SWP Comments 2005/18, May 2005, 8 Pages

Introduction Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs A New President in Northern Cyprus The End of an Era but No Solution in Sight Heinz Kramer / Kirstin Hein SWP Comments The long presidential reign of Rauf Denktaş came to an end with the election of April 17, 2005. After almost thirty years in the highest office of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), Denktaş—a resolute opponent of reunification of the divided island—has been succeeded by the prime minister, Mehmet Ali Talat. Does Talat’s rise from head of government to become the leader of his ethnic community give grounds for new hope of reopening negotiations on the island? The rigid line taken by Greek Cypriot President Tassos Papadopoulos suggests not. The change in leadership in the north will not end the impasse in the Cyprus question and the conflict will remain an obstacle on Turkey’s path to European Union membership. Mehmet Ali Talat, a supporter of Cypriot The Rise of Mehmet Ali Talat reunification, was elected president of The Turkish Cypriots have expressed this northern Cyprus in the first round on April wish repeatedly since summer 2003, when 17, with a majority of 55.6 percent of the significant numbers of Turkish Cypriots vote. Derviş Eroğlu of the National Unity first started protesting against Denktaş and Party (UBP), Talat’s main rival and an op- his policies, which stood in the way of an ponent of the Annan plan, drew less than accommodation with the Greek Cypriots. 23 percent. After almost three decades in Mehmet Ali Talat became the spokesman office, Rauf Denktaş did not stand again in for the protests and embodied the hopes for this election. a political alternative. As president, Talat intends to move on The victory of his left-leaning, pro-Euro- from the “two states” theory that his pre- pean Republican Turkish Party (CTP) in the decessor had declared to be the starting parliamentary elections of December 14, point for any solution to the Cyprus prob- 2003, allowed Talat to replace UBP leader lem, and attempt a fresh start of negotia- Eroğlu as prime minister. Now, for the first tions with the south of the island. The clear time in the history of the conflict, the vote for Talat demonstrates yet again that parties loyal to President Rauf Denktaş the Turkish Cypriots would like to see an found themselves in the minority. However, end to the conflict, which has dragged on the outcome of the elections produced in the eastern Mediterranean since 1964. deadlock in parliament, and forced Talat to SWP Comments 18 May 2005 1 enter a shaky coalition—holding a margin ported a solution based on the Annan of just twenty-six to twenty-four seats—with Plan. With twenty-four of fifty seats, Talat the Democratic Party (DP) led by Serdar narrowly failed to achieve the absolute Denktaş, the president’s son. Talat’s victory majority he aimed for, so the coalition attracted positive reactions abroad. The with Serdar Denktaş’s DP was revived. The European Union and the United States had DP had gained six seats, so the government clearly sided with the Turkish Cypriot commanded thirty seats and a solid par- opposition, believing that an electoral liamentary majority. victory for the opposition would improve However, already in September 2004, the prospects for a solution to the conflict. Mehmet Ali Talat had announced that he During the talks on the Annan Plan in would stand in the regular presidential spring 2004, Talat and Serdar Denktaş elections in April 2005 unless visible prog- represented the president in the third and ress toward a resolution of the conflict had final round of negotiations in the Swiss been made by then. As a consequence of resort of Bürgenstock. By personally staying the clear failure of his “no” campaign, Presi- away from the discussions, Rauf Denktaş dent Rauf Denktaş had already declared kept open the option of campaigning in May 2004 that he would not stand for against the negotiated proposal in the another term. referendum. Talat countered the passionate Denktaş’ withdrawal was a sensible “no” campaign of the Turkey-oriented decision, given that the polls forecast a nationalists with a powerful “Evet” (yes) decisive defeat should he have stood again. campaign for acceptance of the Annan This cleared the way for Talat to rise from Plan. Serdar Denktaş, on the other hand, head of government to become the leader took a neutral position in the referendum of his nation. Talat strove for the presidency campaign and merely stated that he per- in the conviction that only in that office sonally intended to vote against the plan. would he be able to act as the undisputed Several factors contributed to the Turkish chief negotiator for the northern part of Cypriots’ clear 65 percent vote in favor of the island. the Annan Plan, but Talat’s campaign In order to be able to act as head nego- certainly had a considerable influence on tiator in the otherwise symbolic office of the result. Nonetheless, the even clearer president—as Rauf Denktaş did—Talat needs “no” from the Greek Cypriot side prevented not only the support of the populace, as him from realizing the declared goal of his expressed in the result of the April 17 government, and on May 1, 2004, a divided elections, but also the backing of parlia- Cyprus joined the European Union. ment. There, however, he will continue to Shortly after the referendum, in May meet the resistance of the parties loyal 2004, Talat’s government lost its parlia- to Denktaş. Like his father, Serdar Denktaş mentary majority when several deputies also opposed Talat’s candidacy, so even left the coalition. The prime minister sur- within the governing coalition Talat could vived a confidence vote initiated by the face difficulties in organizing support. UBP, but resigned nonetheless in October Talat’s move to the presidency made it 2004 to hold new elections in the hope of necessary to appoint a new prime minister. broadening the base for his policies. Talat’s Meanwhile Ferdi Sabit Soyer, who fol- CTP indeed recorded gains of about 9 per- lowed Talat as leader of the CTP, has also cent in the elections of February 20, 2005. been appointed his successor as leader of Even though these votes came primarily at the government. The rest of the cabinet the expense of the second reformist party, remains unchanged. the Peace and Democracy Movement (BDH), the 44 percent for Talat’s party demon- strated that Turkish Cypriots still sup- SWP Comments 18 May 2005 2 The Positions of the Main Actors group had been ignored. In his letter to Talat’s main task will be to launch a new Annan of June 7 last year, informing the and auspicious initiative for solving the Secretary-General of the plan’s rejection, Cyprus problem. Here, however, he will Papadopoulos identified security as the part have to depend not only on the support of of the plan containing the greatest short- his own population, but also to at least comings. The president—and, as opinion the same degree on the cooperation of the polls showed—the majority of his popu- other parties on the island and among lation too—regarded the permanent the international community who are presence of up to 650 Turkish troops on indispensable for a solution. A brief exami- the island and Turkey’s continuing right nation of their current attitudes to the of intervention as unacceptable. To many Cyprus conflict shows that Talat faces no Greek Cypriots the number of Turkish easy task. settlers the plan would have allowed to remain on the island seemed too high and unreasonable. Although there is no real Why the Greek Cypriots basis for most of these security worries, Rejected the Annan Plan they can be explained as a psychological Although regarded by the international consequence of the Greek Cypriots’ community as the best possible solution, “invasion trauma” of 1974. the Annan Plan—in its fifth version, with Under the Annan Plan the Greek Cypri- the final details decided personally by ots—unlike the Turkish side—would have the UN Secretary-General (Annan V)—was had to fulfill their obligations, such as decisively rejected by the Greek Cypriot side giving up sole sovereignty over the island, in the nationally separate referendums of immediately, while implementation of the April 24, 2004. At least for the time being, Turkish Cypriot contributions to reunifica- four and a half years of negotiations and tion, such as reducing troop levels and work on the plan had come to nothing. returning Greek property in the north of The most obvious reason why the Greek the island, would have been phased over Cypriots rejected the Annan Plan was that several years. Precisely this implementation they, unlike their Turkish neighbors, were of Turkish Cypriot obligations appeared to under no particular pressure to find a Papadopoulos to be uncertain, and he was solution. Back in December 1999 the Hel- unwilling to take the risk of being depen- sinki European Council had dropped its dent on the good will of the north’s leaders. precondition that the conflict had to be Another reason for the Greek Cypriots’ resolved before accession. In other words, rejection is that they would have had to the Greek Cypriot side faced no decisive bear the most of the financial burden of disadvantages if the status quo continued. reunification with the economically much The gains that could be achieved through weaker north. The no campaign, led by a solution—land restitution, resettlement, Papadopoulos and according to Annan and compensation—were not enough to bristling with misinformation about his outweigh the expected losses, beginning plan, fanned insecurity and worries about with the sharing of power between two the consequences of reunification among politically equal communities.

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