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CARTER HAS SOLID LEAD OVER FORD, REAGAN for Release: June 24, 1976 by Louis Harris B with His First Ballot Nomination Now Virtually Assured, Former Georgia Gov

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CARTER HAS SOLID LEAD OVER FORD, REAGAN for Release: June 24, 1976 by Louis Harris B with His First Ballot Nomination Now Virtually Assured, Former Georgia Gov The Harris Survey CARTER HAS SOLID LEAD OVER FORD, REAGAN For Release: June 24, 1976 By Louis Harris b With his first ballot nomination now virtually assured, former Georgia Gov. Jimmy Carter has aoved out to a sweeping 53-40% lead over President Ford and a much wider 58-352 margin over former Calif. Gov. Ronald Re.~;;cn, according to the latest Harris Survey, held in mid-June. The base of Carter's strength is his apparent ability to carry his hone area of the South. He leads Gerald Ford in the border states by 68-29% and in the deep South by 57-38%. He is ahead of Ronnld Reagan in tkc region by almost the same margin: 68-28% in the border states and 55-372 in the deep South. He is the first Democrat in 12 years to demonstrate a capacity to win a solid South. The reason for Carter's current wide lead in this latest poll of 1,480 registered and likely voters is that traditional Democratic groups have rallied behind his candidacy now that the primary season is over. --Among labor union members, Carter leads the President by 61-33% and Reagan by 64-30%. --Among blacks, he holds a 71-17% edge over Mr. Ford and a 75-119: spread over the former California governor. --Among people who view themselves as liberals, Carter is ahead against President Ford by 67-27% and against Ronald Reagan by 76-182. -Among Catholics, he runs well ahead of the President by 53-409: and he beats Reagan by a more sizable 58-36%. -Among Jewish voters, a problem for him in the primaries, Carter leads President Ford by 61-262 and Reagan by 70-18%. --Among Denocrats, carter's massive 72-21% lead over Gerald Ford and his 73-202 edge over Ronald Reagan are impressive by the standards of the last two presidential elections, when the Republican candidate was able to garner between 31 to 40% of the Democratic vote. Significantly, Carter wins the vote of those who cast their ballots for George HcGovern four years ago by 73-152 against President Ford and by a higher 80-129: against former Governor Reagan. Apart from the traditional Democratic groups who appear to be coming back to the fold under Carter's banner, there are two other groups with whom he makes a particularly impressive showing: --Among young people under 30, who have not notably backed Carter in the spring primaries, he is now ahead by 60-36% against Mr. Ford and by 63-309. against Reagan. --Among voters in the $10,000 to $15,000 income bracket, he is ahead of President Ford by a wide 58-36% and ahead of Ronald Reagan by 60-34%. b Despite Carter's broad-based support, there are some key segments of the electorate where the vote is close: --In the Midwest, the President leads the Georgian by a narrow 48-46%. although Reagan trails him there by 51-42%. --In the West, where Carter did poorly in the primaries, he has now moved out to a slim 51-459: edge over President Ford and a wider 52-412 over Reagan. --Among the college educated voters, a rising part of the electorate, Carter holds no better than a 48-45% lead over the President, but a much more sizable margin of 54-382 over Reagan. --Among suburban residents, Carter now holds a 50-439. edge over Gerald Ford, but a much higher 58-36% lead over Reagan. --Among professional people, the Carter lead over the President is a narrow 48-46%. but in the case of Reagan, it is a much bigger 57-362. --Among people earning $15,000 and over a year, Jimmy Carter is running ahead of Mr. Ford by a close 48-45%, but is far ahead of Ronald Reagan by 56-372. --Among independent voters, Carter is ahead of the President by a realtively close 48-43%, but he leads Reagan by 55-342. These latest results indicate that if Ford is going to close the gap with Carter, he will have to make it among voters in the Midwest, the West, the college educated, suburban dwellers, professionals, those in the upper income brackets and independents. Taken in the aggregate, the more affluent, educated and mobile voters hzve become the real balance of power in American politics in recent years. It is precisely among these nore affluent and educated voters that Reagan makes his poorest shewing, ar.d this accounts for the fact that he is 23 points behind Carter while the President trails him by a smaller 13 points. ~eagan'sbest bet for closing ground on Carter might be the deep South and the border states. However, the Califor- nian does no better in those regions than the President does. But there is another discouraging note for the Republicans. The contest between President Ford and forner Cov. Reagan is so fierce and partisan that 442 of those GOP voters who prefer Reagan say they will cast their ballots for Carter if their favorite is not chosen at the Republican convention. For their part, 49% of the Ford supporters threaten to vote Democratic if the President is not nominated. TABLES TABLES 4 Between June 9 and 14, the Harris Survey asked a cross section of 1,680 people who were registered and had voted in 1972 or 1974 or said they were certain to register in 1976: "suppose for President this November, it were between Gerald Ford for the Republicans and Jimmy Carter for the Democrats. If you had to make up your mind right now, would you vote for Ford the Republican or for Carter the Democrat?" FORD VS. CARTER Total voters X Ford Carter Not sure The Harris Survey also asked: "Now suppose for President this November, it were between Ronald Reagan for the Republicans and JhyCarter for the Democrats. If you had to make up your mind right now, would you vote for Reagan the Republican or for Carter the Democrat?" REAGAN VS. CARTER Total voters X Reagan 35 Carter 58 Not sure 7 Copyright 1976 by the Chicago Tribune. World Rights Reserved. 76: 53 .
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