The Question of the Future of Indian Muslims in Malaysia: the Post-Mahathir Legacy Era

Home , 1999 in Malaysia, Datuk, Datuk (Minangkabau), HINDRAF, Jawi Peranakan, Lina Joy

AFRICAN AND ASIAN STUDIES African and Asian Studies 11 (2012) 219-246 brill.nl/aas

The Question of the Future of Indian Muslims in Malaysia: The Post-Mahathir Legacy Era

Ahmad Noor Sulastry Yurni* Department of Anthropology & Sociology, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, University of Malaya, 50603 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia E-mail: [email protected]; [email protected]

Abstract The Malays, Chinese and Indian community in Malaysia have been homogenized since British colonialism. The existence of Indian Muslims’ identity caused a new paradigm shift in Malaysia involving the racial discussion. This paper traces the diffference in Indian Muslims’ identities from Indian and the Hindus. I argued that Indian Muslims share Islam as their religion and faith, while maintaining a Malay way of life and custom in their daily practices. In Malaysia, the Indian Mus- lim community struggled to place their future in terms of social, economic allocation and political justifĳication among the other communities. However, the strength of ethnic politics clearly charted out their involvement in the political base and moved them to fĳight for their cause and rights. Hence, today’s Indian Muslim community has caused an Islamic resurgence, which has brought a new Indian dimension as a whole.

Keywords homogenized; religion; race; identity and human rights

Introduction As a multi-racial country, Malaysia has four major ethnic groups, each with its own traditions: Malay, Chinese, Indian and the indigenous people. Indians form 7.8 percent of the country’s total population of 27 million and are mostly Hindu with origin from Tamil Nadu. The Muslim Malays form 60 percent of the population while the Chinese, who account for 25 percent, are Buddhists or Christians. Malaysian Indians are largely descended from those who migrated from Southern India during the British colonization of Malaya. Prior to British

* Dr. Ahmad Noor Sulastry Yurni is a Senior Lecturer, Department of Anthropology & Sociol- ogy, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, University of Malaya.

Downloaded from Brill.com09/26/2021 03:16:23PM via free access 220 Ahmad, N. S. Y. / African and Asian Studies 11 (2012) 219-246 colonization, Tamils had been in the archipelago much earlier, especially since the period of the South India kingdom of the Cholas in the 11th century. By that time, Tamils were among the most important trading peoples of maritime Asia (Sneddon, 2003:73). The Indian people were introduced here by the British nearly 200 years ago as laborers, many of them remained even after India attained independence. According to Syed Husin Ali (2008: 1), Malay Peninsula’s people are regarded as the ‘sons of the soil’ (Bumiputera). They live together with various immigrant groups, most of whom were encouraged to come here by the British colonial rulers. In a diffferent context the term ‘Malay’ has many meanings. Taking a wide social and cultural defĳinition, the term not only refers to those who are settled in the Peninsula, but also it includes those in the larger areas of the Malay Archipelago, embracing the Malay Peninsula and thousands of islands which today form the Republics of Indonesia and the Philippines. Although they are divided into many sub-groups, and perhaps just as many dialects, lin- guistic and cultural experts always consider them as belonging to the same stock, known as the Malays or Malayo-Indonesians. Indeed the Malay world covers a wide area, and its people constitute one of the major racial groups of the world.1 Furthermore, Syed Husin Ali (2008) asserted that the defĳinition of Malay has become more complex in the context of two other issues, namely its legal defĳinition and the newly coined term Bumiputera (son of the soil). Accord- ing to the Malaysian Constitution, a Malay is defĳined as “a person who pro- fesses the Muslim religion, habitually speaks Malay, conforms to Malay custom and: (a) was born before Merdeka day, in the Federation or Singapore or born of parents one of whom was born in the Federation or Singapore or was on the Merdeka Day (31 August 1957) domiciled in the Federation or Singapore; or (b) is the issue of such a person.” (Article 160) (2008: 2).2 Both the discussion of the Malays and the question of the ‘given’ privileges to the Malays have been questioned ever since the Malayan Independence in 1957. This

1 Quite often when the term Malay is referred, we think only of those living in the Peninsula. Descendants of the Malays in the Philippines are now known Filipinos, while those in the former Dutch territories are called Indonesians (Syed Husin Ali, 2008: 2). 2 According to the Malaysian Constitution, the Malays are guaranteed a special position that is the responsibility of the Yang DiPertuan Agong to protect them. Some of the examples that the Malays have been the privilege of getting the recruitment into the civil service, awards of scholar- ships, opportunities for education and training, and the issue of licenses and permits. In 2010, with the new administration of Datuk Seri Mohd Najib Abdul Razak, he implemented the new policy of housing privilege to all races especially the low income group to encourage them to buy a house in order to encourage the economic strategy.

Downloaded from Brill.com09/26/2021 03:16:23PM via free access Ahmad, N. S. Y. / African and Asian Studies 11 (2012) 219-246 221 article will identify the problems in the discussion and the Indian Muslim’s positions in the Malaysian Constitution with the new administration after the Mahathir legacy. Statistically, the majority of the Malaysian people considered Malays are Muslims. Thus, Syed Husin Ali has asked: Is there any Malay who is a Hindu today and brought a new challenge to the discussion? He pointed out that this practiced is diffferent from Indonesia, where the spread of Hinduism and its culture have left many adherents, particularly in East Java and Bali. The influence of Islam on the Malays is very deep-seated from the time they discarded their animistic beliefs and embraced Islam during the days of the Melaka kingdom. The Malays have never changed their religion (Syed Husin Ali 2008: 57). The Muslims who intended to change their religion would be facing strong sanctions or downright condemnation from their families and communities. The Malaysian Constitution of 1963 does not allow others to induce Malays to leave Islam. The consequences are serious when and if Malay leaves his religion, even of his own volition. This will be highlighted in this article, whereby in the case of Muslims persistent of the race, the Muslims faced the conflict in the events such as marriage, death, wealth and many others. The objective of this paper is to highlight how the Islamic administration in Malaysia sorted out the problems pertaining to religion issues and how the Malaysians have responded to the practices. The Malays in the Peninsula had long relations with other ethnic groups, not only those who are from this region but also those from other areas. In the 2010 census, the population of Malaysia was 28,300,000: Malays were 60.3 percent, Chinese were 22.9 percent and Indians were 6.8 percent of the total population. Indians were the minority among the main three major ethnic groups, while it seems that the Malays are very signifĳicant in numbers. The focus of this article is not only to bring the Malays into a very big picture but also Indians who embraced Islam as their religion to be an important part of this discussion. However, the fact that the Malays are the majority population in Malaysia and Islam is the offfĳicial religion in the Malaysia Constitution leads to project an important scenario, necessitating the construction of a bigger picture in the country today. The analysis is about difffering characterizations of the state. Ethnicity has been depicted as variously related to the collapse of traditional authority struc- tures, the state’s managerial institutions, the factional rivalries amongst political elites, regional economic disparities, and class structure of society (Hutchinson & Smith 1996: 305). They added that if each or any of these fea- tures of the political, social and economic environment were intrinsic to the nature of ethnicity, then the discussion would contain a central inconsistency.

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It has been argued, however, that these aspects of the environment are only contingently related to ethnicity, while what is intrinsic to ethnicity is its ideo- logical character – as a psychological and political kinship myth. Hutchinson & Smith asked why there is endemic ethnic violence in Burma, fragile but generally non-violent ethnic relations in Malaysia, and generally harmonious ethnic relations in Singapore – all of which pictures the real situation of the discussion (Hutchinson & Smith 1996: 306). One of the crucial factors influencing the relative success of the diffferent states in implementing their ethnic strategy relates to the capacity of the state. The state’s ability to manage ethnicity, according to Hutchinson, depends on its capacity to manage ethnicity. These factors relate to the ambiguities evident in the states’ por- trayals of the nation and to the role played in ethnic-state relations by the ideology of democracy (1996: 306). It is very interesting to discuss the issue of ambiguity in the defĳinition of a nation. It is quite clear that the state elites consider cultural nationalism to offfer a stronger basis for political cohesion and societal loyalty than what does political nationalism. Indeed, political nationalism is perceived to be both western in origin and colonialist in its connotations. Despite its cultural plural- ism, each of the Southeast Asian societies can derive, from its pre-colonial history, an image of dominant cultural attributes and values, which form the core for the defĳinition of contemporary nationhood. Each society therefore seeks to portray the culturally plural society as one which is potentially culturally homogeneous and which already has a cultural core around which nationhood can develop. For Malaysia, this cultural core is the Bumiputera attribute. The discussion does not end here, but employing two diffferent languages of nationhood leads to two incompatible defĳinitions of citizenship that exhibit a sense of confusion and grievance amongst those who perceive themselves as unfairly culturally marginalized by the state. This takes us to the question of the status of Indian Muslims in Malaysia. According to Hutchinson, the political implication is to show that such minority cultural groups, such as Indians, become in varying degrees alienated from the state (Hutchinson 1996: 308). However, this is not happening in Malaysia’s democratic political system. Indians, just as other ethnicity, received their rights in their respective manner according to the Malaysian Constitution. The main objective to be raised in this article is to focus on the dilemma of Indian Muslims in Malaysia in facing the contemporary challenge in issues such as religion and ethnicities. The main highlighted examples in the paper are to exhibit the common conflict involving the ethnicity itself and the local authorities toward the effforts of achieving the solutions. Hence, with racial polarization under the British colonialism, the impact became greater and

Downloaded from Brill.com09/26/2021 03:16:23PM via free access Ahmad, N. S. Y. / African and Asian Studies 11 (2012) 219-246 223 brought many eyes to respond to this dilemma locally and internationally, until the government was questioned about the values of democratic way of practices. The methodology of this research is based on the qualitative approach. It supplements the arguments with some informal interviews, conducted to achieve the objective of the research. The aspects of religion and ethnicities were two major issues and ‘controversial’ in their own unique ways. However, this paper will try to discuss some important problems that hunt the answer within the religion, democracy and multi-ethnicity in Malaysia.

Knowing the Indians, Malays and Indian Muslims Community: Conﬂict or Harmony Examining Indian Muslims that are originally or converted to Islam during their migrations to Tanah Melayu (The Malay Land) or Semenanjung Tanah Melayu (The Malay Peninsula) reveals an incomplete history. The British viewed Indians as a docile, passive and cheap source of labor. The picture of the “Indian coolie” fĳitted into this perception even more than the one of the more independent Chinese laborer. However, the complete institutionaliza- tion of the Indian community as a dependent workforce did not proceed as smoothly as the inculcation of the Malays into the colonial system. Despite lacking a “protector” to defend their interests, the Indians emerged from a much greater variety of social and ethnic backgrounds, unlike the mostly homogeneous group of rural peasantry-oriented Malays3 (Stark 2007: 385). In some cases, the discussions of ethnic and relations in Malaysia have tended to neglect the Indian social structure. The analysis of social structure has been less emphasized, mainly because the Indian community is not identi- fĳied as an economic or political threat to the Malays or the Chinese. Comparing with the Chinese, the Indians had a common immigrant status, and their

3 According to Stark (2007: 385), the inter-linkages between Indian and Malay identity has already manifested themselves from the eighteenth century onwards in the Jawi Peranakan: speaking Malay and adhering to Islam, the ethnic boundaries between the two remained far less pointed than between the Malay and the Chinese. Nevertheless, the degree of ethnic identifĳica- tion of the Jawi Peranakan produced rather ambiguous results: on the one hand, Indian Muslims had been far more successful than the Malays in establishing themselves together with the Chi- nese as the merchant class of the urban settlements under the British rule, among which Penang and Melaka are two outstanding examples. On the other hand, it might have exactly been this “emancipation” from the traditional Malay kingship that prompted the Jawi Peranakan to question their perceptions of race and kinship that were being overhauled simultaneously by the Brit- ish. Neither being part of the well-preserved traditional Malay community, nor belonging to the Indian wage labor migrants, the Indian Muslims emerged at the forefront of the newly developing debates on Malay nationalism, Malay ethnicity and Islam.

Downloaded from Brill.com09/26/2021 03:16:23PM via free access 224 Ahmad, N. S. Y. / African and Asian Studies 11 (2012) 219-246 presence is due to the existence of the plantation rubber industry, a sector which was almost entirely controlled by European capital. Indians and Malays have an exploitative relationship. The Indians have a low political profĳile in relation to Malay interests. To an extent, their conflict- generating potential has been minimized. Generally, the social structure of the Indian community was characterized by social class and caste cleavages, such that ethnic consciousness and ethnic solidarity failed to develop as a meaningful basis for the identity and enhancement of the interests of the community as a whole. In this respect, because the ‘initial conditions’ for the creation of the Indian population were directly related to the establishment of the plantation economy and to a unique plantation culture, the class-race dimension in this setting is to be seen as an ‘ideal-typical’ case (Abraham 2004: 255-256). In the Peninsula, religion, language and custom have been instituted as the yardsticks for identifying the Malays. If both socio-cultural and legal factors are taken together to determine who should be included or excluded as Malay, then many of the questions that have been posed in the context of this work can be easily answered. A Javanese who only speaks his mother tongue or the Malay offfĳicer with Westernized ways can both be categorized as Malay stock. Similarly, the Melaka Baba who has embraced Islam can gradually be assimi- lated as Malay, in the same way as descendants of Pakistanis, Indian Muslims and Arabs have also been regarded as Malays and are accorded the same privileges as hereditary Malays (Syed Husin Ali 2008: 7). The discussion above has attracted the question of whether the non-Malays Muslim, especially the Indian Muslims who regard themselves Malays should be granted the same privileges. Fortunately, the discrepancy was rectifĳied when the constitution extended the special position for all Bumiputera. Accord- ing to Syed Husin Ali (2008), by defĳinition, those who are regarded as akin historically and socio-culturally may have to be legally divided into several sub-groups, while those who do not historically and socio-culturally belong to the Malay stock have to be regarded as Malays merely because they fulfĳill the conditions laid down in the constitution (2008: 6-7). These clearly defĳine the position of those Malays and diffferentiate Malays from non-Malays despite their religion. The Malays’ acknowledgement of Indians as part of the community has been persistent to the past historical moment. Their endowed citizenship has uplifted the Indian status as part of the Malayan community. When the Malay- sian community was formed and the political leadership among Indians were strengthened with the formation of Malayan Indian Independence, Malays faced the Indians harmoniously as the Indians were not considered economic threats to the Malays and Chinese.

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During Abdul Razak’s administration, the education system that provided the Tamil School for the Indians was introduced, as reported in the Laporan Razak 1956. The education policy was granted for the Indians as to provide a better education for the Indians as well as to the Malays and Chinese. With the divide and rule policy during the British rule, the members of the Malayan community were segregated based on their race, status and locations which discouraged harmonious relationship among them. However, the strong friendliness bond between the people in Malaya during the 1950s enabled the Malays, Chinese and Indians to accept each other as they achieved the independence from the British rule in the 1957. With the current policy and administration especially during the Mahathir era, they enjoyed the same portion of cake in most important aspects of life. This situation succeeded in the Abdullah’s era as well. Today, Najib’s succeeded the same way and provide a bigger portion of sharing the economic cake to Malaysians since the political tsunami in 2008. The analytical framework of the study showed clear evidence that the dichotomy was used by the colonial government as part of its ideology in emphasizing the inferiority of the Malays in economic roles when compared to the Chinese and Indians as to facilitate the massive immigration of the latter to the tin and rubber industries as cheap labour. As far as the colonial government was concerned, the model, at least up to the period of the 1930s, was applicable in the maintenance of political stability. The social and cultural plu- ralism approach also emphasized the signifĳicance of ethnicity itself as an independent variable. The elements of prejudice and attitude were the major factors, which led to the domination of one ethnic group by the other. This body of theory has been of particular signifĳicance in the Malaysian situation (Collin 2004: 385-386). It should be noted that the emergence of ethnic consciousness, internal stratifĳication, dependency relationships and political ideology rationalizes and legitimizes inequalities as the necessary conditions. According to Collin, ethnic groups have developed a sense of ethnocentrism because they were faced with a situation of economic competition and political discrimination such that each of these necessary conditions taken together constituted a sufffĳicient condition for the emergence of a race relation situation (Noel 1972: 279). This was the root of racial polarization (2008: 389). It is incomplete to picture the real situation of the Indians, Islam and Indian Muslims in the contemporary multiethnic societies in Malaysia. At the time of Independence in 1957, one of the symbols of the Malay model of the state was the adoption of Islam as “the religion of the Federation” (Malaysian Constitu- tion 1957, Article 3(1). In 1958, when a member of the legislative council raised

Downloaded from Brill.com09/26/2021 03:16:23PM via free access 226 Ahmad, N. S. Y. / African and Asian Studies 11 (2012) 219-246 the question of implementing shariah (Islamic) law, the Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman explained that “this country is not an Islamic state as it is generally understood; we merely provide that Islam shall be the offfĳicial religion of the State.” (Crouch 1996: 168-169). Lukman Thaib (1997: 116) argued that Malaysia is not an Islamic state but rather a state in which, among other things, multi-racial harmony and social cohesion are given primary importance. The driving force behind this prag- matic government policy is, I think about Islam. However, the full religious freedom exists in Malaysia. Islam is a way of life and an important component of the Malays. Conversions of Muslims to other religions occur but some state governments prohibit the proselytizing of Muslims by Christians and other religions. Most Malaysians understand, and they practice the spirit of accommodation that is needed (Milne & Mauzy 1999: 110). There is no doubt that the Indian Muslim communities in Malaysia play an important and essential role in Malaysia economic. Most of them are found in better jobs in government and private sectors. They are also engaged in a variety of businesses. Many of them are highly educated and are found in all types of reputable professions and top-level government positions such as Tan Sri Ali Abu Hassan, the former Governor of Bank Negara. The other groups of Muslims were basically businessmen whom indulged in shipping business, supplied laborers for cargo handling, importers, agents and suppliers of cere- als, groceries, and other consumer products. They are jewelers, moneychang- ers, and dealers of old coins and used-stamps. They also have restaurants, bakeries and cold storage houses. They have been practically involved in all types of business. The discussion of the Indian Muslim community’s future in Malaysia, however, has to be clearly understood as being diffferent in faith. But eventually, it has similarities in customs to the Indian (Tamil) and the Malay. As said by Syed Osman Mohamed (GEPIMA president’s son): “. . . We feel uncomfort- able to be known as Indians, because people automatically think we are Hindus when we are actually Muslim.” This is also agreed by GEPIMA president, “. . . our children do not even know how to speak Tamil; they only con- verse in Malay and our wives wear baju kurung or kebaya nowadays, no more the saree” (http://www.hindujagruti.org/news/4184.html). According to A. Salam (1988: 88) there are many reasons why this group cannot be identifĳied as the Malays. Firstly, the Indian Muslims come from India while the Malays are from Sumatera according to Sejarah Melayu and Epik Hikayat Hang Tuah (Virginia M, 1979: 351-372). Basically, both of these ethnic groups are from the opposite side, which practiced diffferent customs and cultural background. But, they were several people from India who were involved

Downloaded from Brill.com09/26/2021 03:16:23PM via free access Ahmad, N. S. Y. / African and Asian Studies 11 (2012) 219-246 227 in Melaka sultanates before and after the colonization of the Portuguese. Secondly, from the anthropology views, the word ‘Malay’ means people who lives in Malay Archipelago consists of Peninsular Malaysia, Indonesia and Phil- ippines (Aminuddin, 1974: 31). This fact has clearly excluded Muslim people from India to be called, the Malays. While the Indian Muslims in Malaysia refer to an Indian ethnic or perhaps we should mention “minority Muslim ethnic groups” in order to distinguish them from the Indians. From the socio-culture view, Indian Muslims originally come from India or descendants from India and they were Muslims (A. Salam, 1988: 88). Being known as the minority ethnic group, the Indian Muslim community has been living in Malaysia for ages and adopted Islam as their beliefs. However, their cultures are similar to the Hindus rather than the Malays. This statement has justifĳied by the research done by A. Salam who shows that 40 respondents (88.9%) of the Indian Muslims like to be called as Malays. Among the reasons they like to be called as Malays; they were married and lived accordingly to the Malays; they were mixed and lived with the Malay peoples; and they were born in Malaysia and one of their parents is Malay. While 30 respondents favorably liked the term of Indian Muslim, which represents 66.7%, about 10 respondents (22.3%) were associated with the so-called ‘mamak.’ Total of the subjects were 80 respondents. The members of Indian Muslim community did make some effforts to distinguish themselves from other Indians with the diffference of faiths such as Christianity, Buddhism and Hinduism. It is important for the Malaysian people to witness and recognize Indian Muslims diffferently from other Indians who are not Muslims in religion. While the word ‘mamak’ is to refer to those Indians who converted to Islam, it also highlights that this situation is uniquely happened only in Malaysia (A. Salam, 1988: 102-104). Basically, the Indian Muslims are divided into three categories: fĳirstly, people who want to be known as the Malays; secondly, people who introduce themselves as Indians (based on descendants), and third, people who refer themselves as Muslim Indians or Indian Muslims (based on faiths and descendants). Despite the above identity conflicts, research projects conducted by Pandey (1984) in India, Rajakrishnan (1984) and Badrul Islam (1999) in Malaysia have indicated that the Indian and the Indian Muslim communities feel backward due to their lower castes and also lack of interests in education. According to Badrul, this backwardness has been related to economic, education and social factors. While S. Seeni Naina (A. Salam: 120) highlighted the outcomes of backwardness due to the community weaknesses and the political background despite of the variety of ethnics. She had listed three weaknesses of the community, which are: lack of solidarity; no strong leaderships and members of the community do not follow the Islamic way of life.

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However, Rajakrishnan (1984: 20) has pointed out that among the respondents from diffferent castes in India feel backward both socially and economically. Almost all of them especially Paraiyar, Pallar and Chakkiliyar responded that the lower caste is associated with backwardness. The factors that lead to the way they behave also are due to the fact that they never save money, show no interest in education, and no progressive way of living. But, to consider the lower castes (considering most of Indians including the Indian Muslims are from South India mainly from the lower caste) as backward economically in Malaysia would require some explanations related to social freedom, wider jobs, availability and opportunities of education, both in rural and urban areas. As a conclusion of Rajakrishnan’s views, the feeling of backwardness could be due to minimal change in values and aspirations, though these Indians live in the midst of society where competition for survival and progress are rapidly expanding. Indeed, there are internal fractions or conflicts in the Indian Muslim people in Malaysia. The irony is that some leaders of Indian Muslim non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have claimed to be ‘Malays’ in their business registration forms as to enjoy the same privileges and specialties given to the Malays or so called ‘bumiputera’. But the fact remains that there are many cases of Indian Muslims being classifĳied as bumiputera by the relevant department without any special prompting. There is, at least, one case of an Indian Malaysian who converted to Islam of his own free will and was classifĳied as a bumiputera. Nowadays, many Indian Muslim women, for instance, do not wear the sari at home. The speaking of Tamil has no bearing on the status. And the most interesting part is that they claim that many Indian Malaysians can lay to the same Cultural Revolution. Privileges should be earned and not assumed by fĳiats, religious persuasion or tinkering around and tweaking semantics. As a concluding point, the Indian Muslim is similar to Chinese Muslim and other minority Muslim ethnic groups in Malaysia. It is impossible to change people’s ethnicities or races even though they are converted to any new religion. Ethnicity is related to the people’s primordial sentiments. It is a phenom- enon transmitting during the early stage of birth. An ethnic group always remains as such. The Indian Muslim is not diffferent from other ethnic groups in Malaysia whether they belong to the majority or the minority groups. Every ethnic group contains some turmoil in its aspects of economics, politics and social life, as is the case of the Indian Muslims in Malaysia.

Religious Dilemma: Rhetoric or Reality? In the year 2008, the former Prime Minister Tun Abdullah Ahmad Badawi established that those who convert to Islam must advise their families, precisely

Downloaded from Brill.com09/26/2021 03:16:23PM via free access Ahmad, N. S. Y. / African and Asian Studies 11 (2012) 219-246 229 in order to avoid disputes after their death, as it has previously happened on a number of occasions. The issue or perhaps the conflict is more apparent nowadays amongst the Indian Muslims, especially the mualaf (new converter) who is involved in the religious rights of minority groups in the multiethnic Malay- sian society where Islam is the offfĳicial religion, while Buddhists, Christians and Hindus are the minority faiths. Eventually, there will be changes in their beliefs, customs and cultures as well as in terms of their clothing and ways of living. Tensions between Muslims and non-Muslims have also been rising, most recently caused by a series of controversies surrounding competing legal juris- dictions between the civil court and the sharia, which was highlighted most recently in the Federal Court’s decision in the Lina Joy case.4 It is understand- able that many Muslims welcomed the decision, while many non-Muslims felt the reverse. The 2-to-1-court decision epitomizes this fault line. In fact, because our religion re-embedded in our ethnicities, the Muslim-non-Muslim fault line reinforces the Malay-non-Malay divide too (Francis Loh 2009: 224). As indicated earlier, this paper highlights several cases that lead to the dilemma of understanding the nature of the intertwined conflict of religion among the Indian Muslims. The conflict regarding the cases of convicted married couples whose spouses converted to Islam are discussed.

Case 1: Rahimah Bibi Nordin Vs Marimuthu Periasamy The crisis began unexpectedly when Islamic authorities took away Rahimah Bibi (an Indian Muslim wife) and six of her seven children on April 2, 2009 on the grounds that her marriage with Marimuthu was illegal. Marimuthu had fĳiled an application demanding that the Islamic Afffairs Department brings his wife and children to court. The department has indicated the couple could not live together because Marimuthu did not convert to Islam as required by law for their marriage to be legal. Rahimah agreed to surrender her children (7) to her Indian husband’s custody in order to avoid more predicaments. As a result, Malaysia’s Islamic authorities gave a Hindu man married to Muslim woman custody of their children, after the couple was separated because they follow diffferent religions. International( Herald Tribune, 3 May 2007)

4 The Lina Joy case and other related cases, however, should not be viewed through religious or ethnic lenses – nor even in terms of technical legalism as to the meaning of Article 121 (1A), introduced through 1988 constitutional amendment. Rather, the Lina Joy case and other recent conversion controversies should be viewed in terms of our rights and responsibilities as citizens, as enshrined in the letter and the spirit of the Constitution (Francis Loh 2009: 226).

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Case 2: M. Moorthy @ Mohammad Abdullah and Rayappan Anthony M. Moorthy, 36 years old, was a national hero, the fĳirst Malaysian to climb Mount Everest. He was also Hindu. Since 1998, he was paralyzed from the chest downwards. He died on 20 December 2005 after spending the last days of his life in a coma. As soon as he died, the Sharia court (Islamic tribunal) declared that Moorthy had converted to Islam before his death, so he should be buried as a Muslim. Faced with the appeal fĳiled by Moorthy’s widow, the High Court of Malaysia ruled that it had no jurisdiction in religious matters and could not override the Sharia court in such things. M. Moorthy or Muhammad bin Abdul- lah, an ethnic Indian Malaysian, has been buried under Islamic rites. (http:// www.asianews.it/index). To reclaim their bodies, their families appealed to the civil court which ruled that they had to submit before the Sharia court instead. This has brought the conflict and question from the people about the locus standi of the non-Muslims in the Sharia court.

Case 3: R. Subashini Vs T. Saravanan A Hindu wife and a mother (R. Subashini) has tried to prevent her Muslim- convert husband (T. Saravanan/ Muhammad Shafĳi) from dissolving their marriage in the Syariah Court and converting their second son to Islam. Court of Appeal judges, Justices Suriyadi Halim Omar and Hasan Lah dismissed R. Sub- ashini’s appeal against the High Court’s decision to set aside the injunction granted her last year to enable her to temporarily stop T. Saravanan from commencing with the proceedings in the Syariah Court regarding their marriage and conversion of their children. On Sept 25, 2010, Judicial Commissioner Aziah Ali set aside the injunction granted to 28-year-old Subashini a month earlier, which had enabled her to temporarily restrain Saravanan, 31, from commencing with the proceedings in the Syariah Court. The couple, which has yet to fĳinalize its divorce, has two children–Dharvin Joshua, three, and one- year-old Sharvin. Saravanan, whose Muslim names are Muhammad Shafĳi Abdullah, had claimed that the elder child had converted to Islam with him (The Star, 14 May 2007). Being non-Muslims who feel that they do not need to submit to the Sharia, they have been denied their constitutional rights (Francis Loh 2009: 227). Under the administration of Mahathir Mohamad, he and his deputy Anwar Ibrahim launched Malaysia’s Islamization policy which brought to the establishment of the Islamic banking and insurance schemes, the introduction of Islamic values in administration and also the expansion of the Islamic legal system in the federal government since 1980s. With the opening of Interna-

Downloaded from Brill.com09/26/2021 03:16:23PM via free access Ahmad, N. S. Y. / African and Asian Studies 11 (2012) 219-246 231 tional Islamic University, Islamic universities and Islamic higher level of education or studies have been promoted as to consolidate the Islamic understanding and growth among the people. Dr. Mahathir’s proclamation of Malaysia as an Islamic State in September 2001 has brought the Islamic resurgence globally. Francis Loh (2009) argued that with this Constitutional Court in pace, the civil court judges do not need to require projecting any particularity about being non-Muslims. The law should facilitate the rights of all citizens, regard- less of religions, to convert from one religion to another, provided they have reached the age of maturity; they are of sound mind, and not pressured by any person or group. The interface between individual and group rights has to shift towards the former, notwithstanding the expansion of the Islamic legal and bureaucratic machinery, if we are to tout ourselves as a democracy (2009: 229-230). To sum up, minorities have complained that Islamic courts are given jurisdiction in family disputes that involve both Muslims and non-Muslims. In order to display fairness to all religious groups as pursued by the sixth Prime Minister of Malaysia, the Najib’s Cabinet has announced that it would forbid religious conversion of minors without the consent of both parents. This followed high-profĳile legal spats in which people who embraced Islam changed their children’s religion despite protests from non-Muslim spouses.

Discussion

1. A Glance of 2009 Malaysian Political Scenario: The Discussion of Indian Muslims’ Future Malayan people’s objective to rule their own country could not be achieved without the consent of the British to organize and hold the general elections. In the beginning, the Malayan’s people insisted to have state level elections as a practice to parliamentary democracy (Miller 1965: 151). The elections were introduced at the state level in Georgetown (Tanjung), Penang on December 1951, followed by other states in Ipoh and continued to spread. Electoral system was very signifĳicant at that time because UMNO and MCA had consolidated their power under the party of Alliance Party UMNO-MCA. The fĳirst state elections in 1951 contested 9 seats in Penang City Council. Penang Radical Party, Penang Labor Party and UMNO were among the parties involved in the elections. The Radical Party won 6 seats out of 9 seats contested (Means 1976: 132). Other State Council elections also were held in

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Kuala Lumpur, Johor Bahru, Melaka and Seremban in 1952. Alliance Party succeeded in many state council elections gloriously as it fully made the British Administration realized the support it obtained among the people. Clearly, the local leaders had the ability to rule Malaya. Hence, the political independence was quickening. After Alliance Party won the majority vote in the 1955 General Elections, Tunku Abdul Rahman was elected as the Chief Minister. Thus he formed the Cabinet Members (Milne & Mauzy 1992: 42). The triumph was very meaningful to the party and enabled them to lead Malaya to independence. This reflects the Malayan people’s readiness, especially Tunku Abdul Rah- man and the cabinet members to form a functioning coalition government as a preparation to the independent country. However, Alliance Party received many critics from others and this also resulted to the limitation of space given to the opposition party to influence the national political decision-making process. Elections were supposed to represent competition among political parties and leaders as well as the voters. This scenario was pathetic when the party determined by the race or ethnicity led to the deterioration and discrimination of the dominant party against the opposition party. Sometimes this discrimination may also involve the change of laws and acts by the winning party through which it can preserve the status and oppress other members of the community. On 27 July 1955, the fĳirst federal elections were held in July 1955. Besides the coalition of UMNO, MCA and MIC in Perikatan (Alliance), several other parties also put up candidates. They were PAS, Parti Negara (National Party), Labour Party and People’s Progressive Party (Means 1976: 166). The result of the elections indicated the sign of people’s convincing support for the alliance of UMNO, MCA and MIC. The Alliance had swept all but one of the 52 seats contested. The sole seat won by the other political party was that of PAS. The Alliance triumph was very crystallized proven that the leadership and support from other races were one of the core factors to the success. Alliance introduced new policies to produce Western hegemony without the local people realizing it. The Alliance policies showed that it was very generous to help the local people. Behind the true colours of its generosity, the leaders expected to get support and undeniable loyalty from the people to ensure the success of the policy introduced. From the above discussion, the upper class (ruling elite) position was constructed as it played an important role in building the competitive space especially during the elections. It also strengthened the racial division in the party

Downloaded from Brill.com09/26/2021 03:16:23PM via free access Ahmad, N. S. Y. / African and Asian Studies 11 (2012) 219-246 233 system. The construction resulted from the colonial construction as the platform to a new form of competition in the future. Malaysia has been facing tremendous political challenges since the 12th General Elections in 2008. The results of the general elections have had signifĳi- cant impact towards the trend of Malaysian democracy. With the political changes, world has witnessed the openness of democracy in most aspects of liberal democracy such as the political parties, freedom of the press, voting behavior, human rights, new politics and many others. Malaysians have voiced out their rights through the electoral system as they chose their respective leaders to develop the country. However, in essence, these new processes have developed an imbalance in the social transformations of Malaysia, which had resulted in the rise of numerous groups over the past two or three decades as a result of rapid economic growth. This includes the industrialization and the limited change in Malay- sian political system which continued to be tightly controlled through coercive laws like the Internal Security Act (ISA), an electoral system dominated by a single party, and the old politics based on ethnicity and patronage. This imbalance is reflected in the imperatives of rapid socio-economic transformation, and the forces and factors of limited changes in Malaysian political system (Francis Loh 2009: 28). During the era of Mahathir (the 4th Prime Minister), there were a lot of major reforms in politics, education, trade and industry, culture, society, etc. However, these reforms were not allowed to develop further due to severe structural constraints inherent to the centralized political system fĳirst put into place by Mahathir and not removed in any dramatic fashion by Abdullah (the 5th Prime Minister). In fact, those who have vested interests in the existing system have resorted to the old politics of ethnicity and patronage to try to prevent the new politics based on the issues to develop. Consequently, Malay- sian continues to be mired in politics of the old Mahathir era, with a new twist. Whereas the old politics of ethnicity and patronage seemed so natural in the Mahathir era, they appear as farce, silly and odd incidences today (Aliran Monthly 2006, 26(9): 2-7). However, the future of all Malaysian races is quite charted out with their respective race-based political parties fĳighting for their own causes. When one further analyses the electoral results, it appears that the BN victories have been secured in the so-called multi-ethnic constituencies. There are two types of multi-ethnic seats – the mixed constituencies wherein no ethnic group consti- tutes a majority of voters and the small Malay majority constituencies wherein Malays account for 50 to 66.6 percent of enrolled voters. These seats are also

Downloaded from Brill.com09/26/2021 03:16:23PM via free access 234 Ahmad, N. S. Y. / African and Asian Studies 11 (2012) 219-246 semi-urban in character. Here, it is common for the National Front or namely known as National Front to win 90 to 100 percent of seats. From the discussion above, it is believed that the upper class construction (the elite people) plays an important role, which has a signifĳicant impact in building the competitive space, especially that of the Malayan democracy. The construction is resulted from colonial construction as the platform for future competition. Cursorily, elections that were held in the years of 1964, 1974, 1978, 1982, 1986, 1995 and 2004 were the National Front era of victory. In the 1964 3rd General Elections, the percentage of voters is the highest for Parliamentary Seats (78.9% or 2,057,504 out of the sum of registered voters 2,720,100), The National Front won 74 out of 104 Parliamentary Seats (85%) on that year. While in 1974 General Elections, The National Front managed to sweep 87% of winning, in 1978, The National Front won 130 seats from 154 seats contested. In the 6th General Elections, National Front won 132 seats from 154 in the House of Representatives and this is the 2nd highest achievement of the National Front since the day of independence. The National Front won the majority support and votes from the citizens as to ensure their trusted party keeps winning in the elections. However, the 7th General Elections (1986) showed the reduction of 2.4% of National Front votes. The coalition party was able to maintain the majority in the parliament. Thus, it seized the post of Prime Minister to form a good government. The 9th General Elections, the National Front managed to maintain its majority (162 seats out of 192 seats in the House of Representatives), represents 84.4% and shows the increment of 19.6% compared to the previous elections. Hence, in the 2004 General Elections (11th), there was an increase of 63.9% popular vote. Malaysian media reported on 23rd March of that year that the National Front won 198 parliamentary seats as compared to 20 seats of the opposition coalition party with a single independent candidate. Until this stage, the National Front was still winning the heart of Malaysian people. Even though Malaysian politics was shocked with the news of UMNO conflict and the dismissal of Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim from the Vice Prime Minister offfĳice, we witnessed the winning of the National Front with the 2/3 majority. In fact, the economic crisis could not challenge the majority of the 2/3 National Front to form the government in the 1986 and 1999 General Elections.

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Table 1 Strength of government and opposition in the House of Representative Government Opposition Total No. of % of % of No. of % of % of No. of Year Seats Seats Votes Seats Seats Votes Seats 1959** 74 71.15 51.7 30 28.85 48.3 104 1964** 89 85.58 58.5 15 14.42 41.5 104 1969 95 66.00 49.3 49 34.00 50.7 144 1974 135 87.66 60.7 19 12.34 39.3 154 1978 130 84.42 57.2 24 15.58 42.8 154 1982 132 85.71 60.5 22 14.29 39.5 154 1986 148 83.62 55.8 29 16.38 41.5 177 1990 127 70.55 53.4 53 29.45 46.6 180 1995 162 84.38 65.2 30 15.62 34.8 192 1999 148 76.68 56.5 45 23.32 43.5 193 2004 198 90.41 63.9 21 9.59 36.1 219 2008 140 63.1 – 82 36.9 – 222 * “Government” refers to the Alliance Party in 1959 & 1969; Alliance Party and Sara- wak United People’s Party (SUPP) in 1969; and National Front since 1974. ** The number refers to 1959 and 1964 because Sabah and Sarawak did not partici- pate in the 1964 parliamentary elections. Source: Arah Aliran Malaysia: Elections Evaluation

In the remaining two-types of seats – the large Malay majority seats (more than two-thirds Malays), largely rural and concentrated in the northern part of the Peninsula and in the Chinese majority seats (more than 50 percent Chinese) which were found in urban areas. How about the Indian Muslims society? The Malaysian Indian Muslims are progressing through the Malaysian Indian Muslim Congress (MIMC) which in reality is a political party registered in 1977. This party represents the interests of the India Muslim community in Malaysia. Its recent participation with BN’s People’s Progressive Party (PPP) seems to have given it a new lease of life, as this is an indirect entry into BN.

Antonio Gramsci’s Hegemony: The Conceptual Defĳinition The concept of hegemony is an important part in the existing social theory. Antonio Gramsci’s idea of a ‘historical bloc,’ for instance, provides a useful

Downloaded from Brill.com09/26/2021 03:16:23PM via free access 236 Ahmad, N. S. Y. / African and Asian Studies 11 (2012) 219-246 illustration of how power relations develop. However, the power bloc cannot be reduced to a mere set of political coalitions or corporatist alliances. Rather, it represents a more integrated set of state – class accommodations and ideo- logical mediations over a historical phase (Showstack 1980: 121). This allows us to consider more comprehensively, the evolving framework of power from the colonial period in Malaya through the changing confĳigurations of state-class relations under the Alliance, New Economic Policy and Vision 2020 projects. The Gramscian meaning of hegemony involves a more qualitative dimension of power involving two main elements for the leading group’s interests, ideas and values through civil, moral and intellectual processes (Hilley 2001: 10). While the former may be more instrumental in practice, the latter is vital in articulating such values as national-popular constructs, allowing the leading group to assume the mantle of the national interest. This also denotes a sense in which power is formed along a continuum between domination and hegemony that is through state coercion and/or civil consent. In particular, the leading class’s recourse to coercive means in order to maintain power (domination) is inversely related to the quality of its consensual legitimacy (hegemony). In the context of my purpose in this paper, work of Anne Munro-Kua comes closest to the type of hegemonic/state-class approach in the authoritarian populism in Malaysia. In this view, the Malay state-class has internalized power through repressive functions and populism as a legitimating function of the coercive state. However, the orientation of the present study is to put more emphasis on how Mahathir (4th Prime Minister) has sought to create legitimacy by consent through the Vision 2020 (Hilley 2001: 10). According to Gramsci (1971: 258), the state is “ethical in as much as one of its most important functions is to raise the great mass of the population to a particular cultural and moral level which corresponds to the needs of the produc- tive forces for development, and hence to the interests of the ruling classes.” Thus, for the state to fulfĳill its functions, the advancement of economic and political components of any hegemonic order must be considered as well as the integrated role of the intellectual within that order. Gramsci provides a new theoretical understanding of intellectual activity as structural enterprise, a key aspect being the construction of national-popular discourse. The intellectual may be viewed as rather more than an academic, social analyst or pur- veyor of knowledge. Furthermore, Gramsci also conceptualized the organic intellectual which denotes practical meaning to the interactive process of legitimation conducted around the term of ‘UMNO network.’ This conceptualization conveys the sense

Downloaded from Brill.com09/26/2021 03:16:23PM via free access Ahmad, N. S. Y. / African and Asian Studies 11 (2012) 219-246 237 in which individuals and institutions, both within and beyond the party, help sustain hegemony through the reifĳication of dominant interests and social meaning. This agency is linked to common issues such as policy of ideas, social development and social meaning. The Government has used hegemony agent, for instance, the state agent to control and further constructing the public mind and ensuring that it is still in control, especially in governing Malaysia. According to Gramsci (1971), the state has the power of hegemony which it is able to manipulate and which enables it to be in power. In other words, the government will use its power to protect its status quo. For example, the government’s control policy that is obvious is its action to amend the Offfĳicial Secrecy Act (OSA) in 1986 to protect the government’s documents from public enquiries. These actions led eventually to the discontinuity of the flow of information even on NGO bodies that co-operated with governmental apparatuses. It is undeniably clear that the government’s administration that covers all aspects of the public sector from politics to media has the government control of all main local newspapers and entertainment media (Mallot, 2011). For example, the electoral campaigns in 1999 were pictured as such that the government used the media as a tool to portray negative images of the opposition parties. In general, not only the government uses the media channel as a hegemonic agent but the execution of governmental policy, enforcement of Acts, the police force and others are also among the agents’ functions to lobby the government’s interest to ensure that the trust and loyalty of the public is gained fully. The frame of mind of the Malays in the 1990s was constructed by various governmental tools. The government also stipulated that the public who would act against the government would be labeled as ungrateful, and those who protest would be arrested under ISA and so forth. These actions created a pattern that causes the public to shy away in choosing other alternatives or a second opinion and further causes them to keep on supporting the government’s hegemony. Besides that, in order to stay in control and preserve the status quo, the state has used mass media and intellectual aspects in executing control on the minds of the people. However, whatever barriers that the government executed have not deterred or stop the public from giving consent to the government to lead them. In the above discussion, the force concept is emphasized and the force used by the state agent is to execute the government policy. Besides that, the state has been able to obtain permission from the mass media and the support. Whether it realizes it or not, the mass media has been hegemonized. However, in this research I put more emphasis

Downloaded from Brill.com09/26/2021 03:16:23PM via free access 238 Ahmad, N. S. Y. / African and Asian Studies 11 (2012) 219-246 on the role of religion and customs as primary factor. But it is noticeable that the loyalty and support provided to the government by the mass media have further strengthened the status quo of a leader. As a result, even though hegemony that has been executed by the government has obtained the mass group’s consent, there are still individuals in various groups who dare to speak out in opposing the actions of the government. Based on the guarantee of security and sovereignty, the leaders, be it the Sul- tan, King, Resident, British Offfĳicial, ‘Penghulu’, elite leaders, local leaders and others, execute few policies or laws and regulations in the country to deter the actions of the groups labeled as oppositions from challenging the status quo of the government. It is hard to predict just how far the implementation of these laws can deter the actions and intentions of the opposition groups. For example, Antonio Gramsci himself, as a political leader, was arrested and jailed by the fascists army for going against Mussolini even though he managed to influence the public thinking through his writings, which were smuggled out. This would be the equivalence of arrest of Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim under ISA a while ago, which did not deter him or stop him from writing or thinking about Malaysian politics. The diffference is that after Anwar was freed from jail, he became more active in politics and thus, was able to influence more the political culture in Malaysia. This case is considered by some as being diffferent in comparison to other cases. In short, hegemonic leadership involves developing intellectual, moral and philosophical consent from all major groups in a nation. It involves an emo- tional dimension too, in that those political leaders who seek hegemonic leadership must address the sentiments of the nation-people and must not appear as strange who are cut offf from the masses (Bocock 1986: 37).

2. The Malaysian Indian Community and the Political Organizations

Throughout the fĳive decades, Malaysian politics has been dominated by the ruling coalition of parties that started offf as the Alliance in the 1950s and now in its expanded form is known as Barisan Nasional. At present, BN has 13 component members that provide ‘a multi-racial façade around the Malay core, provided by the UMNO’ (Vasil 1980: 205). Although some parties in the BN are non-communal (at least in theory) – notably (in the Peninsula) the Labour Party, the People’s Progressive Party (PPP) and Parti Gerakan Rakyat – the Malaysian political format remains a strongly communal one. Apart from this, the BN and its components have always been closely associated with big business interests and free-wheeling capitalist economy.

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The discussion of the Malaysian Indian is always refers to the Indian community because it belongs to a small and minority in numbers after the Chi- nese community in Malaysia. The Muslim Indians community seems to be intertwined with its similar culture practiced among its members, which pro- longed the language, appearance, physical attributes, passiveness in most aspects and others. This paper focused on how the Indian community enhances its existence in highlighting its rights as Malaysian as a whole. However, it is necessary to glance through the historical background of the MIMC or KIMMA as to give clear picture about their struggle in Malaysia. MIMC was formed in Penang in 1979, though its roots go back much earlier to the fĳirst Malay and Peranakan Muslim organizations that had sprung up in Penang and other British colonial Straits Settlements during the British colonial era. Penang was the birthplace of KIMMA in 1979. This was not surprising, considering the higher-level representation of Indian Muslims and Peranakan Muslims in Penang which goes back to the mid-nineteenth century, after the island was turned into a free port by the British. The Indian Muslims of Penang created the Penang Muslim League, which was overwhelmingly supported by Indian Muslims of Penang and shared ties with the Muslim League of India. The Penang Muslim League was allowed to nominate one of its own members to sit on the British-dominated Penang Straits Settlement Council. During the 1940s, Penang was also the home of other Indian-dominated and Indian-led communitarian organizations such as the Penang Muslim Chamber of Commerce. Cognizant of their status and position in Penang’s commercial free port as independent traders, the Indian Mus- lims of the Muslim League and Muslim Chamber of Commerce resisted any attempts to integrate Penang into the Malayan administration system then. Indian independence and the split between India and Pakistan, however, introduced rifts among the Indians in the overseas, especially among the Indian Diasporas as well, dividing them also along religious-sectarian lines. As Malaya’s own independence grew slower in 1957, the Malays and Chinese had already organized their own ethnic-based parties UMNO and MCA. The creation of the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC), however, left many Indian Muslims in a dilemma to whether they should opt to join the predominantly Hindu-Tamil MIC or to join the predominantly Malay-Muslim UMNO. For some of the Indian Muslims of Penang, both options (of joining MIC or UMNO) were unacceptable for the simple reason that they were not about to deny their ethnic-racial origins and were unwilling to join a party that was dominated by Hindus either. As a result of an internal conflict over the disposition of funds in the Penang Muslim League, the KIMMA was formed by Muslim League dissidents in 1979 (Nagata 2006: 528). Support for the KIMMA was

Downloaded from Brill.com09/26/2021 03:16:23PM via free access 240 Ahmad, N. S. Y. / African and Asian Studies 11 (2012) 219-246 strongest in Penang, which was due to the sizeable Indian Muslim community there. KIMMA (Kongres India Muslim Malaysia) was led by Tuan Mohd Ali Bin Haji Mohd Ibrahim. While, the purpose of the formation of The Malaysian Indian Muslim Youth Movement/ Pergerakan Belia India Muslim Malaysia (GEPIMA) is to unite Indian Muslim Youths, with Mohamed Bin Kathir Ali as the president.5 This has been emphasized by Nagata (2006: 529) that in 1980, KIMMA boasted a membership of 200,000 members, with 70 nationwide branches (20 of which were in Penang). KIMMA immediately began to appeal to the parties of the ruling BN coalition to be allowed into the coalition as a component party but to no avail. UMNO and the MIC both opposed the appeal on the grounds that KIMMA was a divisive force that would weaken the Malay-Muslim vote bloc. The MIC leadership, on the other hand, had continually maintained that KIMMA has divided the Malaysian Indian community along religious- sectarian lines. Unable to gain a place in the ruling BN coalition, KIMMA continued its effforts to mobilize Indian Muslims across the country, with Penang as its political base (Clive, 1996). To take the state power in the future seems to be a very long way of another history or innovations to be ventured by the Indian Muslims community. They have been fĳighting to fĳit politically in the democratic system in the country. This shows, to a certain extent, the direction of their future path toward the state power. With the existence and longevity survival party of MIC, KIMMA or the Indian Muslims are facing the major party to take the lead. It should be noted that not only MIC, PPP, Makkal Sakhti are among the Indian representative political parties which are fĳighting for their own way. Economically and socially, the great gulf between the Indian establishment and the middle classes on the one hand, and the working proletariat on the other, continues to exist, despite the attempts to reduce it. The middle classes,

5 KIMMA initially emerged over dissatisfaction within the Penang-based Muslim league, which acts as a representative of the large Indian Muslim community on the island over the disposition of funds. As a reflection of contradicting ethnic and religious loyal, Indian Muslims had joined the UMNO as early as 1957, resulting in the formation of several local party branches. KIMMA had sufffered a similar fate as the other smaller parties, which were quickly, sideline if they were no able to form – often-short-lived-coalitions (Khoo 2003: 159-164). Apart from the deep divisions within the Indian community over questions of representation, the new party had hardly any maneuvering space politically unless it succeeded in pushing for a greater share of Indian Muslim participation within the government coalition. KIMMA plays it safe for the mean- time, the support that it has displayed on numerous occasions both for the MIC and UMNO in the recent months suggest that if it cannot join the bigger fold of the BN coalition, it might at least hope for some bones thrown at it by its two “big brothers”, UMNO and MIC, in the hope of receiv- ing some benevolent attention in the future (Stark 2007: 388-389).

Downloaded from Brill.com09/26/2021 03:16:23PM via free access Ahmad, N. S. Y. / African and Asian Studies 11 (2012) 219-246 241 to all appearances, have held their own social positions. Their numbers relative to their own community have remained larger than those of their Malay and Chinese counterparts, and they still appear to dominate certain professions (especially law and medicine) even if Indians of the younger generation face stifffer competition from the other races than their fathers did a generation ago (Muzafar 2008: 105). The ratios of other occupations, which had long been the preserve of English-educated Indians in relation to the Malays and the Chi- nese, have also dropped, but their actual numbers have increased and they remain as indispensable as ever. In terms of enrolments at primary and sec- ondary levels, for instance, the Indian ratio has been by and large maintained higher, though bald statistics can be misleading. According to Muzafar (2008: 105), the greatest social change since independence, for the Indian community is that of urbanization which has brought to new social problems, the most glaring is the presence of a rootless class of urban squatters, who have come to be associated in the public mind with an upsurge of violence and crime. The Indians have faced a new poverty syndrome in the town, which is matched by the seemingly endemic and intractable problem poverty in the rural areas, particularly on the estates. The government has laid out many projects and plans to overcome this issue as a way to help the Indians out of their poverty. In 1970, poverty was marked higher among the Bumiputera than the other communities. Approximately two-thirds of Bumiputera households were living below the poverty line – poverty rates among Chinese and Indian households were 26.0 per cent and 39.2 per cent respectively (see Chart 1). As a result of policies adopted by Malaysia, there have been tremendous absolute declines among each of the ethnic groups, such that by 2009 the poverty rates absolute declines among each of ethnic groups, such that by 2009 the poverty rates were 5.3 per cent, 0.6 per cent, 2.5 per cent and 6.7 per cent for the Bumiputera, Chi- nese and Indians respectively. Based on the report by the Economic Planning Unit, historically, the Bumiputera community lived in settlements along the coasts and riverbanks. Chinese and Indian migrants settled along the western coastal plains around the tin mines, agricultural estates, and urban centres. Relatively few of these communities settled in the east coast states, especially in Kelantan and Tereng- ganu which were sparsely populated in 1970. The big states of East Malaysia, Sabah and Sarawak were Selangor, Perak and Johor. In 1970, there were wide disparities in poverty levels between the states. Poverty levels were lowest in the west coast states of Melaka, Selangor and Johor, and they were highest in Sabah, Kelantan and Terengganu. There have been signifĳicant reductions in poverty rates for all of Malaysia’s 13 states and the Federal Territory of Kuala

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Chart 1 Poverty Rates by Ethnic Groups, Malaysia, 1970-2009

50 Bumiputera 40 Chinese

30 Indians Other ethnic groups 20

10 Other ethnic groups

0 Bumiputera 2009 1995 1970 Source: Post Enumeration Survey of 1970 Population & Housing Census (Reference 1970).

Lumpur. Geographical and historical factors continue to play a role in the process of economic development and location of poverty. For instance, the west coast states of Peninsular Malaysia are more developed and have tended to attract more foreign direct investments (FDI). The railway and road system were fĳirst built in these states, which are more accessible to the seaports facing the Straits of Malacca, a key maritime highway for international trade in South East Asia (http://www.epu.gov.my). Furthermore, the major episodes in politics and developments such as the May 13 Incident, the introduction and implementation of the New Economic Policy (NEP), urbanization, industrialization, the moves towards privatization, the current towards globalization have left deep marks on the Indian community in various ways. However, the communal dispensation at national level still persists, together with a high level of factionalism within the Indian community. The Indian community still upholds the strong tradition of dissent and the championing of alternative points of view also persist – vocal, articulate and relevant to many aspects of the Indian community’s problems. But these aspects have no obvious likelihood of being able to efffect change within the

Downloaded from Brill.com09/26/2021 03:16:23PM via free access Ahmad, N. S. Y. / African and Asian Studies 11 (2012) 219-246 243 short term. This situation indicates that in its essence, the composition, structure and major problems of the Indian community remain very much the same in 2000 as they were on the eve of independence in 1957 (Muzafar 2008: 106). The Indian Muslim community in Malaysia also fĳights for the rights of the Hindu community. This can be seen in the street demonstrations held by the HINDRAF (Hindu Rights Action Force) which was considered as an illegal rally as it was accused for ignoring the sensitivity of the country’s 26 million citizens (Bernama 29 Nov 2008). President of the Indian Muslim Congress Malaysia (KIMMA) Syed Ibrahim Kader indicated that the ISA should be used against anyone trying to threaten the country’s peace and stability. On Hindraf ’s demands, he indicated that the Indians in Malaysia should remember that they came to this country 150 years ago to earn a living. As he said: “However, we the Indian Muslims do not feel that we have been marginalized in this country or that there are quarters trying to take away the rights Nazahar also supported the move to use the ISA. Otherwise more people would become even bolder to challenge the government via street demonstrations.” He urged the government to use the ISA against the Hindraf leaders for Sun- day’s incident, besides inciting racial hatred and arousing religious sentiments which could disrupt harmony in the country. Despite the fact that Hindraf ’s ethnic posturing is hardly novel to the country, the reaction to the movement was swift and vocal. Thus far, the reaction to Hindraf has been complex and manifold to be discussed in this paper.

Conclusion Despite the fact that Malaysia is a multiracial and multicultural country, with 27 million people, it has been remarkably economic developed since it acquired its independence. However, as the country marked the 51st anniversary of its independence, its uneasy racial detente is coming under stress. The ethnic of Chinese and Indians, the two largest ethnic groups other than Malays, have become more vocal in demanding racial equality in part because of growing economic hardships, and Indians staged unprecedented public protests in November 2007. More or less, the minorities particularly the Indian Muslims, began to voice up their rights to be recognised as the Bumiputera (son of soil). However, this request has been rejected by the government since the Indian Muslims are not the only minority Muslim groups in Malaysia. There are other Muslim groups such Chinese Muslims which follow Malay customs and traditions and also speak well and accurate Malay language. But still they are Chinese at race. They are not considered as “purely label Malays.”

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The future of the political participation of the Indian Muslim community is still vague because the struggle of the Indian Muslims in Malaysia under the Progressive People’s Party does not only represent the community but also other Indian people as a whole. However, the Malaysian government did pro- long their effforts to acknowledge the existence and rights of the community in education, business, civil rights, political participation and others. But the excitement to witness the determine future of this community in Malaysia is still puzzled. In the way of conclusion, the ruling party Barisan Nasional (National Front) inherited the trust and tradition initiated by the Alliance Party that achieved the Malayan Independence. The Alliance fĳirst test was the Kuala Lumpur Municipal Council’s elections in 1952 where they won convincingly 12 out of 14 seats. The support continued in the 1955 General Elections, where they won 51 out of 52 seats contested. Nevertheless, in the 1969 election, the Alliance has experienced a major loss when it failed to obtain the two-third majority and even lost several state governments to the oppositions. This party later changed its name into the National Front in 1972 and simultaneously expanded its components into a bigger coalition party. It has become a unique political formula in Malaysian politics to reduce politicking and keeping the divided ethnicized parties together. The National Front kept on winning and the dominance of National Front in most general elections proved that its strength couldn’t be challenged easily. The supremacy, however, started to deteriorate in the 2008 recent general elections when the two-third usual majority was suddenly denied. The ability of the opposition to deny the National Front its majority has put the party into a very difffĳicult position. Malaysian political history shows how the electoral process has been dominated by ‘Malay-Non Malay’ form of communal politics. This is based on the dominance of UMNO’s influence compared to other component parties that represent their own race and ethnic. Although the accommodation and com- promise basis became an indication for this alliance, the existence of one dominant political party is undeniable, even so it has become not acceptable among other parties. By considering the evolution of Malaysia political landscape after the leadership transition and 2008 elections, it can be proven that the present political structure and practice have developed the new wave in Malaysian socio-politics condition. Thus, the practice of democracy has become more open when the youngsters apparently arose while the political orientation is more favoring on opposition ideology. In addition, democracy which previously confĳined by the control of ruling class has become less dominance, yet the new political feature takes place as a common practice of civil society.

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