Rbmk Nuclear Power Plants: Generic Safety Issues
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IAEA-EBP-RBMK-04 XA9744137 RBMK NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS: GENERIC SAFETY ISSUES A PUBLICATION OF THE EXTRABUDGETARY PROGRAMME ON THE SAFETY OF WWER AND RBMK NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS May 1996 INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY The originating Section of this publication in the IAEA was: Safety Assessment Section International Atomic Energy Agency Wagramerstrasse 5 P.O. Box 100 A-1400 Vienna, Austria RBMK NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS: GENERIC SAFETY ISSUES IAEA, VIENNA, 1996 IAEA-EBP-RBMK-04 ISSN 1025-2754 ©IAEA, 1996 Printed by the IAEA in Austria May 1996 FOREWORD The IAEA initiated in 1990 a programme to assist the countries of central and eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union in evaluating the safety of their first generation WWER-440/230 nuclear power plants. The main objectives of the Programme were: to identify major design and operational safety issues; to establish international consensus on priorities for safety improvements; and to provide assistance in the review of the completeness and adequacy of safety improvement programmes. The scope of the Programme was extended in 1992 to include RBMK, WWER-440/213 and WWER- 1000 plants in operation and under construction. The Programme is complemented by national and regional technical cooperation projects. The Programme is pursued by means of plant specific safety review missions to assess the adequacy of design and operational practices; Assessment of Safety Significant Events Team (ASSET) reviews of operational performance; reviews of plant design, including seismic safety studies; and topical meetings on generic safety issues. Other components are: follow-up safety missions to nuclear plants to check the status of implementation of IAEA recommendations; assessments of safety improvements implemented or proposed; peer reviews of safety studies, and training workshops. The IAEA is also maintaining a database on the technical safety issues identified for each plant and the status of implementation of safety improvements. An additional important element is the provision of assistance by the IAEA to strengthen regulatory authorities. The Programme is extrabudgetary and depends on voluntary contributions from IAEA Member States. Steering Committees provide co-ordination and guidance to the IAEA on technical matters and serve as forums for exchange of information with the European Commission and with other international and financial organizations. The general scope and results of the Programme are reviewed at Advisory Group Meetings. The Programme, which takes into account the results of other relevant national, bilateral and multilateral activities, provides a forum to establish international consensus on the technical basis for upgrading the safety of WWER and RBMK nuclear power plants. The IAEA further provides technical advice in the co-ordination structure established by the Group of 24 OECD countries through the European Commission to provide technical assistance on nuclear safety matters to the countries of central and eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Results, recommendations and conclusions resulting from the IAEA Programme are intended only to assist national decision makers who have the sole responsibilities for the regulation and safe operation of their nuclear power plants. Moreover, they do not replace a comprehensive safety assessment which needs to be performed in the frame of the national licensing process. EDITORIAL NOTE In preparing this publication for press, staff of the IAEA have made up the pages from the original manuscript (s). The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the governments of the nominating Member States or of the nominating organizations. The use of particular designations of countries or territories does not imply any judgement by the publisher, the IAEA, as to the legal status of such countries or territories, of their authorities and institutions or of the delimitation of their boundaries. The mention of names of specific companies or products (whether or not indicated as registered) does not imply any intention to infringe proprietary rights, nor should it be construed as an endorsement or recommendation on the part of the IAEA. CONTENTS SUMMARY 7 1. INTRODUCTION 8 2. SUMMARY OF GROUP REVIEWS 9 2.1. Core monitoring and control 9 2.1.1. Core calculations 10 2.1.2. Monitoring of ORM 11 2.1.3. Core monitoring and control 11 2.1.4. Diverse shutdown system 11 2.2. Pressure boundary integrity 11 2.2.1. Integrity of fuel channels 11 2.2.2 Integrity of the main circulation system 12 2.2.3. Components reliability 12 2.2.4. Leak before break 13 2.3. Accident mitigation 13 2.3.1. Design basis 13 2.3.2. Analysis capability 14 2.3.3. Accident analysis 14 2.3.4. Analysis applications 15 2.4. Safety and support systems 15 2.4.1. ECCS 16 2.4.2. Accident localization system 18 2.4.3. Service water system 19 2.4.4. Intermediate cooling system 19 2.4.5. Electric power supply 20 2.5. Instrumentation and control 20 2.5.1. Shutdown mechanism 21 2.5.2. Control and protection equipment 21 2.5.3. Additional trip parameters 21 2.5.4. Equipment qualification 21 2.5.5. Documentation 21 2.5.6. Operator interface 22 2.5.7. Other issues 22 3. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 22 APPENDIX I: CORE MONITORING AND CONTROL 25 APPENDIX II: PRESSURE BOUNDARY INTEGRITY 39 APPENDIX III: ACCIDENT MITIGATION 48 APPENDIX IV: SUPPORT AND SAFETY SYSTEMS 59 APPPENDIX V: INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL 77 ANNEX I: LIST OF DOCUMENTS PREPARED BY RDIPE 101 ANNEX II: NEAR TERM SAFETY IMPROVED PROGRAMME (SIP) 102 ANNEX III: BARSELINA PROJECT IMPROVEMENT PROPOSAL 105 ABBREVIATIONS 107 CONTRIBUTORS TO DRAFTING AND REVIEW 109 4.2.7. Operational safety 38 4.3. Individual safety issues 39 4.3.1. Core design and core monitoring 39 4.3.2. Instrumentation and control 46 4.3.3. Pressure boundary integrity 54 4.3.4. Accident analysis 61 4.3.5. Safety and support systems 71 4.3.6. Fire protection 81 4.3.7. Operational safety 86 REFERENCES 99 ANNEX I: CROSS-REFERENCE BETWEEN GENERIC SAFETY ISSUES AND RELATED RECOMMENDATIONS CONTAINED IN THE IAEA DATA BANK 101 ANNEX II: CROSS-REFERENCE BETWEEN GENERIC SAFETY ISSUES AND RELATED SAFETY IMPROVEMENTS CONTAINED IN THE IAEA DATA BANK 195 ABBREVIATIONS 251 SUMMARY The development of the RBMK system came out of the Soviet uranium-graphite production reactors, the first of which began operation in 1948. In 1954 a demonstration 5 MW(e) graphite- moderated, water-cooled reactor began operation in Obninsk and subsequently a series of reactors were developed using the combination of graphite moderation and water cooling in a channel design. The RBMK is a thermal-neutron, graphite-moderated, channel-type, direct-cycle boiling water nuclear reactor with on-line refueling. Description of an RBMK NPP in this report is given based on Smolensk Unit 3 to provide the reader with some familiarity of the design of the RBMK NPP. Smolensk 3 is a third generation unit and in fact is the only 1000 MW(e) third generation unit in operation. Currently there are 15 RBMK reactors in operation: 11 units in Russia, two in Ukraine and two in Lithuania. The connection to the grid of these units took place from 1973 (Leningrad I) to 1990 (Smolensk 3). Since the Chernobyl accident in 1986, a considerable amount of work has been either completed or has been under way to improve the safety of RBMK NPPs. However, safety concerns still remain for NPPs with this reactor type. In response to a request from the former Soviet Union, made at the September 1991 IAEA Nuclear Safety Conference "Safety of Nuclear Power and the Future", an IAEA Programme on the Safety of RBMK NPPs was initiated. Other international and bilateral projects have also started. In April 1992 an IAEA Technical Committee meeting on the safety of RBMK reactors established the general lines of the Programme with emphasis on direct improvement of RBMK safety. The IAEA started its Programme in June 1992. The objectives of the IAEA Programme are to consolidate results from various national, bilateral and multilateral programmes and establish international consensus on the required safety improvements and related priorities. It assists both regulatory and operating organizations and provides a basis for technical and financial decisions. In order to consolidate all results of safety reviews of RBMK NPPs, a meeting was held from 23 to 27 January 1995 at the IAEA Headquarters in Vienna. A total of 58 safety issues were consolidated in seven topical areas. Two broad issues addressing quality assurance and regulatory interface have been recognized as affecting all topical areas. The results of the meeting have been made available in June 1995 in the RBMK-SC-20 (Rev. 1) report. The report was prepared on the basis of the safety reviews of Smolensk 3 and Ignalina NPP. Therefore, it is primarily applicable to RBMK NPPs of this vintage. Whenever applicable, reference is also made to RBMKs of other generations. Specific safety issues and improvements for RBMKs of 1st and 2nd generation will be consolidated upon completion of ongoing studies for these NPPs. It is recognized that how and when the identified safety issues are addressed exactly is a matter to be resolved between the operating organization and each national regulatory body. This report has been prepared on the basis of above mentioned report and it is intended to provide information on RBMK NPPs generic safety issues. As all other insights, recommendations and conclusions resulting from the IAEA Programme, this report is intended to assist national decision makers, who have sole responsibility for the regulation and safe operation of their nuclear power plants. It also serves to focus national and international projects on priority of the RBMK safety improvements. 1. INTRODUCTION 1.1. BACKGROUND Various analyses of the Chernobyl NPP Unit 4 accident have revealed safety deficiencies of RBMK reactors.