Political Economy of Discontent in Jammu and Kashmir 1953-1975

BASIT MASOOD SUHRAWARDY

Research Scholar (Ph.D.)

Department of Political Science Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh Abstract: The economic aspect of Jammu and Kashmir crises has more or less been overlooked. Therefore, the paper is an attempt to highlight the economic discontent in Jammu and Kashmir from 1953-75. Hence, against this backdrop, the paper evaluates the empirical data on level of economic development of the state during this period.

Keywords: Accession, Autonomy, Discontent, Economic underdevelopment, Political Economy.

The accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India is different from accession of other States as it took place when the State was in imminent danger of being overrun by tribal raiders acting under the instigation of the Government of Pakistan. It was a limited accession restricted only to three subjects: defence, foreign affairs and communications.1 The restriction of Centre‘s (Indian federal Government at the Centre) authority only to defence, foreign affairs and communication was formalised by virtue of Instrument of Accession, signed with Maharaja Hari Singh, the last ruler of Jammu and Kashmir on 27 October 1947.2 Nehru in a letter to sheikh Abdullah on 18 May 1949 committed that ―Jammu and Kashmir State now stands acceded to Indian union in respect of three subjects, namely, Foreign Affairs, Defence and Communications.3 In fact, the internal autonomy was one of the fundamental reasons that prompted Sheikh Abdullah-led National Conference to accede to India. As Sheikh testifies it, himself, “As is well known to you, the present relationship of the State is based on the document of Instrument of Accession. We, the people of Kashmir, regard the promises and assurances of the representatives of the Government of India, such as Lord Mountbatten and Sardar Patel, as surety for the assistance rendered by us in securing the signatures of the Maharaja of Kashmir on the Instrument of Accession, which made it clear, that the internal autonomy and sovereignty of the Acceding States shall be maintained except in regard to three subjects which will be under the Central Government. I mention here in this connection, the clear assurances given by Sardar Patel to Indian States on July 5, 1947. He observed: We do not want anything more from them than accession in these three subjects, therein lies the good of the entire country. We respect their independence in other matters.4 The political logic of autonomy and Article 370 of the Indian Constitution was necessitated by the need to bring about socioeconomic transformations.5 The National conference assumed administration of the state under the prime ministership of sheikh Abdullah on 5th of March, 1948. Having led the struggle against economic marginalization of Kashmiris under the Dogras, after assuming administration, the national Conference government was too eager to translate its Naya Kashmir Manifesto adopted in 1944 into a reality.6 After the Centre brought about undemocratic dismissal of sheikh Abdullah from the Premiership in 19537, it (the centre) installed pro-integrationist successive state governments till 1975. During this period(1953-975),the centre followed a policy; what Sumantra Bose IJRAR2001507 International Journal of Research and Analytical Reviews (IJRAR) www.ijrar.org 638

© 2020 IJRAR March 2020, Volume 7, Issue 1 www.ijrar.org (E-ISSN 2348-1269, P- ISSN 2349-5138) terms as contractual relationship8, between the successive state governments and the government of India, whereby in return for facilitating Jammu and Kashmir‘s integration with India, these centrally sponsored state governments were provided with free liberal aid to manufacture consent in favour of India.9 Thus a Subsidised economy was created, more to manufacture political consent than to restructure economy, which Wajahat Habibullah, terms as ‘buying the Kashmiri back’.10 “Between 1950 and 1970 nearly 90% of the state’s Five Year Plans were funded by the Centre.”11 Thus, consequently, on the one hand Centre persisted with the policy of economic integration that led to resentment. For example, the abolition of customs barrier on April 13, 1954 economically integrated J and K to India on the same footing as those of other.12 It was a most significant move since it deprived Kashmir of considerable portion of her income derived from duties and excise imposed on trade with British India for years.13 The reaction to this move came when, in March 1955, Mirza Afzal Beg, the leader of the small opposition in the assembly, attacked it for frustrating the state‘s goal of self-reliance.14Similarly, Indian Comptroller and Auditor-General, despite protests by Sheikh Abdullah (from his prison cell) and by the Security Council of the United Nations, duly came into effect.15 On the other hand the policy of Subsidised economy created two problems (a) One, this policy failed to give the state an impetus to mobilize its own resources for economic growth. (b)The benefits of economic development remained confined to a thin, top layer of society and did not trickle down to the masses, thus created a gulf between two classes16; those who could reap the benefits of development programmes; the small proprietary class‘ and those who were deprived of or remained untouched; the vast segments of masses’. This left vast segments of the population-urban and rural, educated and illiterate, men and women-engaged in fierce struggle for social and economic survival.17 Since the state governments were installed by the centre, the discontented masses held the centre responsible for their ills.18 The masses found expression in the Plebiscite Front, the only representative organisation of the people in the valley of Kashmir during 1955-1975.19 During the trial in the Kashmir Conspiracy case, Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah in a written statement of 8 August 1960 before the court of Special Magistrate, Kud Sub-Jail,… Kashmiris have been reduced to the position of being worse than that of a ‘colonial State’.20 It was against such a backdrop that the Plebiscite Front convened a special convention in first week of July 1965, at its headquarters at Mujahid Manzil Srinagar. The Resolution number four, one of most significant resolutions highlighting the economic grievances of the Kashmiri people, viewed with great concern the deteriorating economic conditions of the people who felt crushed under the burden of soaring prices, increasing unemployment and bleak chances of rescue from the economic bankruptcy which had set in. The resolution provided a short review of the economic crises of the state, and stated that there has been no basic economic reconstruction and no advancement in the economic growth of the people’ (emphasis added). It further stated that doles and subsidies cannot bring prosperity to the people. Therefore the convention resolved to urgently place the resolution before the general public and the authorities.21 Subsequently, the Indira - Abdullah of 1975 was essentially reaffirmation of the status quo, which Sheikh Abdullah accepted, notwithstanding his insistence at the outset of the negotiations on return to pre-1953 relationship between the state and Union. But the new generation of young educated Kashmiris brought up in Sheikh Abdullah‘s school of rebellion, from 1953 to 1975 were not ready to accept the exacted status quo.22

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Below discussion is an attempt to empirically analyse economic life of Jammu and Kashmir within a time frame of these 22 years. Such an exercise will highlight the issues of lack of development. Table 1 presents a comparative view of growth of different states in terms of State Domestic Production (SDP). Table 1 clearly shows that in terms of economic growth among 18 major states, Jammu and Kashmir ranked 10th in 1960-61 and 15 in 1975- 76.This reveals Jammu and Kashmir’s dismal economic performance during these years. Furthermore, the downward trend is indicative of the fact that the subsided economy was detrimental to the economic growth of the state.

Table 1 Per capita income of Indian States at current prices (Rs) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 S.No. State 1960-61 Rank 1964-65 1969-70 1975-76 Rank 1 Andhra Pradesh 314 8 438 544 897 11 2 Assam 349 6 441 586 848 13 3 Bihar 216 16 299 402 669 18 4 Gujarat 380 4 523 740 1236 4 5 Haryana 350 5 504 902 1514 2 6 Himachal Pradesh - - - 724 1165 5 7 Jammu & Kashmir 287 10 341 503 825 15 8 Karnataka 292 9 420 571 1038 7 9 Kerala 278 11 393 643 1000 8 10 Madhya Pradesh 274 12 373 495 790 16 11 Maharashtra 419 1 526 736 1455 3 12 Manipur - - - 542 904 10 13 Orissa 226 15 347 545 834 14 14 Punjab 385 3 575 1002 1688 1 15 Rajasthan 271 13 356 478 873 12 16 Tamil Nadu 344 7 434 591 997 9 17 Uttar Pradesh 244 14 374 485 727 17 18 West Bengal 386 2 498 728 1100 6

All India 307 422 590 981 Sources: For 1960-61,1975-76;Mahesh Chand and V.K. Puri, Regional Planning in India, Original source; For 1975-76 Report of the Seventh Finance Commission,178,Annexure VII.3,p.308,For 1960-61, Om Prakash Mathur, “The Problem of Inter-Regional Disparities”, Indian Journal of Regional Science, Vol. V, No. 1,1973,Table I,p.89.

In order to get a better picture of economic development of the Jammu and Kashmir we need to look at the sectoral distribution of the economic activity during these years. Table 2 Percentage distribution of net state domestic product by sectors in Jammu and Kashmir (at current prices) 1960–61 to 1975-76

Sector 1960–61 1965–66 1970–71 1975–76 Primary 67.52 56.21 56.64 54.44 Jammu & Kashmir Secondary 8.84 13.59 14.57 15.007 Tertiary 23.64 30.19 28.79 30.54 Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 Sources: Indicators of Economic Development 2016-17, Directorate of Economics & Statistics, Govt of Jammu & Kashmir

Table 2 shows, from 1960-61 to 1975-76; there has hardly been any structural change in the economy of the state. The state witnessed a relative neglect of the secondary sector and agricultural sector dominated the economy. Moreover, the economic backwardness of the state is manifested in the decline of the primary sector leading to substantial increase in IJRAR2001507 International Journal of Research and Analytical Reviews (IJRAR) www.ijrar.org 640

© 2020 IJRAR March 2020, Volume 7, Issue 1 www.ijrar.org (E-ISSN 2348-1269, P- ISSN 2349-5138) the tertiary sector with secondary sector lagging far behind at 8.84 percent, 13.59 percent, 14.57 percent and 15.007 percent in 1960-61, 1965-66, 1970-71 and 1975-76 respectively. Furthermore, in contrast to the only large-scale industry in the Central public sector namely Hindustan Machine Tools which commenced its production in 1973, providing employment to 212 persons in 1973-74,23 Table 3 shows dominance of small scale industries in the manufacturing sector of economy the state in 1972-73 and 1973-74. Table 3 Number of Working Units and Employment in Jammu and Kashmir

(1972-73) (1973-74) Employment Working Closed Employment State Total no. of Units Units Units Jammu & Kashmir 1039 706 9600 2203 4031 17252

Source: Compiled from the statistics released by: Institute of Applied Manpower Research For 1973-74, Digest of Statistics -1995-96, Jammu and Kashmir Government

The low credit deposit-ratio is not a problem in itself but is a manifestation of low level of industrialization. Table 4 therefore, presents a comparative view of credit-deposit ratio of the major 20 states in 1973.

Table 4 State-wise Credit-Deposit Ratio of the Scheduled Commercial Banks in 1973

1973- Rank Rank Rank Sr. No/ States June Rank Sr. No/ States 1973(June) % 1973(June) % (6)Assam 41.2 13 (11)Orissa 55.9 9 (16)Maharashtra 81.0 4 (1)Haryana 59.6 7 (7)Manipur 30.6 17 (12)West 72.6 5 (17)Andhra Pradesh 86.5 3 (2)Himachal Bengal Pradesh 10.4 19 (8)Nagaland 34.1 14 (13)Madhya 45.6 11 (18)Karnataka 87.3 2 (3)Jammu & Pradesh Kashmir 20.3 18 (9)Tripura 10.3 20 (14)Uttar 41.6 12 (19)Kerala 70.5 6 Pradesh (4)Punjab 33.1 15 (10)Bihar 31.1 16 (15)Gujarat 56.7 8 (20)Tamil Nadu 114.7 1 (5)Rajasthan 49.8 10 All India mean :51.61

Source: Basic Statistical Returns, Banking Statistics 1972-1995, Reserve Bank of India, 28 April 1998. Table 4 shows that the credit-deposit ratio for Jammu and Kashmir in 1973 was mere 20.3 percent less than half of the all India ‘mean’ of 51.61 percent. Moreover, Jammu and Kashmir ranked 18 among these 20 major states, almost at the bottom. Hence, the centre government’s ‘misguided development’ policies towards Jammu and Kashmir during the period created lopsided development which in turn became the basis for economic discontent. While on the one hand, the subsidised economy failed to give impetus to the economic development (as Aijaz Ashraf Wani’s study depicts)24, the misappropriation of the centre’s aid by the ‘centre sponsored state ruling

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© 2020 IJRAR March 2020, Volume 7, Issue 1 www.ijrar.org (E-ISSN 2348-1269, P- ISSN 2349-5138) class’ deprived Kashmiri masses of their due share in the economic development of the state. Thus, suffering from a sense of discrimination Kashmiri masses grew alienated from the Indian state and got lured towards Plebiscite Front demand of self-determination. The mass psyche created during this period gave way to the pro-plebiscite sentiment among Kashmiri masses in the times that followed. Hence it is important to further analyse the significance of generally; overlooked economic aspect of the Jammu and Kashmir problem.

Refrences 1A .G. Noorani, The Kashmir Question, P. C. Manaktala and Sons Private Ltd.1964,p.11. 2 Altaf Hussain Para, The Making of Modern Kashmir, Routledge, 2019, p.147. 3 Letter Dated 17 May 1949 by N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar to Vallabhbhai Patel Enclosing Jawaharlal Nehru’s Draft Letter to Sheikh Abdullah for his Approval in Durga Das (ed.), Sardar Patel’s Correspondence 1945—50, Navajivan Publishing House, Ahmedabad, 1971, pp. 275—309. 4 Sheikh Abdullah’s Letter to Maulana Azad on 16 July 1953,qouted in A.G. Noorani, The Kashmir Question ,p.232 5 Nyla Ali Khan, Our Kashmiriyat was Pro-Poor and Anti-landlord: Article 370 Enabled Kashmir to Give Land to the Tiller. Today That Freedom is gone, Daily O, 17-08-2019. 6 Lord Birdwood, Two Nations and the Kashmir, London Robert Hale Limited, 1956,p.176 7 Iffat Malik, Kashmir: Ethnic Conflict International Dispute, OUP, 2003, p.104-107. 8 Sumantra Bose, Kashmir :Roots of Conflict, Harvard University Press, 2003, p.68. 9 Altaf Hussain Para, The Making of Modern Kashmir, Routledge, 2019, p.197. 10 Wajahat Habibullah, The Political Economy of the Kashmir Conflict, United States Institute of Peace, June 2004, p.07. 11 Siddhartha Prakash, The Political economy of Kashmir Since 1947, Contemporary South Asia (2000) 9(3), p. 320. 12 Lord Birdwood, Two Nations and the Kashmir, London Robert Hale Limited, 1956,p.181. 13 bid,182. 14 Ibid,183. 15 Alastair Lamb, A Disputed Legacy, Roxford Books,1991,p.203. 16 Navnita Chada Behra, Transforming Kashmir, Harvard University Press, 2013, p.41. 17 Riyaz Punjabi, Kashmir: The Bruised Identity,in Raju C. Thomas (ed.),Perspectives on Kashmir, Boulder :Westview Press,1992,p.142-143. 18 Ibid. 19 Gull Mohd. Wani & Nasir Naqash, Reflections on Kashmir Politics, Asish Publishing House New Delhi,1993,p.31 20 Abdul Jabbar Gockhami, Kashmir Politics and Plebiscite, Gulshan Books, Srinagar, 2011, p.84. 21 The Peoples Voice in Jammu and Kashmir State, Proceedings of the Special Convention Held in July 1965,Mujahid Manzil Srinagar, Resolution No.4, Published by G.M. Hamdani, New Kashmir Press Srinagar,p.32-38. 22 Altaf Hussain Para, The Making Of Modern Kashmir,p.230. 23 Tara Singh Rekhi, Socio-economic Justice in Jammu and Kashmir, Ideal Publications, Delhi, 1993, p.155. 24 Aijaz Ashraf Wani, What Happened to Governance in Kashmir?,OUP,2019

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