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Appendix A: Summary of Hypotheses

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Appendix A: Summary of Hypotheses Appendix A: Summary of Hypotheses No. Hypotheses Frameworks Risk reduction : NS 1 Fatalism increases the likelihood of decision makers who emphasize the PF uncertainty of a crisis and decrease the likelihood of decision makers who emphasize the urgency of responding to it 2 Individualism increases the likelihood of decision makers who disparage PF the threat involved in a crisis 3 Hierarchy increases the likelihood of decision makers who have PF anticipated a crisis 4 Egalitarianism increases the likelihood of decision makers who NS emphasize the threat involved in a crisis 5 Hierarchical culture fears social disorder NS 6 Egalitarian culture fears risk that might harm many people PF 7 Individualistic culture fears risk to freedom PF 8 Fatalistic culture fears risk in general PF Decision Making (- process and - units ): NS 9 Hierarchy increases the likelihood of vertical movement of power up the NS chain of command into the hands of one or a few strong leader(s) 10 Fatalism increases the likelihood of a vertical movement of power up PF the chain of command into the hands of one or a few strong leader(s) 11 Egalitarianism increases the likelihood of a positive relation with GLF occurrence of formal decentralization within a set framework 12 Individualism increases the likelihood of a positive relation with NS occurrence of informal decentralization within a set framework 13 Egalitarianism decreases the likelihood of predominant leader as the NS most infl uential type of decision-making unit in crisis situations 14 Egalitarianism increases the likelihood of coalition of autonomous PF multiple actors as the most important type of decision-making unit in crisis response 15 Hierarchy increases the likelihood of “groupthink” among members of a CLF, GLF decision-making unit © Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015 169 Á.E. Bernhardsdóttir, Crisis-Related Decision-Making and the Infl uence of Culture on the Behavior of Decision Makers, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-20714-8 170 Appendix A: Summary of Hypotheses No. Hypotheses Frameworks 16 Fatalism increases the likelihood of “New Group Syndrome” among CLF members of a decision-making unit 17 Hierarchy increases the likelihood of “New Group Syndrome” among PF negative members of a decision-making unit CLF positive 18 Hierarchy increases the likelihood of “Rally around the fl ag” among CLF, GLF members of a decision-making unit 19 Hierarchy increases the likelihood of decision makers who do not PF display confl ict within their own decision-making group 20 Egalitarianism increases the likelihood of decision makers who display NS value-confl ict within the decision-making group and toward others 21 Hierarchy increases the likelihood of decision makers who express PF loyalty to the decision-making group 22 Fatalism increases the likelihood of decision makers who display low NS trust in people in general, both within their own group and toward others outside their group 23 Hierarchy increases the likelihood of decision who display a high level GLF of trust toward their own group 24 Egalitarianism increases the likelihood of decision makers who display NS a lower level of trust toward others outside their decision- making group 25 Egalitarianism increases the likelihood of decision makers who are CLF concerned and sensitive toward others and more focused on people and processes 26 Fatalism decreases the likelihood of decision makers within fatalism CLF that are less concerned and sensitive toward others and more focused on the task at hand Information management : NS 27 Hierarchy decreases the likelihood of decision makers who show a lack NS of information 28 Egalitarianism increases the likelihood of decision makers who show a NS lack of information 29 Individualism increases the likelihood of decision makers who offer NS direct and pointed information processing 30 Egalitarianism increases the likelihood of decision makers who will NS offer indirect and unclear information processing 31 Egalitarianism increases the likelihood of decision makers who follow CLF, GLF informal information processing 32 Individualism increases the likelihood of decision makers who follow NS informal information processing 33 Hierarchy increases the likelihood of decision makers who follow NS formal information processing 34 Egalitarianism decreases the likelihood of decision makers who localize CLF information 35 Hierarchy increases the likelihood of decision makers who localize NS information 36 Hierarchy increases the likelihood of decision makers who process NS information in accordance with the “sender” approach Appendix A: Summary of Hypotheses 171 No. Hypotheses Frameworks 37 Individualism increases the likelihood of decision makers who use the NS “volume” approach in processing information 38 Egalitarianism increases the likelihood of decision makers who use the NS “dialogue” approach in processing information 39 Fatalism increases the likelihood of decision makers who display a PF reactive media strategy 40 Egalitarianism increases the likelihood of decision makers who display PF, CLF a proactive media strategy Learning: NS 41 Fatalism decreases the likelihood of decision makers who learn and CLF modify their practices during or after a crisis 42 Egalitarianism increases the likelihood of decision makers who use NS historical analogy to draw lessons at any point during the crisis 43 Egalitarianism increases the likelihood of decision makers who use NS historical analogy in order to exaggerate the danger 44 Fatalism decreases the likelihood of decision makers who draw NS conclusion or learn based on comparison between present and previous crisis 45 Egalitarianism increases the likelihood of decision makers who PF, CLF emphasize collective learning Note: PF stands for ‘preparedness framework’, CLF for ‘collective learning framework’, and GLF for ‘group loyalty framework’, NS for ‘not supported’ Appendix B: Crisis Management Case Coding Guide Following is a presentation of chosen variables, (within the TCM dataset) used in this study, including the way in which the variables were coded according to the coding guide. B . 1 Case Characteristics 1–2 CASENAME – Case Name Description: What is the name of this case as given by the author? 1–7 CASETRIG Description: Which of the following best describes the origin of the crisis or its trig- gering event? (Choose only one) 1 = Technological 2 = Fiscal 3 = Political 4 = Environmental 5 = Military 6 = Legal 7 = Natural Disaster 9 = Unknown 99 = Not Applicable to this case © Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015 173 Á.E. Bernhardsdóttir, Crisis-Related Decision-Making and the Infl uence of Culture on the Behavior of Decision Makers, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-20714-8 174 Appendux B: Crisis Management Case Coding Guide 1–42 CASEDUTP Description: Which one of the following best describes the key decision-making units? Remember you are considering the case as a whole. (choose only one): 1 = Public Organization or Agency 2 = Private (for profi t) Organization/Company 3 = Not-for-Profi t or Non-governmental Organization 4 = Public Actor Using Private Contractors 5 = Public and Private Actors in Joint Collaboration 9 = Unknown (not enough information to code for this variable) 99 = Not applicable (variable does not apply to this case) Situational Crisis Characteristics (remember these apply to the case as a whole) 1–44 CASETHRT Description: What is the decision makers’ dominant perception of the severity of the threat overall? 0 = Low (Routine threat with little danger of long-lasting negative consequences.) 1 = Medium (Decision makers’ values/policies may be weakened and/or under- mined, but not beyond repair. In the case of threat to life or human health, the threat is considerable, but not unusual for the type of threat.) 2 = High (Decision makers’ values are seriously threatened, and/or there is a risk of an unacceptable number of deaths and/or injuries.) 9 = Unknown (not enough information to code for this variable) 99 = Not applicable (variable does not apply to this case) 1–45 CASETOR Description: Was the original threat perceived by decision makers to have origi- nated from the outside actors (external to the organizations/groups that set out to manage the crisis) or from the inside (problem generated in part or fully by one or more actors involved in managing the crisis)? Note: For natural disasters, code as “99”. 0 = There was no clear perception of where threat originated 1 = Outside 2 = Inside 3 = Both outside and inside 9 = Unknown (not enough information to code for this variable) 99 = Not applicable (variable does not apply to this case) Appendux B: Crisis Management Case Coding Guide 175 1–46 CASEURG Description: In general, what is the level of urgency decision makers perceive in the crisis? 0 = Low urgency (Decisions makers can go about their other activities while con- sidering what action to take. The window of opportunity is considered to be open.) 1 = Medium Urgency (Decision makers must act quickly, but have time to con- sider multiple options. The window of opportunity is perceived to be brief but manageable.) 2 = High Urgency (All attention is focused on the decision at hand. A short and narrow window of opportunity is perceived to be open.) 9 = Unknown (not enough information to code for this variable) 99 = Not applicable (variable does not apply to this case) 1–47 CASEUCTY Description: In general, how much uncertainty do the decision makers perceive in defi ning the nature of the crisis? 0 = Low Level of Uncertainty (Crisis is easily
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