A Black Swan in the Money Market
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September 18, 2019
September 18, 2019 Overnight Borrowing Liquidity Issues Overnight borrowing rates have spiked unexpectedly this week, raising questions about whether there’s a looming liquidity issue in the market. The NY Fed implemented borderline-emergency measures to inject liquidity this week. It bought $50B in Treasurys yesterday and will buy another $75B today. The basic mechanism is that the Fed will overpay a bank to buy some of its Treasury holdings. This gives the banks cash, which in turn they can lend to other banks. Liquidity. Or as some might call it, Quantitative Easing. Jay Powell won’t call it that, but some might… The headline culprits according to the talking heads I trust the least: 1. Corporate tax bills - money was withdrawn from bank and money market accounts to pay quarterly and annual taxes (Monday was the corporate extension deadline), which reduced the amount available as deposits to banks 2. Last week’s Treasury auction - the cash payment for the $78B T auction was due yesterday and banks typically pay for their Treasurys by borrowing in the overnight market Call me a cynic, but while these may be contributing factors, are they really to blame for a liquidity event that caused some borrowing rates to spike 3x? We were hearing from traders that repo rates got as high as 8% - 10%. Think about it – you are contractually obligated to buy something (or pay for something), you will pay 10% for one night of borrower if you have to, right? How high does the interest rate need to go before you willingly default on whatever it was that required you to go borrow in the first place? Banks don’t borrower the way consumers borrower. -
Interbank Offered Rates (Ibors) and Alternative Reference Rates (Arrs)
VERSION: 24 SEPTEMBER 2020 Interbank Offered Rates (IBORs) and Alternative Reference Rates (ARRs) The following table has been compiled on the basis of publicly available information. Whilst reasonable care has been taken to ensure that the information in the table is accurate as at the date that the table was last revised, no warranty or representation is given as to the information in the table. The information in the table is a summary, is not exhaustive and is subject to change. Key Multiple-rate approach (IBOR + RFR) Moving to RFR only IBOR only Basis on Development of Expected/ Expected fall which forward-looking likely fall- back rate to IBOR is Expected ARR? back rate to the ARR (if 3 Expected being Date from date by the IBOR2 applicable) discontinu continued which which ation date (if Alternative ARR will replaceme for IBOR applicable Reference be nt of IBOR Currency IBOR (if any) )1 Rate published is needed ARS BAIBAR TBC TBC TBC TBC TBC TBC TBC (Argentina) 1 Information in this column is taken from Financial Stability Board “Reforming major interest rate benchmarks” progress reports and other publicly available English language sources. 2 This column sets out current expectations based on publicly available information but in many cases no formal decisions have been taken or announcements made. This column will be revisited and revised following publication of the ISDA 2020 IBOR Fallbacks Protocol. References in this column to a rate being “Adjusted” are to such rate with adjustments being made (i) to reflect the fact that the applicable ARR may be an overnight rate while the IBOR rate will be a term rate and (ii) to add a spread. -
Cra Ratings of Massachusetts Banks, Credit Unions, and Licensed Mortgage Lenders in 2016
CRA RATINGS OF MASSACHUSETTS BANKS, CREDIT UNIONS, AND LICENSED MORTGAGE LENDERS IN 2016 MAHA's Twenty-Sixth Annual Report on How Well Lenders and Regulators Are Meeting Their Obligations Under the Community Reinvestment Act Prepared for the Massachusetts Affordable Housing Alliance 1803 Dorchester Avenue Dorchester MA 02124 mahahome.org by Jim Campen Professor Emeritus of Economics University of Massachusetts/Boston [email protected] January 2017 INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS Since 1990, state and federal bank regulators have been required to make public their ratings of the performance of individual banks in serving the credit needs of local communities, in accordance with the provisions of the federal Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) and its Massachusetts counterpart. And since 1991, the Massachusetts Affordable Housing Alliance (MAHA) has issued annual reports offering a comprehensive listing and analysis of all CRA ratings of Massachusetts banks and credit unions. This is the twenty-sixth report in this annual series. Since 2011 these reports have also included information on the CRA-like ratings of licensed mortgage lenders issued by the state’s Division of Banks in accordance with its CRA for Mortgage Lenders regulation. As defined for this report, there were 153 “Massachusetts banks” as of December 31, 2016. This includes not only 131 banks that have headquarters in the state, but also 22 banks based elsewhere that have one or more branch offices in Massachusetts.1 Table A-1 provides a listing of the 153 Massachusetts -
20. the Policy Conundrum of Financial Market Complexity Hilton
20. The Policy Conundrum of Financial Market Complexity Hilton L. Root George Mason University “Your own best footstep may unleash the very cascade that carries you away, and neither you nor anyone else can predict which grain will unleash the tiny or the cataclysmic alteration.” —Stuart Kauffman The Origins of Order: Self-Organization and Selection in Evolution (Kauffman 1993) Abstract: The first global financial sector crash eludes conventional assessments of sector risk. Singling out the usual culprits—the housing bubble, executive pay, regulators, rating agencies, risk models, and global imbalances—fails to explain either the unpredictability or the rapidity of the collapse of 2008, which in many ways resembled the avalanche of a sand pile, where at some point of criticality, avalanches occur that bear no relationship to the grain of sand that triggered them. Since appropriate financial regulation is part of the remedy, policymakers should recognize that success will depend on a more refined knowledge of why some initial events may have prompted an avalanche, while others did not. 1 I. ECONOMICS AND THE SAND PILE A pile of sand. What could be a less likely metaphor for a global financial system that contains close to $200 trillion in assets worldwide? Yet an avalanche in that sand pile caused a colossal financial meltdown that destroyed at least 15 percent of national wealth in the United States alone.1 Which grain of sand triggered the avalanche? We cannot know with certainty where it was or why it moved. Conventional risk models used by economists are poor at predicting which set or category of transactions pushed the markets into a system-wide free fall, and they fail completely at expressing the market in collapse. -
OCC, Report of the Ombudsman (2005-2006)
Appendix A OCC Formal Enforcement Actions in the Consumer Protection Area 2009: • Florida Capital Bank, N.A., Jacksonville, Florida (formal agreement – March 26, 2009). We required the bank to strengthen internal controls to improve compliance with applicable consumer laws and regulations. • National Bank of Arkansas, North Little Rock, Arkansas (formal agreement – March 30, 2009). We required the bank to strengthen internal controls to improve compliance with applicable consumer laws and regulations. • Merchants Bank of California N.A., Carson, California (formal agreement – March 31, 2009). We required the bank to strengthen internal controls to improve its information security program and to improve compliance with applicable consumer laws and regulations. • Ozark Heritage Bank, N.A., Mountain View, Arkansas (operating agreement – Apr. 10, 2009). We required the bank to adopt and ensure adherence to a written consumer compliance program. • Farmers and Merchants National Bank of Hatton, Hatton, North Dakota (formal agreement – May 11, 2009). We required the bank to strengthen internal controls to improve compliance with applicable consumer laws and regulations. • Stone County National Bank, Crane, Missouri (formal agreement – June 25, 2009). We required the bank to strengthen internal controls to improve compliance with applicable consumer laws and regulations and to strengthen internal controls to improve its information security program. • Union National Community Bank, Lancaster, Pennsylvania (formal agreement – Aug. 27, 2009). We required the bank to strengthen internal controls to improve compliance with applicable consumer laws and regulations. 2008: • Crown Bank N.A., Ocean City, New Jersey (consent order – Feb. 19, 2008). We required the bank to pay a civil money penalty of $7,500 for violations of HMDA and its implementing regulation. -
Libor's Long Goodbye
LIBOR’S LONG GOODBYE Readiness for LIBOR transition TRANSACTIONAL POWERHOUSE 1 CASE0155238_Report_Print Ready.indd 1 21/07/2020 12:06:23 Introduction As has been noted in a continuous drumbeat of warnings from major global, regional and local regulatory bodies, LIBOR is expected to go away at the end of 2021, when the UK Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) has announced it will withdraw support for the rate. This deadline was first announced This report also includes a matrix written, in each case that mature in a speech by Andrew Bailey, chief showing an assessment of readiness after 2021. The official sector executive of the FCA, in July 2017. for transition by currency and product of regulators and central banks Since more than half of the roughly type. As we’ve noted previously, continues to stress the need to four-and-a-half-year-period that that LIBOR transition is at different develop robust alternative reference speech gave until the deadline has stages of progress in different rates and robust contractual fallbacks now elapsed, it is perhaps fitting to jurisdictions and with respect to in the event that LIBOR were to consider how far markets have come different financial products. cease or become unrepresentative in LIBOR transition, and how much of underlying financial reality, and to further they need to go. LIBOR transition remains a transition to such alternative rates. fundamental issue confronting Despite the uncertainty that exists, the This report assesses the state of financial markets. To date, transition FCA has stated firmly that the end-2021 readiness for transition from LIBOR has been slower than regulators deadline remains in effect, a statement (and other interbank offered rates would like, and considerable it reiterated on 25 March 2020 in (IBORs)) to alternative interest rates uncertainty still exists (and may response to the Covid-19 pandemic. -
FEDERAL FUNDS Marvin Goodfriend and William Whelpley
Page 7 The information in this chapter was last updated in 1993. Since the money market evolves very rapidly, recent developments may have superseded some of the content of this chapter. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Richmond, Virginia 1998 Chapter 2 FEDERAL FUNDS Marvin Goodfriend and William Whelpley Federal funds are the heart of the money market in the sense that they are the core of the overnight market for credit in the United States. Moreover, current and expected interest rates on federal funds are the basic rates to which all other money market rates are anchored. Understanding the federal funds market requires, above all, recognizing that its general character has been shaped by Federal Reserve policy. From the beginning, Federal Reserve regulatory rulings have encouraged the market's growth. Equally important, the federal funds rate has been a key monetary policy instrument. This chapter explains federal funds as a credit instrument, the funds rate as an instrument of monetary policy, and the funds market itself as an instrument of regulatory policy. CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL FUNDS Three features taken together distinguish federal funds from other money market instruments. First, they are short-term borrowings of immediately available money—funds which can be transferred between depository institutions within a single business day. In 1991, nearly three-quarters of federal funds were overnight borrowings. The remainder were longer maturity borrowings known as term federal funds. Second, federal funds can be borrowed by only those depository institutions that are required by the Monetary Control Act of 1980 to hold reserves with Federal Reserve Banks. -
Stressed, Not Frozen: the Federal Funds Market in the Financial Crisis
Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports Stressed, Not Frozen: The Federal Funds Market in the Financial Crisis Gara Afonso Anna Kovner Antoinette Schoar Staff Report no. 437 March 2010 Revised May 2011 This paper presents preliminary findings and is being distributed to economists and other interested readers solely to stimulate discussion and elicit comments. The views expressed in the paper are those of the authors and are not necessarily reflective of views at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System. Any errors or omissions are the responsibility of the authors. Stressed, Not Frozen: The Federal Funds Market in the Financial Crisis Gara Afonso, Anna Kovner, and Antoinette Schoar Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports, no. 437 March 2010; revised May 2011 JEL classification: G21, G01, D40, E40 Abstract We examine the importance of liquidity hoarding and counterparty risk in the U.S. overnight interbank market during the financial crisis of 2008. Our findings suggest that counterparty risk plays a larger role than does liquidity hoarding: the day after Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy, loan terms become more sensitive to borrower characteristics. In particular, poorly performing large banks see an increase in spreads of 25 basis points, but are borrowing 1 percent less, on average. Worse performing banks do not hoard liquidity. While the interbank market does not freeze entirely, it does not seem to expand to meet latent demand. Key words: fed funds, financial crisis, liquidity, interbank lending, hoarding Afonso: Federal Reserve Bank of New York (e-mail: [email protected]). -
Trade Dynamics in the Market for Federal Funds∗
Trade Dynamics in the Market for Federal Funds∗ Gara Afonso Ricardo Lagos Federal Reserve Bank of New York New York University February 2012 Abstract We develop a model of the market for federal funds that explicitly accounts for its two distinctive features: banks have to search for a suitable counterparty, and once they have met, both parties negotiate the size of the loan and the repayment. The theory is used to answer a number of positive and normative questions: What are the determinants of the fed funds rate? How does the market reallocate funds? Is the market able to achieve an efficient reallocation of funds? We also use the model for theoretical and quantitative analyses of policy issues facing modern central banks. Keywords: Fed funds market, search, bargaining, over-the-counter JEL Classification: G1, C78, D83, E44 ∗We are especially grateful to Todd Keister for his generous feedback at various stages, and to Darrell Duffie for his discussion at the 2011 NBER Asset Pricing Meeting in Stanford. We also thank Tan Wang, our discussant at the 46th Annual Conference of the Western Finance Association. The views expressed in the paper are those of the authors and are not necessarily reflective of views at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System. 1 Introduction In the United States, financial institutions keep reserve balances at the Federal Reserve Banks to meet requirements, earn interest, or to clear financial transactions. The market for federal funds is an interbank over-the-counter market for unsecured, mostly overnight loans of dollar reserves held at Federal Reserve Banks. -
Yi Gang: the Development of Shibor As a Market Benchmark (Central
Yi Gang: The development of Shibor as a market benchmark Speech by Mr Yi Gang, Deputy Governor of the People’s Bank of China, at the 2008 Shibor Work Conference, Beijing, 11 January 2008. * * * Thank you for your presence. Since its launch one year ago, Shibor has made remarkable progress. I’d like to share with you some of my observations. First, Shibor is for market participants. At the initial stage, central bank promotion is necessary. But Shibor, as a market benchmark, belongs to the market and all the market participants. All parties concerned including financial institutions, National Inter-bank Funding Center, National Association of Financial Market Institutional Investors shall have a full understanding of this, and actively play a role in the operations of Shibor as stakeholders. The success of Shibor relies on the joint efforts of all the stakeholders. Under the command economy, the central bank is the leader while commercial banks are followers. But from the current perspective of the central bank’s functions, the bipartite relationship varies on different occasions. In terms of monetary policies, the central bank, as the monetary authority, is the policy maker and regulator, while commercial banks are market participants and players. But in terms of market building, the relationship is not simply that of leader and followers, but of central bank and commercial banks in a market environment. This broad positioning and premise will have a direct bearing on how we behave. On the one hand, it requires the central bank to work as a service provider, a general designer and supervisor of the market. -
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Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Limited, Dubai (DIFC)
OFFERING CIRCULAR INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL BANK OF CHINA LIMITED, ACTING THROUGH INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL BANK OF CHINA LIMITED, DUBAI (DIFC) BRANCH (a joint stock company incorporated in the People’s Republic of China with limited liability) US$8,000,000,000 Euro Medium Term Note Programme ____________________ Under this US$8,000,000,000 Euro Medium Term Note Programme (the Programme), Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Limited, acting through Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Limited, Dubai (DIFC) Branch (the Issuer), subject to compliance with all relevant laws, regulations and directives, may from time to time issue notes (the Notes) denominated in any currency agreed between it and the relevant Dealer (as defined below). Notes may be issued in bearer or registered form (respectively Bearer Notes and Registered Notes). The maximum aggregate nominal amount of all Notes from time to time outstanding under the Programme will not exceed US$8,000,000,000 (or its equivalent in other currencies calculated as described in the Programme Agreement described herein), subject to increase as described herein. The Notes may be issued on a continuing basis to one or more of the Dealers specified under “Overview of the Programme” and any additional Dealer appointed by the Issuer under the Programme from time to time (each a Dealer and together the Dealers), which appointment may be for a specific issue or on an ongoing basis. References in this Offering Circular to the relevant Dealer shall, in the case of an issue of Notes being (or intended to be) subscribed by more than one Dealer, be to all Dealers agreeing to subscribe such Notes.