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Majoritarian Politics in Sri Lanka: the ROOTS of PLURALISM BREAKDOWN Majoritarian Politics in Sri Lanka: THE ROOTS OF PLURALISM BREAKDOWN Neil DeVotta | Wake Forest University April 2017 I. INTRODUCTION when seeking power; and the sectarian violence that congealed and hardened attitudes over time Sri Lanka represents a classic case of a country all contributed to majoritarianism. Multiple degenerating on the ethnic and political fronts issues including colonialism, a sense of Sinhalese when pluralism is deliberately eschewed. At Buddhist entitlement rooted in mytho-history, independence in 1948, Sinhalese elites fully economic grievances, politics, nationalism and understood that marginalizing the Tamil minority communal violence all interacting with and was bound to cause this territorialized community stemming from each other, pushed the island to eventually hit back, but they succumbed to towards majoritarianism. This, in turn, then led to ethnocentrism and majoritarianism anyway.1 ethnic riots, a civil war accompanied by terrorism What were the factors that motivated them to do that ultimately killed over 100,000 people, so? There is no single explanation for why Sri democratic regression, accusations of war crimes Lanka failed to embrace pluralism: a Buddhist and authoritarianism. revival in reaction to colonialism that allowed Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists to combine their The new government led by President community’s socio-economic grievances with Maithripala Sirisena, which came to power in ethnic and religious identities; the absence of January 2015, has managed to extricate itself minority guarantees in the Constitution, based from this authoritarianism and is now trying to on the Soulbury Commission the British set up revive democratic institutions promoting good prior to granting the island independence; political governance and a degree of pluralism. This will opportunism among especially Sinhalese, but also not be easy, given the majoritarian mindset that Tamil elites who manipulated ethno-nationalism has become embedded as well as the undermining and weakening of state institutions that nearly This paper is part of a new publication series from the Global Centre for Pluralism called Accounting for Change in Diverse Societies. Focused on six world regions, each “change case” examines a specific moment in time when a country altered its approach to diversity, either expanding or eroding the foundations of inclusive citizenship. The aim of the series – which also features thematic overviews by leading global scholars – is to build global understanding of the sources of inclusion and exclusion in diverse societies and the pathways to pluralism. Majoritarian Politics in Sri Lanka three decades of civil war and post-conflict follows: Sinhalese 74.9%, Sri Lankan Tamil authoritarianism promoted. But, hopefully, the 11.2%, Indian Tamil 4.1%, Moors (Muslim) lessons learned can now enable a more inclusive 9.3% and others 0.5%. In terms of religion, the society that emphasizes common citizenship over island was 70.1% Buddhist, 12.6% Hindu, 7.6% divisive ethno-religious identities. Christian (with 6.2% being Roman Catholic) and 9.7% Muslim. Muslims were 7.5% in 1981, In covering the long story of post-independence and that religious community’s high fertility Sri Lankan politics and the way it hampered rate has been of concern for some Sinhalese pluralism, this case narrative is divided into Buddhist nationalists. In this context, it is worth four sections. The first looks at the country’s noting, however, that, over the past century, it ethno-religious demographics and how they is the majority community’s numbers that have influenced public policies that undermined what mainly risen: in the 1911 census, the Sinhalese could have been a liberal democracy. It focuses and Buddhists only accounted for 66% and 60%, on the numerous moves away from a strategy respectively as compared to 75% and 70% in to build pluralism, and highlights how and why 2012.2 this happened at each moment. The second section discusses the consequences resulting Inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic dynamics in from the anti-pluralism policies, with a focus on multi-ethnic and multi-religious societies are ethnic relations and democracy. The third briefly complicated, and Sri Lanka is no different. evaluates ongoing attempts to rectify the mistakes The island’s Muslims mainly speak Tamil of the past while arguing that the majoritarianism (although many Muslim youth now also speak that has been institutionalized makes it very Sinhala), but they have consciously used their unlikely Sri Lanka will strike a blow for full- Islamic identity as their primary identity to fledged pluralism. The final section recaps the differentiate themselves from ethnic Tamils. preceding narrative in list form so as to link it to While approximately 10% of Sinhalese and 7% the four drivers representing the Governance of of Tamils are (mainly Catholic) Christians, one Diversity section of this project. today rarely runs into Sinhalese Hindus and Tamil Buddhists, although Tamil areas in both India and Sri Lanka harboured Buddhist devotees in earlier times. II. DEFENESTRATING Sri Lanka (called Ceylon until 1972) is Asia’s PLURALISM oldest democracy, having achieved the universal Sri Lanka was colonized for almost 450 years, franchise in 1931, just three years after colonial first by the Portuguese, and then the Dutch and power Britain adopted it. The country was granted British. This heritage has shaped the country’s independence in February 1948 without the ethno-religious makeup. According to the 2012 instability in neighbouring India, which gained census, the island’s ethnic breakdown was as 2 Accounting for Change in Diverse Societies Global Centre for Pluralism Majoritarian Politics in Sri Lanka its freedom following decades of anti-colonial Political elites play a leading role in determining struggle, communal violence and Partition. a country’s political development and the Indeed, the transfer of power to independent belief that Senanayake could be trusted to treat Ceylon was so tranquil that many in the interior minorities fairly influenced both the Tamils and failed to grasp the moment’s significance. By British in how they approached independence. the time power was transferred, civil society If trust in Senanayake was responsible for the associations (organized both along ethno-religious informal elite pact that led to minority guarantees and secular lines) were numerous, and leftist being de-emphasized within the Constitution, political parties led by the Lanka Sama Samaja the camaraderie he fostered across ethnic lines Party (Lanka Equal Society Party, LSSP) and caused observers to believe that of those states Communist Party of Ceylon (CP) had played gaining independence following the Second World a leading role socializing people politically. War, Sri Lanka had “the best chance of making The United National Party (UNP) was created a successful transition to modern statehood.”5 just before independence and its leaders were Senanayake died unexpectedly in 1952 and influential in negotiating the Constitution that the ethnocentric policies rooted in linguistic Britain’s Soulbury Commission designed.3 nationalism that soon thereafter took shape caused even Britain’s constitutional engineers to realize The period from the late 1930s to mid-1940s had that they had made a serious blunder in not seen some ethnic tension as Tamils clamoured for instituting ironclad minority guarantees.6 “fifty-fifty” representation between the minorities (Tamils and others) and the Sinhalese. This A constitution is a country’s most important claim meant that the Sinhalese, who were nearly institution and represents its foremost governing 70% of the population, would only have 50% of “hardware.” What gets included and excluded representatives within the legislature. Neither in a constitution conditions the degree of the Sinhalese nor the British thought much of institutionalization and the trajectory of ethno- the demand. Instead, a weighting formula was religious narratives and interactions (i.e., the adopted to address Tamils’ concerns, but it still country’s “software”) that subsequently take ensured that the Sinhalese would be a majority shape. The political structure the post-colonial in 75 of 95 constituencies.4 Yet, notwithstanding Constitution created, in a country with a clear differences regarding representation, Sinhalese ethnic majority, lacked a bill of rights or specific and Tamil elites came together to promote a united minority guarantees, which made defenestrating front when discussing independence, thanks to the pluralism quite a simple task for those advocating faith both groups placed in D.S. Senanayake, the majoritarianism. UNP leader who became Sri Lanka’s first prime minister. Global Centre for Pluralism Accounting for Change in Diverse Societies 3 Majoritarian Politics in Sri Lanka III. ETHNO-RELIGIOUS also created a precedent that emboldened Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists who have since DIVERSITY repeatedly resorted to sectarianism to exclude and disempower the island’s minorities. The first major instance of exclusion was perpetrated against Indian Tamils, also called Hill Buddhism has played a major role in Sri Lanka Country Tamils, Up-Country Tamils or Estate and contributed to the island’s unique character. Tamils, since most continued to work on tea Its influence is noted in a history book called the plantations, as did their ancestors who came to Mahavamsa (Great Chronicle), which documents the country as indentured labourers
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