Peacetime Violence on the Maine Frontier, 1749-1772
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Sanctions for Slaughter: Peacetime Violence on the Maine Frontier, 1749-1772 DAVID L. GHERE and ALVIN H. MORRISON University of Minnesota SUNY-Fredonia (Emeritus) INTRODUCTION In Europe, the War of the Austrian Succession was decreed to be ended by the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, signed in October 1748. For the baroque jubilee of London's official celebration, George Frederick Handel was commissioned to compose "Music for the Royal Fireworks". But in Britain's North American colonies the mood was hardly that festive. Along the northeastern frontier, this conflict (which was known there as King George's War) was no less than the fifth de facto war between New Englanders and the Abenaki. Thus, by 1748, these old adversaries had learned from long, sad experience at least to mistrust each other. Many New Englanders went much further: they thoroughly hated the Abenaki, and that hatred was reciprocated by many Abenaki who had been driven off their ancestral lands by the English. Not all Abenaki had actively sided with the French in attacking New England's frontier settlements, and killing and capturing English settlers, but more than enough of them had been "French Indians" to taint the reputation of all Abenaki people as being a dangerous threat to all New Englanders. To those of the latter who still sought revenge against the Abenaki, learning that King George's War officially should cease could evoke little if any cheer. Furthermore, since disputed frontier issues were unresolved and no Anglo-Abenaki truce had been negotiated, some Abenaki frontier raids continued after the Anglo-French treaty had been signed. Instead of recognizing these as acts of autonomy (contradicting their basic assumptions about "French Indians"), New Englanders generally believed that the raids were evidence supporting their assump tion that the Indians were innately savage and treacherous. These Abenaki raids and the attitudes generated by them made it easier for New Englanders to justify acts of retaliation. 106 GHERE AND MORRISON Those who actually sought revenge against the Abenaki grew more adamant and, even if relatively few in number, had both direct and indirect supporters galore. Virtually all New Englanders must have felt at least let down if not actually betrayed by the Old English diplomats who signed the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle. In 1745, during their finest hour in King George's War, New England militiamen under William Pepperell had very proudly captured the great French fortress of Louisbourg on Cape Breton Island. Yet their pride was short-lived, for the 1748 Treaty gave Louisbourg back to France, prompting consternation and anger throughout New England. After that insult, many New Englanders showed little respect when English governments, Old or New, ordered a cease-fire — especially those on the Maine frontier, and in the settled towns north of Boston who long had experienced or expected French and Indian raids (Rawlyk 1967:158-9). With the treaty putting French and Canadian soldiers well out of range, the only targets left near at hand for New Englanders to vent their frustrations upon were the Abenaki. And, of course, nearest of all were those individual Abenaki who had the most interaction (and usually the friendliest relations) with English settlements. Thus the stage was set for the long series of killings with which this paper is concerned. All of them stem from New Englanders' doing violence to Abenaki during periods of supposed peace on the Maine frontier, starting in 1749. We will summarize the first case, assess the worst case, generalize about other cases, and consider an ironic sequel in the early 1800s. FIRST CASE: WISCASSET (2 DECEMBER 1749) Sporadic frontier raids continued until the summer of 1749, and Abenaki factionalism complicated efforts to negotiate peace (BM 23:303-323). It took Massachusetts leaders several months to get enough Abenaki bands to agree to attend a peace conference at Falmouth, Maine (MeHSC 4:145-167). Eventually, the lead item in the 2 November 1749 issue of the Boston Weekly News-Letter officially announced the signing of a peace treaty with the "Eastern Indians". Therein, Massachusetts Lt. Gov. Spencer Phipps proclaimed, in part, "I do hereby strictly command and require all his Majesty's good Subjects to live in Peace with the Indians...And not to commit any Acts of Violence or Hostility against the SANCTIONS FOR SLAUGHTER 107 said Indians, or give them any Trouble or Molestation." Yet exactly one month later, on 2 December, the "Wiscasset Incident" occurred. Wiscasset, Maine, on the Sheepscot River, was a rustic seaport village. Seven Massachusetts men, all apparently relatives or friends of Obadiah Albee, Sr., a recent settler from Massachusetts, appeared in Wiscasset, apparently as crewmen or passengers on a Massachusetts vessel in port. While there, they went out hunting — what for is unclear — and encountered a hunting encampment of peaceful Abenaki families, who were slowly heading back home from the Falmouth treaty confer ence. The whites fired on the Indians without provocation, killing one Indian man and wounding two others; they then tried to hide the dead man's body. Later, back in town, they bragged about their exploit (MA 31:666-685; Thayer 1899). Days went by before two Indian women were able to contact a magistrate in a nearby town. When law enforcement officers eventually got to Wiscasset, they were met by a mob and assaulted. Nonetheless, some of the accused men were arrested. Four soon were released officially. The apparent ringleader, Obadiah Albee, Jr., escaped on a schooner outbound for Marblehead, Massachusetts. Mob and escape problems would continue to dog this case. But let us now return to the Abenaki victims — all of them leaders at one level or another (BM 23:325-354). The dead man was Saccary Harry, also known as Hegen. He was a Norridgewock (Kennebec) who also had resided at Wawenock (Wol- inak/Becancour). The wounded men were Capt. Job, a Norridgewock, and Andrew, an Arosagunticook (Odanak/St. Francis). Thus, they were from three separate but related Abenaki bands. This greatly worried the Massachusetts governor and council, once they learned about the Wiscasset Incident, because it could cause a pan-Abenaki uprising, endangering the entire New England frontier, in this time of supposed peace (BM 23:366). For our analytical purposes, the Wiscasset case shows both Abenaki unity-in-separation (Kidder 1867:307-9) and Abenaki diaspora-and-retum (Haefeli and Sweeney 1994). Through connections of both descent and marriage, Abenaki bands were thoroughly interrelated, adaptively allowing their members shifting residence options. Since at least the 108 GHERE AND MORRISON early 1600s, first under Iroquois raids, then under English pressures, the Abenaki had survived by individuals, families, or entire villages vacating and regrouping in other places. This pattern included eventual reoccupa- tion of formerly abandoned sites, if and when this was feasible. The victims of the Wiscasset attack were back hunting in former Abenaki territory — the original Wawenock region in particular. Such flexibility and fluidity as this was difficult for the sedentary English to comprehend, and lack of understanding enhanced suspicions (Ghere 1993). Yet, if all Abenaki were one people, they were not all of one mind. In response to the Wiscasset incident, the Canadian Abenaki of Wolinak and Odanak were in favor of immediately exacting revenge upon the English settlers of the Wiscasset area. The confrontational factions of the Penobscot and Kennebec demanded swift and severe punishment for the men responsible for the death, but did not yet propose attacks on English settlers to avenge the atrocity. The conciliatory factions urged Massachu setts to "cover the blood" with compensatory presents. Consequently, along with expressions of their regret and condolences, Massachusetts officials distributed presents to each tribe, to the wounded, and to the deceased man's widow shortly after the incident. Furthermore, the officials gave well-intentioned promises of justice through the court system, and made impressive efforts to achieve that end, but the flood- tide of strong anti-Indian sentiment throughout the frontier prevented it (BM 23:363-8). Enroute to the far-off gaol in York (Maine), the two men arrested — Samuel Ball and Benjamin Ledite (both of whom had been soldiers in King George's War) — were freed by a mob in the Falmouth (Maine) area, and, despite a reward offered for them, were hidden away for weeks before being retaken. Meanwhile, Obadiah Albee, Jr. (also with a reward on his head) was at large in the Marblehead (Mass.) area until a justice of the peace personally arrested him, after a constable refused to do so. When Albee was placed in Salem gaol, the Essex County sheriff feared that a mob would release him. A February 1750 special court session at York was scheduled, but then called off when a judge became ill. When the regular court session was held at York in June 1750, the jury found Albee not guilty, and he was released (BM 12:34-35). SANCTIONS FOR SLAUGHTER 109 The Massachusetts governor and council were as embarrassed by the jury's verdict as the Abenaki were furious. To lessen the chances of Ball's and Ledite's trials being equally hollow, attempts were started to change their venues to the Boston area. However, the legislative body eventually killed that idea, further embarrassing the governor and council, who had invited Abenaki leaders to Boston to see justice done. In March 1751, Samuel Ball escaped from York gaol, thereby avoiding trial. Finally, at the June 1751 annual session of superior court at York — 18 months after the crime and 12 months after the acquittal of Albee — the jury found Benjamin Ledite not guilty of abetting Hegen's murder, and guilty only of assaulting Capt.