Images, Dehumanization and South Koreans' Attitudes Towards

Images, Dehumanization, and South Koreans’ Attitudes towards Uniﬁcation

In KINU 통일의식조사 2018: 남북평화 시대의 통일의식. The KINU Unification Survey 2018: New Era of Peace in Korean Peninsular and Unification Attitudes. Ed. Sang Sin Lee. Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2019.

Pre-publication version: September 3, 2018

Joshua D. Kertzer

Paul Sack Associate Professor of Political Economy Department of Government, Harvard University. 1737 Cambridge St, Cambridge MA, 02138, USA. Email: [email protected]. Web: http:/people.fas.harvard.edu/˜jkertzer/ Introduction

At both the elite and mass level, international politics is driven by the perceptions that actors have about one another.1 Just as the images leaders have about other countries shape the types of foreign policies they pursue, the images that citizens have about other countries affects the types of foreign policies they support.2 One of the key barriers to conflict resolution, for example, involves changing the images that citizens on each side of the conflict have of one another; when citizens on one side view their opponents as inferior or less than human, it legitimizes the use of violence and retaliatory aggression.3 Yet just as images can shape the likelihood of intergroup conflict, they can also affect the likelihood of cooperation.

For example, the key causal mechanism in classic theories of economic integration — and central rationale behind economic and cultural exchanges — is that as individuals from diﬀerent groups interact with one another, their images of each other change, making future conﬂict less likely.4

This chapter borrows from psychological research on images, stereotypes, and dehumanization to ask three questions.5 First, what images do South Koreans have about North

Koreans? Second, what demographic factors and political orientations explain variation in these perceptions? Third, how do these perceptions relate to South Koreans’ attitudes about uniﬁcation? These questions have clear substantive importance, but are also of interest for theoretical reasons, since some of these theoretical frameworks have yet to be systematically tested in the context of inter-Korean relations.

The discussion below has four parts. It begins by reviewing how political psychologists

1. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Uni- versity Press, 1976); Richard K. Herrmann, Perceptions and Behavior in Soviet Foreign Policy (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1985). 2. Richard K. Herrmann and Michael P. Fischerkeller, “Beyond the Enemy Image and Spiral Model: Cognitive-Strategic Research After the Cold War,” International Organization 49, no. 3 (1995): 415–50. 3. Ifat Maoz and Clark McCauley, “Threat, dehumanization, and support for retaliatory aggressive policies in asymmetric conﬂict,” Journal of Conﬂict Resolution 52, no. 1 (2008): 93–116; Emile Bruneau and Nour Kteily, “The enemy as animal: Symmetric dehumanization during asymmetric warfare,” PLOS ONE 12, no. 7 (July 2017): 1–20. 4. Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1953); Thomas F. Pettigrew, “Intergroup Contact Theory,” Annual Review of Psychology 49 (1998): 65–85. 5. Susan T. Fiske et al., “A Model of (Often Mixed) Stereotype Content: Competence and Warmth Respectively Follow From Perceived Status and Competition,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 82, no. 6 (2002): 878–902; Nick Haslam, “Dehumanization: An Integrative Review,” Personality and Social Psychology Review 10, no. 3 (2006): 252–64.

1 have studied images in international relations, focusing on two theoretical frameworks in particular: stereotypes, and dehumanization. It then investigates the content of South Koreans’ images of North Koreans, finding that South Koreans perceive their Northern counterparts as being not particularly warm, but also not especially cold, and significantly less competent. It also finds evidence of South Korean dehumanization of North Koreans, specifically with respect to what the dehumanization literature refers to as “human nature” traits, rather than “human uniqueness” traits. South Koreans don’t dehumanize North Koreans by viewing them animalistically, but by viewing them mechanistically instead; in as much as North Koreans are perceived as somehow less than human, it is that they are perceived as nonhuman, rather than subhuman.

Third, it investigates the demographic correlates of these perceptions in a multivariate context, identifying the types of respondents more or less likely to embrace each stereotype.

It ﬁnds in particular the existence of stark generational diﬀerences, with younger South

Koreans displaying more negative stereotypes about North Koreans than older generations, as do the less wealthy, and more conservative. Younger South Koreans are also more likely to dehumanize the North with respect to human nature traits, as do the less educated.

Finally, it explores the political consequences of these perceptions, showing that variation in perceived warmth and human nature dehumanization is significantly associated both with attitudes towards reunification, operationalized both in terms of general support for reunification, and as willingness to personally sacrifice for unification. These effects hold even when controlling for a variety of demographic and political characteristics, demonstrat- ing the importance of examining perceptions of outgroups in the context of inter-Korean relations.

Images and perceptions in international politics

One of the central insights of psychological theories of international politics is their emphasis on actors’ perceptions.6 In privileging the ideational over the material, these theories can be

6. Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1985); Keren Yarhi-Milo, Knowing the Adversary: Leaders, Intelligence,

2 contrasted with realist theories of international politics that focus more on the structure of the international system as a whole, and less on the perceptions of the units that populate it.7 Theories of international politics that emphasize perceptions argue that state behavior

(at the elite level) or policy preferences (at the mass public level) cannot always be strictly deduced from structural factors like the balance of power, since actors can deﬁne situations in myriad ways, such that actors’ perceptions are not simply reducible to their environment.

If perceptions were completely idiosyncratic, they would be diﬃcult to study systematically. Image theory, however, argues that even if the speciﬁc content of actors’ perceptions vary, the structure of the perceptions remain the same; even though we have a large number of perceptions and beliefs about our relationships with other actors, we tend to categorize them along a small number of common dimensions that work together to form a holistic judgment of who the target is and what they want. Early work on image theory argued that actors’ images of others in international politics essentially reduced to a single dimension: whether the target’s intentions were understood to be hostile or friendly, and thus, whether it poses a threat, or an opportunity.8

More recent work on images in international politics has gone beyond the simple dis- tinction between friends and foes to argue that images of other countries are structured along three dimensions. First, we analyze others based upon the degree of perceived threat or opportunity they pose, such as whether they pose a threat, a chance for mutual gain, or an opportunity for exploitation; this is the valence dimension central to earlier work on images. Importantly, however, we also categorize targets on two additional dimensions: their relative power, and perceived status. Along the second dimension, a target can be evaluated as less powerful, equally powerful, or more powerful than the observer; along the third, the target can be perceived as of lower status, equal status, or higher status.9 Thus, an enemy and Assessment of Intentions in International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014); Joshua D. Kertzer, Resolve in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016). 7. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 1979). 8. Kenneth E Boulding, “National images and international systems,” Journal of Conﬂict Resolution 3, no. 2 (1959): 120–131. 9. Herrmann and Fischerkeller, “Beyond the Enemy Image and Spiral Model: Cognitive-Strategic Research After the Cold War”; Richard K. Herrmann, “Perceptions and Image Theory in International Relations,” in Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology, 2nd Ed., ed. Leonie Huddy, David O. Sears, and Jack S. Levy (Oxford University Press, 2013), 334–363.

3 image, for example, is attributed to an actor perceived of being comparable in power, with threatening intentions, of equal status, whereas a colony image is attributed to an actor weaker in power, lower in status, and who oﬀers an opportunity for exploitation.

The power of images is that they are linked to behavioral tendencies. If we think of another group as our enemy (as the Americans did towards the Soviets during the second half of the twentieth century), we treat it very diﬀerently than if we think of it as a colony

(as the Japanese did towards the Koreans in the ﬁrst half of twentieth century). Images thus not only shape how we wish the target to be treated, but function as cognitive schema, with implications for how we process information.10 They also have an aﬀective component: it is because of the emotions that images generate that they shape behavior.

Stereotypes: warmth and competence

In this sense, how we understand images of others in international politics bears a strong resemblance to how psychologists understand social stereotypes more generally.11 Whereas earlier psychological work on person perception argued that we form impressions of others along a single dimension, current research on stereotype structure, most notably Fiske et al.’s stereotype content model, argues our perceptions of other actors are clustered along two dimensions: perceived warmth (a function of perceived intentions, thus corresponding to image theory’s interest in whether the target poses a threat or an opportunity), and perceived competence (a function of perceived capabilities, thus corresponding to image theory’s interest in whether the target is more or less powerful than the observer).12 The cognitive processes through which we think about other countries is thus similar to those through which we think about other people.13

10. Richard K. Herrmann et al., “Images in International Relations: An Experimental Test of Cognitive Schemata,” International Studies Quarterly 41, no. 3 (1997): 403–433; Emanuele Castano, Alain Bonacossa, and Peter Gries, “National Images as Integrated Schemas: Subliminal Primes of Image Attributes Shape Foreign Policy Preferences,” Political Psychology 37, no. 3 (2016): 351–366. 11. Gordon W. Allport, The nature of prejudice (Cambridge, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1954); Susan T. Fiske, Amy J. C. Cuddy, and Peter Glick, “Universal dimensions of social perception: Warmth and competence,” Trends in Cognitive Sciences 11 (2007): 77–83. 12. Solomon E. Asch, “Forming impressions of personality,” Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 41 (1946): 1230–1240; Fiske et al., “A Model of (Often Mixed) Stereotype Content: Competence and Warmth Respectively Follow From Perceived Status and Competition.” 13. Kathleen M. McGraw and Thomas M. Dolan, “Personifying the state: Consequences for attitude for- mation,” Political Psychology 28, no. 3 (2007): 299–327.

4 How do South Koreans perceive North Koreans in this framework? To answer this question, the analysis below studies the ﬁrst two dimensions of South Koreans’ images of North

Koreans based on instrumentation from the stereotype content model, asking respondents the extent to which they characterize North Korean people as warm, and as competent; to provide a reference point, respondents were also asked the same questions about South

Koreans, as well as the Japanese. This theoretical model has been tested in Korea before, most notably as part of a large cross-national study by Cuddy et al., though the approach here diﬀers both through the use of a nationally representative sample, and in focusing on stereotypes of citizens in other countries, rather than groups within domestic society.14

Dehumanization: human uniqueness and human nature

A key related construct in intergroup relations is dehumanization, or the tendency for individuals to deny human characteristics to members of other groups.15 Dehumanization ranges in severity. Its most extreme form, blatant dehumanization, involves literally com- paring members of outgroups to animals or insects, thereby weakening moral constraints against violence by denying the target’s humanity.16 Its more subtle form involves being relatively less likely to attribute characteristics we associate with humanness to members of outgroups.17 Dual models of dehumanization argue that there are two broad types of characteristics we tend to associate with human essence.18 The ﬁrst cluster, human uniqueness, concerns the attributes we perceive as distinguishing humans from other animals, such as intelligence, self-control, moral sensibility, and secondary emotions.19 The second cluster, human nature, involves those traits we perceive as distinguishing humans from machines, robots and inanimate objects: warmth, agency and individuality, cognitive openness, and

14. Amy JC Cuddy et al., “Stereotype content model across cultures: Towards universal similarities and some diﬀerences,” British Journal of Social Psychology 48, no. 1 (2009): 1–33. 15. Haslam, “Dehumanization: An Integrative Review.” 16. Nour Kteily et al., “The ascent of man: Theoretical and empirical evidence for blatant dehumanization,” Journal of personality and social psychology 109, no. 5 (2015): 901. 17. Jacques-Philippe Leyens et al., “Psychological essentialism and the diﬀerential attribution of uniquely human emotions to ingroups and outgroups,” European Journal of Social Psychology 31, no. 4 (2001): 395– 411. 18. Nick Haslam and Steve Loughnan, “Dehumanization and Infrahumanization,” Annual Review of Psy- chology 65, no. 1 (2014): 399–423. 19. Whereas we attribute primary emotions like anger and anxiety to both humans and non-human animals, we tend to attribute secondary emotions like embarassment or regret only to humans.

5 emotionality. Denying human uniqueness to an outgroup is an animalistic form of dehumanization — viewing others as subhuman — whereas denying human nature to an outgroup is a mechanistic form of dehumanization — viewing others as nonhuman.

Since denying human uniqueness traits to outgroups involves perceiving others as low in competence, and denying human nature traits to outgroups involves perceiving others as low in warmth, dehumanization and stereotype content models are interrelated.20 Dehumaniza- tion is related to the relative status dimension of image theory as well; imperial powers often justiﬁed their interventions in their colonies with dehumanizing rhetoric, viewing colonial inhabitants of being backwards and incapable of governing themselves.21

Do South Koreans dehumanize North Koreans? And if so, does it involve denying human nature traits, or human uniqueness traits? In the analysis below, we address these questions by including instrumentation from the dual model of dehumanization.22 Respondents were presented with a list of eight traits previous research has found to vary in human nature, human uniqueness (and, to avoid valence eﬀects, desirability), and asked to indicate the extent to which each trait described the people of South Korea, North Korea, and Japan.

By calculating the respondent-level diﬀerences in trait ratings between the ingroup and each of the two outgroups, and averaging these diﬀerences for the traits high in human uniqueness, versus those high in human nature, we obtain measures of dehumanization along each of the two dimensions, for each of the two outgroups.

Results

What are South Koreans’ perceptions of North Koreans?

We begin by looking at the structure of South Koreans’ perceptions of North Koreans, in Figure1. For purposes of comparability, the left-hand panel displays South Koreans’ perceptions of the South Korean people as a whole, while the right-hand panel displays 20. Lasana T. Harris and Susan T. Fiske, “Dehumanizing the lowest of the low: neuroimaging responses to extreme out-groups,” Psychological Science 17, no. 10 (2006): 847–853. 21. Herrmann and Fischerkeller, “Beyond the Enemy Image and Spiral Model: Cognitive-Strategic Research After the Cold War.” 22. Nick Haslam and Paul Bain, “Humanizing the Self: Moderators of the Attribution of Lesser Humanness to Others,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 33, no. 1 (2007): 57–68.

6 Figure 1: South Koreans’ images

1. South Koreans 2. North Koreans 3. Japanese

100

50 Warmth 7

0 25 50 75 100 0 25 50 75 100 0 25 50 75 100 Competence

Figure1 plots survey respondents’ perceptions of citizens from the Republic of Korea, North Korea, and Japan. The y-axis measures the perceived warmth of each stereotype target, while the x-axis measures the perceived competence; each dot depicts the response of an individual survey respondent, jittered here to produce legibility. The solid blue lines correspond to the average level of warmth and competence attributed to a given stereotype target. Thus, the ﬁrst panel shows that most Koreans have a positive image of their fellow citizens, rating them high in both warmth and competence. In contrast, the next two panels show that Koreans have more negative images of citizens from North Korea and Japan. North Koreans are perceived as being neutral in warmth, and slightly below the scale midpoint in competence; the Japanese are perceived as being almost as competent as the Koreans, but less warm. South Koreans’ perceptions of the Japanese. The y-axis on each plot measures the perceived warmth of each stereotype target, while the x-axis measures the perceived competence. Each grey dot depicts the response of each individual survey respondent, while the solid blue lines correspond to the average values attributed to a given target on each dimension. The left- hand panel shows that most Koreans have a positive image of their fellow citizens, perceiving them as being relatively high in both warmth and competence — as is expected given that respondents were being asked to evaluate their ingroup. In the stereotype content model, the emotion elicited by this particular combination of warmth and competence is admiration.23

In contrast, the other two panels show that South Koreans have more negative images of both North Koreans and Japanese, with a much higher variance. The right-hand panel shows that South Koreans perceive the Japanese to be almost as competent as the South Koreans are, but signiﬁcantly less warm. In the stereotype content model, this particular combination is associated with envy, the result of competition with a high-status outgroup. The middle panel shows that South Koreans perceive the North Koreans to be similarly cold as the

Japanese, but to be signiﬁcantly less competent, indicative of a perception of lower status.

While the emotion this particular combination is associated with is contempt, on the whole the averages on each dimension are relatively close to the midpoint of each scale, such that the stereotype is not particularly extreme. Additionally, it is noteworthy that the dispersion of responses is greater for North Korea than for the other stereotype targets; this indicates a relative degree of dissensus amongst the respondents in their images of North Koreans compared to South Koreans or Japanese. This raises the question of which types of South

Korean respondents — younger or older, richer or poorer, more liberal or more conservative

— espouse which types of stereotypes, a question we return to in the following section.

Figure2 displays the results of the dehumanization measures. Here, since the measures are all calculated relative to the ingroup, there are two panels; the left-hand panel depicts

South Koreans’ dehumanization scores for the Japanese, and the right-hand panel shows

South Koreans’ dehumanization scores for North Koreans. The x-axis measures human uniqueness dehumanization: the extent to which outgroup members are attributed rela-

23. Fiske et al., “A Model of (Often Mixed) Stereotype Content: Competence and Warmth Respectively Follow From Perceived Status and Competition.”

8 Figure 2: Distribution of dehumanization scores

Japanese North Koreans 80

20 9

0 Dehumanization: human nature human Dehumanization: -20

-40 -25 0 25 50 -25 0 25 50 Dehumanization: human uniqueness

Figure2 plots survey respondents’ dehumanization scores for the Japanese and North Koreans. The x-axis measures the degree of dehumanization in terms of assessments of human uniqueness — the traits and mental states seen as separating humans from animals. The y-axis measures the degree of dehumanization in terms of assessments of human nature — the traits seen as distinguishing humans from machines. Thus, the x-axis corresponds to animalistic forms of dehumanization, while the y-axis corresponds to mechanistic forms of dehumanization; in both cases, higher values correspond with higher levels of dehumanization. The plot shows that neither the Japanese nor the North Koreans are dehumanized significantly in terms of human uniqueness, but that each population is dehumanized substantially in terms of human nature, or mechanistic dehumanization. tively fewer traits that distinguish humans from animals. In contrast, the y-axis measures human nature dehumanization — the extent to which outgroup members are attributed relatively fewer traits that distinguish humans from machines. As before, each dot repre- sents the scores of a different respondent. Interestingly, we find similar patterns for both outgroups. Neither the Japanese nor the North Koreans are dehumanized animalistically, and are attributed human uniqueness traits like conscientiousness and politeness at roughly the same rate as South Koreans attribute to their fellow citizens. However, South Korean respondents dehumanize both the Japanese and the North Koreans with respect to human nature traits, the characteristics that distinguish humans from robots or machines, such as curiosity or friendliness. As was the case with the stereotype content results in Figure1, however, there is considerable variation in dehumanization scores in Figure2: some South

Koreans dehumanize North Koreans signiﬁcantly more than others. It is explaining this type of variation that we turn to next.

What shapes South Koreans’ perceptions of North Koreans?

The analysis has thus far shown that South Koreans have relatively neutral stereotypes of North Koreans, while viewing them as signiﬁcantly less competent than either South

Koreans or Japanese, and signiﬁcantly colder than South Koreans. We have also shown that

South Koreans dehumanize North Koreans mechanistically, denying them in relative terms some of the traits that we associate with human nature. At the same time, we found evidence of signiﬁcant variation across both respondents’ stereotype and dehumanization scores.

Table1 attempts to explain this variation systematically, presenting the results of a series of linear regression models that examine respondents’ warmth and competence scores for

North Koreans as a function of a series of demographic variables and political orientations.

Models 1-3 present results for the warmth scores, while models 4-6 present the results for the competence scores. For purposes of comparability, all variables are scaled from 0-1 except for age (where a one-unit increase corresponds to one additional year of age). The first three models show that male respondents perceive North Koreans as significantly colder than fe- male North Koreans; depending on the other covariates in the model, the effect of gender

10 Table 1: Predictors of stereotype content

Warmth Competence (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Male −2.168∗ −1.948∗ −1.890∗ −0.919 −0.766 −0.788 (1.132) (1.136) (1.135) (1.106) (1.111) (1.112) Age 0.088∗∗ 0.090∗∗ 0.075∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ (0.041) (0.041) (0.042) (0.040) (0.040) (0.041) Education −0.963 −0.424 −0.292 0.172 0.687 0.219 (3.623) (3.643) (3.624) (3.539) (3.562) (3.552) Income 28.897∗∗ 28.533∗∗ 29.236∗∗ 11.915 11.740 12.041 (14.524) (14.510) (14.495) (14.185) (14.186) (14.208) Ideology −8.140∗∗∗ −8.132∗∗∗ −8.385∗∗∗ −5.701∗ −5.755∗∗ −5.675∗ (2.981) (2.979) (2.976) (2.911) (2.913) (2.917)

11 Class 0.912 1.587 0.687 4.387 4.861 4.563 (3.147) (3.163) (3.178) (3.074) (3.092) (3.115) Seoul 3.752∗∗∗ 3.772∗∗∗ 3.405∗∗ 4.030∗∗∗ 4.021∗∗∗ 3.996∗∗∗ (1.417) (1.416) (1.426) (1.384) (1.384) (1.398) Social dominance orientation −6.292∗ −4.769 −3.466 −3.678 (3.240) (3.318) (3.167) (3.252) Right wing authoritarianism 2.293 3.389 (3.752) (3.668) National attachment 6.577∗∗ −0.845 (3.154) (3.091) National chauvinism 0.691 1.961 (2.845) (2.788) Intercept 48.374∗∗∗ 48.943∗∗∗ 46.706∗∗∗ 41.246∗∗∗ 40.313∗∗∗ 41.975∗∗∗ (4.013) (4.676) (4.449) (3.919) (4.571) (4.361) N 1,001 1,001 1,001 1,001 1,001 1,001 R2 0.025 0.029 0.034 0.023 0.025 0.025 ∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01. All coefficients and standard errors reported from OLS models. ranges from −1.9 to −2.2 percentage points. In contrast, the next three sets of models show that gender has no statistically significant association with perceptions of competence. Age is significantly related with perceptions of both warmth and competence. Since potential generational effects may be nonlinear, we test for potential nonlinearities by estimating a generalized additive model with a nonparametric smoothing spline on the effects of age, the results for which are shown in Figure3. 24 Despite modeling the effects of age more flexibly, it nonetheless depicts a straightforward linear effect: younger respondents perceive North

Koreans as relatively colder than respondents from older generations, as well as relatively less competent. On the whole, then, the relatively neutral average stereotypes shown in Fig- ure2 are partially a function of generational divides, with younger respondents displaying more negative stereotypes about North Koreans than older respondents.

Figure 3: Eﬀects of age on stereotypes about North Koreans 15 15 10 10 5 5 0 0 Warmth Competence -5 -5 -10 -10 -15 -15

20 30 40 50 60 70 80 20 30 40 50 60 70 80

Age Age Figure3 plots the effects of respondents’ age on their perceptions of North Koreans’ warmth and competence; to account for potential nonlinear effects, the results here come from a generalized additive model with a nonparametric smoothing spline on the effects of age. Nonetheless, age displays a straightforward linear effect. Younger respondents perceive North Koreans as relatively colder and less competent, while older respondents perceive North Koreans as relatively warmer and more competent.

Interestingly, education is not signiﬁcantly associated with stereotypes about North

Koreans, but income is. The wealthiest category of respondents are signiﬁcantly more likely

24. Luke Keele, Semiparametric Regression for the Social Sciences (Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons, 2008).

12 to perceive North Koreans as warmer than South Koreans are; a shift from the lowest to highest income category in the survey is associated with a 29 percentage point increase in perceptions of warmth. Political ideology is signiﬁcantly associated with stereotypes of

North Koreans, for both warmth and competence: more conservative respondents display significantly more negative stereotypes about North Koreans than more liberal respondents, with the effects being larger for warmth (roughly an 8.0 percentage point difference) than for competence (roughly a 5.7 percentage point difference). Once income is controlled for, social class is not significantly associated with stereotypes of North Koreans, while respondents living in Seoul display 3.7−4.0 percentage point increase in positive stereotypes with respect to both warmth and competence.

The next set of predictor variables estimate the eﬀects of a variety of political orientations. Social dominance orientation is a psychological trait that measures beliefs in social and economic inequality.25 Individuals high in social dominance believe in the inevitability of hierarchies, and of the powerful dominating the weak, and thus tend to be economically conservative and opposed to social welfare programs.26 As one might expect, respondents high in social dominance orientation demonstrate more negative stereotypes about North

Koreans, particularly with respect to perceptions of warmth. In contrast, right wing authoritarianism — a psychological construct measuring beliefs in respect for authority, tradition, and social control — is not significantly associated with respondents’ stereotypes.27 The final two covariates refer to two different facets of national identity. National attachment refers to the extent to which respondents identify with their nation, whereas national superiority or chauvinism refers to the extent to which they view it as superior to others.28 Interestingly, national superiority is never significantly associated with stereotypes about North Kore- ans, but national attachment is: the more being South Korean forms an important part of

25. Felicia Pratto et al., “Social Dominance Orientation: A Personality Variable Predicting Social and Po- litical Attitudes,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 67, no. 4 (1994): 741–763; Jim Sidanius and Felicia Pratto, Social Dominance: An Intergroup Theory of Social Hierarchy and Oppression (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 26. John Duckitt and Chris G. Sibley, “A Dual-Process Motivational Model of Ideology, Politics, and Prejudice,” Psychological Inquiry 20 (2009): 98–109. 27. Bob Altemeyer, Right-wing Authoritarianism (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 1981). 28. Richard K. Herrmann, Pierangelo Isernia, and Paolo Segatti, “Attachment to the Nation and Interna- tional Relations: Probing the Dimensions of Identity and their Relationship to War and Peace,” Political Psychology 30, no. 5 (2009): 721–754.

13 respondents’ identities, the less warm they perceive North Koreans to be.

Figure 4: Eﬀects of age on dehumanization of North Koreans 15 15 10 10 5 5 0 0 Human nature Human -5 -5 Human uniqueness Human -10 -10 -15 -15

20 30 40 50 60 70 80 20 30 40 50 60 70 80

Age Age Figure4 plots the effects of respondents’ age on human uniqueness and human nature dehumanization of North Koreans. As in Figure3, to account for potential nonlinear effects, the results here come from a generalized additive model with a nonparametric smoothing spline on the effects of age. The left-hand panel shows no significant effect of age on human uniqueness dehumanization, while the right-hand panel displays a straightforward linear effect for human nature dehumanization. Just as younger respondents in Figure3 perceived North Koreans as relatively colder, here we find that younger respondents deny human nature traits like warmth and curiosity to North Koreans at relatively greater rates, whereas older respondents dehumanize North Koreans less.

Table2 conducts a similar analysis as Table1, but regressing dehumanization scores on demographic variables and political orientations. Models 1-3 focus on the effects of these covariates on human uniqueness judgments, while models 4-6 turn to human nature dehumanization. The results show that although stereotype content and dehumanization are related concepts, they have different patterns of relationships with the covariates. The only significant predictors of human uniqueness dehumanization in models 1-3 are social dominance orientation and national attachment. Respondents with the highest levels of social dominance orientation are 4.0−5.5 points higher in human uniqueness dehumanization than respondents with the lowest levels of social dominance orientation. And, respondents higher in national attachment dehumanize along the human uniqueness dimension significantly less.

In contrast, we ﬁnd more signiﬁcant results in models 4-6 that examine the predictors of human nature dehumanization, the dimension we saw the greatest levels of dehumanization

14 Table 2: Predictors of dehumanization

Human uniqueness Human nature (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Male 0.865 0.752 0.669 0.935 0.930 1.072 (0.711) (0.712) (0.709) (0.934) (0.938) (0.936) Age −0.008 −0.014 −0.001 −0.077∗∗ −0.073∗∗ −0.092∗∗∗ (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) Education 2.552 2.611 1.833 −10.422∗∗∗ −10.673∗∗∗ −9.995∗∗∗ (2.276) (2.283) (2.266) (2.988) (3.008) (2.990) Income −12.795 −12.414 −12.581 −3.984 −4.113 −3.343 (9.124) (9.092) (9.064) (11.976) (11.981) (11.961) Ideology −2.538 −2.687 −2.365 −0.588 −0.486 −0.883 (1.872) (1.867) (1.861) (2.458) (2.460) (2.455)

15 Class 2.208 1.865 2.163 −1.698 −1.717 −2.348 (1.977) (1.982) (1.987) (2.595) (2.612) (2.622) Seoul 0.558 0.490 0.754 −3.155∗∗∗ −3.115∗∗∗ −3.531∗∗∗ (0.890) (0.887) (0.892) (1.168) (1.169) (1.177) Social dominance orientation 5.521∗∗∗ 4.027∗ −1.465 0.006 (2.030) (2.075) (2.675) (2.738) Right wing authoritarianism 3.169 −3.136 (2.351) (3.098) National attachment −6.364∗∗∗ 6.439∗∗ (1.972) (2.602) National chauvinism 2.048 0.766 (1.779) (2.347) Intercept 0.304 −3.232 1.050 24.606∗∗∗ 26.890∗∗∗ 21.517∗∗∗ (2.521) (2.930) (2.782) (3.309) (3.861) (3.671) N 1,001 1,001 1,001 1,001 1,001 1,001 R2 0.009 0.018 0.027 0.029 0.030 0.036 ∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01. All coefficients and standard errors reported from OLS models. in Figure2. Here, older respondents dehumanize North Koreans less than their younger counterparts. To test for nonlinear generational effects, we estimate the effects of age flexibly using a nonparametric smoothing spline in Figure4, which finds, as before, a relatively straightforward linear effect. Interestingly, the pattern here corresponds with the effect of age on perceived warmth: younger respondents dehumanize North Koreans more with respect to human nature traits — traits like curiosity, emotion and agency that are typically associated with warmth. Younger South Koreans thus are less likely to perceive North Koreans as fellow humans, and more likely to perceive them as machine or robot-like. Similar patterns are shown in models 4-6 of Table2 with respect to education: the most educated South

Koreans attribute human nature traits to North Koreans 10−10.5 points less than the least educated respondents; residents of Seoul dehumanize North Koreans 3.2 − 3.5 points less.

Finally, respondents high in national attachment dehumanized North Koreans signiﬁcantly more than their less nationalist counterparts.

How do South Koreans’ perceptions of North Koreans shape their attitudes towards uniﬁcation?

While understanding South Koreans’ perceptions of North Koreans is important in its own right, it is particularly important if these stereotypes influence South Koreans’ policy preferences. Table3 explores the relationship between perceptions and policy attitudes towards reunification. Survey respondents were asked a series of twelve items measuring their support for unification (including statements such as “It is my sincere wish that the two Koreas be unified”, and “Even if we couldn’t witness the unification in our life time, we must endure through all means to achieve the grand goal of unification.”); parallel axis factoring with varimax rotation finds that that 10 of the items load neatly on a two-factor solution, where one factor refers to respondents’ general levels of support for reunification (e.g. disagreeing with statements like “It is better to stay divided than to unify two Koreas.”), and the other to respondents’ self-described willingness to personally sacrifice in order to achieve reunification (e.g. agreeing with statements like “I am in favor of raising taxes to cover the costs

16 of reuniﬁcation.”)29

Table 3: Predictors of attitudes towards uniﬁcation

Support for reunification Personal sacrifice for unification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Male −0.023∗∗ −0.022∗∗ −0.023∗∗ −0.047∗∗∗ −0.044∗∗∗ −0.046∗∗∗ (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) Age 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) Education 0.080∗∗ 0.081∗∗ 0.070∗∗ 0.078∗∗ 0.079∗∗ 0.072∗∗ (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.035) (0.036) Income 0.151 0.130 0.151 0.339∗∗ 0.296∗∗ 0.327∗∗ (0.140) (0.140) (0.140) (0.144) (0.142) (0.144) Ideology −0.068∗∗ −0.061∗∗ −0.068∗∗ −0.125∗∗∗ −0.111∗∗∗ −0.127∗∗∗ (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.030) Class −0.056∗ −0.057∗ −0.058∗ 0.005 0.001 0.005 (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) Seoul 0.007 0.004 0.004 −0.010 −0.017 −0.012 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) Warmth 0.075∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ (0.037) (0.038) Competence 0.0003 0.058 (0.038) (0.038) Human uniqueness 0.015 −0.080 (0.053) (0.055) Human nature −0.104∗∗ −0.089∗∗ (0.041) (0.042) Intercept 0.422∗∗∗ 0.386∗∗∗ 0.472∗∗∗ 0.368∗∗∗ 0.281∗∗∗ 0.448∗∗∗ (0.039) (0.042) (0.049) (0.040) (0.042) (0.050) N 995 995 995 995 995 995 R2 0.046 0.052 0.052 0.094 0.121 0.101 ∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01. All coefficients and standard errors reported from OLS models.

Table3 thus estimates the effect of stereotypes and dehumanization on both general support for reunification and willingness to sacrifice for reunification (operationalized using factor scores for more precise estimates),30 controlling for a set of demographic characteristics. Models 1-3 focus on support for reunification more generally, while models 4-6 turn

29. The two factor solution produces a good ﬁt according to standard model ﬁt criteria: RMSEA: 0.042, TLI=0.976. Two items were dropped due to cross-loading. See Kristopher J. Preacher et al., “Choosing the Optimal Number of Factors in Exploratory Factor Analysis: A Model Selection Perspective,” Multivariate Behavioral Research 48, no. 1 (2013): 28–56 30. Joshua D. Kertzer et al., “Moral Support: How Moral Values Shape Foreign Policy Attitudes,” Journal of Politics 76, no. 3 (2014): 825–840.

17 to a willingness to personally sacrifice for unification. For ease of interpretability, all covariates except for age have been rescaled from 0-1. Model 1 estimates the effects of a set of basic demographic covariates on support for reunification, showing that male respondents, younger respondents, the less educated, the upper-class, and the more conservative are less supportive of unification. Model 2 adds covariates for our two stereotype content measures.

Importantly, the warmer the image South Korean respondents have towards North Korea, the more supportive they are of uniﬁcation: respondents with the warmest images of North

Koreans are 7.5 percentage points more supportive of reuniﬁcation than respondents with the coolest images, even when controlling for all of the demographic covariates listed above.

Perceived competence has no significant effect. Model 3 adds the dehumanization measures instead, showing a significant effect for human nature dehumanization. Respondents who deny human nature traits to the North Koreans are significantly less supportive of reunification; in a multivariate regression context, the respondents who dehumanize the most are

10.4 percentage points less supportive than those who dehumanize the least.

Model 4 replicates model 1, but this time estimating the effects of the demographic covariates on respondents’ willingness to personally sacrifice for unification. Similar to the results in model 1, male respondents, younger respondents, the less educated, the lower- income, and the more conservative are less willing to sacrifice for unification. Adding the stereotype measures in model 5 yields similar results as in model 2, although stronger in magnitude: respondents who perceive the North Korean people to be warmer express significantly more willingness to sacrifice for unification; controlling for the other demographic covariates, the respondents with the warmest images of North Koreans display a 13.0 percentage point increase in reported willingness to sacrifice than the respondents with the coolest images. As before, images of competence are not significantly associated with expressed willingness to sacrifice. Turning to the dehumanization measures in model 6, we gain find evidence of significant negative effects of human nature dehumanization: the more respondents dehumanize North Korean respondents mechanistically, the less willing they are to sacrifice for unification. Respondents who dehumanized the North Korean people the most expressed 8.9 percentage points less willingness to sacrifice for unification than

18 respondents who dehumanized the North Korean people the least.

Conclusion

This chapter borrowed from a range of theoretical frameworks from political psychology — including image theory, stereotypes, and dehumanization — to explore the nature, origins, and consequences of South Korean perceptions about North Koreans. First, it looked at the images that South Koreans have of North Koreans, showing that South Koreans have a neutral image of North Koreans overall, but nonetheless perceive North Korean citizens to be significantly less competent and significantly less warm than South Koreans. This is somewhat different than how the South Koreans perceive the Japanese people, who are perceived as being similarly competent as South Koreans, but less warm. In contrast, both the

North Koreans and the Japanese are dehumanized by South Koreans in similar ways, with respect to human nature traits, rather than human uniqueness traits: they are dehumanized mechanistically, rather than animalistically. With both stereotypes and dehumanization, however, there is considerable variation in respondents’ perceptions, raising the question of how this variation should be best explained theoretically.

Thus, the second set of analyses turned to the demographic and dispositional correlates of respondents’ perceptions, ﬁnding evidence of stark generational divides, with younger

Koreans displaying more negative stereotypes and greater levels of dehumanization than older Koreans. With stereotypes, similar patterns are also displayed by male respondents, ideologically conservative respondents, and Korean residents outside of Seoul, while human nature dehumanization is highest amongst the less educated, and respondents who do not live in Seoul. The third set of analyses shows that these patterns are politically consequential: even when controlling for a range of demographic variables, South Koreans who perceived

North Koreans as less warm, or who dehumanized them with respect to human nature traits, were significantly less supportive of reunification, and expressed significantly less willingness to make personal sacrifices in order for unification to occur. Taken together, these findings highlight the applicability of these theoretical frameworks to the study of inter-Korean

19 relations, and showcase the importance of the study of perceptions in international relations more broadly.