Mueller Live Slides

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Intro to Volume I Executive Summary to Volume I I. The Special Counsel’s Investigation II. Russian “Active Measures” Social Media Campaign A. Structure of the IRA B. Funding & Oversight from Concord and Prigozhin C. The IRA Targets U.S. Elections III. Russian Hacking & Dumping Operations MUELLER A. GRU Hacking Directed at the Clinton LIVE! Campaign part B. Dissemination of the Hacked Materials C. Additional GRU Cyber Operations 1 6 D. Trump Campaign & the Dissemination of Hacked Materials Redactions Defined... Harm to Ongoing Matter (HOM) Information that pertains to ongoing investigations stemming from special counsel’s original probe. Investigative Techniques Information that would disclose secret intelligence sources and methods. Personal Privacy Information that could be damning to “peripheral third parties” - specifically unindicted individuals. Grand Jury Material collected in grand jury interviews with witnesses. Used to protect secrecy of federal investigations and people under investigation not charged with a crime. INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TO VOLUME I SOURCE https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/01/26/us/politics/trump-contacts-russians-wikileaks.html I. THE SPECIAL COUNSEL’S INVESTIGATION II. RUSSIAN “ACTIVE MEASURES” SOCIAL MEDIA CAMPAIGN Key Findings The IRA used social media to attempt to influence U.S. Elections. The IRA recruited U.S. persons to organize pro-Trump rallies across the U.S. The Trump campaign engaged with IRA-controlled social media accounts. Key Players Sean Hannity Roger Stone Michael Flynn, Jr. Donald Trump Jr. Eric Trump Brad Parscale Michael McFaul Kellyanne Conway Key Organizations ● The Internet Research Agency, LLC. (IRA): A Russian organization funded by Yevgeniy Viktorovich Prigozhin ● The Trump Campaign ● The Clinton Campaign ● The Sanders Campaign Key Findings The IRA used social media to attempt to influence U.S. Elections. The IRA recruited U.S. persons to organize pro-Trump rallies across the U.S. The Trump campaign engaged with IRA-controlled social media accounts. III. RUSSIAN HACKING AND DUMPING OPERATIONS Key Findings The GRU hacked into email accounts in the Clinton campaign, the DNC, and the DCCC. The GRU disseminated this data through DCLeaks, Guccifer 2.0, and WikiLeaks. The Trump campaign displayed an interest in the WikiLeaks releases. Evidence was sufficient to indict GRU officers for their roles in election-related hacking. Key Players Julian Assange John Podesta Rick Gates Paul Manafort Jerome Corsi Ted Malloch Michael Cohen Key Organizations ● GRU: The Russian Federation’s Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff ● DNC & DCCC ● WikiLeaks ● DCLeaks ● Guccifer 2.0 ● Administration of U.S. Elections ● Access Hollywood Key Findings The GRU hacked into email accounts in the Clinton campaign, the DNC, and the DCCC. The GRU disseminated this data through DCLeaks, Guccifer 2.0, and WikiLeaks. The Trump campaign displayed an interest in the WikiLeaks releases. Evidence was sufficient to indict GRU officers for their roles in election-related hacking. NEXT TIME... Sunday, July 7th 5pm - 9pm VOL. I, PART IV RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT LINKS TO AND CONTACTS WITH THE TRUMP CAMPAIGN.

Copy Link

Recommended publications

Ted Malloch 1 DOCUMENT REQUESTS Please Produce The
Ted Malloch DOCUMENT REQUESTS Please produce the documents set forth in Schedule A, provided, however, that in order to facilitate production of documents on an expedited basis, you may limit your production at this time to documents you furnished at any time after November 8, 2016 to: (a) the Special Counsel’s Office established by Department of Justice Order No. 3915-2017 (May 17, 2017); (b) the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York (“SDNY”); (c) any other federal or state regulatory and/or law enforcement agency; (d) any congressional committee; or (e) in civil or other litigation. This includes but is not limited to documents that were voluntarily provided, produced under compulsion, or seized. Instructions for producing documents appear in Schedule B, and definitions appear in Schedule C. SCHEDULE A 1) All documents relating to the following: (a) Discussions or attempts to provide or receive election information, campaign data, or campaign communications with, to, or from foreign entities or individuals in connection with the 2016 U.S. Presidential primary or general elections. This includes, but is not limited to, voter data, polling information, political ad targeting, voter registration rolls, social media data, and campaign or party e-mails. (b) Any contacts, direct or indirect, from January 1, 2015 to January 20, 2017 between or involving the Russian Federation and its officials, agents, intermediaries, and/or instrumentalities and any of the following: Donald Trump, the Trump Campaign, the Trump Organization, Paul Manafort, Rick Gates, Michael Cohen, Michael Flynn, Jeff Sessions, Jared Kushner, Thomas Bossert, Roger Stone, Jerome Corsi, George Papadopoulos, Carter Page, Konstantin Kilimnik, K.T.
[Show full text]
JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment
S E C R E T //NOFORN I I 20320619 DEPARTMENTOF DEFENSE HEADQUARTERS,JOINT TASK FORCEGUANTANAMO U.S. NAVAL STATION,GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA APO AE 09350 JTF-GTMO-CDR 19June 2007 MEMORANDUM FOR Commander,United StatesSouthem Command. 3511 NW 9lst Avenue. Miami,FL33172. SUBJECT: Recommendationfor ContinuedDetention Under DoD Control (CD) for GuantanamoDetainee, ISN: US9SA-000079DP(S) JTF-GTMO DetaineeAssessment 1. (S//NF) Personal Information: o JDIMSAIDRC ReferenceName: FahedA al-Harasi o Aliases and Current/True Name: Fahd Atiyah Hamza Hamid al-Harazi" Hassanal-Makki. FahedFahad" Khalid. Abu Hassan. al-Sharif. Abu Barak o Placeof Birth: Mecca. SaudiArabia (SA) o Date of Birth: 18 November 1978 o Citizenship: SaudiArabia o InternmentSerial Number (ISN): US9SA-000079DP 2. (U//T'OUO) Health: Detaineeis in good health. 3. (S//NF) JTF-GTMO Assessment: a. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMO recommendsthis detaineefor ContinuedDetention Under DoD Control (CD). JTF-GTMO previouslyassessed detainee for Continued Detentionwith TransferLanguage on 26May 2006. b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: Detaineeis reportedto be a memberof al-Qaida. He was identified as having attendedmilitant training and was an instructor at the al-Qaida al- Faruq Training Camp. Detaineewas in Afghanistan (AF) since 1999 during which he is assessedto have participated in hostilities againstUS and Coalition forces as a member of Classifiedby: MultipleSources REASON:E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED,Section 1.4(C) Declassi$on:20320619 S E C R E T //NOFORN I I 20320619 S E C R E T // NOFORN I I 20320619 JTF-GTMO.CDR SUBJECT: Recommendationfor ContinuedDetention Under DoD Control (CD) for GuantanamoDetainee, ISN: US9SA-000079DP(S) UsamaBin Laden's (UBL) 55th Arab Brigade.l Detainee'sname and aliaswere listed in recovereddocuments associated with al-Qaida, and the Saudi Ministry of Interior General Directorate of Investigations(Mabahith) identified him as a high priority detainee.
[Show full text]
Inside Russia's Intelligence Agencies
EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON FOREIGN BRIEF POLICY RELATIONS ecfr.eu PUTIN’S HYDRA: INSIDE RUSSIA’S INTELLIGENCE SERVICES Mark Galeotti For his birthday in 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin was treated to an exhibition of faux Greek friezes showing SUMMARY him in the guise of Hercules. In one, he was slaying the • Russia’s intelligence agencies are engaged in an “hydra of sanctions”.1 active and aggressive campaign in support of the Kremlin’s wider geopolitical agenda. The image of the hydra – a voracious and vicious multi- headed beast, guided by a single mind, and which grows • As well as espionage, Moscow’s “special services” new heads as soon as one is lopped off – crops up frequently conduct active measures aimed at subverting in discussions of Russia’s intelligence and security services. and destabilising European governments, Murdered dissident Alexander Litvinenko and his co-author operations in support of Russian economic Yuri Felshtinsky wrote of the way “the old KGB, like some interests, and attacks on political enemies. multi-headed hydra, split into four new structures” after 1991.2 More recently, a British counterintelligence officer • Moscow has developed an array of overlapping described Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) as and competitive security and spy services. The a hydra because of the way that, for every plot foiled or aim is to encourage risk-taking and multiple operative expelled, more quickly appear. sources, but it also leads to turf wars and a tendency to play to Kremlin prejudices. The West finds itself in a new “hot peace” in which many consider Russia not just as an irritant or challenge, but • While much useful intelligence is collected, as an outright threat.
[Show full text]
CIA Best Practices in Counterinsurgency
CIA Best Practices in Counterinsurgency WikiLeaks release: December 18, 2014 Keywords: CIA, counterinsurgency, HVT, HVD, Afghanistan, Algeria, Colombia, Iraq, Israel, Peru, Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, Chechnya, Libya, Pakistan, Thailand,HAMAS, FARC, PULO, AQI, FLN, IRA, PLO, LTTE, al-Qa‘ida, Taliban, drone, assassination Restraint: SECRET//NOFORN (no foreign nationals) Title: Best Practices in Counterinsurgency: Making High-Value Targeting Operations an Effective Counterinsurgency Tool Date: July 07, 2009 Organisation: Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Author: CIA Office of Transnational Issues; Conflict, Governance, and Society Group Link: http://wikileaks.org/cia-hvt-counterinsurgency Pages: 21 Description This is a secret CIA document assessing high-value targeting (HVT) programs world-wide for their impact on insurgencies. The document is classified SECRET//NOFORN (no foreign nationals) and is for internal use to review the positive and negative implications of targeted assassinations on these groups for the strength of the group post the attack. The document assesses attacks on insurgent groups by the United States and other countries within Afghanistan, Algeria, Colombia, Iraq, Israel, Peru, Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, Chechnya, Libya, Pakistan and Thailand. The document, which is "pro-assassination", was completed in July 2009 and coincides with the first year of the Obama administration and Leon Panetta's directorship of the CIA during which the United States very significantly increased its CIA assassination program at the
[Show full text]
Wikileaks and the Institutional Framework for National Security Disclosures
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL PATRICIA L. BELLIA WikiLeaks and the Institutional Framework for National Security Disclosures ABSTRACT. WikiLeaks' successive disclosures of classified U.S. documents throughout 2010 and 2011 invite comparison to publishers' decisions forty years ago to release portions of the Pentagon Papers, the classified analytic history of U.S. policy in Vietnam. The analogy is a powerful weapon for WikiLeaks' defenders. The Supreme Court's decision in the Pentagon Papers case signaled that the task of weighing whether to publicly disclose leaked national security information would fall to publishers, not the executive or the courts, at least in the absence of an exceedingly grave threat of harm. The lessons of the PentagonPapers case for WikiLeaks, however, are more complicated than they may first appear. The Court's per curiam opinion masks areas of substantial disagreement as well as a number of shared assumptions among the Court's members. Specifically, the Pentagon Papers case reflects an institutional framework for downstream disclosure of leaked national security information, under which publishers within the reach of U.S. law would weigh the potential harms and benefits of disclosure against the backdrop of potential criminal penalties and recognized journalistic norms. The WikiLeaks disclosures show the instability of this framework by revealing new challenges for controlling the downstream disclosure of leaked information and the corresponding likelihood of "unintermediated" disclosure by an insider; the risks of non-media intermediaries attempting to curtail such disclosures, in response to government pressure or otherwise; and the pressing need to prevent and respond to leaks at the source. AUTHOR.
[Show full text]
Cyber-Conflict Between the United States of America and Russia CSS
CSS CYBER DEFENSE PROJECT Hotspot Analysis: Cyber-conflict between the United States of America and Russia Zürich, June 2017 Version 1 Risk and Resilience Team Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zürich Cyber-conflict between the United States of America and Russia Authors: Marie Baezner, Patrice Robin © 2017 Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zürich Contact: Center for Security Studies Haldeneggsteig 4 ETH Zürich CH-8092 Zurich Switzerland Tel.: +41-44-632 40 25 [email protected] www.css.ethz.ch Analysis prepared by: Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zürich ETH-CSS project management: Tim Prior, Head of the Risk and Resilience Research Group; Myriam Dunn Cavelty, Deputy Head for Research and Teaching; Andreas Wenger, Director of the CSS Disclaimer: The opinions presented in this study exclusively reflect the authors’ views. Please cite as: Baezner, Marie; Robin, Patrice (2017): Hotspot Analysis: Cyber-conflict between the United States of America and Russia, June 2017, Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zürich. 2 Cyber-conflict between the United States of America and Russia Table of Contents 1 Introduction 5 2 Background and chronology 6 3 Description 9 3.1 Tools and techniques 9 3.2 Targets 10 3.3 Attribution and actors 10 4 Effects 11 4.1 Social and internal political effects 11 4.2 Economic effects 13 4.3 Technological effects 13 4.4 International effects 13 5 Consequences 14 5.1 Improvement of cybersecurity 14 5.2 Raising awareness of propaganda and misinformation 15 5.3 Observation of the evolution of relations between the USA and Russia 15 5.4 Promotion of Confidence Building Measures 16 6 Annex 1 17 7 Glossary 18 8 Abbreviations 19 9 Bibliography 19 3 Cyber-conflict between the United States of America and Russia Executive Summary Effects Targets: US State institutions and a political The analysis found that the tensions between the party.
[Show full text]
ASD-Covert-Foreign-Money.Pdf
overt C Foreign Covert Money Financial loopholes exploited by AUGUST 2020 authoritarians to fund political interference in democracies AUTHORS: Josh Rudolph and Thomas Morley © 2020 The Alliance for Securing Democracy Please direct inquiries to The Alliance for Securing Democracy at The German Marshall Fund of the United States 1700 18th Street, NW Washington, DC 20009 T 1 202 683 2650 E [email protected] This publication can be downloaded for free at https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/covert-foreign-money/. The views expressed in GMF publications and commentary are the views of the authors alone. Cover and map design: Kenny Nguyen Formatting design: Rachael Worthington Alliance for Securing Democracy The Alliance for Securing Democracy (ASD), a bipartisan initiative housed at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, develops comprehensive strategies to deter, defend against, and raise the costs on authoritarian efforts to undermine and interfere in democratic institutions. ASD brings together experts on disinformation, malign finance, emerging technologies, elections integrity, economic coercion, and cybersecurity, as well as regional experts, to collaborate across traditional stovepipes and develop cross-cutting frame- works. Authors Josh Rudolph Fellow for Malign Finance Thomas Morley Research Assistant Contents Executive Summary �� 1 Introduction and Methodology ��
[Show full text]
Offensive Capabilities
GCHQ and UK Mass Surveillance Chapter 5 5 Beyond signals intelligence: Offensive capabilities 5.1 Introduction Documents released by German magazine Der Spiegel provide a much richer picture of the offensive activities of the NSA and its allies, including the UK’s GCHQ.i The global surveillance infrastructure and hacking tools described in the previous chapters are not only used for obtaining information to be fed into intelligence reports and tracking terrorists. The agencies are also developing cyber-warfare capabilities, with the NSA taking the lead within the US armed forces. This militarisation of the internet saw U.S. intelligence services carried out 231 offensive cyber-operations in 2011ii. The UK's National Strategic Defence and Security Review from 2010 made hostile attacks upon UK cyberspace a major priorityiii. It is fair to assume that many countries are following suit and building cyber-warfare capabilities. Der Spiegel terms the development of these aggressive hacking tools as Digital Weapons. In their view D weapons which should join the ABC (Atomic, Biological and Chemical) weapons of the 20th century because of their indiscriminate nature. Here lies a fundamental problem. The modern world with connected global communications networks means that non-state actors such as civilians and businesses are now affected by the agencies’ activities much more frequently than before. The internet is used by everyone – cyberspace is mainly a civilian space – and the opportunity for collateral damage is huge. The papers leaked to Der Spiegel appear to show that signal agencies have little regard for the security and wellbeing of anyone who gets caught in the path of their operations.
[Show full text]
Episode 230: Click Here to Kill Everybody
Episode 230: Click Here to Kill Everybody Stewart Baker: [00:00:03] Welcome to Episode 230 of The Cyberlaw Podcast brought to you by Steptoe & Johnson. We are back and full of energy. Thank you for joining us. We're lawyers talking about technology, security, privacy, and government. And if you want me to talk about hiking through the rain forest of Costa Rica and just how tough my six-year-old granddaughter is, I'm glad to do that too. But today I'm joined by our guest interviewee Bruce Schneier, an internationally renowned technologist, privacy and security guru, and the author of the new book, Click Here to Kill Everybody: Security and Survival in a Hyper-Connected World. We'll be talking to him shortly. For the News Roundup, we have Jamil Jaffer, who's the founder of the estimable and ever-growing National Security Institute. He's also an adjunct professor at George Mason University. Welcome, Jamil. Jamil Jaffer: [00:00:57] Thanks, Stewart. Good to be here. Stewart Baker: [00:00:58] And David Kris, formerly the assistant attorney general in charge of the Justice Department's National Security Division. David, welcome. David Kris: [00:01:07] Thank, you. Good to be here. Stewart Baker: [00:01:08] And he is with his partner in their latest venture, Nate Jones, veteran of the Justice Department, the National Security Council, and Microsoft where he was an assistant general counsel. Nate, welcome. Nate Jones: [00:01:23] Thank you. Stewart Baker: [00:01:25] I'm Stewart Baker, formerly with the NSA and DHS and the host of today's program.
[Show full text]
Robert Mueller Testimony
Colborn, Paul P (OLC) From: Colborn, Paul P (OLC) Sent: Tuesday, May 14, 2019 9:54 AM To: Engel, Steven A. (OLC); Gannon, Curtis E. (OLC) Subject: Fwd: Discuss Mueller testimony Won't be back until 12:15 or later. Could join noon meeting late and can do 3:30. Sent from my iPhone Begin forwarded message: From: "Lasseter, David F. {OLA)" <[email protected]> Date: May 14, 2019 at 9:51:28 AM EDT To: "O'Callaghan, Edward C. (OOAG}" <[email protected]>, "Rabbitt, Brian (OAG)" <[email protected]>, "Weinsheimer, Bradley (ODAG)" <[email protected]>, "Engel, Steven A. (OLC)" ,., (b) (6) per OLC , "Colborn, Paul P (OLC)" ,., (b) (6) per OLC >, "Gannon, Curtis E. (OLC)" > Cc: "Boyd, Stephen E. (OLA)" <[email protected]> Subject: Discuss Mueller testimony Good morning all. Could we gather today to discuss the potential testimony of Mr. Mueller (b) (5) I SCO is discussing the scheduling of the testimony with HJC and HPSCI but needs to be better informed on the process as they seek an agreement. Would noon or 3:30 work? Thanks, David David F. Lasseter Document ID: 0.7.23922.34583 Rabbitt, Brian (OAG) From: Rabbitt, Brian (OAG) Sent: Tuesday, May 14, 2019 10:27 AM To: Engel, Steven A. (O LC); Lasseter, David F. {OLA); O'Callaghan, Edward C. (OOAG); Weinsheimer, Bradley (OOAG); Colborn, Paul P (OLC); Gannon, Curtis E. {O LC) Cc: Boyd, Stephen E. {OLA) Subject: RE: Discuss Mueller testimony 330 would be best for me. -Original Message---- From: Engel, Steven A. (OLC) < (b) (6) per OLC •> Sent: Tuesday, May 14, 2019 10:04 AM To: Lasseter, David F.
[Show full text]
Reporting, and General Mentions Seem to Be in Decline
CYBER THREAT ANALYSIS Return to Normalcy: False Flags and the Decline of International Hacktivism By Insikt Group® CTA-2019-0821 CYBER THREAT ANALYSIS Groups with the trappings of hacktivism have recently dumped Russian and Iranian state security organization records online, although neither have proclaimed themselves to be hacktivists. In addition, hacktivism has taken a back seat in news reporting, and general mentions seem to be in decline. Insikt Group utilized the Recorded FutureⓇ Platform and reports of historical hacktivism events to analyze the shifting targets and players in the hacktivism space. The target audience of this research includes security practitioners whose enterprises may be targets for hacktivism. Executive Summary Hacktivism often brings to mind a loose collective of individuals globally that band together to achieve a common goal. However, Insikt Group research demonstrates that this is a misleading assumption; the hacktivist landscape has consistently included actors reacting to regional events, and has also involved states operating under the guise of hacktivism to achieve geopolitical goals. In the last 10 years, the number of large-scale, international hacking operations most commonly associated with hacktivism has risen astronomically, only to fall off just as dramatically after 2015 and 2016. This constitutes a return to normalcy, in which hacktivist groups are usually small sets of regional actors targeting specific organizations to protest regional events, or nation-state groups operating under the guise of hacktivism. Attack vectors used by hacktivist groups have remained largely consistent from 2010 to 2019, and tooling has assisted actors to conduct larger-scale attacks. However, company defenses have also become significantly better in the last decade, which has likely contributed to the decline in successful hacktivist operations.
[Show full text]
Trump Is Obama's Legacy. Will This Break up the Democratic Party?
real-world economics review, issue no. 78 subscribe for free Trump is Obama’s legacy. Will this break up the Democratic Party? Michael Hudson [University of Missouri at Kansas City, USA] Copyright: Michael Hudson, 2017 You may post comments on this paper at https://rwer.wordpress.com/comments-on-rwer-issue-no-78/ Nobody yet can tell whether Donald Trump is an agent of change with a specific policy in mind, or merely a catalyst heralding an as yet undetermined turning point. His first month in the White House saw him melting into the Republican mélange of corporate lobbyists. Having promised to create jobs, his “America First” policy looks more like “Wall Street First”. His cabinet of billionaires promoting trickle-down corporate tax cuts, deregulation and dismantling Dodd-Frank bank reform repeats the Junk Economics promise that giving more tax breaks to the richest One Percent may lead them to use their windfall to invest in creating more jobs. What they usually do, of course, is simply buy more property and assets already in place. One of the first reactions to Trump’s election victory was for stocks of the most crooked financial institutions to soar, hoping for a deregulatory scythe taken to the public sector. Navient, the Department of Education’s knee-breaker on student loan collections, accused by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) of massive fraud and overcharging, rose from $13 to $18 now that it seemed likely that the incoming Republicans would disable the CFPB and shine a green light for financial fraud. Foreclosure king Stephen Mnuchin of IndyMac/OneWest (and formerly of Goldman Sachs for 17 years; later a George Soros partner) is now Treasury Secretary – and Trump has pledged to abolish the CFPB, on the specious logic that letting fraudsters manage pension savings and other investments will give consumers and savers “broader choice”, e.g., for the financial equivalent of junk food.
[Show full text]