Trade Implications of the Trans-Pacific Partnership for ASEAN and Other Asian Countries
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Trade Implications of the Trans-Pacific Partnership for ASEAN and Other Asian Countries ∗ ALAN V. D EARDORFF Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/adev/article-pdf/31/2/1/1641915/adev_a_00035.pdf by guest on 25 September 2021 The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) aspires to become a state-of-the-art trade agreement linking 12 countries on both sides of the Pacific. In addition to establishing a free trade agreement (FTA) among these countries, negotiators are pursuing a long list of other issues, both trade-related and non-trade related. This paper examines the likely effects of the TPP on trade alone, taking into account the fact that all of the potential members of the TPP are already participants in other FTAs. Using information from the World Trade Organization (WTO) on the existence of these FTAs plus data on the identities of countries’ major trading partners for both exports and imports, I discuss the likely effects on a list of countries in terms of trade creation, trade diversion, preference erosion, and “trade reversion”—the reversal of trade diversion that has already occurred due to existing FTAs. The list of countries includes all of the members of the TPP as well as of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In addition it includes 10 additional Asian economies that are not part of either. Keywords: Trans-Pacific Partnership, free trade agreements JEL codes: F13 I. Introduction Negotiations have been underway for several years towards the formation of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which aims to be a “next generation” or “21st century” trade agreement linking countries on both sides of the Pacific. Originating as the Pacific 4, or P-4 agreement among New Zealand, Singapore, Brunei Darus- salam, and Chile, which began in 2006, the TPP negotiations now include the 12 countries indicated in Table 1, with Japan the most recent to join, in 2013. My pur- pose in this paper is to explore the potential implications of the TPP for its members and for other economies of Asia, especially those who are members of ASEAN and ∗The author ([email protected]) is Associate Dean and Professor of International Economics at the Ford School of Public Policy, University of Michigan in Ann Arbor. I have benefited in writing this paper from conversations with, and other inputs from, two students, both of whom volunteered their assistance. Mindy Shaw helped me to track down data about the economies and their FTAs. Dani Litovsky shared with me much that she had learned studying the TPP when working with William Krist at the Wilson Center, and she also directed me to a number of other valuable sources of information. I am also grateful to an anonymous referee whose suggestions greatly improved the paper. Asian Development Review, vol. 31, no. 2, pp. 1–20 C 2014 Asian Development Bank and Asian Development Bank Institute 2 ASIAN DEVELOPMENT REVIEW Table 1. Economies Considered Likely Member of Actual Member of TPP AFTA Australia yes Bangladesh Brunei Darussalam yes yes Cambodia yes Canada yes Chile yes People’s Republic of China Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/adev/article-pdf/31/2/1/1641915/adev_a_00035.pdf by guest on 25 September 2021 Hong Kong, China India Indonesia yes Japan yes Lao PDR yes Macau, China Malaysia yes yes Mexico yes Myanmar yes Nepal New Zealand yes Pakistan Peru yes Philippines yes Singapore yes yes Republic of Korea Sri Lanka Taipei,China Thailand yes United States yes Viet Nam yes yes AFTA = ASEAN Free Trade Agreement, TPP = Trans-Pacific Partnership. Sources: WTO and USTR websites. the ASEAN FTA (AFTA). Table 1 lists the economies I will consider, including their membership in AFTA as well as their potential membership in the TPP.1 The TPP is of interest in part because it is large, mainly due to the presence of the United States (US) and Japan. It is of interest also, however, for two other reasons. First, as a free trade agreement (FTA), it will overlap numerous other FTAs, so that its economic effects are not just the effects that have long been studied for trade agreements that are freestanding, without such overlaps. The economic effects therefore go beyond the simple trade creation and trade diversion introduced by Viner (1950). The TPP is also of interest because of its ambition to extend well beyond the limits of trade and trade policy, including a host of other issues. Some of these, such as trade in services, technical barriers to trade, and intellectual property, have 1Their membership is potential, since it is possible that the TPP may never be completed, or if it is, that some economies may not then ratify their membership. TRADE IMPLICATIONS OF THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP 3 been included previously both in the World Trade Organization and in other regional agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), but the TPP intends to go further in these directions than ever before. At the same time, the TPP negotiators are addressing new issues that have never, or hardly ever, been part of trade agreements, such as competition policy, regulatory coherence, and standards for labor and environment. All of these issues will take most of the included Asian countries well beyond what they have included previously in their existing trade agreements.2 Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/adev/article-pdf/31/2/1/1641915/adev_a_00035.pdf by guest on 25 September 2021 One might object that the TPP is not the most important trade agreement on the horizon that will matter for Asian economies. In 2013, negotiations began between the US and the European Union (EU) on a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, or TTIP.Although TTIP includes only two partners, the US and the EU, it will encompass a larger part of the world economy than currently envisioned for the TPP. Therefore, while the TTIP will not include any economies of Asia, it will surely matter a great deal for them. That, however, is a topic for another paper. And in some ways, the TPP’s overlap with both Asian economies and various existing Asian trade agreements makes it a more interesting case. I will divide this discussion into three parts. First, in section II, I will provide some description of the TPP itself, including a list of the many issues that are being discussed in addition to tariffs and that may become part of an agreement if and when it is reached. Since my focus in the rest of the paper will be only on the trade effects of the TPP, and since these are influenced by the presence of trade agreements that already exist, I will then, in section III, provide a picture of the relevant agreements involving ASEAN and other Asian economies. Finally, in Section IV,I will use this information together with data on the bilateral patterns of trade to discuss how the TPP might be expected to benefit or harm the countries of the TPP, of ASEAN, and other selected Asian economies. II. TPP, AFTA, and Other Asia3 Both the TPP and AFTA are, or propose to be, FTAs—that is, the member countries reduce to zero all tariffs on imports from other member countries of all, or almost all, products. Their agreements do not involve any commitments about external tariffs—that is, the tariffs on imports from economies outside the FTA. These typically remain at the levels that they were prior to the FTA, although economies are free to, and often do, negotiate additional FTAs with other economies. To varying degrees, member countries of FTAs also identify “sensitive sectors” in 2Exceptions are Australia and Singapore, whose FTAs with the US do include these issues. 3A referee asks about the purpose of including the economies I’ve called “Other Asia.” This was done at the request of the journal editors, who wanted implications for the PRC and India, not just ASEAN. 4 ASIAN DEVELOPMENT REVIEW which they do not fully and/or immediately eliminate tariffs. The more trade is covered by these sensitive sectors, the smaller are the economic benefits, and the larger are the economic costs of the FTA, but the smaller also are the internal dislocations that the FTA is likely to cause. The 10 countries of AFTA include six—Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand—that have already reduced tariffs among themselves to almost zero. The remaining four—Cambodia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), Myanmar, and Viet Nam—because of Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/adev/article-pdf/31/2/1/1641915/adev_a_00035.pdf by guest on 25 September 2021 their lower per capita incomes, were granted a slower schedule for reducing tariffs to below 5%, but they are on track to do so. However, both sets of countries are allowed to exempt sensitive sectors—most significantly rice—from these tariff reductions, so that the fraction of potential trade covered by the FTA is well below what it could have been.4 The TPP will also be an FTA, and it seems likely that the tariff reductions among the TPP countries will be more complete and more general than those of AFTA, although that of course remains to be seen. The TPP will also exempt some sensitive sectors, and the negotiations on which sectors those will be, and how many, are already contentious. In addition to tariffs, both trade agreements include some restrictions on the use of nontariff barriers (NTBs). These are, by their nature, harder to identify and even harder in most cases to quantify, which makes including them in a trade agreement difficult.5 The AFTA aspires to eliminate NTBs, but to my knowledge it has not so far made much progress in doing so.