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Home , Bucalemu, Central Chile, Dichato, Maule Region, Pichilemu, Santiago

EERI Special Report — June 2010

Learning from

The Mw 8.8 Earthquake of February 27, 2010

From March 6th to April 13th, 2010, mated to have experienced intensity ies of the gap, overlapping extensive a team organized by EERI investi- VII or stronger shaking, about 72% zones already ruptured in 1985 and gated the effects of the Chile earth- of the total population of the country, 1960. In the first month following the quake. The team was assisted lo- including five of Chile’s ten largest main shock, there were 1300 after- cally by professors and students of (USGS PAGER). shocks of Mw 4 or greater, with 19 in the Pontificia Universidad Católi- the range Mw 6.0-6.9. As of May 2010, the number of con- ca de Chile, the Universidad de firmed deaths stood at 521, with 56 Chile, and the Universidad Técni- persons still missing (Ministry of In- Tectonic Setting and ca Federico Santa María. GEER terior, 2010). The earthquake and Geologic Aspects (Geo-engineering Extreme Events destroyed over 81,000 dwell- Reconnaissance) contributed geo- South- is a seismically ing units and caused major damage to sciences, geology, and geotechni- active area with a convergence of another 109,000 (Ministry of Housing cal engineering findings. The Tech- nearly 70 mm/yr, almost twice that and Urban Development, 2010). Ac- nical Council on Lifeline Earthquake of the Cascadia zone. cording to unconfirmed estimates, 50 Engineering (TCLEE) contributed a Large-magnitude earthquakes multi-story reinforced concrete build- report based on its reconnaissance struck along the 1500 km-long ings were severely damaged, and of April 10-17. A complete list of coastline in 1835, 1906, 1928, 1960, four collapsed partially or totally. The team members begins on page 19. 1985, and 2010 (Cisternas et al., earthquake caused damage to high- 2005). Tectonic deformation result- The research, publication, and dis- ways, railroads, ports, and airports ing from the February 27th quake tribution of this report were funded due to ground shaking and liquefac- played a substantial role in the ob- by the EERI Learning from Earth- tion. The earthquake was followed served damage. Ground shaking quakes project, under grant #CMMI- by a blackout that affected most of and surface effects were observed 0758529 from the National Science the population, with power outages Foundation. Additional support was affecting selected regions for provided by the Pacific Earthquake days. Estimates of economic Engineering Research Center, Fed- damage are around $30 billion. eral Highway Administration, Ameri- According to the USGS (2010), can Society of Civil Engineers, and the earthquake epicenter was the host organizations of participat- in a zone where the Nazca ing individuals. plate is being subducted down- ward and eastward beneath Introduction the . The On Saturday, February 27, 2010, earthquake occurred as thrust at 03:34 a.m. local time (06:34:14 faulting on the interface be- UTC), an Mw 8.8 earthquake struck tween the two plates, with the central south region of Chile, an epicenter at 35.909°S, affecting an area with a population 72.733°W (just off the coast exceeding eight million people, in- 105 km NNE of Concepción) cluding 6.1M, 0.8M, and 0.9M in the and a focal depth of 35 km. urban areas around , Val- The estimated dimensions of paraíso/Viña del Mar, and Concep- the rupture zone were 500 km ción, respectively. Figure 1 shows long by 100 km wide. The the location of the main shock and earthquake struck in an area aftershocks relative to major cities. that had been identified as a In the region of strongest ground seismic gap, with projected shaking, ground accelerations worst case potential to produce exceeded 0.05g for over 120 s. an earthquake of Mw 8.0-8.5 Coastal locations were affected by (Ruegg et al., 2009). The rup- Figure 1. Main shock and aftershocks of both ground shaking and tsunami. ture zone extended beyond the Mw 4 and larger between 2/27/10 and Over 12 million people were esti- northern and southern boundar- 3/26/10 (USGS).

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resulted in drowned tidal flats and local areas of significant tsunami erosion. To the north, from about the town of to , there was little or no obvious uplift/ subsidence. The areas of coastal subsidence were exposed to sub- stantial tsunami runup and scour, as well as wave damage, whereas areas of substantial uplift generally had relatively little damage from tsunami waves. However, in coastal areas close to the epicenter with only moderate uplift (e.g., Concep- ción and ), there was sub- stantial damage related to both strong ground motions and tsunami runup.

Strong Motion The main shock of the earthquake was recorded by at least 15 strong motion instruments in the area Figure 2. Model of estimated surface deformation (after K. Wang, bounded by the cities of Santiago, 2010, personal communication), overlain by initial field estimates Viña del Mar, Angol, and Concep- of coastal uplift (GEER, 2010). ción. At the station nearest to the epicenter, , the accel- over an area more than 100 km uplift affected harbor facilities (Figure erometer maximum 1g range was wide and 600 km long, from Val- 3), produced an emergent marine exceeded. Several of the recording paraíso in the north to Tirúa in the platform, and exposed the tidal habitat instruments are analog, so process- south. This is equivalent to the zone. In the central part of the rup- ing is slow and still underway. Some entire coastline of and ture zone, coastal subsidence over a of the digital instruments have been Oregon. distance of about 50 km between the processed and reported in Boro- towns of Constitución and In south-central Chile, regional geo- schek et al. (2010) and National logic characteristics are largely con- trolled by long-term aseismic surface deformation, punctuated by sudden, coseismic coastal uplift and inland subsidence. These influence the pattern of ground motions and tsu- nami runup, and hence earthquake damage. The February 27 earth- quake produced both uplift and sub- sidence along the coastline (Figure 2), and the variable pattern of defor- mation may have affected tsunami impacts on coastal communities. Reconnaissance-based estimates of deformation (GEER, 2010) sup- port initial models of surface defor- mation. In the south, the Arauco Peninsula was uplifted and tilted gently eastward, with at least 2 m of coastal uplift on Isla Santa Maria and near the town of Lebu. The Figure 3. Fishing boats stranded within uplifted harbor of Lebu; uplift of 1.8 +/- 0.2 m in this area (photo: GEER, 2010).

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Table 1. Preliminary Processed Records Maximum Accelerations of the damaged structures there. (from Boroschek et al., 2010 and DGF 2010) The cities of Viña del Mar and Station Maximum Maximum , founded on marine and al- Horizontal Vertical luvial deposits, suffered extensive Acceleration Acceleration damage during the earthquake. (g) (g) Concepción is founded on a sedi- Santiago Universidad de Chile 0.17 0.14 Santiago Elevated Train Station Mirador 0.24 0.13 mentary valley, and the extensive Santiago CRS MAIPU 0.56 0.24 damage there was associated with Santiago Hosp. Tisne 0.30 0.28 site or basin effects. Among seven Santiago Hosp. Sotero de R’o 0.27 0.13 distinct zones in the city where Santiago Cerro Cal‡n 0.23 0.11 buildings or bridges collapsed cata- Santiago Campus Antumapu 0.27 0.17 El Roble Hill 0.19 0.11 strophically, six were parallel to the Vi–a del Mar (Marga Marga) 0.35 0.26 La Pólvora fault, which defines the Vi–a del Mar (Downtown) 0.33 0.19 northwest edge of the basin. Curico Hospital 0.47 0.20 Concepci—n Colegio San Pedro 0.65 0.58 Buildings. Liquefaction-induced Hospital 0.14 0.05 ground deformations affected the seismic performance of several modern buildings. At a recently Seismological Service (2010); addi- pass bridges exhibited markedly dif- constructed hospital in , tional records from research and ferent performance: two collapsed with ten structurally isolated wings private institutions have not been while the other two had only minor ranging in height from one to six reported yet. Table 1 summarizes damage. Another example of local stories, individual wings underwent the known peak accelerations. The site effects in Santiago was the se- differential settlement and rotation records show two to three minutes vere structural damage of high-rise due to extensive liquefaction. Four of vibrations (Figure 4). Shaking buildings observed at Ciudad Empre- 8-story condominium buildings lo- higher than 0.05g lasted more than sarial, a recently constructed busi- cated in Concepción on a site filled 60 s in most of the records, and ness park founded on deep silty/clay with compacted were dam- more than 120 s in Concepción area sediments. Published data show that aged by liquefaction-induced per- records. the fundamental periods of soil pro- manent ground movement and by files in the area approximately match Elastic response spectra of several strong shaking. The Riesco building the fundamental resonant periods records are higher than elastic de- at this site underwent 30 cm of dif- sign demands from the Chilean seis- mic design code NCh433; however, displacement spectra demands are in general lower than those required in the National Base Isolation Build- ing Code NCh2745. Some records show important contributions to total signal energy from periods higher than 1 s. This behavior could be related to source or local soil condi- tions. Soil conditions on several sta- tions are known only for the first 10 m, so further studies are required.

Geotechnical Effects Local Site Effects. Damage pat- terns observed in Chile suggest local site effects were important. For example, Santiago is located on an alluvial sediment-filled basin surrounded by the main and coastal ranges of the . Localized damage was observed along the Figure 4. Viña del Mar downtown area earthquake records. This same sta- Americo Vespucio Norte , tion recorded the 1985 Central Chile Earthquake. NS and EW are nominal where four structurally similar over- coordinates.

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there was lateral spreading at the east approach and several spans collapsed in the middle. The Bio-Bio Railroad Bridge, built in 1889 and retrofitted in 2005, also suffered dam- age associated with lateral spreading, including lateral pile movement and misalignment of the rails. Damage from lateral spreading was also ob- served at the La Mochita Bridge in Concepción (significant transverse movement), the Tubul Bridge in Tubul (collapse), and the Pulen and Pata- gual bridges near (moderate cracking and distortion). The Mata- Bridge, built in 2008 near Iloca, performed well, although lateral spreading was observed at both abutments, and up to 0.5 m of liq- uefaction-induced settlement was measured at one abutment. Localized ground failures also had Figure 5. Schematic plan view of the Riesco building in Concepción (GEER, widespread impact on highways 2010). throughout the region affected by ferential settlement across its foun- Bridge, built in 1974, was closed due the earthquake. Route 160 in Lota dation and 1 degree tilt in the north to column shear failure induced by along the coast was closed in both side of the building (Figure 5). As a lateral spreading at the approach, as directions due to embankment slope result of the uneven foundation set- well as interior pier settlement in ex- failures (Figure 7). Several ground tlement and rotation, excessive in- cess of 0.5 m due to liquefaction. failures were observed inland along ternal deformations were imposed (See also Transportation Systems the main north-south highway, Route on the coupling beams in the super- below and Figure 26). At the Bio-Bio 5, often resulting in the closure of structure. Several homes in north- Bridge, built in 1937 and closed in either northbound or southbound ern Concepción were torn apart by 2002 to all but pedestrian traffic, lanes (e.g., near Copihue, Parral, translational ground movement. Ports. Ports are essential facilities for the Chilean economy, as they carry more than 90% of the coun- try’s imports and exports. There was significant damage due to liq- uefaction and lateral spreading, notably at Valparaíso and Coronel. Figure 6 shows cracking of asphalt pavement at Coronel with lateral ground extension in excess of 1.2 m. Bridges and Roads. Liquefaction affected transportation systems most significantly along the coast. For example, all four bridges cross- ing the Bio-Bio River near Concep- ción were damaged to varying de- grees by liquefaction-induced ground failure. The Llacolen Bridge, built in 2000, suffered deck unseat- ing due to lateral spreading at its Liquefaction and lateral spreading-induced damage at the Port of north approach. The Juan Pablo II Figure 6. Coronel (photo: GEER, 2010).

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A conspicuous feature of the Chil- ean tsunami was its extreme varia- bility in height, destructiveness, and wave arrival times (Table 2). Local tsunami water height and arrival times were influenced by bathym- etry, coastal topography, aspect, fault slip, and localized subsidence and uplift due to the earthquake. The first tsunami surges generally arrived less than 30 minutes after the earthquake; in most areas, eye witnesses reported three or four distinct surges. The third or the fourth were typically the largest, arriving between 90 minutes and four hours after the earthquake. The highest water levels recorded by ITST groups were generally in the 10–12 m range, excepting Figure 7. Slope failure on Route 160 in Lota (photo: GEER 2010). splash values. Tidal variations of about 1.6 m from rise to fall in 20-30 minutes intervals were still and Paine). These failures were The Tsunami often associated with lowland observed in the Valparaíso area crossings or under-highway culverts. The earthquake produced a tsunami 7-8 hours after the earthquake, that caused major damage locally revealing the intense excitation the Earthen Structures. The perfor- over 500 km of coastline, from Tirúa Pacific Ocean experienced. mance of earthen structures — to Pichilemu, and at the Juan Fer- Tsunami damage to structures re- dams, levees, mine tailings dams, nandez Islands about 600 km off the sulted from hydrodynamic loading and retaining structures — was good coast. Around the Pacific, the tsunami on structural elements, impact load- overall. The earthquake struck near was recorded at over 150 locations, ing from floating debris, and scour the end of the dry season in Chile, triggering tsunami alerts (Warnings/ around foundations, especially dur- when reservoir levels are low. A Advisories) in 54 countries and ter- ing drawdown. Timber-framed small number of earth structures did ritories. Post-event field investigation homes and unreinforced or poorly exhibit adverse effects. For example, International Tsunami Survey Teams reinforced masonry structures were Coihueco Dam, which is a 31-m- (ITST) were coordinated by UNESCO particularly vulnerable (Figure 9). high zoned earth fill dam, had sev- and the International Tsunami Infor- In Dichato, 1500 homes were eral scarps along its upstream crest, mation Center (ITIC, 2010). as well as bulging along the up- stream toe. The most significant fail- ure of an earth structure was at the Las Palmas Tailings Impoundment, where liquefaction resulted in a flow failure of as much as 100,000 m3 of retained tailings a distance of up to 0.5 km and caused four casual- ties (Figure 8). Another interesting failure was in a 7-m-high earth levee constructed with a silty-sandy gravel with cobbles near Colbún. While this section of levee showed no signs of distress after both the February 27 event and a Mw 6.9 aftershock on March 11, it subsequently failed on March 13.

Figure 8. Upper scarp of Failed Tailings Impoundment (photo: GEER 2010).

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Table 2. Water Heights and Wave Arrival Times casualties and missing were attrib- Water Height Approximate Wave Arrival Time2 uted to the tsunami (Forensic Medi- Community meters1 1st 2nd 3rd 4th cal Service, 2010). With the notable 6 - 9 6:30 - 7:00 exception of Constitución (see Constituci—n 6.9 - 11.2, 26* 3:50 4:17 4:50 5:20 below), few coastal residents died in the tsunami, because of a high Dichato 3.6 - 9.4 4:00 5:00 7:30 of tsunami awareness. Older Iloca 4 - 8.2 4:00 4:25 residents had personal experience Juan Fernandez 5 4:25 4:40 of the 1960 earthquake and tsunami, Pellehue 7.2 - 9.3 4:15 7:30 and many coastal residents recog- Pichilemu 4 3:50 4:20 nized ground shaking as the warn- San Antonio 2.5 - 3.4 3:50 4:20 ing. Many towns had posted tsunami 3.3 - 6.3 3:54 5:30 6:00 6:40 hazard zone signs and/or tsunami Valpara’so 2.6 4:00 4:50 5:20 6:00 evacuation zone signs (Figure 12). 1 Compilation of preliminary water heights from NGDC (2010), ITST and EERI teams 2 Based on eyewitness accounts from ITST teams and (2010) In Chile, all schools are required to * Splash estimate prepare for local natural hazards, and the coastal schools had robust destroyed, primarily because of no were also damaged due to up- tsunami awareness and education hydrodynamic loads, though debris lifted large naval ships and barges. programs. generated by failed homes may Scouring of shallow foundations have progressively contributed to Most vulnerable were unaware tran- caused a number of buildings to col- the loading. Light-framed buildings sient populations. The single largest lapse (Figure 11). Sheetpile wharfs in were destroyed in many other coast- loss of life from either ground shak- Talcahuano Harbor collapsed or were al towns. Reinforced concrete build- ing or inundation was in Constitu- damaged by soil failure induced by ings, on the other hand, performed ción, where numerous people died tsunami inundation and drawdown. very well structurally, even when on La Isla Orrego in the River Maule Elevated pore pressures led to fluid- inundation reached well above the (LA Times, 2010). The island was ization of backfill during tsunami inun- second floor level. accessible only by boat, had no high dation and drawdown, causing severe ground, and was an informal camp- Bridges on coastal highways also scour that damaged sheetpile wharf ground packed on the weekend of sustained tsunami damage such as structures, machinery with shallow February 27. In other areas, camp- the lateral distortion of the super- foundations, and soil-supported pave- grounds were also filled. Campers in structure of the Pichibudi Bridge ments. Eyewitness reports from dock- Pellehue and Curanipe accounted just north of Iloca, the undermining workers indicated that the majority of for large numbers of fatalities. There of several piers due to scour and damage was caused by the tsunami. were no education programs target- the puncture of steel pile bents by According to Ministry of Interior data ing tourists or other transient popula- floating debris in the Cardenal Silva in May 2010, 124 of the 521 identified tions. Henriquez Bridge across the at Constitución. In Talcahuano, nonstructural dam- age was widespread; almost all exterior enclosures and contents of commercial buildings and industrial warehouses along the shorefront were damaged by the hydrodynamic loading of the flooding and debris field, and the commercial fishing facilities along the wharf were also rendered inoperable. Debris impact, particularly in the form of fishing vessels, shipping containers, and trucks, caused damage to masonry and steel-framed harbor buildings, though reinforced concrete struc- tures were generally able to with- Figure 9. Wood building on left in Dichato was transported from across street stand the battering (Figure 10). The and collided with the concrete frame building on the right. Arrow shows water piers at the Naval Base at Talcahua- height (photo: L. Dengler).

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Fortunately a 12-year-old girl who felt the earthquake rang a village bell, alerting most of the residents on (The Independent, 2010).

Buildings Earthquake shaking caused exten- sive damage to many non-engi- neered and engineered buildings throughout the affected area. The team focused on concrete, masonry, and adobe construction, as this constitutes the vast majority of buildings. Some damage to steel buildings also was observed, but is not reported here. The region contains a large number of older houses, churches, and other buildings constructed of adobe Figure 10. Talcahuano Harbor 3 days after the tsunami (photo: Intl. Federation of Red Cross Red Crescent Societies). Shipping containers were originally or unreinforced masonry. Seismic stacked in the area of the red ellipse and displaced up to 300 m in the direction resistance typically is provided by of the arrow. walls located around the perimeter and, to a lesser extent, at the inter- There were difficulties with Chile’s tween the earthquake and tsunami, ior. Absence of reinforcement and tsunami warning system. An initial the failure of the official warning weak connections between adjoin- warning was cancelled by the Navy’s system may have had little impact, ing walls apparently led to the col- Hydrographic and Oceanographic although there are some reported lapse of walls and roofs in many Services and announced on the ra- cases of people returning to the coast buildings, contributing to some hu- dio by Chile’s president. In Chilean after hearing of the cancellation. In man fatalities. In addition, delam- coastal communities, where most the Juan Fernandez Islands, 600 km ination of exterior stucco, while not people recognized natural warning off the coast, the lack of timely warn- jeopardizing the structural sys- signs and there was little time be- ings may have hindered evacuations. tem, created the appearance of significant damage in many other buildings. Damage was especially severe between latitudes 34.5° and 36.5°, a length of 240 km (Astroza et al., 2010). Figure 13 shows a typ- ical street scene from Talca. Historic churches were particularly hard hit, with extensive damage observed from Santiago to Concepción. Confined masonry construction is also widely used for buildings one to four stories tall (Figure 14). Exterior walls of clay bricks are first con- structed on a concrete foundation and then reinforced concrete confin- ing elements are cast around the brick walls, forming a tight bond be- tween the masonry and concrete elements. These buildings generally performed very well; typical damage Figure 11. This concrete frame and confined masonry building in Dichato (where observed) included diago- survived the hydrodynamic loads, but suffered substantial foundation scour nal cracking of masonry walls and (photo: G. Chock).

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walls framing from the corridor to ity of damage was concentrated in the building exterior. Typical ratios newer buildings. of wall to floor areas are relatively Figure 15 shows typical damage to high compared with concrete build- a transverse wall in the first story of ing construction in the U.S. In 1996, a ten-story building in Viña del Mar. Chile adopted a seismic code with Note the setback in the wall profile analysis procedures similar to those at this level, provided mainly to ac- in UBC-97, but there are no prohibi- commodate automobile access to tions or penalties related to vertical parking spaces. This condition was or horizontal system irregularities. observed in several buildings; in NCh433-1996 also enforces provi- buildings with subterranean parking, sions of ACI 318-95; however, in this damage was likely in the first light of good building performance level below grade. in the earthquake, it was not required to provide closely Figure 16 shows a failed wall from spaced transverse reinforcement a subterranean level of a 12-story around wall vertical boundary bars. building in which large steel pipe col- Starting in 2008, the new Chilean umns were being used to raise the Reinforced Concrete Code does re- building to enable repairs. Given the quire use of boundary elements. An wide spacing of transverse rein- Figure 12. Tsunami evacuation apparent trend is to use thinner walls forcement, there was little bearing sign, Curanipe (photo: N. Graehl). in recent years than in the past. section remaining in the thin wall and the entire wall section buckled wall failure due to lack of confining The team observed severe damage laterally. In this example the longi- elements around openings or poor to 31 concrete wall buildings (10-26 tudinal bars buckled without frac- quality of the confinements. stories) in or around Santiago, Viña ture; in many other examples the The vast majority of mid- to high- del Mar, Chillán, and Concepción. longitudinal bars were fractured. It rise buildings in Chile are construct- In Viña del Mar, damage was gener- was reported that, even though not ed of reinforced concrete. Most of ally concentrated in the alluvial plain required by the local building code, these rely on structural walls to re- directly north of the Marga-Marga some engineers used transverse sist both gravity and earthquake River, where a majority of the taller reinforcement conforming to the ACI loads; some more recent construc- buildings are located. Some build- Building Code. The team did not tion uses a dual system of walls ings damaged in the 1985 earth- observe that type of reinforcement in and frames. A typical high-rise plan quake (and repaired) were again any damaged buildings. has corridor walls centered on the seriously damaged (e.g., Festival longitudinal axis, with transverse and Acapulco); however, a major- Coupling beams over doorways along corridor walls are typically reinforced with small-diameter hoops at relatively large spacing (20 cm); many buildings had dam- age to these beams. Some build- ings omitted the coupling beams; in many cases, damage resulted from the slab acting as a coupling ele- ment. There were several examples of doors becoming jammed be- cause of permanent offsets in the walls adjacent to the opening. The team also observed spalled cover over lap splices of wall boundary reinforcement. Several of the severely damaged mid- to high-rise buildings had permanent offsets at the roof, appar- ently due to subsidence of walls, raising questions about repairability. Figure 13. Street in Talca (photo: J. Moehle). Four concrete buildings collapsed

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The recently com- and cable trays (Figure 19). The pleted 23-story widespread nonstructural damage O’Higgins 241 caused significant economic loss office tower in and major disruption to the normal Concepción suf- functioning of Chilean society. fered partial story With few exceptions (e.g., some new- collapses at levels er hospitals), Chilean practice on 10, 14, and 18, seismic anchoring/bracing of non- each coincident structural components lags consid- with a framing set- erably behind earthquake-resistant back (Figure 18). design practice for structural sys- The perforated tems. Although Section 8 of the Chil- shear walls on the ean seismic code (NCh 433.Of96) east face (shown) includes provisions for nonstructural and south face components, these are usually not showed damage to enforced unless requested by build- both wall piers and ing owners, as in newer hospital spandrels. Exterior construction. The state of practice is north and west similar to that for buildings construct- faces appeared ed in the early 1970s in California or undamaged. typical current practice in other U.S. regions of moderate seismicity. As Nonstructural with U.S. practice, for most buildings Components it is not clear who is responsible for Figure 14. Engineered confined masonry apartment and Systems the design, installation, and inspec- tion of seismic anchoring and bracing building, showing confining elements at boundaries of There was exten- of nonstructural components. walls and openings (photo: M. Astroza). sive nonstructural damage in practically all types of Nonstructural damage resulted in the completely or partially. Two of buildings — residential, commercial, closure of the international airports in these were nearly identical, proxi- and industrial. Commonly observed Santiago (see Figure 20) and Con- mate, five-story buildings in Maipú, was damage to glazing, ceilings, fire cepción, which together handle more Santiago. These buildings had four sprinkler systems, piping systems, el- than two thirds of the air traffic in stories of condominium units atop a evators, partitions, air handling units, Chile. The cost of the earthquake to first-story parking level with a highly irregular wall layout. Wall failure likely contributed to the collapses. A third collapsed building was the 15-story Alto Río condominium in Concepción (Figure 17). The team was unable to examine closely the side of the building toward which it collapsed, but the structural draw- ings indicate that concrete walls on the façade were discontinued, and the wall length was decreased in the first story on the side toward which the building collapsed. The building apparently rotated about its corridor walls as it collapsed, leading to tension failures of the transverse walls on the other side (the side from which the photo was taken). Some of the wall vertical reinforcement fractured and some lap splices failed on the tension side. Figure 15. Wall damage, Viña del Mar (photo: P. Bonelli).

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for 71% of all public hospitals in Chile. The Chilean Ministry of Health (MINSAL) found that of these, four hospitals became uninhabitable, twelve had greater than 75% loss of function, eight were operating only partially after the main shock, and 62% needed repairs or replacement. Of the beds in public hospitals, 18% continued to be out of service one month after the earthquake. MINSAL estimates the damage at $2.8B, and expects the replace- ment of severely damaged hospi- tals to take three to four years. The hospital operability study was focused on the Bio-Bio province of Chile. The only hospital in the cho- sen study area with structural dam- age is the Victor Rios Ruiz Hospi- Figure 16. Wall damage, Santiago. Note the 90-degree bends on the trans- tal of Los Angeles. In one of the verse reinforcement (photo: J. Wallace). newer buildings of this hospital, braced by concrete frames with LAN , the national in substantial economic losses. This is shear walls, the penthouse was Chile, was approximately $25 million especially important for critical facili- severely racked due to torsion, in lost passenger traffic alone. ties such as hospitals, airports, and and steel roof trusses buckled. water distribution systems. Two other buildings, circa 2005, Of the 130 public hospitals in re- had damage to some columns, gions affected by the earthquake, slight cracking on the shear walls, 62% suffered nonstructural dam- Hospitals and Health Care and collapsed in-fill walls. This wall age requiring repairs. Most of the The 130 hospitals in the six regions failure caused damage to nearby economic loss, closures, and evac- affected by the earthquake account uations in hospitals are attributed to nonstructural damage. For example, of the hospitals that were partially or completely closed as a result of the earthquake, 83% lost some or all functionality exclusively due to non- structural damage (they suffered no structural damage). Santiago’s 131 emergency call cen- ter (analogous to 911 in the U.S.), located in the uppermost level of the Posta Central building, suffered severe nonstructural damage and could not operate following the earthquake. Nonstructural damage also caused significant losses and disruption to industries associated with paper, wine, grain, and fruit. This earthquake illustrates the im- portance of improving seismic per- formance of nonstructural compo- nents, the failure of which can lead to injuries, loss of functionality, and Figure 17. Collapsed Alto Río tower showing underside (photo: J. Maffei).

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cracking of the plaster Lifelines over brick walls, and partition damage. The The TCLEE reconnaissance team collapse of ceilings and examined earthquake impacts to associated light fixtures electric power, telecommunication, and mechanical grills water and wastewater, gas and (Figure 21a) discomfited liquid fuel, and other lifelines (not occupants and caused presented here), and evaluated unsanitary conditions lifeline interdependence and resil- that led to many evacu- ience. The study of lifeline resilien- ations. cy must continue with a focus on cost-effective preparedness and A few hospitals also had loss reduction for lifeline service moderate water dam- providers. age from pipe failures. Most buildings that re- Electric Power. The transmission quired evacuation also network performed reasonably well lost use of elevators — and was ready to provide power due to lack of power or 24 hours after the main shock. The failure of the counter- long, narrow configuration of the weight rails — forcing system — dictated by the shape of staff to carry patients the country and the topography of down rubble-strewn the land — limits transmission line stairs. However, the route dispersion and system redun- only reported patient dancy. While much of the equip- casualties were due to ment is the same as that found in heart attacks. the , Chile makes extensive use of pantograph dis- Although no hospital lost connect switches and candlestick the capacity to Figure 18. O’Higgins 241 office tower (photo: E. provide all regular Miranda). service, all but one saw reduc- distilled water tanks, subsequently tions in multiple services for shutting down half of the hospital up to seven days. Radiologic surgical ward, located on the floor and laboratory services were below, due to water damage. The most affected by earthquake saw no evidence of structural dam- damage. In terms of patient age in any of the one-story hospi- care, the largest deficit was due tals of the Bio-Bio province built to the loss of 54% of beds in after the 1960 earthquake. the Los Angeles Hospital. With hospital non-clinical services, Although structural damage was the most frequent interruption minimal in hospitals, most suffered was due to the loss of patient nonstructural damage, and frequent- medical records (Figure 21b) in ly, loss of utilities. All hospitals in the collapsed and tipped file man- study area lost municipal electrical agement systems. power and communication for sev- eral days, and 71% lost their munici- The team visited three seis- pal water supplies. All hospitals were mically isolated hospital build- equipped with backup power and ings in Santiago; none was water supplies, but such redundancy damaged other than at joints was not present in their communica- with adjacent buildings or tion system, creating enormous diffi- other structures. In two cases, culties for aid coordination. immediately adjacent fixed- base buildings had moderate Figure 19. Nonstructural damage in the Additionally, most hospitals reported nonstructural damage. Talca Supreme Court building constructed damage to their suspended ceilings, in 2003 (photo: E. Miranda).

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live-tank circuit breakers, which are used sparingly in the western United States. There were more than 25 failures reported in these elements, but that represented only a small percentage of the inventory (Figure 22). The backbone 220 kV and 500 kV systems, which were designed with earthquake provi- sions, performed reasonably well overall. Lower voltage subtransmis- sion systems near the coast, where there were higher levels of ground shaking, were damaged sporadi- cally. The low-voltage distribution system was also affected by col- lapsed buildings and damaged poles. Two weeks after the earth- quake, the distribution system ser- Figure 20. Nonstructural damage at the Santiago International Airport ter- vice was restored. minal (photo: E. Miranda).

Telecommunication. Both landline difficult; additionally, many utilities damage to the various Essbio and wireless services were bedev- that relied on wireless service found water systems was concentrated iled by commercial power outages, it difficult to dispatch maintenance in Concepción and Talcahauno. equipment failures, building fail- crews in order to restore service. Areas within 60 m (or so) of river ures, and loss of reserve power in Both landline and wireless services often were affected by lateral most distributed network facilities were restored within seven days spreading and settlement, and (base stations, small remote switch- of the quake. tsunami-related destruction to build- es, and digital loop carrier [DLC] re- ings and sea walls damaged buried Water and Wastewater. Chilean water mote terminals). Only critical offices water pipes. At the Concepción- utility Essbio delivers potable water to have backup power generators, area water treatment plant, there urban areas, serving about 4 million with the majority of cell sites and was severe damage to the raw people. The potable water systems remote offices relying on battery water intake structure from both lat- include about 7,000 km of transmis- reserve power; by about 6:30 a.m., eral spreading and ground shaking; sion and distribution pipe, of which most cell sites and remote sites ran internal damage to the four clarifiers 1,200 km are in the city of Concep- out of power. Damage to roads and (baffles, settlers and supporting ción. By far the largest amount of bridges made access to these sites elements); damage to suspended

Figure 21. (a) Ceiling collapse and nonstructural damage in Chilean hospital (photo: W. Holmes), and (b) tedious reorganization of medical records three weeks after the earthquake (photo: J. Mitrani-Reiser).

12 EERI Special Earthquake Report — June 2010 ceilings (control room, water quality laboratory); toppling of control room computer monitors and computers; and toppling of water quality equip- ment and glassware from counter- tops. In the Concepción-area distribution system, there were 72 breaks or leaks to large diameter (500+ mm) welded steel pipes; as of April 12, 2010, about 3,000 re- pairs had been made to smaller diameter pipes, of which about 2/3 were for service laterals and 1/3 for pipe mains. Over the past 50 years, the federal government of Chile has construct- ed nearly 2,000 small rural potable water systems country-wide, of which about 420 were in the areas of strong shaking. At least 73 of the elevated tanks completely collapsed Figure 22. Damaged candlestick style live-tank circuit breakers (photo: (Figure 23). TCLEE). There was heavy damage to waste- ción. Both refineries shut down (loss is currently being imported. It has water systems, including treatment of power, need to appraise possible been estimated that three to seven plants, large-diameter interceptor damage) with only minor, non-critical months will be required to bring the pipes, and small-diameter collector damage. The Aconcagua refinery refinery to its operating capacity of pipes. Due to the damage, there near Santiago had minor damage and 130,000 barrels per day. were direct discharges of sewage restarted ten days after the earth- into rivers. Primary causes of dam- quake. At the Bio-Bio refinery near Lifeline Interdependence and Re- age were permanent ground defor- Concepción, the refractory in the heat- silience. Infrastructure interdepen- mations for pipes and inertial over- ers fell to the heater floors, and one of dence among power, transportation, loads to structures. the two steel crude oil pipelines feed- telecommunication and water sys- ing into the refinery failed due to liq- tems increased their loss of func- Gas and Liquid Fuel. Chile has uefaction and lateral spreading of tionality or delayed the restoration two principal oil refineries, one west beach . The gasoline and diesel processes. This additional loss of of Santiago and one in Concep- for the service area of this refinery functionality reduced regional re- silience, and it was triggered by physical and cyber interaction among lifeline systems, as well as by co- location, and by relational and logist- ical coupling among infrastructures and institutional entities. The early post-earthquake phase was characterized by uncertainty about road conditions and the ab- sence of power. Blackouts impaired telecommunication system - tion. Uncertainty about refinery shut- downs and fuel availability hampered water systems’ operation of the un- damaged and repaired portions of the network. Lack of telecommunica- tions during the blackout phase also led to delays in assessing the Figure 23. Typical collapsed elevated small steel tank (constructed in 1999) damage and safety of the power (photo: TCLEE).

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distribution system. This phase ports, and airports as noted above. Vertical rods and hold-down ties had different durations in different Highways and railroads between were provided to prevent uplift, regions, but for the Concepción Concepción and Constitución also after high vertical ground accel- area, it lasted about three days. had substantial tsunami damage. erations were recorded during the The subsequent phase was charac- The most serious damage occurred 1985 earthquake. These rods and terized by the increasing availability to roads and bridges. Of the nearly ties were largely ineffective in the of alternate transportation routes, 12,000 highway bridges in Chile, transverse direction, and many restoration of power at the sub- approximately 200 were damaged. spans slid sideways on their cap transmission levels, a steady recov- About 20 of these bridges had col- beams. This lack of restraint also ery of telecommunications, water lapsed spans. Before the mid-1980s, allowed a number of two-span and gas, and improving power deliv- the bridge design code in Chile bridges to rotate about a vertical ery to customers along main feeders was based on the provisions in the axis through the pier and slide off and then laterals. AASHTO Standard Specifications of their abutments seats (Figure 24). that time, with a seismic design coef- In addition, several skewed spans Although important underground, ficient of 0.12. This coefficient was with diaphragms and shear keys overhead, and surface level co- increased to 0.15 following the 1985 also rotated about a vertical axis located infrastructure was observed earthquake, and a modified version of and were unseated in their acute in the field, in only a few instances Division I-A of the AASHTO Standard corners, due to insufficient support were there interdependence- Specifications was adopted in 1998. length (Figure 25). Straight bridges induced failures. These included The design coefficient was not, how- built before the concession era and telecommunication, gas, and water ever, changed until 2001, when three those with cast-in-place diaphragms lines conveyed by collapsed or seismic zones were introduced with and concrete shear keys behaved excessively displaced bridges at PGAs of 0.2, 0.3, and 0.4g. Columns well. waterway crossings, electric train were required to be designed to the halts from power and telecommuni- Despite higher-than-anticipated requirements for Performance Cat- cation downed poles, rooftop tele- spectral accelerations, column dam- egories C and D of Division I-A. communication structure failures or age was slight, perhaps because interrupted operations at collapsed Since the mid-1990s, a number of ma- the lack of transverse restraint and buildings, and power distribution jor highways have been constructed insufficient support length allowed overhead lines pulled down by col- in Chile using design-build-and-oper- many superstructures to separate lapsed facades or structures. ate contracts with entities known as from their substructures, limiting concessions. Many of the bridges the demand on the columns. Where Most lifeline companies managed built by these concessions used pre- this did not happen, column dam- to avoid operational personnel cast, prestressed concrete girder su- age was more likely to occur, such shortages by supporting workers perstructures without diaphragms or as the shear failures of several col- with food and water provisions, and shear keys for transverse restraint. umns under the approach span to by linking to relative search pro- grams. However, the services of some companies, such as banks in dense urban areas, are not going to receive power and other utility services until demolition of tagged buildings takes place, despite hav- ing completed their own retrofit projects. Re-installation of utility infrastructure can interrupt their business for another three or four months. Further, the rate of lifeline restoration slowed down after a majority of customers were back on line, so the remaining residential and commercial users endured sig- nificant inconvenience and indirect losses. Figure 24. Lateral movement of the superstructure of Las Mercedes Bridge Transportation Systems across Route 5 near , due to absence of end diaphragms and Ground shaking and liquefaction transverse shear keys. Note extreme deformation of vertical seismic bars and damaged highways, railroads, damaged curtain walls (photo: Ministerio de Obras Públicas).

14 EERI Special Earthquake Report — June 2010 the Juan Pablo II Bridge across the designed to the recent NCh2369 seis- buckling of steel braces near the Bio-Bio River in Concepción, appar- mic design code for industrial facilities top of its main bagging facility, and ently due to imposed displacements performed well structurally; however, damage due to excessive move- from liquefaction-induced lateral significant downtime and losses ment of equipment. The Bio-Bio spreading (Figure 26). Other resulted from improperly anchored plant at Talcahuano apparently suf- bridges across the Bio-Bio River equipment and contents. fered more damage, but the team also suffered damage from lateral was unable to visit that installation. Wineries. Some older wineries with spreading, as noted above under adobe walls and timber roofs or Cellulose Plants. The large Arauco Geotechnical Effects. ribbed brick vaults sustained localized brown paper plant in Constitución The Ferrocarril del Pacífico S.A. collapses. Modern warehouse struc- had minimal structural damage from (FEPASA) maintains tracks paral- tures were minimally damaged, most- ground shaking, but much of the lel to the Pan-American Highway ly in the tension braces, but there was equipment was submerged and dis- (Route 5), and several areas of damage to steel fermentation tanks, placed from its original location by track and railway bridges were barrel stacks, and bottle storage the tsunami. Water damage to the damaged due to soil movement. racks. One wine industry representa- equipment controls systems was Several piers and bearings sup- tive reported that more than 75% of serious. Another Arauco cellulose porting the rail bridge at Chepe Hill total capital loss was from loss of wine plant at Nueva Aldea, near Chillán, across the Bio-Bio River in Con- from stainless steel tanks, with most appeared to have suffered no seri- cepción were damaged by lateral of the remainder from damage to the ous damage. spreading. Tsunami damage was tanks themselves. Local buckling of Power Plants. The team visited the reported between Constitución and legged tanks in many cases led to 350 MW Santa Maria power plant Talca; however, repairs were made subsidence or toppling that ruptured under construction in Coronel, south quickly, and the railroads were used piping or valves, leading to loss of of Concepción. The plant is about to help remove earthquake debris. wine (Figure 28). Total wine losses 60% complete and consists primar- were estimated at over 125M liters. Damage to the major ports of Val- ily of three very large braced steel paraíso and Concepción (Coronel) Cement Factories. The very large, frames. Damage was limited to por- has been attributed to strong shak- modern Bio-Bio cement plant south tions of the structure that had not ing and liquefaction-induced lateral of Curico (about 100km from the epi- been finished or where there was spreading, rather than the tsunami. center) suffered only minor damage seismic settlement under some foun- The San Antonio Port had been to its installations, mostly in the form dations that were on spread footings. reconstructed between 1992 and of fine shear cracks around some of Refineries and Steel Mills.The 1997, and was undamaged. A new, its larger concrete silos, some minor team was unable to enter either the seismically isolated wharf in Coronel (Figure 27), carrying two container cranes, was not damaged, whereas a neighboring conventional wharf of similar size had weld failures in some steel pile bents. Industrial Facilities The Chilean economy is heavily centered on minerals extraction, agricultural production, and forestry. The agricultural and wine produc- tion regions, stretching south from Santiago towards Valdivia, were affected by the earthquake, as were the paper and cellulose mills located in the areas from Consti- tución south. Steel mills, refineries, and cement and electricity plants in the Concepción area were also damaged, some seriously. The Figure 25. Unseating at the abutment of the skewed steel plate girder, Matta- overall impression from the team Bridge, north of Santiago, due to insufficient support length (photo: J. is that modern industrial facilities Arias).

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contents fell to the floor in Governance and Territorial Order. the extended shaking. A There are four tiers of territorial number of spectacular col- planning: national, regional (involv- lapses of stacked, unse- ing one or more provinces), inter- cured storage drums and municipal, and municipal. Nation- similar items were evident ally, the Ministry of Housing and in facilities. Urban Development is in charge of regulations and ordinances for Social Impacts, urban development and land use, Response, and building construction, and commu- Recovery nity facilities. The Ministry of the Interior is in charge of regional In the 1960 Valdivia earth- plans (http://www.subdere.gov.cl). quake, 428 per Regional planning is legally dele- million lost their lives; by gated to administrative regions by comparison, only 31 Chil- way of territorial regulatory plans eans per million lost their and intermunicipal plans, while lives in the 2010 quake. municipal plans and district plans This can be attributed to fall under the authority of municipal effective governance as governments. Neighborhood orga- measured by economic nizations provide local linkages to prosperity, physical infra- municipal and district planning. The structure standards, con- Ministry of Planning (www. struction code enforcement, Mideplan.cl) works on the social and state-society institution- well-being aspects of development. Figure 26. Shear failure in a column in northern al assets. Table 3 presents approach to Juan Pablo II Bridge across Bio-Bio a damage assessment Risk reduction and emergency mea- River, Concepción, due to lateral spreading and overview. Chile offers im- sures are articulated, if inconsistent- the propping action of the superstructure at the portant lessons in disaster ly so, at the various tiers of territorial top of the column (photo: J. Arias). policy and highlights the planning. Since 2002, the Program interplay between pre- and of Updating Territorial Planning Reg- ulations has modernized Chile’s large ENAP refinery or the CAP steel post-disaster social and spatial in- instruments of urban and regional mill in the San Vicente/Talcahuano equalities. There is an excellent oppor- planning, though it does not yet area. Both facilities were out of pro- tunity for long-term policy-relevant mandate risk assessment at each duction and appeared to have suf- research on the rebuilding of families, level of regional and local planning. fered significant structural damage. housing, neighborhoods, communities, livelihoods, and economies. Natural hazard risks are to be ad- Food Processing Facilities and Warehouses. The team entered only a limited number of these structures, but it appeared that most light industrial steel buildings per- formed well, even if the anchorages at the column bases would have been considered insufficient by to- day’s standards. Similar precast concrete structures did not fare so well, as there was evidence of con- nection distress in the wall panel connections and some panel col- lapses. Numerous examples of silo failures were observed; perfor- mance depended on support details and whether silos were full. Storage racks seem to have performed well even if the anchorage to the floors was minimal; however, most of their Figure 27. Base-isolated wharf at Coronel (photo: E. Miranda).

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ment and alert between ONEMI and ministries such as Defense, Interior, Housing and Urban Development, Health, and Education, Public Works, and the Hydrolographic and Oceanographic Institute. Clearly, the communication system requires upgrading, as the disaster interrupt- ed cell phone service, and few satellite phones are available. The need to strengthen local cap- acities refers not just to govern- ments, but also to synergies with non-governmental organizations. Universities responded quickly to the disaster by supplying volunteers Figure 28. Typical damage to storage tanks in wineries (photo: R. Leon). and other levels of support. The Red Cross (with centers in Santi- dressed in detail in a city-level gen- Although municipal emergency com- ago, Talca, and Concepción) and eral plan, but disaster management mittees carried out search and rescue the , operating often suffers from tensions between and damage assessment profession- through CARITAS, have been lead- territorial planning guidelines and ally, given the resources available, the ers in providing medical, material, private land development interests, central government’s slow emergency social, and psychological assis- especially in coastal zones. A Na- response led to some looting and tance. The Catholic Church’s hous- tional Coastal Commission contrib- breakdown in civic order. The plight of ing NGO, “Un Techo para Chile,” utes to the formulation of coastal the poor living in overcrowded condi- has built small housing settlements land use policy; however, its recom- tions was brought to public awareness (30-40 units on a site) in many mendations are not binding. The and everyone could see the two faces affected cities. Ministry of the Interior’s SUBDERE of the country: the modern versus the Insurance. Insured losses from the (Subsecretaria para Desarrollo Re- marginalized. earthquake are estimated in the gional y Administrativo) serves as The new president, Sabastian Piñera, $US 6-9 billion range. By law, the an intermediary between central is beginning the task of improving the water and electricity utility compa- government and regional-local gov- coordination of emergency manage- nies (which are privatized) are re- ernment.

Disaster Response. In general, the Table 3: Estimated Losses by Category Chilean government did not demon- strate sufficient central, regional, Loss Category Amount Location Deaths 521 All regions and local capacity for quick re- Missing 56 All regions sponse to disaster events. The cen- Victims (estimated injured, lost 800,000 All regions tral government’s National Emer- housing, died, and missing) gency Management Office (ONEMI), Housing 200,000 All regions (damaged or destroyed) located in the Interior Ministry, is Housing 12,000 Santiago small. (damaged or destroyed) Economic losses US $30 billion All regions In the early weeks, regional ONEMI Employment loss 15,000 jobs lost All regions offices were understaffed and Public sector losses US $9.33 billion All regions lacked direction from the main office Houses (total loss) 81,440 All regions Houses (heavy damage) 108,914 All regions in Santiago. The Army has been Houses (minor damage) 179,683 All regions widely praised for its effectiveness Housing damage 58,000 and comportment in maintaining Catholic churches 444 47% of all churches in post-disaster order, but it was not (heavily damaged) the country Impacted small cities 45 Over 5,000 deployed immediately for various inhabitants reasons, some having to do with its Impacted large cities 5 Over 100,000 historical association with General inhabitants Pinochet. Secondary schools 4,013 All regions (some damage) Source: Chile government documents

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Closing Remarks Chile is a country with stable institu- tions and a prosperous economy that, in response to a history of frequent strong earthquakes, has developed and implemented pro- grams and standards to improve safety and selective infrastructure operability following major earth- quakes. Like many other economi- cally developed countries in the world, including the United States, however, Chile is also a nation of in- come inequality and many marginal structures that are at higher risk to earthquake effects. The February 27, 2010, earthquake, with its long durations of earthquake ground shaking and ensuing tsunami in- undation, demonstrated both the effectiveness and the shortcomings of modern earthquake risk reduction programs. Consequently, the earth- Figure 29. Families displaced to temporary tent camps in the center of Talca. quake and its effects are especial- Construction of simple wood frame shelter is under way (photo: G. Franco). ly relevant and important to seismic risk reduction activities in other quired to have disaster insurance. the event in order to prevent people earthquake-prone parts of the Churches and public buildings were from returning to them. world. not insured, while insurance cover- The central government proposes age for residential buildings varied. This brief report highlights some of a variety of recovery housing solu- Ninety-five percent of households the principal observations from a tions. For families living in govern- with mortgages did carry the re- number of reconnaissance teams ment-supported apartments, their quired seismic insurance, but few that studied the February 2010 units will be rebuilt on site. Extremely who owned their houses without a earthquake. The earthquake and poor families, and families who lost mortgage did. Although content its effects put forth a wealth of data, their houses, have no titles, or live in coverage is very low, owners are some already gathered and some high-risk zones will be relocated to paid full structural coverage if a yet to be discovered, on subjects new locations, and such settlements house cannot be repaired, and six including ; geologic and will be supported by the Housing months of rent if it is not habitable. geotechnical effects; strong earth- Solidarity Fund. Destroyed or severe- There was no insurance for adobe quake ground motion; tsunami; ly damaged adobe houses in rural buildings, which represented two- performance of buildings, bridges, and urban zones will be rebuilt on thirds of the residential losses. and lifelines; early warning, emer- the same sites with support from gency response, civil protection, Reconstruction. Many families the Housing Solidarity Fund and the and health care; and social impacts have camped out across from their Construction in Residential Sites and long-term recovery. Continued destroyed or damaged houses in Program. study, including focused research small settlements of 10-12 families, Damaged houses in zones of tradi- and detailed documentation, can and most expect to return to and tional (típica) Chilean building style produce data and procedures to rebuild on their own parcels. Other will be rebuilt to original styles with more effectively reduce losses and victims are living with family or special architectural heritage funds. improve resilience following future friends in nearby towns, or are rent- People lacking earthquake insurance, earthquakes. Team members urge ing locally if possible. Structures but not poor, will be able to obtain that these studies become a high have been quickly demolished in a favorable loan. Low-income priority. many towns and cities. Most build- families will be provided a subsidy ings that had been declared unsafe and technical assistance for repair of were bulldozed within two weeks of their dwellings.

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Individuals from the Ministerio de Obras Públicas who greatly assisted the bridge team include José Orte- ga, Mauricio Guzmán and Sandra Achurra. The GEER team. Co-Team Lead- ers: Jonathan Bray (UC Berkeley), David Frost (Georgia Tech), Ramon Verdugo (U Chile), Christian Ledez- ma (U Católica), and Terry Eldridge (Golder Associates). Team Members: Pedro Arduino (U Washington), Dominic Assimaki (Georgia Tech), Youssef Hashash (U Illinois),Tara Hutchinson (UC San Diego), Laurie Johnson (Laurie Johnson Consulting), Keith Kelson (Fugro William Lettis & Associates), Robert Kayen (USGS), Gonzalo Montalva (U Concepción), Robb Moss (Cal Poly SLO), George Mylo- nakis (U Patras), Scott Olson (U The Puertas Verdes Camp in the outskirts of Constitución has Figure 30. Illinois Urbana-Champaign), Kyle capacity for about 100 families (photo: G. Franco). Rollins (BYU), Nicholas Sitar (UC Berkeley), Jonathan Stewart Team Members (-Manoa), Carlos Sempere (UCLA), Alfredo Urzúa (Prototype (Forell/Elsesser), Mark Sereci (Digi- The EERI team. Co-Team Leaders: Engineering Inc.), Rob Witter (Ore- texx Data Systems), William Siem- gon Dept of Geology and Mineral Jack Moehle (UC Berkeley), Rafael bieda (Cal Poly, San Luis Obispo), Riddell (U Católica), and Rubén Industries), and Nick Zoa (U Mary- Jennifer Tanner (U Wyoming), Rich- land). Boroschek (U Chile). ard Tardanico (Florida International U), Team Members: Tony Allen (WA John Wallace (UCLA), Mark Yashinsky Contributors: Scott Ashford (Oregon DOT), Daniel Alzamora (FHWA), (Caltrans), W. Phillip Yen (FHWA), State U), David Baska (Terracon), Juan Arias (U Nevada-Reno), Scott Farzin Zareian (UC Irvine). Jim Bay (Utah State U), Rodrigo Ashford (Oregon State U), Richard Betanzo (U Concepcion), Rubén The following additional individuals Boroschek (U Chile), Gabriel Candia Bissell (U Maryland), Ian Buckle (U from three Chile universities contrib- Nevada-Reno), Mehmet Çelebi (UC Berkeley), Leonardo Dorador uted generously to the EERI team (U Chile), Aldo Faúndez (Servicio (USGS), Alvaro Celestino (Degen- reconnaissance. kolb Engineers), Genda Chen (MO de Salud Arauco), Gabriel Ferrer Univ Science & Technology), Gary Federico Santa Maria Technical Uni- (U Católica), Lenart González Chock (Martin and Chock, Inc.), Jeff versity: Professors Patricio Bonelli and (Golder Assoc.), Katherine Jones Dragovich (NIST), Luis Fargier Gab- Carlos Aguirre, with Arturo Millán. (UC Berkeley), Dong Youp Kwak (UCLA), Jaimé Salazar Lagos aldon (U Los Andes, ), The Pontificia Universidad Católica de Guillermo Franco (AIR Worldwide), (Burgos Arquitectos), José Miguel Chile: Professors Juan Carlos De La Lopez (Vale Exploraciones), Walter Jeffrey Ger (FHWA), William Holmes Llera, Matias Hube, and Carl Lüders, (Rutherford & Chekene), Tom Kirsch Lopez (UCLA), Eduardo Miranda with Vicente Ariztía, Juan Jose Besa, (Stanford), Claudio Medina (Golder (Johns Hopkins U), Roberto Leon Alvaro Carboni, Claudio Frings, Juan (Georgia Tech), Joe Maffei (Ruther- Assoc.), Sebastian Maureira (U Pablo Herranz, Cristobal Moena, Chile), William Siembieda (Cal Poly, ford & Chekene), Mike Mahoney Rodrigo Oviedo, Victor Sandoval, (FEMA), Eduardo Miranda (Stan- San Luis Obispo), Constanza Tapia Nicolas Santa Cruz, César Sepúlveda, (U Católica), Mesut Turel (Georgia ford), Judith Mitrani-Reiser (Johns and Benjamin Westenenk. Hopkins U), Gilberto Mosqueda Tech), and Claudia Welkner (Golder (SUNY Buffalo), Gokhan Pekcan (U The Universidad de Chile: Professors Associates). Nevada-Reno), Rodrigo Retamales María Ofelia Moroni, Leonardo Mas- A Humboldt State University team, Saavedra (Rubén Boroschek y sone, and Rodolfo Saragoni. operated through UNESCO’s Inter- Asociados Ltda.); Ian Robertson

19 EERI Special Earthquake Report — June 2010

national Tsunami Survey Team The success of the reconnaissance ticle&id=2&Itemid=5. protocols, included Team Leader teams was a direct result of gener- Los Angeles Times, 2010. “In Chile, Lori Dengler (HSU), Troy Nicolini ous assistance of numerous individu- a father’s hope washed away,” (NWS), Sebastian Araya (Stillwater), als and organizations in Chile. The March 22, http://articles.latimes. Nick Graehl (HSU grad student), and list of names is too long to include in com/2010/mar/21/world/la-fg- Francisco Luna (freelance journalist). this short report but instead can be chile-survivor22-2010mar22. found at http://www.eqclearinghouse. The TCLEE team. Team Leader org/20100227-chile/published-reports/ Ministry of the Interior, Chile, 2010. Alex Tang, (L&T Consulting Inc); eeri-newsletter-insert/additional- www.interior.gov.cl. Team Members: Sonia Castellanos acknowledgments. of Emerson Network Power; Tom Ministry of Housing, Chile, 2010. Cooper (T. W. Cooper Inc); Leon- http://www.minvu.cl/opensite_ ardo Dueñas-Osorio (Rice U.); References det_20100329164111.aspx. John Eidinger (G&E Engineering Astroza, M., F. Cabezas, M. Moroni, National Geophysical Data Center System); Bill Fullerton (The Louis L. Massone, S. Ruiz, E. Parra, (NGDC), 2010. NOAA/WDC Berger Group Inc); Eduardo del F. Cordero, A. Mottadelli, 2010. Historical Tsunami Data Base, Canto Hidalgo (Civil Aeronautics Intensidades Sismicas en el Area http://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/ Administration); Roy Imbsen (Earth- de Daños del Terremoto del 27 de hazard/tsu_db.shtml. quake Protection Systems, Inc); Febrero de 2010. Santiago: Univ. Leon Kempner (Bonneville Power of Chile. National Seismological Service, Adm); Alejandro Kolbe (Ministry of 2010. Cauquenes Earthquake, Boroschek, R., P. Soto, L. Leon, D. Public Works); Alexis Kwasinski (UT February 27, 2010. Servicio Sis- Comte, 2010. Central-South Chile Austin); Solange Loyer (Universi- mologico Technical Report, Univ. Earthquake February 27, 2010. dad Católica de la Santísima Con- of Chile, April 3 (Spanish). 4th Preliminary Report. Univ. of cepción); Juan Arrese Luco (Ministry Chile, April 5 (Spanish). Ruegg, J.C., et al., 2010. “Interseis- of Public Works); Eduardo Mesina mic strain accumulation mea- (Ministry of Public Works); Rodrigo Cisternas, M, B.F. Atwater, F. Torre- sured by GPS in the seismic gap Lopez Muela Parra (Civil Aeronau- jo´n, Y. Sawai, G. , M. between Constitución and Con- tics Administration); Allison Pyrch Lagos, A. Eipert, C. Youlton, I. cepción in Chile,” Physics of the (Shannon & Wilson Inc); Hugh Rud- Salgado, T. Kamataki, M. Shishi- Earth and Planetary Interiors, nick (Catholic University, Santiago); kura, C. P. Rajendran, J. K. Malik, 175, pp. 78-85. Anshel Schiff (Stanford); Mauricio Y. Rizal & M, Husni, 2005. “Pre- Villagran (Universidad Católica de decessors of the giant 1960 Chile Technical Council on Lifeline Earth- la Santísima Concepción); Yumei earthquake,” Nature, V. 437, quake Engineering (TCLEE), Wang (Oregon Dept Geology and doi:10.1038, p. 404 – 407. 2010. “Preliminary Report on the Mineral Industries). 27 February 2010 Mw8.8 Off- El Mercurio, 2010. “Gobierno evalúa shore Maule, Chile Earthquake.” norma de edificación costera,” http://www.eqclearinghouse. Acknowledgments March 31, http://diario.elmercurio. org/20100227-chile/published- The research, publication, and distri- cl/detalle/index.asp?id={6b20c703- reports bution of this report were funded by 8069-41a5-bb6a-28b9ac30dae6}. the EERI Learning from Earthquakes The Independent, 2010. How 12- Forensic Medical Service (SML), project, under grant #CMMI- year-old girl saved her Chilean 2010. Lista fallecidos, http://www. 0758529 from the National Science island from catastrophe, March interior.gov.cl/filesapp/Lista_ Foundation (NSF). Geology and 4, http://www.independent. fallecidos.pdf. geotechnical engineering aspects co.uk/news/world// were based on GEER studies sup- GEER, 2010. “Geo-engineering Re- how-12yearold-girl-saved-her- ported by NSF under Grant # CMMI- connaissance of the 2010 Maule, chilean-island-from- 1034831. Chile Earthquake,” report of NSF- catastrophe-1915821.html. Sponsored GEER Association Any opinions, findings, and conclu- United States Geological Survey Team, J. Bray & D. Frost, eds., sions or recommendations are those (USGS), 2010. http:// http://www.geerassociation.org/ of the authors and do not necessarily earthquake.usgs.gov/ reflect the views of NSF. FHWA and International Tsunami Information earthquakes/eqinthenews/2010/ PEER provided financial support for Center (ITIC), 2010. 27 February us2010tfan/#details. the bridge reconnaissance team. 2010, MW 8.8, Off Central Chile, ASCE provided financial support for http://193.191.134.38/itic/index. the TCLEE report on lifelines. php?option=com_content&view=ar

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