, 20).

Foundations of Canadian Right Wing Identity Before Trump

Donald Trump cannot be credited as the founder of right-wing populism in Canada as the farright have been active in Canada since the 1990s (Perry et al. 2019, 62). The Canadian government has witnessed historical and contemporary vestiges of right-wing populism that resembles Trump’s campaign (62). During the Harper government, Canada took a turn towards the far-right populist policies and leadership as the government greatly represented far-right “sub-groups seeking a means of expressing their political preferences” (Sayers and Denemark 18). Harper’s government emphasized on immigration control, denounced Quebec’s “distinct province” demands and decrease the Canadian welfare state’s scope (7). In addition to the anti-immigrant rhetoric, the Harper government also initiated a retreat from human rights through the elimination of hate speech protections, fear-mongering and hate (Barbara et al. 63). Many policies released by Harper such as removing the citizenship of individual Canadian citizens “for national security”; the “Zero Tolerance for Barbaric Cultural Practices Act” targeting the Muslims in Canada and the “Oath of Citizenship Act” (2015) that disapproved religious observance in public spaces were applauded by the right-wing extremist groups in Canada (Meyer 2017). Harper’s term, an archconservative milieu,” also alludes to the possible imprint on American politics and identity as well since the far-right populist policies and leaders have been prevalent in Canada before Trump’s rise to political fame and were in place before he was elected (Smith 2018, 26). While some Canadian individuals and groups have accepted the far-right populist ideology, Justin Trudeau’s election as the Prime Minister depicted that the majority of the Canadian population was averse to the right-wing populism as Trudeau’s campaign focused on an inclusive approach to negotiating identities and ethnic differences (66).

Anti-Far-Right Response In Canada

It is important to acknowledge the influx of responses to Donald Trump’s populism that emphasize the Canadian multicultural identity and have attempted to counter ideologies of hate in Parliament, online and in public (Perry and Scrivens 2019, 165). The Canadian House of Commons passed M-103: a motion in 2017 “condemn[ing] Islamophobia and all forms of systemic racism and religious discrimination” in response to the growing unease and far-right sentiments that attacked their core values of liberty and multiculturalism (CBC News 2017). Moreover, many local activist groups participated within private sector politics such as Canada such as “Coalition Against White Supremacy and Islamophobia” (CAWSI) with more than 6000 members who continue to oppose right-wing populism (Patton 2017). CAWSI further believe that economic differences are the root cause of the issues, such as unemployment, which have been used as the precedent for creating an anti-immigrant and xenophobic rhetoric in Western countries following Donald Trump’s campaign and victory (Patton 2017).

Conclusion

The duplicity of the Canadian-American relationship and the impressionability of Canadian individuals can be explored through an analysis of the effects of Donald Trump’s election as the President of the United States. The event, although theoretically distant from the Canadian citizens as it did not explicitly affect their government and was paradoxically distinct from the morals of the Canadian society of equality, liberty and multiculturalism, impacted the Canadian population significantly by inciting an increase in the far-right identities. While the majority of Canada defines their identity as separate from the United States, identity politics within the country is significantly aligned with American politics and fluctuates with it (Brooks 2014, 347). However, Donald Trump, alone cannot be associated with the rise in the right-wing populism and extremism in Canada as their past governments and leaders have also propagated far-right beliefs and ideas in their policies and set a foundation for Donald Trump’s ideologies to attach to the Canadian rhetoric. At the same time, Trump’s popularity has also shown how different identity politics interact with each other through the interactions of his supporters and adversaries in formal and informal domains.

References

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Barnett, Brett A. 2019. "The Trump Effect: The 2016 Presidential Campaign And The Racist Right's Internet Rhetoric”. Journal Of Hate Studies 14 (1): 77. doi:10.33972/jhs.125.

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POLITICAL SCIENCE UNDERGRADUATE REVIEW VOL. 5 Winter 2020 ARTICLE 1

Red Toryism and Neo-Liberalism in Alberta Conservative Party Ideology

By Trista Peterson

Introduction

Alberta’s political history has been almost entirely dominated by conservative parties, and thus, Albertans have earned an almost caricature-like reputation as obstinate conservatives whose dogged devotion to their right-wing politics does them more harm than good. In reality, the situation is more nuanced. Large ideological divides between different strains of conservatism are present, which will be referred to as red toryism and neo-liberalism in this article. Red toryism is marked by an approach to governance that conceptualizes society as “an organic whole rather than a mere aggregation of individuals,” (Patten 2001, 137) which is at times willing to “violate the liberal commitment to the limited state,” having “accepted public assistance and the social infrastructure associated with the modern state” (137). Conversely, the neo-liberal strain of conservatism identifies “deficit reduction, deregulation, and privatization” as the ideal “approach to governance” (139). Alberta’s conservative political parties are generally thought to have evolved from a red tory party to one of a more distinctly neo-liberal flair, and there has been a great deal of academic research and armchair speculation exploring this ever-present and perplexing trend. This article presents a continuation of this research, suggesting that conservative party ideology tends to shift between red tory and neo-liberal ideology in response to provincial economic conditions.

Literature Review

Research regarding the transition toward the adoption of neo-liberal ideology in Alberta conservative party politics can be divided into several primary schools of thought. First, there is a consensus among political scientists that the overall transformation of conservative ideology from red tory to neo-liberal occurred in lockstep with an unprecedented downturn in the economy both at the provincial and international level from 1970-onwards. The Keynesian, red tory economic policies of PC premier Peter Lougheed experienced its heyday during the economic boom of the 1970s (Tupper 2004). Steve Patten (2015) explains that Lougheed’s government harnessed “the powers of the state” (259) to promote economic development, using profits from Alberta’s booming oil and gas sector to expand infrastructure, provide subsidies to farmers and small-business owners, expand the size and number of government departments, and other interventionist policies. However, the recession of the 1980s hit Alberta hard, and the decline in wheat and oil required Lougheed’s PC successor, Don Getty, to adopt the tenets of neoliberalism consensus. This neo-liberal consensus included cutting social spending, lessening economic regulation, and encouraging the export of goods. As Harrison, Johnson, & Krahn (1996) stated, the 1980s brought forth “sizeable tax increases, declines in real income, growing criticisms of centralized decision making, increased levels of political alienation, and the failure of state projects to create the “just society” [which] combined to discredit left/liberal solutions” (163). The PC’s underwent a leadership change in the 1990s, and with Ralph Klein at the head of the party, Alberta entered a new era of neo-liberal conservatism (Barrie 2006). He campaigned on promises to reduce the “debt crisis” by fixing Alberta’s “spending problem,” delivering aggressive cuts to public services, including healthcare, education, and the civil service, demonstrating a sizeable shift towards neo-liberalism in Alberta’s conservative party history.

The other relevant school of thought revolves around the success of populist politics in Alberta, particularly during times of economic decline. As a resource-dependent province, the economy is susceptible to severe fluctuations. Klein has often been described as a populist who successfully framed the civil service and other government expenditures as the enemy against whom Albertans needed to rally in order to win back the “Alberta Advantage” (Harrison 2005). Though Alberta’s economic woes were attributable to a decline in resource revenues, Klein successfully framed them as a result of unfettered spending.

Previous literature has explored the transition of Alberta’s conservative parties from red tory to neo-liberal and how populism has allowed previous conservative parties to harness the feelings of economic insecurity present in the electorate to a party’s advantage. However, it has not fully addressed the non-linearity of this shift. This article will explore this gap through a study of election results and the provincial economy, suggesting that successful conservative parties tend to espouse red tory ideology in times of economic wellbeing and neo-liberal ideology during economic downturns.

Findings

The findings presented in this section build off of the existing knowledge that, perhaps intuitively, the economy tends to play the most significant role in the ideological iteration of conservatism employed by Alberta politics. To do this, six important Alberta general elections and the economic conditions to which they correspond were reviewed. These elections took place in 1971, 1986, 1993, 2008, 2015, and 2019. These economic conditions are measured by gross domestic product (GDP), that is, “a measure of the economic production which takes place within the geographical boundaries of a province or country” (Alberta Government website n.d.). GDP serves as“the traditional measure of economic prosperity and is the basis for the economic growth figures that appear in the media” (Anielski 2002, 4). In 1971, the Progressive Conservatives ended the Social Credit Party’s 31-year reign. Led by Peter Lougheed, the PCs promised to fund education, transportation, daycare services, universities, and economic development. The PC’s “believe[d] in the concept of putting [the government’s] money and resources to work for improvement and progress” (Wesley, n.d.); this was an ostensibly red tory approach that took a dramatically different tack than Social Credit Premier Ernest Manning, quoted as saying that he had “come to appreciate… the disadvantages of government’s becoming involved in areas that the private sector can handle” (Bell 2004, 163). This distinction suggests that the success of the PC’s was perhaps due to a preference for a more interventionist state, and at the time, Alberta could afford it. Oil revenues were undergoing an unprecedented boom, the population was increasing, unemployment was low, and according to a report published by the Pembina Institute, “economic growth was [at its] highest in the 1970s when the GDP grew by an average 8.7 percent per annum” (Anielski 2002).

The 1980s were a turbulent time for Alberta’s economy, and Lougheed resigned in 1985. He was replaced by Don Getty, who was serving as premier when Alberta’s economy took a dramatic nose-dive in 1986. Oil prices plummeted from US $28-$35 a barrel to a low of $11, interest rates rose, and the provincial debt increased (Taft 2012). Alberta experienced its “slowest GDP growth at 2.2 percent per annum” during this decade (Anielski 2002). In response to the economic downturn, Getty cut spending on public programs such as education and healthcare and shrank the size and scope of the provincial government. As such, the trajectory of the PC government throughout the 1980s can be described as transitioning from a red tory party to neo-liberal in its approach to governance.

When Getty’s successor, Ralph Klein, won the 1992 provincial election, Alberta’s debt was at a record high. Previous governments had relied on borrowing money to continue public spending, and Klein’s government vowed to put an end to this with a radically neo-liberal approach to governance. He blamed previous governments for overspending, promoting the notion that, as former PC finance Jim Dinning notably said, Alberta “ha[d] a spending problem, not a revenue problem” (Taft, McMillan, and Jahangir 2012). Before his election, Klein campaigned on a platform of “severe program cuts, government downsizing and privatization of services” (Global News 2019). The neo-liberal bent to his politics was successful, and the PC government under Klein went on to successfully form the government for 14 years. During their years in government, Klein’s government slashed public spending until Alberta’s expenditures had nearly flatlined. Klein privatized many of Alberta’s public services, such as vehicle registration, liquor stores and driving exams. Meanwhile, Alberta’s GDP experienced “a resurgence, averaging 4.9 percent per annum up until 1999” (Anielski 2002).

In 2008, the PC’s returned to their red tory roots-- albeit for a limited time-- when Ed Stelmach replaced Klein as leader of the PC’s and became premier in 2008 (Global News 2019). He campaigned on a platform of “ensur[ing] sufficient investments were made in Alberta’s health and education systems” (Harrison 2015). During his campaign, Alberta’s GDP was on the rise (Alberta Government 2019). The financial crisis of 2008 correlated with a drop in Alberta’s GDP and his government began to run a large deficit. He resigned in 2011 after announcing that a surplus would not be possible for several years, a “stance opposed by many within the party,” especially with the popularity of the “the right-wing libertarian” Wildrose Party (Harrison 2015).

In 2015, the election of the NDP under the leadership of Rachel Notley upended the PC’s 44-year reign. Her government, often compared to that of Peter Lougheed’s PCs, did not shy from public spending. During the NDP’s mandate, health and education, among other public services, received increases to funding (Giovanetti 2019). Her government was heavily criticized for its spending, and during its first year in office, Alberta entered into one of the “most severe” recessions in the province’s history (Gibson 2006; Craig 2008, 6). Meanwhile, the PC party was united with the Wild Rose Party to create the UCP, led by Jason Kenney, which won a decisive majority in 2019. The UCP campaigned on a dedication to eliminate the debt and “restore the Alberta advantage”-- the death of which, according to Kenney, was due to reckless spending on the part of the NDP. Albertans, over a quarter of a century later, watched history repeat itself as this new iteration of Alberta conservatism harkened back to the neo-liberal days of Ralph Klein (Dawson 2019); the ‘Blue Ribbon Panel,’ who convened prior to the release of Alberta’s 2019 budget, stated that “Alberta has a spending problem” (Antoneshen 2019).

In studying both the results of these six critical elections and considering the economic trajectory of these periods, it appears that the economy is largely predictive of election outcomes; Albertans tend to elect neo-liberal conservative governments during periods of recession and red tory conservative governments when the economy is in better shape. Ups and downs in the economy are not unusual, but Alberta is unique in the extent to which global fossil fuel prices influence the economy, creating a situation wherein the volatility of the natural resources market is a “significant part of the explanation for the high variability of the provincial economy.” (Mansell & Schlenker, 2006).

Discussion

So far, this article has focused on two different approaches to government and spending-- neo- liberal and red tory-- and how Alberta’s conservative parties have shifted between the latter to the former from 1971 to the present day. The findings of this research are consistent with previous literature related to this subject: the economy of Alberta is ostensibly the most significant indicator of what type of conservative government Albertans will elect. It has found that successful conservative leaders have garnered support during hard times by uniting Albertans behind the idea that the neo-liberal ideals of small government, decreased spending, and privatizing public services is the only way to combat the economic woes that befall the province during periods of low oil revenue. The discussion that follows will explore possible explanations for why Albertans seem to favour conservative parties with a neo-liberal approach to governance when the economy is underperforming.

Alberta is unique from its neighbouring prairie provinces in its propensity for neo-liberal ideology in times of economic hardship. Saskatchewan, for example, tends to do the exact opposite (Enoch 2011). Saskatchewan’s political history features a heavy presence of social-democratic governments, and they tend to be the most successful during times of economic downturn. This indicates that there are substantial differences between the attitudes and priorities between these two similar provinces, and perhaps the best measure of this is the unique political culture of each province. Saskatchewan’s political culture is often regarded as being collectivist in nature, “emphaciz[ing] security and egalitarian social development”, while Alberta inherited an entrepreneurial political culture that espouses a sense of “individualistic pursuit of liberty and prosperity” from its early inhabitation by American Liberals (Marchildon 2005, 11; Wesley 2011, 20). These differences in political culture ostensibly lead to different priorities, and recent research by Wesley et al. (2019) suggests that Albertans hold “the economy” as a top priority. When Alberta begins to run a deficit budget or suffer due to low resource revenues, the main concern becomes getting the provincial economy, and thus their personal economic wellbeing, back on track. This gives political actors an in-road to capturing the hearts and minds of Albertans in times of economic under-performance: vow to eliminate debt, create jobs, and promise prosperity for all, uniting Albertans under the rallying cry of “balancing the budget” or “bringing back the Alberta advantage” even if at the expense of public services. This brand of populism is defined by leaders such as Ralph Klein and Jason Kenney, who have vowed to fight for “the people” against the overspending, red tory, “political elites.” They use what Simon Enoch (2011) describes as “debt and deficit discourse to prepare the way for neo-liberalism”. Interestingly, the definition of “the people” appears to remain consistent over the decades; in his days as PC leader, Ralph Klein often spoke of Henry and Martha, the “severely normal” Albertans (Pratt 2009). Before the release of the 2019 provincial budget, Premier Jason Kenney spoke again of these “normal Albertans,” that is, “the folks who just try to get by and take care of their families with an ever-rising cost of living” (Leavitt 2019).

The results of this study seem to support the hypothesis that neo-liberal populism resonates with Albertans. Take, for example, the near-clean sweep of the Conservative Party of Canada in 2019’s federal election with their slogan, “it’s time for you to get ahead.” (Aiello 2019), and the UCP’s 2019 continuous campaign refrain of “jobs and the economy, jobs and the economy.”

The success of this pattern is perplexing when considering the evolving political culture of Alberta; the “ordinary people” and “Henry and Marthas” of Alberta are no longer the majority, though Alberta retains a reputation as a socially and fiscally conservative province. Research suggests that Albertans are not entirely deserving of this. When asked to place themselves on a ten-point political spectrum, Albertans, as a whole, are no more conservative than other Canadians (Wesley et al. 2019) For the most part, they want public services, are not opposed to government spending, and support initiatives related to Indigenous reconciliation, women’s rights, and lessening the gap between the rich and the poor. However, progressive parties-- whether red tory conservative or NDP-- struggle to make inroads during economic downturns. It may be the case that economic insecurity triggers what Diana C. Mutz (2018) refers to as “status threat”: that is, the idea that “one’s status in the domestic or international hierarchy has suffered” (9) “Status threat” was highly predictive of Donald Trump’s 2016 presidential victory in the United States, and Alberta’s tendency to swing towards right-wing, neo-liberal governments may be influenced by this as well. Voter turnout tends to peak during elections marked by victories of neo-liberal conservative parties vowing to cut spending, shrink government, and eliminate provincial debt in the face of provincial economic downturn. This pattern suggests that Albertans feel most strongly about their political preferences or perhaps economic issues during particularly populist campaigns; In 1993 and 2019, voter turnout was at its highest (Elections Alberta n.d). This effect may also be due to wanting to “punish” a previous government for their perceived economic irresponsibility. There is still much to explore in this area; one may start with exploring this pattern of voter turnout, and if it is indeed affected by populist politics.

This research has its limitations, of course. There are many factors involved in elections besides GDP and populism that were beyond the scope of this research. Future research may explore this topic in more depth by reviewing a longer time period and more economic indicators.

Conclusion

The previous paragraphs have focused on the shifting of Alberta’s conservative political parties between those with a red tory approach to governance to those with a neo-liberal approach. Researching the results of elections as well as Alberta’s economic trajectory has revealed that Albertans seem to prefer conservative parties with neo-liberal ideology during times of economic hardship and red tory ideology during more prosperous times. This article has also explored the use of populist political tactics to frame government spending as the culprit for economic hardship to great success. This information may be predictive of future election outcomes and add to the body of knowledge about Alberta conservatism.

References

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POLITICAL SCIENCE UNDERGRADUATE REVIEW

VOL. 5 Winter 2020 ARTICLE 5

The Role of Gender Stereotypes in a Political Campaign: An Exploration of the Gender Gap Within American Politics

By Brianna Morrison

Introduction:

The purpose of this paper is to examine gender stereotypes as a mechanism that maintains the under representation of women within elected office. Focusing exclusively on American politics, this paper will explore the barriers female candidates face in running for office. In 2019, the percentage of women holding seats is 23.7 %. This statistic indicates that women occupy 127 of the 535 seats in Congress. Although a record breaking high, this amount still remains far from achieving parity within Congress. To explore women’s under representation, this paper questions the impact gender stereotypes have on a female’s candidacy? Exploring how gender stereotypes influence both voter preferences and the attitudes of party leaders, I predict that gender stereotypes can discourage both voters and party leaders from pursuing female candidates. Based on the research findings, this paper argues that the gender gap in political representation is in fact largely rooted in the campaign process that has and continues to present barriers for women seeking elected office. To support my argument, I discuss “gender stereotypes” as a predominant factor that greatly affects the campaign process. This paper primarily examines the impact gender stereotypes have on voter preferences, which I contend create negative connotations about a woman’s capability in politics. From there, this paper shifts focus to examine party leaders, exploring how gender stereotypes discourage party leaders from pursuing a female candidate, due to the perception that her chances of winning are low. Lastly, this paper will discuss the differences within the Democrat and Republican parties in terms of effort to increase female representation within their respective parties.

Gender stereotypes refer to the widely shared perceptions that people have about gender and the individuals who belong to that gender. Gender stereotypes remain a barrier that presents specific challenges for women seeking elected office. These stereotypes are inherently disadvantageous for female candidates because they perpetuate distinctions between male and female characteristics/roles, aligning the former’s characteristics with the political ideal. By associating male characteristics with political leadership, it influences who seeks and who wins elected office.

This inequity exists due to traditional gender scripts that idolize hegemonic masculinity within American politics. The importance of gender equity within the American political system is to challenge female subordination that is prevalent in all facets of social life. To advance an alternative politics that is better informed by greater representation of female perspectives whose gender accounts for 50% of the American population. Increased female representation provides greater potential for feminist values within the public realm of politics. It is important to recognize the effect gender stereotypes have within the campaign process, so that the process of resolving this inequity can begin. If American politicians are unwilling to acknowledge the inherent discrimination due to gender stereotypes, women will continue to be underrepresented within government, ultimately preserving the hierarchy of power that corrupts American politics.

Literature Review:

For the purposes of this paper, my research seeks to expand on existing knowledge concerning the gender gap in representation within American politics. I intend to provide an in- depth analysis of the role gender stereotypes play within the campaign process. This literature review, therefore, draws on existing scholarship that discusses the existence of a gender gap within American politics. There are five scholarly works that are most pertinent to my research question. The first two scholarly works provide theoretical frameworks for understanding gender stereotypes, while the other three scholarly works offer their own distinct theory for the gender gap within American politics.

Gender and more specifically gender stereotypes, must be considered when examining who seeks and wins elected office in America. Within their own respective works, authors Andreea Zamfira and Kathleen Dolan provide theoretical frameworks for understanding gender stereotypes. Zamfira contends that gender stereotypes can be understood as the “multi-faceted aspects of gender identities…used for socially constructing the feminine and masculine categories, stereotypes influence…social and political constraints on men and women”( Zamfira, et al. 2018,13). Zamfira argues that gender is an integral part of America’s “traditional and modern configurations” of politics (2018,13). Both traditional and modern configurations of politics continue to emphasize male attributes as the ideal. Contrasted to this idealization of masculine traits within politics, women are often socialized to believe that they do not embody the desirable traits of a politician and therefore are discouraged to enter into politics. As such, seeking elected office remains relatively a male privilege in America.

Similarly, Kathleen Dolan defines gender stereotypes as a collective of “dominant and cultural assumptions about women’s nature and women’s capabilities” (2014, 19). Within her definition, she argues that gender stereotypes are mechanisms that generate “antagonism toward women’s political life” (2014, 19). Gender stereotypes serve to discriminate against and exclude women within American politics. This exclusion occurs as a result of gender stereotypes that emphasize men as being innately “more competent, decisive, stronger leaders, and possessing a greater ability to handle a crisis” (Dolan, 2014:20).

In their book, authors Palmer and Dennis, suggest that voters “make assumptions about candidates based on their gender” (2008, 172). By examining trends in both women’s participation as candidates and in winning their party nominations, Palmer and Simons suggest that there is a “partisan component” to the glass ceiling that prevents women from achieving higher levels of political success (2008, 162). In their research, they consider a partisan gender gap that includes “those who seek their party’s nomination, those who win their primary contests, and those who win a seat in both the House and Senate” (2008, 175). Elaborating from their argument, I suggest that the differing gender stereotypes held by Democrats and Republicans influence the perceptions of female candidates. As Democrats are perceived to be more liberal in thought, there is more opportunities for female candidates, as democratic districts often are more open to diverge from tradition.

Authors Julia Dolan, Melissa M. Deckman, and Michele L. Swers further discuss this idea of voter preferences. They argue that, “female candidates must navigate gender to convince voters that they belong in the masculine world of politics” (2019, 119). It is important to consider which gender stereotypes female candidates portray and which stereotypes they attempt to subvert. Considering the political campaign of Gina Ortiz Jones, as discussed by Dolan, Deckman, and Swers, it is apparent she adopts male gender stereotypes while attempting to balance the female stereotypes already ascribed to her. Kathleen Dolan acknowledges this notion that voter preferences can be gendered. Dolan asserts that “voters look at women candidates and women officeholders from a gendered perspective, ascribing certain stereotyped…personality characteristics to them” (2014, 19). In her work, Dolan goes on to argue that, although gendered stereotypes exist, gendered stereotypes are not imperative to a female candidate’s success. For the purposes of this paper, I engage with her work solely to provide a theoretical framework for gender stereotypes.

Authors, Karen E. Kitchens and Michele L. Swers, discuss the disproportionality in representation between the Democratic and Republicans in their piece concerning the 2010 and 2012 elections in America. They purpose two distinct theories for why Republican women candidates have a more difficult time in the primaries than Democratic women. One theory proposes that Democratic districts are typically “more urban, liberal, higher income, and more racially diverse”(651) , and therefore, are more likely to elect female candidates in comparison to Republican districts which are “distinctly unfriendly to women candidates” (651). The other theory proposed is that “democratic women benefit from the evolution of the parties’ electoral coalitions” (651).

In consideration of the first theory, I suggest that perhaps because democratic districts are often more “liberal” and “racially diverse”, they are not as heavily entrenched in gender stereotypes, having progressed from stereotypical understandings of gender. To support the argument made by Kitchens and Swers, I discuss an analysis done by Kira Sanbonmatsu, where she determines if there is a relation between party practices and perceptions about women’s status as candidates (2006, 120). Situating this paper in relation to the scholarly work discussed in this literature review, the paper emphasizes the inherent gender stereotypes at play that contribute to women’s under representation in politics.

Methodology:

Conducting a feminist critique of research on gender and political candidacy, the overall direction of this paper is to discuss gender stereotypes as a mechanism that contributes to the gender gap in political representation. To begin, this paper discusses the influence gender stereotypes have on both voter preferences and party leaders. Afterwards, a comparison between the Democratic and Republican parties will be conducted. The purposes of conducting a comparison is to demonstrate how, in contrast to republican voters, the perceptions held by democratic voters incline them to be more open to female representation. The comparison also reveals that democratic leaders are less hesitant in nominating female candidates. While Republican leaders are often more hesitant due in part to the perception that female candidates will not fare well within Republican districts.

The methods employed focus on qualitative measures, examining in-depth descriptions of how gender stereotypes impact a political campaign. The goal of this paper is to a provide a theoretical response to how gender stereotypes uphold the gender gap in political representation. This paper provides contextual knowledge about how gender stereotypes influence the gender gap in political representation, elaborating specifically on how voter preferences and party leaders are influenced by gender stereotypes.

I chose to focus on gender stereotypes, because gender stereotypes are a significant component in understanding women’s underrepresentation in political office. This paper demonstrates how gender stereotypes both discourage and undermine women’s viability as political candidates. The sources examined in my research discuss themes that relate to the gender gap in political representation, focusing on both voters and party leaders within Democratic and Republican parties. This paper will explore gender stereotypes as a component within the theories proposed, expanding on how gender stereotypes contribute to the barrier female candidates face. The selected secondary sources focus on the relationship between gender and political campaigns, within each source the impact gender has on election dynamics within American politics is considered. For primary sources, this paper includes interviews conducted by Kathleen Dolan to exemplify attitudes of party leaders. Republican party leaders explicitly stated that they felt that female candidates would be less successful in their campaigns. As well, to strengthen the argument on voter preferences, this paper examines articles about Hilary Clinton’s campaign to demonstrate the sexist backlash that occurred as a result of her gender.

Research Findings:

Voter preferences bear a large impact on the success of a political candidate. With regards to female candidates in specific, voter preferences can present a barrier for women, as often times a voter’s preference can be influenced by gender stereotypes. A voter may favour male candidates, believing that a woman does not possess the desirable attributes to succeed in political office. When a voter uses a female candidate’s gender to make inferences about her political candidacy, the voter fails to consider the merit of the female candidate. In the case of the United states, voters rely on gender stereotypes to assess female candidates and their suitability for office (Dolan, 2014, 2). Voters can also rely on gender stereotypes to evaluate male candidates, but these stereotypes often are beneficial rather than harmful. Although intersectionality is not a focus of this paper, I want to emphasize the fact that the male candidates I am referring to are white cis heteronormative males. Engaging with an intersectional approach reveals that it is only men who conform to these ideals that benefit, while often racialized and queer men are subjected to their own specific stereotypes that target them based on their race and sexuality. For the white cis heteronormative man, gender stereotypes assume that they embody agentic traits. Expected to be innate leaders, males’ agentic traits heavily align with what American society has constructed as the political ideal. The idealization of male traits implicitly acts to devalue female traits in politics, while simultaneously prioritizing men for leadership roles.

The difficulty with presenting quantitative data on voter preferences, as stated by Amelia Thomson-Deveaux, is that many voters will not explicitly admit their reluctance towards female candidates (2019). They claim that they would vote for a female candidate and yet Hilary Clinton’s candidacy demonstrates that her loss may partly be attributed to her gender. As analyzed by Peter Beinart, “the percentage of Americans who hold a “strongly unfavorable” view of [Clinton] substantially exceeds the percentage for any other Democratic nominee since 1980” (2016). If voters claim that they would elect a female candidate, why was the dislike for Hilary Clinton significantly more than for any previous Democratic nominee? I reason that this could be because female candidates face more criticism than male candidates due to their perceived gendered characteristics. Although difficult to find proof of gender discrimination in voting patterns, gender discrimination is both prevalent and apparent in the behaviours of politicians themselves. Clinton’s opponent Donald Trump attempted to use her gender against her during his campaign. Trump’s advisers explained his “woman’s card” attack, in which Trump accused Clinton of using the “woman’s card” to garner votes, was intended to undermine Clinton’s qualifications (Chozick and Parker, 2016). Trump’s attack is a different approach that still serves to damage a politician’s image due to their gender. His attack reasons that Clinton’s “political success” is attributed to the fact that she’s a woman, therefore she garners the women’s vote, this statement simultaneously undermines her merit as a political candidate.

Authors Dolan, Deckman, and Swers analyze women’s attempts to manage the often- gendered expectations of voters and media (2019, 120). Unable to circumvent gender stereotypes, female candidates must be cautious of which gender stereotypes they fall victim to. During their campaign, female candidates will attempt to minimize the effect of gender stereotypes by exhibiting a balance of both masculine and feminine traits. Exploring the gender stereotypes that characterize American political culture, female candidates have been observed to portray male stereotypes as a means of affirming to voters that they have the same abilities as men to win elected office.

Gina Ortiz Jones’ campaign is referenced in the work of Dolan, Deckman, and Swers to highlight how female candidates manage gender expectation of voters and media (2019, 120). Gina Ortiz Jones’ campaign slogan “One of Us, Fighting for us”, implicitly communicates to voters that “that she is tough enough for the job”(2019, 119). The word “fighting” in her slogan is associated with ideas of strength, that are linked to male stereotypes favoured in politics. Female candidates must present themselves as both strong leaders but also as compassionate beings, otherwise facing backlash for failing to possess her “innate compassion”. Dolan, Deckman, and Swers claim that perceptions of female and male candidates are viewed “through different lenses”(2019, 123). Female candidates must be careful in how they portray their image to voters, because they are often viewed through a lens that is not only critical of their political merit but is critical of who they are as a woman as well.

Managing gender expectations of voters becomes even more challenging for female candidates when faced with sexist backlash for their attempts to assert agentic traits. Female candidates can face public hostility when the public perceives the candidate as attempting to be overtly masculine. For instance, while men are praised for being ambitious, a study by Victoria L. Brescoll and Taylor G. Okimoto found that women are frequently criticized for their ambition (Beinart 2016). Conventionally, ambition is a trait assigned to men, therefore, when a woman is ambitious this can incite backlash because her ambition challenges traditional gendered norms. Gendered attitudes of party leaders can present a barrier for female candidates. Gender stereotypes limit female opportunities for success by discouraging party leaders from nominating female candidates. Numerous scholars concerned with the gender gap in political representation have argued that party leaders take a candidate’s gender in consideration when recruiting potential candidates. In their book, Palmer and Dennis propose that party leaders “are not gender-neutral in their assessments of male and female candidates and their ability to win” (2008, 174). Rather, party leaders are often found to be hesitant in considering female candidates because they fear that recruiting women candidates may risk the party’s chances in winning. This prevailing fear is detrimental for female candidates, as party leaders -arguably- are one of the largest factors in determining a candidate’s success. Women’s opportunities to seek elected office “are controlled, at least in part, by the attitudes and actions of elites in [the] system” (Dolan 2014, 7), therefore, the support of the party leader is crucial for a female candidate’s success.

It is challenging, however, for female candidates to obtain the support of the party leader. There is significant evidence that “despite evidence of women’s success at the polls, party leaders …still believe that women have a harder time being elected than do men” (Sanbonmatsu cited in Dolan 2014, 8). Party leaders have admitted that they do not believe that a female candidates’ chances would fare well (Dolan 2014, 8), and therefore are discouraged from recruiting female candidates. This belief is a consequence of the gender stereotypes that undermine a women’s ability to serve in elected office. Gender stereotypes serve to invalidate a female candidate’s merit. Shifting emphasis onto her characteristics as a female, gender stereotypes detract from the candidate’s qualifications. This creates additional challenges, as female candidates are burdened with not only have to prove their merit but having to combat gender stereotypes as well.

The disproportionality between Democratic and Republican parties in pursuing women candidacy is a barrier that continues to limit female representation in American politics. Examining the differences in success for female candidates that belong to the Democratic and Republican parties, Palmer and Dennis suggest that “the perceptions of female candidates held by voters and party leaders” (2008, 172) contribute to the greater success of Democratic women in seeking elected office. Elaborating on this, I contend that gender stereotypes are an inherent component to the detriment of Republican female candidates. In examining Republican voters, Palmer and Dennis found evidence to suggest that republic voters “are less sympathetic to female candidates” (2008, 175). For instance, in the case of Sarah Palin, once Palin was nominated to be John McCain’s running mate, “references to her gender and maternal status influenced the campaign”(Schreiber 2016, 1), including descriptions such as being a “mama grizzly” and “hockey mom”(Schreiber 2016, 2). The emphasis of Palin’s maternal role undermined her viability as a political candidate because it challenged traditional political values of hegemonic masculinity. The conversation around Palin’s candidacy was dominated by discussions of how her gender and maternal status challenge her viability as a candidate; demonstrating that the Republican party continues to uphold gendered values. These values, ultimately, preserve the gender role norms that prevent women from entering elected office.

Authors, Kitchens and Swers suggest that, Democratic districts are more likely to elect female candidates as opposed to Republican districts. Referencing Kira Sanbonmatsu’s study on party chairs, Kitchens and Swers contend that the party leaders who believed their districts to be less welcoming of female candidates, were leaders from rural areas (2016, 651). From her analysis, Sanbonmatsu found that respondents in both North Carolina and Ohio -both republican states- “believe that party leaders do not always think of women as candidates” (2006, 154-154). Returning again to this idea of the power held by party leaders, Sanbonmatsu’s analysis demonstrates how as a result of gender stereotypes, republican party leaders are less inclined to nominate female candidates. While “democratic women likely benefit from the perception that they are more liberal”(Kitchens and Swers 2016, 661). Being a woman is automatically disadvantageous for a republican candidate, due to perceptions that if a candidate is female, they are automatically “too liberal” (Schreiber 2016, 3). Sanbonmatsu reiterates the notion that democratic women benefit from the perception of being “more liberal”, stating that “where the public is more liberal, more women typically serve in the legislature” (2006, 156). Kitchens and Swers have found that these “more liberal places” are increasingly democratic (2016, 651).

In concluding their analysis, Palmer and Dennis found there to be a disproportionate trend in women candidacy and office holders between the Democratic party and the Republican party. They argued that “if only one party provides increasing opportunities for female aspirants to enter congress, this is a tremendous barrier” (2008, 175). Kitchens and Swers further this argument, suggesting that, “democratic women benefit from the evolution of the parties’ electoral coalitions” (2016, 651). For instance, EMILY’s List, is an example of a female donor network utilized by female Democratic candidates to support their fundraising process. Unlike the Democratic party that has begun institutionalizing support systems for female candidates, the Republican party has made minimal effort in attempts to aid female candidates. I suggest that this is in part because of the gender stereotypes that discourage the Republican party from wanting to increase female representation within the party.

Conclusion:

To conclude my analysis, I reaffirm my argument that the gender gap in political representation is largely rooted in the campaign process that has and continues to present barriers for women seeking elected office. One of the largest barriers being gender stereotypes, this paper contends that gender stereotypes undermine women’s chances in seeking elected office by influencing both how voters and party leaders view female candidates. Female candidates face additional burdens that male candidates are not subjected to. While a male candidate’s merit is assumed, a female candidate must prove her merit. The gender stereotypes placed on a female candidate undermine her qualifications, causing doubt in her capabilities.

Certain scholars have argued that, although prevalent within politics, gender stereotypes do not play as significant a role in women’s under representation. Kathleen Dolan contends that “gender stereotypes are not a central influence on support for women”, but rather there are “traditional influences” that are more imperative to a women’s success (2014, 186). Focusing on the rigid nature of American politics, Dolan considers political parties, incumbency, and campaign spending as “traditional influences” that are detrimental to a female candidate’s success; however, I would argue that Dolan fails to consider the integration of gender stereotypes into the structure of American politics as the derivation of “these traditional influences”.

Scholars, such as Melinda Adams and Michal Smrek, argue that political institutions are gendered. Taking on a feminist approach, they emphasize that “the interplay of formal and informal practices creates different opportunities for women and men by prescribing acceptable masculine and feminine forms of behavior, rules and values” (2018, 271). As a result, gendered norms shape the structure of American political institutions, and therefore I argue that every facet within American politics is in some way influenced by gendered stereotypes. In consideration of the research explored, it becomes apparent how gender stereotypes influence a female candidate’s campaign. Overall, there is an inequity in treatment that needs to be addressed. Otherwise, how can America truly take pride in itself as a democratic country? A democracy would mean there is equal representation for all constituents. Yet, in America, there is a large inequity in the representation of women in government in comparison to the representation of men, demonstrating that perhaps American politics does not embody the inclusive characteristics necessary for the fulfilment of true democracy.

References

Adams, Melinda, and Michal Smrek. "Making Institutions and Context Count: How Useful Is Feminist Institutionalism in Explaining Male Dominance in Politics?" Politics & Gender 14, no. 2. 271-275, 2018. https://mcgill.on.worldcat.org/search?databaseList=283%2C638&queryString=Melinda+ Adams+and+Michal+Smrek#/oclc/7735803125

Beinart, Peter. “Fear of a Female President”. The Atlantic. October 15, 2016. https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/10/fear-of-a- female- president/497564/

Chozick, Amy, and Ashley Parker. “Donald Trump's Gender-Based Attacks on Hillary Clinton Have Calculated Risk.” The New York Ti April 29, 2016. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/29/us/politics/hillary-clinton-donald-trump- women.html.

Dolan, Julie, Deckman, Melissa M., and Swers, Michele L. “Women on the Campaign Trail”. In Women and Politics: Paths to Power and Political Influence. 118-150. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2016. https://web-a- ebscohost.com.login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/ehost/detail/detail?vid=o&sid=573a9f1-1f45- 41fd-bf60- 992643815cd8%40sessionmgr4007&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZSZzY29wZT1zaXRI #AN=122226&db=nlebk

Dolan, Kathleen. When Does Gender Matter?: Women Candidates and Gender Stereotypes in American Elections, 1-15. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014. https://www- oxfordscholarship- com.login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199968275.001.000 1/acprof-9780199968275

Kitchens, Karin E., and Michele L. Swers. “Why Aren't There More Republican Women in Congress? Gender, Partisanship, and Fundraising Support in the 2010 and 2012 Elections.” In Politics & Gender 12, no. 4, 648–76. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2016. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/politics-and- gender/article/why-arent-there- more-republican-women-in-congress-gender-partisanship- and-fundraising-support-in-the- 2010-and-2012- elections/3E3C34C6098A2A1EC5B3956FFA8A44CD

Palmer, Barbara, and Simon, Dennis. “Understand the Glass Ceiling”. In Breaking the Political Glass Ceiling: Women and Congressional Elections, 161-176. London: Routledge, 2008. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ualberta/detail.action?docID=325570

Rutgers Eagleton Institute of Politics. “Women in the U.S. Congress 2019.” Accessed October 2, 2019. https://cawp.rutgers.edu/women-us-congress-2019.

Sanbonmatsu, Kira. Where Women Run : Gender and Party in the American States, 156-181. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2006. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ualberta/detail.action?docID=341470

Schreiber, Ronnee. "Gender roles, motherhood, and politics: Conservative women's organizations frame Sarah Palin and Michele Bachmann.” In Journal of Women, Politics and Policy 37(1), 1-23. United Kingdom: Taylor and Francis Group, 2016. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1554477X.2016.1115319?journalCode=w wap20

Thomson-Deveaux, Amelia. “Americans Say They Would Vote For A Woman, But…”. FiveThirtyEight, July 15, 2019. https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/americans-say-they- would-vote-for-a-woman-but/

Zamfira, Andreaa, Christian De Montilibert, and Daniela Radu. “The Interplay between Identities, Codes, Stereotypes and Politics in Studying Gender in Western and Non- Western Societies”. In Gender in Focus: Identities, Codes, Stereotypes and Politics.13- 38. Opladen; Berlin; Toronto: Verlag Barbar Budrich, 2018. https://www-jstor. org.login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/stable/j.ctvddzn5f?refreqid=excelsior%3A6e956230 7f1faa0edd74b0f632a9c162

POLITICAL SCIENCE UNDERGRADUATE REVIEW

VOL. 5 Winter 2020 ARTICLE 8

Universe of Support: Suburban Voters in Canadian Federal Elections

By Seeon Smith

Abstract

This chapter reviews the position of suburban voters within Canadian federal elections. In response to the impression that federal elections are won and lost in the greater Toronto area I ask - how do suburban voters factor into the campaign strategies of political parties? I examine the significance of suburban voters, emphasizing those in Toronto, as a contested demographic. I draw attention to the allocation of campaign resources through analysis of the 2019 party leader tours of the Liberals, Conservatives, and New Democrats. This is supplemented by an analysis of party platforms from 2008, 2011, 2015, and 2019 as a measure of campaign marketing. In doing so, I seek to address the nature of Canadian elections and normatively reflect on the consequences of this nature.

Suburban Voters In Canadian Federal Elections

Often repeated, but seldom verified, the belief that elections are won and lost in Toronto is one of the oldest clichés in Canadian federal politics. This is reflected in rhetoric from provinces, such as Alberta, that claim the concentration of power in Toronto produces relative powerlessness for western Canada. The argument concludes that Toronto's influence marginalizes the interests of other regions, and therefore challenges national unity. This chapter takes these claims, not as a cliché, but rather as a significant insight into Canadian politics. Thus, the question becomes, why is Toronto significant to election outcomes? The literature on political campaigns suggests that a campaign ought to direct the bulk of its resources at those known as swing voters (Flanagan 2010). Therefore, the time and labour of Canada’s three major federal political parties in the Greater Toronto Area (GTA), the suburbs surrounding the City of Toronto, in the 2019 election suggest that the GTA is full of these voters. Building off the works of Borden, Perella, and Roy (2015) I argue that suburban voters represent a distinct demographic of swing voters. Utilizing this conception of suburban voters, I contend that the importance of Toronto in election outcomes is significantly linked to the number of suburban ridings in the region. This chapter seeks to confirm the existence of suburban voters as a distinct and influential set of swing voters and examines the extent to which political parties recognize this phenomenon. In doing so, I seek to address the nature of Canadian elections and normatively reflect on the consequences of this.

This supposition is not without academic substantiation. Dating well back to the 1960s, an examination has been made of the relationship between voting patterns and sub-regional communities (Lawrence, 1963). However, the bulwark of the literature has only examined the dichotomy between urban and rural voters. There is a significant consensus among scholars that urban voters tend to be ideologically progressive, and more likely to vote for left-leaning parties than their rural counterparts (Henderson, 2004; Bittner, 2007; Bodet, 2014). Further, Bodet (2014) articulates that certain political parties maintain stable support amongst specific communities. Sub- regionally this can be articulated as the stable support for the LPC amongst urban voters, and the Conservative Party of Canada (CPC) among rural voters (578). The consensus on the existence of voter bases, defined by sub- regional cleavages, is useful in producing a framework in which to place voting patterns in Canada; However, this fails to generate the logics which produce our understanding of politics of the GTA which is neither urban or rural.

Alan Walks (2004) proposes a third category, suburban, to distinguish a separate set of voters defined by their sub-regional location; Therefore, he differentiates himself from the works of those who have established the existence of the urban and rural dichotomy in Canadian politics. Specifically, he has described suburban voters to be more inclined than their urban counterparts to vote for right-wing parties (270). Since then, very little has been published on the subject matter. Borden, Perella and Roy (2015) are the most recent, if not only, academics to return to the distinction of suburban voters from urban and rural. Specifically, they argue suburban voters exist as the medium between rural and urban voters. They explain, based on Walks (2004), that suburban voters are more likely to support the CPC than urban voters but less likely than the rural voters. Inversely this can be said about their support for the LPC. This implies that suburban voters are not part of either parties' base, and potentially exist as a demographic of swing voters. Therefore, parties ideologically left of the LPC such as the New Democratic Party (NDP) will not place suburban voters in their universe of support, but rather target urban voters.

A debate in the discourse does not exist on the existence of suburban voters but challenges subregional voting patterns as a whole, however; What research exists confirms there are consistent distinctions between the voting patterns of rural, suburban, and urban voters. This has been done by maintaining that there are stable voting pattern differences between rural, urban, and suburban voters when accommodating for other socio-economic factors (i.e. religiosity, income, level of education) which may influence voting patterns (Walks, 2004; Borden, Perella, & Roy, 2015). It must be noted that Borden, Perella, and Roy (2015) acknowledge that vote choice did fluctuate by province. Specifically, they point to the outliers of Alberta and Prince Edward Island (PEI) where the trends amongst subregional voting blocs are harder to distinguish. On the account of Alberta, they conclude this is largely related to the political culture of the province. This means that the difference between rural, suburban, and urban voters was maintained, but all voters were more likely to vote for a conservative party. In PEI it is its’ small homogenous population which makes differences between rural, suburban, and urban voters difficult to distinguish (122). The lack of research on the subject matter is a detriment to the discourse on Canadian elections. Further inquiry would help illuminate the relation between the various factors which inform vote choice. Doing so would expand the empirical and normative evaluation of Canadian federal elections. To further the discourse on Canadian elections this chapter expands on Borden, Perella, and Roy’s (2015) research, and investigates the extent to which suburban voters exist as a demographic of swing voters.

Methodology

The nature of Canadian federal elections is such that political parties must manage their resources to produce their desired outcome. As such, not all political parties maintain the same goals. Parties such as the Liberal Party of Canada, Conservative Party of Canada, and arguably The New Democratic Party all intend to win as many seats as possible to form the government. To win seats a party must know which geographical and demographic coalitions exist in their universe of support. A universe of support is made up of core voters (those who have previously and continue to be committed to voting for a specific party), and those who could be persuaded to vote for that party. Persuadable voters are crucial to election outcomes because they extend a party’s support far enough win the number of seats needed to form government (Flanagan, 2010) I argue that suburban voters are a highly contested group of voters, therefore campaigns ought to expend significant resources to persuade these voters. To examine this, I look at the campaign stops made by party leaders of the LPC, CPC, and NDP and the platforms of their parties.

As a metric of the resources and energy being expended on suburban voters, I count the number of stops by party leaders in suburban ridings (CPAC, 2019). However, there is an absence of data on the subject from previous elections. As such, the scope of this analysis is limited to the 2019 election. This analysis codifies suburban ridings as those ridings which surround a metropolitan centre of 500,000 or more, and those communities outside a metropolitan centre with more than 100,000 people.

Party platforms summarize all the policies for which parties are trying to persuade their universe of support to vote for. If suburban voters are a contested demographic, then a thematic emphasis on suburban voters should be recognizable in each parties’ platform (Flanagan, 2010). I analyze each platform in its entirety over the last four federal elections. In doing so, I look at the intention of each platform and attempt to trace out the thematic prevalence of content related to suburban voters. To codify the latent content I utilize the definition of (sub)urban “as a spatial concentration of people whose lives are organized around non-agricultural activities...whereas rural means any place that is not urban” (Juergens and Rashed, 2010). Some of what is defined as (sub)urban will inevitably overlap with rural self-identification, but what makes it non-rural is its lack of explicit reference to agriculture. Expanding on this, I equate fishing and forestry to agriculture to account for trans-national differences in rurality. To supplement this I also use the definition of suburban put forth by Pratt (1987), who defines suburban voters as middle-class homeowners as a metric of distinction from urban voters. Further, I include the prominence of families, adolescent children, and working mothers into the working distinction of the suburban voter (Bell, 2006 144-45). Therefore, I define the suburban voter as one who considers themselves a member of the middle class, owns/or is looking to own a home, has/looking to have children, and lives on the inner or outer suburbs of a metropolitan area. Using this definition I codify the use of the terms middle class, education, families, housing, and childcare as operationalized indicators of suburban focused rhetoric. Using these indicators I qualify the thematic prevalence of suburban related content in platforms.

Data

Leaders’ Tours Of the 91 stops that each of the leaders made during the 2019 campaign on average three out of every five stops were to riding that was codified as suburban. The other two stops were split nearly equally between urban and rural ridings. One exception is Jagmeet Singh who stopped at a significantly higher number of urban ridings (32) compared to the CPC (17) and LPC (11) (CPAC, 2019). The LPC and CPC shared nearly identical numbers in suburban ridings at 58 and 55 stops respectively. This indicates that these two parties have identified the same universe of support. Jagmeet Singh took ten fewer stops in suburban communities (47), but this does not mean suburban voters are not part of the NDP's universe of support. Several potential reasons explain this discrepancy including: finances, mobility, demographics, family status, and his history as a Member of Provincial Parliament in Ontario for urban riding. These could all potentially explain why it would be more beneficial for Mr Singh to stop in urban centres. I do not discuss this much further, but more research into the NDP campaign strategy would be insightful into that party’s relation to suburban voters.

Figure 1.0

(CPAC, 2019)

Party Platforms

My analysis of party platforms confirms what is suggested by the prevalence of suburban ridings in the leaders' tours. There is a focus on suburban voters. Suburban content manifested itself through several patterns related to the type of messaging, the direction of messaging, and location of policy within the platforms. Since 2011, suburban voters have become a more prominent target for CPC and LPC policy. This focus materialized in 2011 where both parties began to introduce the theme of families and the middle class. This does not hold for the NDP who during the 2015 and 2019 campaigns moved away from a theme of family that was prevalent in 2011 and 2008. This is evident in the platform titles during this time. Suburban voters are the theme of the NDP’s platform in 2008 and 2011, and the same for the Liberals in 2011, 2015, 2019 (Figure 2.0).

Figure 2.0

Liberal, Conservative, and NDP Platform Title Pages 2008 -19

Party Year: Liberal Conservative NDP

2019 “Forward, a Plan For “It’s Time For You To “ A New Deal for The Middle Class” Get Ahead” People”

2015 “Strong Middle Class” “Our Plan to protect “Building a Country of the economy” Your Dreams”

2011 “Your Family your “Here for Canada” “Giving your Family a Future” Break”

2008 “Richer, Fairer, “The True North “A Prime Minister on Greener” Strong and Free” Your Family’s Side, For a Change”

(Conservative Party of Canada 2008, 2011, 2015, 2019; Liberal Party of Canada 2008, 2011, 2015, 2019; New Democratic Party 2008, 2011, 2015, 2019)

There is also a clear distinction between the location of themes. The middle class and families are consistently present at the beginning of platforms, but rurality is left until the last third of the platform. Secondly, themes of rurality are always given a separate section. However, these sections are often located within larger sections dedicated to broad based issues (i.e. national security, resource development, foreign policy). Specific issues related to rural communities, such as rural crime, consistently fall to the very end of platforms. I do not discuss this further and focus solely on suburban voters. However, further research into this phenomenon could provide insight into the power dynamics relevant to rural communities.

A shortfall of this data is the absence of manifest content. A quantitative analysis of the mentions of rural, suburban, and urban content could perhaps shed more light on the marketing strategies of each party. However, such an analysis on its own fails to encompass the entirety and focus of each platform. Counting the number of mentions of related key terms is a useful supplement, but it does not always accurately represent the audience. One can discuss families without using the word family. As such, I have omitted a quantitative analysis in favour of a more encompassing thematic analysis.

Discussion

This data demonstrates that the CPC and LPC parties are concentrating their resources on suburban voters. Therefore, suburban voters exist as a persuadable bloc of voters for the CPC and LPC. The NDP, as expected, spent more resources in urban areas and therefore indicates that the NDP does not mainly target suburban voters. Such a conclusion raises the important question of how powerful is the urban vote in shaping election outcomes? Based on my codification of rural, suburban, and urban ridings it appears that urban ridings are limited in number compared to suburban ridings.

Every city that has urban ridings inherently has several suburban ridings, but not every city with suburban ridings will have urban ridings. Urban voters are electorally outgunned, because of the disproportionate number of suburban ridings. This speaks to a criticism of this analysis. Being more numerous in quantity than urban and rural ridings party leaders would inherently stop in suburban ridings more often. I contend that this claim does not hold in light of the distinct difference in the number of stops in suburban ridings by the NDP. My research suggests that the types of ridings being visited are a conscious choice on behalf of the parties. Further, the number of suburban ridings is not irrelevant to my analysis. Rather it indicates that suburban voters are a numerous and powerful coalition of voters. As such suburban voters can be said to be where elections are won and lost. This is affirmed by the frequency of stops made by party leaders in suburban ridings, and the themes pertaining to suburban voters in their platforms (Flanagan 2010, 158-261; Borden, Perella, and Roy, 2015; Walks 2004, 2004). This conclusion does not directly confirm whether elections are won and lost in the GTA. Rather, it only suggests that elections are won and lost in suburban ridings. However, the GTA and the entirety of the Ontario peninsula sometimes called the 905 consists of 15% of the population of Canada and largely consists of suburban ridings (StatsCan, 2016). Therefore, not only is the GTA crucial in determining election outcomes but the entire 905. This confirms the common assertion that elections are won and lost in the GTA.

This phenomenon is important because it determines who and where matters in elections. Suburban voters do not simply enjoy the focus of campaigns, but they determine what the campaign is going to be about. This is evident in the party platforms. For example, the focus on suburban voters issues, such as housing, made housing a prominent issue for both the CPC and LPC in 2019 (Conservative Party of Canada, 2019; Liberal Party of Canada, 2019). These topics themselves are not inherently problematic, but what is problematic is a select few determining what issues are relevant. Critics may push back and claim that suburban voters exist across Canada and that these issues have trans-regional appeal. Therefore this is not problematic, because Canadians across the country are setting the agenda. I refute this claim by emphasizing that this phenomenon also determines which regions matter. The 905 has a larger population than11 of the 13 provinces and territories and this gives it more representation than those provinces (StatsCan, 2016). While we do not vote by province or territory it is still crucial to recognize that one region in Canada wields a lot of political power. This allows for issues that may be central or even existential to some provinces to be overlooked without any significant political backlash. This can shut a large portion of Canada out of the political process.

Conclusion

The topic of suburban voters is not simply a matter of where and who parties target, but a critical discussion in how power is distributed in Canada. Therefore, scholarship should pick up on this issue and deepen its analysis. This chapter did not get to explore the conceptions of suburban in great detail. Doing so would further our understanding of this demographic that wields immense power. From this so should the question of what kind of policy and political marketing resonates with these voters be explored, to further our understanding of which issues are crucial to winning elections. As well, an analysis should also be made into other groups of persuadable voters in Canada to broaden our understanding of who matters in elections.

References

Bell, Colin. 1968. Middle Class Families : Social and Geographical Mobility. International Library of Sociology. the Sociology of Gender and the Family. Vol. 13. London: Routledge. https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9780203001462.

Bittner, Amanda. 2007. "The Effects of Information and Social Cleavages: Explaining Issue Attitudes and Vote Choice in Canada." Canadian Journal of Political Science 40 (4): 935- 968. doi:10.1017/S000842390707117X. https://www- cambridgeorg.login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/core/article/effects-of-information-and- socialcleavages-explaining-issue-attitudes-and-vote-choice- incanada/7423C65399596999D896437B41594122.

Bodet, Marc André. 2013. "Strongholds and Battlegrounds: Measuring Party Support Stability in Canada." Canadian Journal of Political Science 46 (3): 575-596. doi:10.1017/S000842391300067X. https://www-cambridgeorg.login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/core/article/strongholds-and- battlegroundsmeasuring-party-support-stability-in-canada/A96895B4B71690E4BB13C2C99AF68B2F.

Conservative Party of Canada. 2008. The True North Strong and Free. Retrieved October 21 2019, from PolTex.

Conservative Party of Canada. 2011. Here For Canada. Retrieved October 21 2019, from PolTex.

Conservative Party of Canada. 2011. Our Plan to Protect the Economy. Retrieved October 21 2019, from PolTex.

Conservative Party of Canada. 2019. It’s Time For You To Get Ahead. Retrieved October 21 2019, from PolTex.

CPAC. "Follow the Leader. in CPACVote2019.", accessed Oct 21, 2019, https://www.cpac.ca/en/2019leadersmap /?_ga=2.174026595.1162341745.1574894583- 1728453280.1573496131.

Grossman, Lawrence S. 1963. "“Safe” Seats: The Rural-Urban Pattern in Ontario." Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 29 (3): 367-371. doi:10.2307/139222. https://www- cambridge-org.login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/core/article/safe-seats-theruralurban-pattern-in- ontario/AFB29F4F6041723F0F50229ED85B4D5D.

Henderson, Ailsa. 2004. "Regional Political Cultures in Canada." Canadian Journal of Political Science 37 (3): 595-615. doi:10.1017/S0008423904030707. https://www- cambridgeorg.login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/core/article/regional-political-cultures- incanada/A4EA52D0A5EA187B85F78DF7C9F1BDCC.

Liberal Party of Canada. (2008). Richer, Fairer, Greener. Retrieved October 21, 2019, from PolTex.

Liberal Party of Canada. (2011). Your Family your Future. Retrieved October 21, 2019, from PolTex.

Liberal Party of Canada. (2015). Strong Middle Class. Retrieved October 21, 2019, from PolTex.

Liberal Party of Canada. (2019). Forward, a Plan For The Middle Class. Retrieved October 21, 2019, from PolTex.

New Democratic Party. (2008). A Prime Minister on Your Family’s Side, For a Change. Retrieved October 21, 2019, from PolTex.

New Democratic Party. (2011). Giving your Family a Break. Retrieved October 21, 2019, from PolTex.

New Democratic Party. (2015). Building a Country of Your Dreams. Retrieved October 21, 2019, from PolTex.

New Democratic Party. (2019). A New Deal for People. Retrieved October 21, 2019, from PolTex.

Pratt, Geraldine. 1987. "Class, Home, and Politics." Canadian Review of Sociology/Revue Canadienne De Sociologie 24 (1): 39-57. doi:10.1111/j.1755-618X.1987.tb01070.x. https://doi- org.login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/10.1111/j.1755-618X.1987.tb01070.x

Rashed, Tarek and Carsten Juergens. 2010. Remote Sensing of Urban and Suburban Areas. Remote Sensing and Digital Image Processing. Vol. 10. Dordrecht ;London: Springer. http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-1-4020-4385-7.

Roy, Jason, Andrea M. L. Perrella, and Joshua Borden. 2015. "Rural, Suburban and Urban Voters: Dissecting Residence Based Voter Cleavages in Provincial Elections." Canadian Political Science Review 9 (1): 112-127. http://login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx ?direct=true&db=poh&AN=112084917&site=ehost-live&scope=site.

Tom Flanagan. 2010. "Campaign Strategy: Triage and the Concentration of Resources." In Election, 327. Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications.

Walks, R. Alan. 2005. "The City-Suburban Cleavage in Canadian Federal Politics." Canadian Journal of Political Science 38 (2): 383-413. doi:10.1017/S0008423905030842. https://www- cambridge-org.login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/core/article/citysuburbancleavage-in-canadian- federal-politics/C93E04896009CFAB6918D8B9E0693A6C.

Walks, R. Alan. 2004. "Place of Residence, Party Preferences, and Political Attitudes in Canadian Cities and Suburbs." Journal of Urban Affairs 26 (3): 269-295. doi:10.1111/j.0735- 2166.2004.00200.x. https://doi-org.login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/10.1111/j.0735- 2166.2004.00200.x.

POLITICAL SCIENCE UNDERGRADUATE REVIEW

VOL. 4 Winter 2020 ARTICLE 4

Youth Enfranchisement: A Case For A More Democratic Canada

By Leonard Patterson

Abstract

Despite granting its citizens universal suffrage, Canada continues to experience declining numbers in voter turnout (Library of Parliament 2010, 1-4). As fewer Canadians choose to participate in the electoral process, the very foundations of liberal democracy come into question as the legitimacy of a government elected by a dwindling number of supporters becomes increasingly unclear. While the topic of electoral reform is dominated by the debate over proportional representation versus the first-past-the-post system, this paper instead focuses on the legal voting age. I contend that lowering the voting age from 18 to 16 in Canada will create a more equitable, fair, and inclusive electoral system, thus strengthening fundamental democratic values. In this essay, I will discuss how the current system is unfairly excluding youth from participating in decisions that affect their future, why the argument for maintaining the current age is flawed, and how a lower voting age would increase political interest and create a more engaged electorate.

Introduction

A cornerstone of liberal democracy in Canada is the right to fair and free elections. Despite granting its citizens universal suffrage, Canada continues to experience declining numbers in voter turnout (Library of Parliament 2010, 1-4). As fewer Canadians choose to participate in the electoral process, the very foundations of liberal democracy come into question as the legitimacy of a government elected by a dwindling number of supporters becomes increasingly unclear. As academics, politicians, and government search for the antidote to voter apathy, many look to electoral reform. In Canada, the topic of electoral reform is dominated by the debate over proportional representation versus the first-past-the-post system. While this is a worthy debate, I will instead focus on a much less discussed issue: the legal voting age. As democracies around the world look for new ways to reinvigorate their electorate, countries like Austria and Germany have lowered their voting age to 16 in an attempt to catalyze political interest (Peto 2018, 278). I contend that lowering the voting age from 18 to 16 in Canada will create a more equitable, fair, and inclusive electoral system, thus strengthening fundamental democratic values. In this essay, I will discuss how the current system is unfairly excluding youth from participating in decisions that affect their future, why the argument for maintaining the current age is flawed, and how a lower voting age would increase political interest and create a more engaged electorate.

Many of the most pressing issues that our nation faces are inherently intergenerational–that is, the decisions made today will be most felt by younger generations. I will examine the case study of climate change to illustrate the complexity of intergenerational issues, as it will disproportionately affect young Canadians. While there have been attempts by government to mitigate climate change, the drastic transformations required are often “rejected on the grounds that they cost too much, and that those who pay for them will not reap any of the benefits” (Wolf 2009, 350). On the other hand, many youth argue that not taking immediate and bold action is unjust and is unfairly shifting the burden onto future generations (351). So when should climate action happen and who should bear the cost? The case of Greta Thunberg illustrates the need for a more nuanced look at this question. Frustrated by her government’s inaction against climate change, 16-year-old Swedish climate activist Greta Thunberg began skipping school on Friday afternoons to hold a protest at the Swedish parliament. Thunberg’s one-person strike has since snowballed into an international movement with thousands of students across the world joining in weekly strikes to demand immediate climate action. Thunberg’s message is clear: the current generation of decision-makers is disproportionately shifting the burden of climate change onto future generations(Thunberg 2019, 175). Furthermore, the current political system is unfairly excluding youth from having an equal say in the outcome of their future. By preventing youth from voting, the current electoral system is preventing an entire generation from participating in decisions that will have long-lasting effects on their futures. Without a voice in the political system, youth like Thunberg instead take to the streets, skipping school every Friday to urge world leaders to heed the message of a generation that is being disenfranchised by the current political system. Reducing the voting age from 18 to 16 will allow youth to have a fair say in the outcome of their future and ensure a more democratic and equitable electoral system.

The movement ignited by Thunberg also counters the common assumption that teenagers lack the knowledge and maturity required to make an informed political decision (Peto 2018, 278). This assumption is widespread. For example, Chan and Clayton argue that since “16-and 17-year olds have less political knowledge than their elders, and because knowledge is normatively relevant for political maturity, . . . 16-and 17-year-olds are too politically immature to vote” (280). While many dismiss the validity of Thunberg’s views because of her age, anyone who has attended a Fridays For Future rally can attest to the astounding competency by which the teenagers in attendance speak about science, the environment, and the importance of fairness and justice in our society. I assert that while having a base level of knowledge is important, we are on tenuous ground when we deny teens the right to vote by arguing that they are not politically mature.

While there are many different definitions of political maturity, Chan and Clayton define it as “propositional knowledge of the political system, of what voting means, and how voting works, as well as social scientific knowledge and knowledge of current affairs” (Peto 2018, 280). If knowledge of politics is the criteria by which we allow citizens to vote, then it stands that precocious teens should be granted suffrage. If teenagers are required to have a certain level of political fluency to vote, then shouldn’t adults have to meet the same requirements? Surely, adults who fail to meet the requirements should have their voting rights revoked on the grounds that they are not politically mature. While this line of argument is purely conjecture, it illustrates an important point: denying teens the right to vote based on grounds of political maturity is inherently flawed and undemocratic. Chan and Clayton’s failure to take into account that using knowledge as a means to judge political maturity creates an inequitable, two-tier voting system that would result in a collapse of democratic values. While I don’t claim to have the answer to this issue, I believe that granting Canadians the right to vote based on knowledge and maturity is unconstitutional. Another common view espoused by proponents of the status quo is that teenagers are apathetic about politics and therefore, don’t have any interest in voting (Zeglovitsand Zandonella 2013, 1084). To this, Zeglovits and Zandonellaask the question: “why would teens be interested in a subject that they’re not allowed to participate in, especially one that doesn’t reflect their interests or concerns?” (1084) I believe that granting teens the right to vote will increase their awareness of political issues, reinvigorate youth interest in politics, and create a more inclusive political system that gives equal attention to the concerns of youth. In Canada, interest in political matters has been falling in recent decades with only 39 percent of adults between the ages of 18-24 voting in the 2011 federal election (Elections Canada 2018). Clearly, the issue of voter apathy extends much further than 16-and 17-yearolds. Low voter turnout in youth is often dismissed as being the result of the life-cycle effect, a term used to describe the upward trend in voter turn-out that is accompanied by an increase in age (Library of Parliament 2010, 4). However, a report by Elections Canada shows that the voter turnout for current generations is so low that there is no guarantee they will follow the upward trend predicted by the lifecycle effect (4). This lack of interest has many worried about the long-lasting effects of an entire generation that is disillusioned with politics.

So what is causing such low interest? Niemi and Hepburn’s review of the literature surrounding adult political behaviour shows that the most critical period for developing an interest in politics is between the ages of 14 and 25 (Niemi and Hepburn 1995, 9). By this calculation, the current vote age is much too high. By 18, youth are almost halfway through their most informative years for political development and are much less likely to become interested in politics at this age. The case of Austria supports this argument: since lowering its voting age to 16 in 2007, research shows that given the right to vote, teens develop a newfound sense of duty and responsibility to become informed on political issues (Peto 2018, 283). In a separate study, Zeglovits and Zandonella (2013, 1098) drew the same conclusion, adding that early enfranchisement may cause greater interest in politics later in life. In addition to increasing youth engagement, a lower voting age would force politicians to pay greater attention to the concerns of younger voters. As politicians vie for the support of this new demographic, we would see an upshot in new policies and legislation aimed directly at younger generations. This change would create a positive feedback loop where the creation of youth-centred policies feed a growing number of younger voters.

Conclusion The question of lowering the voting age continues to be hotly debated, meanwhile, diminishing numbers of citizens choose to participate in the political process. At the root of this discontent is a fading commitment to democratic values among young adults who feel ignored, betrayed, and frustrated with a political system that is disproportionately ignoring their concerns. Lowering the voting age from 18 to 16 would restore equal rights to youth and would invite them to participate in a decision-making process from which they have long been excluded. Further, despite repudiation from critics, evidence shows a lower age would increase political interest and create a more engaged electorate. Granting enfranchisement to youth would be a great step towards achieving a more equitable, fair, and inclusive electoral system.

References

Library of Parliament. 2010. Youth Voter Turnout in Canada: 1. Trends and Issues. (Publication No. 2010- 19-E). Author: Andre Barnes. https://lop.parl.ca/content/lop/TeachersInstitute/YouthVoterTurnoutinCanada.pdf Niemi, Richard G.,and Mary A. Hepburn. 1995. “The rebirth of political socialization.” Perspectives on Political Science 24(1), 7-16. doi: 10.1080/10457097.1995.9941860. Peto, Tommy. 2018. “Why the voting age should be lowered to 16.” Politics, Philosophy & Economics 17(3), 277–297. doi: 10.1177/1470594X17705651. Thunberg, Greta. 2019. “You Did Not Act in Time.” Vital Speeches of the Day 85(6), 174–175. Retrieved from https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=136738333&site=edslive&scope= site Elections Canada. 2018. Voter Turnout by Age Group. Retrieved from https://www.elections.ca/content.aspx?section=res&dir=rec/eval/pes2015/vtsa&document= table1&lang=e Wolf, Clark. 2009. “Intergenerational Justice, Human Needs,and Climate Policy.” In Intergenerational justice, edited by A. Gosseriesand L. H. Meyer, 349-373. doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199282951.001.0001 Zeglovits, Eva,and Martina Zandonella. 2013. “Political interest ofadolescents before and after lowering the voting age: the case of Austria.” Journal of Youth Studies 16(8), 1084-1104. doi: 10.1080/13676261.2013.793785. POLITICAL SCIENCE UNDERGRADUATE REVIEW VOL. 5 Winter 2020 ARTICLE 6

The Influence of Media in the Evolution of Canadian Political Parties

By Madelaine Ware

The types of political parties in Canada have drastically changed over the last 150 years, and so too has the dominant forms of media. My research explores the role the media has played in the evolution of the Canadian party system, and attempts to answer the question: How has media contributed to the changes in the party system over time, and how has it facilitated a shift between the types of parties? The federal system has seen elite parties, mass parties and brokerage parties, and the market-oriented party, and my research examines how the media has influenced the way parties communicate their platform and policies with the electorate. As well, I explore the dominant types and modes of media present in each type of party system: from newspapers, to the introduction of broadcast radio, to television, to the recent phenomena of social media. Media influence is the most significant factor in the evolution of the Canadian party system, as it is the primary vehicle for the delivery of information to Canadian citizens.

Introduction

The party system in Canada has drastically changed since Confederation, and so too has the dominant forms of media. The ability of the Canadian media to interact and influence citizens is significant in the current age of social media, but media influence has been of import since the beginning of the Canadian political system. Indeed, the media has played a central role in the evolution of party systems in Canada, and this research attempts to answer how technological advances in media spawned changes to the Canadian party system over time. Being the primary vehicle for the delivery of information to Canadian citizens, mainstream media and its influence is the most significant factor in the evolution of the Canadian party system, and has facilitated a shift in the types of parties between the party system eras.

Literature Review

The work of Dan Azoulay (1999) and Carty, Cross and Young (2000) overlap in that they both recognize the first period of political communications is marked by partisan newspapers. Azoulay goes into more depth as he discusses specific publications and how they reflected the interests and agenda of the competing political parties. However, Carty, Cross and Young (2000) examine the first party system further as they discuss ways that politicians of the time would seek to attract media attention.

Also, Carty, Cross and Young (2000) provide an in depth look at the media, particularly broadcast radio, of the second party system. Tanguay and Gagnon discuss how the third party system is marked by the onset of television, and its ability to reach into every household. Although from different party systems, the two works can be considered similarly, as they both discuss the ability of political parties to reach a broader audience. It is the work of Khayyam Zev Paltiel (1996) w ho examines how the mechanics of political marketing and mass communication have contributed to the erosion of party infrastructures. It is noted that scholarly works addressing the advent of social media are limited, as social media is a relatively new phenomenon; research on how social media influences the party system is lacking.

William Cross, and C arty, Cross and Young argue that there is a fourth party system in Canada from 1993 onwards, influenced by new computer based communication technologies. Cross examines the recent phenomenon of “narrowcasting,” while Carty, Cross and Young’s work, published in 2000 focuses more on the impact of the internet, use of emailing and democratic dialing. Carty, Cross and Young discuss at length tracking polls and electronic voter files, and they acknowledge that more sophisticated technologies will be used in the future.

When considering the types of political parties that have historically marked the party systems in the Canadian federal political scene, it is important to define what a party system is. Alex Marland and Jared J. Wesley (2016) present that a party system can be defined as “a particular constellation of political parties guided by a unique framework of behaviour” (351). In the Canadian federal context, Marland and Wesley (2016) further posit that while the start and end dates of the party systems in Canada are disputable, they suggest the following framework for the Canadian party system: “1867 to 1917 - first party system era; 1921 to 1957 - second party system era; 1962 to 1993 - third party system era; 2011 onward - fourth party system era” (353). While the transition periods are marked by a host of social and economic developments in society, among other factors, Carty, Cross and Young (2000) identify that when considering campaign communications in the first three party systems, “the transition periods marking the adoption of new technological techniques roughly coincide with the transition periods for party systems, as changes in party activity have largely paralleled the introduction of new communication technologies” (181). Herein lies the preeminent thought underpinning the thesis of this paper: that it is in fact changing technologies in large part, adapted for political use, that marks the shift in party systems, resulting in the transformation of Canadian political parties.

For the purpose of this paper, the definitions of the political parties as discussed are defined below.

Table: Canadian Political Parties Findings

Media in the First Party System

The first party system in Canada, according to Dan Azoulay, (1999, 52) is “distinguished by several main themes, among them the emergence of national parties, [and] the remarkable stability of the party system.” The emergent national parties - Liberals and Conservatives, are “elite” parties, and are to be considered, as reported by Marland and Wesley (2016, 341) “closed cadres of the upper class.” The party system of the time was dominated by white, wealthy, land-owning males. During this first party system political communication took place in the absence of national media, as Carty, Cross and Young (2000, 181) report and that “without national newspapers, television, or radio, the parties and their leaders were dependent upon personal contact to convey their messages to voters.” In May of 1884, Sir John A. Macdonald (1884, Library and Archives Canada) addressed electors of Toronto in an amphitheatre:

“Sir John Macdonald: Yes; as a friend says behind me, a larger crowd; because, thanks to the N.P., Toronto has grown larger, the population has increased, you are all richer, you have better looking hats (laughter) and better looking coats. (cheers and laughter) And, I really must say as a bloated aristocrat and office-holder, that I myself am not a bit the worse for my three year's salary. (renewed laughter)”

The immediacy of a public speech, and the camaraderie it invited is apparent in the jocular exchange with a group of electors Macdonald addressed. That he himself recognizes his own elite status and privilege, as well as the status of the group he addresses, highlights the restrictive nature of the elite political parties in the first party system.

It is within this context that partisan newspapers, backed by one or other of the elite parties, become the primary media tool in the delivery of information to the electorate; partisan newspapers were of utmost importance to political leaders, as it allowed them to disseminate their message and platform to a larger audience. That the partisan papers were closely integrated with the parties and leaders themselves is apparent in light of George Brown’s (1867, The Globe) Confederation Day editorial in The Globe, where his article celebrating Confederation included: “As a not uninfluential organ of public opinion, we may be pardoned for claiming that The Globe has contributed, in some degree at least, to the successful result over which we this day rejoice.” As he sees it, The Globe itself shares in the success of bringing Confederation to fruition. This era of elite party stability transitioned however, as Dan Azoulay (1999, 62) notes, “the party press was losing its usefulness . . . as voters increasingly turned to the many independent papers that appeared after 1900.” With the advent of new technologies in printing, coinciding with growing rates of literacy, newspapers transitioned to advertisement based “penny press.” As Marland and Wesley (2016, 437) further explain, as readership grew, “this increased the expectation for non-partisan news, and by the early twentieth century, the party press was fading away.” Elite parties were forced to change along with the social and technological developments of the day, resulting in a transition to mass parties of the second party system.

Media in the Second Party System

There were several factors at play simultaneously as elite parties of the first party system gave way to the mass parties that mark the era of the second party system, and the role emerging media technology played in this transition is crucial. As Dan Azoulay (1999, 59-61) presents, the election of 1911, the start of the First World War, and the “decline of traditional ‘partyism’” all contributed to the significant change in the Canadian party system. This decline of traditional “partyism” brings the elite parties to an ideological convergence where, as Dan Azoulay (1999, 61) further presents, “party leaders realized that only moderate, middle-of-the-road “brokerage” parties able to accommodate a variety of groups and regions under one roof could hope to form a government.” Within this growing demographic, along with female suffrage by 1918, the advent of radio as a form of political communication is significant.

As social changes in the country were occurring, radio gave party leaders the ability to communicate simultaneously with voters throughout various communities (Carty, et al., 2000). Political parties could now campaign and broadcast their messages to more people in a region, without relying on the face-to-face interactions that marked the prior party system. Radio created a bridge for political messaging that was previously unavailable, engaging more of the electorate in federal politics. In a radio broadcast speech of May 30, 1945, Mackenzie King (1945, CBC Digital Archives) appeals to Canadians as he seeks re-election: “Today we face a greater opportunity than ever before - to advance the cause of social reform.” The shifted emphasis from appealing to other land-owning elites to societal reform is evident in this excerpt. As a medium of political communication, radio broadcasting was able to promote and bolster the goals of the mass parties of the second party system era in Canadian politics.

Media in the Third Party System

The advent of television was instrumental in facilitating the change from mass parties to brokerage parties that characterize the third party system. Brokerage parties can be considered, according to Marland and Wesley (2016, 344) Canada’s “shock absorbers'' as they seek to “reconcile the wide variety of regional interests found in Canadian society.” Pan-Canadian politics was emerging in the 3rd party system, and as the shift from regional to national parties took hold, so did the NDP party as Canada’s third federal party. As televisions appeared in homes across the country, this medium of communication continued what radio broadcasting had established - an immediate link with vast numbers of the electorate. Khayyam Zev Paltiel in Canadian Parties in Transition (1996, 406) illuminates the impact television had, as it can “bring the national leaders directly into the homes of the electorate.” With television, the persona of the leader was immediately realizable; the images of party leaders became a priority, and political parties quickly recognized the potential to reach a new source of support. A 1968 television clip from the Archives of Ontario, (Footage of Pierre Trudeau election coverage, 2017) depicts Trudeaumania - the nickname given to the enthusiasm that was generated around the young Pierre Trudeau, and TV stations were able to capture and broadcast the event. The role television media plays in this party transformation must thus be considered significant; parties and their leaders were now reaching out to all Canadians. As seen on the leaders debate coverage of CBC’s The National, (1988, CBC Archives) Prime Minister Brian Mulroney debates John Turner over the negotiated free trade agreement with the United States; in defending his actions, he appeals: “You do not have a monopoly on patriotism . . . I believe that in my own modest way I am nation building, because I believe this benefits Canada, and I love Canada!” Televised leaders’ debates had become a way for Canadians to interpret the leadership of party leaders, and nationally televised coverage of campaigns served to cement elections as a national event. (Carty et al., 2000, 184)

Media in the Fourth Party System

At the onset of the 21st century, Canadian society witnessed an evolution in media technology that has promoted drastic change in the federal party system and the parties themselves. The fourth party system emerged after the 1993 federal election where Jean Chretien’s Liberal Party won a strong majority, but the period immediately following saw the emergence of regional parties, including the Bloc Quebecois and the Reform Party. It is in this period of multipartyism that new and pervasive media becomes entrenched in society: digital technology.

Digital technology can be divided into Web. 1.0 - the Internet; e-mail; and other technologies that according to Cross (2004, 119) include electronic voter files and automated calling machines and operators, and Web 2.0 - largely social media technologies, including Twitter, Facebook, Instagram and blogging. Digital technology has impacted political parties, as they now have immediate, precise and detailed information on the electorate. This has forced a change in how parties communicate and campaign, and society today is witnessing the emergence of a new type of political party, the market- oriented party. As Stromback, Lees-Marshment and Rudd (2016, 3) observe, parties may be moving toward the market-oriented model, where “the use of targeting new markets and . . . a move away from selling ideologically driven policy” is becoming more prevalent. The availability of voter information has allowed parties to use new campaign strategies and modes of communication, including narrowcasting, which is, according to William Cross (2004, 131), “the sending of tailored messages to specific groups of voters.”. The public is engaged as never before and market-oriented parties strive to provide messages tailored to their targeted audience, rather than sell their own ideologies.

As the electorate embraces changing and emerging technologies, so too must parties and politicians, in order to remain relevant. Following the newest social media trend Tik Tok, Jagmeet Singh (2019, Oct. 17) utilized the technology to appeal to younger voters by posting a video in which he expresses “who he’s in it for.” His meme garnered 1.3 million views within a day, and drew praise from even his opponents. This is one of the many examples that prove that the immediacy and effectiveness of digital media cannot be overstated. Small, Giasson and Marland (2014, 5) present political communication in today’s digital age as “a triangular process that includes political institutions and actors, the news media, and importantly, citizens . . . It is the interactions between these three groups that matter in political communication.” How the fourth party system will evolve within ongoing and emerging digital technologies, will be an exciting new chapter in the Canadian political realm.

Discussion

It is apparent through this research that mass media today, including a significant number of digital technologies, is opening political engagement to more people, and more importantly to younger people. As evidenced, media technology in the fourth party system gives an intimate look into the lives of our political leaders (which are the faces of political parties) and makes them more transparent, and importantly, relatable. The ability for political parties, because of digital technologies, to engage as never before with the electorate impacts the party system in Canada. As it has been noted, the trend today is for many parties to be moving toward a market-oriented model, where parties will be likely to use advanced technologies to not only discern what the electorate wants, but to deliver a party platform and leader that will adapt to those wants. Will the ever-evolving technologies cause the party system to become less stable, as historically media technologies endured for significant time? As well, it is younger Canadians that embrace changing technologies more readily, and the possibility for media marketing technology to engage with a younger electorate, may contribute to a less stable party system as well. The future of the Canadian party system will be significantly influenced by media technologies.

Conclusion

The Canadian party system has evolved since Confederation, along with changing technologies and modes of media. It has been, in fact, the dynamic changes in media that have impacted shifts in the party system, and in Canadian political parties themselves. Media has progressed from the partisan press of the late 19th century to digital technologies today that invite political engagement at unprecedented levels. What has not changed is the power that the media and news press plays in the Canadian political scene; it has been, and always will be, the primary agent for the delivery and receipt of political communication, and as such must be considered the most significant factor in the changes evidenced in the party system in Canada.

References

ARCHIVED - Macdonald-Speeches-Toronto, May 30, 1881-First Among Equals. Accessed November 18, 2019. https://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/primeministers/h4-4035-e.html.

Azoulay, Dan, eds. 1999. Canadian Political Parties. York University, Toronto Canada: Irwin Publishing.

“Betting on Free Trade in '88 Election - CBC Archives.” CBCnews. CBC/Radio Canada. Accessed November 16, 2019. https://www.cbc.ca/archives/entry/betting-on-free-trade-in-88-election.

“CFPL-TV, Footage of Pierre Trudeau election campaign.” 1968. Produced from the Archives of Ontario, Sept. 15, 2017. Youtube Video, 1:30. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5XRp1eW_tHc

Cross, William. 2004. Political Parties. Vancouver: UBC Press.

Carty, R. Kenneth, William Cross, and Lisa Young. 2000. Rebuilding Canadian Party Politics. UBC Press.

Gagnon, Alain-G, and A. Brian Tanguay, eds. 1996. Canadian Parties in Transition. 2nd ed. Toronto: Nelson Canada.

Giasson, Thierry, Alexander J. Marland, and Tamara A Small. 2014. Political Communication in Canada: Meet the Press and Tweet the Rest. Vancouver: UBC Press.

“King for Prime Minister - CBC Archives.” CBCnews. CBC/Radio Canada. Accessed November 14, 2019. https://www.cbc.ca/archives/entry/king-for-prime-minister.

Marland, Alexander J., and Jared J. Wesley. 2016. Inside Canadian Politics. Oxford University Press.

“NDP Leader Takes Federal Election to TikTok: Watch News Videos Online.” Global News, October 18, 2019. https://globalnews.ca/video/6049392/ndp-leader-takes-federal-election-to-tiktok.

Richard Cole/the Globe And Mail; Capital Press Service. “The Globe on Confederation Day: Read the Fine Print of George Brown's 1867 Letter to a New Nation.” The Globe and Mail, November 12, 2017. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/canada-150/globe-confederation- day-edition/ar ticle35407019/.

Singh, Jagmeet (@jagmeetsingh). 2019. “Just a cutie pie munchkin I met in New Brunswick #elxn43.” Instagram. September 25, 2019. https://www.instagram.com/p/B22yM5VnAhB/?utm_source=ig_web_copy_link

Stromback, Jesper, Jennifer Lees-Marshment, and Chris Rudd. “Political Party Market Orientation in a Global Perspective.” Routledge Handbook of Political Marketing: 1-26. Trudeau, Justin (@JustinTrudeau). 2017. “To those fleeing persecution, terror and war, Canadians will welcome you, regardless of faith. Diversity is our strength #WelcomeToCanada.” Twitter, January 28, 2017, 1.20pm. https://twitter.com/justintrudeau/status/825438460265762816?lang=en

POLITICAL SCIENCE UNDERGRADUATE REVIEW

VOL. 5 Winter 2020 ARTICLE 7

The Effects of Modern Data Analytics in Electoral Politics: Cambridge Analytica’s Suppression of Voter Agency and the Implications for Global Politics

By Evan Oddleifson

Introduction

Each technological revolution, such as the advent of radio, television, the internet, and social media, has informed how politics and people engage in democratic processes. The Kennedy-Nixon presidential debate became the focal point of one such revolution when radio listeners and television viewers were perceived to be divided on the outcome of the debate. To explain this, later research suggested that television viewers weighed personality, rather than policy, more heavily than radio listeners (Gershon 2016). This changed how voters chose candidates and thus how those candidates campaigned - it changed politics. Moreover, it highlighted the importance of technology in politics. This issue has proven itself perennial, and has today reached a point where the technologies of persuasion have become so capable that their use has been construed as information warfare by senior US national security officials (Cadwalladr 2018), and as a credible cyber-threat.

This paper maps the impacts of this modern technological revolution on individual, national and global politics. Specifically, this paper examines the effects of social media driven data analytics on voter micro targeting and electoral politics using Cambridge Analytica’s (CA) involvement in the 2016 US Presidential election and the 2010 Trinidad and Tobago General election to illuminate the electoral strategies and outcomes associated with their use of new data analytical processes. It hypothesizes that, if unchecked, the voter targeting technologies employed by Cambridge Analytica erodes voter agency. This could have many spin off effects, however, this paper argues that it will likely embolden populism in the US and similarly democratic states as well as encouraging a withdrawal from globalism and economic integration more generally.

This paper is organized into three sections. The first defines data analytics and other key concepts in the context of this paper. The second is a case study of Cambridge Analytica’s activities whose aim is to demonstrate that the voter targeting strategies that Cambridge Analytica developed in 2014 and 2015 are substantially more effective than previously existing strategies and thereby pose a greater threat to individual political agency. The third section discusses the relationship between voter agency and politics on a national and global scale.

Definitions and Context

Individualized and personalized data are terms to describe data that is tied to a specific and identifiable person. Unlike data collected through scientific and focus group study, personalized data can be used to target individuals rather than demographic groups. This allows for a far more granular approach political persuasion, whereby demographics can be sub-sectioned into smaller, more internally similar targets. This form of application of personalized data is called micro targeting.

Data analytics is broadly defined as the processing of data into usable conclusions about anything for which we collect data. However, in this paper, data analytics refers specifically to the processing of individualized personal data from sources such as Facebook, MasterCard, Google, and AT&T among others, and compiled by companies such as Cambridge Analytica, Axciom, and Oracle. The personalized data industry has primarily served commercial marketers who, for example, use Oracle’s services to better target potential customers. However, it is the relatively recent breakthroughs in data processing methodologies and applications of these technologies in political campaigns that gives cause for this paper’s examination of the subject.

Cambridge Analytica’s inception and involvement in the U.S. and Trinidad and Tobago

Political campaigns have been targeting “swing” states and voters for quite some time. However, since the Bush W. presidency, data analytics has taken a significantly more prominent to role in refining this strategy. This is owed in no small part to the emergence of social media and the vast expansion of individualized data collection and its availability. Furthermore, unlike television and internet news sites, social media provides a platform on which individualized ad campaigns can be brought to highly granularized audiences. During the 2016 US presidential election, Cambridge Analytica ran an estimated 4,000 distinct advertising campaigns each tailored specifically to a small, persuadable, and relatively homogeneous group of people (Persily 2017).

Founded by Steve Bannon and billionaire political activist Robert Mercer, Cambridge Analytica was a subsidiary of the SCL Group who self-describe as a "global election management agency" but whose defense arm specialized in “psychological warfare” (psyops) and “informational dominance” and held contracts with UK and US defense agencies (Cadwalladr, 2018). Methodologically, the company was based upon groundbreaking personality research from the Cambridge department of psychology titled: “Computer-based personality judgments are more accurate than those made by humans” (Youyou, Kosinski, and Stillwell 2015). Many security organizations showed significant interest in this research and its accompanying dataset, with Boeing and DARPA both ending up supporting the work of one of the study's original authors (Cadwalladr 2018).

Though Cambridge Analytica has tried to obfuscate their involvement in many political campaigns, most notably Leave.EU, two former high ranking employees, Research Director for the SCL group Christopher Wylie, and CA Director of program development Brittany Kaiser, have come forward as whistleblowers speaking before US and UK senate committees. Their testimonies have shed light on the internal motivations and activities of Cambridge Analytica and SCL, both of which are relevant to understanding the relationship CA shares with electoral politics.

Wylie, who worked personally with Steve Bannon, the CEO of Breitbart and chief campaign strategist for Trump, and was one of the data scientists primarily responsible for the creation of CA’s targeting tools, alleges that Bannon and co-founder Mercer sought to bring established military methodology regarding informations operations to data analytics. The reason for this, as Wylie puts it, was Bannon’s desire to change U.S. politics:

“When Bannon uses the term culture war he uses it pointedly and they were seeking out companies that could build an arsenal of informational weapons that could fight that war, which is why they went to a British military contractor which specialized in information operations.” (Judiciary Committee 2018)

Indeed, Bannon has argued publicly in support for populism. For example, at the Munk debate titled The Rise of Populism, he argued for economic nationalism, a withdrawal from globalism, and importantly, “the deconstruction of the administrative state” (2018). Furthermore, pre-debate, when asked by the debate host why he thinks his and Trump’s populist movement in the US will be more durable than previous populist movements Bannon answers by saying: “because we won social media” (2018). This suggests that Cambridge Analytica was founded not simply as a profit seeking enterprise but as a site for political activism, or more aptly, upheaval. It makes sense, then, that Wylie perceives CA as “a full scale propaganda machine” (The Great Hack 2019). Here, the first conclusion of this case study is that CA uses data analytics to further their own political agenda and not merely as a service to their clients in administering electoral politics. This is best exemplified by the parties with which CA partnered, most of whom were populist, including both Trump and Leave.EU. Brittany Kaiser also testified that she refused to meet with Marine Le Pen of France and the AfD party of Germany despite CA itself favorably viewing relations with them (Oral evidence: Fake News, HC 363 2018).

With the issue of ulterior motive and the co-option of data analytical tools qualified by this study of Cambridge Analytica’s origins and motives, this paper now seeks to quantify the potential impact of this tool by examining the effects of its application in the 2016 US presidential election. By comparing data from self-reported personality assessments with the Facebook data of according individuals, CA was able to find correlations that allowed them to construct psychological profiles of Facebook users based solely on their online activity. By applying this technique, CA claimed to be able to create more individualized advertising, which the CEO, Alexander Nix, described as the opposite of blanket advertising (Rathi 2019).

Some have argued that in sum, the CA’s actual ability to predict personality using Facebook data was weak (Rathi 2019) and that data analytics can do little to profoundly influence people until the technology progresses. However, since Trump’s election, other research has corroborated the effectiveness of advertising tools that use data driven psychological assessments like those pioneered by CA (Matz et al. 2017; Ward 2018). One such study showed that online commercial advertising that applied this microtargeting technique garnered 40% more clicks and 50% more sales than conventional targeted advertising (which uses your purchase history and online behavior to display relevant ads but does not create personality profiles on individuals) (Matz et al. 2017). This suggests that Cambridge Analytica’s methodology likely had a significantly greater effect compared with existing targeting

strategies during the time of the 2016 US presidential election. In this same paper, the authors note with gravity that such technologies “could be used to covertly exploit weaknesses in their character and persuade them to take action against their own best interest.” (Matz et.al. 2017)

Most people are likely unaware of the extent to which their advertising is psychologically personalized, which, coupled with the third-person effect - whereby people underestimate their susceptibility to advertising be it political or otherwise - creates an environment that makes detecting CA’s manipulative campaigns exceedingly difficult, thus reducing the individual's capacity for autonomous rationalization (Ward 2018). Brittany Kaiser further emphasizes the severity of CA’s methods in her testimony to the U.K. parliament saying: “I do know that their targeting tool used to be export controlled by the British government. So that would mean that the methodology was considered a weapon, weapons grade communications tactics.” (The Great Hack 2019)

While it is not possible to know fully the extent to which Cambridge Analytica’s involvement in the Trump Campaign contributed to its success, this case study suggests that its role was not trivial. It is true that political strategists have long been using focus groups and other tools to target and manipulate specific voters for political gain. However, as the tools of these strategies improve we must eventually ask where the line should be drawn. When the political arena moved from the radio to the television many lamented the fact that voting became more dependent on personality rather than policy. Today, we have reached a critical point where personality and emotion have been harnessed so effectively that voters are persuaded perhaps more than ever before to unwittingly vote (or not vote) without autonomous rational consideration of their own interests. Take Cambridge Analytica’s role in the 2010 Trinidad and Tobago General election for example. Alexander Nix, the CEO of CA described their involvement and impact therein as follows:

“We were working for the Indians, we went to the client and we said we want to target the youth and we want to try and increase apathy. The campaign had to be non- political, because the kids don't care about politics, it had to be reactive because they're lazy. So we came up with this campaign that was all about being part of the gang, doing something cool, being part of a movement, and it was called the “Do So” campaign. Do So, don't vote. It's a sign of resistance against not the government but politics and voting… We knew that when it came to voting all the afro Caribbean kids wouldn't vote, cause they Do So, but all the Indian kids would do what their parents told them to which, is to go out and vote… The difference in 18 to 35 year old turnout was like 40% and that swung the election about 6%, which was all we needed in an election that’s very close.” (The Great Hack 2019)

This statement makes explicit the threat to democracy that Cambridge Analytica’s approach and strategies pose, more so than any whistleblower’s testimony. Ultimately, Cambridge Analytica has pursued campaigns of voter suppression, inflammation, and misinformation all of which are designed to disorient, coerce, and take advantage of voters. There have always been political actors with mal intent like CA, however, the development of increasingly effective tools brings the issue to a head, where, if we wish to preserve voter agency we must monitor and constrain applications of data analytics in the democratic process.

Voter agency, national democracy, and international order

Though there is always a link between the lived political realities of individuals and the behavior of their governments on the world stage, that link is not always clear. To even define democracy is difficult, however, this section uses some methodological tools from the Economist Intelligence Unit’s (EIU) Democracy Index project to link the reduction in voter agency yielded by CA’s voter microtargeting to the democratic health of a state.

Firstly, one of the most heavily weighted questions in the EIU’s Democracy Index Report is “Whether national elections are free and fair” (Economist Intelligence Unit 2018). American political scientist Robert Dahl qualifies this in part with the criteria that “coercion is comparatively uncommon” and that voters have access to a reasonable quality and quantity of alternative sources of information (Dahl 1998). Through the case study of Cambridge Analytica, we see that data analytical microtargeting limits people's ability to act autonomously and rationally. In current U.S. politics, this can be described as a combination of friction and flooding (Roberts 2014), whereby internet users face an onslaught of targeted content that floods their various media feeds with distracting content that then decreases the proportional presence of alternative sources of information thereby creating friction to the access of that information. Brittany Kaiser describes this process saying: “We bombarded them through blogs, websites, articles, videos, ads, every platform you can imagine, until they saw the world the way we wanted them to” (The Great Hack 2019). These tactics violate both of Dahl’s stipulations by constraining access to alternative information through what are in essence coercive means. Here, CA’s strategies impede democracy on the national level.

On an international level this could have many consequences. To begin with, CA’s personality oriented strategies dictate that those susceptible to being influenced by fear, for example, will be fed fear. Since fear is most easily attributed to the ‘other,’ be it minorities, migrants or the political elite, it is likely that the proliferation of CA’s emotionally charged strategies could embolden anti-migrant and anti- neoliberal sentiments leading to a populist will to withdraw from globalism and alienation of immigrants.

One may argue that this view is unidimensional and that the personal and emotional basis of CA’s data analytical strategies may also have positive effects for those that respond better to positive emotion, such as people high in agreeableness. Unfortunately, while this may be true for select individuals, research in affective politics suggests that anger, disgust, and fear are more effective political mobilizers than other emotions (Weber 2013). This means that those emotions, as has been the case since before the internet, will likely be the most frequently deployed by data analytical microtargeting ad campaigns.

Secondly, if democracy is in fact undermined on the national level in places where firms like CA operate, it is likely that global politics will be increasingly characterized by instability. If Cambridge Analytica’s operations did actually support the Trump or Leave.EU victories then the world may have to prepare for more similar political upheavals. Like Alexander Nix says in reference to Trump’s victory: “If there's one singular takeaway from this event, that is that these sorts of technologies can make a huge difference and will continue to do so for many years to come.” (The Great Hack 2019)

In sum, the data analytical methodologies for microtargeting individual personalities developed and implemented by Cambridge Analytica are powerful tools of manipulation. They undermine individual agency and rational choice and consequently ail democracy on the national level. Furthermore, due to their basis in personality psychology, their deployment of emotional messaging is more impactful than previous methods, which is likely to result in the increased effectiveness of fear and anger-based political mobilization. This may have run off effects internationally, causing the alienation of migrants and elites, emboldening isolationist immigration policies and a withdrawal from neo-liberal economic globalization. International democratic norms may also suffer as democracies lose standing with regards to freedom from coercion and access to varied and alternative information. With all their expanded capabilities, it is more important now than it has been since before the Second World War that powerful political influencers be held in check and forced to observe the democratic value of the people. As Christopher Wylie puts it:

“If you do not respect the agency of people, anything you do after that point is not conducive to democracy.” (The Great Hack 2019)

References

Cadwalladr, Carole. "The Cambridge Analytica Files." The Guardian, March 18, 2018. http://davelevy.info/Downloads/cabridgeananalyticafiles -theguardian_20180318.pdf.

Dahl, Robert. “On Democracy”. New Haven: Yale University Press, (1998).

"Democracy Index 2018: Me Too?". Economist Intelligence Unit. 2018.

Gershon, Livia. “How Televising Presidential Debates Changed Everything.” JSTOR. September 23, 2016. https://daily.jstor.org/how-televising-presidential-debates-changed-everything/

Matz, Sandra C., Michal Kosinski, Gideon Nave, and David J. Stillwell. "Psychological targeting as an effective approach to digital mass persuasion." Proceedings of the national academy of sciences 114, no. 48 (2017): 12714-12719.

Persily, Nathaniel. "The 2016 US Election: Can democracy survive the internet?." Journal of democracy 28, no. 2 (2017): 63-76.

Rathi, Rahul. “Effect of Cambridge Analytica’s Facebook ads on the 2016 US Presidential Election.” Towards Data Science. (2019)

Roberts, Margaret Earling. "Fear, Friction, and Flooding: Methods of Online Information Control." PhD diss., 2014.

The Great Hack. Directed by Karim Amer and Jehane Noujaim. Performed by David Carroll. Netflix, 2019.

"The Rise of Populism." Munk Debates. November 2, 2018. https://www.munkdebates.com/The- Debates/The-Rise-of-Populism.

U.K. House of Commons, Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, Oral evidence: Fake News, HC 363 (17 April, 2018) (testimony of Brittany Kaiser).

U.S. Senate, Judiciary Committee, In the Matter of Cambridge Analytica and Other Related Issues, (16 May 2018), (testimony of Christopher Wylie)

Ward, Ken. "Social networks, the 2016 US presidential election, and Kantian ethics: applying the categorical imperative to Cambridge Analytica’s behavioral microtargeting." Journal of media ethics 33, no. 3 (2018): 133-148.

Weber, Christopher. "Emotions, campaigns, and political participation." Political Research Quarterly 66, no. 2 (2013): 414-428.

Youyou, Wu, Michal Kosinski, and David Stillwell. "Computer-based Personality Judgments Are More Accurate than Those Made by Humans." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 112, no. 4 (2015): 1036-040. doi:10.1073/pnas.1418680112.

POLITICAL SCIENCE UNDERGRADUATE REVIEW VOL. 5 Winter 2020 ARTICLE 8

The Subsidiarity Arrangement of Global Governance: Poverty Reduction in Sub-Saharan Africa

by Grace Li

Introduction

Among the principal purposes of the United Nations outlined in Chapter One of the United Nations Charter is to be a harmonizing centre for the achievement of “international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character” (UN). A central manifestation of this is in the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which to build on the Millennium Development Goals, outlines 17 broad goals and 169 targets to “wipe out poverty, fight inequality, and tackle climate change,” by 2030 (UN). Specifically, SDG One aims to “end poverty in all its forms,” and has developed and worked with several bodies in the UN system, such as the United Nations Development Programme, World Bank, UNICEF, the International Monetary Fund, amongst others, to reach this (UN). However, the UN system provides just one institutional channel to stimulate international poverty reduction and sustainable development. Since poverty is both a widespread and multidimensional issue, the United Nations must share responsibility through a subsidiarity arrangement of global governance in partnership with regional agencies to sufficiently address all aspects. In this paper, I will argue that regional agencies help ease the burden on the United Nations in achieving the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and specifically Goal One because a global division of labour in partnership with regional agencies of varying objectives and scopes allows for greater consideration of regional and national contexts on the ground level, and for the international community to target specific dimensions of poverty reduction (PR).

First, I will define key terms that provide a framework for my thesis. The United Nations system refers to conceptual and structural characterizations of the United Nations, both of which are underpinned by the constitutional document of the organization: The United Nations Charter (Weiss and Wilkinson 2018, 225). The UN system constitutes a “loose collection” of United Nations history and policy, including the “emergence, process, activity, and inherent difficulties” of the UN system, which requires active application by sovereign governments (Weiss and Wilkinson 2018, 223-224). Another understanding refers to the UN’s explicit structural organization into principal organs, subsidiary organs, commissions, specialized agencies, funds, departments, and other entities.

Global governance includes international organizations amongst a variety of public and private actors labelled “global governors.” Global governors can be any authorities who “exercise power across borders for purposes of affecting policy,” by creating issues, setting agendas, establishing and implementing rules or programs, and evaluating outcomes (Weiss and Wilkinson 2018, 81). This can include NGOs, civil society campaigns, experts, intergovernmental organizations, states, regulators,

judges, lobbyists, business firms, and hybrid networks blending multiple types of actors. These actors coordinate on global, regional, national, and local levels, which characterizes the contemporary global governance system as multilayered and multisectoral (Weiss and Wilkinson 2018, 68). However, to move away from defining global governance as all kinds of governance, everywhere, one must recognize the embedded preference for subsidiarity (Weiss and Wilkinson 2018, 33).

Subsidiarity asserts that “collective problems are best solved at the lowest level at which they can be solved” (Weiss and Wilkinson 2018, 33). The demands placed on the UN system in the post-Cold War order requires progression towards a global governance structure based on “rule of all, by all, for all” through a global division of labour between the UN and other global governors (Peou 1998, 439). The principle assumes that a central authority should assume a subsidiary function, performing tasks that cannot be performed effectively an immediate or local level, in a top-down or bottom-up fashion. Top- down subsidiarity allows central authorities, such as the United Nations, to exercise political power in a non-centralized way, while bottom-up subsidiarity places central authorities into an auxiliary role. The assumption is that the prior works when regional agencies are technically and financially competent, and politically capable of achieving collective action, while the latter can succeed when regional and international organizations embrace internationalism and let regional agencies take part in decision- making processes and policy execution (Peou 1998, 439). In the context of PR, this means beginning at the level of the impoverished to avoid alienation of those who are greatest affected through overextension of the central governance system (Knight 2000, 177).

Regions refer to the areas of the world where several countries are “economically and politically interdependent,” and its governance, much like global governance, is facilitated through multilevel and multisectoral state and non-state actors, known as regional agencies, that operate within these specific regions (Weiss and Wilkinson 2018, 251).

The subsidiarity model is best explained through a critical lens, rooted in understandings of the UN’s developmental history, and criticism of the contemporary world order. However, what is key to understanding the relationship between critical theory and subsidiarity is the notion of improving what is being criticized, namely, the UN system. Critical theory entails the “transformation of … existing reality,” reform, and even revolution (Weiss and Wilkinson 2018, 158). Subsidiarity and decentralization of global governance to include multilevel actors is an inherent challenge to existing power relations evident in the UN system, which emphasizes the innate authority of euro-dominant institutions and ideological positioning. The push to renegotiate relative levels of power between central and auxiliary actors in the international community may stem from necessity, but nonetheless presents a compelling challenge to the existing world order to reach a more beneficial result for the international community at this point.

An Overburdened UN System

According to a statement by the World Bank, while global poverty rates have declined in all regions, the progress has been uneven. While East Asia and the Pacific, and Europe and Central Asia have reduced extreme poverty to below 3%, more than half of the world’s extreme poor live in Sub-Saharan Africa, where the number of poor people has increased by 9 million (World Bank 2019). If the trend continues, nearly nine out of ten of the world’s extreme poor will be in Sub-Saharan Africa. These figures indicate that the

United Nations PR agenda must adapt to address these asymmetrical figures of poverty, as the current approach will not meet the UN’s targets by 2030. As it becomes increasingly difficult to reach the populations that have been left behind, the UN system is overburdened in its ability to extend to reach the full breadth of affected populations.

Upon formation, the United Nations featured 51 member-states, growing significantly over the years to the current size of 193 member-states (UN). This expansion of membership has massively expanded the scope of UN operations, especially with the inclusion of more developing nations, where the impoverished predominantly reside. In the 1990s, the “Washington Consensus” which featured a series of macroeconomic policy recommendations anchored around the mantra “stabilize, privatize, and liberalize,” influenced a wave of reforms in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa (Rodrik 2006, 973). However, despite significant policy reform, improvements in the political and external environments, and continued foreign aid, Sub-Saharan African failed to take off, apart from the few cases of Uganda, Tanzania, and Mozambique (Rodrik 2006, 975). What we learned is that this narrow field of market-oriented reforms could not uniformly solve issues of development across the world, as “different contexts require different solutions” to solving common problems (Rodrik 2006, 976). Attempts to copy-paste policy reforms from one country often failed, and precisely this observation necessitates the application of subsidiarity. Sustainable development and more specifically PR requires a nuanced approach contextualized within a specific country or region.

Chapter VIII of the UN Charter can be interpreted through the lens of subsidiarity, as articles 52 and 53 explicitly state that nothing “precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies” when dealing with matters relating to international peace and security, so long as the arrangements or agencies are consistent with UN purposes and principles (United Nations, Chapter VIII). This provides a pathway to a global division of labour between the United Nations, as the central governing body, and regional agencies and arrangements as subsidiaries. While there is some ambiguity concerning what constitutes a regional arrangement or agency, it is reasonable to extend the scope to include “state and non-state actors operating at sub-state, national, transnational, regional, transregional and international levels,” as actors of all these varieties participate in global governance (Knight 2000, 171). While Chapter VIII intends its usage for issues concerning global peace and security, it will be my objective to illustrate how the subsidiarity principle can be applied to international sustainable development efforts, specifically through the thematic study of PR efforts in Sub-Saharan Africa.

To evaluate the weaknesses of subsidiarity we can look to the European Union’s application, in which subsidiarity has been compared to a “marketing gimmick” (Rayle 2015). Critics have argued that despite the aspirational nature of subsidiarity, it has been quickly discarded when inconvenient in the EU context. This illuminates a central weakness of subsidiarity: in the case of a weak application, subsidiarity can remain relatively inconsequential because it “provides too much leeway for state-actors to employ their own criteria” in determining how to most effectively handle an issue” (Jachtenfuchs and Krisch 2016, 18). The decentralizing effects of subsidiarity, which would help to reduce the burden on the UN agenda, depends largely on both the institutional interpretation of what subsidiarity entails and the decision- making of predominantly state actors, which may be reticent to authorize a global division of labour if they see a benefit in maintaining central power (Jachtenfuchs and Krisch 2016, 16).

However, this does not squander the redeeming strengths of the subsidiarity model, as using regional agencies to supplement UN activity in a global division of labour allows those people and agencies “living in the specific region and most directly affected to contribute to the resolution” (Knight 2000, 175). Those who suffer the immediate consequences of extreme poverty have a direct stake in the outcome and are therefore in a position to address PR with the most comprehensive and urgent consideration, compared to global forums that have “broader agendas, competing priorities, and numerous distractions” (Knight 2000, 175-176). By including regional agencies into the global PR conversation, the international community could establish greater consensus on the nature of poverty and the necessary measures to address it, while also allowing these agencies to evaluate the validity of a regional effort.

My paper will qualitatively evaluate the role that subsidiarity can play in poverty eradication efforts in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) through a framework of analysis that begins by looking at what constitutes poverty and what historical developments have led to high levels of poverty in SSA. Then I will draw on examples from SSA to outline what a global division of labour can look like in the region, tying this to the ability for regional agencies to better cater poverty reduction efforts to local contexts, and focus their activities on varying, but specific dimensions of PR. I will be consulting primary documents including the UN Charter, as well as secondary scholarship to empirically support my argumentation.

Poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa

The United Nations defines poverty as “more than the lack of income and productive resources to ensure sustainable livelihoods,” extending to include “hunger and malnutrition, limited access to education and other basic services, social discrimination and exclusion, as well as the lack of participation in decision-making” (“Ending Poverty” UN 2019).” However, there have been many understandings of what poverty entails. Dominant western definitions post-WWII have defined poverty in monetary terms, through indicators such as levels of income or consumption to gauge the number of people who have fallen below a given level, coined the poverty line (Handley et al. 2009, 1). While the United Nations recognizes various dimensions of poverty, they use a poverty line of $1.90 a day to substantively measure poverty levels. The OECD’s definition of poverty, like the United Nations, recognizes how “economic, human, political, socio-cultural, and protective (security)” dimensions of poverty are interlinked, but explicitly includes “gender equity and environmental sustainability” which cut across all dimensions (“DAC Guidelines and Reference Series” 2007, 18). The Overseas Development Institute (ODI) also offers a unique insight into the “powerlessness and voice-lessness” of impoverished populations, which they consider a key aspect of poverty. Therefore, while operational definitions of absolute poverty indicated by economic thresholds are useful, it is important to recognize the various dimensions of PR.

The United Nations reports that the majority of people living on less than $1.90 a day live in sub- Saharan Africa; therefore, a large proportion of international poverty reduction efforts are focused on this region. Various studies recognize income inequality, the lack of basic social services, access to safe drinking water and health care, persistence of conflict, and the lack of economic resilience as significant factors contributing to poverty levels in SSA (Moser and Ichida 2001, 29). These factors present a multidimensional picture of poverty in SSA and entail a historical approach to explore early connections to the imperial Scramble for Africa. The surprisingly high levels of inequality in Africa can be traced to “[processes] of class formation linked to” early colonial state-building, which has translated to social

stratification at independence (Walle 2009, 324). European colonial administrations were concerned with maintaining European hegemony over the continent through “harsh extractive practices” and strict law enforcement, rather than stimulating economic development. European subjugation left Africa with no historical processes of social contracting upon independence to maintain state legitimacy. This illustrates how legacies from early European colonial institutions, in conjunction with modern factors such as high population growth, the poverty financing gap, structural impediments, including infrastructure gaps and gender inequality, reliance on natural resources, and the inability to efficiently convert GDP growth into household income growth, has allowed high rates of poverty in SSA to persist (Beegle and Christiaensen 2019, 1, 6).

SDG One highlights several targets for eradicating poverty in all forms, but I would specifically point to the language in targets 1.A and 1.B which propose “significant mobilization of resources from a variety of sources, including through enhanced development cooperation” and “sound policy frameworks at the national, regional, and international levels, based on pro-poor and gender-sensitive development strategies” (“Goal 1” UN 2019). These targets denote a global division of labour which includes a “variety of sources” on many levels, and also calls for “pro-poor” development strategies, which are defined by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) as “enabling a pace and pattern of growth that enhances the ability of poor women and men to participate in, contribute to and benefit from growth” (“Promoting Pro-Poor Growth” 2019). This entails a grassroots approach to include those most affected by persistent poverty in the conversation about PR. I will begin on a grassroots level, with the impoverished, and work my way up to lay out how subsidiarity can ease the burdens of the UN regarding their PR efforts.

Subsidiarity in “Pro-Poor” Poverty Reduction

There is substantial evidence that points to how while economic growth and increased productivity are necessary for widespread and sustainable PR, it is far from sufficient (Handley et al. 2009, 14). Author Hennie Lötter points to the issues that arise when high authorities or foreign entities “give aid to poor people” (2013, 129). Primarily, the aid giver’s “assessment of either the causes or effects” of poor people’s poverty can be wrong, which may lead to ineffective solutions to address causes or effects (Lötter 2013, 130). Therefore, as outlined by the subsidiarity principle, it is imperative to empower the “collective action and self-organization” of poor people, because their involvement provides contextual insight for what is causing their poverty, and what should be done (Brock 2016, 311). To provide an example of what direct consultation of marginalized people can look like, we can point to a study done by Charles Lwanga-Ntale and Kimberly McClean which examines the factors influencing chronic poverty in Uganda from the perspective of the poor (2007, 177). Uganda is a country in SSA that has named the poverty eradication as the vision of the country, implementing the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) to offer a comprehensive framework to address the causes and dimensions of poverty in Uganda. Researchers collected qualitative information about chronic poverty through direct discussion with community members and the chronically poor during site visits, analysis of chronically poor households, and case studies of chronically poor individuals, from which they identified drivers and maintainers of sustained poverty in the country (Lwanga-Ntale and McClean 2007, 179). Consulting the perspective of poor communities allowed researchers to identify who the poor are and why they stay poor, which provides contextual solutions that influence effectual policy recommendation, rather than broad, blanket solutions.

Specifically citing the section “empowering the chronically poor”, poor people want to be consulted on “determining priorities for planning and resource allocations”, any government “programmes and initiatives that are designed to benefit them”, and given greater access to government and legal information (Lwanga-Ntale and McClean 2007, 192). However, there are limits to what poor people can implement, which is why under the subsidiarity principle, this may require moving up the ladder to an agency with greater jurisdiction. The poor individuals consulted noted that empowering the chronically poor first includes requiring local councillors to ensure greater representation and participation of the chronic poor in decision-making processes. This shows that between the grassroots level and the United Nations system there are a variety of actors available to further ease the burden.

One avenue is through local and international non-governmental organizations, which depending on the scope of their operations, can focus on affecting change and offering expertise towards a specific aspect of PR rather than setting PR as a whole on their agenda. To illustrate this, we can look at how many of the chronic poor who were consulted cited education as a key interrupter of the cycle of intergenerational poverty (Lwanga-Ntale and McClean 2007, 191). Access to education is a barrier for impoverished children, and while poor people and local communities may be unable to finance schooling, education NGOs can offer their services.

Promoting Equality in African Schools (PEAS) is an INGO based in the United Kingdom, which is dedicated to building, running, and increasing knowledge transfer about education in Uganda and Zambia (“Our Work” PEAS 2019). PEAS fund their operations through financial sponsorships and charitable donations and has built 28 schools in Uganda, and 3 in Zambia, amongst a variety of contributions in sustainability and gender equity. This example demonstrates how the scope of PEAS – which focuses on advancing secondary schooling in SSA – allows them to adopt a substantive direction towards alleviating one dimension of poverty, rather than overwhelming their operations by seeking to eradicate poverty as a whole. Whether it be increasing access to clean drinking water or health care in rural settings, partnerships with goal-oriented agencies can be beneficial for targeted change, while attempting to address the entire issue can prevent much substantive change from happening at all. Especially in a time where the United Nations faces uncertainty due to “budgeting shortfalls and a liquidity crisis,” which puts pressure on the General Assembly to streamline activities by reducing the number of meetings, we can look to non-state actors to take on specific burdens at a lower level (UN 2019).

While there is undoubtedly space for NGOs, civil society groups, and other non-state actors, “national governments remain the most important institution for reducing poverty” (Weiss and Wilkinson 2018, 701). It is the governments in SSA which encourage conditions for economic growth and oversee the delivery of basic services, and when sub-national governments function well, this positively affects conditions for health and education provision. Poor people have indicated that despite pro-poor policies, there are concerns that it is the implementation of policies that fail the poor (Lwanga-Ntale 2007, 191). Specifically, “corruption and limited capacity” are major barriers to effective implementation at local levels. Findings from a study by Dr. Theodore Davis indicate that policies and efforts “aimed at improving government effectiveness and political stability and controlling corruption” would significantly improve human development efforts in sub-Saharan Africa (2016, 650). Empowering sub-Saharan African national and sub-national governments to strengthen institutional practices is imperative for both the effective

implementation of pro-poor policies and sustaining national development. This may require developing countries to look up towards a higher level for guidance on how to improve governance structures or hold their institutions accountable.

The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), which is a development agency of the African Union (AU), is mandated to strengthen the capacity of member-states and regional bodies through a comprehensive agenda for the realization of Agenda 2063 – coined Africa’s vision and action plan (NEPAD). This 2063 agenda is tailored to the region, outlining several broader visions that contain further sub-goals to “reduce poverty, put Africa on a sustainable development path, halt the marginalization of Africa, and empower women” (NEPAD). Specifically, NEPAD outlines a pathway to “an Africa of good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law” through the affirmation of democratic values, human rights, and the law, as well as targeting the capacity and capability of national and local institutions and leadership (African Union Development Agency “Agenda 2063” 2019). This platform provides African nations with support for their efforts towards the institutionalization of good governance, through a localized lens. While there is debate over what achievement of the broader SDGs may look like in different parts of the world, the 2063 Agenda crafts a distinct action plan for African development, which it can then track the progress of individual nations, holding them accountable to identifiable targets. NEPAD’s support of African governments in their pursuit of stronger good governance practices can strengthen the capacity and capability of individual national and sub-national governments to implement pro-poor policies, providing an excellent example of what an empowering partnership between a regional organization and national governments can look like.

The AU is partnered with a variety of other regional organizations and countries to support its operations, such as the European Union (EU), the United States, and China, amongst others (AU). Financing for the AU stems from member-state contributions as well as external donors, of which the EU provides the most comprehensive aid package (Phratlhatlhe and Vanheukelom 2019, 5). Foreign aid can have problematic implications, as the AU must follow “different planning, budgeting, and governance procedures for donor contributions” (Phratlhatlhe and Vanheukelom 2019, 5). This is a small window into a greater issue that arises when regional bodies must rely on external actors, who can have vested interests in the region, contribute aid erratically, or place stipulations on their aid in a way that hinders the ability for SSA to act in their best interests. While foreign donors assert that by providing the bulk of the AU budget, they should have access to “regular dialogues in early stages on the main directions and managerial approaches” and be involved in future reviews of strategy and yearly action plans to play a more meaningful role, African partners push back by saying that “donor presence” at high-level events “reduces the space for inter-African dialogue (Phratlhatlhe and Vanheukelom 2019, 14). Developing countries, especially in SSA, have trouble maintaining levels of autonomy when engaging with financing partners who threaten to stem the flow of funding if AU strategies drift from donor ones, which in considering African ties to colonization is something we must actively prevent. On the flip side, there are also concerns of moral hazard, as if key AU stakeholders continue to provide external financial support, this may weaken incentives for the AU to generate alternative resources and pursue reforms needed to consolidate AU effectiveness. The African Union Commission’s position (AUC), while recognizing the necessity of financial and political accountability to their donors, stands that while they “can benefit from discussions… partners cannot set priorities for the AU” (Phratlhatlhe and Vanheukelom 2019, 14).

This is the crux of the argument for employing subsidiarity, especially regarding poverty reduction efforts in SSA. Assistance from high-level actors such as foreign donors or the United Nations “cannot be transformative,” as fundamental change must be pushed and agreed upon by member states (Phratlhatlhe and Vanheukelom 2019, 5). While there is room for high-level collaboration and foreign aid, such as through the United Nations Office to the African Union amongst other UN bodies, and annual review, advisory discussions, and follow-up of progress on the SDGs at the UN High Level Political Forum to coordinate collective efforts, the potential for transformative change begins on a grassroots level, and is implemented nationally and regionally. External bodies such as the UN and other regional bodies can only assess the problems in SSA from an arm’s length, while it is the actors on the lowest levels who can provide contextual insight into the root causes and appropriate solutions for eradicating poverty. Strong partnerships between communities and local state and non-state actors, which includes those who are most affected, eases the burden on high-level actors by putting them in a supportive, rather than dominant role. It is through empowerment, rather than foreign prescription, that the international community can best support PR in SSA, and this is best accomplished through a model of subsidiarity.

To assess the effectiveness of a subsidiarity model in facilitating poverty eradication it would be imperative to:

• Regularly review both economic indicators of poverty, as well as figures representing the non- economic dimensions of poverty, such as access to education and health care, adherence to good governance principles, amongst others in SSA. These figures must then be measured against the achievement of the UN 2030 agenda to see if progress is on track/exceeding/behind expectations. • Track levels of low-level PR initiatives, such as the amount and prevalence of poverty-oriented NGOs or civil society groups with operations in SSA. It may be difficult to do this at the level of poor people, however empirical studies such as the one by Lwanga-Ntale and McClean can help gauge their levels of participation, and their satisfaction with the policies intended to support them. • Follow up with UN bodies to qualitatively and quantitatively determine whether their operations have been streamlined to function more efficiently through subsidiarity.

Conclusion

Subsidiarity, in principle, would serve to empower low-level actors in PR efforts in SSA, however, there is a concern with whether subsidiarity is plausible in the contemporary international community. I am reticent to express too much confidence, as the main barrier I see to the realization of a subsidiarity model is pushback from dominant member-states to facilitate a global division of labour. Countries with prominent ties to the AU and SSA and benefit from their control may be hesitant to take a step back and affirm African autonomy. However, in a time where the UN system risks overheating, we can see the United Nations recognizing subsidiarity as necessary to prevent itself from becoming “unfit for purpose.” The UN has moved towards recognition of civil society groups and engaged in partnerships with the private sector, which is to say, member-states will, and have been, forced to embrace subsidiarity to some extent already (Weiss and Wilkinson 2018, 703). The international community is also not limited to the examples I provided in my analysis; Chapter VIII authorizes a proclivity of other private, non-state, and state actors to aid in poverty eradication efforts. The partnerships I outlined represent an effort to decentralize the UN agenda, however for subsidiarity to thrive, high-level agencies and organizations must be willing to further embrace decentralization by affirming regional and national autonomy, and the African continent must

commit to instituting reforms that encourage self-reliance. By doing so, regional agencies can help ease the burden on the United Nations system in achieving SDG One by providing greater insight into local, national, and regional contexts to bring effectual change, and provide targeted relief rather than attempting to tackle poverty as a whole, which is what the UN has been tasked with thus far.

References

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“Amid Financial Crisis, General Assembly Should Reduce Number of Meetings, Streamline Activities to Better Meet Development Goals, Speakers Stress.” United Nations. United Nations, November 8, 2019. https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/ga12213.doc.htm.

Beegle, Kathleen J., and Luc J. Christiaensen. Accelerating Poverty Reduction in Africa. Washington, DC: World Bank Group, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/10986/323541.

Brock, Gillian. “How Should We Discharge Our Responsibilities to Eradicate Poverty?” Res Publica 22, no. 3 (2016): 301–15. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-016-9328-z.

“Capable Institutions and Transformed Leadership in Place at All Levels.” Agenda 2063. African Union Development Agency. Accessed December 13, 2019. https://www.nepad.org/agenda- 2063/goals/346.

“Chapter I.” United Nations. United Nations. Accessed December 13, 2019. https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-i/index.html.

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Davis, Theodore J. “Good Governance as a Foundation for Sustainable Human Development in Sub- Saharan Africa.” Third World Quarterly 38, no. 3 (July 25, 2016): 636–54. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2016.1191340.

“Ending Poverty.” United Nations. United Nations. Accessed December 13, 2019. https://www.un.org/en/sections/issues-depth/poverty/.

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Handley, Geoff, Kate Higgins, Bhavna Sharma, Kate Bird, and Diana Cammack. “Poverty and Poverty Reduction in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview of the Issues.” Overseas Development Institute, January 2009. https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion- files/860.pdf.

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POLITICAL SCIENCE UNDERGRADUATE REVIEW VOL.5 Winter 2020 ARTICLE 9

Legitimacy & Accountability in Government-NGO Relationships

by Catrin Thomas

This paper examines the dynamics in relationships between Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) and government and how NGOs may seek to effectively influence society and the ways in which it operates within such a relationship and vice versa. NGO-government relationships occur across the globe, in many contexts, and for many reasons. These reasons may include the continued survival of the NGO and/or to consult on complex issues and policies. These alliances are often nuanced with power struggle and conflicts of interest and legitimacy. However, this paper will argue that government-NGO relationships can increase NGO legitimacy, affording them access to traditional structures of the political arena.

There are many ways in which non-governmental organizations (NGOs) may seek to effectively influence society and the ways in which society operates. One such strategy is developing networks with governments to influence the policies and laws at play to benefit the cause of the NGO. Government-NGO relationships are interesting, they are not an alliance one might expect to find based on the name given to NGOs. “Non-governmental” would seem to suggest that these organizations only operate outside of government. Yet relationships between NGOs and governments occur across the globe in many contexts and for many reasons, such as continued survival of the NGO, or to help create and understand complex issues and policies, and to even tackle issues head on with a pooling of resources and expertise. Though these alliances can prove fruitful, at times their cooperation is undermined by a struggle for power. This paper will examine this dynamic and moreover argue that government-NGO relationships increase NGO legitimacy which not only affords them access to traditional structures of the political arena - in which they can influence policies that effectively tackle their primary issues - but also help to legitimate their causes by elevating their status within this domain. This paper will first examine concepts of legitimacy and accountability and then explore the relationships between NGOs and governments. Finally, this paper will determine some of the ways in which these relationships can afford legitimacy to NGOs.

As this paper will largely be generalizing Government-NGO relationships, it is paramount to understand that these relationships are “as varied as the government's, the NGOs, and the societies they serve” (Smillie and Hemlich 1993, 16). Therefore, the purpose of this paper will not be to determine the “Golden rule” of legitimacy in Government-NGO relations, but simply to determine if it is indeed possible for legitimacy to be fostered in these relationships. That being said, it is necessary to define and examine the terms “accountability” and “legitimacy” in order to properly examine Government-NGO relationships and their consequences on legitimacy. Legitimacy is simply understood as justification to be and to do in society (Edwards and Gaventa 2001, 7). It can be further be defined as the “perceptions by key stakeholders that the existence, activities

and impacts of [Civil Society Organizations] are justifiable and appropriate in terms of central social values and institutions” (Brown and Jagadananda, 2007, 7). Legitimacy affords entities and organizations the ability to influence. When an NGO is validated by virtue of legitimacy, clients, investors, donors, the public, and other interested parties get involved and maximize the NGOs capacity to influence and make changes. As well, when entities such as governments or corporations see the legitimacy of these groups they are more likely to, at the very least, hear what they have to say. Legitimacy is an important building block to a successful NGO and as such it proposes a challenge to many organizations looking to increase their capacities for influence. Legitimacy can be cultivated through adhering to laws and regulations (Ibid) as well as by simply “meeting norms for performance” (Brown and Jagadananda, 2007, 7). NGOs, however, will often find themselves seeking many forms of legitimacy, like the ones listed above, as well as being of “instrumental value” in their interactions with their stakeholders and having their actions seen as “appropriate, proper, and “making sense” to the larger society” (Brown and Jagadananda 2007, 7).

In order to obtain legitimacy in any context, organizations must have accountability. Accountability is the ownership of responsibility to answer for one’s performance (Brown and Jagadananda 2007, 9). Accountability is paramount in cultivating trust between the stakeholders and the organization as each stands to lose something should the organization prove unreliable in some way. For NGOs, this loss can correlate specifically to their reputation, investors and funding, and clients. For example, an enormous scandal broke out in 2018 amid the 2010 Haiti earthquake crisis. The organization Oxfam had led an investigation into reports of abuse and sexual coercion by its members in Haiti who were essentially demanding sex in exchange for the foreign aid they were meant to distribute. Oxfam carried out an investigation and dealt with the perpetrators on their own, but instead of contacting the Haitian government or simply announcing the investigation in order to maintain transparency with its stakeholders, Oxfam kept the situation quiet (O'Neill 2018). The investigation was found out by the New York Times and published in February of 2018. The events that followed resulted in immediate threats to cut government funding to Oxfam, the prompt resignation of Archbishop Desmond Tutu who was acting as an ambassador for Oxfam, and the withdrawing of Oxfam’s right to operate in the country of Haiti “for [the] violation of Haitian law and serious violation of the principle of the dignity of the human beings” (Gayle 2018). In response to the issue, Oxfam GB’s chief executive and deputy chief executive resigned. The charity also lost aid from the UK and “thousands of donors” (Ratcliffe 2019). In recent news, Oxfam has been made to sign and implement a transparency pledge that protects whistleblowers and survivors within the organization, however the application of this policy has been slow and limited according to some (McVeigh 2009). In this case, not only did Oxfam suffer the consequences for lack of accountability and transparency, they also lost thousands of dollars in aid and finances, their ability to work within Haiti, and furthermore, their reputation has been significantly diminished. Though the scandal itself would have been enough for stakeholders to pull out of Oxfam, keeping the situation a secret only made matters worse and brought into question their accountability and legitimacy as an organization.

In contemplating these terms, it is important to observe the domino effect they possess. Without accountability there can be no legitimacy; without legitimacy there can be no influence. Therefore, NGOs must seek these items in earnest to ensure their survival. In such pursuits, NGOs may find themselves looking for or accepting partnerships with predominant structures outside of their traditional domain of civil society that offer resources and finances, as well as legitimate standing among the actors who hold

power and influence within and or over society. One such partnership is found between NGOs and governments.

Governments are a central part of life within a state. They are the governing bodies that make decisions on economic policies, laws, health care, and a multitude of other facets. Governments are ultimately responsible to their citizenry and as such they function to provide important services. However, as they balance a multitude of needs and interests, other important issues may not receive adequate attention. In other states however, the capacity to provide for the needs of its citizens may be lacking or the state may actively suppress these needs and functions in order to exert control. States endeavor to tackle many complex interactions with their citizens, laws, and other states. Sometimes attempts at reforms or creating new laws and policies are beyond the capacity of the government. Here governments may see the benefits of working with NGOs on such complex matters where NGOs can lend their expertise and experience as well as utilize their connections with the affected communities in a cost effective and mutually beneficial way so that the government can continue to focus on more central issues.

NGOs then, can be described as gap-fillers of civil society. Their role in this regard is mainly attributed to the fact that NGOs have singular interests and functions (Clark 1995, 512). Consequently, their focus is more centralized, while the state’s is more diffuse. In many ways, NGOs are intermediaries or translators who communicate between the various levels of society and the state (Merry 2006, 39). Interestingly, in these roles as intermediaries it is often difficult to pinpoint an NGO’s loyalties and what keeps them accountable. Of course the answer is far from simple as NGOs host a multitude of stakeholders whom they must remain accountable to if the organization is to survive.

Without accountability to donors, funding sources may dry up; without accountability to regulators, charters may be revoked; without accountability to beneficiaries, services may not be used; without accountability to staff and volunteers, operational capacity may be eroded; without accountability to members and political constituents, credibility may be undermined (Brown and Jagadananda 2007, 9).

Stake holders play an important role in the activities of NGOs which paradoxically can hinder the ability of NGOs to maintain their effectiveness. NGOs require independence from donor influences (Hasmath and Hsu 2008, 7). This makes it increasingly difficult for NGOs to remain accountable and build strong legitimacy. In order to have legitimacy, they need to be accountable to their donors and other stakeholders. Yet, at the same time, they require autonomy to be effective in their work. Evermore the job of an NGO is a balancing act, one that may seem at times impossible to accomplish. NGOs may often struggle with their ability - or lack thereof - to convince target populations of their solutions to problems and to gain support from prominent stakeholders such as states and donors (Merry 2006, 48). Here, governments can offer a platform for NGOs to have greater influence by giving them an elevated status within the political arena. In many ways government-NGO relationships could be described as a “quasi- sponsorship” whereby NGOs are essentially backed by government, or given the go-ahead, to influence policy and law and even to gain greater traction within the community of predominant political actors. Of course, to assume that all NGOs desire a partnership with government would be false. NGOs may find their goals and those of government irreconcilable; “some organizations, in fact, are created in opposition to

government policy” (Gazley and Brudney 2007, 411). Yet there is still room for these relationships to prove fruitful. Government-NGO Relationships, as mentioned earlier in this essay, vary greatly across different contexts. For example, in China NGOs working with the government have greatly increased so the state can operate a “corporatist mechanism” directly embedded in civil society (Hasmath, Hildebrandt and Hsu 2019, 268). Whereas accounts in the US describe these relationships as a “new social form” that has emerged as an integral piece of the evolving social and political climate (Pifer 1967, 15). Ultimately, government-NGO relationships stem anywhere from formats in which NGOs are simply acting out the will of government - holding no autonomy - to the active participation of NGOs in the processes of policy- making (Coston 1998, 375). The type of relationship is dependent on the tolerance of influence each party maintains and the willingness to comply with formalities (Coston 1998, 377). These dynamics can determine the effectiveness of such partnerships and colour their overall experience.

Ultimately, these partnerships aim to effectively accomplish goals that NGOs and governments share. The structures of these partnerships will vary from case to case but in general, government will consult NGOs for their unique and knowledgeable perspective in hopes to create appropriate solutions that are practical and effective. The principal role of the NGO in this regard is to make clear the issues faced by local communities and, simultaneously, to influence and inform government policy (Hsu and Hasmath 2017, 32), backed by research and conscious raising of the citizenry. Ideally, repeated interactions between NGOs and government would build trust in such a way that enables NGOs to be critical of government practices “without alienating government officials” (Bräutigam and Segarra 2007, 172) and vice versa. On the government's part, their role lies in providing legal and financial resources as well as a forum in which the two parties can have productive discourse.

“The most difficult problem which has arisen in connection with the quasi-nongovernmental organization is how to reconcile its dual needs for independence and accountability to government” (Pifer 1967, 23). In the ideal partnership there would be an equal share of influence and respect for each group’s autonomy in pursuit of cooperation (Brinkerhoff 2002, 21). However, this is rarely the case. Governments often find themselves seeking to retain some form of supervision over NGOs in order to keep them accountable. Yet, direct intervention in NGO administration is problematic as it can hinder independence (Pifer 1967, 25). This independence is required for NGOs to be effective in their work and as such, relationships between government and NGOs require a balance of accountability measures and autonomy. However, there exists a trend in these relationships to suggest a correlation between independence and legitimacy. If an NGO’s legitimacy is relatively high, it is more likely to be treated with respect by government from the beginning (Pifer 1967, 24). For these alliances to be effective then, a measurement of legitimacy must already exist. But further studies done in the US context show that after government- NGO collaboration, government trust in its NGO partners was significantly increased (Gazley and Brudney 2007, Figure 5: 402). It would stand to reason then that this increased trust would demonstrate the NGOs legitimacy and, therefore, lessen the governments need for supervision, allowing for more NGO independence. These studies also showed a greater negative response by nonprofit executives as to the degree of success in these partnerships, whereas their government counterparts were more positive (Gazley and Brudney 2007, 410). When NGO autonomy is limited by the state, so is their effectiveness, leaving them to feel as though the accomplishments of the relationship were not as effective as they could have been. Governments and NGOs may seek to remedy this source of shared contention through

professional association. Here, NGOs can learn from one another to “[develop] the expertise to inform on evidence-based policy” (Hsu and Hasmath 2017, 32) and increase their value to government and the public as policy influencers (Hasmath and Hsu, 2014. 948). These professional associations can also provide accountability by being self-regulatory, frequently checking in with its various members and associates. NGOs have found that by determining professional norms and standards, organizations were able to develop better skills and protect themselves from outside authorities with “arbitrary performance standards” (Brown and Jagadananda 2007, 27). This combined with government standards would afford these NGOs the ability to work well with government while growing within their own sector and developing better practices to influence policies. An example of one of these associations is The Humanitarian Coalition. It is a Canadian NGO coalition of leading aid organizations that provide humanitarian aid during international disasters. The coalition accomplishes this by raising donations, developing relationships with government and raising awareness about these issues (Humanitarian Coalition 2019). The coalition is backed by Global Affairs Canada which is the federal government department for international development which provides the coalition with added capacity and legitimacy to act.

In considering these relationships between NGOs and government the opportunity to gain greater status and legitimacy within the political arena can be seen. NGOs require a great deal of legitimacy to be successful in the work they do. Without it, they are disregarded as ineffective and unnecessary and their work is ignored (Gourevitch, Lake and Gross Stein 2012, 193) by key players such as states, corporations, and the public. In taking up these partnerships, however, NGOs can increase their legitimacy by influencing government policies, practices, and laws, as well as by developing networks within government and their respective partners. In the 2007 US case study by Gazly and Brudney, their research showed that nonprofit and public participants accessed new funding through their NGO-government partnerships (401). In this sense, making a good impression and building trust with government is vital to NGO survival and success in these conditions. Without building these relationships government my avoid multilateral policy making which can harm NGO influence (Clark 1995, 523). As well, the mere consultation of NGOs in government affairs validates their existing legitimacy which was built on their knowledge, work, and pre- existing stakeholders. Governments also back the issues and moreover causes NGOs advocate for when they create policies and initiatives together. This may in fact give the impression to those outside this relationship, such as corporations, the public, agencies, investors, etc. that NGOs working with government can a) be trusted in an official capacity; b) are worthwhile to consult/invest in; and c) hold influence over government policies and thus hold authority in the mainstream political sphere.

Critics of government-NGO relationships suggest that because NGOs are “non-governmental” they cannot or should not pursue these partnerships. There is doubt as to whether NGOs can have any real autonomy within such conditions, rendering NGOs as mere avenues for the government to exercise its will. However, as Pifer points out, these relationships were established for a reason; “an urgent national need had been identified that no other institution in the society was meeting, or, seemingly, could meet” (Pifer 1967, 17).

Partnerships between government and NGOs may not be suitable for all causes, governments, or NGOs. Yet, when deemed appropriate they may serve as a mutually beneficial means to accomplish shared goals. Although relations between governments and NGOs can find themselves strained due to a multitude of factors, these relationships can often prove themselves relatively fruitful. As well, these partnerships

provide a unique opportunity for NGOs to grow their legitimacy in the political arena and in the eyes of society at large.

References

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Brinkerhoff, Jennifer M. 2002. “Government-Nonprofit Partnership: A Defining Framework.” Public Administration and Development 22 (1): 19–30. https://doi.org/10.1002/pad.203.

Brown, D, and Jagadananda. 2007. “Civil Society Legitimacy and Accountability.” Hauser Center for Non- Profit Organizations Working Paper (32).

Clark, Ann Marie. 1995. “Non-Governmental Organizations and Their Influence on International Society.” Journal of International Affairs 48 (2): 507–25.

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Coston, Jennifer M. 1998. “A Model and Typology of Government-NGO Relationships.” Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 27 (3): 358–82. https://doi.org/10.1177/0899764098273006.

Gayle, Damien. n.d. “Timeline: Oxfam Sexual Exploitation Scandal in Haiti.” The Guardian.

Gazley, Beth, and Jeffrey L. Brudney. 2007. “The Purpose (and Perils) of Government-Nonprofit Partnership.” Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 36 (3): 389–415. https://doi.org/10.1177/0899764006295997.

Gourevitch, P. 2012. “The Credibility of Transnational NGOs: When Virtue Is Not Enough.” Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781139086356.

Hasmath, Reza, and Jennifer Hsu. 2008. “NGOs in China: Issues of Good Governance and Accountability.” Asia Pacific Journal of Public Administration 30 (1): 29–39. https://doi.org/10.1080/23276665.2008.10779341.

Hasmath, Reza, and Jennifer Y.j. Hsu. 2014. “Isomorphic Pressures, Epistemic Communities and State– NGO Collaboration in China.” The China Quarterly 220: 936–54. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0305741014001155.

Hasmath, Reza, and Jennifer Hsu. 2019. “Conceptualizing Government-Organized Non-Governmental Organizations.” Journal of Civil Society 15 (3): 267–84.

Hsu, Jennifer Y. J., and Reza Hasmath. 2016. “A Maturing Civil Society in China? The Role of Knowledge and Professionalization in the Development of NGOs.” China Information 31 (1): 22–42. https://doi.org/10.1177/0920203x16676995.

Humanitarian Coalition. 2019. “Who Are We.” Humanitarian Coalition. 2019. https://www.humanitariancoalition.ca/.

Humanitarian Coalition. 2019. “Our Partners.” Humanitarian Coalition. 2019. : https://www.humanitariancoalition.ca/our-partners.

McVeigh, Karen. 2019. “Aid Agencies Accused of Failure to Make Good on Oxfam Abuse Scandal Pledges.” The Guardian, 2019.

Merry, Sally Engle. 2006. “Transnational Human Rights and Local Activism: Mapping the Middle.” American Anthropologist 108 (1): 38–51. https://doi.org/10.1525/aa.2006.108.1.38.

Michael, Edwards, and John Gaventa. 2001. “Global Citizen Action.” Community Development Journal 37 (3): 270–72.

O'Neill, Sean. 2018. “TIMES INVESTIGATION: How the Oxfam Sex Scandal Unfolded.” The Times , 2018.

Pifer, A. 1967. “The Quasi-Governmental Organization.” Annual Report Essays. Ratcliffe, Rebecca. 2019. “Oxfam Failed to Report Child Abuse Claims in Haiti, Inquiry Finds.” The Guardian, 2019.

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POLITICAL SCIENCE UNDERGRADUATE REVIEW VOL. 5 Winter 2020 ARTICLE 10

China’s Challenge to the Institutions of Global Governance and US Soft Power

By Evan Oddleifson

Introduction

Since the fall of the Soviet Union, International Relations (IR) scholars have broadly characterized the US as a unipolar global hegemon. However, China’s rapid economic growth brings new challenges to that title, with some commentators even surmising that China will usurp it. Many economic predictions support this and estimate that the Chinese economy will be larger than that of the US by midcentury (O'Brien 2017). This could help give China a superior capacity to coercively influence the behavior of other political and business actors through military and economic force. However, the implications of such a material shift on each state’s soft power - their ability to attract and co-opt the interests of others without coercion - is less clear and has been understudied. This paper aims to address this topic by gauging the extent to which China's political influence and soft power can be constrained through the primary institutions of Global Governance (GG): the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank (WB), and World Trade Organization (WTO). Therein, it hypothesizes that through these institutions China will be kept from surpassing the US in soft power.

Support for this central thesis will be delineated in three parts. First, the IR theoretical framework of this paper will be established in which the aforementioned institutions are conceptualized as extensions of US soft power. Second, US privilege within these institutions will be qualified and its durability examined as evidence that they are likely to retain a superior position to China within them. Third, this paper will argue that China will be unable to accrue superior influence to the US through its growing relationships with other states exterior to the institutions of GG. In this final section, a counter argument emphasizing the negative effects of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) and the resulting backlash to these institutions as a detractor to US soft power will be rebutted.

Theoretical Framework

The study of international relations has long concerned itself with the relative power of states. Realism, a longstanding and dominant IR theory, is predicated upon an anarchic structure between states in which the weak submit to the strong (Crawford 2005). This has proven useful in understanding the unipolar hegemony of the US. They have been by far the most militarily and economically capable state and are therefore the quintessential realist hegemon. However, realism has been ill equipped to explain the emergence of institutions such as the IMF, WB, WTO and supranational Global Governance generally. Liberal IR theories have tried to account for these institutions by arguing that in international relations

rational actors reject conflictual power politics to accrue the mutual benefits of cooperation (Crawford 2005). However, the persistence of conflict worldwide problematizes this conclusion. Therefore, in this paper, a union of theories is applied to understand the relationship between US hegemony and GG.

Here, the purpose is to understand how the US is able to use the IMF, WB, and WTO to co-opt the interests of others as an exercise of soft power. As such, this paper draws from realism, liberalism, and neofunctionalism: realism to contextualize the US’s self-interest in GG, liberalism to qualify the resulting complex interdependence from GG, and neofunctionalism to illustrate the flow of sovereignty from member states to the supranational institutions of GG.

Neofunctionalism predicts that as complex interdependence proliferates, governments, NGOs, and citizens subjected to it will see their interests better served by the supranational institutions that facilitate it than their domestic authorities, and will consequently transfer their allegiance to the supranational (Meyer and Haas 1959). Out of its own interest to expand its soft power, the US harnesses this effect by permeating those supranational institutions - the IMF, WB, and WTO - with their own values and culture, thereby influencing fellow member states to subscribe to US values without directly subscribing to the US itself. US ideology is reflected in the agendas of all three institutions by conditioning loans, trade agreements, and financial aid on the adoption of liberal practices such as trade liberalization and democratization (Rowden 2001).

Each of these organizations promotes liberal (democratic), and free market (market/trade liberalization) policies. While there has been heated debate regarding the effects of aid and loans from the IMF and WB, empirical analyses by Birchler et al. in International Studies Quarterly reveals that, on average, both institutions have had positive effects on domestic accountability and democratization in member countries from 1980-2011 (2016). As for the free market, the WTO states on their website that their primary objectives include lowering trade barriers and promoting competition (What Is the WTO? n.d.).

Denny Roy writes in the Asian Survey journal that China and the US stand in discursive contention over the proper perceptions of world and Asian politics. In particular, he refers to the western style and US led “liberal, free market discourse [as] the hegemonic discourse” which crowds out “distinctive regional [Asian] perspective[s]” (Roy 2005, 231). His implication that western discourse permeates Asian culture reflects the reach of US soft power, which is achieved in part by the IMF, WB, and WTO through their aforementioned policies.

In contrast, China has fewer avenues pursuant to the advance of their influence. Unlike the US, they do not dominate comparably powerful institutions and are therefore more limited in their pursuits of soft power to bilateral relations as exemplified by their foray into African development. Here, China has been successful in attracting attention by modeling unprecedentedly high levels of economic growth. This can be well understood as enhancing their soft power in the English school of IR theory, which characterizes the international community as a society in which ideas shape the behavior of states (Linklater 2005). This implies that by being a world leader in growth, Chinese economic models, and by extensions the ideas and cultures that underpin them, will be imported by countries wishing to replicate their success.

However, China’s economic growth appears to be slowing, and while their global influence has undoubtedly increased in recent decades, the US remains the favored model in many developing countries (Chunga 2015). Therefore, it is in China's interests to diversify the means available to them by which they can project their soft power, hence their pursuit of greater influence within the primary institutions of GG as well as independent state-to-state bilateral relations. In the subsequent sections, I argue that their success in these endeavors is and will continue to be insufficient to expand their soft power beyond that of the US.

US Privilege Within GG and China’s Attempts at Rivalry

Having established the theoretical basis to conceptualize the institutions of GG as extensions of US soft power, this section now qualifies US legal privilege within them to illustrate how China is deprived of the opportunity to dominate them internally.

The IMF and WB have a democratic legal structure but are in effect dominated by the US and more broadly the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) member countries. While these institutions are financed by contributions from all member states, including almost every country in the world, the US is by far their biggest supporter. In fact, the US contributes a greater portion of their funding than vote share they receive. That said, the US retains, with their 16.82 percent vote share in the IMF and 16.28 percent in the WB, the ability to veto key decisions, which, due to their legal structure, require 85 percent majority support to pass (Glenn 2008). Therefore, the US is able to constrain IMF and WB initiatives to reflect their own interests. As such, these institutions are less democratic in practice than their respective constitutions suggest.

Conversely, the WTO does not support differential voting power between members. However, the deliberations that occur within the context of the WTO are largely unregulated and lack transparency (Litonjua 2010). Therefore, agreements reached therein often do not represent the voices or interests of developing and marginalized countries. Collectively, Litonjua writes that: “In effect, all three international organizations [IMF, WB, and WTO], which have been entrusted with writing the rules of the game and with managing the global economy, reflect and pursue the interests of the First World/Global North.” (2010, 62).

The International Monetary Fund and World Bank

In the IMF and WB China has two tasks to accomplish, first to become the most influential member, and second to transition both institutions from their Western orientation into vehicles of Chinese soft power. I argue that while the first task is conceivable, the second is not.

The US retains their unparalleled vote share in each institution providing significantly more funding than any other country. Therefore, given China’s continuing economic growth, it is possible that they will soon be capable of out funding the US thereby usurping this position. In this eventuality, the US can either continue increasing their contributions to retain their veto or allow China to possess the sole veto. If the US maintains their veto position, they will be able to block Chinese efforts to re-orientate the

methods and mandates of these institutions; alternatively, if they lose their veto, they will have to rely on their allies support to make up the vote difference.

Blocking key decisions in the IMF only requires 15 percent voting dissent (Glenn 2008). Presently, the OECD collectively holds 63.2 percent of vote share with the G7 alone holding 43.7 percent (Glenn 2008). Therefore, unless the US becomes a complete pariah in the developed world (a possibility so remote this paper discounts it), it is more likely than not that they could accrue adequate support to effectively veto reforms designed to reconstitute the IMF in accordance with Chinese interests.

As the IMF’s sister institution, the WB has a similar legal structure in which the US holds a parallel role with a vote share of 16.28 percent in the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) arm of the WB (as opposed to 16.82 percent in the IMF), giving them another effective veto over the primary operations of the Bank (Glenn 2008). Likewise, US allies maintain their overrepresentation between the WB and IMF. Therefore, because of the consensus oriented voting criteria (key decisions requiring 85 percent majority support) and the large voting power of the US and its allies, China will be unable to reconstitute either of these institutions to enhance their own soft power.

Overall, the key factor keeping China from dominating the IMF and WB from within is their institutional stickiness. In the wake of WWII, when in 1944 the IMF and WB were created in Bretton Woods, the US wielded uncontested authority. As such, they had the advantage of shaping the foundational liberal values of the IMF and WB during their creation, values they protected by giving the institutions legal structures that made overturning their foundations exceedingly difficult. These US policy makers were farsighted and prepared for the kind of challenge to US influence that China represents. Therefore, it is not the present condition of the relative power between the US and China that determines one’s dominance within the IMF and WB. Instead, it is the original design and legal structures of these institutions that sustain their Western liberal orientation through transitions of great powers like the US and China.

The World Trade Organization

Unlike the IMF and WB, the US does not explicitly dominate the WTO. As mentioned above, the WTO awards one vote per state, therefore, even with the support of the entire OECD the US is not afforded democratic dominance or a veto ability. Instead, the WTO coordinates agreements between countries rather than reaching them bilaterally as is the case with the IMF and WB (Clapp 2006). As such, the relationship between the WTO and US soft power has more to do with liberal values than it does US interests. Therein, the WTO’s mandate explicitly upholds the neoliberal economic framework in which the US situates itself by promoting stability, transparency, and openness to facilitate the free flow of goods and capital.

Despite the recent surge of protectionism and the deeply entrenched agricultural cartels in the US, American policy makers have widely accepted capital outflow and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) as part of a healthy economy despite the loss of government control it implies. Conversely, China has resisted adopting US models congruent with the positions of the WTO like capital account liberalization (deregulating the ownership of national assets). Patrick Foulis of the Economist highlights the fact that

Chinese leaders do not want to give up control or be “bossed around” by financial markets, and that the liberalization of their capital accounts would instigate a major capital outflow from the country. Moreover, while it would also accrue FDI it is likely that new investors would be less amicable to Chinese authorities and interests (Foulis 2015). That said, China recognizes the advantages of liberalizing and began liberalizing their capital accounts in 2009; however, they have since stalled this process making the extent to which liberalization will continue in China unclear.

These differing approaches to economic governance, liberalization and centralization, provide other countries models on which to base their own policy. Diffusion of either model in this manner constitutes soft power projection; therein, the US is advantaged by the promotion of their model by the WTO. However, the inability of the US to explicitly dominate the WTO illustrates the impossibility of this option for China. Like the IMF and WB, the WTO is ‘sticky;’ therefore, China is unlikely to endeavor to change the WTO’s legal structures and mandates themselves. Instead, they may attempt to increase their influence in the WTO by creating and participating in independent coalitions with other member states. Although, If China tries to enhance their influence through coalitions and by fostering solidarity between itself and other member countries, they will face two debilitating impediments, first, the diverse and non- aligning interests of member countries, and second, the uneven distribution of benefits from their cooperation.

These impediments were highlighted by the Doha Round of WTO negotiations in the mid 2000’s in which developing countries successfully cooperated to pressure the US and EU to favorably affect the “process and content” of the deliberations (Clapp 2006). While cooperation between countries of the global South - synonymous with the ‘Third World’ and ‘Emerging World’ - including China, India, Brazil, and Mexico, enhanced their voice, it also frustrated many participant countries whose interests did not align with those of the larger members of the coalition (Clapp 2006). In particular, during the deliberative process, India and Brazil represented the coalition in negotiations with the US and EU garnering criticism from their counterparts who felt they were misrepresented. This illustrates the “fragility on the part of the broader coalitions of such countries” (Clapp 2006: 575). Furthermore, amongst the global South, the final agreements of the Doha Round were estimated to have disproportionately benefited China, India, Brazil, and Mexico, further solidifying political cleavages particularly between developing countries and emerging economies.

Overall, attempts by developing countries to act collectively within the WTO demonstrated just how elusive South-South solidarity is. This case highlights the awareness of developing countries regarding the presence of power politics within the global South; it suggests that efforts to represent developing countries through coalitions “may in the end lead to a weakening of developing country solidarity” (Clapp 2006: 575). Therefore, Chinese efforts to enhance their influence by leading and participating in coalitions within the WTO are likely to be perceived as self-interested and end up undermining their own credibility, and by extension soft power. The pursuit of soft power within the WTO through coalitions is not a viable solution for China.

Internal Challenges in the IMF, WB, and WTO: Conclusion

This section examined how ‘institutional stickiness’ makes China’s prospects of altering the mandates and structures of the IMF, WB, and WTO highly unlikely. In the case of the IMF and WB, the US and its allies possess practical means through which they can limit the increase of Chinese influence therein. In the WTO, skepticism from developing countries and awareness of divergent interests impedes China’s ability to foster solidarity and enhance their soft power.

External Threats to the Institutions of GG: China’s foray in African development

Having considered internal threats to US influence in the IMF, WB, and WTO, this paper now examines exterior challenges posed by China. In particular, it compares IMF and Chinese engagement in Africa to illustrate the greater endurance of IMF projects and effects. This section first characterizes the IMF’s durability by refuting the counter argument that negative perceptions of IMF engagement in Africa undermines US soft power more than Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) enhance it. Secondly, it examines the roles and future implications of IMF and Chinese engagements in Africa.

The global recession of the 1980s adversely affected many newly independent African states. This environment facilitated the formation of economic relationships between African countries and the IMF and WB. To mitigate the crisis and incur economic growth, the IMF provided loans conditional upon the implementation of SAPs entailing the liberalization of trade, privatization of industry, and discipline of fiscal and monetary policy (Kassim 2015).

Scholars have been highly critical of the effectiveness of SAPs, noting that Africa is still “relatively poor” (Thomson 2010: 188). When considering US soft power from this perspective one might argue that because of their apparent failure to yield growth and their paternalistic approach to African governments, the IMF undermined US soft power by creating negative perceptions of the US and GG in developing African countries.

While it is true that SAP’s have been ineffective at achieving their explicit goal of economic growth and that this has fostered negative perceptions of Western engagement in Africa, SAPs were successful in reforming governance patterns in many African countries. As was previously referred to, empirical analyses shows that there is a statistically significant relationship between enhancing domestic accountability and democratization, and IMF & WB engagement in a given region (Birchler et al. 2016). Furthermore, this assessment shows that these adjustments manifest themselves in long term trends. This suggests that SAPs have durable effects on the governance patterns of countries in which the IMF and WB are active. Therefore, while the measures used to instigate SAPs may have been initially coercive, the resulting reforms have taken on a life of their own and now act as a surrogates of US liberal values thereby institutionalizing US soft power in developing countries. Finally, while it is true that many Africans hold negative perceptions of GG and the US, polling as recent as 2015 show that Africans still perceive US development models as more viable than any alternative to facilitate national development (Chunga 2015). Therefore, the long term positive effects of SAPs on US influence in African countries is necessarily more significant than the backlash over the failure of GG to incur growth in Africa. In other words, this counter argument is incorrect not because it mischaracterizes the negative reactions to international intervention

in African countries but because it neglects to account for the changes in governance patterns by SAPs which overall bolster US influence in the countries in question.

In essence, through SAPs, the IMF has successfully embedded seeds of Western influence in governmental institutions, constituting a passive but durable means through which the interests of the host country are shaped by liberal values. Conversely, Chinese intervention in Africa has been deliberately absent of similar conditionalities. This has proven an effective strategy to facilitate and attract bilateral agreements with African states who value the greater autonomy afforded to them by China as compared to the IMF (Brautigam 2011). Furthermore, Chinese financial agreements also cater to Africa’s need for infrastructure by guaranteeing the technology, labor, and materials needed for infrastructure development in exchange for commodity export to China. Therefore, Chinese development financing opportunities presently appear to be more attractive than IMF agreements to African countries. However, China’s foray in Africa is neither sustainable nor useful for institutionalizing their influence in the long run. Additionally, while their development model seems more attractive to African countries in most instances, it fails to provide key crisis management services leading African countries to continue to engage with the IMF and WB and accept the terms of their SAPs. The following paragraphs deal first with the unsustainability of Chinese financing under their current models, and second with their inability to adequately substitute for IMF services in Africa.

China's economic arrangements in Africa generally entail the trade of infrastructure development for commodities such as oil or coffee. This has the economic advantage of insuring both countries against unexpected inflation changes that distort agreements involving the transfer of currency. Specifically, China loans money to African countries with which they are obligated to contract Chinese companies to develop their infrastructure (Brautigam 2011). Since this secures business for Chinese companies, many of which are state run, China is guaranteed the return of their loaned funds to their own private sector allowing them to offer recipient countries lower interest rates, thereby increasing the accessibility of their financing to poor countries. Governments of recipient countries are then also required to repay those funds with interest back to the Chinese state. In effect, this model secures China double repayment, once to their private and once to their public sectors.

The primary reason this is less sustainable than traditional lending is because it deprives recipient countries of the economic stimulus that would otherwise enhance their ability to repay the debt. In traditional loan structures, like those offered by the IMF, recipient countries use the funds to hire their own citizens for the development of infrastructure. This injects the loaned funds into their local economy which are then continually used by citizens in the exchange of goods and services thereby generating tax revenue with which the government can use to repay the loan. Macroscopically speaking, it increases a country's debt but also their ability to pay it. Like traditional loans this Chinese financing structure provides the means to develop infrastructure, but it does not generate similar economic stimulus. Instead, they increase national debt without increasing peripheral economic activity. This raises the question: how can China ensure they get repaid?

The answer is by tying the repayment of the loan to the country’s natural resources. For China, this guarantees them repayment whether the government is able to repay or not. Poor countries who license their oil production to China, especially those heavily dependent on resource export revenue, are

put at severe disadvantage by price fluctuations. For example, if the price of oil falls by half (which it did in 2014) the volume of oil they are required to export to China doubles, which can seriously limit government revenue. This was the case in Angola, where 70 percent of government revenue is generated by the oil industry (World Factbook: Angola 2018). Expectedly, the Angolan government is already wary of this, limiting the extent to which they accept Chinese influence. A report from the Michelsen Institute highlights this tension, stating that:

“The Angolan government has been less open to Chinese investment in the oil industry than originally expected… it sends a strong political message to Beijing and points to shrewd management of the oil industry on the part of the Angolan government…that the relationship hinges largely on oil, despite its importance, does not bode well for its sustainability. Hearty political posturing indicates that both China and Angola see each other as necessary strategic allies for the foreseeable future, but this may mask an uneasy marriage of convenience.” (Corkin 2011: 2)

This highlights African awareness of China’s self interest in their financing endeavors. Moreover, while the IMF takes criticism for paternally undermining the ideological autonomy of African governments, China undermines their material autonomy. This does and will continue to suppress China’s ability to obtain the upper hand in influencing the development and politics of African countries and developing countries generally.

Despite the drawbacks to Chinese engagement in Africa, many have seen it as the beginning of the end for institutions like the IMF. However, the IMF is not losing their foothold in Africa as is evidenced by China’s relationship with Angola. The case of Angola makes clear the deepening of the IMF’s roots in Africa rather than their withdrawal.

In part because of the Angolan civil war that lasted until 2002, and in part because of the ruling party’s communist backing, the IMF had a relatively delayed entrance into Angola. It was not until the mid 1990’s that Angola opened the dialogue with the IMF in which the IMF detailed the structural adjustments necessary to secure their services. Angola was strongly opposed to the proposed reforms and outright refused their terms until the early 2000s at which point high inflation and sub optimal oil revenues incentivized them to seek IMF assistance (Article IV Consultation 2003). However, Angola failed to meet IMF conditions and abandoned the negotiations when China offered them a low interest rate 2 billion dollar loan under the approximate lending structure previously detailed (Brautigam 2011).

The IMF-Angola relationship was so poor that in 2007 Angola’s finance minister decried the IMF. However, soon after, during the financial crisis of 2008, Angola ironically approached the IMF for support (Brautigam 2011). This time, Angola’s agreements with China strained their economy instead of supporting it. Because of the oil price crash Angola’s oil export quotas to China dramatically increased cutting deeply into their budget. This time, Angola accepted a 1.4 billion dollar IMF loan in compliance with their recommended fiscal and monetary reforms to increase economic stability and transparency (Angola: Stand-By Arrangement request 2010).

This process repeated itself during the oil glut of 2014-2015 yielding further conditional reforms. Furthermore, in 2017 Angola elected President João Lourenço, who, compared with his predecessor, has signaled his will to partner with the IMF and has even organized meetings with IMF officials to discuss future agreements (Gyimah 2018).

Comprehensively, Angola reflects an African pattern of increasing cooperation with the institutions of Global Governance. Despite historical cleavages, it is clear that volatility in the global economy continues to drive cooperation between these institutions and developing countries. While we did see Chinese intervention in the early 2000s enable Angola to stave off engagement with the IMF, it has ultimately proven insufficient to wean Africa off IMF and WB agreements. Moreover, Chinese agreements are unsustainable in structure and have no mechanism of institutionalizing their influence in partner countries. Overall, Western led institutions have proven persistently relevant and directly promote agendas that cement Western and US influence in Africa and around the world. China, on the other hand, has been comparatively unsuccessful in shaping the governance patterns of other countries according to their interests and face continued sustainability issues with their development models.

Conclusion

China stands on the brink of surpassing the US in material capability and is pushing the world towards an increasingly multipolar order. However, liberal values, and by extension the non-coercive influence of the US, are likely to be upheld during this transition by the institutions of GG, namely the IMF, WB, and WTO. This paper demonstrated the impediments China faces in reforming these institutions. First, their legal structures makes them ‘sticky’, unyielding to change and durable in their convictions. Second, realist perceptions of self-interest and the divergence of interests between countries within the WTO reduces the viability of dominance by coalition. Third, China is unlikely to prevent the continued proliferation of IMF and WB operations abroad and the consequent persistence of liberal influence. China’s business agreements abroad do not adequately substitute for the services that the IMF and WB provide and they face their own sustainability challenges. Overall, the institutions of Global Governance are both constant in their convictions and in their international relevance, and China’s economic and political rise has not, and will not, overturn this.

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