National Coordinator for Counterterrorism Countering Violent Extremist Narratives

National Coordinator for Counterterrorism Countering Violent Extremist Narratives National Coordinator for Counterterrorism (NCTb) July 2010 Responsibility for the content of this publication rests with the respective authors, CONTenTS and the views expressed are their own and do not necessarily reflect those of the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism (NCTb) Preface 4 Introduction 6 1 Counter-Narratives and the Unintentional Messages Counterterrorism Policies 1 Unwittingly Produce: The Case of West-Germany Beatrice de Graaf 2 Counter-Narratives against ETA’s Terrorism in Spain 0 Rogelio Alonso 3 Redefining ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ 6 Bob de Graaff 4 The Importance of Countering Al-Qaeda’s ‘Single Narrative’ 46 Alex P. Schmid 5 Narratives and Counter-Narratives for Global Jihad: Opinion versus Action 58 Christian Leuprecht, Todd Hataley, Sophia Moskalenko & Clark McCauley 6 Learning Counter-Narrative Lessons from Cases of Terrorist Dropouts 7 Michael Jacobson 7 Contemporary Jihadist Narratives: The Case of Momin Khawaja 84 Tom Quiggin 8 Violent Radical Content and the Relationship between Ideology and Behaviour: 94 Do Counter-Narratives Matter? Max Taylor & Gilbert Ramsay 9 New Media and Counter-Narrative Strategies 11 Tim Stevens 10 Heterogeneous Counter-Narratives and the Role of Social Diplomacy 14 Sadik Harchaoui 11 Furthering the Counter-Narrative via Educational and Social Grassroots Projects 1 Toaha Qureshi & Sarah Marsden Colophon 144 The National Coordinator for Counterterrorism in the Netherlands employs a ‘comprehensive approach’ Preface to combating terrorism. This approach holds that combating terrorism can only be effective when repressive measures are complemented by preventive policy. In order to prevent terrorism, the government is tackling radicalisation and recruitment, which increase the risk of terrorist attacks. Both local and central government are taking measures to identify, prevent, isolate, curb and intervene in processes of radicalisation and recruitment before it is too late. Much has been written about radicalisation processes and their causes, yet the only consensus in this field is that there is no predictive profile of those who buy into violent extremist narratives. This means that in order to identify radicalisation, one must be able to recognise the content and expression of the violent extremist narrative. This does not mean that acceptance and reproduction of the narrative is in itself the primary driver of radicalisation, only that it is the sole recognisable feature. The reasons for individuals to buy into and act upon a violent extremist narrative are subject to much debate and little agreement. Suffice it to say that substantial resources are being invested in order to tackle exploitable grievances and strengthen the resilience of vulnerable groups, the latter of which involves deepening the acceptance of the pluriformity of ideas as an essential element to democratic society. This form of prevention focuses on the vulnerability of possible receivers of the narrative and – in line with the comprehensive approach – thus complements the repressive measures directed at the senders of the narrative. One way to increase the resilience of potential receivers to the violent extremist message, given that eradicating the availability of extremist narratives in the information age is unrealistic, is to diminish the attractiveness of the narrative. This could be done, for example, by undermining the credibility of the sender, exposing contradictions in the narrative, or by promoting alternatives by those best suited to do so. In order to inform possible future policy in this new field of counter-narratives, I organised an international expert meeting in June 2009 in The Hague, where specialists in the field explored ways to achieve this goal of diminishing the attractiveness of violent extremist narratives. A summary of the findings of this expert meeting is included in the introduction of this publication, which is a compilation of articles reflecting the ideas presented and discussed at the expert meeting. This publication is intended to stimulate and inform the policy debate regarding countering violent extremist narratives. Erik Akerboom The National Coordinator for Counterterrorism 4 5 On June 4 and 5 2009, the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism in the Netherlands (NCTb) and the Introduction Centre for Terrorism and Counterterrorism (CTC) at Campus The Hague of Leiden University, together with the British and the Canadian embassies in The Netherlands, organised the Expert Meeting ‘Counter- narratives and the performative power of counterterrorism’ in The Hague. It brought together a group of Eelco J.A.M. Kessels approximately fifty academics, experts and government officials to discuss the issue of ‘counter-narratives’ Research Fellow at the Centre for Terrorism and Counterterrorism at Campus The Hague - Leiden University and the extent to which they can and should be an appropriate means for countering modern terrorism, as well as to examine possible strategies to deploy this method in the future. This introduction will first give a succinct overview of the issues discussed, the conclusions drawn and the recommendations made at the expert meeting, in order for the reader to gain a more detailed insight into the context out of which the various chapters in this volume originate. Summary of findings and conclusions of the expert meeting During the expert meeting, it became clear that within jihadist extremist narratives, one can differentiate between four distinct, though not mutually exclusive, narrative layers, that can be identified through studying statements and texts of individual terrorists and extremist organisations. Applying these categories to modern, jihadi terrorism, the following narrative layers can be identified: • Firstly, a political narrative can be discerned that concerns themes like the crimes of the West and its supported proxies, the global suppression of certain (religious) minorities and the inequitable distribution of income, welfare or land. Violent extremists succeed in telling a very persuasive, politically subjective story, often without aspiring to be part of the political solution themselves; • Secondly, extremists utilise a moral narrative by continuously portraying concepts such as liberal democracy, the freedom of speech and gender equality as unachievable, hypocritical Western ideals. They emphasise that these so-called liberties have only resulted in the moral degradation of Western societies (where they refer to the moral decay bred by the propagation of sexual promiscuity, the replacement of God’s sovereignty and laws by that of the people, the growing indifference bred by individualism and the neglect of family, the destruction of youth by the distribution of drugs and alcohol, etc.); • Thirdly, religious discourse is employed to further delegitimise the West and advance the perception that fighting against the immoral West is a just cause. Jihadi terrorists often succeed in utilising a persuasive theological argument that sanctions the use of violence against enemies of Islam; an argument they claim to be valid globally and to be an individual duty upon every Muslim. Muslims are thus being forced to choose sides: if you do not approve the scriptural narrative as described, you apparently oppose it and therefore do not prove yourself to be a good Muslim; • Fourthly, a social, heroic narrative is also part and parcel of jihadist extremist narratives. Jihadists use this type of narrative to exploit feelings of social exclusion among young men and women in a global culture of celebrities. They present jihadism and the struggle against the West as perfect fulfilment of their yearning for adventure, heroism, glamour and admiration, by emphasising romantic notions of brother- hood of arms and exciting life in camps. It was generally agreed upon that the most prominent narrative is the political one. The real issues at stake seem to be mainly political; the religious narrative is primarily used to overcome moral hesitations to use violence. This of course is the outsider analysis; Jihadists themselves would not make this distinction and are generally sincere in their conviction that the political follows from the religious. 6 7 The content of a counter-narrative should be tailored to the kind of narrative(s) it tries to oppose. In the message sent. An alternative would be to use other organisations (for example NGOs or local community case of countering the political narrative, it must for instance be made clear that there is no such thing as a leaders) as intermediaries to bring the message across more effectively. However, one must take note of the Western conspiracy to dominate the world and to oppress Islam, whilst pointing towards the values of the difficulties some of these other actors might have when working together with governments. For instance, Western political process and the many investments made in the developing world. A moral counter-narrative whilst politics needs to be transparent and politicians require attention for what they are doing, certain should stress the immorality of killing and the use of violence. Furthermore, it should take issue with, other actors rather wish to conduct their work silently and independently, so as not to lose their credibility. but recognise the narrative that the West is in moral decay. In response to the religious narrative of violent jihadists, the fact that (mass) murder is against Islam and

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