Ahıska Turks and Koreans in Post-Soviet Kazakstan and Uzbekistan: The Making of Diaspora Identity and Culture

A Ph.D Dissertation

By Chong Jin OH

Department of International Relations Bilkent University Ankara December 2006

To my Mom and Wife… 어머님과 아내에게…

Ahıska Turks and Koreans in Post-Soviet Kazakstan and Uzbekistan: The Making of Diaspora Identity and Culture

The Institute of Economics and Social Sciences of Bilkent University

by

Chong Jin OH

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in

THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS BİLKENT UNIVERSITY ANKARA

December 2006 I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations

------Associate Professor Dr. Hakan Kırımlı Supervisor

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations

------Assistant Professor Dr. Hasan Ünal Examining Committee Member

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations

------Assistant Professor Dr. Sean McMeekin Examining Committee Member

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations

------Assistant Professor Dr. Ayşegül Aydıngün Examining Committee Member

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations

------Assistant Professor Dr. Mitat Çelikpala Examining Committee Member

Approval of the Institute of Economics and Social Sciences

------Prof. Dr. Erdal Erel Director

ABSTRACT

Ahıska Turks and Koreans in Post-Soviet Kazakstan and Uzbekistan: The Making of Diaspora Identity and Culture

Chong Jin OH Ph.D., Department of International Relations Supervisor : Associate Professor Hakan Kırımlı December 2006

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, all of the newly independent governments in Central Asia aimed at nationalizing or indigenizing the territories under their control and rectifying what many saw as decades of dominance by foreign actors. These states made great efforts to undertake various nation-building projects. For individuals in many nationalizing states in Central Asia, knowledge of the titular language became increasingly important in order to obtain, maintain and advance their career and position in the society. In other words, members of the titular nations had somewhere to go and settle after the collapse of the Soviet Union, but the non-titular groups, which included group such as the Jews, the Volga Germans, the Koreans, the Crimean Tatars, Ahıska Turks, had nowhere to go. These diasporas found themselves in the middle of nowhere. These ethnic minorities or diasporas are, perhaps, the main losers in the nation-building process in post-Soviet Central Asia due to their powerlessness and vulnerability. As peoples deported by the Soviet regime, these groups were forced to migrate against their will. By using Korean and Ahıska Turkish diasporas in Uzbekistan and Kazakstan as cases, this study examines, to some extent, how diasporas are influenced by nationalizing

iii states in Central Asia. It attempts to inquire into the factors which influence the existence, nature and intensity of ethno-nationalism in the diasporas’ context. Therefore, it analyzes both the existence and transmission of ethno-nationalism between the diasporas’ settings and homelands and specifically will deal with the transmission of ethno-nationalist sentiments across diasporas’ generations. Above all, the task of this inquiry is to examine the sources of diversity within diaspora relations and to move toward an analysis of the patterns of interaction among trans-border ethnic groups, their traditional ethnic homelands, and the states in which they reside. The comparative content of this investigation will show considerable variations in these practices in different settings and groupings.

iv

ÖZET

Sovyetler Birliği Sonrası Kazakistan ve Özbekistan’da Ahıska Türkleri ve Koreliler: Diaspora Kimlik ve Kültürünün İnşası

Chong Jin OH Doktora, Uluslararası İlşkiler Bölümü Tez Danışmanı : Doçent Dr. Hakan Kırımlı Aralık 2006

Sovyetler Birliği'nin dağılmasının ardından Orta Asya'da yeni kurulan bağımsız devletler kontrolleri altındaki toprakları millîleştirmeyi ya da yerelleştirmeyi ve böylelikle onlarca yıl devam ettiğini düşündükleri yabancı egemenliğini temizlemeyi amaçladılar. Bu devletler sayısız millet inşâsı projesinde büyük gayretler harcadılar. Bu sebeple Orta Asya'nın millîleşen pek çok devletinde egemen toplumun dilini bilmek kariyer ve makam sahibi olmak için gittikçe daha da önem kazandı. Diğer bir deyişle, 'titüler' bir devletin üyesi olanların gidecek bir yerleri var iken, Yahudiler, Volga Almanları, Koreliler, Kırım Tatarları ve Ahıska Türkleri için durum farklıydı. Bu diasporalar kendilerini yersiz yurtsuz buldular. Belki de bu etnik gruplar ve diasporalar zayıf ve hassas vaziyetlerinden dolayı Sovyetler sonrası Orta Asya'daki milllet inşâsı sürecinin asıl kaybedenleri oldular. Bu çalışma, Özbekistan ve Kazakistan'daki Ahıska Türkü ve Kore diasporalarını konu alarak bir ölçüde diasporaların millîleşen Orta Asya devletlerinden nasıl etkilendiğini incelemekte ve diasporalar bağlamında etno- milliyetçiliğin varlığını, tabiatını ve yoğunluğunu etkileyen faktörleri irdelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu sebeple, bir taraftan diasporaların yaşadıkları ülke ve

v anavatanları arasında etno-milliyetçiliğin varlığını ve geçişini analiz ederken, özellikle etno-milliyetçi duyguların diaspora nesillerinde tevarüsü üzerinde duracaktır. Herşeyden öte, bu araştırmanın amacı diaspora ilişkileri arasındaki farklılaşmanın kaynaklarının incelenmesi ve sınır ötesi etnik gruplar, bunların geleneksel etnik vatanları ve ikâmet ettikleri devletler arasındaki etkileşim şekillerinin analizi olacaktır. Bu araştırmanın içeriği farklı mekân ve topluluklardaki pratiklerde önemli değişmeler olduğunu göstermektedir.

vi

ACKNOWLEGEMENTS

This dissertation would not have been possible without the generous assistance and encouragement of many people. I have been privileged to have Professor Hakan Kırımlı as my advisor during my four-and-a-half year stay in Bilkent, Ankara. It was Professor Hakan Kırımlı who offered every kind of support during these years, well beyond any formal duties. Likewise, he guided this work from its very inception allowing me to benefit from his vast knowledge of the Turkic and ethnic issues in Eurasia continent, and from his huge library. In times of difficulties in building my argumentation, my talks with him enabled me to focus my attention on the right direction without diverging from the main idea of the dissertation. No doubt, he inspired me with his erudition, encyclopedic knowledge and kind words. He has contributed greatly to my understanding and outlook of the Turkic and ethnic issues. Also, I would like to extend my thanks to Prof. Hasan Ünal, Prof. Sean McMeekin, Prof. Ayşegül Aydıngün and Prof. Mitat Çelikpala, who are included in the examining committee, for their useful insights into my argumentation. Without their suggestions, I would not be able to improve the academic quality of my dissertation as it is now. I am especially indebted to my friends and colleagues, Dr. Hasan Ali Karasar, Ibrahim Körmezli, Berat Yıldız who devoted their precious time to help me with every subject that I faced in Bilkent University. Last, but of course not least, my parent, Sukkyo Oh and Hyojee Ahn, and my wife Seonok Kim deserve the greatest credit for the completion of this dissertation. It was my parent’s concern and care which allowed me to continue my studies, and they never refrained from any sacrifice for this purpose. Seonok was always my best and closest assistant and friend who helped me to get over every hardship that I confronted during my study in Turkey. She has always tolerated when I had to spend a great amount of time in researching and writing my dissertation. Without her understanding and efforts to create the most comfortable environment for me, I would most probably have been lost among numerous books and articles. Jua Oh, my 19 months daughter who was born during my study in Bilkent University, gave spiritual support by motivating my concentration to finish my work in time. To all of them, I take the pleasure of dedicating this work.

vii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ------p.iii ÖZET ------p.v AKNOWLEGEMENTS ------p.vii TABLE OF CONTENTS ------p.viii LIST OF TABLES ------p.xi LIST OF MAPS AND FIGURES ------p.xiii

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY ------p.1 Objectives and Scope of the Study Case Selection Research Questions Plan of the Dissertation Methodology Literature Review

CHAPTER II: THEORETICAL ORIENTATION ------p.35 II.1. Nation and Nationalism, and Ethnicity : A historical and contemporary perspective ------p.37. II.2. Defining Identity ------p.48 II.3. Creating Ethnic Identity ------p.52 II.4. Acculturation in multicultural Assessment ------p.58

CHAPTER III: A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE AHISKA TURKISH AND KOREAN DIASPORAS IN CENTRAL ASIA ------p.65 III.1. A Historical Review of the Korean diaspora ------p.71 III.1.1. Koreans in the Russian Far East ------p.71 III.1.2. Establishment of the Soviet Union and the Koreans in the Russian Far East ------p.84 III.1.3. Mass Deportation and Settlement in Central Asia --- p.92

viii

III.2. A Historical Review of the Ahıska Turkish diaspora ------p.115 III.2.1. Origin of the Ahıska Turks ------p.115 III.2.2. Establishment of the Soviet Union and the mass deportation of the Ahıska Turks ------p.121 III.2.3. The Ahıska Turks after the deportation ------p.130

CHAPTER IV: THE AHISKA TURK AND KOREAN DIASPORAS IN THE NATIONALIZING CENTRAL ASIA: KAZAKSTAN AND UZBEKISTAN ------p.137 IV.1. Historical overview of the indigenization process in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan ------p.143. IV.2. States building and Nationalizing process in the Post-Soviet context and its implication to the Korean and Ahıska Turkish Diasporas ------p.167 - Demographic Trends - Socio-Cultural Kazakization and Uzbekization - Political Kazakization and Uzbekization

CHAPTER V: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE DIASPORA NATIONALISM IN THE KOREAN AND AHISKA TURKISH DIASPORAS ------p.201 V.1. Diaspora Movement and the formation of the Diaspora Organizations. ------p.209 V.2. Territorialization in Titular states ------p.218 V.3. Self-identification and Homeland Image ------p.222 V.4. Language Revival and Education ------p.241 V.5. Compact Living vs. Urbanization ------p.248 V.6. Socio-economical Issues ------p.253

CHAPTER VI: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE HOMELANDS (TURKEY AND KOREA) ENGAGEMENTS WITH THEIR OWN DIASPORA ------p.259

CHAPTER VII: CONCLUSION ------p.279

ix

BIBLIOGRAPHY ------p.294

APPENDICES ------p.316

x

LIST OF TABLES

1. Table I: Berry’s Four Acculturation Strategies ------p.61

2. Table II: Koreans in Imperial Russia 1869-1914 ------p.80

3. Table III: Proposed Korean Autonomous Territories ------p.87

4. Table IV: Demography of the Soviet Far East during 1926-1927 ------p.89

5. Table V: Korean population in the Soviet Far East before the deportation --- p.91

6. Table VI: RESOLUTION № 1428-326cc ------p.104

7. Table VII: Distribution of the Koreans in Kazakstan ------p.108

8. Table VIII: Dynamics of Korean diasporas in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan

during the Soviet Period (1939~1999) ------p.114

9. Table IX: Distribution of the Koreans in the Soviet Union and their ratio --p. 114

10. Table X: Ahıska Turk Special Settlers in Kazakstan according to Oblast ---p.129

11. Table XI: Estimated Statistics of the Ahıska Turks in Kazakstan

and Uzbekistan ------p.136

12. Table XII: Native Occupancy of Leading positions by National Republics,

1955-1972 ------p.158

13. Table XIII: Russian Language Fluency Among the Titular Nationality in

their own Republic, 1989 ------p.164

14. Table XIV: Titular and Non-titular Share in Key Government Positions at

the Center and in Oblasts in 1993-94 ------p.192

xi

15. Table XV: Q. Where is your homeland? (Multiple answer possible) ---p.218

16. Table XVI: Q. Who should be considered native residents of titular states --- p.219

17. Table XVII: Q. What is your primary community of belonging? ------p.221

18. Table XVIII: Level of Language Knowledge of Ahıska Turkish and Korean

Diasporas ------p.241

19. Table XIX: Urban and Rural Population Ratios of the Korean diasporas in

Uzbekistan and Kazakstan ------p.248

20. Table XX: The reasons of watching Turkish satellite television by Ahıska Turks -- p.275

xii

LIST OF MAPS AND FIGURES

1. Map I: Russian Far East and Korean Settlement ------p.76

2. Map II: Ahıska Region ------p.120

3. Figure I: Best Political System for Kazakstan ------p.191

4. Figure II: Best Political System for Uzbekistan ------p.191

xiii

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

A diaspora is a migrant community which crosses borders, retains an ethnic group consciousness and peculiar institutions over extended periods.1 It is an ancient social formation, comprised of people living out of their ancestral homeland, who retain their loyalties toward their co-ethnics and the homeland from which they were forced out.2 The Jews have been one of the most ancient and well-known diasporic people. For a long time the term, “diaspora” was used almost exclusively in relation to the Jews. Hence diaspora signified a collective trauma, a banishment, where one dreamed of home but lived in exile. However, in recent years other peoples, such as Palestinians, Armenians, Chinese, and Tatars, etc., who have settled outside their natal territories but maintain strong collective identities, also

1 Robin Cohen, Global diasporas; An introduction (London: UCL Press Limited, 1997), p.ix. 2 Milton Esman, “Diasporas and International Relations” in John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (eds.), Ethnicity (Oxford University Press, 1996), p.317.

1 have defined themselves as diasporas. As Cohen states, “the description or self- description of such groups as diasporas is now common”, which allows a certain degree of social distance to displace a high degree of psychological alienation.

Accordingly, during the last decades, diaspora has been rediscovered and expanded to include refugees, gastarbeiter, migrants, expatriates, expellees, political refugees, and ethnic minorities.3

Although ideas concerning diaspora and its types vary, the concept of diaspora in this study is limited to the following: an expatriate community dispersed from an original homeland, often traumatically, to alien lands; a community which has a collective memory and myth about the homeland including its location, history and achievements; a community which has a strong ethnic group consciousness sustained over a long period of time and based on a sense of distinctiveness.4 These are, perhaps, the crucial factors that distinguish them from other migrant communities or ethnic minorities. Mere physical dispersion does not automatically connote diaspora; there has to be more, such as an acute memory or image of, or contact with, the homeland.5 Moreover, in order to illuminate relations between an expatriate community and its homeland, this definition well

3 William Safran, “Diasporas in modern societies: myths of homeland and return,” Diaspora 1: 1(1991), p.83. 4 For a list of features of a diaspora see Robin Cohen, Global diasporas; An introduction (London: UCL Press Limited, 1997), p.26. 5 On the issue William Safran, Milton Esman, and Gabriel Sheffer give in-depth analysis.

2 captures the triadic bases of diaspora: host state, homeland, and diaspora community.

For instance, German-Americans whose ancestors emigrated to the United

States more than a century ago are not a diaspora; neither are Polish-American or

Italian American who no longer speak Polish or Italian, no longer attend a homeland-oriented church, have no clear idea of the homeland’s past, and retain no more than a fondness for the cuisine of their ethnicity, a predilection often shared by people who do not belong to their ethnic group. They have no external cultural orientation and no myth of return. Notably, the will to survive as a minority is weak. The use of the homeland language has virtually disappeared and the heritage, if any, that is transmitted hardly goes beyond family recollections or culinary preference.

To stress this point once more, a fundamental characteristic of diasporas is that they maintain their ethno-national identities, which are strongly and directly derived from their homelands and related to them. They generally either have well developed communal organizations or, if not, the determination to establish such organizations. In addition, ethno-national diasporas display communal solidarity, which give rise to social cohesion. They are engaged in a variety of cultural, social,

3 political and economic activities through their communal organizations. They also take part in a range of cultural, social, political and economic exchanges with their homelands, which might be states or territories within states. Diasporas often create trans-state networks that permit and encourage exchanges of significant resources with their homelands as well as with other parts of the same diaspora.

Interestingly, we can find defined diasporas in the post-Soviet borderlands.

In spite of the predictions of marxists, ethno-national diasporas have not disappeared in these regions. On the contrary, their numbers, the scope of membership, their organization and the range of their activities have been increasing dramatically since the collapse of the Soviet Union.6 We should, perhaps, not pass over the fact that at the center of the collapse of the Soviet Union was the dramatic rise of nationalism. There can be no question that many factors contributed to the fall of communism; however, it was nationalism and its capacity to mobilize broad masses of citizens on behalf of independence that proved the decisive force in the unraveling of totalitarianism. Despite the Soviet ideology’s apparent rejection of nationalism in favor of internationalism, the civic identity fostered by communism was never able to overcome the more deeply embedded moral and cultural codes of

6 Garbriel Scheffer, “Ethno-national Diasporas and Security”, Survival 35, no.1. (Spring, 1994), p. 77.

4 ethnonationalism.7

As mid-1980s began, many national activisms were found in the Soviet empire. For nearly three quarters of a century, many of the Soviet Union’s citizens kept their most deeply held views to themselves. Their outward submissiveness even led many Western experts to conclude that the traditions, values, and bonds of the past had been sundered and irretrievably lost. The West’s misconceptions about the Soviet Union were, perhaps, best demonstrated by the interchangeable use of the terms “USSR” and “Russia”. 8 Soviet citizens were frequently called “Russians” in chic shorthand. This practice made the non-Russian peoples, in essence, hidden nations. Even today, the deep spiritual crisis of identity among non-Russian peoples is only weakly understood by the rest of the world. To be sure, there are a few

Western experts, most notably Helene Carrere D’Encausse, Alexandre Bennigsen,

Edward Allworth, Zibigniew Brzezinski, and Richard Pipes, who have pointed to the potential of the non-Russian factors. However, as of the mid-1980s, the majority of the Western academic community was convinced that the force of nationalism in the Soviet Union had been successfully suppressed by state control. Undoubtedly, much of the national spirit and energy of the Soviet peoples was hidden under the

7 Geroge Schopflin, “Nationhood, communism and state legitimating”, Nations and Nationalism 1, no.1 (1995), pp.81-91. 8 Nadia Diuk and Adrian Karatnycky, New Nation Rising. The Fall of the Soviet and the Challenge of Independence, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1993), p. 12.

5 superficial and glib assertions of the self-confident totalitarian media.

The Soviet system not only hid national spirit among non-Russian peoples in the federation but conversely also created a national consciousness for some ethnic peoples. For instance, before the Soviet era, there was no widespread notion of national consciousness among the Central Asian Turkic peoples. It could be argued that the Uzbek, Turkmen, Tajik, Kyrgyz, and Kazak nations, as they are new, were essentially formed under communism, although each of these peoples were the descendants of a rich and ancient Turkish heritage. 9 The idea of nationhood and the concept of a nation state with its essential element of popular sovereignty was originally alien to these cultures and traditions. Thus, we can conclude that in spite of Soviet internationalism, a territorial trope for the idea of the nation was generated by the Soviets, since the Soviets’ idea of cultural unity was linked to the idea of territorially based ethnic groups.10 By federalizing ethnic homelands into ethno-republics, the Soviet state actually created nations whose sense of nation-ness had previously barely existed. In other words, the Soviet Union created a much more complicated social space, in which identity was in many ways rooted to

9 Ibid., p. 178. 10 Greta Lynn Uehling, “The Crimean Tatars in Uzbekistan: Speaking with the dead and living homeland,” Central Asian Survey vol. 20, no.3 (2001), p.396.

6 territory and helped determine both the rights and opportunities of titular nations.11

Even though the forced differentiation of peoples that took place under

Stalin was largely artificial, there is today an increasing tendency, especially among the urban intelligentsia, for individuals, to identify themselves strongly and voluntarily as Uzbek, Kazak, Tajik, and Turkmen. Especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union, each titular state in Central Asia has been rapidly developing its own profile in domestic as well as international affairs. These states are making all possible efforts to revitalize and reformulate their national identities. Due to these developments, the problems of diasporas, cultural rights and state protection of national minorities are growing throughout post-Soviet Central Asia, since these nationalizing states do not have effective ways of harmonizing the relationships of citizenship, ethnic affiliation and religious and national identity. Moreover, as

Annette Bohr has observed, the titular nationals have been squeezing out the non- titular nationals from leading positions since the time of the creation of the new republics up through today, to make room for themselves.12 In other words, the notorious “fifth article” in the Soviet internal passports which was the most eminent manifestation of the institutionalization of nationality that would play a role in

11 Ibid. 12 Annette Bohr, “The Central Asian States as Nationalising regimes”, in Graham Smith, Edward Allworth, Vivien Law, Andrew Wilson, and Annette Bohr (eds.), Nation-building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands. The Politics of National Identities (Cambridge University Press, 1998)

7 hindering a citizen’s chance of gaining employment or admission to institutes of higher learning, was to succeed in all Central Asian states. The “fifth article” was stealthily restored in all of the Central Asian states in order to secure their political and cultural resurgence during their nation-building processes.13 Within the context of this environment, this study seeks to examine and explore the situation of small diaspora groups in the nationalizing Central Asian states.

Objectives and Scope of the Study

According to Russian writer and philosopher Aleksandr Zinoviev14, the communist system had a strong capacity to destroy national barriers and eliminate ethnic differences. He argued that communism created a new, bland, homogenized community of people.15 However, his assessment has since been disproven by the remarkable national rebirth that helped cause the collapse of the Soviet Union.

And, especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union, all of the newly independent governments in Central Asia aimed at nationalizing or indigenizing the territories

13 For example, the governments of Kazakstan and Uzbekistan have found innovative ways to keep the ‘fifth column’ as an ethnic marker in the new passports by denoting ethnic nationality in native language or Russian on the first page for the internal consumption, but on the second page, which is written in English for external consumption, omits all references to ethnicity. Instead, it only indicates citizenship. It is probable that by doing so, they could avoid potential accusation of ethnocratic behavior from abroad. (see appendix for the example of Kazakstan Passport) 14 He characterized national issues in the Soviet Union in his deeply cynical book The Reality of Communism published in 1983. 15 cited in Nadia Diuk and Adrian Karatnycky, New Nation Rising. The Fall of the Soviet and the Challenge of Independence, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1993), pp. 3-4

8 under their control and rectifying what many saw as decades of dominance by foreign actors. These states made great efforts to undertake various nation-building projects. For individuals in many nationalizing states in Central Asia, knowledge of the titular language became increasingly important in order to obtain, maintain and advance their career and position in the society. In other words, members of the titular nations had somewhere to go and settle after the collapse of the Soviet Union, but the non-titular groups, which included group such as the Jews, the Volga

Germans, the Koreans, the Crimean Tatars, Ahıska Turks, had nowhere to go.

These diasporas found themselves in the middle of nowhere. To be sure, deportation and Sovietization had provided a serious challenge to the primordial notion of nationality.

Under these circumstances, we should not overlook the fact that primary targets of the titular nations’ nationalizing measures are not only confined to ethnic

Russians but also to Russified ethnic minorities and other diasporas. These ethnic minorities or diasporas rather than Russian diasporas in the region are, perhaps, the main losers in the nation-building process in post-Soviet Central Asia due to their powerlessness and vulnerability. As peoples deported by the Soviet regime, these groups, unlike the Russian diaspora, were forced to migrate against their will. Thus,

9 the intention of this study is to focus on the ethnic minority and diaspora issues in nationalizing Central Asia, which have generally been ignored by western academic and political circles.

Specifically, this study is an analysis of two deported diaspora groups in

Central Asia, Korean and Ahıska Turks, both of which experienced Stalin’s brutal deportations and which now facing new challenges in the nationalizing states.

These small ethnic groups have no powerful protector to whom they can appeal for help and little chance to return to their homelands. This increases their sense of anxiety and vulnerability even though they have not been harassed or victimized in any discernible way. The objective of this work is to examine their survival and the existence of the diaspora nationalism in the nationalizing Central Asian states.

There is a growing academic literature in the West concerning the origins and future of the Russian diasporas.16 However, non-Russian diasporas have rarely been the subjects of these books and have been at best relegated to cursory chapters. The potential significance of this study lies in filling this lacuna in diaspora studies, given the paucity and poor quality of the literature in this area of the subject.

16 For instance, on Russian diasporas see Bremmer, I., “The Politics of Ethnicity: Russians in the New Ukraine”, Europe-Asia Studies 46, no.2 (1994), pp. 261-283. / Kolstoe, Paul, Russians in the Former Soviet Republics (London: Hurst, 1995) / Melvin, Neil., Russians beyond Russia’s Borders (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995), Shlapentokh, Vladimir., M. Sendich and E. Payin (eds.), The New Russian Diaspora: Russian Minorities in the Former Soviet Republics (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1994).

10 Post-Soviet Central Asia now faces an inharmony of state and nation which nationalists are increasingly reluctant to accept. However, many ethnic diasporas in the region are living symbols of this split and these diasporas have increasingly become the focus of political debates. Unfortunately, as mentioned above, most of these debates have concerned the situation of the Russian diaspora in the region and to some extent other major diasporas, such as Soviet Germans and Jews. This study, in contrast, by focusing on other ethnic minority diasporas that are more vulnerable, powerless, and receive little concern or consideration from Western political and academic circles, will extend the political implications of the diasporas’ existence in the region. Although these implications may be far from clear as yet, studying narratives of deported diasporas in nationalizing states raises important questions about the applicability of the primordial notion of diaspora identity. In political terms, the narrative of the nation articulated by diasporas challenges the nationalists’ idea of the nation as a homogenous cultural unit formed on a common territory and linked by blood ties. Moreover, the cultural hybridity of diaspora identity suggests another narrative of nationalism which disrupts the unifying myth of the modern nationalizing nation. As Bhabha argues, the recognition of such hybridity may provide the space to raise the real questions about

11 nation, citizenship and national belonging necessary to avoid the politics of polarity and emerge as the others of ourselves.17

By using Korean and Ahıska Turkish diasporas in Uzbekistan and

Kazakstan as cases, this study examines, to some extent, how diasporas are influenced by nationalizing states in Central Asia. It attempts to inquire into the factors which influence the existence, nature and intensity of ethno-nationalism in the diasporas’ context. Therefore, it analyzes both the existence and transmission of ethno-nationalism between the diasporas’ settings and homelands and specifically will deal with the transmission of ethno-nationalist sentiments across diasporas’ generations. To understand the effects and consequences of diaspora nationalism fully, this work proceeds from an analysis of nationalism’s public symptoms to an analysis of the relatively private domain of diasporic ethno-communal existence. By doing so, the researcher attempts to illustrate how ethno-nationalist sentiments in the diaspora setting can draw their strength, ideas, material support, or simply nationalist enthusiasm from homelands. Above all, the task of this inquiry is to examine the sources of diversity within diaspora relations and to move toward an analysis of the patterns of interaction among trans-border ethnic groups, their traditional ethnic homelands, and the states in which they reside. The comparative

17 Homi Bhabha, The Location of Culture (London: Routledge, 1992).

12 content of this investigation will show considerable variations in these practices in different settings and groupings. To be sure, knowledge about these processes is inevitably highly contextual.

Case Selection

Until national movements emerged in the late 1980s, native culture seemed like something second-rate or inferior, which is also linked to the less intelligent and low standard of education among titular inhabitants in Central Asia.18 The systemic superiority enjoyed by Russians and their language led only three percent of all Russians to bother learning any of the non-Russian languages. Thus, for the non-Russian national minorities in the region there was no choice to learn titular language or culture, but to accept Russian culture and language for their prosperity and survival. In Kazakstan, where the number of Russians was about equal to the number of indigenous Kazak, Soviet rule meant that there was less room for Kazak language and culture in the society. In 1989, there were no kindergartens for Kazak children, and Kazak language instruction was often unavailable in schools.19 Its heterogeneous demographic composition made Kazakstan relatively less authoritarian

18 Nadia Diuk and Adrian Karatnycky, p.52. 19 Ibid., p. 53.

13 in its system of rule and more open in nature compared to other Central Asian states.

Consequently, Kazakstan, the most Russified of the states (with the possible exception of Kyrgyzstan), stands a bit apart from the others in many respects. It is said that, even today, a walk around Almaty suggests a mode of life much more

Europeanized than in the other Central Asian capitals.

On the other hand, the Uzbeks were the third most numerous ethnic group in the Soviet Union, numbering close to 26 million. Unlike the situation in

Kazakstan, the Uzbeks compose the majority of Uzbekistan’s population.

Nevertheless, their numerical strength never turned into an equivalent access to political power at the highest levels of government during the Soviet period. Thus,

Uzbekistan employs more ethnic codes in all of its policies to provide an important avenue for indigenous social mobility and political status and position. Since independence, Uzbekistan has been the most overtly anti-Russian of the Central

Asian states, attempting to eliminate all Slavic heritage and influences.

If we consider the language law for instance, we can see the difference between the two states more clearly. Uzbekistan removed Russian’s normative status as the language of inter-ethnic communication in the state in 1995.20 The

20 Annette Bohr, “The Central Asian States as Nationalising regimes”, in Graham Smith, Edward Allworth, Vivien Law, Andrew Wilson, and Annette Bohr (eds.), Nation-building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands. The Politics of National Identities (Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 150.

14 Uzbekistani constitution does not provide the Russian language with any protection.

By contrast, in Kazakstan, Russian is still the de facto lingua franca in all spheres of public life. Moreover, the 1995 constitution upgraded the status of Russian from the language of inter-ethnic communication to an official language.21

Thus, this study examines as cases two diverse nationalizing states in

Central Asia, Kazakstan and Uzbekistan, since they have relatively different conditions and settings.22 The comparative content of this inquiry in different settings will show considerable variations in diaspora practices and relations in different groupings. Moreover, many deported Ahıska Turks and Koreans ended up primarily in Uzbekistan and Kazakstan. These two diasporas are still concentrated in the above-mentioned states even after their independence.

In the meantime, this study makes some distinctions between different types of diaspora communities. There are two dominant types: diasporas that are stateless but maintain strong contacts with co-ethnics who reside in a territory that is regarded by most members of the group as their homeland (Ahıska Turk) and diasporas that are related to societies that form the majority in their own established states (Korean).

21 Ibid., p.151. 22 However, it should be underlined that even if there is some difference between Kazakstan and Uzbekistan in terms of their nationalizing degree, for the most part, the post-independent political landscape in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan looks decidedly mono-ethnic. There are few political groups or movements that span ethnic division.

15 Research Questions

The present study is built on the assumption that the formation of new diasporas is an ongoing process, closely related to a combination of economic, cultural, and political factors. On this basis, it will examine the current political, economic, and social situations of Uzbekistan and Kazakstan after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the ways in which Koreans and Ahıska Turks have confronted tasks in the transition period. Since the Korean and Ahıska Turkish diasporas consist of only about one percent of the population in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan, it is impossible to understand the minority diaspora society without knowing the host- states’ political, socio-economic, and ethnic situations. Therefore, sufficient attention will be given to the macro context of the nationalizing regimes where the

Korean and Ahıska Turkish diasporas are situated.

One of the common features between the two diasporas is that they do not have ample possibilities to return to their respective homelands, due to various reasons. Consequently, it is crucial to examine how they organize their lives in nationalizing titular states. As a matter of fact, the majority of Koreans and Ahıska

Turks in Central Asia now seem to accept their new status as diasporas in newly independent states and are adapting rapidly to their host-societies. However, due to

16 dramatic changes in the economic, social, and political environment, both diasporas are in the process of reconstructing their national or diaspora identity in order to unify themselves.

Past years have demonstrated their ability to overcome considerable hardship. Whether the future will allow them similar avenues of group survival is a question that remains open but to be studied carefully in this dissertation. Hence, their fate in post-Soviet Central Asia likewise poses interesting questions. Will they be able to assimilate into the Turkic cultures of the majorities in the Central

Asian republics? If not, will they be able to maintain their diaspora ethnic identity, or will they opt for a greater Russian identity? By asking such questions, this study focuses on a more crucial question: how strong and how significant is the interaction between diasporas and homelands in the post-Soviet Central Asia? This kind of question will lead us to explore the process of diaspora nationalism, its persistence over time, and whether it has the potential to be transmitted through the generations. If it has, what then are the mechanisms involved in such transmission?

In other words, what are the factors that enable the successful transmission of ethno-nationalism across generational boundaries? What roles, if any, are played by the homelands and what difficulties do they have with the nationalizing host-states?

17 Is an active and highly interactive relationship between the ethnic homelands and diasporas necessary for intense ethno-national sentiments to develop in the diasporas? These and other questions will be examined in this work as it elaborates diasporas’ collective-individual identity formation and identity transmission between the older and younger generations. By looking at the case of the Korean and Ahıska Turkish diasporas, we may see how different diasporas respond differently to ethno-national challenges in the host-states. These and similar questions are worth exploring because they provide one of the important keys to understanding diaspora identity.

Based on fieldwork carried out in 2003 and 2005, it can be argued that many diaspora members are ambivalent, since they expressed both affection and disaffection with regard to life in Central Asia. As Uehling argues, for many diasporas of Central Asia, the ideologies of home, soil, and roots fail to line up with the practicalities of residence, so that territorial referents and civic loyalty are perplexingly divided.23 Diaspora identity contains disparate and even contradictory elements and is constantly evolving in reaction to changing circumstances. In short, degrees of diasporaness, or diasporacity, are not static. Thus, this study aims to

23 Greta Lynn Uehling, “The Crimean Tatars in Uzbekistan: Speaking with the dead and living homeland”, Central Asian Survey 20, no.3 (2001), p.394.

18 clarify certain aspects of these confusions by examining two different diaspora groups, which examination will offer a window on the much broader process of diaspora identity and nationalism. This kind of inquiry can reveal the homeland image of the diasporas (Korean and Ahıska Turk), their actual fatherland and alternative homeland.

Plan of the Dissertation

For purpose of this study I have dismissed the conventional idea of presenting the life of ethnic groups purely in terms of formal structures and organizations. My approach focuses more on the ethno-cultural identity perceptions and relationships developed by the Ahıska Turkish and Korean diasporas in Central

Asia. In order to elaborate this discussion and understand the phenomenon of the

Korean and Ahıska Turkish diaspora movement more thoroughly in the context of nationalizing Central Asian states, the first discussion starts with a theoretical orientation. Thus, chapter two will consist of a brief overview of the conceptual understanding of ethnicity, nation and nationalism. The theoretical framework in which different approaches to ethnicity and ethnic identity are debated and relate these to the case of the Ahıska Turkish and Korean diasporas.

As contemporary Central Asian societies have become increasingly

19 multicultural, a growing number of people (especially in the diasporas) come to have access to dual (or multiple) cultures and identities. They are coping with difficulties of “cross-cultural transition” and the burden of minority status24. They have learned and are learning more than one culture and are engaging in “cultural frame switching.” More often than not, they have to overcome formidable barriers of social disadvantage and ethnic discrimination to improve their status in the host society. Thus, the author was concerned about a diaspora’s group level change after their deportation to Central Asia. In other words, how acculturation can be taken into account in multicultural diasporas is a topic that will be discussed. Accordingly, in order to examine these acculturated minority groups during the Soviet and the post-Soviet period, the author will look over in terms of acculturation theory. Under the general heading of acculturation, the researcher will variously use either social contact, cultural shift, or identity-type measures of adaptation in the following chapters while examining the Ahıska Turkish and Korean diasporas. Furthermore, the concepts of nation and nationalism will be discussed in order to give an in-depth grasp of nationalizing Kazakstan and Uzbekistan and their state-building (or nation- building) in theoretical manner.

24 John Berry, U. Kim, T. Minde, and D. Mok, “Comparative studies of acculturative stress,” International Migration Review, no. 21 (1996), pp. 491-493.

20 Chapter three will be devoted to a brief historical review of the Ahıska

Turkish and Korean diasporas in Central Asia. It will be a bare-boned sketch of historical circumstances which have impacted upon Ahıska Turks and Koreans in

Central Asia. Hence, this chapter will cover their deportation and Sovietization before the independence of the titular nations in Central Asia. The significance of more specific historical factors, including deportation, population distribution, official status etc., will be further elaborated. Specific attention will be given to diasporic conceptualizations and the way in which the diasporas’ distance from their homelands in time and space impacts on their construction. It will show that the links that exist between diaspora individuals and the homeland, regardless of generation, can reveal many issues, including the intensity of ethno-national identification. The author will elaborate on this identification process by looking at the extent to which the homeland is portrayed in a romantic fashion, abstracted from complex political and economic realities. For the Ahıska Turks in particular, the question of return to the homeland turns out to be one of the central considerations in assessing the attraction of diasporic conceptualizations to their diaspora population. In this context the Korean and Ahıska Turk samples become highly differentiated, with Ahıska Turks expressing relatively strong links to the homeland

21 and a desire to return. Representatives of the Korean sample revealed relatively limited and more-or-less symbolic links with the homeland. These differences between the samples are supported by the initial historical assessment of deportation and Sovietization patterns.

Chapter four will discuss the social, demographic, and political forces that both induce and constrain the nationalization processes in Kazakstan and

Uzbekistan. Specific nation-building practices as well as their consequent implications for the diasporas in the region will be explored and analyzed. This chapter will attempt to illustrate the disjunction between the formal expression of equality in Central Asian constitutions and the actual impacts of the nationalizing actions of the elites in the titular nations.

Chapter five will focus on the existence of the diaspora nationalism in the

Korean and Ahıska Turkish communities and the revitalization movements of these communities in their nationalizing host-states. It will systematically analyze the interactive relationship between the ethnic homelands and the respective diasporas as well as the generational aspect of this process. It will try to show how the deportation of Koreans and Ahıska Turks to Central Asia is being translated into symbolic or moral capital by the nationalizing elites. It will try to illustrate that

22 the history of the deportation increased the sense of group or communal identity.

In fact, the potential mythologizing of the deportation may very well support the notion that the revival movement involves the creation of an identity involving the

“invention of traditions,” as Hobsbawn calls it.25 Within this framework, the cultural revitalization movements of the Ahıska Turks and Koreans will be examined in terms of the extent to which their cultural heritage has played a role in their lives. While doing so, the author will attempt to reveal that they are more responsive to language/cultural activities when they perceive the economic benefits of pursuing them. Finally, in chapter six characteristics of the two groups and their integration into the host society are studied, with specific emphasis on the role of the Homelands (the Turkish and Korean governments, South Korean multinationals,

Turkish businesses and entrepreneurs and other homeland engagements.)

Methodology

This inquiry approaches the collapse of the Soviet empire and the rise of nationalism in Central Asia among titular nationals and the impact of these developments on the Korean and Ahıska Turkish diasporas within the framework of the historical and social sciences. Investigating ideas of homeland and diasporic

25 Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds.), The Invention of Traditions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 1-15, 263-283, 298-307.

23 identity demands scholarly engagement with several disciplines. The field data in this dissertation is gathered through ethnographic research. In a nutshell, the present study is based on field research, the core of which is based on semi-structured interviews with members of the Korean and Ahıska Turkish diasporas in the nationalizing Central Asian states. Accordingly, the study utilizes a considerable amount of ethnographic material as it weaves together narrative and analysis. The main goal of the study is to elaborate on the dynamics which potentially lead to the construction of diasporic identities. In order to acquire information and data dealing with nationalizing Kazakistan and Uzbekistan regimes the study will make use of various government periodicals, documents and publications along with recent journals and magazines. A special endeavor was made to use a wide variety of

Western, Russian, Turkish, Korean, and titular (Kazak and Uzbek) sources in this study. Furthermore, archival materials (GARF, GAKhK, GAPK, GAKO, GAAO,

GADO, GAChO)26 will also be utilized dealing with the backgrounds of the Ahıska

Turkish and Korean diaspora.

This inquiry seeks to provide empirical data which will illustrate how diasporas have positioned themselves in the nationalizing states as well as to bring

26 Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii(GARF), Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Khabarovskogo Kraia(GAKhK), Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Primorskogo Kraia(GAPK) Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Kzyl-Ordinskoi Oblasti(GAKO), Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Akmolinskoi Oblasti(GAAO), Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Chimkentskoi Oblasti(GAChO).

24 new narratives which may disrupt dominant narratives of “nation” in post-Soviet

Central Asia. In the mean time, it attempts to surmount the methodological difficulties which arise from treating ethnic groups as organic homogenous communities but composed of individuals with different interests. Using the testimonies of its respondents, the study attempts both to recreate the narratives of nation articulated by deported ethnic minorities, Korean and Ahıska Turk, in

Central Asia and also to provide some tentative suggestions as to how these narratives might be interpreted in the context of the wider debates regarding diaspora nationalism. The empirical data will be presented in two sections: first, in establishing the existence of a collective identity among deported diasporas in nationalizing Central Asia and presenting this as evidence of ‘diaspora nationalism’; and second, in arguing that the substance of diaspora identity is in fact different among different diasporas but common in their cultural hybridity.

The author relied on snowball sampling and sought out individuals in likely gathering places (i.e., outdoor markets, restaurants or coffee houses, villages, churches). While the majority of contacts were made through acquaintances who were either directly or indirectly involved in various aspects of the Korean and

Ahiska Turkish revitalization movements, the respondents also included some

25 individuals who could be described as clearly being outside the nationalizing movement. Thus, though going access to respondents initially depended on snowball sampling, individuals regarded by the researcher as “non-participants” in diaspora activities were also located. In short, the individuals from whom the researcher obtained data fall into three categories: 1) members of Korean and

Ahiska Turkish intelligentsias from Kazakstan and Uzbekistan; 2) participants in cultural revitalization activities organized by official cultural organization in

Uzbekistan and Kazakstan; 3) ordinary non-participatory Koreans and Ahiska Turks whom the researcher met through acquaintances and by chance in Kazakstan and

Uzbekistan.

During fieldwork in Kazakstan in 2003, the researcher encountered some

Korean disapora members who described themselves to be Soviet, in words like,

“By nationality I am Korean, but I consider myself Soviet.” Soviet identity continues to be used by some among the deported diasporas (especially Koreans,

Germans, and Jews) since it allows for resolution of the disjuncture between ethnos and territory experienced upon displacement. Diasporas experience their uprooting differently, but always painfully. For some, the awareness of the split between blood and earth leads to a challenging of their sense of national belonging and a

26 recognition of their “hybridity.” For others, however, displacement leads to a bitter sense of loss and a feeling of not belonging anywhere. For instance, some of the interviewed Korean and Ahıska Turk stated that they hade no homeland. They said,

“We are aliens there and here, we are aliens…the children were born there in

Uzbekistan and Kazakstan. We haven’t got a native land!” Truly, deportation,

Sovietization and the establishment of nationalizing titular states presented a serious challenge to primordial notions of nationality.

Generally, respondents were in a state of physical and mental dislocation, unsettled and often unstable, which presented significant empirical problems. This, combined with the fact that the focus of the study is on beliefs, perceptions, and feelings rather than merely social facts, means that purely quantitative research methods are unsuitable. Thus, in the research, empirical data was gathered during the course of the fieldwork conducted among deported diaspora communities using a combination of qualitative research methods. Four complementary methods of qualitative data gathering were used in conjunction: survey; semi-structured interviews; questionnaires, which included open and closed questions and covered the same areas as the interviews (socio-demographic data, motivation for leaving, evaluation of treatment by the host-states, national identification, etc.); and field

27 observations, recorded throughout the period and analyzed together with the transcribed interviews.

Literature Review

As mentioned above, the diaspora movements of the ethnic Koreans and

Ahıska Turks in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan are an ongoing process. What is more, there are few studies in either the Western literature, or in other languages, dealing with their degree of diasporaness or diasporacity after the collapse of the Soviet

Union. Thus, regarding the two cases, this study will effectively use three other complementary methods in conjunction: interview, field observation, and questionnaires. There are some book chapters and journal articles related to the issue. Including these sources, all other accessible ethnographic materials will be consulted. Special attention will be given to the current local diaspora scholars’ works in Uzbekistan and Kazakstan.

There is, however, a fair amount of literature dealing with nationalizing

Central Asian states and the field of diaspora studies in general. Nation Building in the post-Soviet Borderlands: The politics of National Identities, edited by

Graham Smith and others, Nation Abroad Diapora, Politics and International

28 Relations in the Former Soviet Union, edited by Charles King and Neil Melvin, The

Nationalities Question in the Post-Soviet States by Graham Smith, and New Nations

Rising. The fall of the Soviets and the Challenge of Independence by Nadia Diuk and Andrian Karantnysky are some good examples of works in English which deal with the study of nationalism and ethnic politics in the-post Soviet’s non-Russian borderlands. These books, which were based on fieldwork, offer insight into how national identities have been reformulated and revitalized in the recently established states.

Some chapters directly relating to the Central Asia states were quite comprehensive. Shirin Akiner’s article “Melting Pot, Salad Bowl – Cauldron?

Manipulation and Mobilization of Ethnic and Religious Identities in Central Asia” gives perhaps the best analysis of the ethnic relations among various peoples in the region after Soviet rule. Her argument that the Central Asia region, which used to be the ‘melting pot’ throughout history with no records of hostility among different peoples, has changed into the ‘salad bowl’ circumstances with institutionalized nationalities in the region due to Soviet influence, aptly describes situation in the region. She indicates that the post-Soviet nation-building process, maintaining the self-confidence of the titular peoples, has contributed to a heightening of interethnic

29 tensions within each state, creating a sense of “first” and “second-class” citizens.

She notes that, “under such circumstances dormant hostilities could be activated suddenly, by some otherwise trivial incident,” as happened in 1989-91.27 Related with the issue, this study will also take a look at the government’s documents and papers to see the other side of the picture.

In terms of general information in the field of diaspora studies, Garbriel

Sheffer’s books, Modern Diaspora in International Politics, Diaspora Politics at

Home Abroad, and his article “Ethno-National Diasporas and Security,” Robin

Cohen’s, Global Diasporas: an Introduction, Milton Esman’s article, “Diasporas and International Relations,” William Safran’s articles, “Comparing Diaspora: A

Review Essay” and “Diaspora in Modern Societies: Myths of Homeland and

Return” give a good overview of diaspora issues, as well as broaden and deepen the scope of the field beyond its traditional focus. These books and articles are pretty well organized and methodically elaborate on the issue and they provide a good motivation or powerful reason for this specific study. Especially, Engin Isin and

Patrick Wood’s book Citizenship and identity and Stuart Hall’s article “Cultural identity and Diaspora” in particular served as an important referents for the central

27 Shrin Akiner, “Metling pot, salad bowl – cauldron? Manipulation and mobilization of ethnic and religious identities in Central Asia” Ethnic and Racial Studies (April, 1997), p. 392.

30 diaspora concept utilized in the dissertation: “a diaspora’s hybrid diasporic identities.” Their proposed argument regarding the “hybrid and hyphenated diaspora identity” captures the complexity of cultural configuration and identity formation of groups and individuals in this study. As aforementioned, diaspora nationalism is based on a triadic relationship between the homeland, host state/society and the diaspora community, which creates its transnational and hybrid structure. Beside, as German Kim pointed out, in order to avoid lopsided imposition of the homeland culture (i.e., South Korean to Korean diaspora and Turkey to

Ahıska Turk) upon local diasporas during their cultural and, to some extent, language recovery processes, the notion of hybrid and hyphenated identities take important place.28 It is logical to assume that since their dissimilation was a process that occurred over decades, their assimilation will also take time. Therefore, we have to acknowledge that the Korean diaspora in Kazakstan or Uzbekistan are

Koreans and at the same time full-fledged Kazakstani citizens or those Ahıska

Turks in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan were Turkish at the same time full-fledged

Kazakstani or Uzbekistani citizens.

There is a large literature, which comprises many conflicting ideas, in the

28 Interview with German Kim, cited in Chong Jin Oh, “Diaspora Nationalism: the case of ethnic Korean minority in Kazakhstan and its lessons from the Crimean Tatars in Turkey,” Nationalities Paper, vol. 34, no.2 (May, 2006), p.120.

31 area of ethnicity, formation of identity, identity shift or change, and nationalism.

Among various writings, the author has referred to works of Anthony Smith,

Fredrik Barth, Eric Hobsbawm, Ernest Gellner, Stephean Cornell and Douglas

Hartman, Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan, and Anthony Cohen. Anthony

Smith’s argument in his book National Identity has particular importance for the purpose of this dissertation. Starting from the premise that the content of both nationalism and ethnicity differ in each country according to specific historic conditions and internal dynamics, Smith argument that ethnic groups should be analyzed through examination of their histories, which possess various different characteristics and have different historical experiences, gives considerable insight into the issue.29 Indeed, historical culture, historical territory, memories, and myth have played a crucial role in shaping Ahıska Turk and Korean diasporic identity.30

Additionally, it should be stressed that Smith’s analysis of pre-modern ethnic ties to modern nations provides another explanation for the persistence and strength of ethnic attachments to the “nation” and the power of nationalist ideologies and sentiments to spark nationalist movements. That is to say, Smith has shown how the roots of nationalism were to be found in pre-modern ethnicity and that it should be

29 Anthony Smith, National Identity (London: Penguin Books, 1991), p. 200. 30 Ibid, p. 14.

32 understood as continuation of ethnicity.

Another approach useful for this dissertation is Cornell and Hartman’s instrumental perspective as set forth in their book Ethnicity and Race-Making

Identities in a Changing World. In their view, individuals and groups emphasize their own ethnic identities when such identities are in some way advantageous to them.31 In the same vein, Glazer and Moynihan also add that “Ethnicity serves as a means of advancing group interest” thus, “Ethnicity has become more salient because it can combine interest with an affective tie.”32 Given the responses from many interviewees in this study, it would appear that ethnic factors, while not insignificant, are increasingly less influential than economic ones in terms of the ways in which they choose to go about raising their families and seeking employment. Even many interviewees who did not profess an interest in nationalizing diaspora projects per se, showed instrumental reasons for learning

Korean language and culture (i.e., to study or work in Korea or to find employment, possibly with a Korean firm). Although Ahıska Turks have lower degree considering the issue this also does happen to them as well. Paul Henze also supports this idea by saying, “Ethnic awareness is a powerful emotion, but it does

31 Stephan Cornell and Douglas Hartman, Ethnicity and Race-Making Identities in a Changing World (California: Pine Forge Press, 1998), p. 58. 32 Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan, “Why Ethnicity,” Commentary (October, 1974), p.37.

33 not act in vacuum. It is closely connected to economic considerations and expectations.”33

Lastly, some ethnographic works by important regional and local scholars

(Korean, Korean diaspora, Turkish, and Ahıska Turkish diaspora) were used and consulted for the dissertation. In the case of the Ahıska Turks, books and articles by Ayşegül Aydıngün, Zakir Avşar, Feyzullah Budak, Yunus Zeyrek and Elipaşa

Ensarov were of particular value, while works by, German Kim, Valeriy Han,

Sergei Han, Georgii Kan, Ko song Mu, and many other South Korean scholars gave important insight into the situation of the Korean diaspora.

33 Henze Paul, “Russia and China: Managing Regional Relations in the Face of Ethnic Aspiration,” The International Research & Exchanges Board’s Huang Hsing Foundation Hsueh Chun-tu Lecture Series (21 June, 1999)

34

CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL ORIENTATION

Recently there is a large literature in the area of ethnicity, formation of identity, identity shift or change, and nationalism. Particularly with the breakup of the Soviet Union, the study of identity politics has exploded with conflicting views.

Hence, there is no consensus on what identities, ethnicity, and nationalism are, or on how they are formed. However, the lack of agreement does not disqualify them as useful concepts in social science. We cannot dismiss their conceptual importance in explaining recent phenomena. The explosion of nationalism in the former Soviet

Union and the search for a post-Soviet identity testify to the importance of ethnicity and identity politics.

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the rise of nationalist movements placed the nationalities issue at the forefront of the governmental

35 agenda in many of the newly born Central Asian states. Within this environment, the Central Asian states have been attempting to join the international community on many levels and are at the same time dealing with internal conflicts resulting from rising nationalist sentiments among different nationality groups. Accordingly, research into the ethnic minorities in Central Asia’s newly independent republics is crucial, because the way they handle the nationalities factor will have an impact both within and beyond their borders. In particular, research into the Korean and

Ahiska Turkish diasporas in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan could provide insight into the potential complexities of a future nationalities policy in other Central Asian republics where the nationalities factor must be adequately and appropriately addressed in order to ensure regional stability. To be sure, ethnicity is an important variable in explaining identities in the post-Soviet space. There are distinct differences of custom, religion, and language among the many peoples. To clarify the general concepts that will be used to explore the specific subject matter of this study, this chapter will give background about the ideas of nation and nationalism, ethnicity and identity, and acculturation.

36 II.1. Nation and Nationalism and Ethnicity: A Historical and Contemporary

Perspective

In the study of nationalism it is important to recognize that the concept of

“nation” and the phenomenon of nationalism are fluid and polymorphous, as it is commonly misconceived and often presented in social science literature. Therefore,

“nation” cannot be defined as any kind of bounded or homogeneous entity. In this respect, question of what constitutes a nation and how are we to understand of the phenomenon of nationalism remains crucial. Much of the literature on the subject recognizes the break between the modern and pre-modern as a significant point in the development of the nation-state and the rise of nationalism. This is thus an appropriate point at which to begin the discussion.

The argument that the concept of “nation” is a modern one finds much support in the literature. Many authors trace the emergence of nation and nationalisms to the rise of the modern state. The proponents of this view, such as

Gellner34 and Breuilly35, write that the nation is a modern phenomenon which came into being in the late eighteenth century with the nation-state-building projects that emerged in the wake of the Industrial Revolution, the rise of capitalism, and the

34 Ernest Gellner, Thought and Change (London: Weidenfeld & Nichoson, 1964), pp. 147-178. 35 John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), pp. 366-403.

37 accompanying development of centralized mass education systems, conscription, and extensive communications and transportation networks. Prior to the French

Revolution, the contemporary notion of “nation” did not exist because pre-modern political forms did not demarcate clear boundaries or foster internal integration and homogenization as did the nation-state. Therefore, in pre-modern times specific cultural elements were not significant because cultural homogeneity was not necessary for empires to collect tribute.36 However, in the modern era, cultural markers have taken on a significance that did not exist in the pre-modern era.

Consequently, Gellner states that the concept of nation is a modern phenomenon because now nations have become mobilized around these cultural traditions for political ends.37

In fact, state-building was nation-building. With the emergence of the modern state it became important to inculcate in citizens a sense of loyalty to the state so as to be able to mobilize the citizenry (in order to defend the newly formed state’s territorial integrity). And in fact, this is what has been happening in Central

Asia since titular nations became independent in 1991. In cases where there was an ethnic core upon which to build the nation-state, this facilitated the nation-

36 Craig Calhoun, “Nationalism and Ethnicity,” Annual Review of Sociology, vol.19, 1993, pp. 212-215. 37 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1983)

38 building project because the state could invoke the salient pre-existing cultural traditions of the dominant ethnicity to establish a sense of nation-ness among the citizenry. For instance, in most of the titular Central Asian states (e.g., Kazakstan and Uzbekistan) we see that the dominant ethnic group coincided roughly with the territorial boundaries of the nation-state, allowing the state to mobilize its citizens based on the dominant ethnic group and to promote its language and other significant aspects of culture. Hence, emotional loyalty to the nation-state could be achieved by calling forth the myths and symbols and shared historical memories of the dominant ethic group.

And even when an ethnic core (or dominant ethnic group) is lacking,

“nation-ness” can also be promoted through the invention of traditions, or through the re-invention of various myth and histories (such as a myth of origins, a heroic and golden past) which usually do contain some historical basis, as Anthony Smith argues.38 In other words, “Nations are not so much invented as composed and developed out of pre-existing historical materials,” as Hobsbawm states.39 And it is in this context of the modern state that we see the phenomenon of nationalist

38 We can clearly see such cases in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan after their independence. (i.e., Altın Adam from Kazakhstan and Timur and Timurade legacy from Uzbekistan); Anthony Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1986), p.212. 39 Eric Hobsbawm, “Some Reflections on Nationalism” in T.J. Nossiter and A.H.Hanson Stein Rokkau (eds.), Imagination and Precision in the Social Science (London: Faber & Faber LTD, 1972), p.393.

39 politics emerge. This argument fits in well with the direction of this study, since the latter brings ethnicity into the discussion of nationalism in the way that Smith asserts. To repeat the gist of Smith’ argument, there exists a historical link between ethnicity and nationalism. That is to say, all nationalistic struggles are historically based on ethnic struggles.

However, in the case of Korean and Ahiska Turkish diasporas in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan, they are national minorities with citizenship in their respective

Soviet successor states, but they do not share an ethno-national identity with fellow citizens in their states. Conversely, they do share nationality (i.e., ethnicity) with the external national homeland (Korea and Turkey), although they do not have citizenship.

In addition to the state-generated nation-building discussed above, there are also ethnic intelligentsias that take up the project of defining ethnic identity to promote their nations. In post-colonial states in particular, indigenous elites are often the leaders who promote their county’s nationhood and lead nationalist movements. These intelligentsias engage in re-creating and re-interpreting their past in such a way that their national identity, and specifically the particular elements that they are trying to resuscitate, will resonate with members for political ends.

40 Because the idea of nations seems to imply some kind of internal homogeneity, there are some characteristics upon which a nation is said to exist, such as shared common descent, territory, and a common language. There is an intangible psychological dimension to the phenomenon of nationalism because nationalism becomes prominent when people consider themselves to constitute a nation. After all, a nation exists where members of a particular ethnic community define themselves as such, and it is through this act of self-naming that its existence is asserted.40 As Benedict Anderson has so famously phrased it, “a nation is an imagined community.”41

While the rise of the nation-state and the concept of nation coincide with modernization (dating roughly to the French Revolution), Anthony Smith finds that continuities between pre-modern ethnic and modern nations illustrate that the break between the modern and the pre-modern eras is not as clear-cut as modernists contend.42 This is the argument that Smith develops in his book in which he attempts to trace the ethnic origins of nations. His basic argument, that “a pre- existing framework of collective loyalties and identities” underlies modern nations,

40 We cans see such developments from the Ahiska Turk case in Central Asia. How they have developed their ethnic identity (or makers) after the deportation. This will be elaborated on later chapter. 41 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1991), pp. 5-7. 42 Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nation (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986)

41 is compelling because it attempts to explain why identification with the nation and nationalist movements can have such a powerful hold over members of ethnic groups. Smith claims that the core of ethnicity is to be found in the more enduring cultural forms which are embodied in the “myth-symbol complex” of ethnic groups, through which values, beliefs, myths, memories, and symbols are passed down to succeeding generations.43

Smith emphasizes that nationalism cannot be analyzed without considering the role played by ethnicity, which also effects the formation of nation-state. To him ethnicity is the forerunner of the modern national unit, and ethnic identity has the potential of being transformed into a nationalist sentiment when the necessary conditions are fulfilled.44 While not discounting the validity of modernist claims,

Smith’s analysis of pre-modern ethnic ties to modern nations provides another explanation for the persistence and strength of ethnic attachments to the nation and the power of nationalist ideologies and sentiments to spark nationalist movements.

Accordingly, it seems that Smith’s position is a powerful model for explaining current developments with regard to ethnicity, nation, and nationalism.

Another major approach that should be considered is the instrumental

43 Ibid., pp. 15-16, 58, 60-68. 44 Ibid., 11.

42 perspective of ethnicity, which views ethnicity as a social construction. 45

Proponents of this approach treat ethnicity as a social, political and cultural resource used by different interest and status groups. Thus, the instrumental perspective focuses on how ethnic boundaries, identities and cultures are transacted and defined through social interaction in ethnic communities. In the view of these scholars, individuals and group emphasize their own ethnic identities when such identities are in some way advantageous to them. The basis of the persistence of ethnic identity is the practical use to which it is put, rather than its deep roots.46 Paul Henze supports this argument by saying, “Ethnic awareness is a powerful emotion, but it does not act in vacuum. It is closely connected to economic consideration and expectations.”47 The significance of this argument is that it shows there are other factors that work simultaneously along with ethnicity in establishing networks among diaspora or in forwarding their revitalization activities. In other words, it underlines that ethnicity is only one part of the catalyst. As evidenced in interviews with some individuals who did not profess an interest in the nationalizing projects per se, there were certainly instrumental reasons for their wanting to pursue, say,

45 Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan, “Why Ethnicity,” Commentary (October, 1974), p.32. 46 Ibid., pp.33-35. 47 Paul Henze, “Russia and China: Managing Regional Relations in the Face of Ethnic Aspiration,” The International Research & Exchanges Board’s Huang Hsing Foundation Hsueh Chun-tu Lecture Series (21 June, 1999)

43 Korean language studies (i.e., to study or work in Korea or to find employment, possibly with a Korean firm). Almost all non-participant interviewees revealed their instrumental reasons for learning Korean. It was not a question of participating in a symbolic movement with the goal of regaining some kind of link to a mythic and glorious past in their people’s history. On the contrary, their systematic and concerted efforts to learn Korean had the goal of employment with a Korean company. Thus, we can presume that like local native people (Uzbek or Kazak) who learn Korean for instrumental reasons, there are ethnic Koreans who have instrumental rather than symbolic or primordial reasons for seeking language and cultural education.48

However, we should bear in mind deeply that this instrumental perspective should be employed in conjunction with primordial reasons when assessing the motivation of a diaspora or a particular ethnic group. In other words, we should synthesize the primordial and instrumental approaches to ethnicity when examining ethnic groups. In fact, the sense of sharedness based on a general sense of ethnic homogeneity may be sufficient as the common base upon which to establish various economic, cultural, and political ties. It is a kind of cultural capital based on shared

48 Even though most Ahıska Turks have good command of their native language, many youngsters are revising their Turkish for instrumental reasons as well (i.e., to work or study in Turkish firms or institutions).

44 ethnicity, which enables diasporas to proceed with the initial steps in establishing networks among scattered diasporas and with the homeland. We may not ignore the instrumental perspective, as it helps us to see the economic and psychological dimensions of ethnic identity (or, we may say the rational dimension of ethnic behavior). However, Glazer and Moynihan stress the importance of the sentimental component in assessing the instrumental perspective. They note that

“ethnicity serves as a means of advancing groups interest –which it does – by insisting that it is not only a means of advancing interests. Indeed, on reason that ethnicity has become so effective means of advancing interests is that it involves more than interests.”49

Nationalism takes various forms. There is bureaucratic nationalism, which is promoted by the state; anti-colonial nationalism, in which cultural forms may take on heightened significance when threatened by colonial encroachment or oppression; and lastly vicarious nationalism, or what Anderson terms “long-distance nationalism,”50 which this dissertation will focus in analyzing the case of the

Ahıska Turks and Koreans. In other words, nationalism can arise among

49 Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan, p.37. 50 The use of the term “long-distance nationalism” here is based on Benedict Anderson’s writings, “The New World Disorder,” New Left Review, no.193 (1992), pp 3-13. ; “Long-Distance Nationalism: World Capitalism and the Rise of Identity Politics,” Wertheim Lecture (Amsterdam: Center for Asian Studies in Amsterdam, 1992), pp. 1-14.; “Exodus”, Critical Inquiry, no.20 (1994), pp.314-327.

45 populations that do not constitute a “nation,” such as among diaspora or émigré people who lack a territory. In order to protect and articulate their social, cultural, and economic interests, grievances, claims, anxieties, and aspirations, ethnic groups enter into the political arena, as Rothschild states.51 It is in this context that people band together as members of an ethnic group, invoking the ideology of nationalism and engaging in nationalist movements to achieve certain political or economical ends. As Gellner states, “Men do not in general become nationalists from sentiment or sentimentality, they become nationalists through genuine, objective, practical necessity, however obscurely recognized.”52 Like many other nationalisms, “long- distance nationalism” (or we can call it diaspora nationalism) is also a group-based phenomenon, which pervades both public and private spheres of life. One needs to consider the multifaceted nature of nationalism and the sense in which it is always part of a broader and heavily symbolic discursive field. Especially in a diaspora context, nationalism often assumes a variety of forms, but it is precisely this variation and multilayeredness that this dissertation endeavors to analyze.

Now that we have entered what is often referred to as the Postmodern Age, with the globalization of culture and the existence of increasingly advanced

51 Joseph Rothschild, Ethnopolitics: A conceptual Framework (New York: Columbia University press, 1981), PP. 227-245. 52 Ernest Gellner, Thought and Change (London: Weidenfeld & Nichoson, 1964), p. 160.

46 information technologies, one can be skeptical about the status of the modern nation-state or speak of the obsolescence of the nation (i.e., the supersession of nationalism). Eventually, one can conclude that the globalization trend and the increased contacts between diverse ethnic groups attenuate ethnic ties and nationalist sentiments. In fact, this is not the case. As Barth has cited, “Cultural differences can persist despite inter-ethnic contact and interdependence,” and increased cultural contact may even heighten awareness and appreciation of these differences.53

Since the nation-state that contains within it multiple ethnic groups is the norm rather than the exception, it likely to see the continued phenomenon and even an increase in nationalism for several reasons. As Beetham asserts, national sentiments will be mobilized among ethnic groups when they feel oppressed or discriminated against by the dominant ethnic group, when there is a strong centralizing or assimilationist effort by the state, and where regional disparities arise.54 Thus, contrary to many expectations, nationalism is far from waning. In fact, there will continue to be struggles by ethnic groups to (re)assert their political, social, and economic rights and to make claims for some degree of autonomy.

53 Fredrick Barth (ed.), Ethnic Groups and Boundaries (Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1969), p.10. 54 David Beetham, “The Future of the Nation-State,” in Gregor McLenna, David Held, and Stuart Hall (eds.), The Idea of the Modern States (Philadelphia: Open University Press, 1984), pp.208-222.

47

II.2. Defining Identity

An identity is a social and psychological concept that is either achieved or ascribed to by individual and groups. In basic terms, an identity is a cognitive tool

“for managing and organizing information about oneself and the self’s relationship to the environment.” 55 Identities are cognitive tools, but they also contain emotional and evaluative aspects that provide actors with the behavioral cues that are necessary for them to respond to their environments. Thus, identity is a “mental construct that describes and prescribes how the actor should think, feel, evaluate, and ultimately, behave in group-relevant situations.”56 In short, identities inform individuals and groups who they are in relation to other individuals and groups.

In defining who we are, what we want, and how we should act as individuals, we compare and contrast ourselves to other individuals. Therefore, identities are inherently social. To wit, identities are socially constructed, and through this process arises a set of potential interests. Although the objective markers that differentiate actors are often indispensable elements of an identity, the meaning of such makers is itself a product of historically contingent processes of

55 Glenn Chafetz, Michael Spirtas, and Benjamin Frankel, “Introduction: Tracing the influence of Identity,” in Glenn Chafetz, Michael Spirtas, and Benjamin Frankel (eds.), In the Origin of National Interests (London: Frank Cass, 1999), p. viii. 56 Ibid.

48 social interaction. 57 A cultural and social system is the result of cumulated historical experiences; individual behavior is shaped within this context. 58

Consequently, we can say that an identity is more than just a mere named category.

The meaning of an identity and the corresponding set of interests do not naturally flow out of the formal existence of the identity.

Identities acquire meaning through interaction. Through interaction objective markers that may distinguish individuals and groups acquire meaning for a group identity. As stressed earlier, the meanings of any such markers ascribed to any group identity are socially constructed. Through interaction with other actors, historical myths and memories also provide meaning for an actor. The meaning of identities and interests that people embrace most often are the ones created in the home, school, workplace, and other places where people meet and interact. Also, identities and interests are influenced by events, ideas, values, and norms that surround us in our daily interactions. However, prior socialization does not prevent an individual from embracing new conceptions of self and other; thus, socialization can also alter pre-existing identities and interests. For example, members of the

Korean diaspora, the so called Soviet Koreans, started to embrace a new conception

57 Frederick Barth, “Introduction,” in Frederick Barth (eds.), Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference (Boston: Brown, 1969), pp.9-38. 58 Leo Driedger, The Ethnic Factor. Identity in Diversity (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited, 1989), p.139.

49 of self (one which puts more emphasis on Koreanness) and change their pre- existing (Soviet period) identities and interest after they made a contact with the homeland and other Korean diasporas around the world. Consequently, we can conclude that identities and accompanying interests are potentially malleable, since socialization is a continuous process.

In this circumstance, an important factor impacting the stability of identities is social density, or interaction capacity.59 Social density, which refers to the intensity of transactions and communication between actors, affects interactions within societies and between individuals and groups from different states. As long as the quality and intensity of these interactions remain relatively stable, then the identities on both sides of the self and other relations will also remain stable. This is reason why the role of the homeland and continuous contact (or interaction) with the diasporas (Korean and Ahıska Turk) and the homeland is important for the continuation of their stable identity. Since diaspora nationalism (or ethnic identity among diasporas) is “like a handful of water,” a continuous supply of fresh water from the source (i.e., interaction with homeland) is needed in order for it to be

59 Ronald Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter Katzenstein, “Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security,” in Peter Katzenstein (ed.), In the culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), p.60.

50 maintained.60 Fortunately, unlike the situation during the Soviet period, many individuals and groups in Central Asia now have the creativity and resources to combat current alienation and maintain their ethnic Gemeinschaft.

Today, we live in a world of ever-increasing technological advances, which allow for more and faster communication and transportation between countries.

This means that there are increased contacts, which lead to gather cultural sympathy with other compatriots. Increased knowledge of the homeland means an increase in empathy toward them. In particular, the modern mass media plays an important role in the development of identities and interest.

In reference to this issue, Teheranian argues that the mass media can create a national identity and culture.61 Daniel Lerner, one of the most ardent advocates of the idea that the mass media have a crucial role in development and modernization, argues that mass media serves as the primary agent of social change.62 The mass media are expected to accomplish a transition to new customs and practices, by bringing about behavioral changes, which also include changes in attitudes, beliefs and social norms. What is more, mass communication functions as an agent of

60 Chong Jin Oh, “Diaspora Nationalism: the case of ethnic Korean minority in Kazakhstan and its lessons from the Crimean Tatars in Turkey,” Nationalities Paper, vol. 34 (May, 2006), p.125. 61 Majid Teheranian, “Communications and national development: Reflections on theories and policies,” in Majid Teheranian, Farhad Hakimzadeh, and Marcello Vidale (eds.), Communication policy for national development (London: Routledge & Kegan Pou, 1977), pp.17-25. 62 Daniel Lerner, The passing of traditional society: Modernizing the Middle East (New York: Free Press, 1958)

51 gradual change through existing structures rather than directly modifying the structural constraints of development.63 Consequently, there is no doubt that the mass media (especially television) serve an irreplaceable cultural function in motivating groups to accumulate their cultural heritage, heightening peoples’ awareness and contributing to their ethnic development. In other words, in the case of diasporas, the more they watch homeland broadcasting, the stronger their ethnic identity. Thus, the role of homeland mass media (i.e., Korean and Turkish broadcasting) in relation to the diasporas in question will be examined in a later chapter. Detailed cases and examples will be discussed with theoretical references.

II.3. Creating Ethnic Identity

A review of the literature clearly shows that ethnic identity and identification varies considerably by region, ethnic group, community size, generation, and time period. Gordon defines an ethnic group as a group of individuals with a shared sense of peoplehood based on presumed shared sociocultural experiences and similar physical characteristics.64 Therefore, ethnic identification takes place when the group in question is one with whom the

63 Everett Rogers, “Communication and development: The passing of the dominant paradigm,” in Everett M. Rogers (ed.), Communication and development: Critical perspectives (California: Sage, 1976), pp. 121-130. 64 Milton Gordon, Assimilation in American life: the role of race, religion, and national origins (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 24.

52 individual believes he has a common ancestry based on shared individual characteristics and shared sociocultural experiences. 65 As noted above, an important aspect of belonging to an ethnocultural group is the sense of attachment to or identification with the group on the part of its individual members. In plural

(multi-ethnic) societies one’s ethnic identity serves to signal who one is. However, this identity can also sometimes be confused or even lost.66 In order to maintain it, it is important that groups of individuals share symbols and their meanings and values in what we call group identification. Religious institutions, newspapers, and schools (e.g., cultural education centers) can all symbolically reinforce ethnic identification.

Thus, in our discussion on creating ethnic identification, we shall dwell on five factors: the myth of the homeland, ethnic culture, ethnic institutions, historical symbols and ideology. The author suggests that these factors are some of the basic and crucial components which constitute an ethnic community, which Gordon referred to as a group of individuals having a shared sense of peoplehood including both structural and symbolic dimensions. 67 These concepts will be briefly explicated here, and applied to the Ahıska Turkish and Korean diaspora cases at

65 Arnold Dashefsky, Ethnic Identity in Society (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1976), p.8. 66 John Berry, Ype Poortinga, Marshall Segall, and Pierre Dasen, Cross-Cultural psychology: Research and application (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 303. 67 Milton Gordon, p.24.

53 length in later chapters. The fieldwork conducted in the course of this study showed that a given ethnic group will identify more with some of these dimensions than others, and that some groups are more successful at maintaining a distinct community.

The Myth of the Homeland

The relationship between ethnic homelands and their dispersed populations is in many ways crucial to our understanding of the creation of ethnic or disapora identity. Homelands are spatial representations which are influenced by political and cultural factors, rather than a simple fact of geography.68 The question of a territorial definition of homeland is of critical importance in this study, as it is in direct relevance to our understanding of Ahıska Turkish and Korean diaspora settings

The very idea of homeland has the power to evoke memories and intense emotions and to put into action more or less deeply learned attitudes.69 The intensity of attachment between diaspora individuals and their homelands varies and depends upon their temporal and spatial proximity. The idea of homeland may

68 Walker Connor, “The impact of homelands upon diasporas,” in Gabriel Sheffer (ed.), Modern diasporas in international politics (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986), pp. 14-22. 69 Gabriel Sheffer, “A new field of study: Modern diasporas in international politics,” in Gabriel Sheffer (ed.), Modern diasporas in international politics (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986), pp. 1-15.

54 therefore have different meanings to different individuals and could range from a romantically defined goal towards which almost every single aspect of an individual’s life is directed to a simple geographical reference point. Nonetheless, there is no doubt that the homeland can serve as a “mental shelter” for members of a diaspora, in other words as a teleological concept. We can readily observe from real cases how the mythologized concept of the homeland can effectively support the creation of an ethnic identity and the revitalization of traditions.

Ethnic Institution and Creating Ethnic Identification

The rationale for an ethnic community to establish its own institutions is that when a minority can develop a social system on its own with control over its institutions, the social action patterns of the group will take place largely within the system.70 Breton suggests that religious, educational, and welfare institutions are crucial, while Joy (1972) notes the importance of political and economic institutions.71

70 Leo Driedger, “Ethnic Self-Identity: A Comparison of Ingroup Evaluation,” Sociometry, vol. 30, no.2 (1976), pp.133-134. 71 Leo Driedger, “Impelled Group Migration: Minority Struggle to Maintain Institutional Completeness,” International Migration Review, vol. 7, no.3 (1973), p.258.

55 Ethnic Culture and Creating Ethnic Identification

Kurt Lewin has proposed that the individual needs to achieve a firm sense of identification with the cultural heritage of the ingroup to find secure ground for a sense of well-being.72 We assume that a minority culture can be better developed when an ethnic group can build its own institutions. Driedger found six cultural factors which tended to differentiate group adherence to culture: language use, endogamy, choice of friends, and participation in religion, parochial schools, and voluntary organizations.73

The Ahıska Turks, who were generally residentially segregated and maintained their ethnic institutions to a great degree, ranked high in attendance at parochial schools, endogamy, and choice of ingroup friends (all more than 95 percent). This would seem to support use of the Turkish language at home and attendance in mosque more than 95 percent for the Ahıska Turks. However, this was not case for the Korean diaspora. They demonstrated their ingroup culture less actively.

Examination of the myth of the homeland as well as the institutional and cultural identity suggests that these three dimensions tend to reinforce each other.

72 Cited in Leo Driedger, “Ethnic Self-Identity: A Comparison of Ingroup Evaluation,” p.131. 73 For further information see, Leo Driedger, “In search of cultural identity factors: a comparison of ethnic students,” Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology, vol. 12 (1975), pp.150-162.

56 When individuals of a given ethnic group identify with their ingroup according to these factors, they tend to remain more distinctive, which obstructs tendencies toward assimilation.

Historical Symbols and Creating Ethnic Identification

Minority rural villagers may be able to perpetuate their social structures and communities as ends in themselves. However, among ethnic urbanites knowledge of their origins and pride in their heritage would seem to be essential for a sense of purpose and direction. Without such knowledge and pride, the desire to perpetuate tradition rapidly diminishes. Accordingly, historical symbols, which can ritualize one’s history, can create a sense of belonging, sense of purpose, and a sense of continuing tradition that is important and worth perpetuating.

Ideology and Creating Ethnic Identification

Religious or political ideology can rally followers to a goal beyond cultural and institutional values.74 As urban ethnic groups become more sophisticated, it is doubtful that ethnic enclaves can be sufficiently attractive to hold them within the

74 Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan, Beyond the Melting Pot: The Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Jews, Italian, and Irish of New York City (Cambridge Mass.: The MIT Press, 1963)

57 orbit their ethnic ingroup. However, a political or religious ideology can provide a purpose and impetus that could be considered more important than cultural and institutional means.75 In other words, identification with a religious belief or a political philosophy provides a more compelling reason to perpetuate one’s ethnic identity and culture.

II.4. Acculturation in Multicultural Assessment

Most societies do not contain a single cultural tradition, but are made up of a number of cultural groups interacting in various ways within a larger national framework. It is difficult to find a nation-state at present that is culturally homogeneous. Likewise, many Central Asian societies are multi-ethnic and multi- cultural. Thus, ethnic minorities or diasporas have become a prominent and presumably permanent feature of many countries in the region.

The first scientists to study acculturation were sociologists and anthropologists interested in group-level changes following migration, in our case forced migration (i.e., deportation). Robert Redfield, Ralph Linton, and Melville

Herskovits offered the first definition of acculturation. They defined acculturation as culture change that results from continuous, first-hand contact between two

75 Leo Driedger, The ethnic factor: Identity and diversity (Toronto: McGrow-Hill Ryerson, 1989), p. 146.

58 distinct cultural groups.76 That is, the acculturation is a process which involves changes and experiences within the immigrant’s (in our case deportee’s) daily life that the result of contact with new cultural groups, the formation of new relationships, and the loss of old ones. Such experiences involve questions of self- identity and changes in values, attitudes, and behaviors.77

The notion of continuous first-hand intercultural contact implicitly seems to refer to contact between groups with equal resources. This aspect of the definition is not suitable in the context of this study. In cases where deportation into

Central Asian societies has occurred, the encounter that takes place is not one between two equally powerful groups. The mainstream population (during Soviet times Russian and in post-Soviet times, titular culture) in the country of settlement is almost always more powerful than the deported groups. As John Berry argues,

“most changes occur in the non-dominant groups as a result of influence from the dominant group” (in this case, the society of settlement).78 Gordon termed this model as “unidimensional model,” which assumes that acculturation is a process of

76 Robert Redfield, Ralph Linton, and Melville Herskovits, “Memorandum for the Study of Acculturation,” American Anthropologist, vol.38, no.1 (1936), p.149. 77 Saba Safdar, Clarry Lay, and Ward Struthers, “The Process of Acculturation and Basic Goals: Testing an Multidimensional Individual Difference Acculturation Model with Iranian immigrants in Canada,” Applied Psychology: An International Review, vol.52, no.4 (2003), p. 556. 78 John Berry, “Acculturation and Psychological Adaptation: An Overview,” in Anne-Marie Bouvy, Fons van de Vijver, Pawel Boski, and Paul Schmitz (eds.), Journeys into Cross-Culture Psychology (Amsterdam: Swets & Zeitlinger, 1994), p. 129.

59 change in the direction of the mainstream culture.79 Accordingly, ethnic minority groups are often in the position of struggling to sustain cultural values and traditions that may be different from the dominant values of the majority group. This may be achieved through the maintenance of ingroup behavior by involving with members of their own cultural group and with cultural traditions. This also leads ethnic minority group members to seek contact with a wider community (e.g., the homeland).

The model currently most popular was proposed by Berry.80 There are several advantages to his model. Firstly, it allows for the analysis of the acculturation process at different levels, namely at the society, group, and individual levels. Secondly, it serves as an excellent basis for categorizing and describing different types of acculturation attitudes and behavior-strategies on the part of individuals belonging to minority group.81 Berry proposed that there are different strategies of adaptation that lead to different outcomes. This model is based upon the observation that in multi-ethnic and multi-cultural societies, individuals and groups (such as diasporas) must confront two important questions. The first

79 Milton Gordon, Assimilation in American life: the role of race, religion, and national origins (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 24-27. 80 See John Berry and David Sam, “Acculturation and adaptation,” in John Berry, Marshall Segall, Çidem Kağıtçıbaşı (eds.), Handbook of cross-cultural Psychology (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1997), pp.291-326. 81 Paul Schmitz, “Acculturation and Adaptation Processes among Immigrants in Germany,” in Anne-Marie Bouvy, Fons van de Vijver, Pawel Boski, and Paul Schmitz (eds.), Journeys into Cross-Culture Psychology (Amsterdam: Swets & Zeitlinger, 1994), p. 142.

60 question involves adaptation dimension: Do I want to establish a good relationship with the host culture? The second question involves cultural maintenance: Do I want to maintain and develop ethnic distinctiveness (i.e., hold on to my own group’s cultural identity and customs) within the host societies?82 For simplicity of presentation, the answers to the two questions are taken to be dichotomous, thereby creating the scheme set forth in Table I.

Table I

Berry’s Four Acculturation Strategies

Do I want to establish a good relationship with the host culture? Yes No

Do I want to maintain and Yes Integration Separation develop ethnic distinctiveness in host-societies? No Assimilation Marginalization Source: John Berry, “Acculturation and Adaptation in a New Society,” International Migration, vol.30 (1992), p. 82.

In the first strategy, integration implies some maintenance of the group’s cultural integrity (that is some reaction or resistance to change) as well as some movement to become an integral part of the host-society (that is some adjustment).

82 John Berry, “Acculturation and Psychological Adaptation: An Overview,” in Anne-Marie Bouvy, Fons van de Vijver, Pawel Boski, and Paul Schmitz (eds.), Journeys into Cross-Culture Psychology (Amsterdam: Swets & Zeitlinger, 1994), p. 132.

61 The second strategy, called separation implies that the original culture (e.g., ethnic identity and traditions) is maintained and that relationships with the host-society are not considered important. The opposite of this strategy is assimilation, which aims at complete absorption into the host-society and implies the loss of the original culture. Finally, there is an option which is characterized by striking out against the host-society and by a feeling of alienation and loss of identity. This option is called marginalization, in which groups lose cultural and psychological contact with both their traditional culture and the host-society. In the case of this study, the latter phenomenon was observed particularly in second and third generation during fieldwork. This group does not feel related to the parental culture at the same time they do not want to establish strong ties with the host culture (e.g. because of factors like perceived societal discrimination or exclusion).83

Although the terms integration and assimilation may appear as synonyms in some literature, it should be stressed that the term integration as used here is clearly distinct from the term assimilation; maintenance of cultural and ethnic identity is sought in the former case, while in later there is little or no interest in such continuity. Moreover, it should be noted that acculturation might be uneven across domains of behavior and social life. For instance, one may seek economic

83 The author has often encountered such case during the fieldwork.

62 assimilation through work, linguistic integration through bilingualism, and marital separation through endogamy. In this study, even the Ahıska Turks, who attributed greater overall importance to their own cultural heritage and identity, attached more importance to maintenance in private than in public contexts. In general, the author observed that most members of the Korean and Ahıska Turkish diasporas in today’s Kazakstan and Uzbekistan adopted a separation strategy in the private domain along with an integration strategy in the public domain.84 If we consider the long-term outcome of the four acculturation modes, we may assume that integration can be considered as effective strategies in themselves for the

Ahıska Turkish and Korean diaspora in Kazakistan and Uzbekistan for their own sake.85 They are the basis for an arrangement with the mainstream society and clarify the relationship with the own ethnic group. If separation is chosen, the conflict that may occur between the needs and expectations of the mainstream host societies and those of an individual’s own ethnic group often remains unresolved for a long time, and this situation may be experienced as continuous stress.

84 The author would like to emphasize “today’s diasporas in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan”. It has been more than fifteen years since the independence of titular nations in Central Asia. Thus when the author took the fieldwork (in 2003 and 2005) most of the Ahıska Turk and Korean diaspora who remained were the ones who had no option other than residing in their host-states. Those who intended to leave the countries (Uzbekistan and Kazakstan) had left already through various means and gone to other places. This made some change in their attitude toward their host-states. Although there is still a myth of return, many remaining Ahıska Turk and Korean diasporas are resigned to settle down in their current host-state due to various practical reasons. 85 As mentioned earlier, both diasporas do not have an option to return to their homelands.

63 Each of these four alternatives will be assessed with individuals in the

Ahıska Turkish and Korean diaspora that are experiencing acculturation.

Empirically collected data and evidence will be used to show a general coping system which can be related to Berry’s acculturation strategies. In other words categorizing of the acculturation strategies into integration, assimilation, separation, and marginalization will indicate a specific form of the individual’s general coping system among the Ahıska Turkish and Korean diasporas.

64

CHAPTER III

A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE AHISKA TURKISH AND

KOREAN DIASPORAS IN CENTRAL ASIA

The purpose of this chapter is to give an account of the historical review of the Ahıska Turkish and Korean diasporas until the end of the Soviet period to lay a foundation for understanding the present situation. Thus, the main discussion of the chapter will be how did it lead to the deportation and ethnic terror against the

Ahıska Turks and Koreans, which eventually forced them to reside in Central Asia as diasporas.

While explaining the development of the deportation, I will try to illustrate the Soviet transition from class-based deportations to ethnic deportation. In other words, the mass deportations in the Soviet Union were a continuation of Stalin’s

Great Terror. The Great Terror of 1936-1938 witnessed the culmination of a gradual shift from a predominantly class-based terror to a terror that targeted entire nations and communities. It was the culminative experience of the first two decades of

65 Communist rule that made the mass deportations possible. The collectivization of agriculture, dekulakization and the annihilation of the national cultures and cadres in the late twenties and thirties opened a virtual war between regime and populace that boded future trouble.86 Dekulakization itself gave the Stalinist regime its first experience at uprooting and transporting millions.87

Prior to the case of ethnic deportations en masse (i.e., Korean, Ahıska Turk,

German, Crimean Tatar, etc after 1938) there were partial deportations of stigmatized ethnic groups from the Soviet’s western border regions (e.g., Poles,

Germans, and Finns) until the mid-1930s. However, by August 1937 it had escalated into total removal, which would remain the typical pattern until the death of Stalin in 1953. Once the Soviet leadership became convinced that cross-border ethnic ties were being used to their disadvantage, in particular, once western national minorities rejected collectivization and attempted to emigrate in large numbers (i.e., Germans in particular), it became tempting to blame these entire nations and their national cultures. Moreover, once the Soviet Union had persecuted and deported some members of its diaspora nationalities, it assumed the rest of those nations would sympathize with their co-nationals and hate the Soviet

86 Michael Gelb, “An early Soviet ethnic deportation: The Far-Eastern Koreans,” The Russian Review, vol.54 (1995), pp.389-390. 87 Ibid.

66 regime. This led to the deportation of entire nations. Once the deportation of entire nations had begun, the category of “enemy nation” then naturally emerged.

Once the concept of “enemy nations” had evolved, this in turn made the spread of ethnic persecution from deportations of select groups from the border regions to mass arrests and execution throughout the Soviet Union. As the first total nationality deportation, the Koreans’ story represents a milestone on the path from the “liquidation” of a class (i.e., the kulaks) to the “liquidation” of entire peoples during World War II. As ethnic deportation spread outward to all of the Soviet border regions, terror against diaspora nationalities also spread inward to embrace the entire Soviet Union. The use of ethnic deportation and mass terror against diaspora nationalities was accompanied by important revisions to the Soviet nationalities policy. The Soviets started to think that certain ethnic groups, especially on the borderlands, or diaspora nationalities could be exploited by foreign governments as weapons against them. No doubt, this mood resulted in the

Soviet government’s deportation of 1.2 million citizens of German origin from

European Russia to Central Asia and its entire Crimean Tatar, Kalmyk, Chechen,

Ingush, Balkar, Karacahay and Ahıska Turkish populations to Central Asia on the charges of collective treason during World War II.88 The World War II ethnic

88 After 1937, Soviet rhetoric increasingly emphasized the danger of mass treason.; Aleksandr Nekrich, The

67 deportations were a continuation of the pre-war ethnic deportations (e.g. Koreans,

Poles, Finns, etc.) and were fueled by the same motivation: “Soviet xenophobia.”89

World War II served only to accelerate this phenomenon.

On the basis of documents belonging to the various departments in charge of deportation, Nikolai Bugai has classified the Koreans, along with the Germans,

Kurds, Turks, Ahıska Turks, Khemshins and Greeks into the same category according to the reasons given for the government’s decision.90 According to

Bugai all of them were forcibly deported as a preventive measure associated with fears of foreign intervention.91 For the Soviet Union, the foreign intervention during the Civil War confirmed this premise and exacerbated the “Soviet xenophobia.” Terry Martin supports this argument by saying that the Soviet xenophobia based on paranoia manifested itself in the hard-line policy of deportation.92 Growing Soviet xenophobia manifested itself in an increasing hostility towards the Soviet Union’s diaspora population and made the Soviets conclude that they were more susceptible to foreign influence. This cycle of

Punished Peoples: The Deportation and Fate of Soviet Minorities at the end of the Second World War (New York: Norton, 1978), pp.98-99. 89 Terry Martin, “An Affirmative Action Empire: Ethnicity and the Soviet State, 1923-1938,” Unpublished Ph.D Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1996, pp. 788-789. 90 Nikolai Bugai, “Tragicheskie sobytiia ne dolzhny potorit’sia,” Aktual’nye probelmy rossiiskogo vostokovedeniia (Moscow: 1994), p.115. 91 Ibid. 92 Terry Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire, Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), p.315; Terry Martin, “The Origins of Soviet Ethnic Cleansing,” The Journal of Modern History, vol.70, no.4 (1998), p. 846.

68 suspicion and resentment towards diaspora populations led to the wider scale application of deportations.93 As a result, Bugai’s understanding of the Korean and Ahıska Turkish deportations as primarily preventive measures seems sound and all the more so in the light of the plans to remove diaspora populations from the border regions.

An other important basic motivation to consider was the high-level domestic and foreign policies of Stalin’s totalitarian regime. To a certain extent, the

Stalinist regime tried to transform itself into a kind of nation-state. As Morgenthau argues, the traditional goals of Russian expansionism were Stalin’s guiding light rather than the communist ideology.94 For Stalin, the communist orthodoxy was a means to an end and the end was marked by a powerful Russian state.95 Stalin’s priority was not world revolution per se but the security of Soviet Russia. Thus, the phenomenon of mass deportations should be also understood in this context.

As many writers on deportations argued, (e.g., Aleksandr Nekrich, Michael

Gelb, Robert Conquest, Terry Martin, Nikolai Bugai, etc.) the Soviet ethnic deportations were professionalized to an unprecedented degree. The deportations

93 Terry Martin, “An Affirmative Action Empire: Ethnicity and the Soviet State, 1923-1938,” Unpublished Ph.D Dissertation, p. 755. 94 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: the Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Knopf, 1973, 5th edition), pp.85-87. 95 Ibid.

69 were carried out with an amazing speed and efficiency by a well-trained enormous number of army corps and security police in close cooperation with officials in transport, housing, and other bureaucracies. Accordingly, we can conclude that the Soviet ethnic deportations were distinctive in the degree of their professionalization and the extent of its commitment to total ethnic removal.96

Certainly, as with the most of the cases of ethnic deportations, the Soviet practice included substantial levels of intentional murder. The Soviet ethnic deportations were always concomitant with large number of arrests that resulted in summary executions and imprisonments in high-mortality prison camp. The deported diaspora nationalities were singled out for unjust arrests and executions during the deportation. In addition, the deportations were carried out incredibly promptly and with very little, if any, concern for the basic needs for the deportees, leading to large numbers of individuals succumbing to starvation, disease, and harsh treatment both during and after the deportations. Arguably, it verged on genocide. However, it is unlikely that Stalin intended for death of virtually all the deportees.97

96 Example of the organization of the deportation can be seen very well in Belaia Kniga o deportatsii koreiskogo naseleniia Rossii v 30-40-kh godakh. Kniga pervaia (Moscow, 1992); also during the Korean deportation its organization is well documented in Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Khabarovskogo Kraia(here-after cited as GAKhK) fond P-2, opis 1, delo 1316, list 27; GAKhK fond P-2, opis 1, delo 1316, list 336-338; GAKhK fond P-2, opis 1, delo 1344, list 953-955. 97 Terry Martin, “An Affirmative Action Empire: Ethnicity and the Soviet State, 1923-1938,” Unpublished Ph.D Dissertation, p.785.

70 III.1. Historical Review of the Korean diaspora III.1.1. Koreans in the Russian Far East

With the signing of the Treaty of Peking in 1860, Russia absorbed the

Primorskii region which resulted in Russia and Korea sharing a 15-kilometer border along the Tumen River. (see Map I) This lead to the development of relations between Korea and Russia. Exploiting the weakness of the Chinese Empire,

Imperial Russia seized the opportunity to extend its domination on the east of the

Ussuri River. The vast and uninhabited Ussuri region of the Russian Far East, located between the Ussuri and Amur Rivers and Pacific Ocean, was 350,000 square miles which included a population of only 15,000.98 For Russia, the desire to absorb the Korean Peninsula logically followed on the heels of this annexation.

Initially it intensified commercial penetration of Korea as prelude to its expansion to Korea. Thus, Russia, like Japan after the victory over China in 1895, openly espoused rival ambitions for Korea for much the same imperial reasons (e.g., commercial rights, colonial ambitions and strategic considerations).

To increase the population of this new land, Imperial Russia promoted the settlement of Russians or other slavs in the area. By 1869, 5,310 settlers from 761

98 Y.S. Chey, “Soviet Koreans and Politics of Ethnic Education,” in Zvi Gitelman (ed.), The Politics of Nationality and Erosion of the USSR (New York: St. Martin Press, 1992), p.62.

71 families were living in twenty-eight Russian villages. 99 Since the area was strategically important, the Russian government granted special privileges and incentives to migrants to the Far East.100 According to several imperial decrees in

1861, migrants to the Far East were to be granted free land allotments and would not be taxed for the first twenty years.101 Despite these privileges, migrants were few in numbers since the government did not provide assistance for their journey to the Far East from their native region.102 As a result, in the 1870s, the migration of

Russian peasant-colonists to the Far East regions slowed noticeably.103 Wada states that in the first eleven years following the 1860 Treaty of Peking, 4,444 Russian peasants arrived in the Ussuri area, but during the following twelve years only 742 settled in the region.104

Since the migration of these Russian peasant-colonists did not increase substantially, Russia was faced with labor shortages after the incorporation of the

Priamurskii and Primorskii regions. During this period a considerable number of

Koreans crossed the Tumen (Duman) River from the northeastern province of

99 Haruki Wada, “Koreans in the Soviet Far East, 1917-1937,” in Dae-Sook Suh (ed.), Koreans in the Soviet Union (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987), p. 25. 100 Gary Hausladen, “ Settling the Far East: Russain Conquest and Consoliation,” in Allan Rodgers (ed.), The Soviet Far East: Geographical Perspective on Development (London: Routledge, 1990), p. 16. 101 V.M. Kabuzan, “The Settlement of Siberia and the Far East from the Late Eighteenth to Early Twentieth Century (1795-1917),” Soviet Geography, vol.32 (1991), p. 624. 102 Ibid., p. 625. 103 Ibid. 104 Haruki Wada, p. 25.

72 Korea to the Russian Far East.105 Initially, Koreans crossed the Tumen River to

Russia, but later, as their numbers increased, they began to use the Russian-

Manchurian border. There is no exact data showing when the first Koreans moved to the Russian Far East. However, according to one Russian source, by 1862 there were already some Koreans settled in the Primorskii region.106 The illegal border crossings of Koreans during this period were believed to be common but irregular occurrences, making it difficult to have accurate data.107

It was a time when many Koreans were suffering from severe drought in

Korea. These new settlers of the bordering regions of Russia were fleeing from severe exploitation by the feudal Korean monarchy as well as abuse at the hands of

Korean landowners and bureaucrats.108 During the mid-1860s, Korean families in the region numbered close to 100.109 A large influx of Koreans to the Russian Far

East continued after another big famine and drought took place in northern Korea in

1869-70.110 Undoubtedly, the majority of them came to the Russian Far East illegally via the Tumen River. Most of these immigrants settled in the outskirts of

105 Ibid. 106 H.M. Przhevalskii, Puteshestvie v Ussuriiskom Krae 1867-1869 gg. (Moscow: 1947), p. 4 cited in Kho songmo, Soryeon Chungang Asia-iu Hanindul (Seoul: Hankuk Kukje Munwha Hyup Heo, 1984), p. 21.; Kho Songmoo, Koreans in Soviet Central Asia (Finland: Finish Oriental Society, 1987) 107 Ibid. 108 GAKhK fond 2744, opis 3, p. 14. 109 Kho songmo, Ibid. 110 Georgii Kan, Istoriia Koreitsev Kazakhstana (Almaty: Gylym, 1995), p. 15. ; Georgii Kan, Koreitsy Kazakstana (Almaty: Kazakhstan, 1994), p. 7.

73 Valdivostok along the shores of the Amurskii and Ussuriikii bays. In 1872, the first Korean village Blagoslovennoe was established alongside the Samarki River near Blagoveshchensk.111 Accordingly, even though Imperial Russia tried to boost

Russian settlements in the Far Eastern territories, the Ussuri region in particular, where the population of Russians was more sparse than others, Koreans came to outnumber Russian peasants in the region.

To cope with this situation, at the beginning of the 1880s, the Russian government devoted considerable energy to settle Russians in the Ussuri region.

As a first step, the government gave extraordinary privileges and other incentives to promote Russian settlements. For example, in 1882, the Russian government decreed that it would send 250 families annually over a three years period from the southern regions of Russia to the Russian Far East by sea at state expense.112 The

Russian settlers were granted loans of 600 rubles per family over a 33-year period, and fifteen desiatinas113 of land per male adult up to a maximum of 100 desiatinas per family. Moreover, these Russian settlers were exempt from any land fees for

111 See Map I in pg.76; A.H. Petrov, “Koreitsy I ikh znachenie v ekonomike Dalnego Bostoka,” Srednaiia Aziia, vol.1, no.25 (1929), p. 41. cited in Kho songmo, Soryeon Chungang Asia-iu Hanindul (Seoul: Hankuk Kukje Munwha Hyup Heo, 1984), p. 22. 112 A.I. Alekseev and B. N. Morozov, Osvoenie russkogo dalnego vostoka [Konets XIX v.- 1917 g] (Moscow: Nauka, 1989), pp. 7-10. 113 1 desiatina is approximately 2.75 acres.

74 three years and from all state taxes and payments for twenty years.114 Such measures helped to increase Russian population in the Primorskii region from 8,

385 in 1882 to 66,320 by 1902. Thus the effective Russian colonization of the

Primorskii region began only in 1883. Meanwhile, the Korean population of the region increased during the same period from 10,137 to 32,380.115 According to

Kabuzan’s research into government archival data, the population of the Russian

Far East increased tremendously to 1.1 million before the Revolution.116

Control over Korean immigration to the Russian Far East was first imposed by the signing of two agreements between the two countries: the Treaty of Seoul in 1884 and the Russian-Korean Convention on Border Relations in

1888. Paragraph 4 of Article II of the Regulations stipulated as such:117

Should a Korean subject attempts to cross the frontier without a passport,

the Russian Authorities, after due investigation of the circumstances, will not

permit him to proceed further and will arrest him and send him back beyond

the frontier. In like manner, the Korean authorities will deal with Russian

subjects who attempt to cross the frontier without passports.

114 A.I. Alekseev and B. N. Morozov, Ibid. 115 German Kim and Eng Sob Sim, Isotriia Prosveshchennia Koreitsev Rossii I Kazakhstana. Vtoraia Polovina 19 v.-2000 g. (Almaty: Kazak Universiteti, 2000), pp. 15-18. 116 V.M. Kabuzan, p. 630. 117 Hankuk Yuksa Yunkuheo, Hankuksa volume 16 (Seoul: Hankuk Yuksa Yunkuheo, 1981), p 644,

75 Map I

Russian Far East and Korean Settlement

76 In 1866, the Second Congress of Governors of the local authorities of

Priamurskii and Primorskii regions met in Khabarovsk. The Congress drafted a resolution forbidding any further immigration by Koreans and proposed to resettle the earlier immigrants to deep inside the territory of the region.118 In the Russian-

Korean Convention on Border Relations in 1888, Priamur governor-general A. N.

Korf issued a directive that all Koreans in Russia were to be classified into three categories and dealt with accordingly. The first category included Koreans who had settled in Russia before the Russian-Korean agreement of 1884. They were allowed to stay in Russia and were eligible for Russian citizenship. They were granted fifteen desiatinas of land per household. The second category consisted of

Koreans who had settled in Russia after 1884. They were to leave Russia after a maximum stay of two years. Finally, the third category consisted of Koreans living temporarily in the region. They were generally temporary workers residing in

Russia with the permission of the Russian government. This third group of Koreans was forbidden to settle on state lands and was allowed to remain in Russia only after obtaining a residence permit.119 To be sure, they had no legal rights. In addition, beyond these three categories, there were also illegal aliens without

118 I. Nadarov, Materialy k izucheniia Ussuriiskogo Kraia (Vladivostok: 1886), p. 26 cited in Georgii Kan, Koreitsy v Stepnom Krae (Almaty: Edilet, 2001), p. 20. 119 B.D. Pesotskii, “Koreiskii vopros v Priamure,” Trudy komandirovannoi po vysochaishchemu poveleniia amurskoi expeditsii , vol. 11 (1913), pp.2-5.

77 passports residing in Russian territory which adds to the difficulty in identifying exact numbers.

According to this classification of Korean immigrants by the Russian authorities, only 20-30% of Korean immigrants fell under the first categories and were treated as Russian citizens. No doubt, this restrictive policy toward

Koreans in Russia was established because of a growing sentiment against Koreans.

By employing this measure, the Russian government hoped to control the influx of

Koreans who were immigrating not only from the nearby provinces of northern

Korea but were also coming from southern parts of Korea.120 However, in the coming years, the immigration policy towards Koreans would be changed numerous times, depending on the prevailing mood of the regional administration towards

Koreans. Similar to the Soviet period, Imperial Russian policy toward Koreans was always ambivalent. Its policy frequently changed back and forth between exclusion and accommodation.

Liberalization of this policy toward Korean settlers came under a new regional administrator, Governor General Dukhovskii, in 1896.121 He simplified the procedure for granting Russian nationality to Koreans in the

120 Kho Songmoo, Koreans in Soviet Central Asia, p.70. 121 Kim Syn Khva, Ocherki po istoriia sovetskikh koreitsev (Almaty: Nauka, 1965), p. 31.

78 first category and increased the duration to remain in Russia for the second category group. In 1898 Dukhovskii’s successor, Governor General

Grodekov, further liberalized the process by instituting a policy whereby

Koreans who had lived in Russia for at least five years were granted citizenship. 122 Likewise in 1898, he even permitted those Koreans who belonged to the third category to settle down along the bank of the Iman,

Khor, Kii, and Amur Rivers. Both Russian Governor-Generals, Dukhovskii and Grodekov, were of the opinion that Korean immigrants could be used as laborers in the development of the region. These policy changes reflect the more favorable mood of the times towards Koreans in the Russian Far East.

As a result of these new policies, the Korean population in the region increased substantially. During this period antagonism toward Japanese imperialism led some Russian officials see Koreans as natural allies.

Evidence of this was thousands of Koreans served in the Russian Army.

Finally, there was even a Russian warship named, “Koreets”123 which means

“the Korean” in the Far East Fleet.124

122 Ibid., pp.31-33. 123 This warship was destroyed by Japanese Navy during the Russo-Japanese war near southern coast of Korea. 124 Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (hereafter GARF) fond 120, 00, 1914g, delo 288b.f.ch.1, list 61 (1914).; GARF fond 818, opis 1, delo 185, list 1-2 (1809).

79 Table II

Koreans in Imperial Russia 1869-1914

Citizens of Empire Non-Citizens Year Total (1st Category) (2nd Category) 1869 1,800 1870 8,300 1895 16,250 1897 20,000 1898 23,000 1902 32,410 1906 34,399 1907 45,915 1908 45,497 16,965 17,434 1909 51,544 14,799 36,755 1910 54,076 17,080 36,996 1911 57,289 17,476 39,813 1912 59,715 16,263 43,452 1913 57,440 19,277 38,163 1914 64,309 20,109 44,200 * This table does not include illegal migrants. Source: C.D. Anocov, Koreitsy v Ussuriiskom Krae (Vladivostok: 1928), p.12.

After the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), when Korea became a

Japanese protectorate, a huge influx of Koreans fled to the Russian Far East. This influx increased further when Japan annexed Korea in 1910. Prior to this period,

Korean immigration to Russia was mainly caused by economic factors, hunger and unstable national conditions.125 They came as farmers or workers attracted by

125 As mentioned earlier concisely the imposition of arbitrary and oppressive rules by royal authorities was

80 construction projects stimulated by Russia’s accelerating expansion in the

Primorskii and Priamurskii regions since 1860. However, after the loss of their homeland’s independence in 1910 (or 1905 after the protectorate period), Korean immigration to Russia took on a political character. Many of the activists in the anti-Japanese national liberation movement joined the migration across the Tumen

River. They sought to fight for the liberation of Korea in the Russian Far East.126

They viewed the Russian Far East as a sanctuary. Since Koreans historically had certain antagonistic feelings toward the Chinese and Manchus, they preferred fleeing to Russia to meet their first Western neighbors, whom they viewed with curiosity rather than with animosity.127 Thus in their mind, they not only found sanctuary in the Russian Empire, but hoped to obtain political support, even though

Russia harbored the same, though momentarily frustrated, colonial ambitions for

Korea as the Japanese. In brief, at the beginning of the twentieth century for the

Koreans, the Russians represented the best sponsor to expel the Japanese; for the

Russians, the Koreans meant a potential vanguard for future Russian (later Soviet) anti-Japanese policies on behalf of Korea.

prevalent: taxes for cultivation of land, military conscription, and forced collection of grain were common. 126 From 1905 to 1917 Korean refugees formed the Hanin Minhoe (The Korean People’s Association), officially a community organization, but in fact, a political club aimed at restoring Korean independence. As many newcomers join, it tended to radicalized and to show its true colors as a center for anti-Japanese activities. 127 Kyu Hwan Hyun, “Jaesso Hankukinui Sajeok Kochal,” Kyopo Jungchek Jaryo, vol. 13 (1972), p. 43-44.

81 Despite the policy changes to more favorable conditions for Korean immigrants to Russia under Dukhovskii and Grodekov, with the appointment of a new governor general in 1905, another policy shift occurred. After Russia’s defeat by Japan in the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-1905, the size of the Korean influx provoked a chauvinistic reaction on the Tsarist government. Governor General P.F.

Unterberger was an active supporter of this measure. He launched a repressive policy against Koreans in the Russian Far East according to which they were no longer granted Russian nationality. Without citizenship they could not receive land allotments.128 Unterberger considered the long-term Korean settlers in the Russian

Far East to be unreliable aliens since they were an ideal source of recruits for foreign espionage even after forty years of residence.129 His mistrust and antipathy were apparent in his words, “I prefer a Russian wasteland to cultivated land which is Korean.”130 Consequently, he put all Koreans under a strict system of political control, mainly because he suspected them of being Japanese spies on general principle. This notion became ingrained in Tsarist policy toward Korean migrants and even continued later on in the Soviet period. Eventually, three decades later this belief lead to the total deportation of Koreans in the region.

128 B.D. Pesotskii, “Koreiskii vopros v Priamure,” Trudy komandirovannoi po vysochaishchemu poveleniia amurskoi expeditsii , vol. 11 (1913), p.172 cited in Boris Pak, Rossia i Koreia (Moscow: Nauka, 1979), p.19. 129 Ibid., p.176. 130 Ibid., p.172.

82 Unterberger’s replacement in 1911 by General Gondatti once again brought about a liberalization of policy towards Koreans. Despite xenophobia and mistrust among nationalist political circles and some local authorities, Tsarist policy makers were still determined to use Korean immigrants as a source of cheap labor for Russia’s economic reinforcement along its Far Eastern borders. Subsequently many Koreans who did not own land were allowed to be naturalized. As shown in the Table II, the number of Koreans grew rapidly, nearly doubling from a total of

34,399 Koreans to 64,309 by 1914.

As illustrated up to this point, the Tsarist government had a utilitarian approach to the problem of Korean immigration and settlement in Russia. In the first instance, Russian colonization of the Far East was favored, but this was confounded by slack rates of migration from the western and central parts of the empire. In addition, the need to hasten economic and military development of the region eventually forced the choice of the perceived lesser of the two evils of yellow colonization: Korean and Chinese. During the Amur expedition in 1911 by the imperial order, Pesotskii recorded favorable opinions regarding the Korean population. Pesotskii longed for the benefits of Korean settlements of the

Priamurskii and Primorskii regions: growth of agriculture in the region, the placing

83 of cheap Korean labor at the disposal of Russian employer, and the steadying effect of the presence of industrious, unpretentious and law-abiding citizens in the region.131 Likewise, Nedachin holds the view that: “in order to make Korean colonization go the right way and give the expected results, it is necessary to create for the Koreans the conditions which will stimulate them to become attached to the new motherland.”132 Such an opinion led to favor Korean settlement in the Far East, which was seen to furthering the interests of the Tsarist Russia.

III.1.2. Establishment of the Soviet Union and the Koreans in the Russian Far East

There were approximately 100,000 Koreans in Russia on the eve of the

October revolution in 1917. Of these Koreans, 81,825 lived in the Primorskii region, where they accounted for nearly one third of the total population.133 However,

84.3% of Korean households were landless and only 32.4% possessed Russian citizenship.134 The average Korean household possessed less than one-third the

131 B.D. Pesotskii, “Koreiskii vopros v Priamure,” Trudy komandirovannoi po vysochaishchemu poveleniia amurskoi expeditsii , vol. 11 (1913), pp.1-15 cited in Boris Pak, Rossia i Koreia (Moscow: Nauka, 1979), pp.19- 20 132 Nedachin is known for his work on the history of the orthodox mission in Korea and the conversion of the Maritime Koreans to Christianity. He considers the Koreans a God-fearing people and able to Christian teaching, and see the potential for the Orthodox Church to attract into its fold new believers. ; C. Nedachin, “Pravoclavnaia tserkov’ v Koree, k 10-letiiu sushestvovaniia; istoricheskii ocherk,” Missionerskoe obozrenie, vol.16, no.9 (1911), pp. 28-32. For further information see C. Nedachin, Koreitsy-Kolonisty. K voprosu o sblizhenii koreitsev s Rossiei, Vostochnyi sbornik (Izdanie obshestva russkikh orientalistov, 1913) 133 GARF fond 1235, opis 140, delo 141 (1925). 134 Ibid.

84 amount of land compared with local Russians. Thus, many Koreans regarded the

Soviets as defenders of the rights and freedom of all oppressed peoples, since the

Soviet policy called for transferring land to those who cultivated it. Besides, the provisional government tended to be more pro-Japanese, while the Bolsheviks in the region showed an anti-imperialist tendency. Kolchak’s government in Siberia was very much dependent on Japanese assistance, thus it forbade any form of

Korean collective activity, and dismantled Korean schools and the Korean National council.135 Consequently, the most patriotic and revolutionary segments of the

Korean population rose up in arms to defend the Soviet power during the civil war.

Above all, many Korean participants in the civil war were motivated by their desire to liberate their occupied homeland.136 Most Koreans assumed that a victory over the Japanese in the Russian Far East would serve the eventual restoration of Korean independence.137 Many Korean nationalists were engaged in military activities, siding with the Red Army. Especially after Japan landed troops in Valdivostok, the dispersed Russian Koreans were united into a common front in response to their collective fear of a Japanese takeover of the Primorskii region. Under these

135 Henry Huttenbach, “The Soviet Koreans: product of Russo-Japanese imperial rivalry,” Central Asian Survey, vol.12, no.1 (1993), p. 63. 136 Boris Pak, “Kukkwon pital chonhu sigi chaeso manmoyong hanin tul ui hangil tujaeng chamga,” in Hanminjok Tonip Undongsa Nonchong (Seoul: Tamgudang, 1992), p. 1064-1065. 137 According to Pak Hwan many Koreans largely supported the Soviet Cause believing this would help lead to the liberation of Korea. For more information see Pak Hwan, Rosia Hanin Minjok Undongsa [History of the nationalist movement among Russian Koreans] (Seoul: Tamgudang, 1995)

85 conditions, the Koreans and the Bolsheviks became natural allies.138

As the civil war shifted in favor of the Bolsheviks, Bolsheviks’ many attractive policies gave Koreans hope of forming an autonomous Korean territory.

Mass Korean immigration had eloquently demonstrated the attractiveness of the

Soviet Union for the Koreans of Japanese occupied Korea. For the Soviets, the formation of an autonomous Korean territory would further put pressure on the

Japanese colonial regime. As a result, the measure was seriously considered in the

Comintern’s Eastern Department in May 1924. Later, it petitioned the TsIK139 to form a Korean autonomous oblast.140 (See Table III) The OGPU141 reported that

Korean autonomy was extremely popular among Soviet Koreans, especially communist and Komsomol.142 The proposal was fiercely debated in TsIK, but by

1925 it had been rejected.143

The main reason to close down such a proposal was that the Soviet leadership felt politically and militarily weak in the Far East. They were more concerned with the potential Japanese influence on the Soviet Korean population

138 Ivan Babichev, Uchastie kitasiskikh I koreeskikh trudiashchikhsia v grazhdanskoi voine na dal’nem vostoke (Tashkent, 1959), p. 30. 139 TsIK (Tsentralnyi ispolnitelnyi Komitet): Central Executive Committee 140 GARF fond 1235, opis 140, delo 141 (1924). 141 OGPU (Ob'edinennoe Gosudarstvennoe Politicheskoe Upravlenie): Name of Soviet Political Police from 1922 to 1934 142 GARF fond 1235, opis 140, delo 141 (1924) ; Komsomol (Kommunisticheskiy Soyuz Molodiozhi): Communist Youth League or its members. 143 Ibid.

86 than with projecting Soviet influence into Japanese occupied Korea. Additionally, the Far Eastern Communist leadership supported the popular Russian view of

Koreans in the region as potentially disloyal and economically illegal aliens, who should be resettled away from the sensitive border regions.144

Table III

Proposed Korean Autonomous Territories

Population of Korean as Percent Actual Territory Total Population Korean of Total Korean ASSR 152,424 680,011 22.4 (Vladivostok Okrug) Korean AO 85,299 157,438 54.2 (5 Border Raiony)

Source: Vsesoiuznaia perepis 1926 goda, vol.XI, p.36.

The consolidation of the Soviet power did not improve the situation of the

Koreans in the Far East. Even though they fought alongside the Bolsheviks and the civil war ended with a Bolshevik victory, the situation in the region returned to pre- revolution status quo under the Russian empire. The international border remained the same, the Japanese were still occupying Korea, and the Russians (this time the

Soviet) were reluctant to host Korean freedom fighters. In the early 1920s, two-

144 GARF fond 1235, opis 140, delo 141 (1925).

87 thirds of the Russian Korean population still lacked citizenship. As a result, these

Koreans could not own land. Instead they had to rent it from Russians. What is more, the Korean guerrilla detachments, which fought together with the Bolsheviks, were also disbanded.

Nevertheless, many Koreans in the Far East emerged from the civil war overwhelmingly pro-communist. Thus, they succeeded in making up 20% of the candidates of the Primorskii region’s Russian communist party.145 To a certain extent, the civil war had expanded their political education and focused their orientation on socialism. Many talented young and middle-aged Koreans favored communism as a means of recapturing Korea, and assuring national independence from all other foreigners.146

By 1923, Koreans made up 17% of the total population of the Primorskii region and constituted a high profile segment of the communist leadership.147 For the Soviets to resolve the Korean question, it established the Institute of Authorized

Persons for Korean Affairs148 under the Dalrevkom in 1923.149 One of the main

145 Henry Huttenbach, “The Soviet Koreans: product of Russo-Japanese imperial rivalry,” Central Asian Survey, vol.12, no.1 (1993), p. 63. 146 Unfortunately, due to South Korea’s strong stance against communism until recently, their works or activities were ignored . 147 Dae sook Suh, The Korean Communist Movement, 1918-1948 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 45. 148 Institut Upolnomochennykh po Koreiskim Voprosam 149 U Khe Li and Enun Kim, Belaia Kniga. O deportatsii Koreiskogo naseleniia rossii v 30-40kh godakh (Moscow: Interpraks, 1992), pp.37-39. ; Dalrevkom: Far eastern Revolutionary Committee

88 tasks of the Institute of Authorized Persons was to keep records on the Korean population, to set a uniform agricultural tax, to clarify land disposition, etc.

National Soviets were formed below the autonomous oblast level: one Korean national district (Posetskii raion in Ussuriiskii Krai) and 171 Korean village soviets.150

Table IV

Demography of the Soviet Far East during 1926-1927

Ethnic group Population 1 Russian 1,174,915 2 Ukrainian 315,203 3 Korean 162,366 4 Chinese 80,137 Total 1,881,3351

Source: GARF fond 1253, opis 120, delo 60, list 13-18.

From the mid-1920s to the period of Great Terror, the Koreans in the

Primorskii region enjoyed a degree of political participation as members of the

Party and a fair amount of state-condoned cultural life. 151 Whatever doubts

150 GARF fond 374, opis 27s, delo 1706 (1929) 151 Terry Martin explains this soft-line policy very well, calling it “the Piedmont Principle.” He uses the Piedmont Principle and the Soviet xenophobia to explain the Soviet Policy change from the soft-line to hard- line policy. I also subscribe to this analysis in explaining the Soviet’s initial period. For further information see, Terry Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire, Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001)

89 suggested themselves to chauvinist minds, a rather more friendly policy came to dominate. The legal basis for solving the citizenship problem was prepared by the

Dalrevkom on December, 1922. The resolution was adopted after the VtsIk and

Sovnarkom 152 granted Russian citizenship to foreigners in the Far Eastern region.153 Due to this measure the Korean population increased significantly during the 1920s. In addtion, many Koreans were systematically promoted to the Soviet

Far Eastern bureaucracy. By 1926, nearly all Koreans had accepted Soviet citizenship in the primary areas of settlement. Not only did the size of the population increase, but they also developed a strong social group with their own traditions that had economic, political, social and cultural potential. The Soviet government’s concession of cultural autonomy during the 1920s and early 1930s made possible a half dozen journals in Korean and even more newspapers. Three hundred and eighty schools and two technical colleges taught students in the Korean language in the Primorskii and Khabarovsk regions alone with instructors arriving regularly from two teacher’s training colleges and the Korean Pedagogical Institute.

Fifteen Korean party schools served nearly one thousand communists and over six thousand Komsomols. Three Korean hospitals served the community and numerous

152 Sovnarkom: Council of People’s Commissariats, highest ranking non-party body. 153 U Khe Li and Enun Kim, Belaia Kniga. O deportatsii Koreiskogo naseleniia rossii v 30-40kh godakh (Moscow: Interpraks, 1992), pp.10-11.

90 Korean clubs, Korean theaters and libraries served the adult and juvenile clientele in the Korean language. During this period a strong group of Korean intellectuals was formed. Also in the same period, the Korean community had created an energetic and variegated agricultural economy; Korean agricultural and fishing Kolkhozes were formed. These Kolkhozes’ productivity was two or even three times higher than that of neighboring Russians. One of the interesting facts is that the Koreans were less hostile to collectivization than other nationalities, since the formation of kolkhozes represented, for many, the chance to gain access to land or facilitate acquisition of citizenship.154

Table V

Korean population in the Soviet Far East before the deportation

Year Population Year Population

1917 53,000 1926 168,000

1923 106,000 1929 180,000

1925 120,000 1937 199,500 Source: GAKhK П-2/11/233/6-11 (1937); GARF 123/140/141 (1925); GARF 374/27s/1706 (1929); Walter Kolarz, The Peoples of the Soviet Far East (New York: Praeger, 1954); Kho songmo, Soryeon Chungang Asia-iu Hanindul (Seoul: Hankuk Kukje Munwha Hyup Heo, 1984); Haruki Wada, “Koreans in the Soviet Far East, 1917-1937,” in ed. Dae-Sook Suh, Koreans in the Soviet Union (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987)

154 Syn Khva Kim, Ocherk po istorii sovetskikh koreitsev (Almaty: 1965), pp.137-140.

91 By the mid-1930s, the Korean in the Soviet Far East numbered nearly

200,000. They had been quite successful in eliminating illiteracy, and in promoting Korean education as well as promoting the development of Korean culture. But these successes were short lived with the deportation coming in 1937.

Needless to say, with the deportation in 1937, most Korean institutions and centers would be shut down.

III.1.3. Mass Deportation and settlement in Central Asia

Although some relieving measures left the Koreans in a better situation, there was still mistrust and xenophobia from the Russians. Still many Soviet bureaucrats regarded the Koreans as “politically unreliabile.” The Soviet authority assumed that “even Koreans, long-term enemies of the Japanese and were forced out of their own land by Japanese, can someday turn into a tool of intrigue for some imperialist state against the Soviet Union.155 In the public sphere, due to a massive influx of Koreans, there was ethnic tension between the Koreans and the Russians.

Particularly, the land issue was the most pressing question since it determined the territorial distribution of the Korean population.156 As mentioned, one of the first

155 GARF fond 374, opis 27s, delo 1706 (1929) 156 Terry Martin also suggests the land issue as the crucial reason for the deportations (or in his words, ethnic cleansing) of ethnic minorities in the Soviet Union. For more information see Terry Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire, Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001) or Terry Martin, “An Affirmative Action Empire: Ethnicity and the Soviet State, 1923-1938,”

92 slogans had been “Land to the People.” However, the Soviet authority had not solved the land problem. As a result, the Russians and the Koreans in the Far East were at each other’s throats. Needles to say, the Koreans turned out to be the guilty parties, as the victims and the accused. The first aim of the Russian peasants (or people) was to force the Koreans out of Russian territory. In other words, the Soviet government had a good reason to acknowledge its return to, or continuation of, the

Tsarist policy regarding settlement of the Far East. Its mainline policy on the

Korean population was the prohibition of Korean immigration combined with encouragement of migration and resettlement by ethnic Russians.157

At the end of the 1920s, the Far Eastern authorities reopened the issue of forcing Koreans out of the border regions. On April 13, 1928, a decree was passed calling for the resettlement of Koreans from the Vladivostok okrug and the more strategically vulnerable points of Primor’ye to the Khabarovsk okrug.158 The plan was to settle demobilized Red Army soldiers into the Far Eastern border zones to form “Red Army collective farms,” while moving disloyal Koreans to the inner

Soviet zone.159 Forming Red Army collective farms were a typical symbol of

Soviet xenophobia. The Soviet planned to resettle 99,000 Koreans over a five-year

Unpublished Ph.D Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1996. 157 GAPK fond P-61, opis 1, delo 580 158 GARF fond 3316, opis 16a, delo 384 (1928) 159 GARF fond 5446, opis 15a, delo 258 (1933)

93 period in places far removed from the border regions; the Kurdarginsk and Sindinsk regions of the Khabarovsk and the Birobidzhan region of the Amur.160 However, in reality only 1,342 Koreans were resettled which illustrated the failure of this well- planned campaign.161 The reasons for its failure were typical problems the Soviets faced during mass deportation: the lack of money, poor preparation of the lands in the aim destinations, and the unwillingness of the local authorities (the Khabarovsk and Amur regions) to admit Korean settlers. One difference from the 1937 deportation, which made the Soviets call for an end to all resettlement, was its political instability and weakness. When the Far Eastern authority appealed for central funding of the Korean resettlement, the Politburo rejected and ordered them to end the program. It appears that the Foreign Affairs Commissariat was concerned that Japan could use the deportation of Japanese subjects (Koreans) from the Soviet border regions as a casus belli and thus led to the abandonment of Korean resettlement.162 The Soviet authority was unwilling to take any risk due to its military and political weakness. Thus, we can conclude that the first large-scale attempt at Soviet ethnic deportation failed due to the center’s ambivalence. Even

160 GAPK fond P-61, opis 1, delo 580 161 German Kim and Eng Sob Sim, Istoriia prosveshchennia koreitsev rossii i kazakhstana. Vtoraia polovina 19 v.-2000 g. (Almaty: Kazak Universiteti, 2000), pp 10-12. 162 Terry Martin, “The Origins of Soviet Ethnic Cleansing,” The Journal of Modern History, vol.70, no.4 (1998), p. 841.

94 though it failed, this crisis was the first Soviet initiative to deport the Koreans from their original place. The law remained in effect formally and served to stigmatize the Soviet Koreans. In addition, the Red Army collective farms that emerged as part of this resettlement would consistently accompany Soviet deportation. For the

Koreans, it was the sign of their deportation to unknown lands.

Another interesting resettlement was actualized during this period. At the mid of the 1920s a small group of Koreans were resettled in Kazakstan.163 As is well known, the Koreans in the Primorskii region had demonstrated great skill in rice cultivation. With every passing year they had increased both the acreage under cultivation as well as the size of the harvests. Thus, the Soviet government developed the plan to grow rice in Kazakstan by moving some Koreans to

Kazakstan to assist in the organization of rice cultivation so as to share their experience.164 Due to discrepancies in the data, we do not know the exact number who have moved to Kazakstan under this measure. However, the estimates range from 220 to as high as 52,000 Koreans moved to Kazakstan by 1926.165 More remarkably, as early as 1922 the Commissariat of Nationalities of the Turkestan

163 Georgii Kan, Istoriia Koreitsev Kazakhstana (Almaty: Gylym, 1995), p.5. 164 Ibid., p.37. 165 A.M. Egiazarian, Ob osnovnykh tendetsiiakh razvitiia soiuznykh natsii SSSR (Erevan, 1965) gives 52,000 Koreans in Kazakstan in 1926 but German Kim argues that we can only definitively establish 117 families which is approximately 220 people in Kazakstan during the1920s. On the other hands, Songmoo Kho notes there were several thousands of Koreans in Kazakstan in the 1920s. See Kho Songmo, Soryeon Chungang Asia-iu Hanindul (Seoul: Hankuk Kukje Munwha Hyup Heo, 1984), p.36.

95 Republic created a Korean section.166 Regardless of the precise number, it is clear that several hundreds or thousands had migrated to Kazakstan as pioneers in rice cultivation. The Koreans who moved from the Far East to Kazakstan formed a

“Korean agricultural labor artel” called Kazakhskii ris.167 Such an experimental resettlement gave the Soviet authority a good testing ground for its ethnic deportation later on. It gave the Soviet government an idea to solve a fear of non-

Soviet foreign influence by its cross-border ethnic ties.

In addition, after the success of Kazakhskii ris by the Korean artel the

Uzbekistan authorities offered the Korean artel to work on the rice farms in the republic, where they would be given sufficient assistance to organize a farm.168

Even the Peoples’ Commissariat of Land Cultivation in Uzbekistan approached the

Vladivostok okrug Land Department with a request to send three or four rice artels comprised of a total of 80-100 peoples to Uzbekistan.169 This Uzbekistan plan was never carried out. Still, it was an important hint to the Koreans of their future resettlement in the region.

Until the mid-1930s, the Soviets believed in the prevalence and potency of

166 GAKhK fond P-2, opis 1, delo 757, list 27-29. According to archival material there were about 1,110 Korean communist partisans in Kazakstan at the end of the 1920s, which presumes several thousands Koreans in the region. 167 GAKhK fond 304, opis 3, delo 14, list 315. 168 Georgii Kan, Istoriia Koreitsev Kazakhstana, pp.18-20 169 Ibid.

96 cross-border ethnic ties. Its positive evaluation to these ethnic ties served to reinforce the Soviet nationalities policy during the 1920s. However, after the 1930s a series of negative domestic and foreign policy developments with the growing

Soviet xenophobia gradually undermined this mood.170 The Japanese presence in

Manchuria and Korea and Soviet Koreans crossing the border on various errands disturbed the Soviet authorities and increased their apprehensions about Japanese espionage. Many NKVD officers could not distinguish by sight a Japanese spy from a Soviet Korean. The Soviets started to consider seriously that their diaspora nationalities could be used by foreign governments as weapons against them. This cycle of suspicion and resentment led to the spread of ethnic deportation.

Another essential reason that led to the deportation of Koreans and other ethnic minorities lies in the nature of the totalitarian regime that had taken shape in the Soviet Union by the end of the 1920s and developed to its fullest extent in the

1930s and 1940s.171 Stalin’s well-known thesis had intensified the class struggle both inside and outside the country, opening up a terrible era of mass terror in the huge Soviet lands. People were continuously brainwashed with the images of

170 In the context of growing Soviet xenophobia, this meant the Soviet nationalities policy might make diaspora populations more susceptible to foreign influence. 171 This Stalin’s totalitarian regime factor for the Korean deportation has been strongly emphasized during the interview with German Kim. Furthermore, Georgii Kan also underlined this factor with high-level domestic and foreign policies factor as one of the basic reasons for the Korean deportation in all his writings.

97 dangerous and cunning enemies. And what is important after the mid-1930s is that there was a change of mood in the concept of enemies to the Soviets. These enemies were not discrete persons or social groups or classes anymore but entire nations and ethnic groups. As mentioned earlier, it was a time when the Soviets made the transition from the class-based terror to terror that targeted entire nations. And this shift in emphasis from class to ethnic groups (or diasporas) led to the concept of

“enemies of the people.” A moderate policy of national concession in the 1920s was about to end and a new era of a repressive policy featuring ethnic deportations, national terror, and Russification was about to begin.

Under these circumstances, even though the Koreans had been fairly well integrated into the sociopolitical life in the Far Eastern region by 1937, the Soviets started to get seriously disturbed by their tendency to settle in compact areas where they compromised a majority or substantial minority of the population.172 As mentioned, the Soviet did not want the Koreans in the Far East to demand an autonomous region. Consequently, the forced deportation of the Koreans to Central

Asia, a vast area a hundred times greater than that of the Far East, offered an automatic dispersion of the population. Also this gave a partial solution to the recent

172 German Kim, Koreitsy Kazakhstana i srednei azii v zarubezhnykh issledovaniiakh (Almaty: Daik, 1990), pp. 40-45.

98 depopulation in Central Asia.173 The great losses of population created a severe labor shortage that could be partly filled with Korean settlers. Bringing Koreans into the southern regions of Kazakstan and Central Asia meant they could engage more easily in their traditional cultivation of rice and vegetables. As stated earlier, this experimental resettlement was realized with great success at the beginning of the 1920s by the Soviet authorities. Now they had a good experience in the department of deportation and resettlement.

One more factor that should not be omitted is that the Soviets’ internal political aspects which played a crucial role in the deportation of Koreans. Stalin and the Soviet leadership were aware of the coming world war and their lack of preparation for it, thus they needed to make a new approach to imperial Japan. As a result, the Soviet Union used the Korean deportation as a bargaining chip with

Japan. With the deportation of the whole population of anti-Japanese Koreans from the Far Eastern region, Japan could be relieved from nationalistic activities of

Koreans in the region that was connected with the Korean peninsula.174 Kan argues that the Soviet Koreans were hostages to, or pawns in, the Far Eastern policy of the

173 Millions of titular peoples (generally Kazak) had died and hundreds of thousands had left their homeland as a result of Stalin’s forced collectivization. Besides, during the famine of 1931-1933 around 1,700,000 people in Kazakstan alone had been killed. See Martha Brill Olcott, “The collectivization drive in Kazakhstan,” Russian Review, vol.40, no.2 (1981), pp. 122-142. 174 Georgii Kan, “Koreitsy v Kazakhstane: Deportatsiia i obretenie novoi rodiny,” in Fond izucheniia naclediia repressirovannoi intelligentsii Kazakhstana ‘Arys’ (ed.), Deportirovannye v Kazakhstan Narody (Almaty: Arys, 1998), pp.110-111.

99 Soviet Union as a whole.175 Considering the Soviet Union’s more unsecured and complicated western border region, the aim of the Soviet Union was to maintain stable relation with China and Japan and have a secure Eastern region at the dawn of the coming world war.

In July 1936, the Far Eastern Regional Committee (Kraikom) first petitioned the Sovnarkom176 for permission to implement the new border regime in the Far East. They noted, “the aggressive tactics of the Japanese authorities in

Manchuria and Korea are exploiting every border crossing from our side. They are either recruiting spies and saboteurs or making various accusations against the Soviet

Union.”177 Throughout 1936 and 1937, such Soviet concern over Japan’s use of the

Soviet Koreans for espionage escalated. In this atmosphere, in 1936 the Japanese undertook a massive deportation of unreliable elements, generally Koreans, from the border regions of Manchuria and the northern border of their colony. In addition, the

Japanese authorities confiscated their property as well.178 Needless to say, this incident heightened Stalin’s, nervousness and pushed them toward the radical deportation of 1937.

Since the beginning of 1937, the fully-controlled Soviet press continuously

175 Ibid., Kan also indicates the signing of a Sino-Soviet mutual non-aggression treaty during this period. 176 Council of People’s Commissariats, highest-ranking non-party body. 177 GARF fond 5446, opis 29, delo 67, list 42-43. 178 Nikolai Bugai, “Vyselenie Sovetskih koreitsev s Dal’nego Vostoka,” Voprosy istorii, no.5 (1994), p.142.

100 publicized the series of Japanese espionage in the Russia.179 On March 16th 1937,

Pravda published an article on the system of Japanese espionage. On April 23rd it publicly accused the Soviet Koreans of espionage.180 No doubt, it was the highly calculated Soviet propaganda published to justify the deportation by creating an atmosphere of spy-mania.

Finally in 29 July 1937, as the Great Terror was gathering momentum, a meeting of Ezov, Voroshilov and Litvinov approved the introduction of the new border region’s regime.181 The Sovnarkom ratified this decision the next day thereby clearing the way for ethnic deportation in the Far East.182 On 18 August

1937, Stalin and Molotov sent a draft proposal for a Korean deportation to the Far

Eastern leadership.183 This was the first proposal which targeted a single ethnic group, Koreans. Three days later, on 21 August 1937, the decision No.1428-326cc by the Sovnarkom and VKP(b)[All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)], which deals with the deportation of Korean population from the Far Eastern region, was accepted and signed by Molotov and Stalin. With the stroke of a pen all

179 Georgii Kan, “Koreitsy v Kazakhstane: Deportatsiia i obretenie novoi rodiny,” in Fond izucheniia naclediia repressirovannoi intelligentsii Kazakhstana ‘Arys’ (ed.), Deportirovannye v Kazakhstan Narody (Almaty: Arys, 1998), p.109.; you can see number of articles in this book. 180 Ibid., see I. Volodin, “Inostrannyi shpionazh na sovetskom dal’nem vostoke,” Pravda, no.112 (23.04.1937), p. 5. 181 Georgii Kan, Istoriia Koreitsev Kazakhstana (Almaty: Gylym, 1995), p. 15. ; Georgii Kan, Koreitsy Kazakstana (Almaty: Kazakhstan, 1994), pp. 41-45. 182 Ibid. 183 Ibid. pp. 44-49.

101 Koreans who had fought against the Japanese colonizers were ironically accused of Japanese espionage and deported. As was the case in the 1928 deportation plan, the Far Eastern leadership supported a more comprehensive deportation. All the Koreans’ properties were to be transfer to the Far Eastern

NKVD border guard and Red Army leadership.184 Demobilized Red army soldiers were also to be settled in formerly Korean kolkhozes.185 Several waves of purges took place at all level of power, including the Party apparatus, the army, the intelligentsia and tens of thousands of ordinary workers. Not only

Koreans, but also some Russians who had a history of collaboration with the

Koreans, were executed or driven to commit suicide. Their places were replaced by new nomenklatura or bureaucratic elite that had no relationship with the

Koreans. Thus, this new nomenklatura could easily fulfill its duties, deportation, in a tough and ruthless manner.

On September 22nd 1937, the assistant head of the NKVD, Chernyshev, asked

Ezhov for the right to deport every last Korean from the Far Eastern region. His reasoning highly revealed the Soviets mentality and purpose of entire ethnic

184 Michael Gelb, “An early Soviet ethnic deportation: The Far-Eastern Koreans,” The Russian Review, vol.54 (1995), p.399. 185 Ibid.

102 deportation:186

To leave these few thousands Koreans in the Far Eastern krai,

when the majority have been deported will be dangerous, since

the family ties of all Koreans are very strong. The territorial

restrictions on those remaining in the Far East will undoubtedly

affect their mood and these groups will become rich soil for the

Japanese to work on.

186 U Khe Li and Enun Kim, Belaia Kniga. O deportatsii Koreiskogo naseleniia rossii v 30-40kh godakh (Moscow: Interpraks, 1992), pp.109-110.

103 Table VI187 RESOLUTION № 1428-326cc The Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR (Sovnarkom USSR) And the Central Committee of VKP(b) 21 August 1937 On deportation of the Korean population from the border regions of the Far Eastern district The Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Russian Communist Party (VKP (b)) decree: With the purpose to oppose the infiltration of the Japanese spies in the Far Eastern district to fulfil the following measures: 1. To propose to the Far Eastern regional committee of VKP (b), regional executive committee and the NKVD Office of the Far Eastern district to resettle all of the Korean population of the border areas of the Far Eastern district: Posietskii, Molotovskii, Grodekovskii, Khankaiskii, Khorolskii, Chernigovskii, Spasskii, Shmakovskii, Postyshevskii, Bikinskii, Viazemskii, Khabarovskii, Suifunskii, Kirovskii, Kalininskii, Lazo, Svobodnenskii, Blagoveshchenskii, Tambovskii, Mikhailovskii, Arkharinskii, Stalinskii and Bliukherovo regions and resettle to the South-Kazakhstan oblast, to the areas of Aral Sea and

Balkhash, and to the Uzbek SSR. Deportation is to be started from Posietskii region and territories, close to Grodekovo. 2. Deportation has to be started immediately and finished by January 1, 1938. 3. To allow the subjected to deportation Koreans to take with them their property, working tools and animals. 4. To pay to the resettled the value of the left movable and immovable property and the crops. 5. Not oppose the departure of the resettled Koreans, if wished, to abroad, admitting the simplified procedure of crossing of the border. 6. The People Commissar of Interior of the USSR has to take measures against the possible excesses and disorders from Koreans, concerning the resettlement. 7. To compel the Sovnarkoms of the Kazakh SSR and the Uzbek SSR immediately to allot the areas and centres of settlement, and to elaborate the measures for accommodation of the settled people, carrying out the necessary aid. 8. To oblige the NKPS (Narodnyi Commissariat Putei Soobscheniia, or Ministry of Transport) to provide a timely supply of railroad cars regarding the requests of Dal’krayispolkom (Far Eastern Regional Executive Committee) for transportation of the resettled Koreans and their property from the Far Eastern Region to the Kazakh SSR and the Uzbek SSR. 9. To oblige the Far Eastern Regional Committee of VKP (b) and Far Eastern Regional Executive Committee in three days to inform the amount of resettled households and people. 10. The process of resettlement, the amount of sent people from the resettled areas, the amount of peoples coming the areas of new settlements and amount of peoples who were let go abroad,- have to be informed about every ten days by telegrams. 11. To increase the number of frontier guarding troops by three thousand men in order to consolidate the protection of borders in the areas wherefrom Koreans have been resettled. 12. To allow the Ministry of Interior of the USSR to accommodate the frontier guarding troops in the freed houses of Koreans.

The Head of the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR Secretary of the Central Committee of VKP(b) V. Molotov I. Stalin

187 Source: U Khe Li and Enun Kim, Belaia Kniga. O deportatsii Koreiskogo naseleniia rossii v 30-40kh godakh (Moscow: Interpraks, 1992), p.64.; For original source see Appendix.

104 As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, this psychology played an important role not just for the spread of entire ethnic deportation, but also for the escalation of the Soviet Terror. In other words, since the Soviets had injured some Koreans, the

Soviets assumed all Koreans were their enemies. Even though all the Koreans were accused as Japanese spies, in the majority of secret internal correspondences the

Soviet officials portrayed the Korean deportation as a purely preventive measure, with no punitive intent. 188 On the other hand, the majority of the Koreans considered the deportation as a violation of Stalin’s Constitution and the national policy of the Party.189 They openly asserted their objections to resettling. However, their most courageous actions were to make an appeal to leave the country, to kill their cattle and to destroy their cultivated fields to disobey.190 With indignation many Koreans argued, “I am being deported because my face has a different color,” or “because of two-three spies they deport everybody with only their suspicions.”191

During the deportation the Koreans were crammed into overcrowded, underheated, broken down, and filthy freight cars that transported them across the

188 Ibid. p.100. 189 Georgii Kan, “Koreitsy v Kazakhstane: Deportatsiia i obretenie novoi rodiny,” in Fond izucheniia naclediia repressirovannoi intelligentsii Kazakhstana ‘Arys’ (ed.), Deportirovannye v Kazakhstan Narody (Almaty: Arys, 1998), p.112. 190 U Khe Li and Enun Kim, p.134. 191 Interview with deported Koreans and German Kim (Sept. 2003, Almaty Kazakstan). They said, those who asked for the permission to leave the country were arrested and were forced to confess that they were Japanese spies.

105 Asian continent. Each train convoy was given a special number and marked with the place of departure. Analysis of archival materials reveals the technical side of the transportation. Each convoy consisted of 50 wagons for people. The wagons were generally freight wagons for cargo and cattle, which were equipped with bunk beds. Each wagon accommodated 25-30 people, thus it was generally overloaded.192

For instance, due to this overload one train was turned down near Khabarosk on

September 13th 1937. Train number 505’s first seven wagons were completely destroyed which caused more than 30 casualties.193 Not only accidents, but also diseases during the journey, such as measles exacerbated by the hard conditions, increased the death toll up to 600.194 The exact figure is difficult to determine, however, the number of Koreans who died during the transportation in all probability amounted to several thousands.195 No doubt, the two age groups that suffered most were the very old and the very young. Moreover, Genrikh

Liushkov, the head of the NKVD in the Soviet Far East who had supervised the mass deportation of Soviet Koreans, later admitted that during the course of the deportation some 2,500 Koreans were arrested who were eventually executed by the

192 GAKhK fond P-2, opis 1, delo 1316, list 27, 336-338. 193 GAKhK fond P-2, opis 1, delo 1316, list 33-34. 194 Georgii Kan, “Koreitsy v Kazakhstane: Deportatsiia i obretenie novoi rodiny,” p. 113. 195 Ibid.; U Khe Li and Enun Kim, pp.66,82,113.

106 NKVD.196 By October 29th, Ezhov could report to Molotov that 171,781 Koreans had been deported to Kazakstan and Uzbekistan, and only about 700 scattered

Koreans still had to be rounded up.197 Also, the Soviet officials detained, arrested and deported Koreans who were living or studying in other parts of Russia on the basis of this decision.

The deportees arrived in Central Asia very depressed and impoverished situation, bearing the label of “Japanese spies.” They were destined primarily for

Kazakstan (Almaty, Kızıl-Orda and elsewhere) and later Uzbekistan (generally in

Tashkent Oblast) and a few were sent to Astrakhan and Stalingrad Oblasts.198

However, the major and initial unloading and the temporary place of settlement for

Koreans was Kazakstan’s Southern oblast, which is a part of Kızıl-Orda oblast now.

It is a known fact that this oblast was the harshest region in the Soviet Union in terms of nature-climate and socio-economical conditions. 199 The region was economically and culturally underdeveloped. What was more, many had to live under open sky or temporary shelters made of reeds and mud.200 They were unprotected from the elements and denied even the most elementary sanitary

196 Alvin D. Coox, “L’a Faire Lyushkov: Anatomy of a Defector,” Soviet Studies, vol. 19, no.3 (1968), pp. 406- 408.; Liushkov defected to Japanese Empire on 13th June 1938 and wrote about the Korean deportation in 1937. 197 GARF fond 5446, opis 29, delo 48, list 16-17. 198 U Khe Li and Enun Kim, pp.114-115. 199 Georgii Kan, “Koreitsy v Kazakhstane: Deportatsiia i obretenie novoi rodiny,” pp.115-116. 200 U Khe Li and Enun Kim, p 113.

107 facilities. As a result, many of the deportees died due to the hardships after their arrival.201 According to 1938 data, after the arrival to Central Asia death rates reached forty-two per thousand and infant mortality was 20 percent.202 Regardless, the official Soviet reports state that 95,526 Koreas were settled in Kazakhstan, and

76,525 arrived in Uzbekistan in the end.203

Table VII

Distribution of the Koreans in Kazakstan

Oblast Population (unit: household)

Alma-Atinskaia 4,774 Aktiubinskaia 1,285 Gur’evskaia 1,323 Zapadno-Kazakhstanskaia (West) 500 Karagandinskaia 2,255 Kzyl-Ordinskaia 6,476 Kustanaiskaia 720 Severo-Kazakhstanskaia (North) 1,500 Iuzhno-Kazakhstanskaia (South) 1,698

Total 20530

Source: GARF fond 5546, opis 22a, delo 50, list 1-116, also available at APRK(Arkhive Prezidenta Respubliki Kazakhstan) APRK fond 70, opis 1, delo 69, list 10-30.

201 Many of the deportees died of dysentery, malaria and typhus. See U Khe Li and Enun Kim, pp. 155-156. 202 So En Khvan, “Ob istorii naroda bez kupiur,” Zhurnalist, vol.3 (1990), 29. 203 GARF fond 5446, opis 22a, delo 50, list 1-116.

108 After their deportation to Kazakstan in mid-1938, the new stage of resettlement of Koreans in Kazakstan and other Central Asian republics began.

Approximately 60% of Koreans were resettled again, and the transporation distance varied from 20 km to 4000 km.204 This time they were resettled permanently. Not to mention, the majority of the Koreans were settled on the virgin lands and some of them on the lands of bankrupted sovkhozes.205 All this work was done under strict

NKVD control.

Related to the arrivals of deportees and the local reaction during the first months of resettlement, the hospitality and kindness of the Kazak or Uzbek people who gave shelter to the Korean deportees has been mentioned and praised. Many local diaspora scholars and old Korean deportees generally deny any evidence of conflict or friction between local Kazakh and deported Korean population.206 For instance, Georgii Kan’s chapter in the book ‘Deported Nations to Kazakstan: Time and Destiny’ is an example of this discourse.207 In the article, he praises the Kazak

(and Uzbek) people’s hospitalities toward the Koreans, saying “despite directives from the top, local Kazak people shared their bread and homes with the Koreans

204 Georgii Kan, Istoriia Koreitsev Kazakhstana (Almaty: Gylym, 1995), pp. 70-73. 205 Ibid. 206 Interview with local diaspora scholars German Kim, Dmitri Men and number of old Korean deportees (Sept. 2003, Almaty, Kazakstan) 207 Georgii Kan, “Koreitsy v Kazakhstane: Deportatsiia i obretenie novoi rodiny,” p. 112.

109 suffering from cold and starvation.”208 Many local Korean diasporas today tend to emphasize that the Kazaks shared their last piece of bread with them. Even though such statements are not absurd, at the very least, they demand new and more objective analysis. Perhaps, the Kazak historian Beimbet Irmukhanov provides an alternative historical account of this alleged discourse. He argues, “at the time when the Koreans were deported to Kazakstan the Kazaks were preoccupied with other things, and not with helping other peoples; they had recently survived a famine and needed a piece of bread themselves.”209 Also Professor Kerekhan Amanzholov from the Women’s pedagogical Institute gives a more criticed view in this discourse.

He argues that the Koreans occupied the most fertile lands that had formerly belonged to Kazaks.210 Korean farms or kolkhozes were organized in the place of

Kazak auls. Besides, the government assistance that might have gone to Kazak farms, schools, hospitals and housing were diverted to Korean settlement venues.

And finally, he asserts that some members of the Kazak intelligentsia were executed because of their association with the Korean deportees under suspicion of harboring

Japanese sympathies.211 Consequently, we should approach the issue in a more rational manner while explaining the initial arrival of the Koreans in region.

208 Ibid. p.114. 209 Interview with Beimbet Irmukhanov (Sept. 2003, Almaty Kazakstan). 210 Interview with Kerekhan Amanzholov (Sept. 2003, Almaty Kazakstan). 211 Ibid.

110 However, regardless of the historical validity of the assertion of Kazak hospitality to the Koreans, the existence of such a theme among the Koreans is the indication of the re-territorialization of the Korean community in the region. (e.g. from the

Soviet citizen to Kazakstan’s citizen)

One of the most tragic consequences of the deportation was not only the physical casualties suffered by the Koreans but also that many Koreans were completely cut off from their historical motherland, Korea. This destroyed the root system which nurtured the soul of the ethnos. To make matters worse, on December

1937, the politburo passed a resolution abolishing all national soviets and all national schools of the stigmatized diaspora nationalities.212 All of the Korean schools, institutions and libraries were closed. Under the strict control of the state

Committee, tens of thousands of books brought by Koreans from the Far East were destroyed. 213 Accordingly, the Koreans suffered huge losses in the field of education, language and culture as well. As shown up to this point, being the first mass nationality deportation, the Koreans’ story represents the path from the liquidation of the kulaks to the liquidation of an entire people previous to, or during

212 Terry Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire, Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), p.339. 213 Georgii Kan, Istoriia Koreitsev Kazakhstana (Almaty: Gylym, 1995), pp. 96-100.; According to Kan’s calculations 120 thousands of textbooks, among them 17 thousands in Korean language, were destroyed. Many books were destroyed in the library of Korean pedagogical institute, however, many Koreans themselves were getting rid of their books since even keeping Korean books meant the threat of inevitable imprisonment.

111 the World War II.

Despite the harsh conditions of exile, Koreans succeeded even in the early years in achieving relative prosperity. The Koreans brought rice culture into the region and helped replace the 900,000 Kazaks who perished or fled during the

1932/33 terror and famine. 214 With their agricultural skills, they became the vanguard of the Soviet campaign to conquer the virgin territories. Beginning with their specialty, rice, the Korean farmers branched out and pioneered other crops, such as cotton, onions, cabbage, beans and sugar beets, from Kazakstan to

Uzbekistan.215 As a result, Korean collective farms gained fame throughout the

Soviet Union. Innumerable Koreans were decorated with medals and earned other distinctions for outstanding work in agriculture, industry, science, culture, and government service. Their proportion among “Heroes of Socialist Labor” was higher than in any of the other nationalities.216 However, the ethnic Korean way of life in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan during the Soviet period was bound to assimilate into the Soviet (Russophone) society. Especially after the 1970s, when the new generation of youths showed greater inclination to assimilate into the mainstream of

Russified Soviet culture, their assimilation process into Soviet society accelerated.

214 Martha Brill Olcott, The Kazakhs (Standford, 1987), pp.184-186. 215 Kim, G.N. i D.V. Men. Istoriia i kul'tura koreitsev Kazakhstana (Almaty: Gylym, 1995), pp.55-63. 216 A Helsinki Watch Report. Punished Peoples of the Soviet Union. The Continuing Legacy of Stalin’s Deportations (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1991), p. 28.

112 They became a typical Soviet ethnic minority.

Due to their high level of education, industriousness, and organizational skill, the Koreans joined the ranks of the leaders of industry, government, and educational institutions. 217 They played the role of middlemen between the

Russians and the local people. Today celebrities such as the folk balladeer Iulii Kim and the rock star Viktor Tsoi, who died in a traffic accident and became an underground cult figure, symbolize the Koreans’ success and their assimilation into the Russian culture. In reality, for their survival, they had little choice but to assimilate into the environment where they had any connection. However, their

Russification raises the question of the long-term survivability of their culture in spite of the ethnic Koreans’ remarkable economic and educational advancement.

217 By the 1970s, the number of university graduates was about twice that of general population. See (Michael Gelb 1995, 409; Helsinki Watch Report 1991, 28.; Kan, G.V., Istoriia koreitsev Kazakhstana (Almaty: Gylym, 1995); Kim, G.N. i D.V. Men. Istoriia i kul'tura koreitsev Kazakhstana (Almaty: Gylym, 1995)

113

Table VIII

Dynamics of Korean diasporas in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan during the Soviet Period

(1939~1999)

Year 1939 1959 1970 1979 1989 Uzbekistan Population 73000 138000 148000 163000 183100 Year 1939 1959 1969 1979 1989 Kazakstan Population 97000 74000 82000 92000 103000 Source: Agentsvo republiki Kazakhstan po statistike, Naselenie Kazakhstana: ezhe godnyi spravochnik (Almaty: 1996); Material supplied by the Uzbekistan Korean Association.

Table IX

Distribution of the Koreans in the Soviet Union and their ratio

Year 1959 1970 1989 Section The name of population ratio Population ratio population ratio republics All USSR 313,700 100 * * 439,000 100 Russia 91,400 29.2 * * 107,100 24.4 Uzbekistan 138,500 44.1 147,538 * 183,100 41.7 Kazakstan 74,000 23.6 81,598 * 103,100 24.4 Kyrgyzstan 3,600 1.1 9,404 * 18,400 4.1 Tajikistan 2,400 0.8 8,490 * 13,400 3.1 Turkmenistan 1,900 0.6 3,493 * 2,800 0.6 Source: For 1959 and 1989 data, German Kim and Eng Sob Sim, Isotriia Prosveshchennia Koreitsev Rossii I Kazakhstana. Vtoraia Polovina 19 v.-2000 g. (Almaty: Kazak Universiteti, 2000), p.192.; For 1970 data, Tsentral'noe statisticheskoe upravlenie, Naselenie SSSR (Moscow: Finansy i statistika, 1973)

114 III.2. A Historical Review of the Ahıska Turkish diaspora III.2.1. Origin of the Ahıska Turks

Like Korean diasporas, the Ahıska Turks are one of the national groups of the Soviet Union which does not have the option of returning to their homeland218 and have to struggle in their residing states. The Ahıska/Meskhetian Turks are known as Ahıska Turks in Turkey and “Meskhetian” Turks in the West and Russia.

Ahıska (or Akhaliskihe in Georgian) is the name of the place located in the

Southwestern corner of present day Georgia, and is very close to the Posof district of the Turkish province of Ardahan. It is only 10 km away from the present Turkish border. Although on origins of the ethnic Ahıska Turks, some Georgians claim that

Ahıska Turks were ethnic Georgians who at some stage in history, adopted or were converted to Islam, and Turkified, the Ahıska Turks themselves strictly deny being

Georgian and never dispute their Turkishness. During the fieldwork the author observed that although the Ahıska Turks “belonged to the territory of Georgian national space,” they never considered themselves as Georgians.219 Most do not identify themselves with Georgia let alone being Georgian at all, though their homeland fell under the rule of Russia from the Ottoman empire in 1829 and they were deported from there while it belonged to the Georgian SSR in 1944. Many

218 Either to their birth place Georgia or their perceived homeland Turkey. 219 Personal interviews with Ahıska Turks in Uzbekistan and Kazakstan, 2003, 2005.

115 interviews with the elder generation indicate that they were not much concerned with the changes of regime, and until the World War I they could freely cross the border to the Turkish side.220 In addition many Ahıska Turkish interviewees made a retort that “why were we deported and had to live in Central Asia if we were

Georgians? We were deported because we were Turks and not Georgians.”221

The Ahıska Turks are an ethnically heterogeonous group. But they all have in common being either Turkish or Turkified and they all used to inhabit the

Ahıska (Meskhetia) region. Additionally, they all had little consciousness of having a separate ethnic identity. Before the deportation, ethnic peculiarities were of minor importance and very often, religious differentiation was more fundamental than ethnic or national difference. Like else where in other Turkic-Islamic society, including Central

Asia, most of the time, local identities of kin, village, class, and religion were very important.222 As Khazanov notes, they all speak the Eastern dialect of the Anatolian

Turkish language and belong to the Hanafi school of Sunni Islam.223

Until the late 1930s when they were living in their homeland, the Ahıska

Turks did not pay much attention to niceties of their official name and ethnic

220 Ibid. 221 Ibid. 222 Anatoly M. Khazanov, “Meskhetian Turks in Search of Self-Identity,” Central Asian Survey, vol.11, no.4 (1992), pp.2-3. 223 Ibid., p.2

116 affiliation.224 They often called themselves “yerli” (the locals, the natives) which did not have any explicit ethnic connotations though their Turkishness was taken for granted and never disputed.225 In the mean time, their neighbors continued to call them Turks. However, since the deportation various labels have been used by Soviet officials and outsiders, including ‘Meskhetian Muslims’, ‘Ottoman Turks’ and

‘Turks.’ In the end, the Soviet State and the Georgian authorities labeled them as

‘Meskhetians’ or ‘Meskhetian Turks’ in reference to the region in Meskhetia.

Irrespective of the official title, during the fieldwork in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan, the author noticed the adamant refusal to be called ‘Meskhetian Turks’ among

Ahıska Turks in Uzbekistan and Kazakstan. They think of themselves simply as

Ahıska Turks.226 For instance, one elderly Ahıska Turk in Chimkent (Kazakstan) confessed in palin Turkish, “I knew myself as a Turk from Ahıska – namely, an

Ahıska Turk.” This clearly shows how important the Turkishness is to them.

Parallel to this argument, the author heard numerous elder and mid-aged Ahıska

Turkish interviewees make it clear that even there is no need to call them as ‘Ahıska

Turk’ but calling simply ‘Turk’ could be enough since Ahıska merely used to be the

224 Ibid. p.3. 225 E.Kh. Panesh and L.B. Ermolov, “Turki-Meskhetintsky,” in Etnokontaktnye zony v Evropeiskoi chasti SSSR (Moscow: Moskovskii filial Geograficheskogo obshchestva SSSR, 1989), p.119 cited in Anatoly M. Khazanov, “Meskhetian Turks in Search of Self-Identity,” Central Asian Survey, vol.11, no.4 (1992), p.3. 226 This is reason why the author uses Ahıska Turk instead of Meskhetian Turk in this dissertation.

117 name of a Turkish (Ottoman Turkey) province. They asserted that it is enough to call them Turks, since Turks from different regions are not referred to as ‘Izmir

Turks,’ ‘Ankara Turks,’ or ‘Ardahan Turks.’ Such a view is also held by Hakan

Kırımlı, an expert on the Turkic people’s issues. He asserts that Ahıska (or

Meskhetia) used to be an Ottoman province (the Çıldır Vilâyet) whose people were linguistically, culturally or ethnically identical to the Turks of Eastern Anatolia.227

And even when the border was created they could hear and see their neighbors on the Turkish side singing as they worked in the field.228 In addition, although the

Treaty of Edirne in 1829 formally ceded the Ahıska region to Russia, it was not until after the Soviet period that Russia had established its real control over the region.229 Thus, even after the Russian annexation, the local Turks (Ahıska Turks) remained loyal to Turkey rather than to Russia.230 To conclude with a quotation from Ibrahim Mecitoğlu, one of the leaders of the Ahıska Turks: “Although the whole world know us as Meskhetians, we are only Turks from Anatolian Turkey who found themselves within the boundaries of the Soviet Union as result of a bad

227 Personal conversation with Hakan Kırımlı, 2005. 228 Personal conversation with Hakan Kırımlı and interviews with Ahıska Turks in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan, 2003, 2005. 229 Kakoli Ray, “Repatriation and De-terriotorialization: Meskhetian Turks’ Conception of Home,” Journal of Refugee Studies, vol.13, no.4 (2000), p. 393. 230 Nikolai Bugai, K voprosu o deportatsii narodov SSSR v 30-40-kh godakh (Moscow: Istoriia SSSR, 1989), p.136.

118 luck.”231

Consequently, a number of Muslim Turks and maybe some Turkified elements people, mainly Turks, Kurds who happened to inhabit the region around

Ahıska came to be unified under the name of ‘Ahıska Turks.’ These ethnic groups experienced the same tragedy of deportation and were treated similarly by the

Soviet authorities. As Turkophone minorities, they were all considered ‘Turks’ by the Soviet authorities. As Aydıngün argues, the Ahıska Turkish ethnic identity was born and reinforced in the context of the 1944 deportation and their interaction with the other ethnic groups in Central Asia.232 Moreover, the Soviet’s wholesale discrimination against them all through the Soviet period strengthened their group identity as ‘Ahıska Turks.’ This attitude played a significant role in the development of a Turkish ethnic sentiment among the Ahıska Turks and helped to strengthen their feeling of Turkishness. The Soviet policy and system contributed to the round- up of the heterogeneous Turkish-Muslim people into a single ethnic group.

231 Yunus Zeyrek, Dünden Bügüne Ahıska Türklügü (Frankfurt: Turk Federasyon Yayinlari, 1995), p.135. 232 Ayşegül Aydıngün, “Rethinking Ethnic Identity Formation: The Case of the Ahıska (Meskhetian) Turks in Turkey and Kazakstan,” Unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, 2001.

119 Map II

Ahıska Region

120

III.2.2. Establishment of the Soviet Union and the Mass Deportation of Ahıska Turks

Before the deportation, the Ahıska Turks lived in 212 villages in Southern and Southwestern Georgia (Adigenskii, Akhaltsikhskii, Aspinskii, Akhalkalakhskii and Bogdanovskii districts) along the Turkish border. These regions where many

Ahıska Turkish families originate have been an area of contention between Russia and Turkey (especially Ottoman Turkey) for at least 200 years. In 1812 the

Ottoman-Russian Treaty of Bucharest left the control of the all the basin west of

Suram and Abkhazia to Russia. On the eastern Black Sea coast, Turkey controlled the port of Poti, the fortress of Anapa, Ahıska (Akhalsikhe) and Atskhur. In 1828, the Persian-Russian Treaty of Turkmençay ceded the control of Nakhchevan and

Yerevan to the Russians and eliminated Persia as a ruler in Transcaucasia which had been dominant in Caucasus for almost 2000 years. In 1829, the Treaty of Edirne resulted in the annexation of the Ahıska region from Turkey. However, even after the Russian annexation, many Muslim Turks in the region, that is, the Ahıska Turks, remained loyal to Turkey rather than to Russia. 233 As a result, after the establishment of the Soviet Union, the Ahıska Turks were suspected as traitors who might jeopardize the security of Tiblisi in the eyes of Soviet authorities. This may

233 Nikolai Bugai, K voprosu o deportatsii narodov SSSR v 30-40-kh godakh, p.136.

121 have been especially sensitive for Stalin who was born in Gori, near Ahıska.

During the early years of the Soviet Union, Ahıska Turks were officially called ‘Turks.’ However, after the 1950s, the Stalinist regime began to designate them as ‘Azerbaijani’ instead of ‘Turk,’ in an effort to break off their relations and kinships with Turkey, which was seen as a security threat to the Soviet Union. The

Soviet Union’s sensitivity was due to strained relations with Turkey. The Ahıska

Turks were no longer allowed to register their nationality as Turkish. In other words, the Soviet Union denied the existence of a Turkish population in their territory.

Further evidence is found in census data. Unlike the census of 1926, Ahıska Turks were referred to as ‘Azerbaijani’ in the census of 1939.234 In the early years of the

Soviet Union, schools in the region taught Turkish (Anatolian dialect), but during

1935-36 language was switched to Azerbaijani dialect and Russian.235 Nevertheless, paradoxically they were all again called as ‘Turks’ during the deportation in 1944, but had to register as Azerbaijani during their settlement in Central Asia.

Consequently, today there are many Ahıska Turks who remain registered as

Azerbaijani. During the fieldwork the author could easily observe that the members

234 Robert Conquest, Nation Killer. The Soviet Deportation of Nationalities (Glasgow: MacMillan, 1970), p.48. 235 Ender Wimbush and Ronald Wixman, “The Meskhetian Turks: A New Voice in Soviet Central Asia,” Canadian Slavonic Papers, vol.17. no.2/3 (1975), pp.320-340. ; Ann Sheehy and Bohdan Nahaylo, The Crimean Tatars, Volga Germans and Meskhetians: Soviet Treatment of Some National Minorities (London: Minority Rights Group, 1980), p.24.

122 of family were registered differently: some were registered as Turks while others were registered as Azerbaijani. One could come across without difficulty in

Uzbekistan and Kazakstan, a family where the nationality of the children was different from that of the parents. Needless to say, such conditions has made it very complicated to estimate the statistics of the Ahıska Turkish population in Central

Asia.

During the Second World War, Stalin planned an invasion of Turkey and wished to clear Transcaucasia of those ethnic elements who did not enjoy his confidence.236 To support this idea, Khazanov indicates that, “it is no coincidence that the deportation of Meskhetian Turks was followed in 1949 by the deportation of Greeks, Lakhlukhs (Armenian speaking Jews) and some others.”237 Under these circumstances, like the Koreans in the Russian Far East, Ahıska Turks seemed to the

Soviet authorities particularly suspicious because of their linguistic, religious and territorial proximity to the Turks of Turkey. Besides, before the deportation, there were various reports on the Ahıska Turkish and other Muslim populations to Stalin that they had been connected with the population in the border areas of Turkey and were involved in espionage activities.238 As a result, the Soviet Committee of State

236 Anatoly M. Khazanov, “Meskhetian Turks in Search of Self-Identity,” p.3. 237 Ibid. 238 Nikolai Bugai, K voprosu o deportatsii narodov SSSR v 30-40-kh godakh, p.125.

123 made a decision to deport the Ahıska Turks and other Muslim populations in the name of ‘frontier security.’239 Like the case of Koreans in the Far East, it was the practical case for the Soviet authorities to evacuate unreliable elements from the border area, which might easily be reached by the enemy. It must be noted that during the World War II, the territory of Georgia was never occupied by the German troops. Thus, Soviet regime could not accuse the Ahıska Turks of collaborating with

Germany. Also, the time when they were deported the anti-Hitlerite coalition was already victorious and Turkey was about to declare war on Germany. This meant that the pretext of Turkey’s military threat to the Soviet Union was not valid at all.

Therefore, the reason for the Ahıska Turks’ deportation lied much deeper than its subsequent official explanation. In addition, we shouldn’t omit that fact that it must have been associated with the chauvinistic mood of certain Soviet-Georgian populations who tried to clean the most fertile lands of Georgia from Turks and enlarge “the vital area” for the indigenous population of the republic.240

In November 1944, the Ahıska Turks, along with some other smaller ethnic groups of Southerin Georgia, like Khemshins (Turkified Armenians) and Kurds were deported to Kazakstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. They were told by the

239 E.Kh. Panesh and L.B. Ermolov, “Meskhetinsky Turks Under the Conditions of the Modern Ethnic Process in the USSR,” Belleten, vol.LVII, no.219 (1994), p.589. 240 Garifulla Anes, “Byselenie Turok,” in Fond izucheniia naclediia repressirovannoi intelligentsii Kazakhstana ‘Arys’ (ed.), Deportirovannye v Kazakhstan Narody (Almaty: Arys, 1998), p.301.

124 Soviet authorities that for their own protection they were being moved away from the threat of German invasion through Turkey. It is interesting that some Ahıska

Turkish elders in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan still explained their deportation in such a way.241 Thus, during the deportation every Ahıska Turk believed that they were temporarily displaced to a safe place in order to defend them from enemies. Such was the case that many Ahıska Turks told me during the interviews that they even buried their valuable belongings, such as gold, near their house to retrieve them upon their return.242 Many Ahıska Turks were told that they would return in a week, or month. As elderly Ahıska Turkish informants note, enough fodder for cattle was left behind so that the animals could survive for one or two weeks while they were gone. The memories that many elder people, who experienced the deportation, recounted was how they were rounded up and deported within a matter of hours.

In 1944, a whole region of southwest Georgia (around Ahıska) was descended upon within a few hours. Turkish residents of the region were herded into cattle trains and deported. Many elderly Ahıska Turks were told that they began to be afraid after being forced onto the cattle trains. These cattle trains were not designed for human travel.243 There were no provisions for food or water. Luckily

241 Interview with Ahıska Turks in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan, 2003, 2005. 242 Ibid. 243 Ibid.

125 some had brought food, but many others died of starvation or cold during the journey. Especially, many weak elderly and children perished in the deportation. An elderly man who was thirteen years old at the time of the 1944 deportation told me that he was an orphan and alone, and had only some bread to see himself through

Central Asia. He said, “In retrospect, it is a miracle that I have survived the harsh journey. I am always rendering thanks to God.”244 The casualty figure during the deportation varies in different sources from about 15,000 to 30,000 or 50,000.245

Even the minimum casualties contended by Tolz, 14,895 people represent 15.7 percent of the number of Ahıska Turkish deportees.246 Moreover, if we combine the death rate during the settlement the death toll rises very high.

Some sources estimate that approximately 200,000 persons were deported. 247 However, according to the Soviet archives 81,324 persons were deported in 50 wagons from Georgia.248 Also a report prepared in 1949 for Beria,

Commissar of Nationalities, by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Ministry of

Justice, reports the number of deported Ahıska Turks standing at 94,955, including

244 Interview with an Ahıska Turk in Kazakstan, 2003. 245 Anatoly M. Khazanov, “Meskhetian Turks in Search of Self-Identity,” p.4. ; Robert Conquest, Nation Killer. The Soviet Deportation of Nationalities (Glasgow: MacMillan, 1970), p.109. ; Ann Sheehy and Bohdan Nahaylo, The Crimean Tatars, Volga Germans and Meskhetians: Soviet Treatment of Some National Minorities (London: Minority Rights Group, 1980), p.24. 246 Vera Tolz, “New information about the Deportation of Ethnic Groups under Stalin,” Report on the USSR, vol.3, no.17 (1991), p.19. 247 Ender Wimbush and Ronald Wixman, p.323. ; Robert Conquest, Nation Killer. The Soviet Deportation of Nationalities, p.11. ; Ann Sheehy and Bohdan Nahaylo, p.24. 248 GARF fond 9401, opis 2, delo 3, list 764-767.

126 17,000 who died during the journey.249 Other data presented in the Soviet Ministry for Internal Affairs in the same year reports that there were 81,575 deportees from

Georgia.250 Thus it seems that at least 80,000-90,000 Ahıska Turks were deported.

Beyond these figures, there were also approximately 40,000 Ahıska Turkish men who were serving in the Soviet army at the front. There were even Ahıska Turkish soldiers who were entitled to the highest Soviet order, namely the Hero of the

Soviet Union, during the fight against Nazi Germany.251 Among them 26,000 became martyrs for the Soviet Union in the War.252 However, after the end of the war the surviving soldiers returned to Ahıska only to find that their families had been deported and their property stolen. They were not allowed to reside in Ahıska and were forced to undertake searches in Central Asia on their own to find their families and relatives.

The deportees were resettled in small groups on the territory of Kazakstan,

Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. According to the Soviet archival data, 36,313 deportees in 20 wagons arrived in Uzbekistan, 20,634 deportees in 11 wagons arrived in

249 Nikolai Bugai and Kalinina Kotof, Mesketya Türkleri-Rehabilitasyon için Uzun Yol. Trans. From Russian by Kazim Dursun (Moscow: Russian Deportation Deporatation, Vatan Society and Rehabiliation Found Publication, 1994), pp.15-16 cited in Ayşegül Aydıngün, “Rethinking Ethnic Identity Formation: The Case of the Ahıska (Meskhetian) Turks in Turkey and Kazakstan,” Unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, 2001, p.71. 250 V.N. Zemskov, Spetsposelentsy [po dokumentam NKVD-MVD SSSR] (Moscow: Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia, 1990), pp.12-13 cited in Anatoly M. Khazanov, “Meskhetian Turks in Search of Self-Identity,” Central Asian Survey, vol.11, no.4 (1992), p.4. 251 Trud Gazeta (newspaper), September 8,1988. 252 Ibid., You can find more detail stories of Ahıska Turk war veterans from this newspaper.

127 Kazakstan, and 2,744 in 2 wagons arrived in Kyrgyzstan.253 Thus, Ahıska Turks were mainly relocated to Uzbekistan. They were resettled in the region as the so- called special settlers, who were deprived of elementary civil rights. The special settlement (spetsposelenie) regime to which Ahıska Turks were relegated put them under the same regulations as those who were named as traitors, which Ahıska

Turks were never officially accused of being. Upon arrival in Central Asia, Ahıska

Turk were subject to the same deprivations as many other deportees. Shortages from

World War II meant that food and clothing were scarce. Many Ahıska Turks reported that they lived in cattle barns for many years.254 The local republic’s institutions were supposed to provide special-settlers with homes, food and land.

However, there were already too many deported special-settlers settled within the borders of the republic. Thus, it was impossible to provide all the special-settlers with homestead lands. Much time was needed to solve all these problems, since all the instructions about the house holding and provision of special-contingent with working places were coming from Moscow.255 The table shown below is the data about the Ahıska Turkish special-settlers in Kazakstan according to oblast’, which was presented it to the NKVD Kaz SSR.

253 GARF fond 9401, opis 2, delo 3, list 764-767. 254 Interviews with Ahıska Turks in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan, 2003, 2005. 255 Garifulla Anes, “Vyselenie Turok,” in Fond izucheniia naslediia repressirovannoi intelligentsii Kazakhstana ‘Arys’ (ed.), Deportirovannye v Kazakhstan Narody (Almaty: Arys, 1998), p.302.

128

Table X

Ahıska Turk Special Settlers in Kazakstan according to Oblast

Kazakstan

Oblast Family People Alma-Atinskaia oblast 2544 families 11,004 Jambulskaia oblast 822 fmamiles 3415 Kzyl-Ordinskaia oblast 373 families 1826 Taldy-Kurganskaia oblast 337 families 1441 Iuzhno-Kazakhstanskaia oblast 2233 families 10,147 Total 6309 families 27,833 Source: Tsentral'nyi Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Respubliki Kazakhstan (TsGA PK) TsGA PK fond 1987 opis 1, delo20, list 10.

For twelve years, until Stalin’s death, free movement by Turks was strictly prohibited.256 Relatives, who had been resettled in other camps, in regions inside and outside republics could not communicate or meet. Every night the head of the family had to check in with the camp manager. Yet, overtime, especially after

Stalin’s death, conditions improved due to the increased prosperity and relaxation of the confinement of Ahıska Turks. Many Ahıska Turks worked on collective farms and harvested cotton and tobacco.

256 Kakoli Ray, “Repatriation and De-terriotorialization: Meskhetian Turks’ Conception of Home,” Journal of Refugee Studies, vol.13, no.4 (2000), p. 395.

129

III.2.3. The Ahıska Turks after the deportation

The Ahıska Turks were deported due to their Turkish identity from Georgia, but once they arrived in Central Asia they could not register themselves as Turks.

As Khazanov noted, by 1988, only one third of the Ahıska Turks living in

Kazakstan were registered as Turks.257 The Ahıska Turks were put among the unrecognized nationalities, which were deprived of all civil rights. As an unrecognized ethnic group, the large majority of the Ahıska Turks were excluded not only from the political arena but also from all of the important positions that involved decision-making. They lacked all rights given to the recognized nationalities, such as preference in employment, promotion, acceptance by universities and funds to encourage cultural development. For instance, according

Dr. Ömer Salman, the chairman of Ahıska Turkish Association in Uzbekistan and the coordinator of the Cultural Center for Ethnic Minorities for Uzbekistan government, during the Soviet period Ahıska Turks had much discrimination to receive higher education. Ahıska Turks had to report their nationality as Uzbek upon graduating from higher education to increase Uzbeks’ educational statistics for

257 Anatoly M. Khazanov, “Meskhetian Turks in Search of Self-Identity,” p.7.

130 Moscow.258 Those who refused were denied diplomas and those who were about to enter the institute or university were blocked from doing so.259 Thus, throughout the Soviet period the Ahıska Turks perceived their identity to be under threat. Hence they developed informal channels of resistance against the Soviet’s official pressures, such as keeping their language, religion and culture alive in private spheres. During the fieldwork the author found out that compared with the Koreans and other more Russified ethnic minorities (e.g., Germans, Tatars, Jews, etc.) the preservation level of language, religion and ethnic celebration among Ahıska Turks was overwhelmingly high. In almost every village that the author visited, locals were fluent in their mother tongue, Turkish. Halil, who is in his 40s and driving a taxi in Chimkent Kazakstan, boasted to the author how they have managed to preserve their language.260 He showed how his teenage children were proficient in their mother language. He said, in private spheres of life they were all encouraged to speak Turkish rather than Russian or the titular language. He even punished his children if they dared to speak Russian in his house. He said that he himself had been raised in such a way.

As is obvious from this case, as reaction to discrimination and assimilation

258 Interview with Dr. Ömer Salman in Tashkent, 2005. 259 Ibid. 260 Interview in Chimkent, Kazakstan, 2003.

131 processes, the Ahıska Turks have used their language both to identify themselves and also as a tool against assimilation. During the interviews the author could easily observe their ethnic pride and identity which were intermingled with speaking mother language. Although they were deported and lived humbly in Central Asia, every Ahıska Turk took strong pride in knowing that they used to be the part of the

Ottoman Empire. They considered themselves as descendents of a civilized, powerful nation. Considering the related religion and language to Kazak and Uzbek and titulars’ sympathy to their plight in the begging of the settlement, the Ahıska

Turks would be easily assimilated by the titulars (Uzbek and Kazak), however, due to their feeling of superiority and pride in comparison with the local population of

Central Asia the opposite happened. In particular, forced attempts to assimilate them into other nationalities by the Soviets furthered the conception of a separate and distinct identity, as Ahıska Turks.

During the soviet period, Ahıska Turks lived closely with their community and kept their relations with other ethnic groups within limits. Interaction with other nationalities was mostly limited to the public sphere, whereas the private life was dominated by relations within their own ethnic community. Ahıska Turks have strong endogamous practices in Uzbekistan and Kazakstan. Many village headmen,

132 whom the author has met in Kazakstan (Chimkent, Jambul, Almaty) and Uzbekistan

(Tashkent, Sirdarya, Buhara), often proudly remarked that they have never given their bride to other nationalities, even to other Turkic-Muslim communities such as

Uzbeks or Kazaks. Therefore, traditional values were revived and preserved through the rule of ethnic endogamy. Consequently, throughout the Soviet period when Korean diasporas were busy with integrating to the so-called Russified mainstream society, Ahıska Turks made a big effort to preserve their separate ethnic self-identification instead by political mobilization and an effort to return to the homeland. Rather than being good social climbers, they tried to preserve their self- ethnic identity more than the Korean diaspora. Like other deported diasporas,

Ahıska Turks pushed themselves to work hard in order to obtain a relatively wealthy life but they held back from the Russified mainstream society. Many

Ahıska Turks concentrated their efforts on the economic sphere, and soon became more prosperous than their Uzbek or Kazak neighbors, but their socio-political advancement remained low compared with other deported nationalities.

In Kazakstan and Uzbekistan, Ahıska Turks primarily dealt with agriculture since their settlement in Central Asia. Recently, however, they have diversified their professions and now work in construction, oil, or their own business in Kazakstan.

133 In Uzbekistan, they have grafted their agriculture skills with external capital and developed vegetable plantation. 261 Thus, in Kazakstan, Ahıska Turks’ living standard are pretty good while in Uzbekistan, their living standards are no worse than Uzbeks themselves. So, many Ahıska Turks in Uzbekistan, especially in

Tashkent and Sirdarya region which is near Kazakstan, see Kazakstan as an attractive alternative place for opportunities.262 Almost all Ahıska Turks spoke the titular language (Kazak or Uzbek) well and are thus fairly well integrated and have a good relationship with the majority community. However their relatively low level of representation in government and other public sectors makes them disadvantaged in the society.

Very few members of the community, mostly elderly, want to go to Ahıska,

Georgia. Whether they want to or not, it seems that to return to Ahıska, Georgia is now only a symbolic homeland that they should be allowed to go back to. It has become their hypothetical homeland these days. Many middle aged and young

Ahıska Turks think of their current residing country as their homeland but they associate them with Turkey due to certain cultural kinships. Many believe that

261 Interview with Dr. Ömer Salman, 2005. According to him many Ahıska Turk were involved in this kind of business and were making effort to find funds to create a big plantation. He said this kind of plantation business is the way to save themselves from the republic’s difficult economic stagnation. 262 Interview with Ahıska Turks in Tashkent and Sirdarya, and with Dr. Ömer Salman, 2005.; However, they were also hesitating a lot since they have difficulty in finding, selling, or buying property, and finding new employment.

134 Turkey should assume a role as a kin-state. However, even with Turkey they are skeptical, as some of those who went to Turkey in the 1990s have since returned to

Kazakstan and Uzbekistan. Especially economically well-being Ahıska Turks or the intelligentsia are not attracted to Turkey, since they are aware that many will face downward social mobility if they resettle in Turkey. Nonetheless, they all prefer to be called ‘Turks’ rather than ‘Ahıska Turks’ or ‘Meskhetian Turks’. Lastly, it is important to consider the impact of the 1944 deportation on the Ahıska Turk collectivity. Narrating the experiences of deportation was something the author explored because such memories and accounts explain how Ahıska Turkish collective identity was formed. Such narratives operated in the formation of their nationalism. The identity of the Ahıska Turks, which was based on an emphasis on

Turkishness and the belief of belonging to the Ottoman Empire (and Turkey), was developed by the deportation and preserved throughout the Soviet era due to numerous socio-political factors.

135

Table XI

Estimated Statistics of the Ahıska Turks in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan263

Kazakstan Uzbekistan

Some Major Region Population Some Major Region Population Approx. Tashkent, Sirdarya, Approx. Almaty 45,000 Jizak, Kashkadaria 15,000-20,000 Approx. Approx. South Kazakstan Buhara 40,000 3,000 Approx. Approx. Jambul Samarkand 36,000 4,000 Apporx. Approx. Kızıl Orda Navai 10,000 2,000 Appox. Approx. Total Total 150,000 50,000 Source: Estimated data were provide by the Ahıska Turk Association in Kazakstan (Tevfik Kurdaev), 2003 and the Ahıska Turk Association in Uzbekistan (Ömer Salman), 2005

263 Below data include Ahıska Turks who were not registered as Turks (Ahıska Turk). Thus these figures embrace all Ahıska Turk who were even registered as Uzbeks, Azeri, or Kazak.

136

CHAPTER IV

THE AHISKA TURKISH AND KOREAN DIASPORAS IN

NATIONALIZING CENTRAL ASIA: KAZAKSTAN AND UZBEKISTAN

Following the break-up of the Soviet Union, one of the most urgent questions to emerge from the critical confusion was how the newly emerging polities would set about creating convincing identities for themselves and their citizens (ethnic minorities). Having secured sovereign spaces following the collapse of the world’s largest multiethnic federation, Kazakstan and Uzbekistan were busy during the last decade embarking upon nation building. It has allowed political entrepreneurs in Uzbekistan and Kazakstan to link the cultures of the titular nations even more closely to state structures and to further secure their political pre- eminence within the new citizen polities. However, the state is a recent advent in the political discourses of the post-Soviet Kazakstan and Uzbekistan. This is

137 because statehood came unexpectedly and without asking, and in the case of the

Central Asians, it was thrust upon them. Kazakstan and Uzbekistan can be said to have created nations. Accordingly, its been more than a decade since their independence, Kazakstan and Uzbekistan are still struggling to define their national and state identity. Since these nationalizing states do not have effective ways of harmonizing the relationships of citizenship, ethnic affiliation and religious and national identity, the problems of diasporas, cultural rights and state protection of national minorities are growing throughout the post-Soviet Kazakstan and

Uzbekistan.

Historical experiences play a significant role in shaping identity. Although history matters, it is important to emphasize that the collective experience of a nation does not mean that there is a universally shared meaning of history within states. This is particularly so for the countries under study here, Kazakstan and

Uzbekistan. In many ways, the historical experiences of Uzbekistan and Kazakstan are similar. All these countries were subjected to Tsarist and Soviet rule and the hardships and repression that came with those periods. Each country witnessed a massive influx of ethnic Russians and endured the concomitant Russification process in all aspects of life. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, ethnic

138 Russians comprised at least 20% of the population of each country. Yet, despite these commonalities, there was not a universal response during their state building and nationalizing process in the aftermath of the Soviet Union. In other words, even though citizens in each republic faced similar experiences, the consequences of those experiences with regard to the construction of a national identity in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan were not the same.264 Forced Russification, purges, denial of human rights, and complete subservience to Moscow in practically all spheres of life mark the histories of Uzbekistan and Kazakstan. However, not everyone developed a completely negative view of Soviet life or Russians as a result of the

Soviet experience. For instance, Soviet development practices did little to influence the identity of Uzbeks or their language and culture. On the other hand, in

Kazakstan, Soviet development had substantial influences on the language and lifestyle of the Kazaks. As a result, considerable numbers of Kazaks, especially in urban areas, do not have negative view of Soviet life or Russian.265 Naturally, such differences between Uzbekistan and Kazakstan had an impact on the Korean and

Ahıska Turkish diasporas’ life and attitude, as well. Particularly, such different identity formation by the two titulars was more critical to the Korean diasporas,

264 In general, demographic, cultural and developmental (i.e. agricultural or industrial) differences have made dissimilar patterns in forging national identity amongst titular republics. 265 Also, the sizeable number of Russian as a dominant ethnic group in northern Kazakstan should be considered.

139 since their identity and lifestyle were heavily Russified.

Virtually, all post-Soviet states are nationalizing states, institutionally geared to function as the states of and for the particular ethno-cultural nations, based on claims of an exclusive ownership of their land, but incomplete and insufficiently national in a substantive sense.266 And many Kazak and Uzbek leaders see their nations not as vibrant, prosperous, and cohesive ethno-cultural communities, capable of integrating and assimilating their various national minorities, but as threatened cultures and languages, which had been marginalized in their own historical homelands by the demographic and economic might of the dominant nations (Russians and the Russophone population). Thus, the recently acquired sovereign statehood offers them a legal framework and an organizational tool for executing remedial political actions and erecting safe havens for their indigenous cultures and languages as well as redressing their historical injustices.267

After independence, neither Kazakstan nor Uzbekistan sought to emulate the West

European assimilationist nation-state models, or replicate the ‘unity in diversity’ experience of numerous postcolonial countries of Asia and Africa. Instead they have inherited a deeply institutionalized national conception, awaiting its fruition by

266 Rogers Brubaker, “Nationalizing States in the Old and the New,” Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol.19, no.2 (1996), pp. 411-412. 267 Ibid. p. 410.

140 forging de facto hegemony of the titular nation within its domain. National statehood was seen primarily as an apotheosis of national idea, as a legitimate means of countering the political and cultural hegemony of the formerly dominant nation (e.g. Russian).268 In this sense, the Korean diaspora felt that their status and life were more threatened in the titular states. They were not the formerly dominant nation but they were embedded inside the dominant culture and society, participating more actively than any other ethnic diasporas.

The process of ethnic identity revival in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan or

‘Kazakization’ and ‘Uzbekization’, as I intend to examine here, encompasses elements of ethnic, ethno-social, racial, and national consciousness renewal and their relationship to nationalism. As a result, Kazakization and Uzbekization may be defined as an ethnic revival of nationalism; a forceful movement towards reestablishing communal ties. Another point to be underlined is that Kazakization or

Uzbekization are not just a matter of purging Russianness but also about replacing certain aspects with reinvented (or retrieved) Kazakness or Uzbekness. In this context, such nationalizing processes of the titulars (namely Kazakization and

Uzbekization) are not irrelevant issues for the Korean and Ahıska Turkish diasporas.

268 Rogers Brubaker, “Nationhood and the National Question in the Soviet Union and Post-Soviet Eurasia: An Institutionalist Account,” Theory and Society, vol.23. no.1 (1994), p.63.

141 To understand the current socio-political environments of the Korean and Ahıska

Turkish diaspora, better comprehension of the nationalizing tendency of Kazakstan and Uzbekistan is necessary. Accordingly, this chapter will discuss the titulars’

(Uzbeks’ and Kazaks’) social, demographic and political forces both inducing and constraining the nationalization process. Indeed, it will also examine specific nation-building practices as well as the implications that follow for the Korean and

Ahıska Turkish diasporas in the region. In order to understand the current nationalizing state-building process better this chapter will take an overview of the historical indigenization process in Kazaktan and Uzbekitan, initially. By doing so, I will present the post-Soviet nationalism in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan not as a break with Soviet tradition, but more or less as an unconscious continuation of Soviet habits towards the national question.

142 IV.1. A Historical overview of the indigenization process in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan

Central Asia, which includes Kazakstan and Uzbekistan, was a complicated web of overlapping cultural, clan, regional and linguistic affiliations during the 20th century. A sense of national identity was rather shifting and contingent.

Emphasizing the multiple and layered nature of identities among inhabitants of

Central Asia, the Russian-German historian Barthold noted: “When you ask a

Turkestani (Central Asian) what is his identity, he will answer that he is, first of all a

Muslim, then inhabitant of such and such a city or village; or if he is nomad, a member of such and such a tribe….a Mangyt, Yomud or a Nayman.”269 Bennigsen formulated his well-known three-layered classification of identities among the

Central Asian Muslims on the basis of Barthold’s observations on the layers of identities. Bennigsen identified these three layers as: supranational (Islam), national, and clan-based local identities. He believed that the Islamic identity, defined through membership in the Umma, was the most powerful one and formed a cementing force in cooping the various local and regional affiliations.270 However, he did not see ‘national’ identities as capable of gaining a precedence over the supra

269 Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, “From Tribe to Umma,” Central Asian Survey, vol.3, no.3 (1984), p.19. 270 Alexandre Bennigsen, “Several Nations or One People? Ethnic Consciousness among Central Asians,” Survey, vol.24. no.3 (1979), pp.52-53.

143 ethnic unity symbolized by Islam. Bennigsen’s classification is a static scheme, guided by assumptions that national identities among Central Asians will remain subordinated to the competing claims of memberships into local communities and the Umma. In fact Islam was far from a homogeneous cultural force. Islam was more widespread among Kazaks in the southern regions who embraced a settled agrarian mode of life over the course of eighteenth-nineteenth centuries. The religious practices of southern Kazaks do not significantly differ from the Uzbeks, as they both differ from the Kazaks in the northern and eastern regions.

Rakowska-Harmstone claims that “Islam was an integral component in the process of formation of national identity,” thus suggesting that a sense of belongingness to the Islamic communities was the dominant affiliation for the people in the region.271 Karpat subscribes to a similar view by claiming that “the

Central Asian Muslims had acquired a broad and dynamic new identity that was

Turkic in its tribal-ethnic-linguistic dimensions and Muslim in its political and cultural-religious aspects.” 272 Although such explanations were not mistaken, however, these representations of homogenized Islamic tradition have similarly undermined the hold of other religious traditions, such as animist, shamanist and

271 Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, “Islam and Nationalism in Central Asia,” Central Asian Survey, vol.2. no.2 (1983), pp.10-13. 272 Kemal Karpat, “Elites and Transmission of Nationality and Identity,” Central Asian Survey, vol.5, no.3 (1986), p.5.

144 Sufism on the steppes. Underneath its apparent cultural and religious homogeneity,

Central Asia was an ethnically and culturally segmented entity that lacked a political or spiritual center. Affiliation based on region, clan, and kinship ties often undercut the projected religious commonality. We shouldn’t subsume the histories and cultural practices of nomadic people such as Kazak and Kyrgyz under those of settled Muslim communities in Turkestan. Although the Soviets created artificial and a historical national-territorial units by pitting one group against another in order to prevent the emergence of a Greater Turkestan, we shouldn’t ignore the significant internal, cultural and linguistic differences that had already existed among groups believed to be closely related. As Henze argued, the Soviets exaggerated the regional variations in spelling, grammar, and vocabularies of these

Turkic languages in order to set them as far apart as possible and thwart the rise of a

Turkic lingua franca.273

At all events, Islam, though much denigrated during the Soviet period, remained a key attribute of group identity among Kazaks and Uzbeks as well as other Central Asians. Even for the Kazaks who lacked key elements of other Islamic societies such as an indigenous philosophical school or center of learning, the

273 Paul B. Henze, “Politics and Alphabets in Inner Asia,” in Joshua A. Fishman (ed.), Advances in the Creation and Revision of writing system (The Hague: Mouton, 1977), pp.371-420.

145 Islamic heritage had always remained as a reminder to Kazaks that they were different from the Slavs, and is currently being carefully tapped by the government of independent Kazakstan in its efforts to put together a viable Kazak national history and identity. Accordingly, Crowe links efforts by Kazaks to explore their

Islamic connections as a search for a significant heritage beyond the era of Russian domination.274 Although the Soviets drove many Muslims underground after the

Russian revolution and destroyed Central Asia’s Jadidist modernizers,275 Islam, like nationalism, was eventually tolerated in closely regulated form in order to channel religious sentiment in harmless directions. The Soviets decided ‘popular Islam’ which involved both pagan and Islamic rituals of birth, coming of age, marriage and death, was not a direct political threat, and representatives of ‘official Islam’ (e.g.

Mullahs and Mosques)276 were duly registered and closely watched by the central government.277 Today in Uzbekistan and Kazakstan, Islam continues to be divided between unofficial and official representatives of the religion. Even such limited

274 David M. Crowe, “The Kazakhs and the Kazakhstan: The Struggle for Ethnic Identity and Nationhood,” Nationalities Paper, vol.26, no.3 (1998), p.398. 275 The Jadids, or Islamic modernists, became a powerful intellectual force in the southern part of Russian Empire during the waning days of Tsardom. Youthful and possessing European-style education, they hoped to meld Koranic law with Western know-how in order to strengthen the standing of their peoples in the Empire. The first Jadid schools were founded by wealthy Tatars of the Volga valley, and by the early 20th century such institutions activated in the Crimea, Azerbaijan, Turkestan and even the Kazak steppes. 276 In the case of Kazakstan, according to Akiner the traditional Kazak way of life prevented the spread of mosque-based Islam. 277 Geoffrey J. Jukes, Kirill Nourzhanov, Mikhail Alexandrov, “Race, Religion, Ethnicity and Economics in Central Asia,” in Kolchi Inoue and Tomohiko Uyama (eds.), Quest for Models of Coexistence: National and Ethnic dimensions of Changes in the Slavic Eurasian World (Sapporo, Japan: Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, 1998), pp. 264-266.

146 parameters of Soviet acceptance, however, helped Islam, like national sentiment, to survive until the Brezhnev era, when tacit agreement between the government and citizens divided the public and private realms, allowing religion to be recognized as an integral element of private life.278 As a result, an ethno-cultural mentality based on traditional partrimonialism, popular Islam and regionalism survived in

Kazakstan and Uzbekistan. Islam represented a distinction between Russian and

Central Asian (e.g. Kazak and Uzbek) and it is viewed as the central and most basic component of Kazak and Uzbek national identity. In other words, Islam has the potential to be the foremost identity factor for the Kazaks and Uzbeks.

In addition, the Kazaks and Uzbeks were not simply passive recipients of

Russian or Soviet culture, but were shaping it according to their own cultural predilections.279 Thus, even though many young urbanites in the Kazak SSR may have dressed and talked like Russians in order to fit into Soviet society and get ahead in life, they still viewed Russians through the prism of a distinctly Kazak mindset, retaining important elements of their native culture such as eating habits, burial practices, and an ingrained respect for elders. 280 Commenting on this

278 Ibid, 264. 279 Perhaps this is the crucial factor that differentiates them from Korean diasporas. Their strong religious belief (Islam) and cultural heritage played as a barrier role for intervening Russian and Soviet culture and language to them. While the Korean diaspora did not have strong psychological or spiritual prop to protect their own language and culture. 280 Shirin Akiner, The Formation of Kazakh Identity (Washington D.C.: Brooking Inst. Press, 1995), pp. 52-53.

147 phenomenon in the late 1980s, Edward Allworth observes: “The evidence shows that indigenous peoples of the Central Asia retain a strong sense of self,” and further notes that connections with Russian culture and Soviet Russian institutions “seem formal, accepted by habit or necessity, but relatively unintegrated into the group identity of Central Asians.”281 Perhaps, we can say that the Central Asians learnt

Russian only for strategic gains and mobility purposes, preserving their ascribed ethnic identities by preventing Russians from assuming a dominant role in social networks and family settings. At the same time, speaking Russian as a first language did not mean a renunciation of their ethno-linguistic identity.

Moreover, as potent as Russian culture was in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan, it was largely limited by an urban-rural divide. Russian only predominated in the larger cities such as Almaty and Tashkent. Russians seldom settled outside the cities, did not bother to learn the local language, and were not well represented in the republican political apparatus. Thus, because Russian settlers behaved like transients, Kazak and Uzbek apparatchiks were able to consolidate their power in the kolkhozes and village soviets.282 Consequently, in the countryside the titular

(Kazak and Uzbek) language and culture remained strong and perhaps, more pure.

281 Edward Allworth, “The New Central Asians,” in Edward Allworth (ed.), Central Asia: 130 years of Russian Dominance, A Historical Review (Durham: Duke University Press, 1994), p. 571. 282 Olivier Roy, The New Central Asia: The Creation of Nations (New York: New York University Press, 2000), pp.105-107.

148 As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, the present-day nationalist governmental politics in ex-Soviet Kazakstan and Uzbekistan have not witnessed substantial changes in paradigms. They continue to follow the former Soviet nationalism structurally.283 Roger Brubaker sees the Soviet legacy in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan as providing infrastructure, by its very contradictory nature.284 The

Soviet state not only passively tolerated, but also actively institutionalized, the existence of multiple nations and nationalities as constitutive elements of the sate and citizenry. It codified nationhood and nationality as fundamental social categories sharply distinct from statehood and citizenship. 285 This institutionalization of nationality by the Soviet state endorsed two conflicting, if not incompatible, notions of nationality: territorial-political (e.g. each nationality has its own republic), and ethno-cultural in which inscriptive ethnic affiliation (e.g. passport nationality) transcended the territorial one. For instance, a Georgian residing in Kazakstan remained national wise a Georgian, whether he had family ties with Georgia or not. Likewise, all Koreans remained as Koreans in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan. Consequently, nationality and nationhood were codified as

283 Berg Fragner, “Soviet Nationalism: An ideological legacy to the independent Republics of Central Asia,” in Willem van Shendel and Erik Zürcher (eds.), Identity Politics in Central Asia and the Muslim world (London: I.B. Tauris Publisher, 2001), p. 23. 284 Rogers Brubaker, “Nationhood and the National Question in the Soviet Union and Post-Soviet Eurasia: An Institutionalist Account,” Theory and Society, vol.23. no.1 (1994), p.49. 285 Ibid.

149 fundamental social categories, which prevailed at the sub-state (national republics), not at state level, as sharply distinct from statehood and citizenship. This dual and mutually conflicting institutionalization of territorial-political and ethno-cultural definitions of nation at the national republic level has generated conflicting expectations of belonging among national minorities residing in the incipient states.

This explains why ‘ethnic’ rather than ‘civic’ elements prevail in state-building processes. It has caused a pervasive tension in the post-Soviet sphere between the titular nation-state and national minorities belonging to the external homeland states.

This tension has replicated itself in all the new states in a triangular relation among the titular nations (nominally state-bearing nation), the national minorities (or diasporas) and the external homelands of these minorities.286 To be sure, this kind of institutionalized pattern on inter-ethnic conflict is offering a comparative framework to the study of pattern of ethnic migration and problems of integration of minorities.

Thus, so-called Soviet nationalism depended on nation-building through territorial demarcation by the center in Moscow.287 Soviet-style manipulative nationalism gave titular national leaders in the republics a whole range of

286 Ibid, p.64. 287 Willem van Schendel and Erik Zürcher, “Opting out, opting in, exclusion and assimilation: States and nations in the Twentieth century,” in Willem van Shendel and Erik Zürcher (eds.), Identity Politics in Central Asia and the Muslim world (London: I.B. Tauris Publisher, 2001), p. 3.

150 opportunities to build national subsystems, as long as they remained loyal to the center. In Fragner’s view, this fact explains why the Soviet leaderships in Central

Asia have been able to hang on to power and make such smooth transitions to national leaderships.288

It is true that, from Stalin onwards, authentic expression of separate ethnic identities were suppressed, but at the same time, the Soviet regime promoted its own brand of nationalism through the manipulation of history, language and culture and through the strengthening of territorial national identities. The Soviet political leadership, starting with Stalin in his role as commissar for nationalities, developed a model of nationalism which owed little or nothing to Marxist thinking.289 Not only did the Soviets accept nationalism as a given entity in contemporary history, but they consciously promoted their own brand of nationalism, while at the same time fighting pre-existing or autonomous nationalisms. The greater breathing space granted to local party elites under Khruschev and Brezhnev gave the local leaders the opportunity to forge ties with their own populations through the use of ethnic symbols and patronage.290 Hence, we can argue that the Soviet regime created favorable circumstances for the growth of nationalism itself.

288 Berg Fragner, pp. 14, 23. 289 Ibid, pp. 14-20. 290 Willem van Schendel and Erik Zürcher, p.3.

151 Another reason why we should look at a historical overview of indigenization process in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan is that many characteristics of the Soviet system still exist in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan’s elite behavior. Political resources are still concentrated at top in the position of the president. Enhancing presidential powers through constitutional change and the avoidance of popular elections have secured the president’s position as the major power holder. There is no dispersal of political power from the central authorities to outside groups. And opposition, if not prohibited, is strictly monitored by the central authorities. It is then the president who is guiding the transition in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan, and who will decide the outcome. The socialist state’s monopoly over employment had assured a smooth implementation of korenizatsiia type of preferential measures in the post-Soviet era. According to this measure, appointments were often made on criteria such as party membership, class background, political reliability, clan networks, and most importantly, blat 291 rather than merit or professional qualification alone. In the absence of an independent career civil service, or a formal separation between politicians and the administrators, the bureaucracy today continues to remain very much dependent on state patronage, which allows for

291 Blat (Russian: блат) is a term which appeared in the Soviet Union to denote the use of informal agreements, Party contacts, or black market deals to achieve results or get ahead.

152 sudden change in personnel when new groups come to dominate the state. Presently, the entire cadre system is in a state of flux. There are few institutional or legal obstacles to creating a titular-dominated bureaucracy, given the ease with which the nationalizing state can hire and fire. The post-Soviet states lack a career civil service, and the existing bureaucracy has little capacity for organized resistance.

There is no longer a compelling external pressure to maintain an artificial ethnic balance under the guise of ‘internationalism’ as in the Soviet era, although the states continue to celebrate their multiethnicity in a ritualistic manner. As a result, right after the independence of the titular states, a bureaucracy with a titular face was regarded as a favorable step toward creating a nationalizing regime.

Numerous works in the Post-Soviet literature on nationalities recognize how the administrative-territorial arrangements instituted by early the Soviet regime have subsequently reinforced exclusive claims of nationalities to their designated domains. Supported by Bolshevik cultural-linguistic policies of nation-building, this territorial demarcation for the first time, carved out distinct national territories in

Central Asia. Despite their multi-ethnic composition, each Soviet republic was structured as a unit belonging to the titular nationality, containing within it the next lower level of ethnic hierarchy, placed in a segmented arrangement like the

153 matrioshka dolls.292 The organization of its diverse multi-ethnic domain into an exhaustive and mutually exclusive set of national groups, in which each group was endowed with its own distinct territory, language, intelligentsia, music, theater, press, schools, academies of science, flags, emblems and numerous other national- cultural attributes, was to serve as the solution to the national question that has perennially afflicted multinational states.

After the death of Stalin, the Central Asian natives began to occupy representative levels in the republican hierarchies. Under Khrushchev the policy of partially korenizatsiia was restored, and throughout the Soviet Union, local elites began to fill the ranks of party and state apparatus. Under Brezhnev, korenizatsiia was firmly established as the modus operandi of Soviet nationalities policy; where local elites were not sufficient in number to meet the needs of the state, there were affirmative action policies to move them up through higher education and training.293 Together with this korenizatsiia policy, the Soviets initiated a number of nation-building measures. In fact, nation-building was part of a dialectical policy towards the development of socialism. It was argued that ultimately national distinctions would vanish, but the Soviet leadership also acknowledged that the

292 Ray Taras, “Making Sense of Matrioshka Nationalism,” in Ian Bremmer and Ray Taras (eds.), Nations and Politics in the Soviet Successor States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 514-538. 293 Ronald G. Suny, The revenge of the past: Nationalism, revolution, and the collapse of the Soviet Union (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), p. 109.

154 message of socialism would be better received through national channels. Thus began the policy of equality, wherein national sentiments would be ameliorated where they were inflamed. Or, on the other hand, nations would be built up to a modern level from which they could then make the transition to national socialism.294

The Soviet state assured preferential access to the titular nationality within its territories, while ensuring some form of proportional representation of other non- titular groups. The structure of titular preferences, initially implemented through

Korenizatsiia continued subsequently in less overt forms and coexisted with a formal maintenance of its multiethnic form, or ‘internationalism.’ However, it contributed to the indigenization of local political leadership and to the growth or consolidation of an indigenous intelligentsia through preferential access to higher education and to membership in the local communist party. Under this sort of union republic status, each of the Central Asian ethno-republics was provided with a degree of institutional protection that enabled their native languages and cultures to flourish. By federalizing ethnic homelands into ethno-republics, the Soviet state actually created nations, like Kazakstan, whose sense of nation-ness had previously

294 Walker Connor, “Soviet policies toward the non-Russian peoples in theoretical and historical perspective: What Gorbachev inherited,” in Alexander Motyl (ed.), The Post-Soviet nations: Perspectives on the demise of the USSR (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), pp.31-33.

155 barely existed.295 Moreover, this form of nation-building also encouraged ethno- republic nation-builders to think of the ethno-republic as the identity-marker of their homeplace.296 On the other hand, the idea of the Russian Federation was not taken seriously by Russians or non-Russians as the Russian nation-state or the national homeland of the Russian people.297 Like other non-titular nationalities, they were encouraged to think of the Soviet State as their homeland (sovetskaia rodina) and to believe that what was central to their national sense was what Khrushchev, in the late 1950s, had first referred to as the emergence of a new Soviet community, that of the Soviet people (sovetskii narod).298 Titular preferences and a commitment to internationalism did not initially jeopardize the special, hegemonic status of

Russians, however they laid the important groundwork for the indigenization process in titular republics and later for their independence. In sum, as ethno- national communities, the Soviet republics defied the notion that every nation strives to get its own state, and were in fact premised upon a denial of craving for statehood. Yet with the Soviet collapse, statehood was automatically conferred upon

295 Shirin Akıner, “Melting Pot, Salad Bowl – Cauldron? Manipulation and Mobilizations of Ethnic and Religious Identities in Central Asia,” Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol.20, no.2 (1997), p. 368. 296 Graham Smith, “Post-colonialism and Borderland identities,” in Graham Smith, Edward Allworth, Vivien Law, Andrew Wilson, and Annette Bohr (eds.), Nation-building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands. The Politics of National Identities (Cambridge University Press, 1998), p.6. 297 Roman Szporluk, “Statehood and Nation-building in Post-Soviet Space,” in Roman Szporluk (ed.), National Identity and Ethnicity in the New States of Eurasia (London: M.E. Sharpe, 1994), p.6. 298 Graham Smith, The Nationalities Question in the Post-Soviet States (London: Longman, 1996), p. 10.

156 these titular republics.

During the 1960s and 1970s the indigenous peoples of Uzbekistan and

Kazakstan made a resounding cultural and demographic comeback, and, in so doing, made a glaring mockery of Soviet nationalities policy. Due to revival of Muslim influence and more modern healthcare, the birthrate of the Uzbek and the Kazak populations began to outstrip that of Russians. Thus, after 1960 the Russian nationality’s share of the regional population began to decline.299 During the 1970s and 1980s, the Uzbek and Kazak population grew three to four times as fast as the ethnic Russian population, despite countermeasures by Moscow such as the introduction of sex education, a propaganda campaign to reduce family size, and wider availability of contraceptives.300 Moreover, beginning in the 1960s several strong republican leaders were able to circumvent the parallel Russian-dominated bureaucracy that had existed in the region since the days of Stalin, and build their own patronage networks.301

299 Theresa Rakowska-Harmstone, “Introduction,” in William Fierman (ed.), Soviet Central Asia: The failed transformation (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), p.xi. 300 Nancy Lubin, “Implication of ethnic and demographic trends,” in William Fierman (ed.), Soviet Central Asia: The failed transformation (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), p. 36. 301 Edward Allworth, “The New Central Asians,” in Edward Allworth (ed.), Central Asia: 130 years of Russian Dominance, A Historical Review (Durham: Duke University Press, 1994), p. 553.

157 Table XII

Native Occupancy of Leading positions by National Republics, 1955-1972

(Percentage)

Position Kazakstan Uzbekistan CC Secretariat 29.5 59.3 First Secretary 33 100 Organizational Secretary (=2nd Secretary) 0 0 Party-State Control Secretary 0 100 Chair Culture 100 100 Chair Art & Science (Academy of 100 (100) 100 (100) Science) Chair Trade Union council 100 100 Komsomol 1st Secretary 67 100 Presidium Council of Ministers 48.8 82.2 Minister of Agriculture 25 83 Minister of Education 100 100 Minister of Foreign Affairs 100 80 Minister of State Control 33 100 Minister of Construction 0 80 Chairman of Sovnarkhoz 50 33 Source: Grey Hodnett, Leadership in the Soviet National Republics: A Quantitative Study of Recruitment Policy (Ontario: Mosaic Press, 1978), pp.101-103. * Native population as % of total Republic population in 1960 was: Kazaktan-30% and Uzbekistan 60.1%

According to Allworth, it had been customary since the time of Stalin for

Moscow to keep Slavs and the other non-Central Asians in Party positions that really counted, while relegating natives to “superficially prestigious token

158 positions.” 302 However, after the 1960s, Central Asian leaders were able to domesticate the party leadership in their respective republics by taking advantage of the “flexibility in human personalities” (as opposed to the more ideological rigid party control system).303 The non-natives cooperated because their “perks” allowed them to live much better than in the more ideologically restrictive RSFSR, thus allowing native leaders “unusual latitude” in unofficial decision making. 304

Accordingly, as mentioned earlier, such indigenous leaders flourished during the corruption of the Brezhnev era, when the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

(CPSU) finally compromised with the nationalities by tolerating the entrenchment of local satrapies so long as republican leaders remained outwardly subservient to

Moscow.305 This de facto political independence, coupled with the great increase in the native educated population that had taken place in recent years, helped to strengthen Kazak and Uzbek self-awareness, and promised enhanced career opportunities for young Uzbeks and Kazaks.306

By the end of the Brezhnev era some titular nationalities were slightly over-represented in party membership. For instance, in the 1930s, Uzbeks made up

302 Ibid. 303 Ibid., pp.551-557. 304 Ibid. 305 Michael Rywkin, Moscow’s Muslim Challenge: Soviet Central Asia (New York: M.E Sharpe, 1990), pp.150-151. 306 Allworth, op. cit., pp.556-557.

159 76 percent of the Party; by 1934 this number dropped to 64 percent. By 1939 the total fell to 47 percent and reached a lowest point of 34 percent during World War II.

After the war it rebounded, but remained at 47 percent until 1955. Thereafter the percentage of Uzbeks in the Party steadily increased; by 1960 Uzbeks made up 51 percent, and in 1981 they comprised 61 percent of Communist Party members.307

By the end of the 1980s, Uzbek reprsentation in the Party made up some 71.4 percent of the total, while Russians accounted for only 8.3 percent.308 Consequently, by the 1980s, which means before the independence, Uzbek political elites occupied many high-profile positions in Party and state organs, though Slavs dominated certain strategic sectors. The latter, however, did not rule their Uzbek comrades, rather they themselves had been absorbed into local networks of power and influence.

During the beginning of the 1980s, when Yurii Andropov came to power, he tried to re-centralize the Soviet Union in the name of fighting corruption. Many

Central Asians felt that although Andropov’s crusade was union-wide, they came to feel they were being unfairly singled out. Andropov’s policy directly threatened the

Brezhnev-era republican leadership, or status quo. 309 According to Zemtsov,

307 Russian only accounted for 17 percent. 308 Donald Carisle, “Uzbekistan and the Uzbeks,” Problems of Communism, vol.40, no.5 (1991), p.38. 309 Michael Watson, Contemporary Minority Nationalism (New York: Routledge, 1990), pp. 157-158.

160 Andropov tried to roll back the clock by replacing the term “national republic” with

“union republic,” but either was unsuccessful in his attempt or simply did not live long enough to enforce his new policies.310 Unfortunately, for Andropov and his protégé Gorbachev, Central Asians viewed both the anticorruption drive and perestroika as a means by which the central government was attempting to re- impose both Russian culture and political domination on their own republics.311 It was too late to roll back the clock and impose centralized authority to titular republics.

Despite these common developments, Kazakstan and Uzbekistan did not act in the same way. As mentioned earlier, there was not a universal response to relations with Russia in the aftermath of the Soviet Union. Not everyone developed a totally negative view of Soviet life or Russians as a result of the Soviet experience. National identity in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan were not developed in the same way. In the case of Kazakstan, seventy plus years of Moscow’s policy of

Russification did not turn everyone into anti-Russian nationalist. Many political elites and large segments of society in Kazakstan did not possess a clear-cut national identity in which Russia was a threat or an enemy. However, political

310 Ilya Zemtsov, “Andropov and the Non-Russian Nationalities: Attitudes and Policies,” Nationalities Paper, vol. 8, no.5 (1985), pp.5-23. 311 Olivier Roy, The New Central Asia: The Creation of Nations (New York: New York University Press, 2000), pp.128-129.

161 leaders in Uzbekistan did possess and aggrandize a national identity that viewed

Russia as a significant threat to the Uzbek nation and state.

One of the important reasons for this is that these Central Asian republics experienced very different regional relationships with Moscow. In Kazakstan,

Moscow pursued, more or less, policies of industrialization and urbanization, while in Uzbekistan they developed a monocultural agriculture economy. These two patterns left the regions with different structural characteristics (demographic structures, elite organizations and institutions). Under the direction of Moscow,

Uzbekistan was essentially turned into a cotton colony. The vast majority of arable land had been devoted to the production of “white gold,” cotton. However, most of the cotton produced in the region was exported in raw form to Russia, mostly to the textile town of Ivanova, where it is manufactured into cloth.312 Many Uzbeks were left in rural areas employed with agriculture activities. There was only a small portion of Uzbek bureaucrats and industrial workers residing in cities. Only a small portion of the textile industries were opened in Central Asian cities, generally in

Alma Ata, Tashkent, and Samarkand. Needless to say, these cities were occupied by

Slavs, especially Russians. Central Asians, relatively more Uzbeks than Kazaks, did

312 Peter Craumer, “Agricultural Change, Labor Supply, and Rural Out-migration in Soviet Central Asia,” in Robert A. Lewis (ed.), Geographic Perspectives on Soviet Central Asia (London: Routledge, 1992), p 424.

162 not flock to the cities to work, and certainly not to the factories of Russia, nor even to the factories in Tashkent. The industrial labor force there continued to be predominantly Slavic (generally Russian). 313 Thus, the industrial northern

Kazakstan region had to face a great influx of Russians who came to out-number natives in major cities. Unlike northern Kazakstan, where the entire region was inundated by Russians, large geographic regions in Uzbekistan, including bordering southern Kazakstan region, were not Russified. Instead, Russians migrating to

Uzbekistan overwhelmingly settled in cities.314 These urbanized Russians never perceived Central Asia as their homeland. They were tied more closely to Russia and especially Moscow than to the Central Asian countryside which surrounded them. On the other hand, the Uzbeks remained primarily in rural areas.

Such patterns of Soviet-era development and industrial progress have transformed the Kazak nomads into one of the most modernized and Russified people among the Soviet Muslims. Over 95 percent of all Kazaks are bilingual with reasonable proficiency in Russian.315 According to the 1989 census, about 65

313 Michael Rywkin, “Cadre Competition in Uzbekistan: the Ethnic Aspect,” Central Asian Survey, vol.3, no.3/4 (1986), pp. 183-194. 314 By 1960s, 82 percent of all Russian living in Central Asia lived in Cities.; Jeff Chinn and Robert Kaiser, Russian as the New Minority: Ethnicity and Nationalism in the Soviet Successor States (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), p. 215. 315 Nazarbayev frequently emphasizes the fact that all Kazaks speak Russian to deny allegations of discrimination on language, made by non-Kazaks. As he asked rehetorcially in a speech, “How can there be a separate problem of Russian-speaking people in Kazakstan, when all Kazakstani are Russian Speakers?” ; Tadeusz Pioro, “Sparring with the Kazakh President,” Transitions, vol.4. no.1 (1997), p. 10.

163 percent Kazaks claimed fluency in Russian as a second language, which denotes the highest degree of proficiency in Russian claimed by a Turkic-speaking nationality.316 Table XIII indicates that rates of Russian fluency of the Kazaks are almost near with Slavic Ukrainian.

Table XIII

Russian Language Fluency Among the Titular Nationality in their own Republic, 1989

(Figures in parenthesis refer to 1979 levels)

Nationality Total Urban Rural Capital Ukrainian 71.1 (59.6) 81.8 (62.8) 56.4 (54.4) 89.2 (67.9) Kazak 64.2 (62.8) 77.8 (75.3) 55.7 (51.1) 90.7 (86.3) Uzbek 22.7 (22.3) 43.2 (42.0) 13.7 (13.6) 64.3 (62.4) Azerbaijani 32.1 (31.7) 45.8 (45.1) 18.2 (18.1) 64.8 (62.9) Turkmen 28.2 (27.5) 43.2 (47.4) 13.7 (17.4) 60.2 (56.4) Kyrgyz 37.2 (36.9) 67.1 (66.1) 29.9 (28.8) 85.4 (83.4) Source: Mikhail N. Guboglo, “Demography and Language in the Capitals of the Union Republics,” Journal of Soviet Nationalities, vol.1, no.4 (1990), pp.5-6.

First hand observation of the linguistic behavior in Almaty and Tashkent reveals a significantly higher native language use among Uzbeks and also sporadic efforts by Russians to converse in Uzbek through code-mixing, which is totally absent among Russians in Almaty. When a group of Kazak language activists

316 Mikhail N. Guboglo, “Demography and Language in the Capitals of the Union Republics,” Journal of Soviet Nationalities, vol.1, no.4 (1990), pp.5-6.

164 complained that very little was done to implement Kazak as state language,

Nazarbayev claimed, “Almaty is not Tashkent, it is not Baku, or is it Ashgabat,” implying that the difference in native language use between these three cities and

Almaty is too obvious to ignore.317 If I ask Kazaks, why Russian is more rampant in Kazakstan, especially in its urban areas, than in other Central Asian regions, despite the common Turkic linguistic roots of the Central Asian language, their initial responses to this question were: “We weren’t allowed to speak our own language,” “Russians ruled Kazakstan whereas the Uzbeks had their own rulers,” and so on. More detailed conversations with people revealed ethnic stereotypes, characterizations of self and other, which added a greater complexity to these assertions.318 According to a popular Uzbek saying, “If you want to become a

Russian, first become a Kazak.” Kazaks refer to their inherent “national” traits such as “pliability” and “adaptation” to the surrounding environment. One frequently hears the following analogy used by Kazaks: “When you find one Russian in a company of ten Uzbeks, he will have to either speak Uzbek, or remain quiet. But as

317 Bhavna Dave, “National Revival in Kazakstan: Language Shift and Identity Change,” Post-Soviet Affairs, vol.12, no.1 (1996), p. 55.; It was estimated that over forty percent of Kazaks do not have an adequate command over their own language, and about three fourths of the Kazak urban dwellers do not actively use their native language in daily interactions. (see Kazakhstanskaia Pravda, 20.August, 1992) 318 Even during the field visits in 2003, my attempt to converse with Kazaks in Almaty in Kazak almost invariably resulted in the conversation sliding into Russian. Resulting in a Russified identity, urban Kazaks were more likely to prefer a Russian-speaking environment to a Kazak-speaking one. On the other hand, Uzbeks favored a Uzbek-speaking environment over a Russian-speaking one. Even though my Uzbek was not sufficient I always could finish up my conversation in Uzbek with locals in Tashkent.

165 soon as one Russian enters a room full of Kazaks, they will switch to Russian instantaneously.” Statements such as “we learnt Russian so well that we forget our own language in turn,” “they exploited our traditional hospitality and openness to other cultures, pushing us out of our niche,” “as nomads, our genes have been geared toward adaptation to given ecology, rather than resisting or changing it,” abound in popular discourse. Nowadays, inducing many Kazaks to refrain from code-switching in favor of Russian seems to be intensifying a resistance to Russian

(people, language, culture). In contrast, few Russians found it surprising or anomalous that Uzbeks continue using native language in their presence. It is, perhaps, no surprise that Kazakstan was acclaimed as the most “international”

Soviet republic and hailed by Khrushchev as “a planet of hundred nationalities and languages,” and a “laboratory of international friendship.”

Such a different socio-cultural setting and historical development between

Kazakstan and Uzbekistan has resulted in distinct nationalizing processes after their independence. In addition, this has affected the ethnic minorities or diasporas in each republic. We shouldn’t neglect the fact that the Korean and Ahıska Turkish diasporas’ status and life patterns were influenced by the different developments and settings.

166 IV.2. States building and Nationalizing process in the Post-Soviet context and its implication to the Korean and Ahıska Turkish Diasporas

As seen in the previous section, the nationalizing regimes that constitute

Uzbekistan and Kazakstan have been informed and structured by the shared legacy of the Soviet rule. The Soviet past and its consequences raised questions for

Kazakstan and Uzbekistan about identity, about identical and different culture and about the boundaries between peoples. Three perspectives on this discussion should be considered: de-Sovietization, the reinventing of boundaries and cultural standardization. De-Sovietization refers to the way in which nationalizing political elites have been keen on remove the symbols, political institutions, and representatives of Soviet power from the social and political landscape and to replace them with new national symbols, political institutions and social practices.

It has served as an instrument for privileging certain members of the nationalizing state in which the utilization of ethnic codes provides an important resource for indigenous social mobility and political status and position.319 In Kazakstan and

Uzbekistan, for those political elites who have survived, the only way to remain in power has been to distance themselves from the previous regime by switching to employing ethnic codes. To secure power, the key has been to outbid other

319 Graham Smith, “Post-colonialism and Borderland identities,” in Graham Smith, Edward Allworth, Vivien Law, Andrew Wilson, and Annette Bohr (eds.), Nation-building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands. The Politics of National Identities (Cambridge University Press, 1998), p.14.

167 political rivals by deploying ethnic codes in order to secure the electoral support of the titular nation.

As a result, the titular nationalist elites have attempted to restructure the national stratification systems in their homelands to secure the hegemony of the titular nation, which they view as its rightful position in its homeland. The titular nation’s perception of its status was more important than its actual economic, political, and socio-cultural status. Most titular nationalists are pursuing the objective of unitary nation states, even though the territories they claim contain multi-national populations.

They assume that the new states must belong to the indigenous nationality of the region.

The multiethnic legacy is regarded as an arbitrary and artificial product of the Soviet policies, although it continues to be highlighted and celebrated as a self-evident emblem of non-discrimination in official pronouncements. These nation-builders are also engaged in reinventing, defining, clarifying and homogenizing boundaries. Lastly, linguistic, cultural and educational standardization is held up as commensurate with the running of a more efficient titular space with the loyal citizenry. Many Uzbek and

Kazak nationalists argue that they cannot expect patriotism from Russian and

Russophone community. Thus, they say that there is only one option: the creation of the ethnocratic state dominated by the titular (Kazak or Uzbek) within the framework of a

168 multi-ethnic society of equal social-economic opportunities.320 In this circumstances, it is not difficult to image the constraints that the Korean and the Ahıska Turkish diaspora experienced right after the titulars’ independence.

Demographic Trends

The process of creating titular states in Central Asia is still young.

Particularly during this developmental stage, the evolving relationship between members of the titular nations and the Russophone population is having an important impact on both the states developing political institutions and the nature of political discussion. In these circumstances, the very first catalyst of

Kazakhization and Uzbekization occurred through demographic indigenization, when a considerably higher Kazak birthrate and net Russophone (of course, including Russians) out migration occurred.321 Actually, Kazakstan and Uzbekistan experienced a demographic shift in favor of the natives since the mid-1960s.322

And this demographic indigenization has increased since 1989, with relatively high birthrates as the most important causal factor. As Kolstoe argues, demographics

320 Azamat Sarsembayev, “Imagined Communities: Kazak Nationalism and Kazakification in the 1990s,” Central Asian Survey, vol.18, no.3 (1999), p.332. 321 Robert Kaiser, “Nationalizing the Workforce: Ethnic Restratification in the Newly Independent States,” Post-Soviet Geography, vol.35, no.2 (1995), p.89. 322 Uzbeks already formed a majority in their republic at the time of independence.

169 could be the ultimate factor in ethnic superiority. Being predominantly a younger nation than the Russian, or other ethnic minorities, even the Kazaks who are in numerical inferiority in their republic will “win out without engaging the Russians

(or other ethnic minorities) in direct confrontation, simply by biding their time. The ethnic battle, as it were, will be fought out in the bedchamber, where the Kazaks will inevitably be victorious.”323 As an example, in the early 1990s more than 80 percent of all teenagers in the country were Kazaks.324 By January 1st 1995, Kazaks were 44 percent of the republic’s total population while the Russian share had decreased to 36 percent. It is anticipated that by 2015 Kazaks will make up more than 65 percent of the republic’s population.325 On the other hand, Uzbeks were already the majority of the population in their republic, constituting more than 71 percent of the population. Accordingly, the recent trends, high birthrate of titular and out-migration of the Russophone (including Russian) population, will accelerate the demographic indigenization in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan.

Various pronouncements by Nazarbaev and Karimov and other leaders have made unequivocal references to Kazakstan and Uzbekistan as the historical

323 Paul Kolstoe, “Anticipating Demographic Superiority: Kazakh Thinking on Integration and Nation Building,” Europe and Asia Studies, vol.50, no.1 (1998), p.62. 324 Martha Brill Olcott, Central Asia’s New State: Independence, Foreign Policy and Regional Security (Washington D.C.: United States Institute for Peace Press, 1996), p.61. 325 Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, 11 August 1992, cited in Martha Brill Olcott, Central Asia’s New State: Independence, Foreign Policy and Regional Security (Washington D.C.: United States Institute for Peace Press, 1996), p.61.

170 homeland of Kazaks and Uzbeks, punctuating these claims with the demonstration of pride in its multi-ethnicity. However, these laudatory references to its multi- ethnicity by emphasizing a presence of over a hundred nationalities in the republics do not compromise the claims that Kazaks or Uzbeks are the only rightful ancestors of the land. All other non-titular ethnic groups in popular discourse are varyingly categorized as representatives of numerous other nations or diasporas, even as they are broadly referred to as ‘Kazakstanis’ or ‘Uzbekistanis.’ What is more, in the case of Kazak nationalists, who believe they are demographically in an inferior situation in their own republic, believe that Kazakstan can become a genuinely multiethnic state only if the injustice to the indigenous Kazaks, whose plight they consider to be similar to the native Indians in North America, is rectified.326 In their view, the rights and interests of the indigenous Kazaks can be safeguarded only by according them both legal and constitutional protection, and a favorable social climate against more privileged settlers and members of numerous other ethnic diasporas who are generally regarded as more upwardly mobile and better-placed to adapt to the new market condition than the titular nation.327 On the other hand, unlike northern Kazakstan, where the entire region was flooded by Russians, large

326 Information provided during conversation with scholars in the Academy of Science in Kazakstan (Almaty, Kazakstan, 2003) 327 Ibid.

171 regions in Uzbekistan were not Russified. Instead, Russians migrating to

Uzbekistan overwhelmingly settled in cities. Indigenes remained in rural areas.

The current occupational structure is very much in a state of flux due to an ongoing Russophone emigration. The Recruitment of Kazaks to these positions has steadily narrowed the gap. However, Kazak scholars and bureaucrats cite these data and similar figures to demonstrate the subordinate and underprivileged position of the natives in their own homeland and to urge more intense measures to rectify this imbalance. By pointing at their disadvantaged position on their own land, they repudiate the recurring charges of a discrimination of the Russophone population.

Titular (Kazak and Uzbek) over-representation in higher education and political representation, and the dramatic shift during the 1990s toward higher titular (Kazak and Uzbek) participation in all sectors provided an added incentive for Russophone emigration.328 For instance, in Kazakstan by January 1st 1998, some 2.2 million people had left the country since independence.329 Therefore,

Boris Giller and Viktor Shatskikh questioned the prevalent official view that the growing emigration of the Russophone population was motivated by economic reasons, or by a natural desire to be reunited with their co-ethnics in their historical

328 Irina Malkova, “Kazakstan Still Unshaken by the Exodus of its People,” Caravan Business News, vol.2, no.8 (1993), p. 22. 329 Among them 1.2 million of them went to Russia.; “Kazakhstan: Decrease in Kazakhstan’s Population Reported,” ITAR-TASS, 12 December 1998.

172 homelands. Instead, they alleged that a growing invisibility and voicelessness of the

Russian speaking population in all spheres of life and their marginalization from the country’s politics have contributed to the widespread “suitcase fever” among them. 330 Another compelling reason for the emigration of the Russophone population from Kazakstan and Uzbekistan is the anxiety about the future of their children in the climate of an ongoing nationalization of the polity, especially the educational structure. Most Russian speakers, which include the Korean diaspora, also fear that their children may be deprived of fair access to the country’s educational institutes or the various scholarships to study abroad, as the local institutions making such recommendations tend to be biased against the non- titulars.331 The pervasiveness of titular preferences in day-to-day matters and an absence of any countervailing mechanism of ensuring equality of access dissuade the non-titulars from hoping to get admission in the state-controlled institutions for admissions. Fewer and fewer Russian speakers are applying to these institutions, especially the agricultural institutes, humanities and social science divisions in the

Academy of sciences and universities, which are perceived as having a titular

330 Boris Giller and Viktor Shatskikh, “Oredelenie berege: russkoiazychnyie v Kazakhstane,” Karavan (12 December 1993). According to Kazak scholars (diaspora scholars) this article was widely-debated by Russian speakers (of course inclduign the Korean diasporas) in the city. 331 Although the Ahıska Turks who speak their mother tongue, i.e., Turkish at home but also know Russian also concern seriously about the opportunities of their children’s education.

173 (Kazak or Uzbek) profile.

Demographic indigenization is also enhanced by the return of titulars from the former union republics and from foreign states. Kazakstan is especially actively in promoting such a policy to overcome its demographic inferiority. Since its independence in 1991, Kazakstan began to attract and support ethnic Kazak immigration to Kazakstan from abroad. Some 4.5 million ethnic Kazaks live outside the republic and are spread mainly across China, Uzbekistan, Russia, Mongolia,

Turkmenistan, Afghanistan and Turkey. The Repatriation of Kazaks living abroad has been regarded as vital for the strengthening of the Kazak presence and advancing Kazakization across the country. The government allotted special funds and provided housing and employment to attract Kazak immigration.332 Official statistics indicate that, between 1991 and 1996, 154,941 ethnic Kazaks immigrated to

Kazakstan: 84,828 (55 percent) from Russia, 65,126 (40 percent) from Mongolia, 4,617 from Iran, and the remainder from China, Afghanistan or other countries.333 According to a recent official estimate, the number of repatriated Kazaks who immigrated to

Kazakstan for permanent residence between 1991 and 2001 reached 500,000.334 Most

332 Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), Human Rights and Democratization in the Newly Independent States of the Former Soviet Union (Washington D.C.: CSCE, 1993), pp.195-196. 333 Charles King and Melvin J. Neil, “Diaspora Politics: Ethnic Linkages, Foreign Policy, and Security in Eurasia,” International Security, vol.24, no.3 (1999/2000), p. 128. 334 Panorama, no.48 (December, 2001) cited in Zharmukhamed Zardykhan, “Russians in Kazakhstan and Demographic Change: Imperial Legacy and the Kazakh Way of Nation Building,” Asian Ethnicity, vol.5, no.1

174 of these immigrants are being settled in northern Kazakstan a practice which the

Russians perceived as a deliberate effort by the Kazak government to ‘Kazakize’ the population in the north.335 Moreover, the repatriated Kazaks are believed to be more nationalistic than those living in Kazakstan. In particular, those who came from non-

USSR countries such as China, Mongolia and Turkey are strongly bound to the Kazak language and traditions.336 It is no wonder that they were generally distributed in big cities with large Russian populations. The Kazak government deliberately used these incoming Kazaks as a means of Kazak nation building and to balance out the heavy

Russian population.

Such measures, along with a profound state of flux with an ongoing migration of Russohopone and influx of natives, are nationalizing the ethnic composition of the country, especially its cities. After the titular nation’s independence, demographic indigenization occurred not only in rural areas where indigenes were already dominant, but also in the previously Russified cities. As a result of the emigration of the non-titular population, and increased mobility among rural natives moving to the cities, the Russophone cities of Kazakstan and

(2004), p. 75. 335 “Kazakstan: The Question of Dual Citizenship is Entirely Appropriate,” The Current Digest of the Post- Soviet Press, vol.45, no.48 (1993), p.20. 336 Zharmukhamed Zardykhan, “Russians in Kazakhstan and Demographic Change: Imperial Legacy and the Kazakh Way of Nation Building,” Asian Ethnicity, vol.5, no.1 (2004), p. 75.

175 Uzbekistan are rapidly acquiring a native face. The departure of Russian speakers is seen by certain native strata as freeing up more jobs and causing a glut in the housing market. By current estimates, about 40-50 percent of Kazaks and 65-70 percent of Uzbeks are urban residents.337 Regardless, it is obvious to Kazaks or

Uzbeks that time and demography are ultimately on their side. No doubt, the

Korean diasporas were more uncomfortable with the situation compared with the

Ahıska Turks, since the majority of the former used to be the urbanites in the

Russian dominated cities.

Socio-cultural Kazakization/ Uzbekization

After independence, Kazak and Uzbek political and cultural elites began to reverse the socio-cultural, and particularly linguistic, Russification that occurred during the Soviet era. Non-titulars were told not only to hire indigenous over non- indigenes, but to study the titular languages (Kazak and Uzbek) or face unemployment.338 Naturally, for the Korean diaspora, who used to enjoy high social mobility with Russian language, it was a big challenge. Not surprisingly, the titular elites created under these conditions tended to be more nationalistic and

337 Conclusive data on the exact figure are unavailable. These estimates mentioned here are based on information provided in the press and during conversation with scholars. (2003, Almaty; 2005, Tashkent) 338 Jeff Chinn and Robert Kaiser, Russian as the New Minority: Ethnicity and Nationalism in the Soviet Successor States (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), p. 216.

176 exclusionary than in the past. However, there were some differences between

Kazakstan and Uzbekistan due to their demographic and historical dissimilarity.

Uzbekistan has been the most overtly anti-Russian of the Central Asian states in its toponymic overhaul, attempting to eliminate that language from public view as much as possible. Compared with Kazaks, Uzbeks were at the forefront of the struggle for independence because the depiction of Russia and Russians embedded in their identities were clear and negative. From their perspective, the Soviet Union was a new form of Russian imperialism. Thus, after independence, Uzbekistan selected a national security course that moved the country out of the Russian sphere of influence. However, in the case of Kazakstan, although the Soviet experience hardened the identities of some Kazak nationalists, most Kazaks did not embrace anti-Russian conceptions of national identity. The difference between Uzbekistan and Kazakstan is that the identities of many Kazaks were more Russified than those of Uzbeks. From the point of view of linguistic reform, Uzbekistan is unique in that neither its constitution nor its revised language law make any special provision for the Russian language, either as an official language or as the language of inter- ethnic communication.339 By contrast, in Kazakstan, where non-titulars account

339 Uzbekistan’s language law, adopted in December 1995 removed Russian’s normative status as the language of inter-ethnic communication in the state.

177 for a greater share of the population, the trend since 1995 has been to upgrade the status of Russian by protecting it as an official language in the new constitution.340

In Kazakstan, Russian is still the de facto lingua franca in all spheres of public life.

Throughout the fieldwork (interviews, participation, observation etc.) we have witnessed little convincing evidence of an antipathy toward the Russian language and culture among Kazaks, especially in the urban stratum of Kazaks. This makes relatively comfortable circumstances for the Korean diaspora who used to be in the

Russian mainstream society during the Soviet era. As a result, many Korean diasporas in Central Asia prefer Kazakstan for their resettlement. Many Korean diasporas in Uzbekistan showed their willingness to move to Kazakstan if they have sufficient means to move and settle.341 Yet, participation in some professions strictly requires knowledge of the Kazak language and, as consequence, excludes from these professions those who do not know it.342 Under the Kazak constitution, those who do not know Kazak language cannot serve in official posts after 2010.343

Compared with the Ahıska Turks, the Korean diasporas, who used to be the good

340 Annette Bohr, “Language Policy and Ethnic Relations in Uzbekistan,” in Graham Smith, Edward Allworth, Vivien Law, Andrew Wilson, and Annette Bohr (eds.), Nation-building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands. The Politics of National Identities (Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp.200-201. 341 Also, booming Kazakstan’s economy is the important reason. Compared with the stagnant Uzbekistan’s economy Kazakstan economy is developing very fast creating lots of job opportunity. 342 Sagyndyk Mendibayev, “Russkiy vopros i Nazarbayev,” Tsentral’noaziatkiy Byulleten (29 May 2000) 343 Martha Brill Olcott, Central Asia’s New State: Independence, Foreign Policy and Regional Security (Washington D.C.: United States Institute for Peace Press, 1996), p.62.

178 social climbers and who enjoyed certain social advancements during the previous regime, were more influenced directly by the nationalizing measures.

Of all the nationalizing tendencies of cultural standardization, the goal of creating a national language within such a shared spatial frame is the most important for Kazakstan and Uzbekistan. Thus the institutionalization and promotion of the titular language (in the state bureaucracy, politics, and education) is at one level bound up with reversing the one-time colonial policy of asymmetric bilingualism. If Russophones want to become part of the newly independent titular state, then they have little choice but to learn their titular language. For titulars, the titular language (Uzbek and Kazak) was viewed as an instrument to give their children an edge over others, Russians and other Russophone population (e.g.,

Korean diasporas), competing for elite position in their republic. For the non-titulars, titular language policy (i.e. Kazak or Uzbek language) presented a major problem for their social mobility. Such language policy was one of the key instruments of nation building, serving as powerful means of Kazakization or Uzbekization and a way to reduce the number of non-titulars in the state administrative structure.344

As has already been noted, the indigenization of the public sector is often

344 As seen through out the history, one could also see the Korean diasporas’ rapid management to the issue. Almost all the Korean language centers in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan are offering the titular (Kazak or Uzbek) language courses together with the Korean language program.

179 carried out using covert nationalizing methods, such as the practice of issuing official instructions concerning the hiring, firing and promotion of personnel. And titular governments (the Uzbek and the Kazak) used the knowledge of the state language concerning the advancement and hiring of employees. The knowledge of the titular language (Kazak or Uzbek) was effectively employed to squeeze out non- titular nationals from leading positions thus making room for members of the titular nationality. Certainly, it was the main device for the re-distributing political and socio-economic power to titulars. What is more, such preferential treatment to the titular nation was fully legitimatized in the eyes of most titular nationals. In substance, the notorious “fifth article” in the Soviet internal passports, which was the most eminent manifestation of the institutionalization of nationality that would play a role in hindering a citizen’s chance of gaining employment or admission to institutes of higher learning, was to succeed in Uzbekistan and Kazakstan. The

“fifth article” was stealthily restored in Uzbekistan and Kazakstan in order to secure their political and cultural resurgence during their nation-building processes. The governments of Kazakstan and Uzbekistan have found innovative ways to keep the

‘fifth article’ as an ethnic marker in the new passports by denoting ethnic nationality in native language or Russian on the first page for the internal consumption, but on

180 the second page, which is written in English for external consumption, omits all references to ethnicity. Instead, it only indicates citizenship. It is probable that by doing so, they could avoid potential accusation of ethnocratic behavior from abroad.

Viktor, an ethnic Russian in Kazakstan, said that in order for a Russian (or

Russian speakers in general) to be admitted to any major vuz345 in Almaty, he either had to be exceptionally brilliant, or take a recourse to blat346: only blat can overrule nationality, he asserted. These responses confirm that the mechanism through which native preferences are executed is an informal one, pervasive, yet difficult to document.347 On the other hand, most Kazaks believe that it is “natural” for the titular nationality to give a preferred access to jobs and education; in fact a large number of them deny that they enjoy special favors and instead highlight the

“minority” status of Kazaks in their own country. In a survey on interethnic relations in Kazakstan, over 62 percent of the Russians and 64 percent of the other non-titular ethnic groups reported a large increase in the number of the natives in

345 Soviet institutions of higher learning (vysshie uchebnye zavedeniia--VUZy) included universities and institutes. 346 Blat (Russian: блат) is a term which appeared in the Soviet Union to denote the use of informal agreements, Party contacts, or black market deals to achieve results or get ahead. 347 When I asked the non-titulars (e.g., Korean and Ahıska Turkish diasporas, Russians, Germans) to give concrete illustrations of how the preferential treatment worked, the frequent response were that it was the head (nachal’nik, increasingly of the Kazak or Uzbek nationality) who decided who should be recruited and who should be fired. “You cannot prove all this,” and “we do not have a lawful structure (u nas niet pravovogo obshhchestva) or any civilized norms” were frequent responses on the part of the non-titular nationalities.

181 their neighborhood.348 On the other hand, only 31 percent of the Kazaks noticed any pronounced change in the ethnic profile of their work or residential environment.349 Moreover, less than a third of the Kazak respondents felt that the natives do not have an adequate share in the leadership positions, whereas over two thirds of the Russians expressed their concerns over the nationalization of the top positions.350

Contrary to common wisdom, the most crucial obstacle to such language revival is not posed by the sway of Russian speakers. Interestingly, language revival is constrained by the fact that vast majority of the best educated and qualified stratum of Kazaks or Uzbeks are primarily Russian speakers, reared in a

Russophone Soviet culture. They are not at ease with the nationalizing policies of the state which seek to foster a total correspondence between ethnicity and language repertoire. The complexities of language revival are most clear in the urban areas of

Kazakstan and Uzbekistan where Russian is the dominant language still spoken, even among titulars. So in case of Kazakstan, there is a portion of Russian-speaking

Kazaks who are uncertain about tendencies toward an all Kazak language movement, as pointed out by Bhavna Dave: “The commonly-held assumption of a

348 Nursultan Masanov, “Ethnopoliticheskii monitoring,” Ethnopoliticheskii monitoring v Kazakhstane (Almaty: Edition 1, ARKOR, Fall, 1995), p.3. 349 Ibid. 350 Ibid.

182 salient and natural ethnic divide between Russians and Kazak is misleading; it downplays or even ignores internal differences and contradictions within the national revival movement.”351 An important notion here is that mankurtizatsiia, which is a term often used to convey a sense of rootlessness and cultural amnesia among the Sovietized and Russified strata of non-Russian nationalities. Hence, nationalists and pure Kazak speakers from time to time employ the term ‘mankurt’, a term of disapproval, against their urban brethren, chastising them for abandoning their native language and ancestral knowledge to imbibe Russian language and culture.352 In their perception, mankurtizatsiia is a distinct, if regrettable, trait of urban Kazaks. As the Kazak scholar Nurbulat Masanov argues, “the main cleavage in Kazakstan is not between Kazaks and Russians: rather it is between urban

Kazaks and those Kazaks new to the cities or still in rural areas.”353 The hostility against the Russian language and culture displayed by the migrants, arriving from the ethnically homogeneous aul to the urban areas, is directed not just against the

Russians, but extends toward the Russian-speaking cosmopolitan Kazaks as well.

The extensive structure of titular preferences and the shrinking share of Russians

351 Bhavna Dave, “Language Revival in Kazakhstan: Language Shift and Identity Change,” Post-Soviet Affairs, vol.12, no.1 (1996), p. 52. 352 Ibid. 353 Nursultan Masanov, “Perceptions of Ethnic and All-National identity in Kazakhstan,” in Middle East Series, no.51, The Nationalities Question in Post-Soviet Kazakhstan (International Eurasian Institute for Economic and Political Research, 2002), pp. 14-15.

183 and other ethnic groups in the state organs suggest that the competition for this positions and resources within the state sector will acquire an intra-ethnic dimension.354 Even the findings during the fieldwork in Kazakstan suggest that serious constraints to the implementation of Kazak as the state language are posed by Russian-speaking Kazaks and their Russified offspings, rather than the non- titular Russian-speaking population. In this environment, Russian speakers (e.g.

Korean diasporas) are unlikely to turn to learning Kazak until a fundamental restructuring of the language among Kazak takes place. On the contrary, although there were relatively small portions of Russified Uzbek elites in the socio-political arena, the majority of the Uzbeks have traditionally lived relatively isolated from

Russian communities. As a result, Uzbekistan has a more titular oriented society with more homogenized consensus. Accordingly, compared with the Koreans in

Kazakstan, the author could find more Korean diasporas who were versed in Uzbek language or have willingness to learn the titular language in Uzbekistan. A Korean diaspora who thinks he has historical roots in Kazakstan claims that he would have mastered Kazak language long time ago, if only there were a need to know it.355

The necessity to learn Kazak language was not sufficient for non-Kazak people

354 Bhavna Dave, p. 57. 355 Interveiw with a Soviet Korean, Elena Pak, a 40 years old mathamatic teacher, Almaty, Kazakstan, 2003.

184 living in Kazakstan. In addition, as mentioned earlier, higher birthrates amongst the indigenous population, coupled with the migration of part of the non-titular population, will leave only a relatively small Russophone minority in Uzbekistan, virtually guaranteeing that linguistic Uzbekization will proceed of its accord.

Even in Kazakstan, the switch from Russian is considered irreversible because a critical mass of potential speakers of Kazak exists in the large youthful population in the country, especially in the rural, Kazak-speaking regions. Of course, a shift away from Russian to one’s titular language can hardly take place quickly; it typically requires a generational change. Perhaps, for Uzbekistan or Kazakstan five or ten years phase is too short a time to assess the success of language revival, because language shifts are discernible only in intergenerational terms.

Although its hegemony has dwindled, Russian is too deeply rooted in

Kazakstan and Uzbekistan to be forgotten in a matter of generations. The Russian language is still a widespread mode of communication in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan

(especially in Kazakstan). Perhaps, it may find ways to become more incorporated into a political identity in which it now finds itself underrepresented. Finally, the free-marketization of the economy and the continuation of strong economic ties to

Russia mean that identities of many Russified-titulars and other Russophone

185 population (the Korean diasporas in our cases) will likely remain Russified to some extent. To quote from Olzhas Suleymanov, a former leader of Kazakstan’s People

Congress, “Practically every Kazak speaks Russian. Why and to what purpose should we reject Russian language, which give us definite advantages in the sphere of culture and international relations?” 356 Gaining proficiency in one’s own forgotten native language, without abandoning Russian, and learning English actively to catch up with the global trend is the strategy that seems to be the most dominant among upwardly mobile strata in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan. In other words, more and more individuals are responding to the state’s attempt at reversing the language shift by taking strides toward multilingualism, rather than simply going back to a primordial attachment.357 In this environment, it is less appealing to the Korean diaspora, or to other diasporas especially the Russophone minorities, to learn the titular language earnestly. In any case, in the interim, the nationalist titular’s goals are to break out of the regional hegemonic arrangement of Russia and its culture. No matter how much social, cultural and inter-ethnic conditions favor

356 “Suleymanov views on Ethnic Russian Issues,” Foreign Broadcast Information Services (FBIS), June 28, 1994. 357 During a private dinner with a Uzbek politician’s family with the author, his teenage kids and other family members were eager to speak English with the author and Russian with the author’s local South Korean friend. The Uzbek politician seemed to be happier when his kids could speak Russian and English fluently with his guests rather than speaking Uzbek with them. It seems that such attitudes were typical phenomenon among titular elites or titular upwardly strata who already have a relative advantage in the usage of their titular (native) language compare to non-titulars.

186 bilingualism, current conditions at the level of the ruling elites advance an ethno- national conception of statehood.

Political Kazakization and Uzbekization

As was shown earlier, many of the characteristics of the Soviet system still exist in Uzbek and Kazak elite behavior. In Kazakstan and Uzbekistan, political elites from the old Soviet system have succeeded in keeping the nationalistic opposition from developing into a viable political force. Political resources are still concentrated at the top in the position of the president. There is no dispersal of political power from central authorities to the outside groups. The most obvious is the disappearance of a state ideology, and a strong centralized party. The strategy of each president (Kazakstan and Uzbekistan) has been to establish strong executive control over policymaking and over the mechanisms of executive accountability. In these circumstances, it is the president who is guiding the transition in Uzbekistan and

Kazakstan, and who will decide the outcome. The parliament appears to be a mere extension of the president rather than a check on his power.358 The parliament has become an appendage to the president as has the judiciary, which is now subjected to

358 Martha Brill Olcott, “Central Asia’s Political Crisis,” in Dale F. Eickelman (ed.), Russia’s Muslim Frontiers (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1993), p. 179.

187 presidential appointment and under the supervision of the president’s office.

A fear of instability arising from political and economical liberalization was the explanation used by these leaders when they defend their patterns of rule.

Each of the two presidents has stability and economic recovery as his top priorities. To put it briefly, preservation of ethnic harmony, reform of the economy, and social stability are Karimov’s and Nazarbaev’s common goals and they believe that these goals can be achieved through their being the indisputable authority in every area of Uzbekistan’s and Kazakstan’s political life. Because of the difficulty in initiating the economic program while maintaining stability, political liberation may be seen as far off in Uzbekistan and Kazakstan. Democratization is also perceived as linked to political instability. In such conditions, political stability appears to be equated with the harsh repression of opposing organizations. In a nutshell, the fears of instability are being exploited by the leaders to justify oppressive policies (e.g., Karimov and his use of Islam is one example). Interestingly, the authoritarian leaderships of Karimov and Nazarbayev were welcomed by many Korean and Ahıska

Turkish diaspora communities. Many members of these diasporas feared that the changing leadership might bring a more nationalistic regime than the present one.

188 A similar trend was found among Russians in Central Asia after independence. Russians in Central Asia were much less likely to favor political change compared with Russians in the Russian Federation. In 1992, of Russians living in Russia, 52 percent desire political change, while only 32 percent of

Russians in Uzbekistan, and 36 percent in Kazakstan wanted change.359 A possible explanation could be that Russians, including Russophone populations, were afraid of what political change might mean to their status in Central Asia.

As Olcott has noted, Russians in Kazakstan are aware that “any successor of

Nazarbayev is likely to be more Kazakh, and thus less sympathetic to their concerns.”360 Thus, this helps to make Nazarbayev’s position appear to be stable, despite the Russian and Russophones’ misgivings. Likewise, in 1995, when asked which political system would best promote the resolution of their country’s problems “half of all respondents in Uzbekistan and almost two-thirds of Kazakstani respondents supported any system as long as there was order.”361

Such a view was also dominant among the Ahıska Turkish and Korean diasporas.

The major concern of respondents was maintaining order in their states rather

359 Ada W. Finifter and Ellen Mickiewicz, “Redefining the Political System of the USSR: Mass support of Political change,” American Political Science Review, vol.86, no.4 (1992), p.863. 360 Martha Brill Olcott, “ Post-Soviets Kazakhstan: The Demographics of Ethnic Politics,” Problems of Post Communism, vol.42, no.2 (1995), p. 28. 361 Nancy Lubin, “Views of Leadership in Uzbekistan and Kazakstan,” in Timothy J. Colton and Robert C. Tucker (eds.), Patterns in Post-Soviet Leadership (Bolder: Westview Press, 1995), pp.218-219.

189 than acquiring democratic freedoms. Many Korean and Ahıska Turkish diaspora expressed concern about ethnic tension rising from any political change. The most serious challenge facing the two countries was seen to be the need to

“strengthen social order and discipline.”362 In Kazakstan fewer than 40 percent of the respondents and in Uzbekistan 47 percent of them believed that securing a free press and the right to free speech were essential.363 This meant that more than one-third of the respondents in both countries believed that these democratic rights were not important, and around two percent in Uzbekistan and four percent in Kazakstan said that these rights were not even desirable.364

Overall, the data suggest that the notion of democracy is only an ideal to the people of Kazakstan and Uzbekistan.365 Unfortunately, many basic democratic values were poorly understood in these two countries. Maintenance of order and stability were more important than political freedoms. (See Figure I and II below) This helps to explain the continued support for leaders who were formerly members of the Communist Party, and who maintain a centralized hold on political power.366

362 Ibid., p.222. 363 Ibid., p.219. 364 Ibid. 365 Ibid. 366 In general, most of the current political, economical, and religious elites were subordinated to Karimov and Nazarbayev in Uzbekistan and Kazakstan. These elites have no reason to support other groups, such as ultra-

190 Figure I Best Political System for Kazakstan

2.2 4.5 2.6 5.7 3 2.2

17.2 62.4

No Answer(2.2%) Don’t Know(4.5%) Communism(2.6%) Socialism(5.7%) Capitalism(3.0%) Islamic State(2.2%) Western Democracy(17.2%) Anything that brings order(62.4)

Source: Nancy Lubin, “Views of Leadership in Uzbekistan and Kazakstan,” in Timothy J. Colton and Robert C. Tucker (eds.), Patterns in Post-Soviet Leadership (Bolder: Westview Press, 1995), pp.218.

Figure II Best Political System for Uzbekistan

2.2 7.9 2.6

11.8

50.4 3.6

10.2

11.5

No Answer(2.2%) Don’t Know(7.9%) Communism(2.6%) Socialism(11.8%) Capitalism(3.6%) Islamic State(10.2%) Western Democracy(11.5%) Anything that brings order(50.4)

Source: Nancy Lubin, ibid., p.219.

nationalists etc., as they owed their license to operate to the Karimov and Nazarbayev regime. For instance, revolution might very well be personally costly to them.

191 Kazak clan favoritism and other forms of nepotism have determined not only the republic’s economic life but also the social and political composition of its state structure. In the first years after independence, some 80 percent of

Nazarbayev’s administrative appointees, including regional governors, were ethnic

Kazaks.367 With most of the republic’s key posts given to Kazaks, administrative appointments, as often noted, do not reflect the ethnic composition of society.

Boris Giller and Viktor Shatskikh documented the disproportionately highly titular representation in key government positions. The ratio of titular and non-titular groups in key position is shown in Table XIV:

Table XIV Titular and Non-titular Share in Key Government Positions at the Center and in Oblasts in 1993-94

Titular Non-titular Position at the Center Presidential apparatus 6 1 Deputy Prime Ministers 6 1 Education 6 1 Finance 5 3 Transport 4 2 Information and Press 4 1 Economy 7 1 Justice 4 1

367 Martha Brill Olcott, “Post-Soviets Kazakhstan: The Demographics of Ethnic Politics,” Problems of Post Communism, vol.42, no.2 (1995), p. 25.

192 State TV and Radio Committee 5 0 Oblasts Karaganda 6 2 Pavlodar 6 3 Turgai 6 3 Southern Kazakstan 8 1 Atyrau 7 1 Almaty 9 2 Source: Boris Giller and Viktor Shatskikh, “Oredelenie berege: russkoiazychnyie v Kazakhstane,” Karavan (12 December 1993)

As the figures reveal, the titular nationals’ share is disproportionately high in regions with a large Russian speaking population, such as Pavlodar, Karaganda or

Almaty. The non-titular share in Kazak dominated southern oblasts is nominal. The

Kazaks appointed by the center often had no ties to local Russian (or other

Russophone) communities, thus widening the rift between non-titulars and Kazaks and between northern periphery and central authorities in Almaty.

Kazaks held 64.2 percent of all jobs in the various government departments in 1994, whereas 21 percent were held by the Russophone population.368 In the following year, the Kazak share had increased to 81.4 percent, while the

Russophone share had fallen to 14 percent.369 Although Russians and other non- titulars express concerns and anxieties at the rate at which the ethnic composition of

368 Moskovskii Komsomlets (24, August 1995) cited in Bhavna Dave, “Language Revival in Kazakhstan: Language Shift and Identity Change,” Post-Soviet Affairs, vol.12, no.1 (1996), p .58. 369 Ibid.

193 the government, administrative offices, educational establishments and even residential areas is undergoing a change, many Kazaks consider these changes to be natural.

A clear example of the politicization of Kazak identity in motion was the

March 7, 1994 parliament election in which, of 177 parliamentary seats, 42 were appointed by Nazarbayev, not by election. In addition, although over 700 candidates applied for the remaining 135 seats, the Kazak electoral commission disallowed 200 of these candidates on the basis that they tended to represent Russian nationalist interests.370 In the end, Kazaks filled 60 percent of the parliamentary seats, other non-titulars a mere 32 percent, virtually guaranteeing Nazarbayev concentric circles of power.371 The share of Kazaks increased further in the new parliament elected in

December 1995. Among the 38 elected members of the Kazakstans’s Senate

(upper house) 26 were Kazaks. In the 67 member Majlis (lower house) there were

42 Kazaks, 19 Russians, with the remainder belonging to other ethnic groups (one

Korean diaspora member included).372 In Nazarbayev’s effort to increase native control, he has also sought a selective co-optation of Russians and member of other

370 Jeff Chinn and Robert Kaiser, Russian as the New Minority: Ethnicity and Nationalism in the Soviet Successor States (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), pp. 269-270. 371 Ibid. 372 Bhavna Dave, “A New Parliament Consolidates Presidential Authority,” Transition, vol.22, no.6 (1996), p. 37.

194 nationalities. However, few local Russians or non-titulars regarded the presence of their ethnic counterparts in government as a factor facilitating their welfare. The biased procedure in the selection and elimination of parliamentary candidates to guarantee the Kazak domination of the political process left non-titulars with little stake in the political system.

If Kazakstan was in such a situation, needless to say, in the ethno- linguistically more homogeneous and culturally more traditional Uzbekistan, there has been an even stronger processes of indigenization and nationalization. Uzbeks dominate elite structures in the republic: the party and administrative structures, the intellectual and cultural sectors, as well as the informal economic and religious sectors.373 Russians and other non-titulars occupy a small portion of the technical and scientific elite structures. So long as they played a role in political structure, non-natives were hand-in-glove with whatever patterns of corruption that existed.374

Clan politics defined the game in Uzbekistan: anyone who contended for power had to play accordingly. Karimov has been successful at this power game and oppressed all opposition as he was a relative outsider brought in by Moscow as a compromise after the devastation of the cotton purges. Much to everyone’s surprise,

373 Donald S. Carlisle, “Islam Karimov and Uzbekistan: Back to the Future,” in Timothy J. Colton and Robert C. Tucker (eds.), Patterns in Post-Soviet Leadership (Boulder: Westview Press Inc., 1995), p. 140. 374 Jason Strakes, “Tools of Political management in the New Central Asian Republics,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, vol.26, no.1 (2006), pp.94-95.

195 Karimov played the role of a powerbroker among the weakened and relatively disorganized clans until he had secured himself an unassailable position. He took advantage of the clans’ disarray to make himself necessary to all, a compromise leader who balanced clan interests. The clan leaders thought they could control him, but he played them against each other, won supporters in the various clans and made himself necessary. Throughout all this time, Karimov has remained the dominant leader of the country. While stating that Uzbekistan must develop a pluralist society, he has also expressed doubts regarding the appropriateness of pluralism in this stage of Uzbekistan’s development.375 Cementing and expanding personal dominance is considered by Karimov to be an essential prerequisite to all other objectives.376 In sum, the competition for power in Uzbekistan did not take place in the streets, but in a private dance among Uzbek leaders of the relevant clans.377 Hence, there was no room for non-titulars to participate in the socio- political arena.

The Uzbek government is characterized by the concentration of power in the hands of the president and the office of the president. Instead of having a

375 Donald S. Carlisle, “Islam Karimov and Uzbekistan: Back to the Future,” in Timothy J. Colton and Robert C. Tucker (eds.), Patterns in Post-Soviet Leadership (Boulder: Westview Press Inc., 1995), p. 197. 376 Ibid. 377 Willliam Fierman, “Political Development in Uzbekistan: Democratization?,” in Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrot (eds.), Conflict, Cleavage, and Change in Central Asia and the Caucasus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 365-366.

196 separation of powers between branches of government there is a monopolization of power by the executive organs with the legislative and judicial branches, which are, in effect, subordinate to the former. Governors at the oblast and raion levels are appointed directly by the president. To be sure there has been little place for non- titulars here. In addition, at the local level, Karimov utilized and strengthened the mahalle (quarter-hood), presumably as they were viewed to be useful tools for state penetration into local affairs. Karimov viewed the mahalle as a potential dual- faced institution, serving both as means for both gathering information on society, and for projecting state policy to local levels.378 The mahalle has been the basic unit in traditional Uzbeks public life. It is headed by a group of elder men, the aksakals, who generally were of the upper classes. Consequently, it automatically excluded non-titulars who were outside of such a socio-political body. Even though mahalles became a hybrid of old and new structure, which came to play a central role as local building blocks of power, non-titulars remained only as bystanders.

Another discriminative nationalizing measure is the law on citizenship which provided a further cause for non-titulars to perceive inequity in independent

Kazakistan and Uzbekistan. The citizenship law adopted a “zero option” approach

378 Demian Vaisman, “Regionalism and Clan Loyalty in the Political life of Uzbekistan,” in Yaacov Ro’I (ed.), Muslim Eurasia: Conflicting Legacies (London: Frank Cass, 1995), p.106.

197 which automatically conferred citizenship on all permanent residents of Kazakstan and Uzbekistan at the time of the law went into effect. However, they added an article which allowed dual citizenship to their titular compatriots who are citizens of a foreign state.379 Kazaks and Uzbeks wishing to come back were given automatic citizenship and they could also retain their dual citizenship if permitted by the other country. To be sure, the option of dual citizenship was not extended to non-titular groups. The leaderships of Uzbekistan and Kazakstan have rejected the dual citizenship of non-titular groups in their states, arguing that it would result in divided loyalties among their respective Russophone population. President Karimov has stated that “Dual citizenship is impermissible.” He asks, “Why should some nationalities be protected by two laws and have a reserve airport, and how can you demand love, selflessness and self-sacrifice for the motherland from a person with two citizenship?”380 But what about titulars, perhaps Russified titulars, who have dual citizenship? Coupled with the law on immigration of compatriots which provided financial support for titulars returning to Kazakstan and Uzbekistan, the citizenship law resulted in an estimated several hundred thousands titulars returning home.

379 “Kazakstan, Law on Citizenship,” FBIS (Foreign Broadcast Information Service)-USR, no.54 (May 5 1992), pp.66-72.; “Uzbekistan, Republic Law on Citizenship,” FBIS-USR, no.121 (September 24, 1992), pp.178-184. 380 Aleksei Arapov and Iakov Umanskii, “Tsentral’naia Aziia i Rossiia: Vyzovy i otvety,” Svvbodnaia mysl, no.5 (1995), p.77.

198 As nationalizing regimes, Kazakstan and Uzbekistan have accorded a higher status to their respective titular nations, which remain sharply distinguished from the citizenry of the state as a whole. They have legitimized the adoption of policies and practices that aim to promote the specific interests of Uzbeks and

Kazaks. Titulars’ covert and overt nationalizing activities provided a strong indication that titulars (Kazaks or Uzbeks) were “first among equals.” Its been more than a decade since their nationalizing process. However, it seems likely that in the coming years, Kazakstan and Uzbekistan will continue to implement elaborate policies promoting the revival and domination of the Kazak or the Uzbek identity in many aspects of economic, political and cultural life. Like language revival, their nationalizing activities require a generational change. It can hardly take place in short order. Nonetheless, it is obvious to Kazaks and Uzbeks that time and demography are ultimately on their side. In the meantime, the current negative birthrate among the non-titulars (especially amongst the Russophone nationalities,

Russians, Koreans, Germans, etc.) in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan could bring more favorable outcomes to the titular state. In 1993, considering the Soviet legacy and the past, Kuttykadam argued in the newspaper, “We cannot, say like Turkey, declare all our inhabitants as Kazaks.” 381 However, considering the last decade’s

381 Seidakhmet Kuttykadam, “Sladkii veter svobody,” Kazakhstanskaia Pravda (May 4, 1993)

199 indigenization development it seems feasible in the near future to make a declaration similar to that of Turkey. To be sure, such a stand would have critical implications for the Korean and Ahıska Turkish diasporas in the region for their survival. They need to reset and reorganize their diaspora organizations accordingly if they do not want to remain as unacknowledged diasporas in each republic.

Recently, many members of the Korean diaspora are willing to embrace a “second among equals” status and adapt to the new reality of a titular dominated Kazakstan and Uzbekistan. On the other hand, the Ahıska Turks, having not forgotten the

Fergana events382, have usually preferred to play a lower profile in terms of national activities in the new republics. Such different adaptation patterns of the two diasporas in the Kazakstan and Uzbekistan will be elaborated in the next chapter.

382 Numerous Ahıska Turks were massacred by the Uzbeks in the 1989 ethnic conflicts in Uzbekistan.

200

CHAPTER V

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE DIASPORA NATIONALISM

IN THE KOREAN AND AHISKA TURKISH DIASPORAS

Throughout the Soviet period, the Koreans and Ahıska Turks, and perhaps all peoples of the Soviet Union, were subjugated to great losses in the realm of national culture. Under Soviet ideology and a policy encouraging the “merging of nationalities” they were forced to downplay their national specificities and culture.

After the deportation, the Korean diasporas developed a modus vivendi of adaptation to the harsh circumstances of life in exile and consequent integration into a Russian/Russified society in a relatively short period of time. From a practically all-agrarian population, they were transformed into a well-educated urbanized community but all in Russian. Many Soviet Koreans, especially intellectuals, argue that they had no choice but to move in step with the changing environment and to

201 focus their energies on securing a stable socio-economic base. The Korean diaspora adopted a lifestyle that was thoroughly pro-system and assimilative. Thus, before perestroika, as German Kim and Valeriy Khan note, the Koreans in the Soviet

Union barely had the opportunity to get their bearings.383 In other words, the Soviet

Koreans didn’t pay much attention to issues like a Korean national revival, returning to their homeland and other series of movements for cultural and identity preservation. Despite the Soviet Koreans’ remarkable economic and educational advancement since their deportation, their excessive assimilation raised the question of the long-term survivability of their culture and identity. Indeed, most of the [ex-

]Soviet Koreans did lose the Korean language as their mother tongue or do not speak of at all. Not only among the educated children who moved into the cities and studied in the universities, but also among the farmers whose collectives were absorbed into the giant multi-ethnic sovkhozes or kolkhozes of Kazakstan and

Uzbekistan, assimilation has separated Koreans from their cultural and ethnic roots.

On the other hand, the Ahıska Turks engaged themselves more in preserving their identity and culture during the Soviet period. Since the end of the 1950s, the

Ahıska Turks formed an underground organization named “Homeland Society”

383 German Kim and Valeriy Khan, “The Korean Movement in Kazakstan: Ten years later,” Korean and Korean American Studies Bulletin, vol.12, no.2/3 (2001), p.114.

202 (Vatan Cemiyeti) and engaged themselves in a struggle for repatriation and rehabilitation. This was the only organization leading the Ahıska Turkish movement during the Soviet regime. Despite the harsh assimilationist policies of the

Soviet authorities during the 1960s and 1970s the Ahıska Turks preserved their identity and culture. Although the Soviet authorities imprisoned and arrested many members of the Ahıska Turkish movement, the Ahıska Turks actively continued to demand their relocation to their homelands and staunchly proclaimed their

Turkishness.384 While many Soviet Koreans urged their children to speak Russian and educated them in a Russian atmosphere for their social advancement and economically well-being, many Ahıska Turks mentioned that they were primarily concerned with teaching their children the importance of their own tradition, traditional values, religion and language.385 As mentioned in the earlier chapter, the

Ahıska Turks have, in a way, used their language to identify themselves and have also used it as a tool against assimilation. Yavuz Zeybek argues that language is one of the most important elements for the formation of identities for the Turks.386

Regardless, the Ahıska Turks passionately preserved their own language which

384 Ahıska Turks’ organization Homeland Society’s main goal has been to work for the return of the Ahıska Turks to their homeland. 385 Interview with Ahıska Turks and Korean diasporas in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan, 2003, 2005. 386 Yavuz Zeybek, “Turkish Television to Central Asia: Perception of Turkish Avrasya Television in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzhstan,” Unpublished Ph.D dissertation, The University of Oklahoma, 1996, p. 115.

203 fortified their ethnic consciousness and solidarity.

In accordance with the common Soviet practice, the nationality (ethnicity) of the citizens of the USSR were written in their passports and other official documents. Hence, automatically the Koreans couldn’t deny their nationality even if they wanted so. Of course, this did not mean that they tried to hide their ethnicity.

When asked about their nationality they all answered that they are Koreans. It was not only they who called themselves Koreans, but other people labeled them as

Koreans too. At present, the level of self-esteem and ethnic identity among Koreans is very high. It might be the paradox in history, however, for the Soviet Koreans, the

Soviet internal passport system was an obstacle for their merging fully into the

Russified society, since their children also inherited the ethnicity of their parents regardless of their Russified identity. As a result, even for the Koreans who adopted the Russian language and culture and lost their language and culture in the process, they could not change their ethnicity to Russian. This created a barrier for the full assimilation of the deported Koreans into Russian society, and lead them instead, to integrate into the Russian society while maintaining their ethnic distinctiveness. On the contrary, the situation of the Ahıska Turks was different from the beginning. As mentioned earlier, even before the deportation, many Ahıska Turks could not

204 designate themselves as a “Turk” or an “Ahıska Turk.” Most of the Ahıska Turks in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan had to register as Azerbaijanis, Uzbeks or Kazaks. For this reason, many Ahıska Turks’ nationality was written in their passports variedly.

However, regardless of what was written in their passports, they knew themselves as Turks. Consequently, the Ahıska Turks had to fight for the basic right to call themselves Turks or Ahıska Turks. The strong assimilation policy of the Soviets to remove Turks from their ethnic identity stimulated the Ahıska Turks to stick to their ethnicity and collectivity more firmly. As one interviewee said, “We always tried to keep our language,” since she thought it was the critical mark of resistance to the regime in which the nomination “Turk” was a pejorative term.387 Thus, unlike the

Koreans who automatically acquired their ethnic designation and did not worry about its essence, Ahıska Turks had to engage in struggling to preserve their ethnic identification. Besides, the Soviet Koreans were deported from the Russian

Far East, i.e., not their homeland per se but an alien territory, where they had fled from their homeland due to the Japanese occupation. On the other hand, the Ahıska

Turks considered themselves descendents of the Ottoman Empire and as members of the dominant power in the region, thus boasting a strong ethnic pride and identity.

There is one thing that the author would like to point out about the

387 Personal interview with an Ahıska Turkish woman in Chimkent, Kazakstan, 2003.

205 Koreans’ peculiarity in terms of their Russified identity. Many scholars mentioned the exclusive ability of Koreans to adapt to the new economic and social conditions and pointed out this character as an evidence of assimilation into the Russian society. It is argued that their adaptation during a short time led to an acculturation process. However, this process did not really give way to assimilation. The Koreans strategy of adaptation was “integration” rather than assimilation. As mentioned in

Chapter II, integration implies some maintenance of the group’s cultural integrity as well as a move to become an integral part of the host-society.388 Although the terms

“integration” and “assimilation” may appear as synonyms in some literature, it should be stressed that the term integration as used here is clearly different from assimilation: while the maintenance of the cultural and ethnic identity is sought in the former case, in the later there is little or no interest in such continuity. Although, there was not political mobilization or cultural association during the Soviet period, the Soviet Koreans preserved their traditional customs, values and cuisine. Like the

Ahıska Turks and many other deported nationalities, the Soviet Koreans also mythologized the deportation and utilized its memory in preserving their ethnicity.

The sufferings of deportation facilitated the strengthening of ties among the

Koreans. Even a third generation half-blooded Soviet Korean said that his family

388 See Chapter II, Acculturation section, pp.58-62.

206 always ate Korean food as their way of maintaining Korean traditions.389 One could easily observe in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan that no matter how Russified a Korean might be, he proudly mentions that he eats Korean food. Thus, a national cuisine seems to have a great deal of significance in terms of their heritage culture. In addition, while they may not speak their mother tongue and may not always observe traditional celebrations, the Soviet Koreans always expressed feelings of kinship with fellow Koreans. Thus, it would not be correct to define the situation of the

Soviet Koreans as “assimilation” (rather than integration), since many of them still maintain and develop at least some ethnic distinctiveness. They simply had integrated very well into the mainstream population (Russian in this case) for their socio-economical well-being and advancement. To use Berry’s term, the Ahıska

Turks’ and the Koreans’ adaptation strategies were different, leading to different outcomes.390 Therefore, according to Berry’s categorization, the Ahıska Turks’ acculturation strategy fits into “separation” which implies that the original culture

(or ethnic identity) is maintained strongly and relationship with the host-society are not considered critical.391

389 Interview with a members of the Korean diaspora, Valentin Kim, businessman in his 40s, in Almaty, Kazakstan, 2003. 390 John Berry, “Acculturation and Psychological Adaptation: An Overview,” in Anne-Marie Bouvy, Fons van de Vijver, Pawel Boski, and Paul Schmitz (eds.), Journeys into Cross-Culture Psychology (Amsterdam: Swets & Zeitlinger, 1994), pp. 128-129. 391 See Chapter II, p.60.

207 In all events, perestroika and the subsequent breakup of the Soviet Union brought about radical changes in the life and consciousness of the Ahıska Turks and

Koreans in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan. Due to the dramatic changes in the economic, social, and political environment, both diasporas are in the process of reconstructing their national or diaspora identity in order to unify themselves. Moreover, they now have the chance to connect with co-ethnics from their respective homelands. After the

Koreans made contact with the homeland and other Korean diasporas around the world, they started to embrace a new conception of themselves (one which puts more emphasis on Koreanness) and change their (Soviet) identities. For the Ahıska Turks, it was a time to realize their long-cherished hope: immigration to Turkey which is perceived as their homeland. As one woman from Tashkent region told the author, about forty percent of the Ahıska Turks in her village left for Turkey from the beginning of the 1990s.392 For diaspora minorities, formation of the independent titular nations in

Central Asia was both a challenge and an opportunity to revive their ethnic identity and culture.

392 Interview with an Ahıska Turkish woman, Tashkent, Uzbekistan, 2005.

208 V.1. Diaspora Movement and the formation of the Diaspora Organizations.

For the Soviet Korean diaspora, the break up of the Soviet Union has provided an opportunity to find their own roots and culture. In the wake of these events, a Korean national revival began along with a series of other movements for cultural autonomy among Kazakstan and Uzbekistan’s multi-national population.

Many intellectuals have been attempting to revive a sense of Korean identity among the Soviet Koreans through language and cultural education. After years of forced silence, the Korean diaspora took the opportunity to lobby actively to develop their national customs, traditions, language and culture. This initial development of the

Korean movement was shaped primarily by academic intellectuals. These scholars played important and positive roles in the organization of Korean centers; the methods and contents of their activities and forging ties with homeland Korea.393

There are several reasons for the predominance of intellectuals on the sphere of social sciences in the leadership of Korean association. First, their ties to the party and its government organs gave them access to the power which was needed to resolve organizational questions related to the establishment of Korean cultural centers. In addition, these same ties allowed them to lobby on behalf of the Korean

393 En Un Kim, “Iz zhizni mezhdunarodnoi konferentsii koreiskikh assotsiatsii,” in F. Ran Kim (ed.), Aktual’nye problemy rossiiskogo vostokovedeniia (Moscow: 1994), p.45.

209 centers. Furthermore, their professional specialization and work experience in party organs meant that the professors were better grounded in the preparation of statutory documents, conceptualization of cultural centers, and management of organizational work. Finally, since these faculty members were all experienced in organic elements of the party-state system, their roles as the leaders of cultural centers was agreeable to the organs of power.394 Consequently, the Korean cultural associations in their early stages copied the working style of the Communist party and other Soviet organs.395 Later, these social associations became automatically accountable to the titular government organizations as well as dependent upon them.

A central concern of this Korean movement was the establishment of

Korean national organizations. Consequently, after the dissolution of the Soviet

Union, the Koreans in Uzbekistan and Kazakstan founded dozens of Korean cultural organizations on each oblast, city and regional level which served different populations of Koreans in different areas. They arose almost simultaneously in

Tashkent, Samarkand, Fergana, Almaty, Kyzl-orda, Chimkent and elsewhere where substantial numbers of Koreans lived. As German Kim and Valeriy Khan noted, other ethnic groups “look on us with astonishment as our Korean centers,

394 Interview with German Kim, Almaty, Kazakstan, 2003. 395 German Kim and Valeriy Khan, “The Korean Movement in Kazakstan: Ten years later,” Korean and Korean American Studies Bulletin, vol.12, no.2/3 (2001), p.125.

210 organizations and societies grew and multiplied like dormant seeds after rain.”396 In

March 1990, the Koreans in Central Asia gathered in Almaty Kazakstan and organized the First Annual Congress of the Koreans of Soviet Union. At this

Congress the Korean diasporas from each of the Central Asian republics, founded the Republican Association of Korean Cultural Centers. 397 In Kazakstan the organization was named “The Association of the Koreans in Kazakstan” and in

Uzbekistan it was christened “The Association of the Korean Cultural Centers in

Uzbekistan.” These organizations came to being upon the adoption by the [ex-

]Soviet republics of the law “on social groupings,” which gave the right to form ethnic organizations.398 All these associations placed emphasis on the revival of the

Korean language, customs, and tradition as their basic goals and missions. The awakening of ethnic consciousness took place against the background of these goals.

The goals of the Koreans societies coincided with generally accepted trends during this period. The leaders of the Korean organization in the 1990s studiously omitted any mention of goals in their statutory documentation that might complicate their relations with titular authorities. Consequently, Koreans did not regard themselves as subjects of political activity during the formative period of their new

396 Ibid., p.114. 397 German Kim and Eng Sob Sim, Isotriia Prosveshchennia Koreitsev Rossii I Kazakhstana. Vtoraia Polovina 19 v.-2000 g. (Almaty: Kazak Universiteti, 2000), pp. 22-23. 398 German Kim and Valeriy Khan, p.117.

211 organizations; their political consciousness had not yet been awakened.399 No doubt, these Soviet Korean leaders were very loyal to the ruling regime in their respective countries of residency. Therefore, the association’s ethnic agenda was primarily cultural rather than political. As of 2001, the Associations (in Uzbekistan and

Kazakstan) have come a long way toward fulfilling the goals set four years ago at the Third Congress. It has consolidated and unified all of the various Korean groups in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan. The ties between the center and the regions have been strengthened as well as the relationships between business people and the academic and cultural intelligentsia. To a certain extent, the Associations have awakened the ethnic consciousness of the Korean diaspora. Moreover, in recent years, they have helped to raise the professional and political profile of the Korean diaspora.

Looking closer at matters below the official level, many Korean intellectuals have increasingly become aware of their social and political rights. Since 1999, three members of the Association of Koreans in Kazakstan’s presidium have been actively participating in the activities of the Assembly of Peoples of Kazakstan, as members of the Council.400

Compared with the Korean diaspora, the Ahıska Turks have a long history

399 Valeriy Khan, “Koreiskaia Diaspora segodnia,” Koryo Ilbo, January 22, 1994. 400 Natsuko Oka, “The Korean Diaspora in Nationalizing Kazakhstan: Strategies for Survival as an ethnic minority,” Korean and Korean American Studies Bulletin, vol.12, no.2/3 (2001), p.89.

212 of ethnic organization. Until the end of 1980s, the Vatan society, as the only organization of the Ahıska Turks, led the Ahıska Turkish movement. Its leaders continuously fought against the Soviet authorities for their rehabilitation to the homeland and their rights to proclaim themselves as Turks. However, due to demographic dispersion and efforts of the Soviet authorities to control and disorganize the Ahıska Turks the movement was fragmented. Also there was the disagreement between the leaders in the organization. After the dissolution of the

Soviet Union, numerous other societies were founded by the Ahıska Turks residing in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan. A Central Association of the Ahıska Turks was founded in Almaty and Tashkent in 1991. These Associations presented a somewhat different perspective on the issues of importance to Ahıska Turks, though not departing significantly from the mainstream. One of the important points on their agenda is still obtaining permission and means to emigrate to Turkey, which they consider as their homeland. However, they are also concerned with the problems of the community still living in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan. The improvement of the

Ahıska Turks’ socio-economic conditions was central to the Association’s agenda.

Anyhow, compared with the Korean associations, they worked towards their rehabilitation to homeland. The Ahıska Turkish associations made close contact

213 with the Turkish embassy and prepared and submit the list of the Ahıska Turkish families willing to migrate to Turkey.401 During the interview with the leaders of the Associations in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan, they both said that their primary activities after the formation of the associations were emigration from the titular states to other places, if possible, to Turkey. 402 Within this framework, the associations made the necessary demands to the responsible authorities of titular states.

On the contrary, the Koreans did not make any demands to the titular authorities. And unlike many other diaspora minorities, such as Russians, Germans and Ahıska Turks, the Koreans did not leave Kazakstan and Uzbekistan in large numbers. This fact coincided with the Koreans Associations’ (in Uzbekistan and

Kazakstan) official stance. For example, the Association of the Koreans in

Kazakstan’s vice President Gurri Khan stated at a session of the Assembly of

Peoples of Kazakstan that they do not support the idea of Korean emigration from

Kazakstan. He said, “for us Kazakstan has become our motherland.”403 Hence, the

Korean Associations cooperated closely with the titular regime and tried to lobby

401 Ayşegül Aydıngün, “Rethinking Ethnic Identity Formation: The Case of the Ahıska (Meskhetian) Turks in Turkey and Kazakhstan,” Unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, 2001, p.138. 402 Interview with Tevfik Kurdaev, Almaty, 2003 and Ömer Salman, Tashkent, 2005. 403 Iurii Tskhai, et al., Assotsiatsiia Koreitsev Kazakhstana – 10 let (Almaty: Daik Press, 2000), p.136.

214 for their interest and representation.

However this was only the official stance of the Associations. Like the

Ahıska Turkish Associations, there was a lack of communication between the

Association and the community members. Many ordinary Koreans, who were at the periphery of the movement, residing in rural areas were not aware of such activities of the Associations. Actually many Koreans were like Ahıska Turks in their indifference towards politics. Many of them think that nothing will be changed by voting in elections. But they often expressed disappointment that, in contrast to the former Soviet Union, there are few Koreans in the executive or legislative bodies at the national level. Nevertheless, in official appearance the Koreans looked more loyal to the regime (even in the eyes of the titular bureaucrats.)404 Some Soviet

Koreans think that the Korean Association is too politically and business-oriented, although they concede that nothing can be done in the present political climate without money.

It seems this is resulting from the psychological perception of their ethnic identity. Many Ahıska Turks perceived their ethnic identity in a negative form. That is, the Ahıska Turks think that, as during the times of the Soviet Union, they

404 Interview with a Kazak government civil servant, Almaty, Kazakstan, 2003.; Georgii Kan, “Aktual’nye problemy koreitsev Kazakhstana,” Koryo Ilbo, December 21, 1996.

215 continue to be an unwanted nationality in the region. They considered themselves as not being a privileged group in the region although they were ethnically and religiously similar to the titulars. Many Ahıska Turks have thought that they were among the most discriminated nationalities.405 On the other hand, many Koreans expressed their identity in positive terms. They think that their ethnic identity holds them in high regard, characterized by traits such as diligence, workaholic, patient, filled with goodwill, and persistent in achieving their goals. In other words, they consider that the attitude of other nationalities towards Koreans has always been positive. Accordingly, many think that they are a wanted nationality in the host- states for the development of the nation.406 Having carved a niche for themselves in the Soviet economy and transcended the status of criminality that brought their community to Central Asia, Koreans appear far more willing to embrace a “second among equals” status and adapt to the new reality of a titular dominated Kazakstan and Uzbekistan. By contrast, the Ahıska Turks are presented with an idealized vision of a better life in the distant homeland of Turkey and have had less success in transcending the status of “other” within which they have existed throughout the

Soviet period. A comparison of Ahıska Turks’ and Koreans’ reactions after the

405 Ayşegül Aydıngün, “Rethinking Ethnic Identity Formation: The Case of the Ahıska (Meskhetian) Turks in Turkey and Kazakstan,” Unpublished Ph.D dissertation, p.141. 406 Valeriy Khan, “Koreiskaia disapora segodnia,” Koryo Ilbo, January 22 1994.

216 formation of their associations in titular states reveals a clear divergence in the degree to which these communities feel they may legitimately vest their future in the new states.

217 V.2. Territorialization in Titular states

Considering the aforementioned, this section will show a textured picture of re-territorialization identity within titular states as well as shed light on the general nature of diasporic identity in the context of post-Soviet space. As suggested by Table XV, which was acquired during the fieldwork, in comparison with the Ahıska Turkish community, a far higher percentage of Koreans consider the states they live in (Kazaktan and Uzbekistan) as their homeland. This constitutes the central issue in this examination of the territorialization of identity and compels an exploration of the degree to which members of both groups feel that they are capable of full integration into the civic nation.

Table XV

Q. Where is your homeland? (Multiple answer possible)

Nationality Koreans (%) Ahıska Turks (%) Place of birth 46.3 20 Soviet Union 20 0 Titular States 42 22.2 (Kazakstan/Uzbekistan) Land of forefathers 22 80 (Russian Far East / Ahıska region) Historical Homeland 43 96 (Korea / Turkey) Source: Data derived from survey conducted in Kazakstan (2003) and Uzbekistan (2005) from Ahıska Turks and Koreans, 150 samples in each country and diaspora (total 600)

218

Table XVI

Q. Who should be considered native residents of titular states (Multiple answer possible)

Nationality Koreans (%) Ahıska Turks (%)

Titulars (Kazak or Uzbek) 7.2 15 All people who were born in titular states 52 38 All citizens 50 42 Difficult to say 2 5 Source: Data derived from survey conducted in Kazakstan (2003) and Uzbekistan (2005) from Ahıska Turks and Koreans, 150 samples in each country and diaspora (total 600)

Taken together, Table XV and XVI demonstrate that both groups attribute considerable value to “being born in a place” as a criterion of indigeneity. Such a trend was high among youths and middle-agers who think they have certain rights in their countries of residence. This, more or less reveals their desire rather then the reality of dwelling states.

The following quote from a middle-aged Korean in Almaty conveys a common thread of interview responses from both communities, in which the complex interaction of ethnic, territorial, and national identities remains unsettled. It shows a dynamic process of identity formation.

In my heart, I feel I am a native of this place – I mean this

city or maybe this country. I don’t know. I know that I never

219 lived in Korea, neither did my father and mother. Thus I am

not quite sure if it is my homeland. At the same time, however,

I now live in a country that I did not choose. Neither did my

father or grandfather choose to come here. I really don’t know.

You ask me difficult questions.407

In general, the Korean diaspora tend it to have a “hyphenated identity” which is composed of a territorial-based citizenship and ethnicity (i.e. Korean-

Kazakstani or Korean-Uzbekistani). On the other hand, such a trend rarely appears among the Ahıska Turks. In other words, there is a far greater willingness among

Koreans to embrace a long-term association with the titular states.408 As one Kazak official stated, “Koreans were forced to come here, but once here, found a way to contribute greatly to the Soviet Union and now Kazakstan. It makes them an important part of the Kazakstani people.”409 In an instrumentalist sense, such a remark may have contributed to Koreans’ higher levels of territorialization within

Kazakstan. In addition, a more sentimental approach to Koreans’ sense of belonging to Kazakstan is evident in many of their writings. However, Table XVII shows a

407 Interview with a member of the Korean diaspora, Anatoli Kim, Almaty, 2003. 408 However, there is a difference of degree between the Koreans in Uzbekistan and Kazakstan. Koreans in Kazakstan tend to have more willingness compared with those in Uzbekistan. This is because, the Koreans in Uzbekistan were worried about the increasing Islamization and titular nationalism compared to relatively socio- politically liberal Kazakstan. Such an anxiety in Uzbekistan makes less willingness to territorialize among the Koreans in Uzbekistan. 409 “Kazakstanui Koroyoin,” Dong-a Ilbo, May 22 2005.

220 continued significance of ethnic self-conception. It seems that the prominence of ethnic identity among both groups results from a combination of the legacy of

Soviet nationality policy and the role of the homeland after having contact with them.

Table XVII

Q. What is your primary community of belonging? (Multiple answers possible)

Nationality Koreans Ahıska Turks Own ethnicity 98 100 Soviet nation 20 0 Kazakstani (citizenship) 38 13 Source: Data derived from survey conducted in Kazakstan (2003) and Uzbekistan (2005) from Ahıska Turks and Koreans, 100 samples in each country and diaspora (total 400)

221 V.3. Self-identification and Homeland Image

The Ahıska Turks always defined themselves as Turkish. Their identity is significantly based on an emphasis on Turkishness, which derives from their belief that they were the only Turks in the Soviet Union and part of the Ottoman Empire and modern Turkey. Many Ahıska Turks stated that they enjoy quite a high degree of ethnic solidarity compared to other diasporas, indicating their strong self- identification. Sometimes they even disparage Kazaks since many Kazaks do not know their own language. They considered this shameful and a symbol of weak ethnic identity. Even though in their passports in some cases they were defined as other ethnicities, they always recognized themselves as Turks (or Ahıska Turks).

By referring to themselves as ‘Turks,’ which is the same self-designation used by their homeland compatriots, Ahıska Turks are rediscovering their Turkish heritage.

It has helped to awaken and mobilize the Ahıska Turkish diaspora in Uzbekistan and Kazakstan. Perhaps, this suggests a good lesson to the Koreans who use different self-designations between the homeland and the host state. While Koreans in the Korean peninsula indicate themselves ethnically as Han-Min Jok, they do not seem to extend this term to the Korean diaspora in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan (and

222 other CIS regions as well).410 In addition, the members of the Korean diaspora in

Kazakhstan refer themselves as ‘Koryo Saram.’ Although German Kim, a Korean diaspora scholar, argues the term ‘Koryo saram’ is appropriate for their designation since they had different experiences during the last decades,411 it seems that this will estrange the diapora from the homeland compatriots rather than bringing them together. This will not lead to the recovery of their divergent culture. As German

Kim notes, there are indeed some substantial cultural differences between the two peoples of the same origin.412 Many members of the Korean diaspora have been strongly Russified during the past decades. However, this does not mean that one has to consider the Korean diaspora utterly distanced from the homeland Koreans.

This is a tragedy that one must overcome. As seen from the case of the Ahıska

Turks, a common designation between the disapora and their compatriots in the homeland seems to be the starting point to narrow the gap between them.

In this context, the Ahıska Turks’ image of a homeland is clear and well constructed compared with that of the Korean diasporas. As Zlatko Skrbis argues, the relationship between ethnic homeland and diaspora is crucial in understanding

410 Chong Jin Oh, “Diaspora Nationalism: the case of ethnic Korean minority in Kazakhstan and its lessons from the Crimean Tatars in Turkey,” Nationalities Papers, vol. 34, no.2 (May, 2006), p.120. 411 German Kim, “Koryo Saram or Koreans of the Former Soviet Union in the Past and Present,” unpublished article, 2003 412 Ibid.

223 their ethnic identity and nationalism.413 The idea of homeland had always special meanings to the Ahıska Turks, as a romantically defined goal towards which almost every single aspect of an individual’s life was directed. To the Ahıska Turks, the homeland was a spatial representation which was influenced by political and cultural factors, rather than a simple fact of geography.414 Many elderly Ahıska

Turks told the author that they would know the place and be able to find their way around even if they were blind.415 Such narratives of the homeland certainly form the logic and basis for their identity. Accordingly, almost all of the Ahıska Turks in

Kazakstan and Uzbekistan feel themselves to be in a state of continuous exile. All

Ahıska Turkish diasporas indicated during the course of fieldwork that they were outsiders, though they pointed to their cultural and linguistic ties to Kazakstan and

Uzbekistan. Outsiders, such as Koreans and others from different cultures, might have a hard time differentiating Ahıska Turks’ culture, life style and language with the titulars, since they have many similarities. Yet, they do differentiate them with the titulars. Many Ahıska Turks argue that their language (dialectical difference), food, household design and style of dress distinguish them from the titulars who are

413 Zlatko Skrbis, Long-distance Nationalism: Diaspora, homelands and identities (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 1999), p.38. 414 As mentioned in the Chapter III, although the Ahıska region is now located as the part of Georgia, many Ahıska Turks consider their homeland as Turkey, since the region and themselves used to be the part of Ottoman Empire. 415 Interview with Ahıska Turks, Kazakstan and Uzbekistan, 2003, 2005.; Here, as the same reason with the footnote 410, the Ahıska Turks describe the region (Ahıska) as part of Turkey.

224 also Turkic peoples.416 Moreover, they say that titulars (Uzbeks and Kazaks) refer to them as “Turks” though they themselves are also technically Turkic peoples.417

Thus, although they are residing in Turkic Muslim countries, many Ahıska Turks think that being a Turk and preserving their tradition there is difficult. A representative of the Ahıska Turks, Tafur Abuzer, argued in 1989, “There are no

Meskhetian Turks just like there are no Uzbek Turks.” “There are only Turks and

Uzbeks,” thus he claims that they should go to Turkey.418 Also the titular states’ nationalizing policies and trends all over the societies are pushing their emigration to their homeland. Even in Kazakstan, which has been reputed to be a relatively tolerant republic in Central Asia and where Almaty is still considered to be one of few places where Muslim, Jews, Protestants, and Orthodox Christians could live harmoniously, has become less welcoming towards non-Kazaks. Moreover, some of the Ahıska Turks confessed their anxiousness that they might be assimilated to the titular society in two or three generations if they would continue to live there without any help and support from their homeland and host-state. They showed their concern about their offspring losing their mother language and customs in urbanized cities. As Aydıngün notes, the fear of the disappearance of their

416 Interview with elderly Ahıska Turks, Kazakstan, 2003. 417 Ibid. 418 V. Knovratovich, “Sovetskie turki v poiskakh krova,” Izvestiia, 12 October, 1989, cited in Anatoly M. Khazanov, “Meskhetian Turks in Search of Self-Identity,” Central Asian Survey, vol.11, no.4 (1992), p.13.

225 community is pushing the Ahıska Turks to migrate to Turkey. 419 In such a psychology, it is no wonder that the idea of emigration to Turkey is considered as the only solution. No doubt, such a mood resulted in having out-migration as the main task of the Ahıska Turkish Association.

Since they did not see their future in the titular states, many Ahıska Turks wanted to sell their property to have money ready for the migration to Turkey.

Initially, many of the Ahıska Turks expected Turkey’s help in organizing their migration to Turkey. Like the case of Germans or Jews they wanted to migrate with all of their family to their homeland country, i.e., Turkey. However, Turkey’s reaction was something paradoxical since their official stance and informal practice was different. The official position of Turkey toward the Ahıska Turks was to solve this problem within the context of its general policy towards all ethnic Turks outside

Turkey.420 Therefore, officially the Turkish government wanted the Ahıska Turks to stay in their residing countries and develop their life there. Yet, informally, the

Turkish government did not prevent the illegal migration of the Ahıska Turks to

Turkey. Although there was a lack of political initiative and the desire from the

Turkish government, they welcomed all the Ahıska Turks who came to Turkey,

419 Ayşegül Aydıngün, “Creating, Recreating and Redefining Ethnic Identity: Ahıska/Meskhetian Turks in Soviet and post-Soviet contexts,” Central Asian Survey, vol.21. no.2 (2002), p. 195. 420 Zakir Avşar, “Ahıska Türkleri,” Türk Dünyası, vol.16 (July-August, 1997), p.1626.

226 whether they arrived legally or illegally. Consequently, Turkey’s policy toward the

Ahıska Turks, was between Germany and Korea’s stance toward their co-ethnics abroad. Germany accepted their compatriot diasporas migrating to Germany after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. But the Korean government (South Korea) had a firm stance against the migration of the diaspora Koreans to Korea. The Korean government only wanted to cultivate cultural and economic ties with its co-ethnics in the CIS. Thus, the South Korean government hoped to avoid a massive immigration, which estimated around 650,000, of CIS Koreans to South Korea.

Actually, Turkey’s paradoxical standpoint and policy also resulted from the fear of massive migration from Central Asia and elsewhere. At one point the

Turkish government accepted a limited number of Ahıska Turks to Turkey. Under the law number 3835421 on July 2nd 1992, which is the law concerning the acceptance and settlement of Ahıska Turks in Turkey, the Ahıska Turks received the status of settled immigrants and had certain benefits.422 The Act provided property rights for the Ahıska Turks, support for shelter, settlement and transportation of their to Turkey and even allowed dual citizenship.423 It was a generous and expansive piece of legislation, however, it was not fully enacted. With this

421 see appendix for the Legislation number 3835. 422 Zakir Avşar and Zafer Tunçalp, Sürgünde 50. Yıl Ahıska Türkleri (Ankara: TBMM Kültür, Sanat ve Yayın Kurulu Yayın, no.30, 1994), pp.49, 78. 423 see appendix for the Legislation number 3835.

227 legislation only 500 Ahıska Turkish families could settle in Turkey in 1992 and

1993.424 Although, the legal measures to accept the Ahıska Turks to Turkey were applied for a limited time with limited people, informally Turkey continued to receive those who migrated to Turkey by their own means.425 But this didn’t lead to a mass migration of Ahıska Turks to Turkey. Because even though they were allowed to resettle in Turkey unofficially, they have been excluded from all social security and welfare systems since they did not receive Turkish citizenship. They are approved illegal aliens without any rights. This meant that they had to withstand all hardships for a certain period (until they received citizenship) in order to have a proper resettlement and life. Such a situation automatically discouraged mass migration to a large extent. Those who were well off or had higher education in the titular states couldn’t take such venture. For example, they heard from those Ahıska

Turks who have migrated to Turkey during the early stage that reality was often inconsistent with the dream that compelled their return. This is not overtly surprising given the tendency for diasporic peoples to construct essentialized, idealistic visions of their homeland during their years of dispersal. It has been the case for numerous other groups inspired to migrate on the basis of an essentialized

424 Ibid.; in 1992 150 families and 350 families in 1993. 425 They come with a tourist visa and then somehow get a working permit, later a resident permit. According to an Ahıska Turk immigrant to Turkey, it is not so difficult to get Turkish nationality. He said, one could get citizenship around after five years.

228 “return myth,” the reality of integration within the homeland is often more complicated than anticipated. According to an elderly Ahıska Turk, who came back from Turkey and resettled in Sirdarya, Uzbekistan, Turkey became too westernized in terms of culture and language that he was disappointed and had a hard time adopting himself to this new environment.426 Like many other Ahıska Turks, he had been obliged to live in an isolated way for decades and was unaware of the changes that were going on in Turkey. Actually, for them preserving the Ottoman traditions was the main engine for the survival of the community. Many elderly Ahıska Turks or Soviet Koreans, didn’t seem to understand that the culture doesn’t stand in the same place. With the transformation of the traditional society to an industrial one and with the global internationalization, this type of culture (e.g., customs, rituals, beliefs, moral norms, etc.) has been transformed into industrial-urban culture. To conclude, migration to their homeland is an expansive and arduous undertaking for

Ahıska Turks. This fact divides the potential migrants into those more thoroughly territorialized and those simply lacking the finical resources to move. The second of these categories brings into question the level of development of the homeland

(Turkey): its potential to support or sponsor return migration.

Among the youth and middle-aged Ahıska Turks, the importance of their

426 Interview with an elderly Ahıska Turk, Sirdarya, 2005.

229 homeland started to have a practical and real dimension which is related to

economic survival. For example, in 2005, which is about a decade after the

titular’s independence, when the author asked people about which country they

consider their homeland, Ahıska Turks often responded by stating among other

things, an explanation of what an ideal homeland is. This includes a description

of the ideal economic and social conditions of living in a homeland. Currently, in

Kazakstan, and to some extent Uzbekistan, Ahıska Turks were able to attain

relative economic prosperity. For, younger Ahıska Turks and people in their

thirties and forties, life in Kazakstan is relatively prosperous. As Ahmet, a truck

driver and a father of three children in his forties, told the author, “Home is where

you can have your own house and where you can send your children to school

and where they can have a future.”427 When contemplating the possibility of

migrating to Turkey, Ahmet and many other young Ahıska Turks understand that

without land and support for economic life, migration is not feasible, even if the

law allows it. They also require houses to be built for them to live in. Yıldız, who

runs a small business in Turkistan and claims himself as an ardent nationalist

admitted this and argues, “Of course we want to return, but we need houses and

427 Interview with Ahmet Ali-Osman oğlu Nabiyev , a truck driver in Chimkent, 2003.

230 land. Without these it is not possible to go back.”428 The characteristic of this

younger generation is that they have a pragmatic image of their homeland and a

myth of return rather than having the nostalgic longing for their homeland. One

elderly Ahıska Turk lamented the current situation as such; “Previously, we

couldn’t travel as the law prevented it, now money stop us.”429 In the case of the

Ahıska Turks, the question becomes not whether they would like to migrate to

Turkey but whether they feel they that they have a right to do so. It gives them a

certain feeling of comfort to possess the right to migrate to their homeland, i.e.,

Turkey, even if they might not actually migrate at the moment due to economic

and other reasons. In general, all the Ahıska Turks hope to see their future in

Turkey and perceive it as the only place where they can feel at home.

Compared with the Ahıska Turks, the Soviet Koreans take on a new aspect on their self-identification and their homeland image. Rather than searching for the common Koreanness with the homeland, many Korean diaspora intellectuals tended to underscore their distinctiveness. Many Korean diaspora organizations and the

Korean government (South Korea) made a great effort for a national revival in the last decade. Its main thesis was “all of us are Koreans.” Thus the paradigm of

428 Interview with Yıldız Osmanov, Turkistan, 2003. 429 Interview with an elderly Ahıska Turk, Tashkent, 2005.

231 national revival was the reviving Korean culture, Korean language, and developing

Korean identity. It was directed at the strengthening of Korean idea and Korean unity. And the model of this Koreanness in the revival was from South Korea (in terms of language and culture). Accordingly, many Korean diaspora intellectuals started to rethink about this national revival. Valeriy Khan argued, “There are many programs of national revival but it is not easy to find clear theoretical understanding of the essence of national revival in these programs.”430 Also, German Kim wrote,

“As for reviving Korean customs and traditions we have more questions than answers.”431 The problem for them was that they wanted to have clear theoretical understanding of the national essence of Soviet Koreans.

Many Korean diaspora intellectuals argue that Koreans in Central Asia and

Koreans from the peninsula have many common features: customs, food, language, anthropological type, etc. On the other hand they also argue that there are many differences in customs, food, language, etc. Valeriy Khan notes, “Even outward appearance is not same. At least it is not difficult to distinguish Koreans from

Uzbekistan from Koreans in Korea.”432 He goes even further in saying that Koreans

430 Valeriy Khan, “Paradigmy i problemy natsional’nogo dvizheniia: sotsio-filosofskii analiz,” Izvestiia koreevedeniia v kazakhstane i srednei azii, vol.1 (1993), p. 23. 431 German Kim, “Topical problems of Korean Diaspora in Kazakhstan,” Izvestiia koreevedeniia Kazakhstana, vol.1 (1996), p. 85. 432 Interview with Valeriy Khan, Tashkent, 2005. ; Valeriy Khan, “Paradigms and problems of national movements: Social-philosophical analysis,” Occasional Papers, vol.2 (Korean-American Historical Society)

232 in Central Asia differ from both North and South Koreans in language, mentality, values, outlook, behavior, customs and traditions.433 He says, Soviet Koreans’ cultural genetic fund is synthetical. It is the synthesis of traditional Korean, Russian,

Central Asian and European cultures.434 Actually many Soviet Koreans living in urban areas, generally who had more chance to have contact with Koreans (South

Koreans), stated that sometimes Koreans from homeland are more alien for Soviet

Koreans than Russians, Uzbeks, or Kazaks. They said that for Soviet Koreans in

Central Asia very often it is easy to understand the psychology and behavior of

Russians, Uzbeks, Kazaks than the psychology of Koreans from Korea. Dimitri

Men, a Korean diaspora Professor in Almaty state University in the history department gave his idea of self-identification as such;435

Am I Korean in general? Yes, I am if we take my genetic roots. But

I have many essential differences from Korean Koreans. Who am

I? We can identify myself in the following way: I am Korean by

my genetic roots, I was educated in the Soviet system, my native

language is Russian, my outlook is based on world culture, I have

(1996), p.23. 433 Valeriy Khan, “The Korean Minority in Central Asia: National Revival and Problem of Identity,” International Journal of Central Asian Studies, vol.3 (1998), p.69. 434 Ibid. 435 Interview with Dimitri Men in Almaty, 2003.

233 European-Asian thought, I am adopted to various cultural

environments and I live in Kazakstan. Thus, the so-called Korean

nature has not been a dominating factor in my human nature.

Accordingly, he said, it would be naturally illogical if Koreans from homeland expect the Soviet Koreans to bear the same psychology and same value orientations.

To a certain extent, such negative statements or reactions result from the homeland or the associations’ excessive attempt to dictate a model of behavior and consciousness to the Soviet Koreans. In the initial phases, all the members of the

Koreans diaspora suddenly felt themselves Koreans and wanted to be similar to homeland Koreans.436 There was a boom of Korean language, culture, and trend during this period. In fact, this seemed to be a phenomenon of mechanical imitation.

Such an attempt to imitate the homeland Koreans led the Soviet Korean intellectuals to have the complex of being defective Koreans. Therefore, while reviving the tradition and culture of homeland not only the level of external attributes but also the level of the internal content should be considered in order to overcome the criticism of being an external imitation of homeland culture. As German Kim

436 Valeriy Khan, “Paradigms and problems of national movements: Social-philosophical analysis,” Occasional Papers, vol.2 (Korean-American Historical Society) (1996), p.19.

234 pointed out, recovering the cultural and, to some extent, language difference should not be a lopsided imposition of the homeland (South Korean) culture.437 In fact,

South Koreans very often try to impose their culture on the Soviet Koreans as if that is the meaning of cultural revival. It should also not be forgotten that these Soviet

Koreans were one of the most integrated ethnic to the Soviet society. As their dissimilation from the Korean culture was a process that occurred over decades, their re-embracing of it would also take time, if it is to take place totally or partially at all.

Since the Korean government has a firm stance against the repatriation of the Soviet Koreans, almost none of them see their future in (South) Korea. As a result, many former Soviet Koreans seemed to decide their resettlement in the titular states, generally Kazakstan since they perceived it as more multi-ethnic with a relatively liberal atmosphere compare with other republics in the region. Such a decision is continuously reaffirmed by the Korean diaspora associations during their gatherings. Compared with Turkey, which has a more flexible attitude toward its diasporas, Korea showed its clear commitment that it will help its diasporas but not allow the repatriation. While Turkey’s immigration policy has steadily become less

437 Interview with German Kim, Professor, Koreans Studies Department, The Sate University of Kazakstan, 2003. ; German Kim, “Koryo Saram or Koreans of the Former Soviet Union in the Past and Present,” unpublished article, 2003.

235 welcoming over the last decade, South Korea’s policy reveals an even more overt resistance to diasporic return migration. The Turkish president, Süleyman Demirel showed his commitment to the Ahıska Turks in the Turkish Daily News in 1999, as

“Turkey is a receiving country with many demands but Ahıska Turks had always been given priority in migration.” On the other hand, he also proceeded to state that,

“[our] goal is not to offer citizenship in Turkey but to revise the nationalization process in the titular state where these Turks lived.”438 Accordingly, it showed the typical contradictory policies of Turkey, between the official and informal measures.

However, when the president of Korea, Kim Youngsam, first visited Kazakstan to celebrate the first CIS Korean festival with the President of Kazakstan Nazarbayev in 1993, he delivered the clear message of the homeland. He said;

“My dear countrymen! Your long friendship with the peoples of

Kazakstan is an important bridge in the heartfelt good-neighbor

relations between our two countries. I hope that you will continue

to work to develop Korean culture and traditions with pride and

that you will also continue to fulfill your social obligation to the

state of Kazakstan. I also hope that you are able to partake in the

development and growth of our common homeland. As for our part,

438 Turkish Daily News, January 29, 1999.

236 we guarantee that your historical homeland is prepared to help you

and protect your peaceful and prosperous future in Kazakstan.”439

In response to this, the President of Kazakstan noted:

“In Kazakstan, we honor the great work of our Korean citizens

toward the development of our economic and cultural life and its

future potential. We know the Koreans well as great masters of

labor as well as important figures in the world of science, culture,

and art. I would like to express my sincere confidence that our

Korean citizens will always have a special place in our republic

and will be able to apply their national traits of wisdom, love of

work, and desire of knowledge to their participation in economic,

social, cultural, and political activities of our state.”440

By and large, such official announcements have led the Soviet Koreans to see their future in the titular state and accelerated a percentage of Koreans conceptualizing the titular states (Kazakstan and Uzbekistan) as their homeland. In

439 Iurii Tskhai et al., Assotsiatsiia Koreitsev Kazakhstana – 10 let (Almaty: Daik Press, 2000), p.19. 440 Ibid.

237 other words, this constitutes the central issue in this examination of the territorialization of Korean diasporas’ identity. These statements reflect the realization that for the community to exist in Kazakstan, its members must vest themselves in the state, not simply at a micro-level but as members of the citizenry at large. This nesting of identity is far more prominent among Koreans whose urbanized localism is couched within an increasingly cosmopolitan self-conception as Kazakstani citizens.441 A measure of cosmopolitan trends are also evident among urbanized

Ahıska Turks but lack the goal of an eventual acceptance of the state-level civic,

“Kazakstani” identity.

A Korean diaspora scholar, German Kim, gives his idea of returning to the homeland as such, which more or less reflects the thought of Korean diaspora in general :

“It is not so important whether the homeland governments (South or

North Korea) are interested in repatriation of Soviet Koreans. We know

the fact that South Korea is a very crowded country. Thus, every year

tens of thousands of South Koreans are pushed out of their homeland

for a myriad of different reasons,442 and hundreds of thousands of

441 Tae Hyeon Back, “The Social Reality Faced by Ethnic Koreans in Central Asia,” Korean and Korean American Studies Bulletin, vol.12, no.2/3 (2001), p.49. 442 The formation of a South Korean trade/labor diaspora over the last 40 years has seen a steady exodus of

238 North Koreans are running away from North Korea trying to escape

starvation. So how can we talk about repatriation? But even if such an

appeal sounded from Korea, I don’t think that many Soviet Koreans

would move to their historical motherland. I have already explained

the reasons: we would be aliens there, we do not know the language, we

have a different mentality, habits, way of life, we cannot live in a mono-

ethnic environment, and we would be absolutely incompetent there. I

have experienced it myself. In Korea, despite the distant but existing

kinship, I felt as a stranger.”443

Actually, the likelihood of advancement for even native-born Koreans is complicated and requires a combination of social networking, specialized training, and a great deal of hard work. Viktor Kim, a graduate student in Uzbekistan, gives his impression after his recent visit to South Korea as follows: “Our people do not have contacts in the business world of Korea, our education is not highly respected and, to be honest, they work very hard there – harder then we are accustomed to.” It is, therefore, considered illogical for relatively successful Soviet Koreans to migrate

ethnic Koreans from the country. 443 Interview with German Kim, Almaty, 2003.

239 to South Korea.

Despite the Koreans and the Ahıska Turks’ historical association with

Kazakstan and Uzbekistan, a variety of factors effect the groups’ collective willingness to vest itself in the future of the new states. While, at least in theory, most Ahıska Turks clearly favored emigration, the majority of Soviet Koreans have opted to embrace Central Asia, and quite often Kazakstan, as their homeland.

240 V.4. Language Revival and Education

Compared with the Korean diaspora, the Ahıska Turks preserved their language far better, since Ahıska Turks somehow used their language to identify themselves and used it as a tool against assimilation. Table XVIII, which is the data collected from the 2001 Statistical yearbook of Kazakstan, prepared by the

European Union’s Tacis program, somehow illustrates the general situation of language knowledge of Ahıska Turks and Koreans.

Table XVIII444

Level of Language Knowledge of Ahıska Turkish and Korean Diasporas

Among them those who know language Total Native (TU/KR) Kazak Russian Population Nationalities As % of As % of As % of Thsd. Thsd. Thsd. Thsd. total total total person person Person person population population population Korean 99.7 25.7 25.8% 28.7 28.8% 97.4 97.7% Ahıska 78.7 59.6 75.7% 57.8 73.4% 59.5 75.6% Turk Source: European Union Tacis Program, Statistical Year Book of Kazakhstan (Almaty: Agency on Statistics of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2001), p.434

444 As mentioned earlier, due to some difficulties of calculating the Ahıska Turkish population, data in this table seems not accurate; moreover, Ahıska Turks are artificially and arbitrarily divided into “Ahıska Turks” and “Turks” in the original data. Thus, the Ahıska Turks’ data shown in Table XVI are reorganized (combined) by the author. However, these data give some information about the knowledge of language between Ahıska Turk and Koreans.

241 Although the Ahıska Turkish community has, by and large, preserved its native language, recently signs of change are visible among those who live in cities, and especially among those who have higher education. Thus, many Ahıska Turkish intellectuals point out that the lack of education in Turkish is an important factor contributing to the loss of language, especially children born and raised in the urban centers of Kazakstan and Uzbekistan. Moreover, since the elderly people, who possessed high levels of tradition and language, are now aging and passing away, it has become more difficult for the younger generation to learn and speak Turkish.

Although there are schools and Universities founded by Turkish charities or religious organizations and also Turkish departments in major universities, unfortunately these institutions are not designed to help the ethnic revitalization of the Ahıska Turks. In general, all these Turkish institutions have a bigger agenda, such as the solidarity of all Turkic peoples in Eurasia. Thus, there aren’t any organized language courses to revitalize the mother language for the Ahıska Turkish diaspora.

On the other hand, the Soviet Koreans have many organized language teaching institutions all over the titular republic. At the beginning of the 1990s there was a certain boom in learning the Korean language among the Soviet Koreans and

242 numerous courses in Korean were organized by Korean cultural centers and Korean missionary churches. Perhaps this can be related to the Korean diaspora’s urgent desire to revive their language compared with the Ahıska Turks. Also, the Korean government overtly supported the revitalization of their compatriots’ mother language. Many language centers were established with the help of the Korean government and many Korean books, dictionaries, computers and other technical assistance were provided by South Korea. In the regions where the Koreans lived in a compact form, such as Ushtobe (near Almaty) in Kazakstan and Politotdel (near

Tashkent) in Uzbekistan, the Soviet Koreans have managed to organize Korean language courses as part of the regular curriculum in primary and secondary education.445 In other words, the Korean language has been taught at schools (from elementary to high school), and even in Kindergartens. In higher education, numerous Korean departments were opened after the 1990s in a number of universities and colleges in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan. The total number of students of Korean departments in Kazakstan is about 250, and in Uzbekistan there are about

350.446 The most well known Korean departments in Kazakstan are in the State

445 The author couldn’t get the exact number of schools that are giving Korean language in regular curriculum, however according to the information gathered from a member of the Korea Association, there are about 13 schools in Kazakstan and 19 schools in Uzbekistan. 446 Also in Kyrgyzstan there are 250 students in 3 main universities, therefore in Central Asia there are around nearly 1000 students, mainly the Soviet Korean students, who are studying the Korean language.; German Kim, “Korean Studies in Kazakstan and Central Asia: the Past, the Present, and the Future,” paper presented in the

243 University of Kazakstan and Almaty State University. In the case of Uzbekistan there is a Korean department even in the pedagogical university which has almost

200 students itself. Tashkent Nizami Pedagogical University, and the Institute of

Oriental Studies are the two main universities in Uzbekistan, where specialists in

Korean studies are trained. One of the big differences between these institutions compared with Turkish departments in the region is that the majority of students of

Korean departments are from the Korean diaspora. Both in Uzbekistan and

Kazakstan, the Korean diaspora constitutes around 80 percent (sometimes more, in the case of Tashkent Nizami Pedagogical University Korean diaspora compose 92 percent of its students) of students in Korean departments.447 There is only one exception in the State University of Kazakstan where the Korean diaspora represent only one third of its students due to the official policy of supporting Kazak students.448 According to Vronislav Lee, the chairman of the Korean department at

Tashkent Nizami Pedagogical University, reasons why young people enter Korean departments are as follows:449 (Order is according to the preference)

1. Nationality

17th AKSE (The Association for Korean Studies in Europe) conference, April 1995. 447 One of the interesting things about the students in the Korean departments is that most of the students are girls, boys constitute only about 10-20 percent. If we consider the role of women and their influence while raising their children this data suggests something positive to the language revival of Koreans diasporas in the future.; German Kim, “Korean Studies in Kazakstan and Central Asia: the Past, the Present, and the Future,” paper presented in the 17th AKSE (The Association for Korean Studies in Europe) conference, April 1995. 448 Ibid. 449 Interview with Vronislav Lee, Tashkent, 2005.

244 2. Parent’s wish

3. Possibility to go to Korea

4. Possibility to get a good job after graduation (For example with Korean

Conglomerates, Samsung and LG)

Accordingly, unlike the Turkish departments in the region, the Korean departments are playing a crucial role in revitalizing and preserving the Korean language for the

Soviet Koreans in Uzbekistan and Kazakstan.

In addition, numerous churches around the region, even in the rural areas, provide Korean language courses to the Korean diaspora free of charge whenever they express an interest in it. However, such classes are not a part of any larger revitalization effort on the part of the churches. As pastor Lee Bumsuk in Tashkent explained, the Korean church is not seeking out Koreans per se, and neither is the church attempting to play any direct role in a nationalizing project.450 Nevertheless, the existence of Koreans in the region has made it possible for them to gain a foothold in that country and seemingly this allows the South Korean missionaries to play a role in the fostering of transnational network among co-ethnics. As a consequence, many Korean churches, including the American churches ran by

Korean-Americans, hold Korean language classes for church members as well as

450 Interview with Pastor Lee Bumsuk, Tashkent, 2005.

245 for other locals (including Korean diaspora and titulars) on a formal basis. As a result, these churches indirectly contribute to the revitalization activities, though it may not be intentional on their part. In other words, their contribution to the language (or tradition) revival can be assessed as an unintended consequence of the missionaries’ evangelizing work.

There are also some differences for the reasons to learn the mother language between the Ahıska Turkish and Korean diasporas. By and large, Ahıska

Turks have symbolic or primordial reasons for seeking language and cultural education; on the other hand, the Korean diaspora seems to have more instrumental reason. When the author asked Soviet Koreans what their goals were in learning

Korean, many Koreans stated that learning Korean would be useful for professional opportunities. One interviewee professed that their learning of Korean was not an interest in the nationalizing projects pre se, but to study or work in South Korea or to find employment, possibly with a South Korean firm, which are certainly instrumental reasons. For example, the narrative of Vladimir Pak, a 26 years old

Korean from Tashkent gives an idea of the issue. Vladimir grew up on the Korean collective farm in Politotdel near Tashkent and is a bilingual Russian-Korean speaker. After graduating from university, he obtained an internship with a South

246 Korean firm in Seoul, where he worked as an apprentice for two years. There he learned to speak the standard Korean dialect and has been employed as a director of the TashCom Computer School in Tashkent for the last few years. As this is a South

Korean company, his manager is a South Korean. Vladimir acts as his manager’s unofficial liaison to the outside community, and he also provides translating and interpreting services for him. Vladimir considers himself very fortunate in that he grew up speaking Korean. He attributes his language skills in helping him to get the internship in South Korea and to secure employment with a South Korean company in Tashkent. Consistent with this case, many Soviet Koreans acknowledge that language abilities certainly can work in their favor.

247 V.5. Compact Living vs. Urbanization

One characteristic feature of the Korean diaspora society in post- independence Uzbekistan and Kazakstan has been its accelerated pace of urbanization. This phenomenon is far more conspicuous among the Korean diaspora than among other nationalities, of course, including the Ahıska Turks, in Uzbekistan and Kazakstan. Table XIX summarizes the urbanization of the Korean diaspora in

Kazakstan and Uzbekistan.

Table XIX

Urban and Rural Population Ratios of the Korean diasporas in Uzbekistan and Kazakstan

Year 1970 1979 1989 1999 Kazakstan Urban 73.5 80.1 84.1 87 Rural 26.5 19.9 15.9 13 Year 1959 1970 1979 1989 Uzbekistan Urban 15 57 72 80 Rural 85 43 28 20 Source: A.D.Pak, Demograficheskaia Kharakteristika Koreitsev v Kazakhstane i srednei azii (Almaty: 2002), pp.27, 42.

As seen from the Table XIX, at present approximately 90 percent of the

Soviet Koreans live in cities, which marks them as one of the most urbanized ethic groups in Central Asia. Increasing urbanization has been evident among Koreans

248 since the 1970s, and has involved trends of migration from poorer regions to wealthier regions and resettlement in more cosmopolitan settings. This trend has brought about considerable changes in the Korean community. Longstanding areas of compact living, such as the Korean kolkhozes or sovkhozes, have witnessed a major reduction in the percentage of Korean inhabitants these days, thereby altering the ethnic nature of these places. According to Tae Hyeon Back, the present pattern of resettlement is better described as an exodus from farming areas to escape from economic problems than as urbanization for the purpose of individual advancement.451 In any case, the Soviet Koreans in their 30s and 40s with any economic means have been leaving the countryside for the cities.

What is more, group resettlement is quite rare among these Koreans - most

Soviet Koreans make decisions to relocate on the basis of their individual situations and inclinations. When asked the question, “Is it important to live in an area of compact living?” 68.7 percent of the Korean respondents stated that the existence of an area of compact living was essential for preservation of their culture in

Uzbekistan and Kazakstan.452 However, 57 percent of the Koreans revealed that

451 Tae Hyeon Back, “The Social Reality Faced by Ethnic Koreans in Central Asia,” Korean and Korean American Studies Bulletin, vol.12, no.2/3 (2001), p.46. 452Sang Cheol Kim, Im Young Sang, “Jung-ang Asia jee-yuk 3, 4 Saedae Koryo-in ŭ-shik-kwa Seng-hwal Munwha Byeon-wha”, Project Paper, Center for International Area Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, 2001.

249 they did not feel that they (personally) should live within a compact Korean settlement.453 Therefore in urban areas, where most of the Soviet Koreans are located, they live more independently, confining themselves within small nuclear families. In contrast, the majority of the Ahıska Turks are settled in the rural areas of Kazakstan and Uzbekistan and they live in closely-knit communities, which help them to retain their language and traditions. Moreover, their migration pattern is different from that of the Koreans. Rather than individual migration they prefer group migration. Thus, even in the big cities, such as Almaty or Tashkent, they form their own quarter-hood in the suburban area maintaining their area of compact living. Ahmet, an Ahıska Turks in Tashkent said to the author, “We chose community over family life.” “Instead of family unit migration, Ahıska Turks choose to be with other Turks first.”454 In sum, if they had the option to be with only their families in an area, say somewhere in Almaty, where there were no other

Turks, many Ahıska Turks choose to move to an area where there are Turks. As a result, in Uzbekistan or Kazakstan Ahıska Turks have lived closer together. To be sure, they also show signs of urbanization and scatteration, especially among those who have higher education. However, even in such exceptional cases, many young

453 Ibid. 454 Interview with an Ahıska Turk, Ahmet Ali-Osman oğlu Nabiyev, Tashkent, 2005.

250 Ahıska Turks still preserve some of their traditions and their ethnic identity in urban areas and resist assimilation. Besides, such a behavioral distinction between educated and uneducated or rural and urban is a phenomenon that can be found in every diaspora community. Compared with the Korean diaspora there is no serious question of the loss of compactness in their settlements which is an important factor in disintegration.

It is clear that the practice of endogamy contributes to this rigid structure, and thus to the survival of the Ahıska Turkish community. Many village headmen in the Ahıska Turkish villages proudly mentioned to the author that they rarely give their brides away to other nationalities. Mixed marriages, even with other Muslim communities were not accepted. On the other hand, in the case of the Korean diaspora, the last ten to fifteen years have witnessed a significant rise in the proportion of inter-ethnic marriages among urban Koreans. Such cases are more visible in Almaty rather than in Uzbekistan. The Korean diaspora in Almaty tend to have more openness and bohemian-lifestyle compared with those Korean diaspora in Uzbekistan. In Almaty, a city that is home to one in every five Koreans in

Kazakstan, approximately 40 percent of marriages take place across ethnic lines.455

455 Natalia Em, “K probleme national’nosmeshannykh brakov (po reszul’tatom aktovykh zapisei gorarkhiva ZAGS Almaty),” Izvestiia Koreevedeniia Kazakhstana, vol.2 (1997), p.43.

251 As a result, the present generation of diaspora Koreans includes a large group of marginal Koreans with very weakly developed ethnic consciousness. What is more, uncertainty in current socio-political changes lead many Koreans to have general tendency to have fewer children, which eventually results in the danger of natural depopulation. Certainly, the nuclearization of Korean settlement in the titular republics aggravates the problem of preserving the Korean diaspora as an independent ethnos. In this context, the Korean diaspora nationalists are anxious about a Balkanization of what was once a single ethnic group, “the Soviet

Koreans.” To be sure, the widening of policy differences between Uzbekistan and

Kazakstan, would lead to a different range of living environments for Koreans.

One way or another, this might affect the intra-ethnic consolidation of the Soviet

Koreans between Uzbekistan and Kazakstan.

252 V.6. Socio-economic Issues

The Soviet Koreans were well known, prior to independence, for their zeal and their achievements in education, and this reputation still prevails in Uzbekistan and Kazakstan. The Soviet Koreans have always enjoyed considerable social prestige as scholars, teachers, doctors, lawyers, engineers and technicians of all descriptions, accountants, etc. Moreover, successes in these professions helped to secure their socio-economic status. However, the changes in the economy since the independence of the titulars have created a situation of pursuing material wealth in the first place. And this has redirected the attitudes of the Korean diaspora toward their employment. In other words, the Korean diaspora has become more materialistic in their employment preferences as a result of the transition to a market economy. Many Koreans are currently engaged in commercial activities of various descriptions. However, many Korean diaspora intellectuals point out that such a situation drastically threatens to lower their intellectual level in the future. To be sure, this trend is influencing the younger generation, whose educational and academic achievements are declining noticeably. A large number of Soviet Koreans formerly active in science, education, health care, culture and other fields have left them for small and medium-sized businesses. Other Koreans have reinvented

253 themselves as interpreters and translators for South Korean business and churches.

Actually, since independence, many Korean professionals were under the pressure of the low wage level and experienced difficulty obtaining promotions in the public sector.

It must also be said that increasingly frequent contacts with South Koreans, too, have accelerated the materialistic turn of the Korean diaspora society. Since independence, a substantial number of South Korean businessmen, from the biggest

Conglomerates down to lower-level representatives of private business, have set up offices and factories in Uzbekistan and Kazakstan. Moreover, large numbers of

South Korean missionaries are active in numerous areas throughout Uzbekistan and

Kazakstan.456 While the missionaries do not have the same goals as the business people, both need the help of local Koreans in order to establish themselves as quickly as possible. Some Soviet Koreans have been able to hone their economic instincts quite rapidly through contacts with these South Koreans, and have also been quicker to find better job openings. On the other hand, these contacts have had a number of undesirable side effects.

At present, most of the Soviet Koreans, regardless of their level of

456 Numerous protestant churches (sects) are activating in Central Asia. It is impossible to estimate them since their activities are veiled. The major protestant sects in Korea are; the Presbyterian church, Methodist church, Baptist church and Holiness church. However, there are more than 100 sects of Protestant churches in Korea.

254 educational attainment, living in the Central Asian cities are engaged in business.

This trend toward commercial enterprise among the in Korean diaspora community enables the Korean diaspora to adapt quickly to a new economy, and in many regions one might even say that they are leading the way in this respect. In some instances, the Korean diaspora entrepreneurs have taken over special areas. For example, in Almaty the distribution network for the South Korean electronic goods and food items is mostly controlled by the Korean diaspora. In Tashkent, the Soviet

Koreans have taken the lead in the computer business. In 1999, more than 1,500

Korean diaspora businesses were registered in Almaty, which has a total Korean diaspora population of just 19,000.457 Thus the Korean diaspora accounts for a significant proportion of all businesses registered in city. 458 If one adds the unregistered, small-scale Korean diaspora businesses and the Korean vendors in the wholesale and retail marketplaces, a majority of the Soviet Koreans in Almaty is involved in some kind of business.

In the same vein, Ahıska Turks also sought for opportunities to capture specialized areas and niche economies. They also understood that business enterprises allow the greatest possibilities for accumulating wealth on the basis of

457 Dmitri Men, “Smena pkolenii sredi koreitsev Kazakhstana i izmeneniia v ikh etnicheskom samosoznanii,” Koryo Ilbo, July 14, 2000. 458 Ibid.

255 individual effort and ability. The fields of self-employment or home business that are flourishing at present are farming and commerce.459 In Uzbekistan, most Ahıska

Turks are involved in the farming enterprise. In Kazakstan, they are also in farming business, however, the author witnessed quite a number of truck or taxi drivers as well, who were all self-employed. With the 1992 enactment of privatization as a part of economic reforms, the sovkhozes and kolkhozes were privatized, and land usage rights were also transferred to non-government hands. Ahıska Turks used much of this policy for their economical survival. Private farming has become prominent among the Ahıska Turks after the independence. Moreover, their farming enterprise represents, perhaps, a new historical type of agricultural production that combines elements of socialist collective system with small-scale capitalist farm management in order to maximize personal profit. The farming cooperatives of today resembles this model, but the greatest change has been that all land owned by each cooperative is now invested for the cooperative as a whole by each individual member. The members farm this land collectively and share the profits. Almost all members of the these farms are composed of Ahıska Turk family units. For the

Ahıska Turks, as an ethnic minority in a multi-ethnic state, forming micro- communities based on close kin relations was a social necessity that expanded into

459 Interview with Ömer Salman, the Head of Ahıska Turk Association in Uzbekistan, 2005.

256 the farming sphere. The fundamental working unit in this farming enterprise is always an Ahıska Turkish micro-community. In other words, it is not a style of farming undertaken by individuals.

This sort of farming enterprise is currently expanding among Ahıska Turks in Uzbekistan. In order to provide sustainable financial support many Ahıska Turks are looking for investors from Turkey and elsewhere. In addition, they use their

Ahıska Turkish networks in Kazakstan (e.g., truck drivers and merchants) for the distribution of their agricultural products.460 By selling their products to Kazakstan

(rather than Uzbekistan), where the economy is booming and their products are worth more, Ahıska Turks in Uzbekistan are increasing their profits. Moreover, by cooperating with their compatriots in Kazakstan it creates a win-win situation for all

Ahıska Turks in the region. The hard work and farming enterprise method demonstrated by the Ahıska Turks serves as a good model for overcoming the current economic difficulties as well as preserving their ethnic identity and culture in rural areas. This also reflects the Ahıska Turks’ tendency to preserve their ethnicity foremost rather than making social advancement their primary goal. In one aspect, private business became the economic base of a relatively high degree of personal

460 For example, the Ahıska Turks are running a greenhouse plantation, as a cooperative farming, in Sirdarya, Uzbekistan, which borders near Chimkent Kazakstan, is cooperating with their compatriots in Chimkent for their product’s delivery and distribution in Kazakstan.

257 freedom and independence. As a result, the economic liberty made its imprint on the diaspora’s behavior, worldview, and inter-personal relations, including reluctance to work as part of a team. This lack of commitment to teamwork also influenced the solidarity of the diaspora community. These differences must be taken into account as we continue to work on strategies and tactics for the Korean or Ahıska Turkish movements.

258

CHAPTER VI

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE HOMELANDS (TURKEY AND

KOREA) ENGAGEMENTS WITH THEIR OWN DIASPORA

The Seoul Olympics opened the eyes of Soviet Koreans, who started to realize that South Korea was a dynamically developing country which had already achieved considerable economic success.461 After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the independent Kazakstan and Uzbekistan established diplomatic relations with both Korean states (North Korea and South Korea). At first, North Korea tried to compete with South Korea in establishing and developing ties with the Soviet

Koreans in Uzbekistan and Kazakstan. For instance, in 1989 three thousand textbooks in Korean were sent from Pyongyang.462 Professors and taekwondo instructors came from North Korea to teach the Korean language and traditional

461 Valeriy Khan, “Koreiskaia disapora segodnia,” Koryo Ilbo, January 22 1994. 462 Georgii Kan, Istoriia Koreitsev Kazakhstana (Almaty: Gylym, 1995), p. 45.

259 martial arts. In addition, the North Korean government financed the All-Union

Association for Promotion of the Unification of Korea. This organization was to promote a pro-North Korean diaspora thus many materials they brought were propaganda materials rather than those for purely educational purposes. During the first years of its activity this organization made it possible for several hundred

Soviet Koreans to visit North Korea. However, the deep economic crisis which has struck North Korea in the mid-1990s forced Pyongyang to close its embassy in

Almaty and call back all its diplomats. In Uzbekistan, only minimal personnel were left over (3 persons). As a result, on the whole North Korea left no noticeable traces and failed to impress and influence the Korean diaspora in any significant manner.

Relations with South Korea developed quickly and widely from the beginning. Thousands of Soviet Koreans were able to visit South Korea and in turn, thousands of South Koreans came to Uzbekistan and Kazakstan.463 The Korean conglomerates such as LG, Samsung, and Daewoo have invested hundreds of millions of dollars in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan. Dozens of Korean companies, including joint ventures, operate in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan. Such investment gave the Korean diaspora a great opportunity to work. Also the Association of Koreans in

463 Korean embassies in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan estimate the number of their citizens with permanent residence in their respective countries as such: Kazakstan, 2000, Uzbekistan, 1700.

260 Kazakstan and Uzbekistan contributed to signing a number of contracts between and

South Korean companies and Kazak authorities. By doing so they could consolidate their position in the titular republics. Many Soviet Koreans mentioned that the image of South Korea as an economically developed country has contributed to the high status of the Korean diaspora.

For instance, the president of Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov, realized the potential for investment and growth with South Koreans’ input when he visited

South Korea in 1992.464 That visit dealt primarily with questions of cooperation in the economic sphere between the two countries. During that visit, agreements were signed indicating that the two countries would agree to work together to promote the expansion of large South Korean firms such as Daewoo and Samsung in

Uzbekistan. In this trip, Karimov stated, “I am convinced that we have set out on the correct path and further contact with the South Korean government…(means development) retarding not only economic questions but also ethnic and political questions.”465 It is the presidents of these two countries, and not only individual entrepreneurs, who foresaw the potential for increased contacts in the economic sphere, not to mention the spheres of politics and ethnic relations. Currently, South

464 Islam Karimov, Uzbekistan: Along the Road of Deepening Economic Reform (Tashkent: 1995), p. 96. 465 Pravda Vostoka, March 5, 1993.

261 Korea is the third biggest investing and trading country of Uzbekistan. South

Korean’s investments were more than 1.7 billion US dollars in 1997.466

Of the various leaders of the Korean movement interviewed, one pointed to the significance of nurturing Korean business ventures as a mean to promote not only the economic well-being of the Korean communities but as a way of forming potential ties among Koreans and Soviet Koreans in Central Asia. This individual, the president of a smaller Korean cultural organization, expressed that both the

South Korean and local Korean diaspora businessmen working as citizens of their titular republics were not only helping to promote the economies of their own republics but also strengthening their ethnic solidarity. To be sure, when the economic well-being of local Korean communities is assured, this self-sufficiency can support various projects taking place at socio-cultural level. One Korean diplomat said that the funds that South Korea spent to support the Korean diaspora in Central Asia could create conditions for them to develop business in the region which will reduce their desire for emigration, thereby reflecting the interests of all three sides, Kazakstan/Uzbekistan, Korea, and the Korean diaspora.467

In socio-cultural aspects, South Korea has been active in its support for the

466 Korea EXIM Bank, Uzbekistan Kukga Hyun Whang mit Jinchul Bang-an (Seoul: 2005), p.119. 467 Interview with a Counselor of Korean Embassy in Tashkent, 2005.

262 Korean diaspora communities. For example, with regard to cultural programs, such as the 60th anniversary of the Korean residence in Central Asia in 1997, the Korean government provided 150,00 US dollars for the ceremony and festival. It also provided 20,000 US dollars for the Central Asian Korean Newspaper Koryo Ilbo, and it sponsored various small and mid-sized businesses of the Korean local diaspora. Not only the South Korean government but also various South Korean based social support foundations have invested several million US dollars in the establishment of cultural or language learning centers, which teaches Korean language as well as the titulars’ language (Kazak/ Uzbek). In these educational centers, they teach Korean language, promote traditional Korean art, disseminate facts about Korean history and culture, and hold various events to bring the Korean diaspora together. Every year these branches are expanding to other cities where there is a compact Korean population. All of the main buildings of the Association of Koreans in Uzbekistan and Kazakstan were refurbished and modernized by the

South Koreans. Not only the buildings or facilities, but also numerous teachers from

South Korea are sent to Kazakstan and Uzbekistan since the independence. Every year, South Korean government is giving its teachers (from primary to high school) and professors a chance to work in Kazak or Uzbek’s schools and universities and

263 its own language centers during their sabbatical year.468

There are three main governmental organizations of South Korea which deal with the Korean diaspora: The Korea Foundation, the Overseas Koreans foundation and KOICA (Korea International Cooperation Agency). The Korea

Foundation is under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its main project is to support Korean studies in region. Hence, it is running numerous visiting programs and fellowships and scholarships for students, teachers and professors of Korean studies or language.469

The Overseas Koreans Foundation is also under the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs, but its mission differs with the Korea Foundation. While the Korea

Foundation supports academic affairs, the Overseas Koreans Foundation focuses its support on various diasporic centers and organization. The Overseas Koreans

Foundation was founded with the announcement of the “Overseas Koreans

Foundation Legislation” (Law No. 5313) passed on March 27, 1997.470 Then on

October 30 of that year, the Foundation was inaugurated and put into official operation. All of its efforts have been focused on various cooperative programs,

468 Every year the Korean government is sending around 20 teachers to each republic. The government is providing housing and living expenses. Moreover, they all have their regular salary coming from their own institutions. Thus the competition is pretty high. One can extend its duration up to 3 years. 469 Also, prominent Korean diaspora scientists in various fields are included in this program. They get grants or fellowships to do their further research in various Korean institutes. 470 Overseas Koreans Foundation Brochure (Seoul: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2005)

264 since the government thought that these initiatives would be a great help to overseas

Koreans and serve as a driving force for the Korean community. The Overseas

Koreans Foundation’s aim is to help overseas Koreans to maintain a sense of national fellowship among them and live as exemplary citizens in the nations where they are residing. In order to accomplish its mission, the Foundation took every measure to complete the construction of the Overseas Koreans Center, with the goal of providing exclusive service for Koreans living abroad when they pay a visit to their ethnic homeland. In this context, it gives support to diaspora’s radios, newspapers, TV stations, language and cultural centers, etc. In terms of a personal exchange program the foundation offers various homeland visit programs to elderly

Koreans and juveniles. In reverse, it gives South Korean high school and universities students’ visit and voluntary activities in the compatriots’ village, organizations or centers during their vacation. In addition, to support the maintenance of national homogeneity it created the cyber Korean community

Hanminjok Network, and established the Korean business network as an integrated hub for those overseas Koreans engaged in the fields of commerce, trade, information technology, science and technology.

KOICA is also under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: its project may

265 overlap with the Korea Foundation and the Overseas Koreans Foundation, however its mission and projects are broader in scope compared with the other two organizations. Rather than focusing on the Korean diaspora issues, its mission is targeted to the whole country, i.e., Kazakstan or Uzbekistan. KOICA focuses more on general issues such as supporting human resources development and providing the material and physical aid necessary to reduce poverty and achieve sustainable development. KOICA’s aim is to contribute to strengthen Korea’s friendly relationships with its partner countries by promoting the socio-economic advancement in the developing world. Within this context, they are sending 40-50 experts in every field, from agricultural experts to IT (Information Techonology),

Taekwondo masters, and even Korean language teachers, to Uzbekistan and

Kazakstan every year.471 These experts are sent to various titular governments’ institutions and offices. For example, generally Korean language experts are sent to

Universities while Taekwondo masters are sent to military or security related institutions. Actually, KOICA’s projects are not designed to support the Koreans diaspora in a direct manner. Nonetheless, the author witnessed during the fieldwork that not a few of the local Koreans were benefiting from these programs as well.

Besides, such activities from the homeland are giving great pride to the Korean

471 KOICA, Annual Report 2004 (Seoul: KOICA, 2004), p. 4.

266 diaspora in the region.

Like the Korean diaspora, the dissolution of the Soviet Union gave the

Ahıska Turks the opportunity to learn about their homeland, Turkey. During the

Soviet period, many Ahıska Turks mentioned that they knew Turkey as very poor and under developed country. However, when they had a chance to properly see the situation in Turkey they all said they were shocked. Most of the Ahıska Turks were impressed by the level of development of Turkey and its modernization.

Considering the pride they took in Turkishness throughout the Soviet era, this fact certainly boasted the morale of the Ahıska Turks in the titular states. However,

Turkey’s role in engaging with their diaspora, Ahıska Turks, has been quite disappointing. As Aydıngün argues, “Turkey did not officially take into its agenda the problem experienced by the Ahıska Turks, in order not to damage its relations with Kazakstan and Uzbekistan.”472 Turkey always had a bigger agenda when dealing with the region. To Turkey, Kazaks and Uzbeks and other Turkic ethnics were also lost brothers who were newly found after their independence. As a result,

Ahıska Turks were pushed behind in terms of priority by Kazaks and Uzbeks, the dominant ethnic (or perhaps ruling ethnic) of the titular states. As mentioned earlier,

472 Ayşegül Aydıngün, “Ahıska (Meskhetian) Turks: Source of Conflict?” The International Journal of Human Rights, vol.6, no.2 (2002), p.59.

267 Turkey’s official position concerning the Ahıska Turk’s issue was always in the big framework, “regarding all ethnic Turks outside Turkey in general.” There were only limited measures to repatriate some Ahıska Turks in the region. However, there are still many remaining in the titular states.

TICA (Turkish International Cooperation Agency), which is more or less similar to KOICA in terms of their mission and objective, is the only Turkish government body that deals with the region. Therefore, its mission is not to support the Ahıska Turks directly. Rather, TICA focuses on more general issues such as providing material and technical assistance to the titular states for their socio- economical development. Like KOICA’s objective, Turkey seeks to strengthen its friendly relationships with Uzbekistan and Kazazkstan with various projects. On a small scale TICA is sending Turkish books, newspapers, and other printed materials to the Ahıska Turkish community and organizations but it is generally done in a rather covert fashion. During talks with the head of TICA and KOICA together in

Tashkent, the author could see the official attitudes of these two governments.473

Faruk Uysal, a chairman from TICA Tashkent office, denied firmly that there is no such direct support program for the Ahıska Turks. Moreover, he said, it is TICA’s position to avoid the ethnic issues in their project which were sensitive subjects in

473 Interview with Faruk Uysal from TICA and Dong-ho Kim from KOICA, Tashkent, 2005.

268 the region. On the other hand, Dong-ho Kim, KOICA chairman in Tashkent, said openly that his Organization is working hard to aid the Korean diaspora as much as possible with his programs. The difference has, perhaps, resulted from the policy of

Turkey having no proper agenda on the Ahıska Turks’ issue.

Although Uzbekistan and Kazakstan are Turkic countries, which share many heritages in common with Turkey, it seems Korea is freer from the titular governments’ censorship. As a result, Ahıska Turks get limited support from the

Turkish government even that in indirect ways or from behind the scenes. For example, the Turkish government had a program to train the Ahıska Turks as teachers of Turkish classes in ordinary Kazak schools which are in the regular curriculum. However, its intention is neither to promote Ahıska Turk’s cultural revival, nor to preserve the Turkish language for them. In sum, such projects are more oriented toward the titulars (Kazaks or Uzbeks) rather than the Ahıska Turks.

In economic aspects, Turkish businesses are engaging with the Ahıska

Turks while expanding their enterprise in the region. Though the scales of these businesses are smaller than that of Korea, Turkey is still one of the important economic actors in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan. There are many small and mid-sized

Turkish enterprises active in the region. Since there is almost no difference in terms

269 of language between the Turks of Turkey and the Ahıska Turks, as local Turks, the

Ahıska Turks have been playing a crucial role in building a bride between the

Turkish entrepreneurs and Kazak counterparts. To the Turkish entrepreneurs, Ahıska

Turks are important for their businesses since they are fluent both in Russian, the titular language, and in Turkish. Moreover, Ahıska Turks are familiar with the procedures and the business manners of Kazakstan and Uzbekistan. Consequently, if they are qualified for the job, the Turkish companies offered a good number of opportunities to the Ahıska Turks.

However, this favorable situation did not last long for the Ahıska Turks.

First, as mentioned, many Ahıska Turks resided in rural areas generally dealing with agricultural production. Thus, there were shortages of well-educated urban Ahıska

Turks who could coordinate the work between the Turkish businessmen and their

Kazak counterparts. As a result, the Ahıska Turks could not totally preoccupy such opportunities in the initial stage when they had a chance to play as an important middleman. Second, after a few years titulars become their vital competitors. Since the titulars, Kazak and Uzbek, were all ethnically Turkic whose languages were similar to Turkish, it didn’t take long to learn Turkish themselves. Moreover, after the independence, Turkey has been actively engaged with the titular states with its

270 pro-Central Asian policy. With this welcoming policy, Turkey invited thousands of

Kazaks and Uzbeks to study and do research in Turkey. Likewise, many Turkish departments in the Universities were occupied by the titulars (Kazak or Uzbek).474

After the mid-1990s many titulars were equipped with Turkish language skills and good connections with their governments. Consequently, Turkish entrepreneurs started to prefer qualified Kazaks or Uzbeks (who had a good language ability, qualified diploma and connections with the local partners) rather than the local

Ahıska Turks.475 The author rarely met Ahıska Turks in Turkish companies. It seems that priority is given to the titulars rather than Ahıska Turks within the

Turkish enterprises. Actually, some Turkish companies did not have any consideration of the Ahıska Turk at all. It was not in their agenda while employing the employees.476 In this sense, perhaps, unlike the Korean diaspora, a certain degree of urbanization and emphasis on education is needed among the Ahıska Turks.

Although the official homeland engagement toward the Ahıska Turks is

474 To remind, many Korean departments in the region were occupied by the local Koreans. Also, since many Ahıska Turks preserve their language very well there is no merit to study the Turkish departments. 475 As one of Turkish businessman in Tashkent said during the interview, “It is more advantageous to work with a Uzbek who speaks Turkish, since he is more likely to overcome the difficulties of the complex system while doing businesses.” He also mentioned that there were many Uzbeks who can speak Turkish in the labor market these days. Also, many Turkish businessmen could speak the titular languages to some extent. It wasn’t hard for them to learn Kazak or Uzbek. During a visit to a couple of Turkish enterprises in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan, the author witnessed many titulars (Kazaks or Uzbeks) who were playing as a middleman between the Turkish entrepreneurs and local counterparts. 476 Many Turkish businessmen said that if one knows Turkish, Russian and perhaps local language with qualified profession in ones fields they did not care about ethnicity, or giving priority to their compatriots, Ahıska Turks.

271 nominal for developing and preserving their ethnic identity, the Turkish media is playing a crucial role in keeping the Turkish identity. The Turkish government started satellite broadcasting in 1994 with its successful launch of the TURKSAT satellite system. Turkish media influence was made possible when Central Asian states gained independence. With this satellite system, there are numerous private channels, as well as state channels, airing through out Central Asia. There is even a channel which is targeted at Central Asia. TRT-Eurasia (Avrasya) TV (Currently

TRT TURK) service has started to foster ethnic unity and reinforce a Turkic identity to various Turkic peoples.477 Its aim was to establish a basis for Turkic pride and ultimately pan-Turkic goal of a strong solidarity among all Turks.478 The Turkish government thought that this project was achievable, since Turkish people and

Turkic peoples living in Central Asia are culturally and linguistically similar. Some

Turkish politicians viewed the television channel as a propaganda tool in a larger campaign to establish the groundwork for a greater solidarity and cooperation among the Turks in the world.479 As Schram mentioned, mass media might control interpersonal communication, planting new ideas in the minds of individuals.480

477 Haluk Sahin and Asu Aksoy, “Global Media and Cultural Identity in Turkey,” Journal of Communication, vol.43, no.2 (1993), p.33. 478 Ibid. 479 Ibid., p.38. 480 Daniel Lerner, “Book review: Mass Media and National Development by Wilbur Schramm, 1964,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, vol.14, no.2 (1966), pp.243-247.

272 As part of its educational policy, TRT-Eurasia TV (TRT-TURK) has been encouraged to broadcast in Turkish with Turkish subtitles to promote familiarity with the Istanbul Turkish.481 According to Robins, it was Turkey’s intention to encourage Central Asian Turkic republics to switch their alphabets to the Latin script Turkey uses.482 TRT-Eurasia channel especially focused on cultural programs such as documentaries of the Turkic heritage and history. Such programs reminded the viewers of their past history, culture, and language. There were few channels at the beginning, however there are now more than 70 channels, all broadcasting in

Turkish, covering topics ranging from news to music, entertainment, documentaries, etc. In other words, the Ahıska Turks in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan can see all the state and private channels of Turkey. Increased knowledge of the homeland means an increase in empathy toward them. In particular, these satellite television channels are playing an important role in the development of identities. To be sure, this satellite system was not established for the Ahıska Turks or other diasporas. It implies a bigger and broader project and mission of Turkey. However, its influence on the Ahıska Turks is huge in terms of revitalizing their national identity and culture.

481 Philip Robins, “Between Sentiment Self-interest: Turkey’s policy toward Azerbaijan and Central Asian states,” Middle East Journal, vol.47, no.4 (1993), p.607. 482 Ibid.

273 One can find a big satellite antenna in every house of Ahıska Turks these days. Almost all of the houses that the author visited were equipped with the satellite system which allows Ahıska Turks to see all of the Turkish channels. An

Ahıska Turk village headman in Sirdaria mentioned, “It isn’t expensive to install a satellite system in the house these days. Thus, almost every household can watch the homeland television now.” All the Ahıska Turks were enjoying Turkish television. There was no one who was watching the state-controlled, boring local channels. Many Ahıska Turks in Uzbekistan and Kazakstan see Turkish channels as very trustworthy, objective or impartial. If people have a goal of gaining information for important issues, they will become highly dependent upon available media which they see as credible. In other words, it should be said that the more credible channel, the more likely people would become dependant upon it. Thus, it was not only a matter of nationalism or ethnic identity which made them to watch

Turkish channels, but the channels’ credibility as well as the content of the channels led to Ahıska Turks continuously watching Turkish television channels. The contents of local channels have by no means been qualified enough to compete with the programs of the Turkish channels. The programs from the Turkish channels were more rich and varied in the eyes of the viewers. As one Ahıska Turk said to the

274 author, “We have never experienced this (watching the Turkish television) before.

Thus it is exciting and quite interesting for many.”483 Without a doubt, Turkish television is more open (practices free speech tenets) compared to the currently available local titular’s channels. Although Uzbekistan and Kazakstan are independent, the old communist apparatus of power is not fully eradicated.

Domestic TV broadcasting is most heavily politically controlled. The people of

Uzbekistan and Kazakstan are only informed within the dictates of current regime, learning the truth long after the events. This situation led almost all the Ahıska

Turks fixing their channels to Turkish television. Table XX shown below is the top

4 responses collected from the Ahıska Turk during the fieldwork about the reasons for watching Turkish satellite television.

Table XX

The reasons of watching Turkish satellite television by Ahıska Turks

Q. What is the reason of watching Turkish satellite television? 1. It is trustworthy and impartial. Objective on events reporting. 2. It shows a Turkish way of life (Turkish daily life, music, folklore, etc.) 3. Turkish TV imparts in people a sense of Turkish pride 4. It teaches the Turkish language

Source: Collected from the interviews of the Ahıska Turks, Uzbekistan, Kazakstan, 2005, 2003.

483 Interview with an Ahıska Turk in Chimkent, 2003.

275

The Soviet Koreans are also in the same situation, however, they don’t have as many chances to watch homeland television compared with the Ahıska

Turks. Since the Korean satellite system is focused on East Asia and the Asian

Pacific region, it does not cover the Central Asian region. However, there are two

Korean satellite channels operating in the region. Interestingly, these two channels were almost useless in motivating the Korean diaspora to accumulate their cultural heritage, heighten the diaspora’s awareness and contribute to their ethnic development. Even though these two channels were state owned channels, one of them, KBS WORLD, is a paid channel so that one has to pay 40 dollars every month to watch it. Koreans in America, Japan or other developed countries might be able to afford such a fee to watch a Korean channel but for the Soviet Koreans in

Central Asia it is too expensive to watch. As a result, it can be watched only in the big language or cultural centers operated by South Koreans who can afford the fee.

Another channel, which is called Arirang TV, is free of charge, thus some Soviet

Koreans are watching it. Yet many of them are complaining about the channel and its orientations. Although there are some programs introducing homeland Korea and current issues, trends and language, which may be useful for the Korean diaspora to

276 recreate their identity, absurdly all these programs were broadcasted in English with

English subtitles. The English-centered broadcasting of the Arirang channel result in the Korean diaspora abandoning the channel since it was unfamiliar to them and hard to understand. As a result, many Koreans watch the Russian channels broadcast from Moscow, which they are familiar with. It is the result of the South

Korean government’s Western oriented mentality, thinking that broadcasting in

English would bring them a more globalized and have a bigger effect. But to whom? Among the hundreds of channels in the satellite, a person who chooses the

Korean channel to watch will have a willingness to learn about Korea and Korean.

Thus, broadcasting in Korean with English subtitles will be enough to meet all of the expectations of the viewers. Perhaps, Yavuz Zeybek gives a good statement related to the issue. He states that Turkish Eurasia TV does not make Central Asians or Turkish diaspora Turkish. They all identify themselves as Turkish or Turkic, then they watch the channel. They already know who they are so that the position of

Turkish Eurasia TV is to promote this already known identity.484

As Teheranian argues, the mass media can create a national identity and culture.485 Mass media functions as an agent of gradual change through existing

484 Yavuz Zeybek, “Turkish Television to Central Asia: Perception of Turkish Avrasya Television in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzhstan,” Unpublished Ph.D dissertation, The University of Oklahoma, 1996, p.125. 485 Majid Teheranian, “Communications and national development: Reflections on theories and policies,” in

277 structures rather than directly modifying the structural constraints of development.486 Consequently, there is no doubt that its consequences are huge and will have a deep impact in the long run. In the case of diasporas, the more they watch homeland broadcasting, the stronger become their ethnic identity. Moreover, once the mass media system is well-established it is not expensive to maintain and develop it. Its impact will be broader and deeper than any other measures. Although there is a lack of support from the Turkish government for the Ahıska Turks, due to the Turkish satellite

Television system Ahıska Turks are very well informed about their homeland and its current issues. Even the younger generations who did not have a chance to visit Turkey knew all of the current Turkish pop-stars and streets of Istanbul and cafes by watching various programs. Without a doubt, this will narrow the gap between the diaspora and the homeland compatriots.

These examples of homeland engagement with diasporic communities reveal the power and longevity of ethno-national bonds. These bonds do not necessarily bridge the cultural distance created over decades, however, in the long run this distance may become narrower by various engagement policies from the homeland. eds., Majid Teheranian, Farhad Hakimzadeh, and Marcello Vidale, Communication policy for national development (London: Routledge & Kegan Pou, 1977), pp.17-25. 486 Everett Rogers, “Communication and development: The passing of the dominant paradigm,” in ed., Everett M. Rogers, Communication and development: Critical perspectives (California: Sage, 1976), pp. 121-130.

278

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

At present, the societies of Uzbekistan and Kazakstan are being restructured with the titular nationalities being as the new dominant ethnic groups.

Whether the indigenization process is a successful or not, the higher birthrates amongst the indigenous population coupled with the migration of the titular population from other countries will force non-titular ethnic minorities in

Uzbekistan and Kazakstan to accept Uzbekization and Kazakization. This development does not mean that the current nationalizing process restricts the

Korean and Ahıska Turk diaspora movements in any systematic way. Nonetheless, discrimination stemming from the nationalistic sentiment on the part of the titular nationalities can be felt in every sector of the society. The most fundamental change in the consciousness of the Korean and Ahıska Turkish diasporas in Uzbekistan and

279 Kazakstan since the breakup of the Soviet Union has been the recognition that they have no choice but to adapt to the current state ideologies and their new nationalistic tendencies. As mentioned, these two diasporas were composed of the ethnic groups who had been deported from their homelands by Stalin and who today have nowhere to go. Officially or legally they have been all undesirable in, or unable to move to, their original homelands. Consequently, a decade later, the majority of Koreans and Ahıska Turks in Uzbekistan and Kazakstan now seem to accept their status as ethnic minorities in the newly independent states and are adapting rapidly to their host-states. Hence these two diasporas are in the process of reconstructing their national identity or diaspora identity in the newly formed environment to unify themselves. The flow of migration has dropped off, particularly after the mid-1990s, and it has become clear that at least a significant portion of the Korean and the Ahıska Turk diasporas residing in Kazakstan and

Uzbekistan will remain in the region, at least for the foreseeable future. As seen from the previous chapters, the decision to stay, however, is not necessarily a portent of assimilation. They are busier than ever before revitalizing their traditions and languages in their host-countries.

The socio-economic adaptation strategies of the Soviet Koreans showed a

280 number of differences from the Ahıska Turks in Uzbekistan and Kazakstan. The character traits emphasized by the Soviet Koreans during the Soviet period, actively coping with the situation (or social change), have served them well in the post- independence circumstances. Indeed, this is one of the defining features of the

Korean diaspora society against the historical backdrop and regional peculiarities of

Central Asia. In addition, the outstanding human resources built up among the

Soviet Koreans during the Soviet period in many specialized fields have been diverted into commercial fields. Many Soviet Koreans are currently engaged in commercial activities of various descriptions. In this respect, the Soviet Koreans are said to be the leading diaspora who are quickly adapting to a new economy.

Although some Korean diaspora intellectuals worry that such a situation might lower their intellectual level in the future: influencing the younger generations to choose commercial activities rather than educational or academic achievements.

This phenomenon is perhaps best understood as a temporary, adverse phenomenon arising from social and economic transitions. In this transitional period, material independence or economic well-being is important in mobilizing the diaspora movement and various activities. Abundant funding would enable the Soviet

Koreans to organize and maintain their associations and centers more effectively

281 and powerful throughout the republic.

In the case of the Ahıska Turks, their farming communities have been undergoing a number of changes; perhaps the most important of such changes has been the pursuit of privatized management and massive plantation in all aspects of agriculture. This type of strategy, as a form of private farming or cooperative farming, is exercised by the Ahıska Turks who remained in rural areas. This strategy enabled the Ahıska Turks to overcome the current economic difficulties while preserving their traditions and language by maintaining their compact living in rural areas. This, more than any other factor, intensifies the productive competitiveness of the Ahıska Turks in sustaining their ethnic identity in the titular states and slowing down their migration from rural areas to the cities. For the titulars’ part, each republic desperately needs to develop policies to promote investment in and development of their agricultural sectors. Thus, if the Ahıska Turks can find a sustainable financial support from the outside, perhaps from Turkish investors, their strategy can create a win-win situation for them as well as the host-states.

There have been speculations that the Korean diaspora had long been assimilated into the Russified society. Lacking the proper conditions to develop diaspora activities, assimilation for them seemed inevitable. However, as mentioned

282 in previous chapters, for the Korean diaspora, speaking Russian as a first language did not mean a renunciation of their ethnic identity. They have identified themselves unequivocally as Koreans since the Soviet period. Despite centuries of assimilation, it is worth noting that the Soviet Koreans have somehow managed to perpetuate their ethnicity and diaspora nationalism. The Koreans strategy of adaptation was

“integration” rather than assimilation. As mentioned, integration implies some maintenance of the group’s cultural integrity as well as some movement to become an integral part of the host-society.487 Although, there was no political mobilization or cultural associations during the Soviet period, the Soviet Koreans somehow preserved their traditional customs, values and cuisine. Like the Ahıska Turks and many other deported nationalities, the Soviet Koreans also mythologized the deportation and utilized its memory in preserving their ethnic identity and collective consciousness. The sufferings of deportation facilitated and strengthened the ties among Koreans. While they may not speak their mother tongue or may not always observe traditional celebrations, the Soviet Koreans have always had strong kinships and ethnic unity among them. Thus, the author contended that it would not be correct to use the term assimilation (instead of integration) in the case of Korean diaspora, since many of them still maintain and develop at least some degree of

487 See Chapter II, Acculturation section, pp.57-62.

283 ethnic distinctiveness. The Korean diaspora had simply integrated well to the mainstream population (Russian in this case) for their socio-economical well-being and advancement.

Especially from the beginning of the 1990s when the Soviet Union was dissolved, many Korean solidarity associations and other diasporic activities emerged in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan. Moreover, recently, many people have been uncovering their Korean ethnicity and registering themselves with Korean associations in various places in Uzbekistan and Kazakstan. Arguably, the driving force of the current vigorous activities of the Korean diaspora results from the abundance of well-educated intellectuals and continuous material supports from the homeland, i.e., South Korea. While the Ahıska Turks had many problems due to lack of funding and cadre during the process of the reorganizing of their associations and activities after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Korean diaspora did not face such problems during their revitalization movement. The relative lack of an intellectual stratum among the Ahıska Turkish population in comparison with the Soviet Koreans led to their organizational weakness. The shortage of well-educated urban Ahıska Turks, also with the emergence of titular people as their competitors in the economic field, made the Ahıska Turks miss their

284 opportunity to play the role of middlemen between the host-states and homeland after the mid-1990s. In sum, despite the Ahıska Turks preserved their ethnic identity and language far better than the Korean diaspora during the Soviet period, the

Ahıska Turks diaspora movement after the 1990s is incomparably weaker than the

Korean one and less active. This reveals the importance of cadre and funding in diaspora movements.

Since the independence of titular nations, i.e., Kazakstan and Uzbekistan, the South Korean government overtly and continuously announced its intention to the Korean diasporas that it would not repatriate its compatriots in the region but guaranteed to help and protect their peaceful and prosperous future in the states they resided. Such consistent policy of the homeland made the Korean diasporas to vest their future in the titular states and actively participate in the diaspora activities

(including politics) to maximize their benefits and advantageous position in each republic. Many Soviet Koreans in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan and South Korea have been able to capitalize to varying degrees on their shared ethnicity to further their socio-economic prospects. In contrast, the lack of Turkey’s firm commitment to the

Ahıska Turks left the latter like stray sheep. Many Ahıska Turks defined their situation as an exile situation in Uzbekistan and Kazakstan. They could neither vest

285 their future in the titular states nor see their future in their avowed homeland Turkey.

Accordingly, the Ahıska Turks’ diaspora movement is not revitalizing (or successful) at the moment. Many Ahıska Turks hope to see their homeland Turkey show certain interest in and responsibility for them. Actually, rather than the material support, many wanted to see Turkey’s public claim against them, even though it might be symbolic.488 Many Ahıska Turks believes that this sort of action from Turkey would protect their rights and decrease discriminations from the titular states. Turkey’s paradoxical standpoint between the official policy and informal practices did not provide a solution for the survival of Ahıska Turks as a diaspora in the region.

In this context, we cannot emphasize homeland engagement with diaspora communities too much in the matter of strength and longevity of ethno-national bonds. Due to the various communally useful and beneficial activities of the different foundations and organizations of South Korea, many indifferent (or ordinary) Soviet Koreans also participate in the diaspora movement. Even some individuals, who do not profess an interest in the nationalizing project per se, participate in the various nationalizing projects for their instrumental reasons (to

488 As one Ahıska Turk mentioned, “What we want is not material help from our homeland Turkey, but the homeland’s interest and its public claim against them.” Such response was very common among the Ahıska Turks during the interview. ; Interview with Ahmet Ali-Osman oğlu Nabiyev, a truck driver in Chimkent, 2003.

286 study or work in South Korea or to find employment, possibly with South Korean enterprises, etc.). When the Soviet Koreans came to learn about various opportunities with South Korean foundations, organizations, and enterprises they began to seriously entertain the idea of pursuing studies in the Korean language and traditions. Truly, compared with the Ahıska Turks, symbolic or primordial reasons for seeking language or cultural education are lacking among the Soviet Koreans, who are motivated to learn Korean for instrumental reasons. Whatever the reason may be, the participants of the Korean diaspora movement are increasing every day since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Many Soviet Koreans in Uzbekistan and

Kazakstan are rapidly rediscovering their ethnic identity with their language and traditions.

The sense of shared ethnicity is instrumental to lead co-ethnics to establish initial ties between the [ex]Soviet Korean and Koreans from the homeland.

Nevertheless, the ethnicity factor alone is not sufficient for members to strive to maintain ties unless there is an economic element involved, that is, unless there are economic benefits to be gained from such an association. It is on this point that the

Turkish intellectuals from Ahıska and Turkey leading the cultural revitalization movement have faltered. They have failed to link their symbolic nationalist project

287 with the instrumental motivations among ordinary Ahıska Turks to use their cultural capital for economic betterment. Today, it is the economic factor alone that seems sufficiently powerful to motivate the settlements of diasporas from wherever they currently reside.

The South Korean government and the leaders of the Korean diaspora in

Uzbekistan and Kazakstan exhibit varying degrees of adaptive strategies which require the manipulation of various aspects of their ethnic capital, whether it be linguistic, economic, educational, or symbolic. Despite apparent divisions among the Soviet Koreans in the region, they demonstrate the ability to use the various forms of capital for both group gains (especially for the leaders of the revitalization movement) as well as for personal profits (e.g., local and South Korean businessmen). The Korean diaspora’s ultimate success in mining their ethnic capital for personal gain or profit through such networks remains to be seen. Nevertheless, it is their cultural capital based on shared ethnicity which allows them to proceed with the initial steps in establishing contacts with the homeland Korean in the first place.

The nature of a diaspora is a people who have a homeland, but at the same time accept a new place as home. The Koreans in Central Asia brought into play the

288 triadic nature of diaspora in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan to maintain their identity, by asserting that they belong both to the titular state (Kazakstan or Uzbekistan) and

Korea. In fact, in the end, the Korean and the Ahıska Turkish diasporas have to integrate into socio-economic and political life in Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan. But, this doesn’t mean full assimilation into the society and giving up their ethnicity and identity. Full assimilation will raise the question of the long-term survivability of these diasporas. “Partial-assimilation” actually points out the existence of diaspora.

Diaspora is culturally, not to mention ethnically, hybrid. Therefore, we have to acknowledge that the Korean and Ahıska Turkish diasporas in Kazakhstan and

Uzbekistan are Koreans and Turkish and at the same time Kazakhstani or

Uzbekistani citizens.

Recent urbanization and intermarriage are perhaps seen as the biggest challenges in reducing ethnic identity, both for the Ahıska Turkish and Korean diasporas. This being the case however, one may also point out to the existence of similar challenges to the ethno-national culture in their very homelands, i.e., Turkey and South Korea, in the face of globalization or Westernization. This points out the critical role of diaspora associations in each republic. They are the engines of developing diaspora consciousness and preserving ethnic identity in the host states.

289 However, these associations have limitations in their ability to support such activities due to the lack of funding and cadres. Thus, the diaspora activities should be linked to, and cooperate with, the homeland. In one sense, engagement between homelands and dispersed communities inherently catalyzes cultural revival and re-imagining of the co-ethnic groups as diasporic. Fortunately, both the Ahıska

Turkish and the Korean diasporas have their own homeland that can support these activities.489 The Homeland’s commitment to its diasporas is a key factor in preserving the diaspora ethnic identity and nationalism. But we should remind ourselves again that supporting does not mean imposing the homeland’s culture and language unilaterally. As I mentioned, diaspora nationalism is based on a triadic relationship between the homeland, host state/society and the diaspora community, which creates its transnational and hybrid structure.

Although ideas concerning diaspora and its types vary, this study, while dealing with the Ahıska Turkish and Korean diasporas, tried to illustrate the common concept that can be applied to the Soviet deported diasporas. While examining the Ahıska Turkish and Korean diasporas, the study tried to demonstrate

489 Generally Ahıska Turks live in closely-knit communities maintaining their area of compact living, thus if Turkey, as the homeland of the Ahıska Turks, has a strong commitment or policy to revitalize the Ahıska Turks’ ethnic identity and traditions it would be less costy and easier compared with the Korean government in its support to its diaspora in Central Asia. Although the Central Asian Korean diaspora is more urbanized and has less area of their own compact living compared with the Ahıska Turks, it is the strong commitment and policy of the South Korean government that enable the Korean diaspora to recover their ethnic identity and traditions in the recent years.

290 the existence of common concept of diasporas that was mentioned in the introduction: an expatriate community dispersed from an original homeland, often traumatically, to alien lands; a community which has a collective memory and myth about the homeland including its location, history and achievements; a community which has a strong ethnic group consciousness sustained over a long period of time and based on a sense of distinctiveness. In the mean time, the study demonstrated that mere physical dispersion does not automatically connote diaspora. As seen in the cases of the Ahıska Turkish and Korean diasporas there has to be more, such as an acute memory or image of, or contact with, the homeland.

To stress a fundamental characteristic of diasporas once more, diasporas maintain their ethno-national identities, which are strongly and directly derived from their homelands and related to them. They generally either have well developed communal organizations or, if not, the determination to establish such organizations. Such developments were to be found in both the Korean and Ahıska

Turkish diasporas throughout the chapters. In addition, ethno-national diasporas display communal solidarity, which give rise to social cohesion. They are engaged in a variety of cultural, social, political and economic activities through their communal organizations. They also take part in a range of cultural, social, political

291 and economic exchanges with their homelands, which might be states or territories within states. Diasporas often create trans-state networks that permit and encourage exchanges of significant resources with their homelands as well as with other parts of the same diaspora. Moreover, in order to illuminate relations between an expatriate community and its homeland, this study emphasized the triadic bases of diaspora, host state, homeland, and diaspora community, by using the Korean and

Ahıska Turkish diasporas cases.

The Ahıska Turkish and Korean diasporas had a similar tragic history: both were uprooted from their homeland. Nonetheless, after the long separation, during the 1990s they both established contacts with their respective homelands. It was a critical historic event, since diaspora nationalism (or the preservation of ethnic identity among the diaspora) is like a handful of water. In order to preserve their ethnic identities and culture they need to have a continuous supply of the fresh water from a riverhead (i.e., the homeland). It was impossible when there was a thick iron curtain in the region. Although, the nationalizing titular regime emerged in the region, the Ahıska Turkish and Korean diasporas can now have various contacts with their own homelands. The homelands’ (South Korea and Turkey) strong commitment and continuous engagements with their own diasporas can

292 revitalize the Ahıska Turkish and Korean diasporas’ ethnic identities and culture.

Perhaps this is the only way to maintain the diaspora identity and nationalism, unless the homeland has the willingness for the repatriation of its own diaspora. To be sure, it is not an easy task. However, for the sake of the Korean and Ahıska

Turkish diasporas’ prosperity and survival it is the course they should take in the future.

293

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Archival Sources∗

- Arkhive Prezidenta Respubliski Kazakhstan (APRK)

APRK fond 70, opis 1, delo 69, list 10-30.

- Tsentral'nyi Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Respubliki Kazakhstan (TsGA PK)

TsGA PK fond 1987 opis 1, delo20, list 10.

- Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Khabarovskogo Kraia (GAKhK)

GAKhK fond P-2, opis 1, delo 1316, list 27

GAKhK fond P-2, opis 1, delo 1316, list 336-338

GAKhK fond P-2, opis 1, delo 1344, list 953-955.

GAKhK fond 2744, opis 3, p. 14.

GAKhK fond 304, opis 3, delo 14, list 315.

GAKhK fond P-2, opis 1, delo 1316, list 27, 336-338.

GAKhK fond P-2, opis 1, delo 1316, list 33-34.

GAKhK fond P-2, opis 1, delo 757, list 27-29.

- Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Primorskogo Kraia (GAPK)

GAPK fond P-61, opis 1, delo 580

GAPK fond P-61, opis 1, delo 580

∗ The Archival sources listed here are actually cited in the footnotes and does not include materials that were consulted but not cited.

294 - Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (GARF)

GARF fond 120, 00, 1914g, delo 288b.f.ch.1, list 61 (1914).

GARF fond 818, opis 1, delo 185, list 1-2 (1809).

GARF fond 1235, opis 140, delo 141 (1924)

GARF fond 3316, opis 16a, delo 384 (1928)

GARF fond 374, opis 27s, delo 1706 (1929)

GARF fond 5446, opis 15a, delo 258 (1933)

GARF fond 5446, opis 22a, delo 50, list 1-116.

GARF fond 5446, opis 29, delo 48, list 16-17.

GARF fond 5446, opis 29, delo 67, list 42-43.

GARF fond 9401, opis 2, delo 3, list 764-767.

GARF fond 1253, opis 120, delo 60, list 13-18

2. Unpublished Materials.

Kim, German. “Koryo Saram or Koreans of the Former Soviet Union in the Past and Present,” unpublished article, 2003.

3. News Agency Reports, Newspapers, Periodicals

“Kazakhstan: Decrease in Kazakhstan’s Population Reported,” ITAR-TASS, December 12, 1998.

“Kazakstan, Law on Citizenship,” FBIS (Foreign Broadcast Information Service)- USR, no.54, May 5, 1992.

“Kazakstan: The Question of Dual Citizenship is Entirely Appropriate,” The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, vol.45, no.48 (1993).

295 “Suleymenov views on Ethnic Russian Issues,” Foreign Broadcast Information Services (FBIS), June 28, 1994.

“Uzbekistan, Republic Law on Citizenship,” FBIS-USR, no.121, September 24, 1992.

Giller, Boris and Viktor Shatskikh. “Oredelenie berege: russkoiazychnyie v Kazakhstane,” Karavan (12 December 1993).

Volodin, I. “Inostrannyi shpionazh na sovetskom dal’nem vostoke,” Pravda, April 23,1937

Kan, Georgii. “Aktual’nye problemy koreitsev Kazakhstana,” Koryo Ilbo, December 21, 1996.

Khan, Valeriy. “Koreiskaia disapora segodnia,” Koryo Ilbo, January 22, 1994.

Khvan, En. “Ob istorii naroda bez kupiur.” Zhurnalist, vol.3 (1990).

Kuttykadam, Seidakhmet. “Sladkii veter svobody,” Kazakhstanskaia Pravda. May 4, 1993.

Malkova, Irina. “Kazakstan Still Unshaken by the Exodus of its People.” Caravan Business News, vol.2, no.8 (1993).

Men, Dmitri. “Smena pkolenii sredi koreitsev Kazakhstana i izmeneniia v ikh etnicheskom samosoznanii.” Koryo Ilbo, July 14, 2000.

Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan, “Why Ethnicity,” Commentary (October, 1974)

Pravda Vostoka, March 5, 1993.

Trud Gazeta, September 8, 1988.

Turkish Daily News, January 29, 1999.

296

4. Dissertations

Aydıngün, Ayşegül. Rethinking Ethnic Identity Formation: The Case of the Ahıska (Meskhetian) Turks in Turkey and Kazakstan. Ankara: Middle East Technical University, 2001.

Buntürk, Seyfeddin. 20. Yüzyılda Ahıska Türkleri. Ankara: Gazi University, 2004.

Karasar, Hasan Ali. National Identity and Regional Integration in Central Asia: Turkestan Reunion. Ankara: Bilkent University, 2002.

Kemaloğlu, Aga-Ali. The Phenomenon of Ethnic Deportations in the Soviet Nationality Policy: Ahıska (Meskhetian) Turks Case. Ankara: Bilkent University Master Thesis, 1996.

Kim, Julie. The Korean diaspora of the former Soviet Union: The cultural revitalization movement, 1980s--1990s. University of California Los Angeles, 2000.

Martin, Terry. An Affirmative Action Empire: Ethnicity and the Soviet State, 1923- 1938. University of Chicago, 1996.

Park, John Hyun Sun. A historical study of Koreans in Central Asia: Missiological implications. Fuller Theological Seminary, School of World Mission, Master Thesis, 2002.

Zeybek, Yavuz. Turkish Television to Central Asia: Perception of Turkish Avrasya Television in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzhstan. The University of Oklahoma, 1996.

5. Books and Articles

A Helsinki Watch Report. Punished Peoples of the Soviet Union. The Continuing Legacy of Stalin’s Deportations. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1991.

297 Akiner, Shirin. “Melting Pot, Salad Bowl – Cauldron? Manipulation and Mobilizations of Ethnic and Religious Identities in Central Asia.” Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol.20, no.2 (1997), pp.362-398.

Akiner, Shirin. The Formation of Kazakh Identity. Washington D.C.: Brooking Inst. Press, 1995.

Alekseev, A.I. and B. N. Morozov, Osvoenie russkogo dalnego vostoka [Konets XIX v.- 1917 g]. Moscow: Nauka, 1989.

Allworth, Edawrd. “The New Central Asians,” in Edward Allworth (ed.), Central Asia: 130 years of Russian Dominance, A Historical Review. Durham: Duke University Press, 1994.

Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso, 1991.

An, Viktor, Georgii Kan, German Kim, Dmitry Men. Koreitsy Kazakhstana: Illiustrirovannaia Istoriia. Seoul: STC, 1997.

Anes, Garifulla. “Byselenie Turok,” in Fond izucheniia naclediia repressirovannoi intelligentsii Kazakhstana ‘Arys’ (ed.), Deportirovannye v Kazakhstan Narody. Almaty: Arys, 1998.

Assotsiatsiia Koreiskikh Kylturnykh Tsentrov Respubliki Uzbekistan, Desiat Let Cpustia (K 10-i Godobshchine Assotsiatsii Koreiskikh Kylturnykh Tsentrov Uzbekistana). Tashkent, 2001.

Arapov, Aleksei and Iakov Umanskii. “Tsentral’naia Aziia i Rossiia: Vyzovy i otvety.” Svvbodnaia mysl, no.5 (1995), pp.65-89.

Aslan, Kıyas. Ahıska Türkleri. Ankara: Ahıska Türkleri Kültür ve Dayanısma Derneği Yayını, 1995.

Avşar, Zakir and Zafer Tunçalp. Sürgünde 50. Yıl Ahıska Türkleri. Ankara: TBMM Kültür, Sanat ve Yayın Kurulu Yayın, no.30, 1994.

298 Avşar, Zakir. “Ahıska Türkleri”, Yeni Türkiye, vol.97, no.16 (1997), pp.1621-1627.

Aydıngün, Ayşegül. “Ahıska (Meskhetian) Turks: Source of Conflict?” The International Journal of Human Rights, vol.6, no.2 (2002), pp. 49-64.

Aydıngün, Ayşegül. “Creating, Recreating and redefining ethnic identity: Ahıska/Meskhetian Turks in Soivet and post-Soviet context.” Central Asian Survey, vol.21. no.2 (2002), pp.185-197.

Aydıngün, Ayşegül. “A deported Nationality: The Ahıska Turks.” Perceptions 31, no.3 (December 1998-Feburary 1999), pp.120-129.

Babichev, Ivan. Uchastie kitasiskikh i koreeskikh trudiashchikhsia v grazhdanskoi voine na dal’nem vostoke. Tashkent, 1959.

Back, Tae Hyeon. “The Social Reality Faced by Ethnic Koreans in Central Asia.” Korean and Korean American Studies Bulletin, vol.12, no.2/3 (2001), pp.45-88.

Back, Tae-hyeon. “Socio-economic Changes in Kazakhstan and Korean Society- Focusing on the Karatal raion.” Asia Munhwa Yongu 4 (2000), pp. 22-44.

Barth, Frederick. “Introduction,” in Frederick Barth (ed.), Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference. Boston: Brown, 1969.

Barth, Fredrick ed. Ethnic Groups and Boundaries. Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1969.

Beetham, David. “The Future of the Nation-State,” in Gregor McLenna, David Held, and Stuart Hall (eds.), The Idea of the Modern States. Philadelphia: Open University Press, 1984.

Bennigsen, Alexandre. “Several Nations or One People? Ethnic Consciousness among Central Asians.” Survey, vol.24. no.3 (1979), pp.51-64.

299

Berry, John and David Sam, “Acculturation and adaptation,” in John Berry, Marshall Segall, Çidem Kağıtçıbaşı (eds.), Handbook of cross-cultural Psychology. Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1997.

Berry, John, U. Kim, T. Minde, and D. Mok, “Comparative studies of acculturative stress.” International Migration Review, no. 21 (1996), pp.491-511.

Berry, John. “Acculturation and Psychological Adaptation: An Overview,” in Anne- Marie Bouvy, Fons van de Vijver, Pawel Boski, and Paul Schmitz (eds.), Journeys into Cross-Culture Psychology. Amsterdam: Swets & Zeitlinger, 1994.

Berry, John, Ype Poortinga, Marshall Segall, and Pierre Dasen. Cross-Cultural psychology: Research and application. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

Bhabha, Homi. The location of culture. London: Routledge, 1992.

Bishkekskii Gumanitarnyi Universitet i Obshchestbennoe Obedinenie Koreitsev Kyrgyzstana, Istoriia, Kyltura i byt Koreitsev Kazakhstana, Kyrgyzstana i Uzbekistana. Materialy Medzduharodnoi Hauchnoi Konferentsii Bishkek, 6- Febralia 2003. g. Bishkek: Bishkekskii Gumanitarnyi Universitet, 2003.

Bohr, Annette. “Language Policy and Ethnic Relations in Uzbekistan,” in Graham Smith, Edward Allworth, Vivien Law, Andrew Wilson, and Annette Bohr (eds.), Nation-building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands. The Politics of National Identities. Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Bohr, Annette. “The Central Asian States as Nationalising regimes”, in Graham Smith, Edward Allworth, Vivien Law, Andrew Wilson, and Annette Bohr (eds.), Nation-building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands. The Politics of National Identities. Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Bremer, I., “The Politics of Ethnicity: Russians in the New Ukraine”, Europe-Asia Studies 46, no.2 (1994), pp. 261-283.

300

Breuilly, John. Nationalism and the State. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985.

Brubaker, Rogers. “Nationalizing States in the Old and the New.” Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol.19, no.2 (1996), pp.411-437.

Brubaker, Rogers. “Nationhood and the National Question in the Soviet Union and Post-Soviet Eurasia: An Institutionalist Account.” Theory and Society, vol.23. no.1 (1994), pp.47-78.

Budak, Feyzullah. “Ahıska Türkleri Üzerine.” Yeni Türkiye 16 (1990), pp.1628-1631.

Bugai, Nikolai. “Vyselenie Sovetskih koreitsev s Dal’nego Vostoka.” Voprosy istorii, no.5 (1994), pp.132-149.

Bugai, Nikolai. “K voprosu o deportatsii narodov SSSR v 30-40-kh godakh.” Voprosy istorii, no.6 (1989), pp.135-143.

Bugai, Nikolai. K voprosu o deportatsii narodov SSSR v 30-40-kh godakh. Moscow: Istoriia SSSR, 1989.

Calhoun, Craig, “Nationalism and Ethnicity.” Annual Review of Sociology, vol.19 (1993), pp.211-239.

Carlisle, Donald. “Uzbekistan and the Uzbeks.” Problems of Communism, vol.40, no.5 (1991), pp.23-44.

Carlisle, Donald S. “Islam Karimov and Uzbekistan: Back to the Future,” in Timohty J. Colton and Robert C. Tucker (eds.), Patterns in Post-Soviet Leadership. Boulder: Westview Press Inc., 1995.

Chafetz, Glenn, Michael Spirtas, and Benjamin Frankel. “Introduction: Tracing the influence of Identity,” in Glenn Chafetz, Michael Spirtas, and Benjamin Frankel (eds.), In the Origin of National Interests. London: Frank Cass, 1999.

301 Chey, Y.S. “Soviet Koreans and Politics of Ethnic Education,” in Zvi Gitelman (ed.), The Politics of Nationality and Erosion of the USSR. New York: St. Martin Press, 1992.

Chinn, Jeff and Robert Kaiser. Russian as the New Minority: Ethnicity and Nationalism in the Soviet Successor States. Boulder: Westview Press, 1996.

Clifford, James. “Diasporas.” Cultural Anthropology, vol. 9, no.3 (1994), pp.302-338.

Cohen, Robin. Global diasporas; An introduction. London: UCL Press Limited, 1997.

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), Human Rights and Democratization in the Newly Independent States of the Former Soviet Union. Washington D.C.: CSCE, 1993.

Connor, Walker. “Soviet policies toward the non-Russian peoples in theoretical and historical perspective: What Gorbachev inherited,” in Alexander Motyl (ed.), The Post-Soviet nations: Perspectives on the demise of the USSR. New York: Columbia University Press, 1992.

Connor, Walker. “The impact of homelands upon diasporas,” in Gabriel Sheffer (ed.), Modern diasporas in international politics. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986.

Conquest, Robert. Nation Killer. The Soviet Deportation of Nationalities. Glasgow: MacMillan, 1970.

Coox, Alvin D. “L’afaire Lyushkov: Anatomy of a Defector.” Soviet Studies, vol. 19, no.3 (1968), pp.405-420.

Cornell, Stephan and Douglas Hartman. Ethnicity and Race-Making Identities in a Changing World. California: Pine Forge Press, 1998.

Craumer, Peter. “Agricultural Change, Labor Supply, and Rural Out-migration in Soviet Central Asia,” in Robert A. Lewis (ed.), Geographic Perspectives on Soviet Central Asia. London: Routledge, 1992.

302 Crowe, David M. “The Kazakhs and the Kazakhstan: The Struggle for Ethnic Identity and Nationhood.” Nationalities Paper, vol.26, no.3 (1998), pp.395-419.

Dashefsky, Arnold. Ethnic Identity in Society. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1976.

Dave, Bhavna. “A New Parliament Consolidates Presidential Authority.” Transition, vol.22, no.6 (1996), pp.33-37.

Dave, Bhavna. “Natioanl Revival in Kazakstan: Language Shift and Identity Change.” Post-Soviet Affairs, vol.12, no.1 (1996), pp.51-72.

Diuk, Nadia and Adrian Karatnycky. New Nation Rising. The Fall of the Soviet and the Challenge of Independence. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1993.

Donald S. Carlisle, “Islam Karimov and Uzbekistan: Back to the Future,” in Timohty J. Colton and Robert C. Tucker (eds.), Patterns in Post-Soviet Leadership (Boulder: Westview Press Inc., 1995), p. 140.

Driedger, Leo. “Ethnic Self-Identity: A Comparison of Ingroup Evaluation.” Sociometry, vol. 30, no.2 (1976), pp.131-141.

Driedger, Leo. “Impelled Group Migration: Minority Struggle to Maintain Institutional Completeness.” International Migration Review, vol. 7, no.3 (1973), pp.257-269.

Driedger, Leo. “In search of cultural identity factors: a comparison of ethnic students.” Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology, vol. 12 (1975), pp.150-162.

Driedger, Leo. The Ethnic Factor. Identity in Diversity. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited, 1989.

Dymov, Oleg. “Turki”, in Dymov, Teplo Kazakhstanskoi Zemli. Almaty: Arys, 1999.

Edward, William, David Allen and Paul Muratoff. Caucasian Battlefields: A history of the Wars on the Turko-Caucasian Border 1828-1921. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953.

303

Em, Natalia. “K probleme national’nosmeshannykh brakov (po reszul’tatom aktovykh zapisei gorarkhiva ZAGS Almaty).” Izvestiia Koreevedeniia Kazakhstana, vol.2 (1997), pp.40-50.

Esman, Milton. “Diasporas and International Relations” in John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (eds.), Ethnicity. Oxford University Press, 1996.

Fierman, Willliam. “Political Development in Uzbekistan: Democratization?” in Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrot (eds.), Conflict, Cleavage, and Change in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

Finifter, Ada W. and Ellen Mickiewicz. “Redefining the Political System of the USSR: Mass support of Political change.” American Political Science Review, vol.86, no.4 (1992), pp.857-874.

Fragner, Berg. “Soviet Nationalism: An ideological legacy to the independent Republics of Central Asia,” in Willem van Shendel and Erik Zurcher (eds.), Identity Politics in Central Asia and the Muslim world. London: I.B. Tauris Publisher, 2001.

Gelb, Michael. “An early Soviet ethnic deportation: The Far-Eastern Koreans.” The Russian Review, vol.54 (1995), pp.389-412.

Gellner, Ernest. Nations and Nationalism. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1983.

Gellner, Ernest. Thought and Change. London: Weidenfeld & Nichoson, 1964.

Ginsburgs, George. “A Statistical profile of the Korean Community in the Soviet Union.” Asian Survey 17, no.10 (1977), pp.952-967.

Glazer, Nathan and Daniel Moynihan. Beyond the Melting Pot: The Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Jews, Italian, and Irish of New York City. Cambridge Mass.: The MIT Press, 1963.

304 Gordon, Milton. Assimilation in American life: the role of race, religion, and national origins. New York: Oxford University Press, 1964.

Guboglo, Mikhail N. “Demography and Language in the Capitals of the Union Republics.” Journal of Soviet Nationalities, vol.1, no.4 (1990). pp.1-42.

Hankuk Yuksa Yunkuheo, Hankuksa volume 16. Seoul: Hankuk Yuksa Yunkuheo, 1981.

Hausladen, Gary. “Settling the Far East: Russain Conquest and Consoliation,” in Allan Rodgers (ed.), The Soviet Far East: Geographical Perspective on Development. London: Routledge, 1990.

Henze, Paul B. “Politics and Alphabets in Inner Asia,” in Joshua A. Fishman (ed.), Advances in the Creation and Revision of writing system. The Hague: Mouton, 1977.

Henze, Paul. “Russia and China: Managing Regional Relations in the Face of Ethnic Aspiration.” The International Research & Exchanges Board’s Huang Hsing Foundation Hsueh Chun-tu Lecture Series (21 June, 1999).

Hobsbawm, Eric and Terence Ranger (eds.) The Invention of Traditions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

Hobsbawm, Eric. “Some Reflections on Nationalism” in T.J. Nossiter and A.H.Hanson Stein Rokkau (eds.), Imagination and Precision in the Social Science. London: Faber & Faber LTD, 1972.

Hur, Seung Chul. “Aspect of the linguistic assimilation of Soviet Koreans,” Journal of Slavic Studies 3 (1988), pp.123-139.

Huttenbach, Henry. “The Soviet Koreans: product of Russo-Japanese imperial rivalry.” Central Asian Survey, vol.12, no.1 (1993), pp.59-69.

Hyun, Kyu Hwan. “Jaesso Hankukinui Sajeok Kochal.” Kyopo Jungchek Jaryo, vol. 13 (1972).

305 Jepperson, Ronald, Alexander Wendt, and Peter Katzenstein, “Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security,” in Peter Katzenstein (ed.), In the culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics. New York: Columbia University Press, 1991.

Jukes, Geoffrey J., Kirill Nourzhanov and Mikhail Alexandrov, “Race, Religion, Ethnicity and Economics in Central Asia,” in Kolchi Inoue and Tomohiko Uyama (eds.), Quest for Models of Coexistence: National and Ethnic dimensions of Changes in the Slavic Eurasian World. Sapporo, Japan: Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, 1998.

Kabuzan, V.M. “The Settlement of Siberia and the Far East from the Late Eighteenth to Early Twentieth Century (1795-1917).” Soviet Geography, vol.32 (1991), pp.616-632.

Kaiser, Robert. “Nationalizing the Workforce: Ethnic Restratification in the Newly Independent States.” Post-Soviet Geography, vol.35, no.2 (1995), pp87-111.

Kan, Georgii. “Koreitsy v Kazakhstane: Deportatsiia i obretenie novoi rodiny,” in Fond izucheniia naclediia repressirovannoi intelligentsii Kazakhstana ‘Arys’ (ed.), Deportirovannye v Kazakhstan Narody. Almaty: Arys, 1998.

Kan, Georgii. Istoriia Koreitsev Kazakhstana. Almaty: Gylym, 1995.

Kan, Georgii. Koreitsy Kazakstana. Almaty: Kazakhstan, 1994.

Kan, Georgii. Koreitsy v Stepnom Krae. Almaty: Edilet, 2001.

Karimov, Islam. Uzbekistan: Along the Road of Deepening Economic Reform. Tashkent: 1995.

Kemal Karpat, “Elites and Transmission of Nationality and Identity,” Central Asian Survey, vol.5, no.3 (1986), pp.1-19.

Khan, Sergei Mihaillovichi and Vallerii Khan, translated by Taehang Kim. Koryo Saram: Uri’nin nugu inga? Seoul: Kodamsa, 1999.

306 Khan, Valeriy. “The Korean Minority in Central Asia: National Revival and Problem of Identity.” International Journal of Central Asian Studies, vol.3 (1998), pp.66-77.

Khan, Valeriy. “Paradigmy i problemy natsional’nogo dvizheniia: sotsio-filosofskii analiz.” Izvestiia koreevedeniia v kazakhstane i srednei azii, vol.1 (1993), pp.23-38.

Khazanov, Anatoly M. “Meskhetian Turks in Search of Self-Identity.” Central Asian Survey, vol.11, no.4 (1992), pp.1-16.

Khazanov, Anatoly. “People with Nowhere to Go: Plight of the Meskhetian Turks” in Khazanov, After the USSR. Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Politics in the Commonwealth of Independent States. University of Wisconsin Press, 1995.

Khazanov, Anatoly. “Ethnic Situation in the Soviet Union as Reflected in Soviet Anthropology,” Cahier du Monde Russe et Sovietique, XXXI, no.2-3 (1990), pp.213-222.

Khazanov, Anatoly. “The Collapse of the Soviet Union: Nationalism during Perestroika and Afterwards.” Nationalities Papers, vol.22, no.1 (1994), pp.157-174.

Kho, songmo. Soryeon Chungang Asia-iu Hanindul. Seoul: Hankuk Kukje Munwha Hyup Heo, 1984.

Kho, Songmoo. Koreans in Soviet Central Asia. Finland: Finish Oriental Society, 1987.

Kim, En Un. “Iz zhizni mezhdunarodnoi konferentsii koreiskikh assotsiatsii,” in F. Ran Kim (ed.), Aktual’nye problemy rossiiskogo vostokovedeniia. Moscow: 1994.

Kim, German and D.V. Men. Istoriia i kul'tura koreitsev Kazakhstana. Almaty: Gylym, 1995.

Kim, German and Eng Sob Sim. Isotriia Prosveshchennia Koreitsev Rossii I Kazakhstana. Vtoraia Polovina 19 v.-2000 g. Almaty: Kazak Universiteti, 2000.

307

Kim, German and Valeriy Khan. “The Korean Movement in Kazakhstan: Ten years later.” Korean and Korean American Studies Bulletin, vol.12, no.2/3 (2001).

Kim, German, Koreitsy Kazakhstana i srednei azii v zarubezhnykh issledovaniiakh. Almaty: Daik, 1990.

Kim, German. Kore Saram: Istoriografiia i Bibliografiia. Almaty: Kazak Universiteti, 2000.

Kim, German. Istoria immigratsii Koreitsev. Kniga Pervaia. Vtoraia polovina 19 v.~1945 g. Almaty: Daik Press, 1999.

Kim, German. “Topical problems of Korean Diaspora in Kazakhstan.” Izvestiia koreevedeniia Kazakhstana, vol.1 (1996), pp.80-87.

Kim, Syn Khva. Ocherki po istoriia sovetskikh koreitsev. Almaty: Nauka, 1965.

King, Charles and Melvin J. Neil. “Diaspora Politics: Ethnic Linkages, Foreign Policy, and Security in Eurasia.” International Security, vol.24, no.3 (1999), pp.108-138.

KOICA, Annual Report 2004. Seoul: KOICA, 2004.

Kolstoe, Paul. “Anticipating Demographic Superiority: Kazakh Thinking on Integration and Nation Building.” Europe and Asia Studies, vol.50, no.1 (1998), pp.51-68.

Kolstoe, Paul. Russians in the Former Soviet Republics. London: Hurst, 1995.

Korea EXIM Bank. Uzbekistan Kukga Hyun Whang mit Jinchul Bang-an. Seoul: 2005.

Kreinder, Isabelle. “The Soviet Deported Nationalities: A Summary and Update.” Soviet Studies 38, no.3 (1986), pp.387-405.

Lemercier-Quelquejay, Chantal. “From Tribe to Umma.” Central Asian Survey, vol.3, no.3 (1984), pp.15-26.

308

Lerner, Daniel. “Book review: Mass Media and National Development by Wilbur Schramm, 1964.” Economic Development and Cultural Change, vol.14, no.2 (1966), pp.440-441.

Lerner, Daniel. The passing of traditional society: Modernizing the Middle East. New York: Free Press, 1958.

Li, U Khe and Enun Kim. Belaia Kniga. O deportatsii Koreiskogo naseleniia rossii v 30-40kh godakh. Moscow: Interpraks, 1992.

Lim, Young-Sang. “A Research on Non-Governmental/ non-profitable network of ethnic Korean in CIS countries: Focused on Euro-Russian Area and Central Asian Countries, Overseas Korean Foundation Project Paper series. Seoul, 2002.

Lubin, Nancy. “Implication of ethnic and demographic trends,” in Willam Fierman (ed.), Soviet Central Asia: The failed transformation. Boulder: Westview Press, 1991.

Lubin, Nancy. “Views of Leadership in Uzbekistan and Kazakstan,” in Timothy J. Colton and Robert C. Tucker (eds.), Patterns in Post-Soviet Leadership. Bolder: Westview Press, 1995.

Martin, Terry. “The Origins of Soviet Ethnic Cleansing.” The Journal of Modern History, vol.70, no.4 (1998), pp.813-862.

Martin, Terry. The Affirmative Action Empire, Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001.

Masanov, Nursultan. “Perceptions of Ethnic and All-National identity in Kazakhstan,” in Middle East Series, no.51, The Nationalities Question in Post- Soviet Kazakhstan. International Eurasian Institute for Economic and Political Research, 2002.

Masanov, Nursultan. Ethnopoliticheskii monitoring v Kazakhstane. Almaty: Edition 1, ARKOR, Fall, 1995.

309 Melvin, Neil., Russians beyond Russia’s Borders. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995.

Mendibayev, Sagyndyk. “Russkiy vopros i Nazarbayev,” Tsentral’noaziatkiy Byulleten (29 May 2000) in IAC Eurasia

Morgenthau, Hans J. Politics Among Nations: the Struggle for Power and Peace. New York: Knopf, 1973.

Nazarbaev, Nursultan. Kazakhstan 2030. Almaty: Bilim, 1997.

Nekrich, Aleksandr, The Punished Peoples: The Deportation and Fate of Soviet Minorities at the end of the Second World War. New York: Norton, 1978.

Nikolai Bugai, “Tragicheskie sobytiia ne dolzhny potorit’sia,” Aktual’nye probelmy rossiiskogo vostokovedeniia (Moscow: 1994), p.115.

Oh, Chong Jin. “Diaspora Nationalism: the case of ethnic Korean minority in Kazakhstan and its lessons from the Crimean Tatars in Turkey.” Nationalities Paper, vol. 34, no.2 (May, 2006), pp. 111-130.

Oka, Natsuko. “The Korean Diaspora in Nationalizing Kazakstan: Strategies for Survival as an ethnic minority.” Korean and Korean American Studies Bulletin, vol.12, no.2/3 (2001)., pp.89-113.

Olcott, Martha Brill. “Post-Soviets Kazakhstan: The Demographics of Ethnic Politics.” Problems of Post Communism, vol.42, no.2 (1995), pp.24-28.

Olcott, Martha Brill. “Central Asia’s Political Crisis,” in Dale F. Eickelman (ed.), Russia’s Muslim Frontiers. Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1993.

Olcott, Martha Brill. “The collectivization drive in Kazakhstan.” Russian Review, vol.40, no.2 (1981), pp.122-142.

Olcott, Martha Brill. Central Asia’s New State: Independence, Foreign Policy and Regional Security. Washington D.C.: United States Institute for Peace Press, 1996.

310

Olcott, Martha Brill. The Kazakhs. Standford, 1987.

Overseas Koreans Foundation Brochure. Seoul: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2005.

Pak, Boris. “Kukkwon pital chonhu sigi chaeso manmoyong hanin tul ui hangil tujaeng chamga,” in Hanminjok Tonip Undongsa Nonchong. Seoul: Tamgudang, 1992.

Pak, Hwan. Rosia Hanin Minjok Undongsa. Seoul: Tamgudang, 1995.

Pak, A.D. Demograficheskaia Kharakteristika Koreitsev Kazakhstana. Almaty, 2002.

Panesh, E.Kh. and L.B. Ermolov, “Meskhetinsky Turks Under the Conditions of the Modern Ethnic Process in the USSR.” Belleten, vol.LVII, no.219 (1994), pp. 589-607.

Payin, Emil. “The Tragedy of the Meskhetian Turks.” Cultural Survival Quarterly (Winter, 1992), pp.31-37.

Pioro, Tadeusz. “Sparring with the Kazakh President.” Transitions, vol.4. no.1 (1997).

Rakowska-Harmstone, Theresa. “Introduction,” in ed., William Fierman, Soviet Central Asia: The failed transformation. Boulder: Westview Press, 1991.

Rakowska-Harmstone, Teresa. “Islam and Nationalism in Central Asia.” Central Asian Survey, vol.2. no.2 (1983), 1-19.

Ray, Kakoli. “Repatriation and De-terriotorialization: Meskhetian Turks’ Conception of Home,” Journal of Refugee Studies, vol.13, no.4 (2000), pp.391-414.

Robert Redfield, Ralph Linton, and Melville Herskovits, “Memorandum for the Study of Acculturation,” American Anthropologist, vol.38, no.1 (1936), p.149-152.

311 Robins, Philip. “Between Sentiment Self-interest: Turkey’s policy toward Azerbaijan and Central Asian states.” Middle East Journal, vol.47, no.4 (1993), pp.593-610.

Rorlich, Azade-Ayse. “Islam, Identity and Politics: Kazakstan, 1990-2000.” Nationalities Papers, vol. 31, no.2 (June, 2003), pp.157-176.

Rogers, Everett. “Communication and development: The passing of the dominant paradigm,” in Everett M. Rogers (ed.), Communication and development: Critical perspectives. California: Sage, 1976.

Roy, Olivier. The New Central Asia: The Creation of Nations. New York: New York University Press, 2000.

Rywkin, Michael. “Cadre Competition in Uzbekistan: the Ethnic Aspect.” Central Asian Survey, vol.3, no.3/4 (1986), pp.183-194.

Rywkin, Michael. Moscow’s Muslim Challenge: Soviet Central Asia. New York: M.E Sharpe, 1990.

Safdar, Saba, Clarry Lay and Ward Struthers, “The Process of Acculturation and Basic Goals: Testing an Multidimensional Individual Difference Acculturation Model with Iranian immigrants in Canada.” Applied Psychology: An International Review, vol.52, no.4 (2003), pp.555-579.

Safran, William. “Diasporas in modern societies: myths of homeland and return.” Diaspora, vol.1, no.1 (1991), pp.83-99.

Safran, William. “Comparing Diaspora: A Review Essay.” Diaspora, vol.8, no.3 (1999), pp.255-291.

Sahin, Haluk and Asu Aksoy. “Global Media and Cultural Identity in Turkey.” Journal of Communication, vol.43, no.2 (1993), pp.31-42.

Sarsembayev, Azamat. “Imagined Communities: Kazak Nationalism and Kazakification in the 1990s.” Central Asian Survey, vol.18, no.3 (1999), pp.319-346.

312

Scheffer, Garbriel. “Ethno-national Diasporas and Security.” Survival 35, no.1. (Spring, 1994), pp.60-79.

Schendel, Willem van and Erik Zurcher, “Opting out, opting in, exclusion and assimilation: States and nations in the Twentieth century,” in Willem van Shendel and Erik Zurcher (eds.), Identity Politics in Central Asia and the Muslim world. London: I.B. Tauris Publisher, 2001.

Schmitz, Paul. “Acculturation and Adaptation Processes among Immigrants in Germany,” in Anne-Marie Bouvy, Fons van de Vijver, Pawel Boski, and Paul Schmitz (eds.), Journeys into Cross-Culture Psychology. Amsterdam: Swets & Zeitlinger, 1994.

Schopflin, Geroge. “Nationhood, communism and state legitimating.” Nations and Nationalism vol.1, no.1 (1995), pp.81-91.

Sheehy, Ann and Bohdan Nahaylo. The Crimean Tatars, Volga Germans and Meskhetians: Soviet Treatment of Some National Minorities. London: Minority Rights Group, 1980.

Sheffer, Gabriel. “A new field of study: Modern diasporas in international politics,” in Gabriel Sheffer (ed.), Modern diasporas in international politics. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986.

Sheffer, Garbriel. Diaspora Politics at Home Abroad. Cambridge University Press, 2000.

Shlapentokh, Vladimir., M. Sendich and E. Payin (eds.), The New Russian Diaspora: Russian Minorities in the Former Soviet Republics. New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1994.

Skrbis, Zlatko, Long-distance Nationalism: Diaspora, homelands and identities. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 1999.

Smith, Anthony D. The Ethnic Origins of Nation. Oxford: Blackwell, 1986.

Smith, Anthony. National Identity. London: Penguin Books, 1991.

313

Smith, Graham. “Post-colonialism and Borderland identities,” in Graham Smith, Edward Allworth, Vivien Law, Andrew Wilson, and Annette Bohr (eds.), Nation-building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands. The Politics of National Identities. Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Smith, Graham. The Nationalities Question in the Post-Soviet States. London: Longman, 1996.

Strakes, Jason. “Tools of Political management in the New Central Asian Republics.” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, vol.26, no.1 (2006), pp.87-99.

Suh, Dae sook. The Korean Communist Movement, 1918-1948. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967.

Suny, Ronal G. The revenge of the past: Nationalism, revolution, and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993.

Szporluk, Roman. “Statehood and Nation-building in Post-Soviet Space,” in Roman Szporluk (ed.), National Identity and Ethnicity in the New States of Eurasia. London: M.E. Sharpe, 1994.

Taras, Ray. “Making Sense of Matrioshka Nationalism,” in Ian Bremmer and Ray Taras (eds.), Nations and Politics in the Soviet Successor States. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

Teheranian, Majid. “Communications and national development: Reflections on theories and policies,” in Majid Teheranian, Farhad Hakimzadeh, and Marcello Vidale (eds.), Communication policy for national development. London: Routledge & Kegan Pou, 1977.

Tishkov, Valeriy. Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in and after the Soviet Union. The Mind Aflame. London: Sage Publication, 1997.

Tolz, Vera. “New information about the Deportation of Ethnic Groups under Stalin.” Report on the USSR, vol.3, no.17 (1991), pp.16-20.

314 Tskhai, Iurii et al., Assotsiatsiia Koreitsev Kazakhstana – 10 let. Almaty: Daik Press, 2000.

Uehling, Greta Lynn. “The Crimean Tatars in Uzbekistan: Speaking with the dead and living homeland.” Central Asian Survey vol. 20, no.3 (2001), pp.391-404.

Um, Hae-Kyung. “The Korean Diaspora in Uzbekistan and Kazakstan: Social Change, Identity and Music Making”, in Kirsten Schulze, Martin Stokes, and Colm Campbell (eds.), Nationalism, Minorities and Diaspora Identities and Rights in the Middle East. London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1996.

Vaisman, Demian. “Regionalism and Clan Loyalty in the Political life of Uzbekistan,” in Yaacov Ro’i (ed.), Muslim Eurasia: Conflicting Legacies. London: Frank Cass, 1995.

Veyseloğlu, Ali Paşa. Ahıska Türkleri’nin Drami. Ankara: Ocak, 1999.

Wada, Haruki. “Koreans in the Soviet Far East, 1917-1937,” in Dae-Sook Suh (ed.), Koreans in the Soviet Union. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987.

Watson, Michael. Contemporary Minority Nationalism. New York: Routledge, 1990.

Weitz, Eric. “Racial Politics without the concept of Race: Reevaluating Soviet Ethnic and National Purges.” Slavic Review (Spring, 2002), pp.1-29.

Wimbush, Ender and Ronald Wixman. “The Meskhetian Turks: A New Voice in Soviet Central Asia.” Canadian Slavonic Papers, vol.17. no.2/3 (1975), pp.320-340.

Zardykhan, Zharmukhamed. “Russians in Kazakhstan and Demographic Change: Imperial Legacy and the Kazakh Way of Nation Building.” Asian Ethnicity, vol.5, no.1 (2004), pp.61-79.

Zemtsov, Ilya. “Andropov and the Non-Russian Nationalities: Attitudes and Policies.” Nationalities Paper, vol. 8, no.5 (1985), pp.5-23.

Zeyrek, Yunus. Dünden Bügüne Ahıska Türklügü. Frankfurt: Turk Federasyon Yayınları, 1995.

315 Appendix 1

* Example of the Kazakstan Passport indicating ethnic identification so-called ‘fifth column’ during the Soviet period.

316 Appendix 2

317 Appendix 3

LEGISLATION ESTABLISHLNG THE AHISKA TURKS’ RECEPTION AND SETTLEMENT IN TURKEY

Legislation Number: 3835 Date of admission: 2/7/1992 Published in Official Journal: Date: 11/7/1992 No: 21281 Published in Code of Laws: Disposition: 5 Vol: 31 Page:

Article 1: Among our compatriots who are living dispersed on the republics making up the old Soviet Union and who are named as "Ahıska" Turks, those who are willing to come to Turkey will be received as free or settled immigrants, with priority given to those within the most difficult conditions, and on condition that they do not exceed the annual number to be determined by the Council of Ministers. Their acceptance and settlement is to be conducted according to the sentences of the present Legislation and the Legislation for Settlement numbered 2510.

In the settlement that will be conducted by giving property, the governors and lieutenant governors will be in authority. On the table of conveyance, all the family members are given equal share and are to be registered to the title-deed just as it appears on the conveyance.

Article 2: In order to fulfill the tasks that are determined in the article 3. a high commission is to be established under the coordination of a State Minister who will be charged by the Prime Minister, and composed of authorities from the Ministries of Internal Affairs. Foreign Affairs, Finance and Tariff, Public Education, Development and Settlement. Health, Transport, Agriculture and Village Affairs, and Forest; the Undersecretaryship of the State Planning Organization, the Undersecretaryship of the Treasury and External Commerce, the General Presidency of the Turkish (Kızılay) Association, and the Foundation of the Instigation of Social Aid and Solidarity.

As attached to the high commission, sub commissions, composed of directors of L-: branches and institutions of the ministries and establishments of the provinces indicated in the first article, are to be established in the provinces to be determined by the Ministry of State, under the presidency of the governor or those to be brought in charge by him, and the specificity of the issue being considered.

Article 3: The tasks of the high commission are as follows: a) To determine the conditions of reception, transitory and permanent places of settlement of the Ahiska Turks arriving in Turkey as immigrants,

318 b) To prepare the programmes of Placement and Settlement, c) To take the necessary measures in order to provide the immigrants with employment, d) To fix those among the Ahıska Turks who are willing to immigrate to Turkey and to ensure that they are assembled from their places of residence and departure to Turkey, to plan the operations to be conducted concerning the issues of board, lodging and health, to establish a coordination committee to provide coordination with the authorities of their current countries of residence, e) To determine the amount of the fund provided for the expenditure by the coordination committee, and for the transport of the immigrants from their current places of residence, their lodging and settlement, f) To fulfill other tasks to be allocated by the Prime Ministry and the Council of Ministers. The decisions of the high commission gain certainty by the ratification of the State Minister in charge.

Article 4: All personal and household belongings of the immigrants and all kinds of furniture and animals kept for breeding that are documented as belonging to themselves, are exempted from all kinds of taxes, customs duties and fees in the condition that they are brought to Turkey in one consignment.

Article 5: Meeting the cost of the transport and settlement of the immigrants as well as the necessary funds for their other expenditures is to be given priority. In order to meet these demands, in accordance with transferring from the relevant sections of the budget of the Ministry of Finance and Tariffs to the sections which are existing or which are to be reactivated within the budgets of the relevant ministries and foundations, or for making payments to Turkish Red-Crescent (Kizilay) and conducting other operations connected to these.

Article 6: Among the “Ahıska” Turks whether they will be settled in Turkey or stay in the new states within the borders of the old Soviet Union in which they are currently residing, the status of double citizenship is to be provided to those determined to be eligible by the Council of Ministers.

Article 7: The present Legislaition is valid by its date of publication

Article 8: The sentences of the present Legislation are to be executed by the Council of Ministers

319