Refashioning Provincial Government in Democratic South Africa, 1994-1996

REFASHIONING PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT IN DEMOCRATIC SOUTH AFRICA, 1994-1996

SYNOPSIS In 1994, nine provincial heads, or premiers, came to power as a result of South Africa’s first democratic elections. Many had spent decades mobilizing opposition to the state but had never held political office. All faced the challenge of setting up provincial administrations under a new constitution that reduced the number of provinces and cut the number of departments in each administration, eliminating significant numbers of staff. Anticipating those challenges, the political parties that negotiated South Africa’s democratic transition had laid the groundwork for a commission that would help the newly elected provincial leaders set up their administrations. The panel, called the Commission on Provincial Government, operated under a two-year mandate and played an important role in advising the premiers and mediating between the provincial governments and other influential groups. By providing a trusted channel of critical information, the commission helped the new provincial leaders find their feet after their election, reducing tensions and keeping the postelectoral peace.

Tumi Makgetla and Rachel Jackson drafted this case study based on interviews conducted by Makgetla in Pretorian and Johannesburg, South Africa, in January and February 2010. A separate policy note, “Negotiating Divisions in a Divided Land: Creating Provinces for a New South Africa, 1993,” focuses on provincial boundary delimitation. Case originally published in April 2011. Case revised and republished in August 2013.

INTRODUCTION that we need to do away with the duplication of “Jobs, jobs, jobs!” read election posters for the some of the posts. We had to cut the civil service African National Congress (ANC) in the run-up almost by half in certain areas,” he said. In Botha’s to South Africa’s first democratic elections in home province of Eastern Cape, the newly elected 1994. government deemed 18,000 civil servants When the party emerged victorious, ANC superfluous. activist Thozamile Botha had much to celebrate. The new, post-apartheid constitution But despite those promises, he also had bad news overhauled the provincial government structure by for thousands of civil servants around the country. changing its responsibilities and reducing the “During the elections [we] had promised people number of subnational administrations in the jobs, and here we were a few months later saying country. As the first chairman of the Commission

ISS is program of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs: successfulsocieties.princeton.edu. ISS invites readers to share feedback and information on how these cases are being used: [email protected]. © 2013, Trustees of Princeton University. This case study is made available under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. Tumi Makgetla and Rachel Jackson Innovations for Successful Societies on Provincial Government, which was created to The problem was further compounded by help define and manage subnational government unsettled questions around the status of the reorganization, Botha had to help new and largely provinces. The main contention during the inexperienced provincial leaders establish their negotiations that paved the transition from administrations. Along with his fellow apartheid government to majority rule had been commissioners, he helped them address daunting whether South Africa would have a unitary or technical and political challenges. federal-state structure. The outcome—elected provincial assemblies with weak legislative THE CHALLENGE powers—was a compromise. Having arrived at Following the 1994 elections, which marked that decision just before the election, the the beginning of majority rule in South Africa, negotiators who drafted the interim constitution nine freshly elected premiers faced the politically left much of the detail of provincial government to and technically daunting task of refashioning 14 the post-1994 administration. But to define the regional governments into 9 new ones. The scope of a South African government, those election had formally ended the practice of using details would have to be hammered out before the the borders of segregated homeland territories— 1996 deadline for a final constitution. ethnically defined areas for black South Without knowing the final outcome of their Africans—to divide the black majority from the powers in relation to national or local government, white and other minority populations. Under the nine premiers had to develop their provincial apartheid, the government had not recognized administrations according to the terms of the residents of those homelands as full citizens of interim constitution, which had made sweeping South Africa—one facet of a larger strategy of changes to the system of regional government. racial segregation and discrimination. The The interim constitution created nine new homelands, treated as autonomous or provinces with new powers and functions, semiautonomous nations within South Africa, had replacing four provincial administrations and 10 completely separate and usually underresourced homeland governments. The technical challenges security, health, education, and other service of the premiers’ jobs involved distributing physical infrastructures. assets, such as vehicles and computers, among the The political problem lay in managing the new provinces; closing old departments and interests of incoming ANC loyalists and establishing new ones; and ensuring that the incumbent administrators. Although most of the governments continued providing health, new premiers were ANC members, much of the educational, and other services. workforce retained ties to the pre-1994 apartheid The technical complexity involved in regime. Many of the incumbent civil servants were dismantling the former administrations stemmed loyal to the National Party (NP), which had partly from differences between previous controlled the former government, and to such provincial and homeland boundaries and the new organizations as the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) provincial borders. In some cases, the new in the former homelands. After 1994, those constitution broke up old provinces into more parties joined with the ANC to form a unity than one. In other cases, new provinces government. The premiers had to guard against incorporated parts of old provinces and undermining party relationships as they set up homelands. The task was further complicated by their new administrations. the different structures and different powers of

© 2019, Trustees of Princeton University Terms of use and citation format appear at the end of this document and at successfulsocieties.princeton.edu/about/terms-conditions. Tumi Makgetla and Rachel Jackson Innovations for Successful Societies provincial and homeland governments under The 1994 elections had changed the balance apartheid rule. For example, some of the of power in South Africa, adding a layer of homeland governments had certain functions— complexity to the political landscape. The ANC such as defense and foreign affairs—that the new had won a majority in the national elections and, national government planned to reserve according to the preelectoral agreement, had exclusively for itself. entered a unity government with several other As a result, the premiers had to negotiate political parties. Further, the ANC had won with each other to redistribute the government majorities in seven of the nine provincial elections, assets of the former provinces and homelands while the NP took Western Cape province and among the new entities. The premiers also had to IFP won KwaZulu-Natal. staff their administrations with officials and other The power shift toward the ANC meant that employees from the former homeland areas and most of the new premiers had never served in provinces. government before. They were “senior in politics The former homeland and provincial but junior in experience as far as practical bureaucracies’ different cultures also caused governance was concerned,” said Tjol Lategan, difficulties in the merging of staff and the creation who served as deputy chairperson on the of new hierarchies. The homeland administrations commission. Lategan had a long history in local had often served as patronage machines for local and provincial government structures under leaders, and staffs had reputations for being apartheid, and he was concerned that the new corrupt. premiers might fail to retain experienced officials Similarly, white South African politicians from the previous administration, a fear shared by had used the provincial administrations as sources many civil servants of the apartheid of patronage, especially for white speakers of administration. Afrikaans. The resulting bureaucracy generally Those concerns were difficult to reconcile had a reputation for technical efficiency, though with the incoming ANC premiers’ political oriented toward the needs of the relatively small imperatives: to simultaneously make the public white population. Douglas Irvine, who served as a sector more racially representative and to improve technical adviser to the Commission on Provincial service delivery to reach the previously neglected Government, said: “By and large, because the majority of the population. The premiers came apartheid state was in the service of Afrikaner under additional pressure from fellow party nationalism, this meant that a majority of public members for jobs in the civil service. Those party officials in the state service and, indeed, provincial members might have had the necessary and local government in most parts of the country qualifications but lacked public sector experience. were white Afrikaners [who were] not necessarily The demands on the new premiers created tension well disposed to the new political regime and between the need to hire and retain people with [who] had to battle, among other things, with administrative expertise and the need to their own racial prejudices,” He added that the incorporate people without civil service former, largely black, homeland civil servants, backgrounds into the administration for political brought with them other challenges—namely, reasons. “very bad practices which were being brought into Even without the pressures to diversify the the core of the civil service” from corrupt former civil service and to bring in political appointees, homeland governments. the new government structure was significantly

© 2019, Trustees of Princeton University Terms of use and citation format appear at the end of this document and at successfulsocieties.princeton.edu/about/terms-conditions. Tumi Makgetla and Rachel Jackson Innovations for Successful Societies smaller than the previous administration. His action saddled the new provincial government Cutbacks—a fiscal imperative for a new South with a bloated payroll that the new leaders would African government facing a massive expansion of find politically difficult to whittle down. social services—would leave many civil servants “There were a lot of suspicions that people out of work. who were not part of the liberation struggle were “It was clear that the civil service was being victimized by members of the party of bloated,” said Botha, who later became director liberation, and therefore some of the general of Eastern Cape, where he gained specific retrenchments would not happen innocently,” said insight into that province’s challenges. Eastern Botha. “The racial issue was very sharply brought Cape province incorporated two former to the fore. . . . Whites were unhappy and unsure homelands, Transkei and Ciskei, as well as the about their future.” eastern part of the former Cape Province. Under The negotiating parties who wrote the the old regime, each homeland government had interim constitution and determined the new 12 to 18 departments, each of which had a provincial divisions recognized the challenges director general, one or two deputy directors inherent in creating nine administrations from the general, a chief director, and several directors and pieces of the old regional governments based on deputy directors. The interim constitution, only vague constitutional guidelines. Roelf Meyer, however, stipulated that provincial governments an important government negotiator representing each have 11 departments, which left Eastern the NP, said negotiators had been under extreme Cape with 200 excess managers. pressure to find a political settlement quickly, Eliminating superfluous public servants was, especially after the 1993 assassination of popular however, politically tricky. As part of the ANC leader and Communist Party general agreement that formed the unity government, the secretary Chris Hani gave rise to fears of a popular ANC had pledged to try to retain existing officials uprising over continued delays. As a result, the in the administration. Because of the country’s negotiators had not deliberated any administrative history of segregation, most of the white details. “Those negotiations were aimed at finding administrators in the apartheid government had a political settlement for South Africa, which been loyal to predominantly white political resulted in the interim constitution and ended in parties. F. Firing thousands of officials would have the final constitution,” said Meyer. “Those negative repercussions for cooperative relations negotiations were not primarily about setting up between the political parties at the national level. new administrations.” Similarly, many homeland civil servants saw their own fates closely aligned with those of the FRAMING A RESPONSE leaders of their homelands. Although some In response to their inability to settle the homeland leaders supported the ANC, others details of the new provincial administrations, the formed alliances with parties opposed to the negotiating parties decided before 1994 to write ANC, such as the IFP, which had a strong base in into the interim constitution the Commission on the KwaZulu homeland. Provincial Government as a temporary The homeland leader in Transkei, for mechanism to smooth the establishment of new example, increased his staff size before the 1994 provincial governments. The interim constitution elections in the belief that the incoming ANC stated that the commission was a mechanism to government would maintain their employment. operate from 1994 to 1996 with a twofold

© 2019, Trustees of Princeton University Terms of use and citation format appear at the end of this document and at successfulsocieties.princeton.edu/about/terms-conditions. Tumi Makgetla and Rachel Jackson Innovations for Successful Societies responsibility: to facilitate the establishment of committee to assist the commissioners on an ad new provincial governments and to offer to the hoc basis. The advisers’ technical expertise would Constitutional Assembly certain be important to enabling the commission to draft recommendations about provincial and local concrete proposals. Only a few commissioners— government as the assembly finalized the including the chairman, his deputy, and the constitution. technical advisers—held full-time positions. The The commission began to operate in June Ministry of Provincial Affairs and Constitutional 1994 and reported to Meyer, who was then Development provided the commission with an minister for provincial affairs and constitutional office manager, two assistants, and two secretaries. development. The panel consisted of a diverse group of individuals with a range of pertinent GETTING DOWN TO WORK expertise and knowledge of particular provinces. The members of the Commission on Botha had just entered the national assembly Provincial Government outlined their action plan when Pres. Nelson Mandela approached him to based on a close reading of the commission’s chair the commission. Before then, Botha had run constitutional mandate. The interim constitution the ANC’s department of local and regional required that the commission advise the government and housing. Also, leading up to the politicians drafting South Africa’s final elections, Botha had taught at the University of constitution on issues related to provincial the Western Cape, where he organized government, such as the powers of the provinces researchers in universities and organizations and financial transfers from the center to the around the country to study local and regional provinces. Additionally, provincial governments government. had to consult with the commission on certain Mandela appointed the other commissioners issues, such as staff appointments to the provincial in consultation with other political parties, which legislature. Provincial governments also turned to would ensure the commission would not be the commission to settle interprovincial disputes perceived as politically biased. The NP, for over assets and liabilities. Further, the commission example, nominated Lategan to serve as Botha’s worked with the national and provincial deputy. Lategan had served in both local governments to overhaul the public service. government and provincial government before 1994. He and Botha had radically different Establishing relationships with the premiers backgrounds. Lategan, for example, had been on a The commissioners first set about building commission that considered apartheid laws on rapport with the nine premiers, a task made easier social segregation. by the multiparty composition of the commission. The other commissioners came from each of Lategan, for example, knew the NP premier in the provinces, with four additional experts in such Western Cape, and Botha had built relationships areas as town planning or public administration. with many of the other premiers while in the By bringing together commissioners from ANC. different regions, the commission could draw on The commissioners’ first step was to schedule personal knowledge of the provinces to address meetings with each premier for review of the the challenges of the new administrations. constitution and the ways it defined their The commission appointed several technical relationship to one another. The commissioners advisers, who in turn formed a technical worked with each premier individually to identify

© 2019, Trustees of Princeton University Terms of use and citation format appear at the end of this document and at successfulsocieties.princeton.edu/about/terms-conditions. Tumi Makgetla and Rachel Jackson Innovations for Successful Societies the areas in which the commission could best further assist the provincial governments, the support the premiers’ work. Each commissioner commissioners sought input from directors had in-depth knowledge of a particular province, general and other managers in former and many had extensive administrative experience. administrations. Lategan said that even though it was the premiers who made the ultimate decisions, the Staffing provincial government commissioners would help by pointing out the Staffing decisions were important to the implications of different choices. The chairman commission. The negotiated settlement before the and his deputy traveled regularly around the elections had made it difficult but not impossible provinces. for the new governments to fire veteran When interacting with the premiers, employees, and the commission found that some members of the commission deliberately worked premiers were getting rid of relatively experienced to cultivate a conciliatory rather than a dictatorial ones. Although that decision made room for more stance, Lategan said. Their constitutional representative civil servants, it also ran the risk of mandate lent the commissioners legitimacy, and seriously depleting the capacity of provincial when approaching the premiers, they tried to administrations. convey the message that “We’re not forcing Lategan said he advised the premiers to ourselves onto you, but this is what the prioritize honesty and knowledge of financial constitution requires of us,” Lategan said. He management in their choices of top added that the commissioners told other administrators. “If your finance is in a shambles, institutions working with the premiers not to “talk you can be sure you’re going to fail,” he recalled down to them” or “belittle them” but to “talk up telling them. He also advised that practical to them as the leaders.” experience was often more valuable than university After building strong relationships with the qualifications. However, he helped the premiers premiers, the commissioners could facilitate identify such areas as park management and road interactions between the provincial leadership and maintenance where inexperienced hires could pick other departments and agencies. For example, the up the necessary skills more quickly than commissioners organized national meetings for employees in more-technical positions could. the heads of the management committees in each These decisions were not always easy. province, enabling those leaders to learn from one Lategan recalled meeting with the premier of another’s experiences. Those exchanges also Gauteng, an economically powerful province that enabled the central government to ensure that it includes the seat of the executive, Pretoria, as well did not make promises in one province that it as South Africa’s financial hub, Johannesburg. could not fulfill elsewhere. The premier, Tokyo Sexwale, was a high-profile The commissioners also arranged meetings at ANC politician who had spent 18 years in prison which the premiers and their cabinets could learn for his involvement in anti-apartheid activities. from experts in certain areas. The commission When it came time to discuss staffing the Sexwale organized meetings between provincial administration, Lategan urged Sexwale and his government representatives and the government- cabinet to keep experienced administrators. “The funded Development Bank of South Africa and people will look at you for leadership, the people the Financial and Fiscal Commission, which will look at you for delivery of services, for houses, divided revenue between the provinces. And to for good streets [and] they will look at you for

© 2019, Trustees of Princeton University Terms of use and citation format appear at the end of this document and at successfulsocieties.princeton.edu/about/terms-conditions. Tumi Makgetla and Rachel Jackson Innovations for Successful Societies good governance,” Lategan recalled saying. The commission’s credibility—derived from “Please don’t get rid of the most experienced guys, its constitutional authority, multiparty makeup, because you will regret it one day.” and commissioners’ experience—not only meant Keeping old administrators, however, meant that the premiers listened to their advice; it also continuing to employ former representatives of bolstered the premiers’ authority in following that the very government Sexwale and his cabinet had advice. The commissioners met with senior civil fought against. Lategan said that although he servants to explain the necessity of creating a “lean chose his words carefully during that meeting, and mean government,” Botha said. Those some of the ministers called him “an old racist” interactions helped premiers enforce the and wanted Sexwale to kick him out of the office. constitutional requirement that each province “Then the premier, very wisely, but very firmly, have just one director general, for example. said, ‘Listen, I am listening to Mr. Lategan. If you don’t want to listen to him, that’s your business, Allocating physical resources but I’m listening to him because I want to make a The commission also helped the new success of this province,’” Lategan recalled. He provincial governments divide among the added that Sexwale took his advice and kept a provinces the assets that had belonged to the core of his “old, experienced top guys.” previous regional administrations. National and The commissioners walked a similarly provincial departments drew up registers of state difficult line in advising the premiers on working assets in each region, such as furniture, vehicles, with former homeland administrations. One of and computers. The registers formed the basis for the commissioners, Paul Daphne, had firsthand the departments to divide assets among the new experience with tensions in North West province, provinces. And in case of a dispute, the which incorporated the former Bophuthatswana commission arbitrated between the opposing homeland. Daphne had served as the first parties. For example, the commission received secretary of the ANC in Bophuthatswana after dueling submissions from the government of the national government lifted its ban on the party North West province and the national Defense in 1990. Although the ANC had become legal, Ministry over the ownership of a helicopter that the Bophuthatswana government expelled had formerly belonged to the Bophuthatswana Daphne from the homeland for his involvement homeland government. The commission reported with the party. to the Ministry of Provincial Affairs and After the 1994 elections, Daphne said, the Constitutional Development, outlining both sides’ new provincial leaders made an effort to include arguments; it discussed them; and it produced a former homeland officials. “There was a concerted recommendation on the matter. effort to say to the civil servants, at least, your jobs are still there,” he said. “You are still part of the Advising the Constitutional Assembly government; let’s work together.” The commissioners drew on their In the end, he said, the solution was for the interactions with the provincial governments to provincial administrations to include former develop suggestions that would shape the final homeland officials on the task teams they created powers of the provinces versus local government, as the first step to establishing the new and they sent the suggestions to the departments. The heads of the new departments Constitutional Assembly, which worked from came from the ANC. 1994 to 1996 to finalize the constitution. Irvine

© 2019, Trustees of Princeton University Terms of use and citation format appear at the end of this document and at successfulsocieties.princeton.edu/about/terms-conditions. Tumi Makgetla and Rachel Jackson Innovations for Successful Societies noted that the part-time nature of most also worked closely with the nine provincial commissioners meant that it was the chair, the legislatures as the legislatures worked to draft their deputy chair, and the technical advisers who own provincial constitutions. largely set the agenda for the commission’s debates. OVERCOMING OBSTACLES The commissioners first scrutinized the The transition to new provincial interim and proposed final constitution as it administrations required that the commissioners applied to provincial and local government. The help the premiers balance numerous delicate and advisers also examined the policy documents of competing political interests. different interest groups with reference to the Public sector trade unions initially opposed provinces. efforts to reduce the size of the civil service. “They The commission convened a panel of experts were up in arms, protesting everywhere, resisting to identify issues related to provincial and local the retrenchments,” Botha said. “We had to government that might crop up in constitutional convince [the unions] about the need for a stable discussions. The commission circulated the results country, especially after the elections. We also had to relevant bodies such as provincial and local to convince them that the government [could not] governments as well as the Constitutional be seen as an employment agent.” Assembly. Advertisements solicited public The commissioners met with union response to the issues. leadership on several occasions to discuss the The commission then held five high-level unions’ concerns and reach a compromise. “Trade workshops with experts and interested parties. union leaders were quite rational,” Botha said of The subjects of the workshops were provincial and the negotiations. “Once you sat around the table local government, financial and fiscal issues, and debated with them, there was quite a lot of traditional leaders, local government, and common understanding and therefore there was intergovernmental relations. The commissioners support.” The unions demanded that the used the workshop reports as the basis for their government make the restructuring process proposals to the Constitutional Assembly. transparent and predictable. That position had The commissioners worked with the three sprung from a fear that the new government committees of the Constitutional Assembly would victimize long-serving state employees. focused on provincial government, local Organized labor also demanded that when the government, and financial institutions. The government began to hire new employees after the chairman, the deputy, and two technical advisers transition, preference would be given to people traveled frequently from the commission’s whose jobs had been eliminated. The commission headquarters in Pretoria to Cape Town to sit in agreed to the demands, and the unions agreed to on committee discussions. The commissioners cooperate with the restructuring process. made initial recommendations to the Newly elected politicians who had run on the Constitutional Assembly in March 1995 promise of increasing employment also attempted regarding the final powers, structure, and fiscal to stop cuts to the civil service, accusing the administration. Irvine said the commissioners and commission of creating unemployment in already technical advisers then participated extensively in economically depressed areas. According to debates on those and other proposals. During that Botha, those negotiations were less productive. period, the commissioners and technical advisers “We didn’t really have to offer politicians

© 2019, Trustees of Princeton University Terms of use and citation format appear at the end of this document and at successfulsocieties.princeton.edu/about/terms-conditions. Tumi Makgetla and Rachel Jackson Innovations for Successful Societies anything, because in any case the commission was “leisurely” approach and debated “high issues of carrying out the [constitutional] mandate,” he principle,” according to Irvine. But as the June said. “Only with the reduction of the civil service 1996 deadline for a final constitution neared, a would we have an efficient government. Some of sense of urgency set in. them understood, but of course there’s a lot of Months before the deadline, the assembly political expedience—people wanting to score secretariat transported all of its committee points.” members to a remote convention center for two Not all of the challenges came from outside weeks to complete the text. Irvine joined the interests. The commission ran into some conflicts committee working on the financial powers of the with the Ministry of Provincial Affairs and provinces; the commission’s other technical Constitutional Development, to which it was adviser, Jimmy Vermaak, worked with the accountable. Botha described the relationship as committee to determine the powers of the “a bit tricky,” explaining that “there was quite a bit provinces. of overlap between their work and the “Literally one last week before the commission’s work in the provinces.” He said all finalization of the constitution, the committee of the ministries at the time were also trying to which was working on the powers of local settle into their positions and understand their government in the new constitution still had a roles and responsibilities. blank,” said Irvine. Vermaak wrote out a list of Over time, the commission and the ministry local government powers and handed it to the managed to work together, he said. “We had a chair of the committee. The chair adopted the good relationship,” said Meyer, the minister who suggestions with little amendment. oversaw the commission. “But the demands of the “What had warranted a very thorough jobs were much bigger than what a commission or canvassing didn’t receive it,” said Irvine. “It’s just a department could do.” fortunate that the recommendations that were Regular meetings between leaderships in accepted were reasonably sensible.” different spheres of government represented one In the end, the Constitutional Assembly way the parties dealt with those overlapping incorporated about 50 of the commission’s responsibilities. The government held meetings recommendations and rejected about 20. between national ministers and provincial The commission made some important ministers who worked in the same areas. The contributions to the constitution on the matter of commissioners also made presentations to the provincial government. For example, the president, the president’s cabinet ministers, and commission called for limits on the number of the provincial premiers. According to Meyer, members in provincial legislatures “so that those councils stabilized the relationship between parliaments couldn’t simply inflate their provincial and national government. The [provincial] legislatures,” according to Irvine. interactions also enabled the commission to Such a measure would limit the use of the ensure that important decision makers all had the provincial assemblies as patronage machines. same information, according to Botha. The commission also called for a higher bar to legislate changes to the powers of the provinces, Facing a looming deadline a proposal aimed at cementing the negotiated Following the 1994 elections and for much settlement on the structure of the state. Groups in of 1995, the Constitutional Assembly took a favor of a more federal structure before the

© 2019, Trustees of Princeton University Terms of use and citation format appear at the end of this document and at successfulsocieties.princeton.edu/about/terms-conditions. Tumi Makgetla and Rachel Jackson Innovations for Successful Societies elections still held concerns that the new a source of much-needed, politically balanced constitution might not adequately maintain the technical and political support for the first independence of provincial governments. The provincial premiers, many of whom were skilled, commission’s suggestion would introduce a high-profile politicians. (Later, South Africa’s “degree of inflexibility” regarding the provincial next president, Thabo Mbeki, began to centralize structure, said Irvine. power and appoint less politically independent Some of the commission’s recommendations candidates as premiers.) The commission also did not find their way into the final constitution. made important recommendations and lent vital For example, the interim constitution set up technical support to the Constitutional Assembly provincial elections on a party-list basis. The as it drafted South Africa’s final constitution, commission had suggested instead that the though the assembly did not accept every government adopt a system in which voters would recommendation and the commission was unable elect people on the basis of constituencies. The to come to consensus on all issues. commission also recommended the establishment Commission members had a broad range of of a council on intergovernmental executive political connections and administrative relations with the mandate to liaise between experience and provided valuable advice for the national, provincial, and local government new premiers as they set up their administrations. whenever problems arose. That recommendation The panel also helped the premiers manage the was also not adopted. politics of creating a decentralized government Other issues remained unresolved both structure. And it played a key role in finalizing the within the commission itself and in the final constitutional powers of provincial administration constitution. Notably, the commission debated at in South Africa. length its recommendations on the powers of In the period following the 1994 elections, South Africa’s traditional leaders in the the new premiers lacked other trusted sources of constitution. They held a joint conference with information they needed to organize their representatives of other African countries to administrations. They were often wary of officials discuss possible approaches but ultimately were who had worked in the apartheid state and unable to arrive at a solution. Irvine, describing questioned the latter’s political motives. In that the debates, pointed to the widely divergent forms context, the commission was a credible channel of of traditional authority across South Africa as one administrative and political advice. It also served of the problems in arriving at a consensus. “That as a conduit for communication between the proved to be too thorny a task for the provincial administrations and the central Constitutional Assembly to finalize, and in fact, it government’s departments and agencies. is in many ways still a continuing debate within The Ministry of Provincial Affairs and the South African polity,” Irvine said. “We didn’t Constitutional Development played a similar role produce detailed recommendations on traditional in directing and supporting provincial leadership and traditional authorities, simply governments. However, it, too, was in flux. “Most because the matter was so very complicated and people, even the ministers, had not settled into fraught, both institutionally and politically.” their positions,” said Botha. “They were new, they [had] never been ministers, they were taking ASSESSING RESULTS responsibilities, and they had challenges [from] The commission played an important role as the old bureaucracy.” In that context, the

© 2019, Trustees of Princeton University Terms of use and citation format appear at the end of this document and at successfulsocieties.princeton.edu/about/terms-conditions. Tumi Makgetla and Rachel Jackson Innovations for Successful Societies commission’s involvement was especially wing, and many of them were not prepared for the beneficial to the governments and the ministry, new South Africa. . . . Many of them, just because because all sides were struggling to find their feet. of their attitude toward black people, decided to Without the commission, Botha said, “more say, ‘We’ve got nothing to do with this.’” political upheaval” would have been possible, However, there were also instances of so-called especially in regard to the cutbacks in the civil constructive dismissals, whereby new managers service. Botha said the commission earned a would encourage underperforming employees to reputation as a “neutral and nonpolitical” broker leave by making their work lives difficult. For that was capable of mediating fairly between example, said Lategan, some managers relocated opposing interest groups. “I don’t think we had a staff to uncomfortable offices or did not share problem insofar as convincing people or important information with them. persuading people, because everybody saw the Lategan said provincial governments lost need,” he said. “The work we were doing was more skilled officials than was necessary. “That necessary.” compromise between political need and At the same time, even though the administrative reality—that key—has not yet been commissioners had extensive experience in found by some provinces. And that is why we provincial governments or other areas of expertise, have from time to time these uproars and these the commission sometimes suffered from lack of dissatisfactions,” he said. Service-delivery protests authority. “I think the commissioners were people became prominent during President Mbeki’s who didn’t necessarily have the political status to second term from 2004 and continued under Pres. give a very high profile and political clout to the Jacob Zuma, who entered office in 2009. commission,” Irvine said. Former homeland areas continued to present The commission’s success in its advisory role special problems for provincial governments after depended largely on the backgrounds of individual 1994. Provinces that included former homelands premiers and the pressures each faced. Although tended to have bigger service-delivery backlogs, some listened closely to the commission’s poorer populations, and lower revenue bases than technical advice, many politicians had to bow to other provinces had. In addition, the political the demands of their constituents and parties. challenges were greater in provinces that had Lategan said the commissioners could often incorporated homeland areas, such as North West tell early in the process whether premiers would and Eastern Cape. In those provinces, the bow to the political pressure to keep unneeded premiers had to appease different power bases to a civil service jobs. “We could immediately see larger extent than did premiers elsewhere, which which provinces are going to be successes and gave rise to further problems if such which provinces would have difficulty in the accommodation required hiring homeland future, and you needn’t have been a prophet to administrators, who were sometimes poorly have foreseen that,” Lategan said. qualified. In the first years of democracy, many Many people involved with the commission provincial government executives struggled to said it exercised its greatest influence over strike a balance between new entrants and veteran provincial government in the first six to eight administrators when staffing their months of its operation. As the premiers became administrations. Lategan said some of the veteran accustomed to governing, they relied less and less administrators “were very conservative, right- on the commission for advice. By April 1995,

Botha said, it was apparent that the commission’s “Because it was a negotiated settlement, a number usefulness was drawing to a close. Such entities as of compromises had to be made,” Botha said. the Public Service Commission and the Ministry “The provisions to create institutions such as the of Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Commission on Provincial Government [were] Development began to play stronger roles in part of ensuring that all of the sensitivities . . . and assisting the provinces. the concerns that were tentatively provided for in Irvine lamented the commission’s short (two- the transition constitution be managed in a way year) term, which he argued compromised the that would smooth relationships and fade away commission’s effectiveness. “It was far too short— some of the suspicions that people still held.” from the point of view of being able to be an Members of the commission worked well effective body—to be an impartial commentator together—in part because none of them was a and adviser to the provincial governments in a party ideologue—and they respected one another technical capacity,” he said. for their knowledge and experience. Tjol Lategan, Meyer, minister of the department that who served as deputy chairperson, said he could housed the commission, said the commission not remember even one instance when the “played a constructive role” in facilitating the commissioners had a confrontational exchange. transition, but he argued that its usefulness was “We didn’t look at it politically; we looked at it ultimately limited by the wide scope of the from a technical point of view,” he said. problems it faced. “The challenge was probably Douglas Irvine, a technical adviser to the bigger than we realized,” he said. “The demands commission, said “a degree of solidarity” emerged of the jobs were much bigger than what a between the commissioners despite their political commission or a department could do.” differences. He attributed such solidarity to the common identity they developed by interacting as REFLECTIONS a group. The Commission on Provincial Government Irvine added, however, that it was a problem arose out of compromises made during South for so many of the commissioners to serve part- Africa’s difficult political negotiations of the early time: “Their attention was divided; their time was 1990s and was an important agent of compromise relatively limited.” And after he left the in many ways. “We . . . were doing change commission in April 1995 to become director management,” said Thozamile Botha, the general of KwaZulu-Natal, Botha said, the commission’s first chairman. “Not that the job commission lacked a public champion to ensure wouldn’t have been achieved eventually—but it that its debates fed into internal discussions would have been achieved with a lot of trauma.” within the dominant party, the African National According to Botha, the commission’s key Congress. “The commission, by the end of its contribution lay in “smoothing and negotiating” period of office, had probably acquired a better the tensions that arose after 1994 around overview of the provincial system and the provincial government. He said no other body dynamics at work and the needs and so on than could have played that role at the time and that, had any other body in South Africa. It was a pity, although the commission’s work was not perfect, a great pity, that what had been learned there and much could be learned from the experience. the experience and the connections that had been built up were lost,” Botha said.

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