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Mapping out Alternative Nuclear Weapons Futures for East Asia: What Impact Do Civil Nuclear Programs Have on Breakout Ability? Thomas B

Mapping out Alternative Nuclear Weapons Futures for East Asia: What Impact Do Civil Nuclear Programs Have on Breakout Ability? Thomas B

Mapping Out Alternative Nuclear Weapons Futures for East Asia: What Impact Do Civil Nuclear Programs Have on Breakout Ability? Thomas B. Cochran and Matthew G. McKinzie Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) Washington, D.C. Our paper examined civil nuclear assets of four East Asian countries that could be used in developing nuclear weapons, or rapidly expand an existing nuclear weapons arsenal. Historical Review of Nuclear Weapon Developments in Selected Countries

Country R&D Fissile WH Design Sweden 1948-1972 Pu Implosion Israel mid 50s-late-60s Pu, then HEU Implosion India 1962-1974 Pu, then HEU Implosion S. Africa mid-60s-1989 Pu dropped, then HEU (nozzle) Gun DBRK 1960s-2009 Pu, then HEU Implosion Pakistan 1972-1998 HEU, then Pu Implosion (Chinese) Iraq 1971-2003 HEU (calutron, other), Pu Implosion Iran 1985-today HEU, next Pu Implosion Elements of Civil Nuclear Assets Pertinent to Nuclear Breakout Capabilities • Nuclear engineering software and physics data libraries that could be applied to fission weapon design; • High energy physics research that could be re- directed to boosted fission and fusion weapon design; • Civil nuclear fuel uranium enrichment capabilities that could be re-purposed to produce weapons-grade uranium; • Cadres of experts in reactor engineering and nuclear materials chemistry and metallurgy; • Spent nuclear fuel inventories that could be reprocessed for weapons ;

Nuclear engineering software and physics data libraries that could be applied to fission weapon design:

ANSYS Autodyn •Detonation Models MCNP •Shock Capturing •Thermal Models •Neutronics Models •Deformation Heating •Equations of State •Criticality • •Density & Phase •Flux Tallies •Heat Conduction •Geometry Deformation •Reaction Rate Tallies •Multi-Phase Transition & States

USER DEFINED MODELS: •Spatially Dependent Fission Energy/Temperature Contributions Nuclear engineering software and physics data libraries that could be applied to fission weapon design:

keff : Measure of Criticality

fission in generation(i + 1) keff = fission neutrons in generation(i) keff < 1: subcritical (fission chain reaction will not sustain itself) keff = 1: critical (one - chain reaction will just sustain itself) keff > 1: supercritical (the number of fissions in the chain reaction will increase with time) Black Market Offering of Beryllium from the Former Soviet Union: Reflecting Materials: 3.0 Beryllium Oxide Beryllium 2.5 Stainless (316) 2.0

1.5 1.0 Beryllium Oxide: 3.01 g/cm3 Beryllium: 1.848 g/cm3 Tungsten Carbide: 14.8 g/cm3

Critical Masses (crits) Masses Critical 0.5 (316): 7.8 g/cm3 0.0 0.0 5.0 10.0 15.0 20.0 25.0 Thickness of Neutron Reflecting Materials (cm) High energy density physics research that could be re-directed to boosted fission and fusion weapon design: Spent Fuel Burnup Isotopics

PWR 10 Power in KW/KG 35 U-235 965 U-238 burnup MWD/KG pu-238 pu-239 pu-240 pu-241 pu-242 % pu-240 pu-kg u-kg % pu 1 4.40E-05 5.00E-01 7.58E-03 2.78E-04 1.51E-06 1.5% 5.08E-01 9.99E+02 0.05% 2 1.89E-04 9.60E-01 2.85E-02 2.05E-03 2.25E-04 2.9% 9.90E-01 9.97E+02 0.10% 3 4.55E-04 1.381 6.04E-02 6.38E-03 1.07E-04 4.2% 1.45E+00 9.95E+02 0.15% 4 8.59E-04 1.769 1.02E-01 1.40E-02 3.17E-04 5.4% 1.89E+00 9.94E+02 0.19% 5 1.42E-03 2.125 1.50E-01 2.52E-02 7.26E-04 6.5% 2.30E+00 9.93E+02 0.23% 8 4.27E-03 3.03 3.28E-01 8.24E-02 3.97E-03 9.5% 3.45E+00 9.88E+02 0.35% 10 7.34E-03 3.517 4.65E-01 1.39E-01 8.65E-03 11.2% 4.14E+00 9.85E+02 0.42% 15 2.06E-02 4.421 8.38E-01 3.04E-01 3.34E-02 14.9% 5.64E+00 9.79E+02 0.57% 20 4.42E-02 4.996 1.23E+00 5.61E-01 8.14E-02 17.8% 6.91E+00 9.72E+02 0.71% 25 8.10E-02 5.349 1.63E+00 7.93E-01 1.55E-01 20.4% 8.01E+00 9.66E+02 0.82% 30 1.32E-01 5.558 2.05E+00 1.00E+00 2.51E-01 22.8% 8.99E+00 9.60E+02 0.93% 35 1.98E-01 5.675 2.51E+00 1.17E+00 3.64E-01 25.3% 9.92E+00 9.54E+02 1.03% 40 2.80E-01 5.736 2.72E+00 1.37E+00 5.23E-01 25.6% 1.06E+01 9.48E+02 1.11% 45 3.74E-01 5.766 2.88E+00 1.54E+00 7.00E-01 25.6% 1.13E+01 9.42E+02 1.18% 50 4.75E-01 5.779 2.99E+00 1.67E+00 8.87E-01 25.4% 1.18E+01 9.36E+02 1.24% 55 5.80E-01 5.784 3.07E+00 1.76E+00 1.08E+00 25.0% 1.23E+01 9.30E+02 1.30% Spent Fuel Burnup Isotopics

BWR 10 Power in KW/KG 35 U-235 965 U-238 burnup MWD/KG pu-238 pu-239 pu-240 pu-241 pu-242 % pu-240 pu-kg u-kg % pu 1 4.50E-05 4.67E-01 8.29E-03 3.04E-04 2.30E-06 1.7% 4.76E-01 9.99E+02 0.05% 2 1.94E-04 8.94E-01 3.12E-02 2.25E-03 3.45E-05 3.4% 9.28E-01 9.97E+02 0.09% 3 4.69E-04 1.285 6.62E-02 7.04E-03 1.64E-04 4.9% 1.359 9.96E+02 0.14% 4 8.91E-04 1.643 1.11E-01 1.54E-02 4.89E-04 6.3% 1.771 9.94E+02 0.18% 5 1.48E-03 1.971 1.64E-01 2.80E-02 1.13E-03 7.6% 2.166 9.93E+02 0.22% 8 4.50E-03 2.797 3.57E-01 9.19E-02 6.24E-03 11.0% 3.257 9.88E+02 0.33% 10 7.80E-03 3.236 5.04E-01 1.56E-01 1.37E-02 12.9% 3.917 9.87E+02 0.40% 15 2.23E-02 4.035 8.94E-01 3.71E-01 5.35E-02 16.6% 5.376 9.79E+02 0.55% 20 4.87E-02 4.523 1.28E+00 6.29E-01 1.32E-01 19.4% 6.616 9.73E+02 0.68% 25 9.05E-02 4.809 1.65E+00 8.87E-01 2.54E-01 21.5% 7.70E+00 9.66E+02 0.79% 30 1.49E-01 4.968 2.01E+00 1.12E+00 4.16E-01 23.2% 8.66E+00 9.60E+02 0.89% 35 2.26E-01 5.052 2.36E+00 1.30E+00 6.10E-01 24.7% 9.55E+00 9.54E+02 0.99% 40 3.19E-01 5.093 2.51E+00 1.48E+00 8.57E-01 24.5% 1.03E+01 9.48E+02 1.07% 45 4.24E-01 5.112 2.61E+00 1.62E+00 1.12E+00 24.0% 1.09E+01 9.42E+02 1.14% 50 5.34E-01 5.121 2.68E+00 1.71E+00 1.40E+00 23.4% 1.14E+01 9.36E+02 1.21% 55 6.45E-01 5.125 2.72E+00 1.77E+00 1.66E+00 22.8% 1.19E+01 9.30E+02 1.27% Spent Fuel Burnup Isotopics

HEAVY WATER REACTOR 10 Power in KW/KG 7.11 U-235 992.89 U-238 burnup MWD/KG pu-238 pu-239 pu-240 pu-241 pu-242 % pu-240 pu-kg u-kg % pu 1 3.32E-05 8.44E-01 5.24E-02 3.32E-03 9.56E-05 5.8% 9.00E-01 9.98E+02 0.09% 1.5 7.72E-05 1.15 1.05E-01 9.32E-03 4.06E-04 8.3% 1.26E+00 9.97E+02 0.13% 2 1.42E-04 1.401 0.1686 1.86E-02 1.09E-03 10.6% 1.59E+00 9.96E+02 0.16% 2.5 2.29E-04 1.61 2.40E-01 3.10E-02 2.30E-03 12.7% 1.88E+00 9.96E+02 0.19% 3 3.41E-04 1.784 3.16E-01 4.61E-02 4.16E-03 14.7% 2.15E+00 9.95E+02 0.22% 3.5 4.81E-04 1.93 3.97E-01 6.33E-02 6.76E-03 16.5% 2.40E+00 9.94E+02 0.24% 4 6.51E-04 2.053 4.80E-01 8.22E-02 1.02E-02 18.3% 2.63E+00 9.93E+02 0.26% 5 1.09E-03 2.244 6.54E-01 1.23E-01 1.97E-02 21.5% 3.04E+00 9.92E+02 0.31% 6 1.69E-03 2.379 8.34E-01 1.66E-01 3.29E-02 24.4% 3.41E+00 9.90E+02 0.34% 7 2.47E-03 2.474 1.02E+00 2.07E-01 4.96E-02 27.2% 3.75E+00 9.89E+02 0.38% 8 3.43E-03 2.541 1.21E+00 2.45E-01 6.93E-02 29.8% 4.07E+00 9.88E+02 0.41% 9 4.59E-03 2.588 1.41E+00 2.78E-01 9.15E-02 32.3% 4.37E+00 9.86E+02 0.44% 10 5.94E-03 2.619 1.63E+00 3.05E-01 1.15E-01 34.8% 4.67E+00 9.85E+02 0.47% “Simple, Quick Processing Plant” “Simple, Quick Processing Plant”

From “Spent Fuel from Nuclear Power Reactors,” H. Feiveson, Z. Mian, M. V. Ramana, and F. von Hippel

Japan: Break Out Capability

• Tokai Works, the Naka Fusion Institute and other nearby nuclear research sites could be converted to serve as restricted areas for weapons research and development, similar to Los Alamos National Laboratory. • Japan’s domestic plutonium resource could serve as the source of fissile material for upwards to a thousand pure fission nuclear warheads. • Japan would have to develop an underground nuclear weapon test facility to test more advanced nuclear weapon designs, and could produce the needed tritium in any one of it existing power reactors. South Korea: Break Out Capability

• Since ROK has no stocks of HEU or separated plutonium at this time, its best option for obtaining explosive fissionable material is to process CANDU spent fuel stored at the Wolsong reactor site. • ROK has no operational reprocessing plant: two potential options for processing the CANDU spent fuel are: 1) construct a “Simple, Quick Processing Plant” and 2) process the CANDU spent fuel into metal at KAERI’s IMEF. Taiwan: Break Out Capability

• Since Taiwan has no stocks of HEU or separated plutonium at this time, and little plutonium in research reactor spent fuel, Taiwan's best option for obtaining explosive fissionable material is to process some of the 3,360 plus t of LWR spent fuel stored at the three power reactor stations. • Taiwan has no operational reprocessing plant: a primary option for processing the BWR and PWR spent fuel is to construct a “Simple, Quick Processing Plant.” China: Ramp Up Capability • With eight indigenously-designed and constructed operational PWRs and another 21 under construction, China is essentially unconstrained in its ability to use these plants to augment plutonium and tritium production for weapons. • China could remove from IAEA safeguards two CANDU-6 reactors: Qinshan Units 3-1 and 3-2. These two PHWRs, each 2,064 MWt, would be capable of producing on the order of 1,000 kg of plutonium annually, sufficient from several hundreds of new nuclear warheads per year. Next Steps for the Authors:

• Add a section in the paper on nuclear weapons design & engineering resources and skills in civilian programs that could contribute to break out capability (assume this isn’t relevant to China); • Add a section in the paper addressing the “Simple Quick Processing Plant;” • Apply BURN calculations & burnup data to project the quantity of weapons-grade plutonium that South Korea & Taiwan could extract from their spent fuel stockpiles; and • Hypothetical maps/diagrams of Japan, South Korea & Taiwan showing their future “weapons complex” – design lab (re-purposed civilian institutes?), reprocessing facility (adjacent to spent fuel storage?); plutonium fabrication plant & underground test site. Our paper examined civil nuclear assets of four East Asian countries that could be used in developing nuclear weapons, or rapidly expand an existing nuclear weapons arsenal.

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