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Preparing the US Army for Homeland Security Preparing the U.S. Army for HOMELANDHOMELAND SECURITYSECURITY Concepts, Issues, and Options Eric V. Larson, John E.Peters Arroyo Center R The research described in this report was sponsored by the United States Army under Contract No. DASW01-96-C-0004. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Larson, Eric V. (Eric Victor), 1957– Preparing the U.S. Army for homeland security : concepts, issues, and options / Eric V. Larson, John E. Peters. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references. MR-1251-A ISBN 0-8330-2919-3 1. United States. Army. 2. United States—Defenses. I. Peters, John E., 1947– II. Title. UA25 .L27 2000 355' 033273—dc21 00-045819 RAND is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND® is a registered trademark. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions or policies of its research sponsors. © Copyright 2001 RAND All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from RAND. Published 2001 by RAND 1700 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138 1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202-5050 RAND URL: http://www.rand.org/ To order RAND documents or to obtain additional information, contact Distribution Services: Telephone: (310) 451-7002; Fax: (310) 451-6915; Internet: [email protected] PREFACE This report addresses the many conceptual, programmatic, and practical issues associated with an emergent mission area for the U.S. Army and Department of Defense (DoD) called “homeland security” (until recently the mission was known as “homeland defense”). At the most basic level, the report seeks to provide Army and other DoD audiences with an introduction to, and overview of, four of the five homeland security task areas,1 and the various organizations at the federal, state, and local level that the Army and DoD may need to interface with under different circumstances. More ambitiously, it seeks to define homeland security in a concrete way and to provide the necessary background and conceptual and analytic constructs for wrestling with the key issues and choices the Army will face as the mission area matures. The research reported here was initiated as homeland security was emerging as an issue of policy concern and was conducted during Fiscal Year 1999, a year in which the Army and Department of Defense considered but had not yet resolved many key homeland security–related issues. These include a definition of homeland security, the key task areas that constitute homeland security, and the programs and capabilities needed to respond to these various threats. In a similar vein, the broader federal government enacted or ______________ 1Because it already is the focus of substantial analytic attention, national missile defense is not addressed in this report. iii iv Preparing the U.S. Army for Homeland Security refined numerous programs to combat terrorism and weapons of mass destruction and to mitigate the threat to critical infrastructure. While we have made every effort to stay apprised of these develop- ments, the complexity and dynamism of the broader policy envi- ronment led to a conscious choice to focus on broad issues, principles, and options in this report, rather than specific organiza- tional solutions. Indeed, at the time the report was being completed, a new Unified Command Plan (UCP) was announced, specifying responsibilities for some homeland security activities. We have, nev- ertheless, provided observations regarding organizational issues where we felt it useful and appropriate. The research was sponsored by the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations and Plans, Headquarters, Department of the Army, and was conducted in the Arroyo Center’s Strategy, Doctrine, and Resources Program, and was concluded in September 1999. The Arroyo Center is a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the U.S. Army. For more information on the RAND Arroyo Center, contact the Director of Operations, (310) 393-0411, extension 6500, or visit the Arroyo Center’s Web site at http://www.rand.org/organization/ard/ CONTENTS Preface ......................................... iii Figures ......................................... xi Tables.......................................... xiii Summary ....................................... xv Acknowledgments................................. xxix Abbreviations .................................... xxxi Chapter One INTRODUCTION .............................. 1 Organization of This Report....................... 3 Chapter Two UNDERSTANDING HOMELAND SECURITY .......... 5 The Constitutional and Legal Context ............... 5 The Strategic Context ........................... 6 National Security Strategy ...................... 7 National Military Strategy ...................... 9 The Army Strategic Plan ........................ 9 The Domestic Political Context .................... 11 White House Actions .......................... 11 Congressional Action .......................... 13 Leadership Statements ........................ 16 Public Attitudes................................ 17 Homeland Security Task Areas .................... 21 Conclusions .................................. 22 v vi Preparing the U.S. Army for Homeland Security Chapter Three ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK ........................ 25 Threat and Risk Analyses ......................... 26 Establishing Desired Performance Levels ............. 31 Identifying Cost-Effective Program Mixes ............ 36 Budgeting and Resourcing........................ 39 Process and Strategy ............................ 40 Iterative in the Short Term ...................... 41 Part of an Adaptive Long-Term Strategy ............ 41 Conclusions .................................. 42 Chapter Four PROTECTING AMERICANS AT HOME: WMD DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS AND CIVIL SUPPORT .............. 45 Threats and Risks .............................. 45 Threat Assessment............................ 46 Risk Assessment.............................. 53 Planning Magnitudes.......................... 55 Measures of Performance ........................ 57 Notional Performance Levels...................... 60 Program Design Issues .......................... 61 The Federal Setting ........................... 62 Prevention Programs .......................... 64 Preparedness Programs ........................ 71 Response Programs ........................... 76 Domestic Preparedness-Related R&D.............. 91 Budgeting and Resourcing Issues................... 92 Budget Shares ............................... 92 Planning, Programming, and Budgeting ............ 94 Conclusions .................................. 96 Chapter Five ENSURING CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY: CONTINUITY OF GOVERNMENT .................. 99 Threat and Risk Analyses ......................... 100 Threats and Weapons ......................... 100 Targets .................................... 100 Performance Measures and Notional Performance Levels ......................... 102 Program Design Issues .......................... 103 Federal COG ................................ 103 Contents vii State and Local COG .......................... 105 Budgeting Issues ............................... 106 Conclusions .................................. 107 Chapter Six ENSURING MILITARY CAPABILITY: CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS ................................. 109 Threat and Risk Analyses ......................... 109 Threats .................................... 109 Weapons ................................... 117 Potential Targets ............................. 118 Net Assessment .............................. 120 Threat Campaigns ............................ 121 Performance Measures .......................... 121 Prevention Activities .......................... 121 Preparedness Activities ........................ 122 Response and Reconstitution Activities ............ 122 Threat Campaigns ............................ 123 Notional Performance Levels...................... 123 Program Design Issues .......................... 123 Force Protection ............................. 123 Continuity of Operations ....................... 126 Mission-Critical Facilities....................... 126 Mission-Critical Systems ....................... 128 Threat Campaigns ............................ 133 Budgeting Issues ............................... 133 Federal Spending............................. 133 Army Spending .............................. 135 Conclusions .................................. 136 Chapter Seven PROTECTING SOVEREIGNTY: BORDER AND COASTAL DEFENSE .................................... 139 WMD Smuggling............................... 140 Threats and Risks ............................ 140 Measures of Performance ...................... 140 Notional Performance Levels .................... 141 Program Design Issues......................... 142 Budgeting Issues ............................. 149 Large-Scale Refugee Flows ....................... 149 Threat and Risk Analyses ....................... 149 viii Preparing the U.S. Army for Homeland Security Measures of Performance ...................... 153 Notional Performance Levels .................... 154 Program Design Issues......................... 154 Budgeting Issues ............................. 157 Conclusions .................................. 158 Chapter Eight ILLUSTRATIVE PLANNING VIGNETTES ............. 159 Domestic Preparedness.........................
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